Comparing NASA and ESA Cost Estimating Methods for Human Missions to Mars

Charles D. Hunt Michel 0. van Pelt NASA MSFC ESA-ESTEC Huntsville, USA Noordwijk ZH, The Netherlands

ABSTRACT Space Shuttle cost data, taking into account the changes in technology since then. ESA To compare working methodologies used models mostly based on European between the cost engineering functions in satellite and launcher cost data, taking into NASA Marshall Space Flight Center account the higher equipment and testing (MSFC) and ESA European Space Research standards for human space flight. and Technology Centre (ESTEC), as well as Most of NASA’s and ESA’s estimates for A- urn--- n:--.. to set-up cost cngi~iccri~~gciipbiiiiies fur LIIG IVI~LS ULLGL~ iii~coi;ilpaiaLvk, 5ut future manned Mars projects and other there are some important, consistent studies which involve similar subsystem differences in the estimates for: technologies in MSFC and ESTEC, a 0 Large Structures and Thermal Control demonstration cost estimate exercise was subsystems; organized. 0 System Level Management, This exercise was a direct way of enhancing Engineering, Product Assurance and not only cooperation between agencies but Assembly, Integration and also both agencies commitment to credible Tesflerification activities; cost analyses. Cost engineers in MSFC and 0 Mission Control; ESTEC independently prepared life-cycle 0 Space Agency Program Level activities. cost estimates for a reference human Mars project and subsequently compared the If human missions to Mars could be results and estimate methods in detail. As a accomplished according to the Mars Direct non-sensitive, public domain reference case plan, with its relatively short development for human Mars projects, the “Mars Direct” schedule and accepting the higher risks concept was chosen. associated with the very limited testing philosophy, the estimates show that a human In this paper the results of the exercise are Mars program could cost less than the shown; the differences and similarities in Apollo moon program. However, the estimate methodologies, philosophies, and development cost estimates were found to databases between MSFC and ESTEC, as be very sensitive to potential mass growth of well as the estimate results for the Mars the launcher and spacecraft elements. Direct concept. The most significant differences are explained and possible While it was not explicitly addressed in this estimate improvements identified. In study, one way to enable a short addition, the Mars Direct plan and the development cycle and limited test scenario extensive cost breakdown structure jointly as assumed in the Mars Direct plan is by set-up by MSFC and ESTEC for this performing predecessor missions to mature concept are presented. the required technologies and processes It was found that NASA applied estimate prior to the human Mars mission. These models mainly based on historic Apollo and i *

activities would require additional time and It is important to emphasize that the focus of funding in advance of the human mission this exercise was not to endorse any type of development. architecture in any way. Mars Direct was chosen due to its non-sensitive, public domain nature and the fact that it INTRODUCTION incorporates basically all elements of a typical manned interplanetary mission. The Scientific, public and political interest in quantified results presented in this paper are organizing human missions to Mars is only used for the purpose of exposing increasing, due to the recent findings of findings in cost estimating practices. satellites and landers sent to the Red Planet There are studies currently being conducted by NASA and the European Space Agency. both within ESA and NASA that analyze Mars appears to harbor vast amounts of various architectures with a higher fidelity water, which is currently trapped as sub- level and broader scope (i.e. including surface ice but may once have covered the safety, operability, and performance). The planet with oceans and rivers. In the past, results from these exercises might or might Mars may have nurtured life and there is a not concur with the estimate results slim chance that simple organisms even quantified in this exercise. The study manage to survive on the dusty, dry planet described in this paper is more concerned today. with the hows and whys of the estimate than with the reslllting what. As both NASA and ESA are now seriously studying human Mars missions, the need for The exercise described in this paper was accurate cost estimating tools and conceived and completed prior to President methodologies for large international Bush’s announced vision for space projects, and in particular human Mars exploration, and the presented architecture projects, is increasing in both agencies. and costs are not related to that proposal. However, because the exploration initiative To compare working methodologies is likely to involve international between the cost engineering functions in participation, the knowledge gained NASA Marshall Space Flight Center concerning NASA and ESA cost estimating (MSFC) and ESA European Space Research methods for such programs is relevant and and Technology Centre (ESTEC), as well as timely. to set-up cost engineering capabilities for future manned Mars projects and other studies which involve similar subsystem MARS DIRECT technologies in MSFC and ESTEC, a demonstration cost estimate exercise was The Mars Direct plan is a low-cost approach organized. for human missions to Mars, mainly This exercise was a direct way of enhancing invented and publicized by R.M. Zubrin, in not only cooperation between agencies but which the mass to be launched is also enhances both agencies commitment to dramatically lowered by In-situ Resource credible cost analyses. Cost engineers in Utilization. MSFC and ESTEC independently prepared A Mars Direct mission starts with two life-cycle cost estimates for a reference launches of an “Ares” heavy lift booster. human Mars project and subsequently The Ares launcher is a Space Shuttle- compared the results and estimate methods derived design, taking maximum advantage in detail. As a non-sensitive, public domain of existing hardware. It uses Shuttle reference case for human Mars projects, the Advanced Solid Rocket Boosters, composed “Mars Direct” concept was chosen. of Advanced Solid Rocket Motors (development cancelled 1993), a Shuttle External Tank modified for handling

