Journal of Liberal Democrat History
issue 18 spring 1998 £5.00 Ten Years On The Legacy of the Alliance and Merger
Bill Rodgers Alan Beith MP Richard Holme Willie Goodhart Michael Meadowcroft Dick Newby Tim Clement-Jones Graham Watson Stuart Mole Dr Tudor Jones
Liberal Democrat History Group Issue 18: Spring 1998 The Journal of Special issue: Liberal Democrat The Legacy of the Liberal-SDP Alliance History
The Journal of Liberal Democrat 4 The SDP’s Ideological Legacy History is published quarterly by the Dr Tudor Jones Liberal Democrat History Group.
The History Group promotes the 8 The Merger Debate in the SDP 1981–87 discussion and research of historical Bill Rodgers topics, particularly those relating to the histories of the Liberal Democrats, 12 Alliance Days Liberal Party and the SDP. Richard Holme For more information on the Liberal Democrat History Group, including details of back issues of the Journal, 14 The Alliance: Two-Party Cooperation in Practice tape records of meetings. Dick Newby ‘Mediawatch’, ‘Thesiswatch’ and Research in Progress services, see our web site: 17 The Alliance: Parties and Leaders http://www.users.dircon.co.uk/ Michael Meadowcroft ~dbrack/ldhg/index.html
32 The Merger Process: An SDP Retrospect Editorial/Correspondence Willie Goodhart Contributions to the Journal – letters, articles, and book reviews – are invited, preferably on disc or by email. 36 The Two Davids Contributions should be sent to: Graham Watson Duncan Brack (Editor) Flat 9, 6 Hopton Road, 38 The Alliance and After London SW16 2EQ. email: [email protected]. The Travelling of a Necessary Road Stuart Mole All articles copyright © their authors. Subscriptions/Membership 41 One Man’s Pride An annual subscription to the Journal Owen and his Impact on the Alliance of Liberal Democrat History costs Tim Clement-Jones £7.50 (£4.00 unwaged rate); this includes membership of the History Group unless you inform us otherwise. 43 Merger Hopes and Fears: Were they Realised? Send a cheque (payable to ‘Liberal Alan Beith MP Democrat History Group’) to: Patrick Mitchell, 6 Palfrey Place, 45 Reviews London SW8 1PA; email [email protected] Greaves and Pitchford, Merger: The Inside Story Sykes, Losing from the Inside Published by Liberal Democrat History Group, 48 Research Notes c/o Flat 9, 6 Hopton Road, London Chronology of key Alliance dates SW16 2EQ. Printed by Kall-Kwik, 426 Chiswick Bibliography: sources on Alliance history High Road, London W4 5TF. March 1998.
2 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 Editorial A Liberal Democrat History Group Fringe Meeting The Alliance Years The Struggle for Women’s Rights
This issue of the Journal of Liberal with Democrat History goes to press as the Liberal Democrats prepare to cel- Johanna Alberti (Newcastle University) ebrate their tenth birthday. and It aims to explore the question: Shirley Williams what did the new party inherit from the old, Liberals, Social Democrats 8.00–9.30pm, Friday 13 March and Alliance? What is the legacy of the seven years, from to ’, Royal Clifton Hotel, Southport during which Britain experienced the phenomenon of two separate and distinct political parties fighting elections on a common platform, view at the time); that the experi- bear at least as much, and possibly with agreed policy positions? What ence of working in alliance brought more, of the blame for the failures are the lessons to be learned from Liberals and Social Democrats to- of the Alliance and of merger than that unique period of cooperation? gether so closely that for most, should David Owen. Above all, why did a political force merger seemed an inevitable and We hope that these contributions that was regularly perceived as a se- desirable destinations; that far and – in the longest Journal the History rious contender for power with the away the biggest drawback of the Al- Group has produced – will spark in- Conservative and Labour Parties liance was the hours spent – and terest, controversy and debate. Bear- consistently fail to achieve its prom- wasted – in painful internal nego- ing in mind our mission to promote ise, and collapsed with such speed tiations, over seats and policy posi- the research of historical topics, we into mutual recrimination and inter- tions; that, more than anything else, have also included a new section, nal conflict? it was the ambition and judgement ‘Research Notes’, with a concise Our contributors write from of David Owen that undermined the bibliography and chronology of the many different backgrounds and per- Alliance and made the merger proc- Alliance period. Additions to these, spectives. Most of them share cer- ess so unnecessarily painful. and responses to any of the articles, tain beliefs: that the Gang of Four Most, but not all. Michael will be – as ever – very welcome. and their followers were right to Meadowcroft powerfully argues the Duncan Brack (Editor) leave the Labour Party and found a case that involvement in the Alliance new political organisation; that, once actually held back the Liberal cause the SDP was formed, it would have in Britain, that the Liberal Party The cartoons on pages been electoral suicide for it and the would have prospered more in the 27 and 42 were reproduced Liberal Party to fight each other s if the SDP had never been with the kind permission of (though that was not the universal formed, and that David Steel must Martin Horwood.
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8 Artillery Row, Westminster, London SW1P 1RZ Tel: 0171 828 0010 Fax: 0171 828 8111 Email: politico’[email protected] Website: http://www.politicos.co.uk Britain’s Premier Political Bookstore journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 3 The SDP’s Ideological Legacy
What was the ideological inheritance of the Social Democratic Party? And what did it bequeath to the Liberal Democrats? Dr Tudor Jones analyses what the SDP stood for.
Although at its foundation in the Social Developed mainly by Gaitskell’s parliamen- tary supporters, revisionist socialist thought Democratic Party was the first significant new party found its most coherent expression in Anthony in British politics since , it inherited a long Crosland’s major work The Future of Socialism ideological tradition. The core values and beliefs and (). The analysis which underpinned Crosland’s principal arguments focused both on distinctive themes of that tradition – British social major changes in the pattern of economic democracy – were to shape the character and broad power in Britain since and on the policy approach of the new party and were thus to achievement during that period of full employ- ment and sustained economic growth by means influence, too, the Alliance which the SDP was to of Keynesian macroeconomic intervention. form with the Liberal Party. Such developments, Crosland persuasively ar- gued, had removed many of the deep flaws of prewar capitalism. The social-democratic Fortified by this theoretical analysis, revi- tradition since 1945 sionist social democracy proceeded to challenge entrenched Labour orthodoxies in two ways. Most of the former Labour MPs and many First, it repudiated the traditional view that so- of the other new members who joined the cialism could be identified, above all, with the SDP in the early s had been influenced public ownership of the means of production. by the assumptions and values of British social It thereby questioned the established Labour democracy. Since this term had gradu- commitment to extensive public ownership as ally come to mean, in Hamilton’s succinct defi- the precondition for achieving all major re- nition, ‘a non-transformative type of socialism formist objectives. or social reform’ in the sense that it offered an Second, Labour revisionism presented a dis- ideological approach that sought ‘amelioration tinctive ethical interpretation of socialism in of injustice and the promotion of common terms of core values such as personal liberty, welfare and a measure of equality .... rather than social welfare and, in particular, social equality, transformation of the economic and social ideal ends that could be pursued, it was now structure’. argued, within the context of a mixed economy. During the s and early s this so- Moreover, from this ethical perspective the tra- cial democratic approach in Britain became ditional doctrine of public ownership – as en- synonymous with the revisionist tendency shrined in Clause IV of the Labour Party con- within the Labour Party. This amounted to a stitution – was viewed as merely one useful deliberate attempt, most apparent after means among several others for realising en- following Hugh Gaitskell’s accession to the during socialist values and ideals. party leadership, to reformulate the principles Throughout the s and early ’s revi- of democratic socialism and to revise Labour sionist ideas on public ownership, economic policies through a new analysis of economic strategy and social policy were further devel- and social changes in postwar Britain. oped and promoted – notably by Crosland,
4 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 Five years after the Limehouse Declaration: Shirley Williams, David Owen, Roy Jenkins and Bill Rodgers at Bath, 25 January 1986.
