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Pakistan and the Narratives of Extremism

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Pakistan and the Narratives of Extremism UNItED StAtES INStItUtE of Peace www.usip.org SPECIAL REPoRt 2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063 ABOUT THE REPORT Amil Khan This report, sponsored by the Center for Conflict Management at the U.S. Institute of Peace, focuses on the inroads extremist narratives have made in Pakistani society. As Pakistani reactions to the attack on schoolgirl Malala Yousufzai illustrated, Islamist extremists of various types Pakistan and the have largely succeeded in painting their worldview as being analogous to Pakistan’s self-image. Their success in framing the narrative makes extremism in Pakistan a unique challenge and countering it of importance to global counterextremism Narratives of Extremism efforts. Reversing this success and preventing extremists from destabilizing Pakistan and threatening the international community requires engagement with the narratives that shape Summary Pakistanis’ views of their country and their country’s place on the world stage. • People process events around narratives that resonate on an emotional level. Effective strategic communications efforts understand this and ground messages within existing, ABOUT THE AUTHOR accepted narratives. Amil Khan is a director of Breakthrough Communications Ltd. • Violent extremist Islamist organizations in Pakistan have effectively drawn on powerful Before working in strategic communications, he was a foreign existing narratives in presenting and promoting their particular worldview. correspondent for Reuters and later worked for the BBC. He speaks fluent Arabic and Urdu and has lived and worked in the • Specifically, the circumstances and arguments surrounding Pakistan’s birth gave rise to nar- Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. From 2009 to 2012, Khan ratives that violent extremist organizations, including al-Qaeda, have exploited to promote was based in Pakistan consulting on strategic communication themselves and to gain sympathy. projects for nongovernmental organizations, governments, and • For example, extremist strategic communications efforts build on Pakistan’s existing nar- private organizations. ratives to portray events related to Pakistan as proof that there is an ongoing war against Islam. • As a result, narratives promoted by extremists are making strong headway among the Pakistani people, who are increasingly seeing extremist narratives as an attractive way of © 2013 by the United States Institute of Peace. explaining the world around them. All rights reserved. • Unlike extremist communications efforts, strategic communications efforts to counter extremism in Pakistan typically do not deploy messages built on Pakistan’s narratives. SPECIAL REPORT 327 MarCH 2013 • An effective counterextremism communications strategy needs to engage Pakistan’s narra- CONTENTS tives and work with those elements of society who are—through their cultural output— Introduction 2 challenging extremist visualizations of the world. Al-Qaeda’s Master Narratives 3 • Any strategy toward counterextremism communications in Pakistan should draw on Paki- Pakistan’s Fragile Narrative 4 stan’s existing narratives and its sense of itself. Indeed, these narratives provide significant Al-Qaeda’s Pakistan Narratives 5 opportunities for counterextremists to attack the vision and worldview of groups like al- The Role of Pakistan’s External Patrons Qaeda. in the Narratives 7 A Plan for Working with Existing Narratives • Strategic communications efforts against extremism need to move away from crafting the and Promoting New Ones 9 “right” message from the practitioners’ point of view and move toward focusing on emo- Key Recommendations and Conclusions 11 tionally engaging the audience. ABOUT THE INSTITUTE • All such efforts should be long-term and Pakistani-led, with the capacity to involve state The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, and private entities. nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict Introduction management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital world- According to scholar Steven Corman, narratives help provide “an alternative way of thinking wide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 1 knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct about the world.” Whereas rationality is seen as dependent on facts and logic, narrative involvement in conflict zones around the globe. rationality depends on an audiences’ desire to align their own values to a depiction of an event. In essence, Corman is saying people often believe a version of events because BOarD OF DIRECTOrs they want to. Counterextremists often overlook this reality and operate on the hope that J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Prac- they will be able to present audiences with the “right” information capable of convincing tice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • them that extremist arguments are false. Meanwhile, extremists skillfully exploit existing Judy Ansley¸ Former Assistant to the President and Deputy narratives to provide messages that the intended audiences will want to believe. This is National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Washington, especially true in Pakistan, where extremists have been able to exploit, to great effect, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Resi- narratives related to the political, social, and historical conditions of Pakistan’s birth. As dence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Stud- a result, extremist arguments in Pakistan are increasingly seen as aligned with its people’s ies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of Interna- fears, desires, and hopes. At the same time, extremists point to the country in their global tional Service, American University • Kerry Kennedy, Presi- messaging as an affirmation of their worldview. In short, Pakistan’s narratives have become dent, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, for extremists an asset as valuable as bombs, bullets, and recruits. Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care According to Corman’s framework, audiences relate to stories, which form narratives Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, Gra- and then master narratives, which in turn feed into a rhetorical vision. People buy into ham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford this vision because they have an emotional interest in doing so. An approach to counterex- University, Palo Alto, CA • John A. Lancaster, Former Execu- tive Director, International Council on Independent Living, tremism in Pakistan built on this understanding provides an opportunity for a much more Potsdam, NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George fundamental way of tackling extremism there. Mason University, Fairfax, VA • Judy Van Rest, Executive Vice The emotional resonance that extremists manage to generate in their Pakistani audi- President, International Republican Institute, Washington, DC • ences has roots in the narratives that were developed and deployed in the establishment Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership Confer- of Pakistan and in subsequent historical events. In Pakistan, globally oriented Islamist ence on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, DC extremists have a population of 180 million that has been exposed to the main elements of MEMBERS EX OFFICIO extremist narratives for over six decades. Various extremist actors have exploited this situ- Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democ- ation to present an extremist rhetorical vision that is perceived as being analogous to the racy, Human Rights, and Labor • Kathleen Hicks, Principal country’s self-image. Al-Qaeda, as the world’s most ambitious and arguably most successful Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy • Gregg f. Islamist extremist organization, has subsumed Pakistan’s narratives into its own. In doing Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, National Defense University • Jim Marshall, President, United States so, it is has succeeded in making the country seem like an international poster child for the Institute of Peace (nonvoting) extremist cause. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda’s narratives have begun to form Pakistanis’ views of the wider world. An exploration of al-Qaeda’s narratives around Pakistan shows that the organization— and its ideological allies—have succeeded in popularizing their rhetorical vision because they understand Pakistani narratives and have developed stories that their intended audi- ence will want to believe. Meanwhile, counterextremism efforts by Pakistan and its external patrons focus on generating messages they believe to be “right” from their own viewpoints. A successful counterextremism strategic communications policy for Pakistan needs to better understand Pakistani narratives and generate stories that people will want to believe and that will feed into a more attractive rhetorical vision for the country. The government in Islamabad and its supporters should trust that the lives and views of ordinary Pakistanis can be called upon to provide the building blocks for an alternative vision for the country. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily This report looks at why extremist strategic communications in Pakistan have been so reflect the views of the United States Institute
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