2 vertically-mounted payloads, a new engine Operations costs; boat tail structure, and a new LoxLH2 third 0 All System Level costs, including those stage for trans-Mars injection of the at Space Agency level. payload. The first booster delivers an unfueled and For sufficiently accurate estimates and in unmanned Earth Return Vehicle (ERV) to order to provide enough detail for the the Martian surface. Via basic chemical estimate comparisons, it was deemed reactions and powered by a small nuclear necessary to set up a cost breakdown to reactor, the ERV fills itself with subsystem level for the main flight vehicles. methane/oxygen bipropellant manufactured For supporting ground elements on Earth from the COz in the atmosphere and a and Mars, as well as for parts of the Ares limited onboard supply of Hydrogen. launcher, it was decided to limit the Once the propellant production is complete, breakdown to less detail. a second launch delivers a Habitation Since public Mars Direct documentation did vehicle with four crewmembers to the not provide the required level of detail, the prepared site. During their transit to Mars, authors of this paper set up a more artificial gravity is achieved by rotating the exhaustive equipment and activities cost Habitat and the upper stage of the Ares breakdown themselves, including necessary, booster, which are connected to each other assumptions on technical details such as via a long cable. A gravity force 1/3 of that mass, type of technology, redundancy etc. on Earth; similar to the conditions on Mars, T!x! fim! bre&dc?wr! rtmcture csed for the is assumed to be sufficient to ensure optimal cost estimates is shown in table 1. crew functionality right after landing. On Mars the astronauts conduct extensive regional exploration for 1.5 years. After that, COST ESTIMATES GROUND RULES they launch themselves onboard the ERV AND PHILOSOPHY capsule back to Earth using two rocket stages filled with the manufactured To enable direct comparisons, the following propellant. No artificial gravity is deemed ground rules have been accepted: necessary during the journey back. The ERV 0 All estimates in fixed 2002 economic capsule directly re-enters the Earth’s conditions; atmosphere to land on the surface. 0 One U.S. Dollar is assumed to equal one No on-orbit assembly or orbital rendezvous Euro; is required in any phase of the mission. 0 The total development phase from Moreover, the different mission elements project initialization till the launch of the are designed for a maximum of equipment for the first Mars mission is 8 commonality. For instance, the same Lander years; Module system is used to land both the ERV 0 Funding for the complete development and the Habitat on Mars. phase is assured from the start of the project; 0 Multiple NASAESA centers are THE COST BREAKDOWN assumed to be involved for major STRUCTURE subsystems and spacecraft elements; 0 All developments will adhere to normal The exercise was to cover a full life-cycle NASA and ESA requirements for cost estimate, including: manned space systems; Flight equipment development and 0 For the NASA estimate, all development production; is assumed to be done in the US; Ground infrastructure development and 0 For the ESA estimate the project is production; considered to be mainly a European Flight and Ground Software effort except for the Ares launcher, development; 3 I c