Gaitskell, Douglas Jay and Roy Politically and ideologically, too, the purposes of ‘a new-model liber- Jenkins – and incorporated into party British social democracy seemed an tarian decentralist social democ- policy documents such as Industry and increasingly marginalised force by racy’. Although little systematic Society ().The economic founda- the late s. On its left flank it progress was made in that direction, tion on which those ideas rested was found itself challenged within the both Marquand, by implication, and a firmly Keynesian one since that Labour Party by the revived funda- Roy Jenkins, more explicitly, indi- creed offered the techniques by mentalist socialism of Tony Benn and cated that a new political vehicle which future Labour governments his supporters. On its right flank, might be needed for a revised social would, it was hoped, seek to achieve meanwhile, it was confronted after democratic theory and strategy. In economic growth and full employ- with the revived market liberal his Dimbleby lecture, ‘Home ment and hence secure the economic doctrines of an increasingly Thoughts from Abroad’, Jenkins thus surplus that could be redirected into Thatcherite Conservative Party. The welcomed the possibility of a new higher social expenditure. Built growing isolation of social democrats party of the radical centre which around this Keynesian foundation within the Labour Party at this time would support state intervention and was the distinctive strategy of was also greatly increased by their market forces in equal measure. Croslandite social democracy – strong identification with the cause namely, the promotion, within a of British involvement in the Euro- mixed economy, of social welfare and pean Community. Their predica- Social democracy in greater equality by means of high ment deteriorated further with Roy the SDP public expenditure and redistributive Jenkins’ departure from British poli- taxation and upon the basis of sus- tics in to become President of When that new party did eventu- tained economic growth. the European Commission and with ally emerge on the political scene in This revisionist social democratic the deaths of Crosland in and March , its new launch state- model was a major ideological in- John Mackintosh, another iconoclas- ment, ‘Twelve Tasks for Social fluence on Labour thinking and tic thinker, in . Democrats’, together with books by policy for about years – from the In the face of their declining in- three of its founder-leaders – David mid-s to the mid-s. But in fluence some social democratic poli- Owen, Bill Rodgers and Shirley the face of the inflationary pressures ticians, notably Mackintosh, David Williams – sought to provide the of the s, the intellectual and po- Marquand and Evan Luard, had be- Social Democratic Party with a clear litical appeal of Keynesian social de- gun to develop a critique of the political and ideological identity. mocracy began to fade. Intellectu- centralist and corporatist tendencies At first this undertaking appeared ally, its confident assumptions were inherent in state socialism. Both to be inspired by the pantheon of undermined by the economic stag- Mackintosh and Marquand had also major British socialist thinkers of the nation, sterling crises and bitter in- stressed the need to revise past – G.D.H. Cole, R.H. Tawney dustrial conflicts of those years, and Croslandite social democracy in the and Evan Durbin, to whom Owen, consequently by the strains of office harsher economic and political cli- Williams and Rodgers respectively exerted on the Wilson and Callaghan mate of the late s, and thereby paid homage. But it also became governments between and ’. to work out what Marquand called evident that the SDP’s political lead- journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 5 ers were engaged in developing a ity of opportunity and treatment. nounced by the party’s rank-and-file critique of the bureaucratic There were thus, as Owen admitted, activists. By , however, David centralism and statism of established ‘genuinely conflicting arguments Owen had discarded the term itself, Labour policy. For they demon- and attitudes .... posed within the favouring instead the idea of a ‘so- strated a shared commitment to the centralist/decentralist dilemma’. cial market economy’ or ‘social mar- principle of political and economic Nevertheless, this emphasis on ket’. For in his view, the ‘mixed decentralisation previously affirmed political decentralisation, welcomed, economy’ had become a broad, de- by Marquand, Mackintosh and of course, by the new party’s Liberal scriptively imprecise term to which Luard in the late s. allies, had become established as an virtually anyone in British politics Owen thus advocated a revival of essential element of early SDP could subscribe. From September ‘the concept of fellowship and com- thought. As part of the developing , therefore, after succeeding Roy munity within a participatory demo- social democratic critique of an Jenkins as SDP leader, Owen increas- cratic society’ in place of the ‘deeply over-centralised and bureaucratic ingly employed the concept of a ‘so- centralist’ tradition of Fabian collec- state, associated both with traditional cial market economy’ as a means of tivism which had dominated the socialism and with the postwar defining his party’s ideological posi- Labour Party for so long. In prac- collectivist consensus in general, the tion. tice, he argued, that process would idea was reinforced by an eagerness The term ‘social market’ had first require ‘a detailed programme of leg- to embrace a market-oriented mixed been used by German economic islative and administrative reforms to economy. For Marquand such a liberals after and taken up by diffuse power in Britain’. That goal commitment constituted one of the Christian Democrats, particularly was supported, too, by Williams who most distinctive and important prin- by Ludwig Erhard. It originally meant a market economy in which the state’s role was restricted to en- What remained, however, of the SDP’s suring that market forces operated without distortion. The term en- original social democratic legacy, apart tered British political discourse in from enduring egalitarian and welfarist when it was enthusiastically adopted by Keith Joseph and his ideals, was perhaps more a political style free-market Conservative Centre for Policy Studies. Within the SDP, and approach – pragmatic, flexible, however, Owen revised the mean- favouring cautious reformism with the aid ing of the concept so that it implied, in Peter Jenkins’ definition, ‘that of active government and an enabling wealth should be created by mar- state. ket forces but redistributed accord- ing to social principles’. This in- terpretation suggested that the op- favoured both an extension of indus- ciples of social democracy. A few erations of the market economy trial democracy and wider popular months after the new party’s foun- were to be supplemented by gov- participation in public policy-mak- dation he thus depicted the mixed ernment intervention of various ing and on public bodies. economy not just as the source of kinds – by an industrial strategy, for This decentralist approach was prosperity and personal freedom but instance, that would promote skills endorsed by official party statements also as ‘neither a staging post on the training and research and develop- of principle and policy. The original road to full socialism not a regretta- ment; by an incomes policy; and by Limehouse Declaration of , for ble compromise between economic the redistribution of incomes and instance, affirmed the new party’s sin and economic virtue, but an en- resources by means of taxation and support for ‘the greatest practical tity in its own right, positively de- a more generous welfare system. degree of decentralisation of deci- sirable in and for itself’. Owen elaborated his interpreta- sion-making in industry and govern- In the Labour Party from which tion of the social market economy ment’. Embedded in all this, how- Marquand had recently departed in the opening chapter of his book ever, as Owen and Williams recog- such a stance remained ideologically A Future that Will Work (), as well nised, were some problematic issues, contentious. For support for the as in a succession of articles and including the possibility of dispari- mixed economy had become La- speeches. Further theoretical jus- ties in, say, health care provision be- bour’s ‘official heresy’, as the politi- tification for the idea was provided tween different localities and regions. cal journalist Peter Jenkins neatly by Owen’s economic policy adviser In that instance, decentralisation described it, reflected in official Alex de Mont and by the social might well clash with the social policy documents and in the con- policy specialist Nick Bosanquet, democratic commitment to equal- duct of Labour governments, yet de- who stressed the need to combine
6 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 competitive markets with govern- equation. It could thus be inter- tain its appeal and value in the face ment action to provide public serv- preted as meaning a market of the economic and political ices such as health-care and educa- economy accompanied either by a changes sweeping through Britain tion and to correct market failures minimal state that intervened only and the Western world during the such as, for instance, the omission of to ensure competition and end mo- s. the costs of pollution from the mar- nopolies or by an active, enabling ket price of a good or service. state that intervened to correct mar- Dr Tudor Jones is a senior lecturer in poli- By the concept of the so- ket failures and promote social wel- tics at Coventry University. His publi- cial market economy had become fare and justice. It was also unclear, cations include Remaking the Labour closely identified with Owen’s lead- largely for that reason, what exactly Party: From Gaitskell to Blair ership and was officially adopted as the economic and social policy im- (Routledge, ) and ‘Liberal Demo- a central SDP policy at the party plications of the idea were for the crat Thought’ in The Liberal Demo- conference of that year. In spite, SDP’s programme and strategy. crats (ed. D. MacIver) (Harvester however, of its elevated status in Wheatsheaf, ). SDP thinking and policy it did not feature prominently in the Alliance Conclusion Notes: programme in the run-up to the As a consequence, Owen’s innova- M.B. Hamilton, Democratic Socialism in general election. The detailed Britain and Sweden (Macmillan, ), pp. tive use of this distinctive but im- Alliance policy statement, The Time , . precise idea failed to provide a clear See, for instance, D. Marquand, ‘Inquest Has Come, whilst endorsing the ideological redefinition of social de- on a Movement’, Encounter, July ; E. broad underlying approach of the mocracy towards the end of the Luard, Socialism without the State social market economy, contained SDP’s political life. In other respects, (Macmillan, ); D. Marquand (ed.), no references to the phrase itself. It John P. Mackintosh on Parliament and So- its doctrinal and strategic platform merely stated that the Alliance par- cial Democracy (Longman ). was built upon ideas and attitudes – D. Marquand, ‘Inquest on a Movement’, ties ‘bring together ideas which the political and economic decentralisa- Encounter, July , p. . Conservative and Labour Parties tion, constitutional reform, selective See Marquand, op. cit.; R. Jenkins, ‘Home believe to be mutually exclusive: government intervention within a Thoughts from Abroad’, Dimbleby lec- enterprise and welfare, a market market economy – which helped to ture, , published in Partnership of economy and social justice’. This Principle (The Radical Centre; Secker & cement the Alliance with the Liber- Warburg, ), pp. _. omission of the term was repeated als after , marking out a broad See D. Owen, Face the Future (revised in the Alliance election mani- common ground of principle and edition, Oxford University Press, ), festo Britain United, although Owen policy. p. ; W. Rodgers, The Politics of Change himself did try to revive his empha- What remained, however, of the (Secker & Warburg, , p. ); S. sis on the social market during the Williams, Politics is for People (Penguin, SDP’s original social democratic ), p. -. election campaign. legacy, apart from enduring egalitar- Owen, op. cit., pp. , . Ultimately, then, the idea of the ian and welfarist ideals, was perhaps ibid., p. . social market economy exerted lit- more a political style and approach Williams, op. cit., p. . tle direct influence on Alliance strat- – pragmatic, flexible, favouring cau- Owen, op. cit., p. ; see also Williams, op. egy, even though it had been one of cit., p. . tious reformism with the aid of ac- the few distinctive political ideas to D. Marquand, Russet-Coated Captains: The tive government and an enabling Challenge of Social Democracy (SDP, ), emerge from SDP thinking between state. But what had given British so- p. . and . It had proved useful, cial democracy its distinctive char- P. J enkins, The Guardian, September in terms of both policy and rheto- acter in the period from the mid- . ric, in helping to widen the gap be- s to the mid-s – namely, its See also, for example, D. Owen, ‘Agenda tween a more market-oriented SDP for Competitiveness and Compassion’, central strategy of egalitarian redis- Economic Affairs, :, October . and the more collectivist and inter- tribution through the use of tax and See A. de Mont, A Theory of the Social ventionist approach of social demo- welfare systems and upon the basis Market (Tawney Society, ), and N. crats such as Denis Healey, Roy of Keynesian economics – had by Bosanquet, ‘The “Social Market Hattersley and John Smith who had the late s largely declined as a Economy”: Principles, Behind the Poli- remained loyal to Labour. But as its cies?’ Political Quarterly, July–September major political influence. . critics argued, both at the time and When, therefore, the newly D. Owen and D. Steel, The Time Has later, the Owenite concept of the formed party, the Liberal Democrats, Come (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, ), pp. social market economy lacked either painfully emerged in from the –. a precise meaning or intellectual co- collapse of the Alliance, it, too, like See, for instance, L. Andrews, Liberalism herence. It was unclear, for instance, Versus the Social Market Economy (Hebden the SDP in , faced the task of Royd, ); D. Brack, The Myth of the whether the emphasis lay on the ‘so- establishing a distinctive political and Social Market Economy (LINk, ). cial’ or the ‘market’ factor within the ideological identity that would re-
journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 7 The SDP and Merger 1981–1987 Bill Rodgers traces the history of the SDP-Liberal relationship, from beginnings to alliance to merger.