which is based on US Space Shuttle complete Ares operation, Mars entry and technology . landing systems, and the ERV fuel 0 The cost estimates include all costs for manufacturing system. If the ERV functions government support and supervision; i.e. as specified, it will be used to return the first they are “full cost” estimates. Mars crew to Earth. This crew would be 0 In all total costs for major elements a launched onboard a Habitaaander at the 30% cost margin is included, due to the next launch window. At the same time, currently rather low technical, another ERVLander would be send to Mars operational and organizational definition for the second crewed mission. It would also of the Mars Direct plan. serve as a back-up for the first crew, in case problems arise with the first ERV. All estimates were conducted with the In this flight qualification approach, the philosophy that ESA or NASA is going to Habitat is only tested once in Earth orbit lead the development and operation of the before operational use, and the ascend and Mars Direct architecture. Hence, all return to Earth of the ERV is not tested at methodologies, philosophies, and tools used all. It is doubtful that NASA or ESA would in the estimates are the same as those that follow such a rather risky approach under would be applied for a real case. the current safety rules. However, to remain true to the Mars Direct approach it was For all elements in the cost breakdown nevertheless used as the baseline for the cost strurture, hnth the inifa! nor?-recurrent COS~S estimates. for the development as well as the operational recurring costs have been estimated. For the spacecraft, the production COST ESTIMATE TOOLS and tests of the first (Proto) Flight Models are included in the development costs. The NASA estimates are primarily based on the NASA-Air Force Cost Model As for the Apollo project, critical equipment (NAFCOM Ver. 2002) for hardware and spacecraft will likely be qualified in estimates and COMET/OCM (Nov. 2003 limited, non-operational missions before the version) for support and operations first actual operational manned Mars estimates. Secondary estimating tools and landing. For the assessment of the total non- methodologies consisted of recurring development costs, a spacecraft 0 Cost Estimate Relationships (CERs) flight test plan thus had to be defined. Upon based on NAFCOM data; request, R.M. Zubrin suggested the PRICE-H; following low-cost approach: SEER-H; First, an Ares would launch an unmanned Historical Analogies; Habitation module into low Earth orbit. Vendor Quotes. Next, a Space Shuttle would bring a crew to the orbiting Habitat, in which they would Over 60% of the NASA estimates were live for some six months. The astronauts performed using NAFCOM, which has two would briefly test the Habitat in distinct estimating methodologies: microgravity conditions (in which it will Complexity Generators (a multi-variable operate for a few hours during the model taking in account such factors as operational Mars missions) and then for an heritage, manufacturing methods, extended period as a tethered, spinning engineering management, year of space station with artificial gravity. Apart technology and new design percentage) from the Habitat, this first mission would Conventional CERs (primarily weight flight-demonstrate the Ares launcher, except based) for Trans-Mars injection. NAFCOM is the primary tool used for Next, an Ares would send an ERV and launch vehicle and satellite estimates within Lander module to Mars, demonstrating the

4 I

NASA. The main benefit of NAFCOM for data, while ESA mostly uses cost data that is the Mars Direct exercise is the database contractually agreed before the actual start populated with Gemini, Apollo, Skylab and of the development. Shuttle data. This data is directly related to Contract data does not show cost growth manned spaceflight, dealing with similar during the project’s life-time as actual cost requirements and systems as those to be can. However, in ESA’s case the cost and used in the Mars Direct program. However, technical data is very coherent and the data is relatively old and sometimes organized during the proposal phase, but is represents obsolete technology and hard to track after the signing of contracts. methodologies. To solve this problem, the ESA feels that without careful analysis of historic data was normalized to take into which cost overruns are due to initial account the improvements in technology, underestimation, and which are caused by development methods and production stochastic events such as test accidents, processes over time by use of “year of technical changes, poor management etc., technology” factors. actual cost data should not be used. At present, ESA’s cost information does not COMETIOCM is one of the tools used by allow such analyses. NASA to estimate operations and support for launch vehicle systems. This model was Another difference is that NASA’s chosen on the basis of its availability. NAFCOM model generally uses more technical input parameters than ESA’s ESA applied a mixture of in-house build models. This could imply more accurate CER tools based on Excel, as well as the estimates, reacting on multiple cost drivers. commercially available tools PRICE-H and However, it was found that NAFCOM as TRANSCOST. well as models based on PRICE-H and ESA has much less data on large manned SEER can allow for significant levels of space systems than NASA and therefore subjectivity in the estimates and therefore mainly used tools based on unmanned need to be handled with care and by cost spacecraft data, adding cost multiplication experts only. factors to take into account the higher equipment and testing standards for human space flight. ESTIMATES AND COMPARISONS The benefit of the data used by ESA is that it is very recent, incorporating the actual, After initial estimates were performed current state of the technology and the separately at NASA and ESA, the results market. Recent stepwise “jumps” in and methods were compared in detail. technology and costs over time can be Many significant differences were found to identified, which are sometimes not be caused by different interpretations of the captured by the gradual “year of equipment assumed to be included in certain technology” normalization factors used in subsystems, and differences in assumed NAFCOM. However, the setting of proper Technology Readiness Levels. This shows “human-rating factors” to be applied to that the cost estimates rely heavily on satellite CERs and the stretching of the tools accurate information on the type and beyond their normal application (for development status of spacecraft equipment, instance, because equipment masses in even though the estimates may only be human spacecraft tend to be much higher performed at subsystem level. This was than for unmanned satellites and probes) especially the case for items such as the poses some challenges. surface Rovers and Field Science Equipment, for which only broad system A main difference between NASA’s and level information was found and defined. ESA’s cost estimation tools is that those of NASA are based on actual, “as spent” cost