In January I wrote a letter to Roy Jenkins, as nent. We took for granted that a partnership of a kind would be essential. There was, how- much to clear my own mind as to convey a message. ever, no collective view of what form it should Hitherto I had been concerned only to find a way take, not because of disagreement within the of saving the Labour Party from itself. Now I was Gang of Four but because it was absent from our agenda. It follows that any idea that two hesitantly considering the possibility of helping to parties – one not yet launched – might even- launch what I called ‘a fourth party.’ I was not tually merge was very far away. It may have sanguine about the prospects but reflected on the crossed Roy Jenkins’ mind but it never crossed mine. scope for an understanding with the Liberals. For The first hint that there might be serious the moment I favoured a cautious and discreet differences of opinion in the Gang of Four approach to them. about relations with the Liberals came on the day of the launch on March . The four As the Labour Party continued to slide to- of us sat together on the platform at the Con- wards disaster, I had given it a year, no more, naught Rooms, off Kingsway in central Lon- to come to its senses. Unlike Roy Jenkins, who don, each to make a short statement and to had set out his stall very clearly in his Dimbleby answer questions on an allocation previously lecture, I was locked into the party I had joined agreed between us. Apart from the largest con- over years earlier, and as yet had no coher- ent view on realignment. I was ready to con- A new party is launched: the Connaught Rooms, cede the possibility of a new party but my en- 26 March 1981. ergies were still devoted to the rescue of an old one. David Steel was aware of this, but on sev- eral occasions tried to open a dialogue. We had worked together during the European refer- endum campaign of and I had acted as a conduit between him and the Prime Minister, Jim Callaghan, in the early days of the Lib-Lab Pact. I was in no doubt that he was a man we could do business with. For the moment, how- ever, that was a bridge too far. The position of both Shirley Williams and David Owen was similar: it was too soon to discuss what rela- tions we would have with the Liberal Party if it came to a break. What is strange, looking back, is that we had not discussed the matter much between ourselves even by the beginning of when the Limehouse Declaration and the formation of the Council for Social Democracy – which led two months later to the SDP – was immi-
8 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 tingent of UK press, radio and tel- evision I had ever seen, there were reporters from most of western Eu- rope, the United States, the Com- monwealth and the rest of the world. One of these was Bonnie Angelo, head of Time magazine’s London bureau and she asked how many Par- liamentary seats the SDP would fight. This fell to me to answer and I said without hesitation, ‘About half, at least three hundred.’ Had I been asked this question before the Limehouse Declaration, I might have suggested about seats, the figure I had in mind in my letter to Roy Jenkins a year earlier. But the immense enthusiasm we had ‘What do you mean, can’t we slow down a bit? We haven’t even started the motor aroused and the skeleton of a nation- yet!’ (2 February 1981) wide organisation for which there was already a blueprint, made me confident in my announcement. together of the two parties with ac- members of the Gang of Four. Al- David Steel might not like it, but if tivists setting the pace. But merger though close to Roy, my negotia- the Liberals and the SDP each was not then part of my vocabulary. tions with the Liberals in – fought half the seats it would be a It was the result of the elec- over the allocation of Parliamentary measure of our equal partnership. tion that made it a serious subject seats – including my public row with My answer was given on the for discussion. The Alliance won David Steel – had won David spur of the moment, but it did not .% of the vote and was within Owen’s approval whilst Roy had occur to me that exception would .% of overtaking Labour. It was been unhappy. Shirley had seen be take to it within our own ranks. first or second in seats and nearly David Owen to be the more accept- I was mistaken, and soon David eight million votes were divided al- able image for a new party and had Owen was arguing that I had made most equally between Liberal and nominated him against Roy for the a serious error in ‘giving away’ half Social Democrat candidates. The leadership. A small group of key peo- the seats to the Liberals. I should, I SDP had the highest proportion of ple who had kept in touch with Roy was told, have threatened to fight women candidates and an effective during his Brussels years, particularly all seats as a measure of the domi- national organisation. The result nev- after his Dimbleby lecture – David nance the SDP proposed to achieve. ertheless was a great disappointment Marquand, Clive Lindley, Matthew We might even choose to fight the after the byelection victories of Oakshott, Jim Daly – were some- erals or in saying they were perceived Crosby, Hillhead and Bermondsey; times more royalist than the king. by the public as representing failure. and after the time, in December But for the most part even those Thus the lines were drawn up which , when Gallup had recorded most active in committees preferred were to persist to the decisive merger % of the electorate prepared to to judge issues on their merits. They vote of . vote for the SDP or the Liberals and wanted a harmonious collective Relations with the Liberals re- an average of all polls had given the leadership. mained a constant theme in the two Alliance .% of the vote. Roy This was not the way David years that led to the general Jenkins’ position as leader of the SDP Owen saw it. He preferred to label election. For the most part, Roy, had become untenable with David them and balance their numbers on Shirley and I saw no point in re- Owen making clear that he would committees and working groups. straining a closer partnership, but challenge Roy if he failed to give The Jenkinsites were pro-Liberal and David Owen was constantly on the way. Thus at the moment that therefore pro-merger. His own alert to anything that might com- merger became a credible option to troops were anti-Liberal and not pre- promise the SDP’s identity either by discuss, the SDP’s new leader ruled pared to see merger discussed. open decision or by stealth. I re- it out. Merger by stealth was what he mained more cautious than Roy, and From the earliest days of the SDP most feared when it came to another occasionally found myself sharing David Owen had seen it – at least agreement with the Liberals about some of David Owen’s reservations. in its central core – as divided into Parliamentary seats. The Liberal My essential theme was of ‘natural Jenkinsites and Owenites. This was Party did not want the prolonged convergence’, a bottom-up growing nonsense in the case of the other two and damaging round of previous journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 9 Liberals in a byelection (and, it was negotiations. Nor did most Social and that the remaining seats should implied, trounce them). But within Democrats. Under pressure from simply choose the candidate they a few days, my approach to the di- David Owen, I agreed to take charge preferred. vision of seats was agreed by the of the negotiations once again but, David Owen’s attitude to merger Steering Committee of the SDP, al- apart from agreed exchanges, hoped insofar as it had previously seemed though not without some argu- to leave the arrangements inchoate was firmly articulated in his ment, and we turned to how ne- largely in place. But the question first few months as leader. Roy gotiations should be conducted. I arose of who should choose the can- Jenkins was not in favour of merger said in a paper: ‘Relations with the didates, individual Liberals and in- but of keeping the door open to it. Liberals are bound to follow an ir- dividual Social Democrats (each in I certainly rejected an instant merger regular pattern. In some areas, there their own seats) or Liberals and So- but in an article for the Political Quar- will be hard bargaining with little cial Democrats voting together for terly, said this was ‘quite different from genuine spirit of cooperation; in whoever they thought to be the best a deliberate attempt to frustrate the others, the Liberals and Social man or woman? organic growth of the Alliance.’ ‘If’, Democrats will get on happily to- Most of us would have left this I continued, ‘members of both par- gether.’ And so it proved. to local decision with no more than ties wish to turn a loose Alliance into Nine days after the launch of the guidance from the centre, but in the a close day-to-day relationship .... it would be foolish to resist such pres- sure on the grounds that premature What slowly emerged was a clearer view merger might result.’ But this was unacceptable to David Owen, and he of David Owen’s strategy. Put simply, it contrived to ensure a motion for was to keep the Alliance together only debate at the SDP’s Salford Confer- ence in September that effec- long enough to win proportional tively ruled out merger until the end representation for Westminster; and then of the Parliament. The Party, always deferential to its leader, agreed and for the SDP and the Liberals to go their this became a point of reference in separate ways. the years ahead. What slowly emerged was a clearer view of David Owen’s strat- SDP, Shirley Williams and I de- end we devised a system of joint egy. Put simply, it was to keep the parted for the Anglo-German closed and joint open selection. Alliance together only long enough Königswinter Conference on the Under the first, members of both to win proportional representation Rhine. In the margins of it we had parties would vote together but for Westminster; and then for the serious discussions with David Steel only for a shortlist made up entirely SDP and the Liberals to go their and Richard Holme, in which we of Liberals or entirely of Social separate ways. This was flawed in were joined by David Marquand. Democrats; under the second, open, two crucial respects. Whatever re- The outcome was the so-called system members of both parties straints he placed on coming closer ‘Königswinter Compact’, an agree- voting together would choose from together, there was very little in ment between the two parties writ- a mixed list of Liberals and Social terms of ideas or policies that sepa- ten out by Richard Holme on a Democrats. These arrangements rated the two parties. The Alliance lined sheet of greenish paper that were monitored by the National itself was a measure of this. For the looked as if it had been torn from Committee of the SDP which SDP to turn on its previous allies an office ledger. It committed us to would approve or disapprove local at some future date and fight the fighting the next general election proposals with David Owen taking Liberals was quite unrealistic. Even in alliance, ‘as distinct parties but of- a close interest in every seat. It was the Salford delegates would have fering the nation a government of a laborious process. The objective found that unacceptable had it been partnership.’ seemed reasonable enough – to en- spelt out to them. Shirley Williams and I returned to sure a fair share of seats for both The second objection was even London well pleased, believing that parties, especially good seats – but more profound. David Owen had our agreement was totally consistent for David Owen it was meant to abandoned the ‘win-a-majority, with previous understandings. But place a barrier wherever possible form-a-government’ message of again there was trouble, principally against members of two parties be- both the SDP and the Liberals prior from David Owen who said we had ginning to think and work as one. to the election. He now set his no mandate for our Königswinter He only abandoned the attempt in sights much lower, making activities. He was not alone in dislik- the autumn of when I told holding-the-balance in a hung par- ing a closer relationship with the Lib- him I would no longer oversee it liament the aim. This was an unsat-
10 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 isfactory formula for campaigning jected its unanimous report which tuous impatience with much of the and it crucially depended on a stale- I, together with other Social Demo- Liberal Party which he thought of mate between Labour and the Con- crats, had signed in the spring of as jejune and ungovernable. There servatives which only the voters , was evidence that he pre- was no song in his heart about the could decide. There had been three ferred to keep his distance from the prospects for the next parliament. occasions since the war – , Liberals rather than reach any In the early hours of Friday and – when a strong and con- agreement that involved compro- June any hope of a hung Par- fident third party might have been mise. Defence was, he believed, one liament fell apart as Mrs Thatcher able to negotiate a deal, but this gave area where SDP policy should be again headed for a three-figure ma- no more than a one-in-four chance distinct. It helped to mark an iden- jority. At .am Alan Watson, a of a hung parliament next time. tity he hoped the SDP would re- former Liberal President and one of David Owen was not alone in grasp- tain. David Steel’s close advisors, and I ing at the idea: it seemed our best The report of the Commission were interviewed together on televi- hope. But to predicate the future of on Defence and Disarmament sion by Robin Day. Our message was the SDP on such an outcome was caused much bitterness in the SDP. the same: merger was now a serious fragile. David Owen always demanded great option that our two parties should We are now, in , also wiser personal loyalty and he also equated address without delay. Six difficult about the process by which propor- losing with humiliation. The belief months later, against David Owen’s tional representation might have that John Roper and I had been dis- wishes and after much political been secured. An agreement with loyally responsible for him ‘losing’ in blood-letting, it was achieved. Had either Labour or the Conservatives the Commission made us the object David Owen been prepared to ac- would have been extracted under of his anger. My personal relation- knowledge that merger was the logic duress and the new government ship with him was never to be the of two consecutive electoral defeats would have looked for an early op- same again. for the Alliance – or been willing to portunity to hold a further election During and we had accept the ‘Yes’ verdict of the SDP’s and win a clear majority. The need been quite close. I admired his domi- membership in a one-member, one- to decide on the form of PR, the nating parliamentary performance vote ballot – the Social and Liberal possibility of a referendum and the and his relentless determination to Democrats could have been difficult progress of legislation keep the SDP in the political game. launched with hope and excitement. through parliament (there would By any standards, it was an achieve- As it was, the climb back to cred- have been backbench revolts) would ment of a high order. Over lunch, ibility was to be hard. have provided the necessary breath- he would relax for a moment and ing space. A hung parliament would confess how tired he was and how William (Lord) Rodgers was Secretary not have delivered what David uncertain about the future. I would of State for Transport –, one of Owen wanted from it. The whole then try to persuade him not to rule the SDP’s ‘Gang of Four’ founders in experiment would have ended in out eventual merger and leading the , and SDP Vice President until tears. merged party thereafter. He never . In he was elected to succeed Throughout the Parlia- dismissed this out of hand but a ma- Lord Jenkins as leader of the Liberal ment, the two leaders, David Owen jor obstacle was plainly his contemp- Democrat peers. and David Steel, preferred to make decisions together rather than find themselves bound by any joint committee of the two parties. David Owen in particular feared that some Membership Services Social Democrats, myself and The following listings are available to History Group members: Shirley Williams included, might make common cause with Liberals Mediawatch: a bibliography of major articles on the Liberal Democrats in an unacceptable majority. But appearing in the broadsheet papers, major magazines and academic from the Alliance Strategy journals from 1988; plus articles of historical interest appearing in the Committee, chaired jointly by the major Liberal Democrat journals from 1995. leaders, met regularly to discuss and sometimes resolve problems be- Thesiswatch: all higher degree theses listed in the Bulletin of the Institute tween the parties. In early meetings of Historical Research under the titles ‘Liberal Party’ or ‘liberalism’ (none yet there was a desultory attempt to under SDP or Liberal Democrats). raise merger until it was seen to be fruitless. And the row over the Joint Any member is entitled to receive a copy of either listing free; send an A4 Commission on Defence and Dis- SSAE to the address on page 2. Up to date versions can also be found on armament when David Owen re- our web site (http://www.users.dircon.co.uk/~dbrack/index.html). journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 11 Alliance Days Richard Holme provides a few vignettes of the days of elation and experiment, frustration and failure.