5 After refinement of the technical details and assumptions where necessary, many Software important estimate differences still No software information could be found for remained. These were found to be caused by Mars Direct. Without some form of fundamental differences in the tools and independent variable (i.e. SLOC, functions reference data used by NASA and ESA. points, objects) it is very difficult to estimate Figure 1 shows the NASA and ESA main cost for software. ESA developed ROM elements cost estimates for the total costs for estimates based on mission and spacecraft all development (including test flights) plus analogies, i.e. type of payload, complexity the first operational Mars mission, for all of the attitude control requirements etc., main mission elements. Figure 2 shows the whereas NASA assumed that most software same for the second Mars mission, which is embedded into the avionics CERs. This includes only recurring costs. The main made a detailed comparison of avionics and estimate differences and their primary software estimates impossible, but the total causes are indicated in both figures, and costs for these combined cost elements were described hereunder. relatively similar for the NASA and ESA estimates. Large Structures and Thermal Control On large structural elements (such as the Svstem level AITN and Pro-jectOffice spacecraft Main Structures, Heat Shields NASA applies three levels of System Level and Propellant Tanks) and on large Thermal Assembly, Integration and TestNerification Control subsystems, NASA’s estimates for (AITN) and three levels of System Level both development and recurring costs tend Project Office (Management, System to be much higher than those of ESA (up to Engineering and Product Assurance). over 200% for development and up to over However, only those at Launcher Stage / 300% for recurring). These differences have Spacecraft level and Project (Prime been accredited to the differences in the data Contractor) level are visible in the WBS. used. NASA’s approach was to base its cost This is due to the way the data was off of historical Apollo and Shuttle data, normalized at the subsystem level in then find ways to model effects of improved NAFCOM. engineering, manufacturing, and general ESA accounts for System Level AITN and technology trends over time. ESA’s Project Office at each Launcher Stage / approach was to rely on models based on Spacecraft Module level, at Complete recent data on ESA satellites, then find ways Spacecraft level and at Project level. to model the differences in Platform, i.e. the This difference made it often difficult to quality and testing standard difference directly compare system level AITN and between unmanned and human space Project Office costs. Instead, rolled-up projects. system level cost estimates had to be The two different strategies lead to compared. In these comparisons, NASA’s surprisingly similar results for most AITN and Project Office numbers were hardware elements, but in the case of “big, consistently and significantly higher than dumb” structures and thermal control there those of ESA. This could be due to the seemed to be major discrepancies. historical nature of each agency’s database NAFCOM (version 2004) will have some or it could account for different ways of changes to its Structures CER to counteract doing business in NASA and ESA. This is some of these discrepancies. Though there difficult to conclude from this manned can be a certain amount of convergence for mission exercise alone; it would be these structures, the main underlying issue is interesting to see how these costs compare that most data on large exploration missions for a less complex, unmanned satellite or and launch vehicles is 20 to 40 years old. space probe. The question is: are the trends that this data shows still valid?

6 Mission Control human lives, ESA primarily deals with A significant difference in estimate results smaller, unmanned systems. was also found for Operations, specifically caused by the Mission Control cost estimate. NASA estimated these costs in analogy to OVERALL ESTIMATE RESULTS current costs for NASA’s Mission Control teams, assuming Mission Control personnel Table 2 shows a summary of NASA’s and now working for the Space Shuttle and ISS ESA’s estimate results for the Development programs will gradually start working for phase (including test flights) and the first Mars Direct. This minimizes the training operational Mars mission. Table 3 shows the required, causing NASA’s Mission Control same for the second operational flight, estimates for the development phase and involving only recurring spacecraft. first mission to be the same as for subsequent missions. Comparison with R.M. Zubrin’s numbers ESA’s estimate is a “bottom-up” approach, In the early 1990’s R.M. Zubrin published listing the envisioned ESA personnel that the total development cost for Mars required. ESA assumed that all Mission Direct were estimated to be around $20 Control personnel will initially need to be billion, and each operational mission would newly trained, while for the second mission cost about $2 billion. In today’s economic the training will be much more limited. conditions, that is equivalent to about $29 The rewlt is that the eqtimateq of NASA and hillinn fnr develnpment and close. to $3 ESA for the development phase and first billion for each flight, i.e. the development operational mission are similar, but based on and first mission would cost some $32 very different assumptions, while the ESA billion. estimate for subsequent missions is much It is not clear whether R.M. Zubrin’s lower. numbers include a substantial project In effect, ESA’s estimate represents a maturity cost margin (30% in the NASA and Mission Control approach that is much ESA estimates), but with or without margin, leaner and more automated than is currently the development + first mission cost as the case at NASA. Whether such an published by R.M. Zubrin is somewhere optimistic approach will really materialize in between ESA’s and NASA’s estimate. the future remains to be seen. However, the recurring costs per flight are expected to be significantly higher than Space Agency Program Level assumed by R.M. Zubrin, according to The largest single discrepancy between the ESA’s and especially NASA’s estimates. two estimates was found to be the difference in Space Agency Program Level costs. This Comparison with Apollo cost is accounting for government It is interesting to see how the Mars Direct Management and Engineering, Product estimates compare to Apollo historical Assurance and AITN control to the project. program costs. NASA’s estimate was derived by using Table 4 shows a comparison at the total historical NASA agency costs as a Program level, assuming 10 missions would percentage of procurement for programs be made over a period of 10 years for Mars such as the Space Shuttle and Space Station. Direct (for comparison purposes only, such The estimate of ESA was based on a a scheme is not proposed in the Mars Direct “bottom-up” approach, listing the required plan). The development of the Saturn 1 and personnel typically required in ESA for the Saturn 1B launchers is not included, as also various tasks. the development of Space Shuttle equipment The main reason for the large difference lies is not included in the Mars Direct estimates. in the history of the agencies; whereas According to R.M. Zubrin’s cost numbers, NASA has always been heavily involved in Mars Direct would cost about half that of high risk, high profile missions dealing with Apollo, for a similar number of missions.