First the famous, or no doubt to David Owen Another vignette, and I find it difficult to re- member the date, is a recollection of walking infamous, Königswinter Compact. In in the the beautiful hills around Ettrick Bridge with margins of the annual Anglo-German Conference David Steel and his labrador, talking about the beside the Rhine there was a lunch at a riverside hotel name we should put on this new combination and agreeing ‘Alliance’ was the best option, followed by a walk up the Drachenfels. The lending itself to an alternating prefix. participants were Bill Rodgers, Shirley Williams, John And subsequently telling Roy Jenkins at a Roper, then SDP Chief Whip, David Steel and myself. rally at Central Hall that in the Croydon byelection Bill Pitt would be fighting as The SDP was in its first flush of heady opinion poll Liberal-SDP Alliance, and showing him stick- success, the subject of enormous interest among the ers and leaflets. He gulped but took the ‘bounce’ conference participants and understandably rather with his usual aplomb. Jennifer Jenkins was forthright in her support. pleased with itself. At the lunch there was white wine, pale spring sunshine and a lot of mutual teasing. Then there is the painful memory of negoti- ating the manifesto. Negotiated manifes- Somewhat to my surprise we managed to tos are not a good idea, whether intra-party reach agreement in principle, without too or, as this was, between parties. They tend to- much difficulty, that the attempt to break the wards the lowest common denominator rather mould should be concerted rather than com- than the highest common factor. And whereas petitive. I set down, there and then, on a paper I am proud of my part in the and table napkin in rather blurred handwriting, the Liberal Democrat manifestos, I cannot say the three-point understanding which we had same of the last Alliance platform. It was bland reached: broad agreement on principles; seat and uninspiring. sharing rather than fighting each other, the The miracle is that we succeeded in get- details to be negotiated; and Joint Policy Com- ting agreement on anything at all. The prob- missions on major issues. On the way through lem was not with Ian Wrigglesworth and my- the winding alleys of the town towards the hill self, heading our respective teams, nor with after lunch I vividly recall Shirley saying to me Wendy Buckley and Peter Knowlson consci- ruefully that she supposed she would now have entiously servicing our labours. It was rather to support PR. with Michael Meadowcroft and Sue Slipman This event, and its consequences, were seen facing each other across the table – for whom subsequently as an historic sell-out of the iden- most issues were issues of principle and for tity and independence of the new party by whom differences of emphasis were David Owen. To David Steel and myself they unbridgeable chasms. I was not surprised that, seemed common sense. To the other SDP par- whereas most of us involved ended up in the ticipants I believed they seemed inevitable for same party, Michael and Sue decided to fol- two third parties in a political system with low their respective lonely paths. winner-takes-all voting. Then, as part of the follow-up to that agree- Then, who of those involved would not recall, ment, in constructing the broad agreement on generally with a feeling of furious sorrow, the principles I recall sitting with David Marquand events surrounding the Joint Defence Com- in the refreshment room at King’s Cross, in late mission. John Edmonds, an emollient and May, drafting and redrafting amid the puddles knowledgeable chairman had laboured hard of cold tea, the document which was to be called, over a compromise with a certain amount of at least officially, ‘A Fresh Start for Britain’. behind-the-scenes diplomacy between the
12 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 equally knowledgeable John Roper when someone asked me how the which was in my mind when we and myself, less expert but willing. Assembly had gone, said that I was put together the team for the It was clear that he had succeeded thinking of applying for political general election. when Bill Rodgers, with his own asylum. record of opposition to unilateral- The final vignette is of being taken ism in the Labour Party, gave his sup- Then, as for so many other Liberals out to lunch by Mike Thomas, David port to the report. We all thought and Social Democrats, there are the Owen’s most loyal henchman – we had built a bridge across which memories of the byelections. Croy- older readers will remember Roy people with different perspectives in don, and the recollection of break- Jenkins’ description of him as ‘the the Alliance could move freely and fast daily with Bill Pitt, the table a pint-sized Pavarotti’ – in early . without embarrassment. mass of newspapers and Weetabix, I was slightly surprised by the We had all reckoned without the preparing the rigours of the morn- invitation because we were hardly Doctor. Undoubtedly provoked by ing press conference which I soulmates. He made me a threat I David Steel, in the shape of a pre- chaired. could not refuse. I should desist from emptive briefing on publication of Or Roy Jenkins turning a narrow the so-called convergence strategy, of the report, his fellow leader went bal- defeat in Warrington into a moral vic- letting the two parties evolve towards listic. Every hawkish instinct came to- tory and then converting that into the closer union, putting no obstacle in gether with his barely concealed con- real thing at Hillhead. I remember the way of this, or something terri- tempt for lily-livered Liberals and his one lady in Kelvinside, of overpow- ble would happen. deep distrust of his collaborationist ering refinement herself, telling me – ‘What?’ fellow leaders. that although she was a lifelong Tory – ‘Good people like David Owen Eastbourne was not happy. I re- she would be voting for Roy because and myself will simply leave politics.’ member making a very poor speech he was such a gentleman. We didn’t – and they did. myself, in good company it must be Then minding Shirley for a day said, and leaving there miserably in Crosby and realising for myself Lord Holme of Cheltenham CBE was aware that the best of the Alliance that beneath the charm and President of the Liberal Party – was behind us. ‘ Never again glad wide-ranging policy interest, there and candidate for Cheltenham in and confident morning.’ I went directly lay an incomparable election fight- ’. Made a life peer in , he was elec- to the British-American Project ing machine of great stamina and tion manifesto coordinator in and conference in Philadelphia and, toughness of mind, something election campaign director in .
Research in Progress This column aims to assist research projects in progress. If you can help any of the individuals listed below with sources, contacts, or any other helpful information – or if you know anyone who can – please pass on details to them. If you know of any other research project in progress for inclusion in this column, please send details to the Editor at the address on page 2.
The party agent and English electoral culture, The Liberal Party and foreign and defence c.1880 – c.1906. The development of political agency policy, 1922–88. Book and articles; of particular as a profession, the role of the election agent in interest is the 1920s and ’30s; and also the possibility of managing election campaigns during this period, and the interviewing anyone involved in formulating the foreign changing nature of elections, as increased use was made and defence policies of the Liberal Party. Dr R. S. of the press and the platform. Kathryn Rix, Christ's Grayson, 8 Millway Close, Oxford OX2 8BJ. College, Cambridge, CB2 2BU; [email protected] The grass roots organisation of the Liberal Liberal defections to the Conservative Party, Party 1945–64; the role of local activists in the late c.1906–1935. Nick Cott, 24, Balmoral Terrace, 1950s revival of the Liberal Party. Mark Egan, First Floor Gosforth, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, NE3 1YH; Flat, 16 Oldfields Circus, Northolt, Middlesex UB5 4RR. [email protected] The political and electoral strategy of the The Liberal Party 1945–56. Contact with members Liberal Party 1970–79. Individual constituency (or opponents) of the Radical Reform Group during the papers from this period, and contact with individuals who 1950s, and anyone with recollections of the leadership of were members of the Party’s policy committees and/or the Clement Davies, sought. Graham Lippiatt, 24 Balmoral Party Council, particularly welcome. Ruth Fox, 7 Mulberry Road, South Harrow, HA2 8TD. Court, Bishop’s Stortford, Herts CM23 3JW.
journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 13 The Alliance: Two-Party Cooperation in Practice How did Liberals and Social Democrats cope with the mechanics of alliance? Dick Newby examines the record.