7 NASA’s estimate indicates the costs would Credit was also given to the Habitat and be about 80% of the Apollo costs, while ERV due to an assumed high level of according to ESA’s estimate it would be commonality between various subsystems. close to 60%. A cost growth sensitivity analysis was According to the estimates, under the performed for the case of less Shuttle hypotheses of Mars Direct, a human mission heritage and less HabitatERV commonality. to Mars would thus probably cost less than the Apollo program, for the same number of Historically, mass estimates have increased operational missions. dramatically for space systems. The Shuttle However, this is only valid under the experienced a 25% mass growth through its conditions that Mars Direct requires much development. Therefore, a potential mass less new technology development and growth was assumed for Mars Direct. Two ground and test flights than the Apollo runs were performed: the first assuming a program. Moreover, the Mars Direct 10% weight growth in the Ares launcher scenario is very dependent on the process of with a 20% growth in all other hardware producing propellant out of the Martian items; the second assuming a 15% weight atmosphere, which may cost much more to growth in the Ares launcher with a 30% develop than currently estimated. The basic growth in all other hardware items. These chemistry of the process has been weight allowances are typical for a Phase A demonstrated on Earth, but making it work type of study. on Mars to automatically tank an Earth Return Vehicle may prove to be difficult. The Mars Direct concept assumes a lean testing methodology. A sensitivity analysis was also performed to account for increased COST GROWTH ANALYSIS testing in hardware as well as extended LEO testing. Due to the complexity and the magnitude of a program like the Mars Direct concept, a Table 6 shows a summary of NASA’s cost probabilistic estimate would be preferred to growth results for the development phase the deterministic results stated above. The (including test flights) and the first deterministic estimates conducted by both operational Mars mission, whereas Table 7 ESA and NASA were conducted with the shows the results for the second operational assumptions and spirit of R.M. Zubrin. A mission. proper probabilistic cost analysis, The cumulative cost increasing effect of the encompassing all the cost impacts of parameters taken into account for the uncertainties and risks associated with the sensitivity analysis shows that the system’s technical and programmatic Development + First Operational Mission definition, is out of the scope of this paper. cost could go up by about 50%, indicating However, there is a need to show some that this estimate is very sensitive to the quantitative sensitivity. A cost growth considered parameters. However, the cost of potential analysis was performed by NASA the Second Operational Mission would to illustrate how sensitive the Mars Direct increase only by less than 10% under the concept cost is to: same assumptions. Mass growth accounts heritage assumptions; for most of these potential cost increases. massgrowth; testing methodology; and the cumulative effect of these three CONCLUSIONS parameters. It was found that NASA applied estimate In the original baseline estimate, a good deal models mainly based on historic Apollo and of heritage was given to the Ares launcher Space Shuttle cost data, taking into account due to the fact it is a Shuttle derivative. the changes in technology since then. ESA

8 used models mostly based on European REFERENCES satellite and launcher cost data, taking into account the higher equipment and testing Compton, William David standards for human space flight. Where No Man Has Gone Before: A History of Most of NASA’s and ESA’s estimates for Apollo Lunar Exploration Missions The NASA History Series SP-4214 the Mars Direct case are comparable, but there are some important, consistent Koelle, D.E. differences in the estimates for: Transcost 7. I; Handbook of Cost Engineering for Large Structures and Thermal Control Space Transportation Systems TransCostSystems, Ottobrun, Germany, 2003 subsystems; System Level Management, Larson, W.J., L.K. Pranke, J. Connolly and R. Giffen Engineering, Product Assurance and Human Spaceflight Mission Analysis and Design Assembly, Integration and McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., USA, 1999 TestNerification activities; Zubrin, R.M. Mission Control; The Case for Mars Space Agency Program Level activities. Free Press, USA, 1997

human missions to Mars could be Zubrin, R.M., D.A. Baker and 0. Gwynne Mars Direct: A Simple, Robust, and Cost Effective accomplished according to the Mars Direct Architecture for the Space Exploration Initiative plan, with its relatively short development AIAA-91-0328, 1991 schedu!e ad xcepfng the higher risks associated with the very limited testing philosophy, the estimates show that a human Mars program could cost less than the Apollo moon program. However, the development cost estimates were found to be very sensitive to potential mass growth of the launcher and spacecraft elements.

While it was not explicitly addressed in this study, one way to enable a short development cycle and limited test scenario as assumed in the Mars Direct plan is by performing predecessor missions to mature the required technologies and processes prior to the human Mars mission. These activities would require additional time and funding in advance of the human mission development.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank Stephen Creech, David Greves, Joe Hamaker, HervC Joumier, Andy Prince and Rachael Towle for all their support, as well as R.M. Zubrin for answering any questions we had on the Mars Direct plan.

9 Table 1: Cost Breakdown Structure

~~ Ares Heavy Launcher Earth Return Vehicle Advanced Solld Rocket Boostefs Earth Reentry a Habitatin Capsule No& Environmental Control and Life Support System TVC system Crew Facilities Furniture and lntenor Case Guidance. Nav@abon and Control Rear Skirt Reaction Control System Ignrter Onboard Data Handling System Thermal prot&on TT&C with HGA PropeNant grain Solar Anays Electncal systems Electrical Power Distribuiion & Control Pyro Safety systems Harness Baneries SeparabM Rockets structure Assembly. Integration and Tests Thermal Contml Management, Engineenng and Product Assurance Rahlor Ground Support Equipm6nt MU, Healen. Pumsic. stage 1 Mechanisms Modified Exfemal Tan& HW Rolatim and Pmmw hkhanism Sl*l”rn War Array Dnve MBChamsm Hydrogen Tan* Aermhell for Earn reentry Oxygen Tank Earn Parachute System fmt. cansfem eh 1 Thermal Rotedm Onboard Sotiware Eklmalspem Assembly. Integration and Tests PYO satsty spm Management, Engineering and Product Assurance Separaim Rmkeh Ground Support Equipment Thermal CMtrm Mars Ascent Stage 2 Engine Pod Fuel Tank space shume Ma,” Engmr Oxidiser Tank pprng MhSfmrs elc Rocket Engines Slncfure and MiP~ecl~o Nozzle Assembly lntegrabon and Tests Pipmg, valves. fines etc. Management. Engineenng and Product Arsurance WCsystem Stage 2 strucium Rocket Stage Electrical systems Vehicle Equipment Bay WEB) Thermal Control rnnVne separanon rymrearnics stnrchrre Assembly, Integration and Tests Amde Coniml Spstem Management, Engineering and Product Assurance Guidance, Nangabon 8 Control Ground Suppart Equipment Telemehy Mars Ascent Stage 1 Dala managem1 spm Fuel Tank Electncal systems Oxidiser Tank Pym Safety systems Rocket Engines Thermal Conird Nozzle VEB AssemMy. Integratmn and Tests Piping, valves, finem etc. VEB Managemcnt. Engrnee~gand Product Assuranm TVC system VEB Gmund sclpporr Eqwpment SfrUCtUn, Intentage Electrical systems Payload Adapter Thermal Control Payload Fainng Separation Pyrotechnics Onboard Software Assembly, Integration and Tesfs Launcher System Level Development Management. Engineenng and Product Assurance Launcher Development Management, Ground Support Equipment Direct Operations Cost Automated Propellant Production Unit Tramportabon of Launcher Etements EVA Suits Pre Masion Provisions Mission Hydrogen feedstock (tor propellant production) Public Damage Insurance ERV System Level Propellanh and Pressuranh ERV Integration & Tests stage 1 Liqutd Hydrmn popsl~l ERV Management, Engineenng and PA stage I Llqurd oayw prsprant ERV Development Ground Suo~ortEauioment Slap2 bqud HydWen Prwel&nl Design Matunty Cost Margtn Slap 2 bqUrd OxvoSn PWbt lndiree Operations Cost Programme Admintstraiton 8 ooaliy Comol Mars Habitation Module Ground Segmeni Mamienam and Improvement Environmental Control and Life Support System TaxeS Crew Faalfbes Fumrture and lntenor Fllght Test + Analysis Laboratory Equipment Design Matunty Cost Magn Guidance. Navigation and Control Reaction Control System Onboard Data Handling System Lander ModUb (for ERV and Hab) TTBC WIU?HGA Lander Subsystems a SNV Solar Arrays Landing Engines + Tanks + Piping Electncal Power Disinbubon & Control Structure (mdudfng Landing Leg Structure) Hamess Electncal Systems Batten- Thermal Control stNCtUm Heat Shield Separabon Pymtechnrcs Thermal Control Landing Leg Daploynent Mechanisms Radmtor Onboard SomVam MLI Heatem P- etc Mechanisms Propellants and Pressurants Liquid Hydrogen propellant HW\ Rolation and Poinhog Mechanism Liquid Oxygen propellant SolarAmy Dnve MaclmnlSm Mars Aerobrake Heat Shield Tether System Lander Module System Level iene, cwcT,,v”, mchaolvn Lander lntegrabon 8 Tests Ternor Lander Management, Engineenng and PA Onboard Sotiware Lander Ground Support EquiPment EVA Suits Design Matunty Cost Margin Provlsions Hab System Level Hab lntegrabon & Tests Hab Management Engineenng and PA nab Ground Support Equipment