The Alliance was a unique experiment. It had two individual seats and a single leadership team. Of all these requirements, arguably the most distinguishing features which are rare in British problematic was how to divide up the Parlia- politics and, in combination, unparalleled. mentary seats in the first place. In the spring of , when the SDP was in its infancy, it The first was that one of the partners, the did not have a national constituency organisa- SDP, was a new party. Born out of desperation tion. The Liberal Party, by comparison, had at by pro-European social democrats in the La- least some activists in the large majority of seats, bour Party, it tapped a vein of enthusiasm for a and even if few in number, they understand- new style of non-confrontational politics which ably often had a very strong attachment to the led tens of thousands of political neophytes – idea that a Liberal representative should fight the so-called ‘political virgins’ – to join a po- the seat. By the summer of , they also had litical party and, in many cases, devote a huge candidates in place. amount of effort to active politics. To establish The agreement on how the seats would be and maintain a new party in Britain is daunt- allocated was reached in October after ingly difficult. Even if you can generate an ini- six months of sometimes fraught discussion. It tial surge of enthusiasm and members, to main- stipulated that there should be rough parity in tain momentum under the first-past-the-post the number of seats fought by each party; that electoral system is incredibly hard. As the Green in any one region, the ratio of seats fought by Party found when it obtained % of the vote the parties should not be greater than :; and but no seats in the European Parliamen- that seats should not be ‘clustered’. A six-strong tary elections, members and activists drain away National Negotiating Team was established in the absence of tangible electoral success. from each Party, and the two teams were to In order to give itself a chance in electoral meet in a Joint Negotiating Group (JNG). My terms, the SDP, from the date of its launch, an- role was to act as the SDP official responsible nounced that it would cooperate with the Lib- for servicing this Group and for managing the eral Party, not least in sharing out the Parlia- progress of the negotiating process. mentary seats between the parties. As Bill The way in which the two parties tackled Rodgers explains elsewhere in this issue, his the negotiations reflected – to SDP eyes at least statement at the SDP’s launch press conference – a fundamental difference of approach on how that the SDP would seek to fight half the Par- to run a political party. We undertook an ex- liamentary seats, leaving the Liberals to fight tensive amount of research, coordinated by US the other half, was a spur-of-the-moment de- polling expert Sarah Horack, and with aca- cision, rather than the result of careful strate- demic input from Ivor Crewe, on the gic thought. This decision, more than any other winnability of each seat. Based on this work, single act, however, set the framework in which we ranked seats in each sub-regional negotiat- the two parties would work. For, as soon as ing unit and provided our national team mem- voters had been denied the opportunity to vote bers with a detailed negotiating brief. Local for the SDP in over seats, SDP leaders had members of the negotiating team were ex- to be able to say that a vote for a Liberal can- pected to take a lead from the national team didate in those seats was equivalent to a vote member, who was either an MP or a member for the SDP. This required a common mani- of the Steering Committee. On the Liberal side festo, a single campaign both nationally and in there had been considerable resistance to there
14 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 being any national input at all and ), there would have been parity By mid-, David Owen had their national negotiators were of- between the parties. As we only won adopted a rather more pragmatic ten little more than observers. Local seats between us, it was hardly sur- view. After returning from Colches- whim often appeared to matter more prising that the Liberals had the ma- ter where I had been to explain why than objective judgement. jority ( to the SDP’s ). they couldn’t have joint selection, I The first negotiating meeting was Despite the success of the pre- explained to him in frustration that held in Maidstone on December ’ seats negotiations, it was clear we would win the nomination in , two months after the negoti- that such a national approach would any event. ‘Let them have joint se- ating framework had been agreed. not be acceptable again. Local Lib- lection then’ was his reply. The SDP negotiator was John eral associations had hated it from The process still required delicate Horam (now Conservative MP for the start and their national leader- negotiations to complete and Andy Orpington). I accompanied him. The ship had found it irritating and em- Ellis (now Liberal Secretary-Gen- Liberal national negotiator was barrassing to have to soothe the an- eral) and I were sent to several places Hugh Jones , the Party’s Secretary- noyance of associations and candi- to arbitrate. One particularly diffi- General. The day was frosty. So was the meeting. The Liberals were ex- tremely reluctant to cede any seat Having seen the final edit of the where they had any significant de- gree of organisation. Armed with our broadcast, John Harris returned to Cowley ranking list, we demanded what we Street claiming that it would be ‘either a believed to be a fair mixture of good and bad seats. The meeting broke up triumph or a disaster’. He was right. with little achieved. A similar pattern was followed in the handful of other meetings held before Christmas. dates in seats which were to be cult area was Kirklees, and Andy and It took an outburst from Bill fought by the SDP. On the SDP side I spent a tedious evening hearing Rodgers over the New Year, sus- there was also a recognition that a from representatives of the two par- pending the talks until a more con- national deal was politically ties why they should both fight structive attitude prevailed, to inject unachievable. Agreeing to devolve Dewsbury. As we left the splendours real momentum into the negotiat- negotiations to area party level was of Dewsbury’s Victorian town hall to ing process. As the year progressed, relatively easy for the SDP. The prob- return to the station, we walked my priority became how to ensure lem which quickly arose, and bedev- across the open market. One stall that rough parity of outcome was illed the whole of the process, was caught my eye. ‘Eat tripe, don’t talk achieved. Agreement was reached in the request from many SDP con- it!’ it proclaimed. Unfortunately this the JNG that the Liberals could re- stituencies to have joint selection of principle was not enforced during tain their top (‘golden’) seats and candidates by members of both par- the negotiations. that the SDP would then have two- ties living in the seat. There were two Following the acceptance of a thirds of the next (‘silver’) seats. variants of this option: joint ‘closed’ package of joint open selections Reaching this outcome was tricky, selection where a shortlist was drawn by the National Committee in July given the number of regional nego- from members of one party; and , the seats allocation was soon tiations which were taking place. I joint ‘open’ selection, where there completed. Although some seats regularly trudged up to Hugh Jones’ was a shortlist drawn from members had changed hands between the two dusty lair in the Liberal Party head- of both parties. David Owen, now elections, the SDP fought seats quarters (then part of the National SDP leader, saw both these devices in , only five fewer than in . Liberal Club) for a glass of wine, a – but particularly joint open selec- The two rounds of seat alloca- dry biscuit and careful consideration tion – as a threat to the selection of tion were unprecedented in British of the silver seat list (which he was Owenite candidates, and feared that politics. In one sense the process was not allowed to admit to his party SDP applicants would temper their a great success. The seats were allo- ever existed). All but seats were views to gain Liberal support. This cated on a broadly equal basis and allocated by August and, as the view was not assuaged when Parry the deal held across the country. (The September conferences approached, Mitchell – a textbook Owenite – two parties only fought each other Roy Jenkins and David Steel horse- won one of the first joint open se- in three seats in , where local traded the rest. lections in Salisbury, and I was given Liberal associations ignored the na- The gold-and-silver approach was the unenviable task of travelling the tional seats deal.) The unintended vindicated by the election re- length and breadth of the country consequence of the process, and one sults. They showed that if the Alliance explaining to local parties which which was anathema to the had won or more seats (our wanted joint selection that they Owenites, was that, by the end, in- working assumption during – could not have it. creasing numbers of activists were journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 15 questioning the need, and in some from failure. joint commissions established, nota- cases the viability, of the two parties General election campaigning bly the Fisher Commission on con- maintaining their separate existence. activity was arguably the least suc- stitutional reform, which again were There were a number of reasons for cessful area of Alliance cooperation. able to agree on both the framework this, not least the experience of fight- Although joint press conferences and detail of Alliance policy. No is- ing elections jointly on the ground. were held and joint party election sues of unacceptable policy differ- But the huge amount of additional broadcasts were produced, the na- ence emerged and, during the time spent in negotiating on seat al- tional campaigns of and , election, differences within the Alli- location and, in the case of many for different reasons, were unhappy ance had much more to do with per- SDP local parties, the need to have affairs. In , the greater popular- sonality than policy. an argument with the national party ity of David Steel compared to Roy The disaster occurred on defence about joint selection, led many ac- Jenkins led to the farce of the Ettrick policy. A joint commission produced tivists to see merger as the logical Bridge summit at which Jenkins was a report in June which said Brit- option. From my national standpoint, effectively replaced by Steel as leader ain should retain its independent de- the thought of having to organise a of the campaign only days before terrent and decide on a replacement third round of seat negotiations af- polling day. (or not) only when Polaris was com- ter was deeply depressing. In , Owen and Steel dis- ing to the end of its natural life – Just as the experience of the seat trusted both their professional party years later. David Owen vehe- negotiations led local activists and staff, and each other, to such an ex- mently rejected this suggestion, say- national figures to question the vi- tent that they excluded staff from ing that it was ‘the sort of fudging and ability of a continuing two-party al- election planning and ran virtually mudging’ he had left the Labour Party liance after , broadly similar independent campaigns. It was a to avoid. In response, and amid scenes considerations applied in three other recipe for confusion and produced of confusion, the Liberal Assembly at areas with a large national input, predictably confused results. Nowhere is Eastbourne in September namely Parliamentary byelections, was this lack of a coherent structure passed an anti-Alliance, unilateralist general election campaigning and demonstrated more clearly than in the motion. Although Steel and Owen policy formulation. area of party election broadcasts. Nei- patched up their relations, the East- Parliamentary byelections were ther leader would relinquish personal bourne vote was a godsend to the the oxygen of the Alliance, breathing control of the broadcasts to staff and Alliance’s opponents and demon- new vigour and support into third- so, when the campaign began, virtu- strated an inherent flaw in the Alli- party politics even in times of national ally no work had been done on them. ance. Nobody doubted that there was doldrums. From Warrington in John Pardoe and John Harris, joint a large majority of members of the to Greenwich in , SDP chairs of the day-to-day campaign two parties combined who opposed byelection organisation had benefited committee, were given responsibility unilateralism. The nature of the par- greatly from Liberal help. In at the last minute, leading to the pro- ties’ relationship and the segregation Warrington – the first ever SDP duction of the famous ‘rabbit’ broad- of their decision-making meant that byelection – Liverpool Liberals dra- cast which featured Rosie Barnes and this majority had no outlet through gooned by Trevor (‘the vote’) Jones her family’s pet. Having seen the fi- which to express itself. enthusiastically supported Roy nal edit of the broadcast, John Harris Six years after the Alliance was Jenkins. By the time of Greenwich, returned to Cowley Street claiming formed, the experience of negotiat- six years later, senior Liberal cam- that it would be ‘ either a triumph or ing the division of Parliamentary paigners such as Chris Rennard were a disaster’. He was right. Unfortu- seats, fighting byelections and na- fully integrated into SDP campaign nately it was not a triumph. All the tional elections and forming joint teams. Under the leadership of Alec campaign professionals involved with policy had led me to the firm con- McGivan, the SDP had introduced the election were convinced clusion that an independent SDP innovations into byelection cam- that such amateurism was crazy. It was neither politically necessary or paigns, not least the use of high-vol- helped fuel their support for merger. organisationally viable. Nothing that ume target mail shots. This had gained Policy was an area both of great has happened in the first decade of Liberal respect to the extent that large success and of the Alliance’s greatest the life of the Liberal Democrats has numbers of Liberal activists were pre- presentational disaster. The shaken that view. pared to travel and help as byelection Limehouse Declaration and other foot soldiers. Equally, SDP politicians, early SDP policy statements caused Dick (now Lord) Newby joined the SDP staff and activists regarded it as axi- no great Liberal alarm, and Shirley as Secretary to the Parliamentary Com- omatic that they would visit Liberal Williams and David Steel were able mittee in April . From October byelections. Both parties fairly quickly to launch a ‘A Fresh Start for Brit- until Easter when the Party merged realised that they both benefited ain’ document in the spring of with the Liberal Party, he was the Par- equally from byelection success, or, with the minimum of fuss. Further ty’s National Secretary. He now speaks as in Darlington, suffered equally joint statements were produced and in the Lords on Treasury issues.
16 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 The Alliance: Parties and Leaders How successful was the Alliance? Was merger the right road to follow? Michael Meadowcroft puts the case against.
It is still difficult to take a sufficiently dispassionate political and electoral damage. On occasion one relied – usually rewarded – on one’s tar- personal view of the seven-year period from the get audience reading between the lines. formation of the SDP to the two parties’ final votes The title of this essay emanates from my read- to merge. I still have very emotional feelings on how ing of the history of the period. The relation- ship between the two parties and their leaders much better it could have been, on how badly the was, to my mind, the most influential factor in Liberal Party qua party was treated, particularly in the way that the key events unfolded. I focus the early days, on whether or not, in retrospect, it on the political aspects of the Liberal leader, rather than his personality. I have always found would have been better – or even possible – to reject David Steel personable and easy to get on with. the Alliance root and branch, on the tactical naïvete Unusually for a politician, he does not appear of David Steel, on the eventual supineness of almost to harbour grudges. He also has a good sense of humour and likes jazz – what more could one all the Liberal Party’s negotiating team, and on ask! Alas, his relationship with the Liberal Party whether the final settlement really did represent a was always one-sided and, I believe, his political judgement was highly flawed. It is clear from compromise too far. his autobiography that Steel revelled in being If one had to deal with developments since somehow above the party debate. merger, I suspect that the difficulty of being less than dispassionate would be still more evi- dent. Suffice to say that an absence of com- The Grimond legacy ment does not indicate a weakening of resolve! marks my fortieth year as a member of In exploring these questions I am con- the Liberal Party, and to a larger extent than is scious of the excellence of Tony Greaves’ and often realised, one’s perception of the poten- Rachel Pitchford’s account of the merger ne- tial and the frustration of the Alliance years is gotiations. The very few quibbles that I have coloured by one’s experience of previous op- with their text will become apparent in due portunities and failures. The party of the course. Also, I have never been able to hide Grimond years was by no means as ‘Left-Lib- from, nor disavow, current views – even if I ertarian’ as Jo was. To a certain extent the in- wished to – as I have always found it difficult crease in support, and the byelection victories, to resist invitations to write for any journal in the – period rode on a social demo- or publisher aware of how easy it is to flatter cratic style, and an anti-Conservative appeal, me. Also I have always had a quaint belief in in places where Labour could not hope to win. the need for intellectual rigour and philo- In a curious reversal of the Steel years, the then sophic consistency in politics, without which leader was, at least in terms of philosophy and it is invariably difficult to accommodate the policy, more liberal than the party. Why else necessary tactical compromises. As a conse- would the then Young Liberals have felt the quence there are numerous texts extant which need to launch its excellent New Orbits series put on the record what I felt vital at the time. of pamphlets? The contrast with – is To be sure, there are weasel words therein; in salutary. politics one can never wholly shrink from the For me, at the time at party HQ as Local necessity to avoid every possible scintilla of Government Officer, the local elections journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 17 were a great shock. The party had tween leader and party, the Young romped home in council after coun- Liberals had continued their Liberal Leader versus party cil in May on the coat tails of odyssey into their ‘Red Guard’ pe- Those Liberals who committed the March Orpington byelection, riod, and were duly taken on pub- themselves to involvement in the winning seats in town after town, of- licly for their pains, with debilitat- party nationally – often at consider- ten with little or no organisation. In ing effects. able domestic, financial and electoral March the immense opportu- The relevance of this period to the cost – were not, with very few ex- nity of a possible gain from Labour Alliance years is threefold. First, the ceptions, wild revolutionaries deter- in Colne Valley presented itself and struggle to maintain the party’s lib- mined to embarrass the leadership was, I believe, tactically muffed. Even eral identity vis-à-vis its leader began at every opportunity. The much- maligned Liberal Party Council, for instance, spent far too much of its The failure of David Steel to extract time agonising over how to temper its policy leanings towards the ‘lead- sufficient political and electoral benefits ership’s’ position where the latter was from the Pact gave clear and adequate known or assumed, or how to present palpably different strategy notice that he was not going to be the decisions as being an example of tough leader determined to protect his party unity. Of course, from time to time, sometimes when goaded by the party in crucial negotiations. leader’s – and, by and large, the whole Parliamentary Party’s – ne- glect or criticism, the Party Council without such a timely byelection with Jeremy Thorpe, not with David went to the barricades but, in gen- boost we expected to repeat the Steel, and was a direct consequence eral, conscious of the retribution that successes. With a number of honour- of the lessons learned in the Grimond the electorate tends to wreak on able exceptions we dropped back in era. Second, the contrast between the party disunity, the party was remark- place after place. The palpable disap- response within the party to the ably well behaved – even when pro- pointment was followed by a number Thorpe-Heath talks in February voked. I am absolutely convinced of defections of sitting councillors and the Steel-Callaghan pact that had ‘the leadership’ chosen to and it was certainly clear to me that of is revealing. During the ’s, work with the Party Council (and to if Liberal officers and candidates did I was leader of the Leeds City Coun- a less public degree, the Party Ex- not possess at least some understand- cil Liberal Group and a national party ecutive), as some MPs did, includ- ing of liberal philosophy they were officer. When Jeremy Thorpe went to ing John Pardoe and, from time to liable to be wafted about by every Downing Street immediately after the time, David Penhaligon, rather than passing political breeze. Again, the February election, my tel- treating those who were, after all, comparison with the – period ephone, along with other regional Liberal colleagues with barely con- is, I believe, significant. and national colleagues’, was perma- cealed contempt, the gains in mu- Grimond was so personally at- nently occupied with irate and wor- tual trust and recognition would tractive and charismatic that, even ried Liberals appalled at what deal have had immense benefits during though he was invariably plain might be being contemplated. In the traumatic Alliance years. As ex- speaking, few members of the pub- , my recollection is that I had amples of what would have been lic, let alone many members of the three mildly concerned calls over the possible, one only has to look at the party, looked beyond the sound of Pact. It would have been impossible civilised debates and the acceptance what he was saying to the words to carry the party into a coalition of party consensus at the special as- themselves. In contrast, the Thorpe with the Conservatives in , what- semblies called to debate specific years were politically and organisa- ever the terms, but, despite perfectly crucial strategic issues. tionally horrendous, if at times justified fears as to its possible effect electorally successful. Labour’s deep on the party, the Lib-Lab Pact of unpopularity from and Heath’s – was generally accepted as Byelection candidates stolid leadership, particularly in Op- being a justified risk. Third, the fail- To take two key examples of the position, provided an unrivalled op- ure of David Steel to extract suffi- , frustration and, indeed, the lack of portunity which was simply dis- cient political and electoral benefits understanding of basic courtesy, one sipated and finally sunk in the po- from the Pact gave clear and ad- only has to examine the question of litically catastrophic entrails of the equate notice that he was not going the Alliance candidatures for the Thorpe trial. And whereas the to be the tough leader determined Croydon North-West and Crosby party was mired in the struggle to to protect his party in crucial nego- byelections. An astute Liberal Party present a semblance of unity be- tiations.
18 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 leader, faced with the Croydon op- years early – was also present at to be curiously antipathetic to fight- portunity, and having a perfectly rea- Bradford. We were both outraged. ing Labour. sonable desire to secure the election Suffice to say that Anthony Hill gen- There certainly was at the time of an attractive SDP luminary, would erously accepted and supported a big difference between those Lib- have immediately consulted the ob- Shirley Williams at the byelection. erals – the majority of the party – vious key people – the Croydon However, I am inclined to think that who had no direct personal experi- NW Liberal Association candidate had the situation been handled dif- ence of Labour in local government and officers, the party’s national ferently, and given the different lo- control, and those, such as the party officers, and significant ‘trouble mak- cations and personalities, one just in Leeds, who suffered and struggled ers’ – and attempted to sort out the might still today have Shirley against sophisticated political chican- minimum terms for a ‘deal’: the next Williams and Anthony Hill as MPs ery and the calculating and cynical vacancy guaranteed for a Liberal, for Croydon NW and Crosby re- – and legal – abuse of public funds minor concessions on seat negotia- spectively. to maintain Labour in office. The tions generally, something vague on former saw only the pleasant, pro- policy etc. gressive but mildly erroneous Labour Instead, faced with Steel bully- Labour hegemony Party, whereas the relatively few Lib- ing – from, as usual, a great distance Like, I imagine, most Liberals dur- erals winning seats from Labour – the Liberal Party Council at ing the early s, I observed the knew a very different political ani- Abingdon (this rather curious loca- suicidal tendency of the Labour mal. Inevitably this dichotomy of tion is etched in my memory) re- Party in action with a mixture of party priorities coloured the debates sponded by passing enthusiastically disbelief, hilarity and sheer unadul- and negotiations with the SDP in a motion supporting William Pitt terated joy. I vividly recall driving the succeeding years. (the Defector). I recall seeing David along the M – to or from what oc- Steel in his bijou House of Com- casion I cannot now recall, but it was The inexorable spiral mons office early the following week virtually bound to have been a Lib- and asking him what he now in- eral meeting – as the news came ‘Our’ failure – my failure – to po- tended to do. He replied, extremely through of the special Labour Con- liticise the Liberal Party, and our er- churlishly, ‘I suppose I’ll have to bow ference’s totally bizarre decision on ror of taking for granted the pre- to democracy’! the arithmetic for its electoral col- sumed existence of an inherent radi- Not long afterwards the SDP lege to elect its leader and deputy calism in the party at large, were salu- embarked upon a pro-British Rail leader. Had I not been bombing tarily brought home to us at the campaign. It wasn’t intended as such along a motorway I would have Llandudno Liberal Assembly of – indeed, it rather backfired when done a dance of joy, as it was I con- – the Alliance Assembly. Those of us BR failed to deliver the conference fined myself to a minor whoop. Per- who sought to argue for a philo- delegates on time at, I think, Great haps naïvely, I had at that time no sophical position vis-à-vis the SDP, Yarmouth (and why not!) – but was premonition of the dangers lurking and for constitutional niceties, such planned as a typical SDP mould- ahead for the Liberal Party, even as the – minor? – point that the SDP breaking gimmick of a ‘rolling’ con- though there had been a number of was not at that time actually consti- ference at three locations, as opposed letters, and even introductory arti- tuted, were comprehensively to the infinitely more boring but at cles, in the serious press, and in The swamped by a wave of enthusiasm least achievable and even sustainable Guardian, for the eventual SDP by for some vague but attractive emo- practice of assembling at one resort its soon-to-be luminaries. I saw it as tional spasm, epitomised by the pre- – usually beginning with the letter an unrivalled opportunity to under- Assembly rally with Shirley Williams, ‘B’. The SDP at least recognised the mine a hegemonic, politically cor- Roy Jenkins, Jo Grimond, David latter imperative by holding one- rupt and illiberal Labour Party. Those Steel, Gordon Lishman and – a val- third of its Conference en route at who shared this view, and who suc- iant but downbeat – Tony Greaves. Bradford, which I duly attended. ceeded against the odds to win seats Having been Assembly Chair for five Whilst in the bar at the St George’s in the big cities and other Labour years, and therefore well aware that Hall, ascertaining, as one does on fiefdoms, not only believed theoreti- on setpiece occasions heart always such occasions, the real facts of the cally in the vital necessity to defeat wins over head, I suppose I knew state of play of the SDP, I was as- Labour electorally, but actually set that the ‘promote Liberalism, safe- tounded to hear, over the PA system, about doing it. It was always a strange guard the party, vigilance, watchful- Shirley Williams unilaterally an- paradox to find ourselves castigated ness and all that’ case was doomed; nouncing her candidature for the as being political theoreticians, un- nevertheless, having opted for the Crosby byelection. The existing and interested in power, when we were tactical compromise of an amend- properly-selected prospective Liberal actually winning seats. Winning, ment to delay assent to the Alliance candidate for Crosby – whom I had moreover, without visible support (nothing more could conceivably personally recruited to the party from the party centrally who seemed have been salvaged from the wreck- journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 19 age at that point), the vote on it was ficult to break, addiction to accept- Bridge proved to be accurate. at least respectable. However, one of ing commissions to write, I followed No ‘working’ politician with any the great myths of that Assembly is my Liberalism for a New Decade with nous believes that leaders shouldn’t the subsequent final vote on the pro- a booklet for Liberator, Social Democ- lead, or that there are never occa- Alliance motion itself. From the racy – Barrier or Bridge. This delved sions when leaders cannot immedi- Chair, Gruff Evans simply counted into the background to social de- ately share with their party col- the delegates against the motion, mocracy, and analysed the state of leagues all the delicate nuances of subtracted that figure from the total play between the Liberal Party and possible developments, but the number of registered delegates and the SDP. It stated that ‘[t]he SDP is willing acceptance of such reality re- announced that as the result. The at one and the same time the great- quires, first, confidence in the lead- votes for were never counted and, est opportunity and the greatest dan- er’s capability to deliver, and, second, consequently, the substantial number ger to Liberalism for thirty years.’ a visible willingness to work to en- of abstainers – either by conviction This was intended as a contribution sure that the led follow the leader. or, like me, out of sheer gloom, were to what one presumed would be an On both counts David Owen suc- unknown. ongoing debate on the fluid and ceeded and David Steel failed. An The problem of party ‘placement’ evolving relationship, but its recep- assessment of the style and achieve- in the political spectrum, and its con- tion was altogether different. Edward ment of the two men during the sequential imperative in seat alloca- Lyons QC, then Labour turned SDP crucial period of the Alliance’s life tion etc., lay some way ahead and, at MP for Bradford West – and with turns on its head the received truth the time of the formation of the his wife, Barbara, extremely good of the responsibility for the Alliance’s SDP, I felt genuinely excited by the company, then and now – became ultimate disappointment. This is not evident potential for a cataclysmic almost incoherent during a joint ra- an assessment of the policies and transformation of the political – and dio interview in Leeds at my sug- election tactics pursued by them – electoral – structure. Like, I suppose, gestion in the booklet that, as things for instance Owen’s error during the others, I smiled wryly at the launch then stood organisationally with the general election of admitting a of the new party and at its obses- two parties, the Liberals should fight preference for working with the sion with PR styles and with reject- at least seats and the SDP some Conservatives was a significant fac- ing all received ‘truths’, but was pre- of the rest. Provocative this clearly tor in losing Leeds West – but rather pared to give it the benefit of the was, but the rebuttal, generally, lacked a judgement on the way each han- doubt and to be proved wrong. confidence and content. Alas, far too dled his party. The problem of the In line with the previous, and dif- many of the concerns of Barrier or Alliance was not, as is commonly thought, the problem of David The first contest: Steel and Jenkins before the ’83 election. Owen but rather the problem of David Steel. One knew where one was with Owen – for better or for worse – but one was never sure of what Steel would come out with next – whatever had been agreed in his presence at the party meeting in advance.