10 Mars Surface Elements Prime Contractor Programme Level ERV SP-I 00-like Nuclear Power Generator Pnme Contractor Program Level Management ERV Light Truck, methadoxygen dnven Pnme Contraclor Program Level Engneenng ERV Radio Landing Beacon Pnme Contractor Program Level Product Assurance HLV Open Rover Pnme Contractor Program Level AIT HLV Pressunsed Rover Design Matunly Cost Margin HLV Field Scmnce Equipment Design Malunty Cost Margn Space Agency Programme Level Space Agency Program Level Management Space Agency Program Level Engmeenng Earth Ground Infrastructure Space Agency Program Level Product Assurance Launcher Ground Infrastructure Space Agency Program Level AIT Design Malunty Cost Maqn Launch Pad LauncherProcess,ng Faulrty Operations Launch Confrol Fauhty Mwon Control Unmanned Mtsslon GmundSuppon Equipment Mlssion contml Manned Mssmn GroundFaulfbas Sohare Mlssion Control Tminmg Sialions Man Vehldes Ground Infrastructure Ground CreWS Vehfcles ProcessrngFacflity Recovery. Search and Rescue ERV ProcessrngGround Supporf Equipment Desian MatunW Cost Mamn HLV Pmcssmg Ground Supporf Equipment Lander Prwessng Ground Suppon Equipmenf Mlsston Control Facihly Ground Stations Crew Training Facihty ERV Night Sfmulafor HLV Flight Simulator Man EVA Simulator Ground Faultties Management B Engineenng Design Malunty Cost Margin

11 Figure 1: Development + first operational mission costs __ -.. i I

Development incl. tests + First Operational Mars Mission ~ ...... Matly due to System ...... -.. i PfCjeCt Wce, AITN and- GSE ly due to large Stmtures

N 0 N0 ax

Figure 2: Second operational mission costs

Second Mission, recumng costs only Mostly due to System Led P-t OBiCe. AiTN and GSE. Secondaryduetohrgestnctwes

1,500.000 N 0 0 [Due to ROM cy 3 estimates fo Row l.OOO.000 1 -\c-I and Fteld Eqqnnent I

Ares Launcher EWh Return Mars Habitatiition Lander Module Mars Surface Pnme Space Agency Operations vehicle Mae Elements Gmtractor Programme Programme hl Lael

These numbers are presented only for the purpose of exposing findings in cost estimating practices. Whether the cost estimates are realistic is directly linked with the credibility of the Mars Direct assumptions from a technical, programmatics and safety point of view. A study on this was not part of the exercise described in this paper.