SDP triumphalism The SDP was an ‘all or nothing’ break for fame and power. Inevita- bly it ended up as nothing. There are those who argue that it could have been all. Maybe there was an out- side chance but I doubt it. There was a problem from day one with the SDP’s parliamentary recruits, and, in particular the SDP leadership – with the exception of Roy Jenkins – ini- tially generally treating Liberals in rather the same way as Steel did: as dedicated espousers of worthy causes, but with no commitment to the required discipline for gaining
20 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 power. To some extent this was a ing a new mandate. The moral au- were concluded without much dif- consequence of being elected as La- thority of SDP MPs elected as such ficulty, but others had to be recon- bour MPs ‘on the ticket’ and be- would have given them considerably vened time after time, using up time ing initially wholly unaware of the greater stature in the House, rather which could more valuably have immense problem of achieving elec- than having permanently to coun- been spent actually winning the seats tion as a third party. SDP MPs, ter the argument that they had been in question. faced with tough Liberals, for whom elected on a different ticket. Such One ought not to disparage nor political survival was a daily strug- judgement is, of course, subjective, minimise the many cases and occa- gle, came to revise their opinions, but but frankly, in the circumstances, it sions when Liberal and SDP col- too late to revise the strategy for the was well worth the risk. I have to leagues worked together effectively and efficiently but there was often a very different attitude to politics and ‘The problem with the Liberal Party’, said political activity. Paradoxically, it was often the reverse of the general per- Owen, ‘is that you have a leader who isn’t ception of which of the two parties interested in policy’. was playing at politics and which was serious about winning. Liberals tended to despise the SDP’s predi- lection for interminable meetings on longer haul. A less arrogant and pat- confess, as one who soon came to detailed policy formation and its af- ronising attitude, and, for instance, a believe in the need to protect and fection for social gatherings – pref- seat allocation strategy which con- preserve the Liberal Party’s base and erably with big names – whilst the centrated less on an equality of seats its position from the SDP maraud- SDP tended to deride the Liberals’ fought and more on who was most ers, aided and abetted by the Liberal incessant community-politics activ- likely to win each seat, might con- leader, I was mightily relieved that ism. Such differences tended to arise ceivably have not only produced they didn’t choose the byelection from the SDP view that victory more ‘Alliance’ victories but would route! would come via the ‘Grand Slam’ arguably also have entrenched the As it was, the Alliance soon be- whereas the Liberals believed in the SDP on the scene far better for the came a bureaucratic nightmare. It necessity of the incremental long long haul. was difficult enough for Liberal haul. Perhaps it was emotionally im- council groups to have to accept In the end, although the trauma possible for the then SDP to have SDP members who were often of getting there left a number of swallowed a numerically ‘junior’ role amongst the Labour, and occasion- scars, it was surprising in the circum- but the consequences of not doing ally Conservative members they stances that only three seats in the so are numerically apparent today. had in the main felt least affinity with general election were contested Paradoxically, the one tactic that – though in the main they swallowed by both SDP and Liberals. could have given the SDP electoral hard and got on with it – but we and political dominance over the had to embark on an interminable Liberals, and, indeed, could have round of joint committees, particu- Owen’s dominance given them phenomenal impetus, larly to determine seat allocation. I learned a lot from David Owen’s was the one they backed away from The bureaucracy involved was phe- chairmanship of meetings. The joint – the defectors resigning their seats nomenal! There were ‘gold’, ‘silver’ meetings he chaired did not only and fighting byelections. The argu- and ‘bronze’ seats, allocated to each come to a conclusion on some ment was, of course, finely balanced. category on the basis of their policy point or on some item on the The parliamentary custom and prac- winnability, and each party had to following week’s parliamentary or- tice of the party holding the seat have its due share of each. There was der paper; when agreement had been choosing the timing of the a national ‘panel’ of representatives reached, Owen would then ask, ‘OK byelection – not to mention the cost who either led the team – usually – now what are the politics of this?’ of so many campaigns – would, for on the SDP side, the Liberals be- There would then ensue a short dis- instance, probably have denied the ing happier to rely on leading local cussion on how one dealt with the SDP a significant tactical advantage. colleagues – or who ‘observed’ each decision made and what were the However, in the heady electoral at- negotiating meeting, and there was tactical implications of it. The need mosphere of the SDP’s early days, provision for an appeal mechanism to relate policy and parliamentary and with an extended stream of par- in the event of deadlock! Some of decisions to the current political liamentary recruits, my firm belief is these meetings, often where little was agenda would certainly not have that the electorate would have re- at stake in terms of winnable seats, been dealt with in so disciplined a acted positively to the highly prin- or constituencies which had been way in a purely Liberal context. cipled action of each individual seek- nursed for many years by a Liberal, I had the adjacent office to David journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 21 Owen in the Norman Shaw North bility outside the constituency in parliamentary colleagues when I ar- building on the Embankment, and order to concentrate on winning rived at the House that the Leeds from time to time when we walked Leeds West, though I did manage to West victory was unexpected. It has together across to the main building write a fair bit to defend the Liberal been suggested to me that it was also he would say, ‘The problem with the Party whenever it was being ma- unwelcome to some, but I never had Liberal Party is that you have a leader ligned by its own leader, or misun- any sense of this from anyone. who isn’t interested in policy’. This derstood by the SDP – both of Stephen Ross – a splendid Liberal was palpably obvious, as the later fi- which occurred fairly often. Cer- who always wore his heart on his asco over the infamous ‘dead parrot’ tainly in West Leeds at that time the sleeve – did say to me after a couple document demonstrated, but one SDP was no vote winner. General of years, ‘When I heard you’d won could well have responded that the opinion, particularly in the six Lib- Leeds, I thought, ‘Oh, we’re getting a problem of the SDP is that it had a eral clubs there, was, first, that they troublemaker’, but you’re actually the leader who was obsessed with the should have stayed in the Labour ultimate loyalist!’ The only response minutiae of policy. Not as desperate Party and continued to fight their I could come up with was to ask how a fault, to be sure, but nonetheless a corner, and, second, that particularly he thought it could be otherwise af- barrier to a healthy policy formation as seen through Leeds’ eyes, Liberals ter my years in the party. partnership between party and had been fighting these self-same Stephen Ross’ comment came leader. One innocent analysis of SDP people for years and could hardly during my period as Assistant Lib- policy came from one of the splen- embrace them now. The local party eral Whip. With the increase in Lib- did sign language interpreters who was virtually unanimous in deciding eral members, and the heavy spokes- translated for both the Liberal As- that tactically we should be ‘Liberal’ person duties each of us had to carry sembly and the SDP Conference. I on the ballot paper ‘without prefix (apart from David Alton and Cyril went to the Salford SDP Conference or suffix’ and should not seek to Smith, who refused to take on any and spotted one of these colleagues depend on any Alliance-based assist- such responsibilities), Alan Beith felt duly performing on the edge of the ance. We had no outside speakers and that it would be useful to have two stage. When she descended I went no outside money, but we did have Assistant Whips. Archy Kirkwood round to greet her. ‘Oh, Michael’, she the excellent Leighton Andrews and and I were appointed, Archy particu- said spontaneously, ‘I’m so glad to see Jim Heppell (who should both have larly to look after Scottish interests. you. I’m having awful trouble trans- been fighting seats themselves but I was very happy to take this on. I lating these speeches. There’s no sub- who weren’t) who added a winning regarded it as an opportunity to de- stance to them!’ flair to all the solid fifteen-year local velop the vital relationship between As SDP leader Owen was also build-up. the Parliamentary Party and the phenomenally alert to immediate party in the country, which would press comment. He believed that it be crucial to winning many more was essential to impress the media The 1983–87 seats. I was more interested in being with his ability to know what was Parliament one of than being one of and going on at all times and to be first the risk of spending more time at with a comment. John Sargent of the The early days of the new parliament Westminster than was wise in terms BBC remarked to me once that the were taken up with one of the most of holding Leeds West seemed worth apogee of this came when, in April bizarre episodes of my time in the taking if, over the course of a full , Owen ‘phoned the BBC Liberal Party. Instead of concentrat- parliament, we could make the Lib- newsdesk with a comment on the ing on how we could build on the eral Party sufficiently attractive as to shooting of WPC Fletcher in St huge popular vote we had just won, boost the national vote sufficiently. James’ Square, opposite the Libyan the initial Parliamentary Party meet- Also, and relevant to this article, I Embassy, before the newsdesk had ings were taken over by vitriolic at- hoped to play a part in developing a heard of the shooting! Owen was tacks on Steel’s leadership by Cyril healthy and mutually useful relation- also rather wryly proud of having Smith, supported by David Alton. ship between the Alliance parties, spoken at one of LINk’s ‘Radical Steel himself was clearly fed up with which were organised separately – Conference’s’ at which, gauging his the whole business and it was left and whipped separately – for most audience well, he gave just about his largely to David Penhaligon to try of the – Parliament. In any most left-wing address of the Alli- and restore calm. This led to Steel’s case, contrary to some popular be- ance period – extracts from which so-called ‘sabbatical’, though in fact lief, I reckon that I am a ‘natural’ were forever being quoted thereaf- he actually resigned the leadership Whip! I believe that party solidarity ter by Leighton Andrews. and had to be talked out of it over is extremely important and that, for The Alliance nationally between some days – often at long distance. instance, council group discipline is to is less vivid to me than Astonishingly it was somehow kept also vital – and has to be worked at it should be, mainly because I with- out of the press. rather than simply imposed. Over drew from virtually every responsi- I gathered from the response from my years as council group leader