12 Number ESA Cost NASA Cost of Estimate Estimate

Table 3: Estimates for the Second Operational Mission

% of Development + First Mission Cost 20%

13 Table 4: Program level cost comparison with Apollo I 10 misninns over

without cost margins

Table 5: Elements cost comDarison with ADOIIO.- - Apollo and Mars Direct Elements Cost comparisons I Development Recurrent Cost

Apollo Command + Service Module I 15,0001 400

Apollo Lunar Module 7,500 130 Mars Direct Lander Module (NASA) 3,570 230 Mars Direct Lander Module (ESA) 1,720 260

Lunar Rover 170 ? Mars Direct Open Rover (NASA) 180 28 Mars Direct Open Rover (ESA) 270 65

14 Table 6: Potential cost growth for Development phase + First Operational Mission. 160%

15% wetght growth for Ares 150% . Launcher with 30% growth for all other hardware Rems as well as smaller inherltance and

140% c 5 ;e 0” 130% -m -c Ares Launcher Wh E - 30% growth for all n ott-er hardware Rems 120% 120% growth for all ISmaller inheritance I other hardware items. I

110%

100% iiernage wt +PO% wt +30% Testing Combination

Table 7: Potential cost growth for Second, Operational Mission. 112%

1 10%

108% c s- -8 106% -m -c n 104%

102%

100% Baseline Heritage wt. + 20% Wt. + 30% Combination

These values are presented only for the purpose of exposing findings in cost estimating practices. Whether the cost estimates are realistic is directly linked with the credibility of the baseline Mars Direct assumptions from a technical, programmatics and safety point of view. A study on this was not part of the exercise described in this paper.

15 Comparing NASA and ESA Cost Estimating Methods for Human Missions to Mars.

Scientific, public and political interest in organising human missions to Mars is increasing, due to the recent findings of satellites and landers sent to the red planet by NASA and the European Space Agency. Mars appears to harbour vast amounts of water, which is currently trapped as sub-surface ice but may once have covered the planet with Oceans and rivers. In the past, Mars may have nurtured life and there is a slim chance that simple organisms even manage to survive on the dusty, dry planet today. As both NASA and ESA are now seriously studying human Mars missions, the need for accurate cost estimating tools and methodologies for large international projects, and in particular human Mars projects, is increasing in both agencies.

To compare working methodologies between the cost engineering functions in NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and ESA European Space Research and Technology Centre (ESTEC), as well as to set-up cost engineering capabilities for future manned Mars projects and other studies which involve similar subsystem technologies in MSFC and ESTEC, a demonstration cost estimate exercise was organised. This exercise was a direct way of enhancing not only cooperation between iigeii~iesbut &O e&iiiiCes mi.iig~iicies c~iruiiin~iii IO Cidibk COS^ ziid:j;ses. COG engineers in MSFC and ESTEC independently prepared life-cycle cost estimates for a reference human Mars project and subsequently compared the results and estimate methods in detail. As a non-sensitive, public domain reference case for realistic human Mars projects, the “Mars Direct” concept was chosen.

In this paper and presentation the results of the exercise are shown; the differences and similarities in estimate methodologies, philosophies, and databases between MSFC and ESTEC, as well as the estimate results for the Mars Direct concept. The most significant differences are explained and possible estimate improvements identified. In addition, the Mars Direct plan and the extensive cost breakdown structure jointly set-up by MSFC and ESTEC for this concept are presented.

Speaker biographies

Charles Hunt received his BS degree in Industrial Engineering from Tennessee Technological University prior to employment with NASA MSFC’s Engineering Cost Office (ECO). Currently, he is supporting various NASA technology, engine, and space architecture projects and studies. Mr. Hunt is an active member in ECO’s effort to hone, enhance, and develop cost credibility through parametric modelling. He is the designer of the Engineering Cost Office Liquid Engine Model (ECOLEM), a macro-level parametric regression-based engine model used for engine cost analysis at an early concept stage. He is also a member of the International Society of Parametric Analysts (ISPA) and the Society of Cost Estimating and Analysis (SCEA).

Michel van Pelt received his MS degree in Aerospace Engineering at Delft Technical University before joining ESA ESTEC’s Cost Engineering Section in 1998. As a cost engineer, he is supporting various ESA Earth observation, satellite navigation, planetary probe and launcher projects during various phases. He regularly fills the cost engineering seat for the conceptual studies performed in ESTEC’s Concurrent Design Facility, and recently acted as System Engineer for such a study as well. In addition, he is the designer of the RACE model, and internal tool for fast cost estimates during the early phases of a conceptual design study. He is a member of the International Society of Parametric Analysts (ISPA) and Space Systems Cost Analysis Group (SSCAG). In his spare time he writes and edits articles for Dutch space magazines. Charles Hunt NASA Marshall Space Flight Center Address: Phone : Fax : E-mail : Charles.D.Hunt@nasagov

Michel van Pelt ESA ESTEC IMT-ICE Address: Keplerlaan 1, P.O. Box 299,2200 AG Noordwijk ZH,The Netherlands Phone : +31(0)71 565 5372 Fax : +31 (0)71 565 4997 E-mail : [email protected]