22 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 in Leeds we ran a very tight ship and from not being part of the team to – or allies. it served us well in a tough political being responsible for it. Clement We were clearly in for a bout of situation. Freud, as commendably straightfor- mindless activism, with overheated The two years as a Whip were ward as ever, told me that Steel had photocopiers, a deluge of House of hard going but not exceptionally dif- originally wanted to appoint me but Commons franked envelopes, and ficult so far as the Alliance was con- ‘the Welsh won’t have it’! with whole forests being lined up for cerned. There were rare occasions slaughter, rather than continuing to when the two parties agreed to pro- develop radical and soundly-based mote different arguments and to The 1985 reshuffle political and campaigning initiatives vote in opposite lobbies but these I regard that particular Wednesday, in linking parliamentary and party cam- were regarded as worthwhile exam- July , as a disastrous day. The paigning. Given the changes that ples of being two parties and suffi- commitments to making a Liberal were being made, which were bound ciently rare to be promoted as such Party – and Alliance – impact na- to make it more difficult to win Leeds without damage. John Cartwright tionally were, in theory, in parlia- West, all I could do was to opt out of was the remarkably well-organised mentary terms, less than half way my then spokesmanships to try and SDP Chief Whip and the relation- through, but were being, as I saw it, spend enough time in Leeds to hold ship between the two parties’ Whips seriously damaged by Steel’s changes. the seat. We had no-one full-time in was as amicable and cooperative as Knowing how Steel operates – lead- Leeds. The local association slaved one might expect faced with the ership by announcement – I realised away devotedly, helped conscien- joint pressures of maintaining a ‘third that he would come to the Parlia- tiously and innovatively by my Par- party’ presence in the face of a two- mentary Party meeting at pm that liamentary staff – from a distance – party system. The parliamentary par- evening with a fait accompli. Early that but the lack of someone able to pull ties met separately each Wednesday afternoon, when Steel’s changes were the strings together day by day was a evening to discuss the following known, I saw Paddy Ashdown who great handicap. Eventually in week’s parliamentary order paper offered to make ‘representations’ to the Rowntree Social Service Trust – and then met jointly to compare Steel. I replied that this was, alas, no bless ’em! – came up with enough notes, with the two leaders alternat- use. Unless he told Steel categori- funds to employ an agent but, alas, it ing in the chair. cally that, in the circumstances, he was too little too late. Such detail is The tasks of maximising the Lib- would not take on the Trade and only worth mentioning because it il- eral impact in the House, of writing Industry spokesmanship – and thus lustrates the inherent lack of party and and debating – such as with Tony putting the reshuffle back into the Alliance commitment to winning and Benn and with Ken Livingstone – melting pot – it would all be done holding seats which would otherwise of building the partnership with the and dusted before the pm meeting. be Labour. party in the country, and of find- ing the most acceptable modus oper- andi for operating the Alliance, The Liberal Party was side-stepped by the coursed through the Whips’ office for two years, and had to be carried Steel/Owen trick of appointing ‘expert’ on alongside coping with constitu- commissions which were supposedly ency casework and nursing West Leeds. Then, in July , came one bipartisan but whose members were not of David Steel’s perennial obsessions even rubber-stamped by the party. with ‘reshuffling’ parliamentary re- sponsibilities, mainly in order to re- move Alan Beith from the Whips’ Paddy didn’t believe me but kindly During the – parliament Office. I had had hardly any prob- went to make his ‘representations’ we had a number of Liberal Parlia- lems in working with Alan and anyway, particularly to state the ob- mentary Party ‘away days’, for which would have been very happy to con- vious: that the Parliamentary Party I religiously prepared papers on tac- tinue, but, if he was to be moved, should have the opportunity to dis- tics and strategy. At this distance in then there was no secret that I would cuss the proposals that evening. At time I don’t recollect any of these have been happy to have been pro- .pm the changes were an- sessions resulting in any effective col- moted. There were those in the Par- nounced to the press, and the meet- lective action. The Parliamentary liamentary Party, including Paddy ing an hour and a half later, as ever, Party meetings became more and Ashdown and Archy Kirkwood, who rather than having a public row with more Alliance-oriented – which was pressed for it, but Steel eventually its leader, knuckled under. It was a not necessarily a bad thing, though telephoned David Alton, who was at well tried technique of the leader Owen was consistently disparaging the time in the USA, to persuade and, in a narrow sense, served him of Ashdown, and Penhaligon regu- him to take the job on! Alton went well, but it didn’t make many friends larly teased Owen. We had Alliance journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 23 spokesmanships and endeavoured to weakness. Just before the report was approached Simon Hughes and my- make the best of a difficult political due out, David Steel made an un- self with the idea of producing a situation. All the time, however, fortunate lobby lunch comment book of essays on defence which policy problems were simmering, which appeared to divulge the con- would explore the increasing steril- without any effective party mecha- tents on the key issue of a non-nu- ity of the sloganising between the nisms for resolving them. The Lib- clear Britain. Owen was furious and pro-NATO hard-liners and the eral Party was side-stepped by the used his SDP conference to go over emotional CNDers. Others, includ- Steel/Owen trick of appointing ‘ex- the top. The result was that the un- ing Archy Kirkwood, joined in the pert’ commissions which were sup- fortunate Commission Chairman, discussions and, to our pleasant sur- posedly bipartisan but whose mem- John Edmonds, was forced to amend prise, we all found the meetings ex- bers were not even rubber-stamped his report in a last-minute attempt hilarating. Contrary to what Steel by the party. The problem with this to find a new consensus. The result later alleged, the meetings were open was that there was consequently no was unimpressive. As a rescue at- and were usually held in a meeting party accountability for these ‘Com- tempt Steel and Owen embarked on room at the Norman Shaw North missions’’ findings and they had to a round of European defence con- Building, where a number of Lib- be bludgeoned through the Party sultations out of which emerged eral MPs had offices. Eventually, Assembly. We, the Alliance – me be- their Euro-bomb option. As a policy rather than writing individual essays, ing the Whip in charge – nearly it was unsustainable, and even the there was enough common ground came unstuck over the Northern usual refuge of calling frantically for to produce the booklet under our Ireland motion at the Bourne- unity and for backing the leader(s) joint names. It had unambiguous ar- mouth Assembly and the lesson sim- at the subsequent Liberal assembly guments on the intellectual ply wasn’t learnt. could not hide the threadbare case. unsustainability of the deterrence There is a useful analysis of the theory but it was far from being the Eastbourne debate in Radical unilateralist rant that it was later de- Defence Quarterly and, therefore, there are picted as. Then came the biggie: defence. This only a few extra items of importance While this was going on, Clay one had run and run. The Alliance to relate here. First, the booklet Across Freud, as the Chair of the Policy Defence Commission beavered away the Divide, which was produced by Committee – a job he carried out with commendable conscientious- a number of Liberals at the time was with commendable seriousness and ness. Bill Rodgers was, as ever, sen- attacked for being deliberately in- assiduity – was trying to get Steel to sible and undogmatic. Laura tended as an ‘alternative’ defence agree on a wording for an assembly Grimond organised a number of commission. Why this should have defence debate which would have to valuable consultations and those of been necessarily a heinous political deal with the commission report. I us with views on the subject were sin is debatable, but it was certainly was also a member of the Policy much involved. But Owen was, per- nothing of the kind. It gained a no- Committee and was perfectly ame- fectly legitimately, a hawk on the is- toriety way beyond its then signifi- nable to having a motion which sue and would not countenance a cance. Essentially it was a Young Lib- would get us over a big political hur- report which gave the impression of eral initiative. A small group of them dle. I seem to recollect that William Wallace produced a wording which ‘Aaah, isn’t that nice – he’s wishing us luck!’ (26 September 1986) was adequate. Steel would have none of it. He rejected attempts at mediation and decided to go for the high wire act. Which is how the Euro- bomb came to be on the Eastbourne agenda. It was unnecessary and, alas, all too typical. The high-wire act requires a specialist in get- ting to the other side. Our erstwhile leader was not such a person! The outcome of the debate is well enough known. The appalling events of much later that evening are less well known. Inevi- tably, rather hyped up by the
24 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 emotion of the debate and its out- clue as to where he was going or nothing to deserve such disloyal come – though not so hyper as to where he had gone. treatment. In the foyer afterwards, muff a ‘let’s put the lid on this; good Those who were present, or who despite such provocation, Tony debate; now let’s get on with the followed the assembly on television, Greaves and others still managed to politics’ television interview with a will doubtless remember the valiant temper their response to the inter- highly professional Bill Rodgers – efforts of the Chief Whip, David viewers. Archy Kirkwood and I were booked Alton, on breakfast television the Back eventually at the House, a to play in the jazz band at that night’s next day, to make a disaster out of a more constructive atmosphere took Liberator review, which left us on difficulty, parading the tabloid head- over and an uneasy but wearable even more of a high. We finished just lines in front of the camera. Worse compromise Alliance defence posi- before midnight and Archy tel- was to follow with the leader’s tion was hammered out which I de- ephoned Steel’s hotel suite, where speech. Knowing Steel well, and as- fended, somewhat uncomfortably, in there had been the scheduled regu- suming that Alton had cleared his the Chamber. It was akin to the po- lar Parliamentary Party meeting, just outburst with him, I guessed that sition which had been available to to check that it had finished. He Steel would use his speech to con- Steel in advance of the Liberal As- came back from the telephone look- tinue the attack. For these setpiece sembly and which he had rejected. ing suddenly serious and said that he occasions the parliamentary party and I were urgently needed at the had assigned seats on the platform meeting. We went straight across and in full view of the television cam- The 1987 election experienced just about the most ap- eras. I therefore sought out the par- Preparations for an Alliance mani- palling and unpleasant Liberal meet- ty’s press officer, Jim Dumsday, and festo were already underway by this ing I have been to in years in the told him that I would not sit on the time. Sensible and practical ar- party. The level of anger and bitter- platform as I did not wish to be in rangements had been made for its ness was beyond belief. Simon the spotlight when Steel attacked his composition. Rightly, an original draft from a ‘single pen’ was thought important and Alan Beith duly pro- Those who were present will doubtless duced a typically professional piece remember the valiant efforts of the Chief of work. As anyone accepting such a commission would have done – as Whip, David Alton, to make a disaster out opposed to writing a Liberal mani- of a difficulty, parading the tabloid festo – Alan produced a draft which reflected Alliance thinking, such as headlines in front of the camera. it was, and wrote with an eye to what would be acceptable to a consensus of both parties. Thereafter the draft Hughes had been under personal colleagues. Jim, faced with yet an- was referred to a joint committee of attack for some time before we ar- other PR problem, was understand- both parties, chaired by myself and rived, and our colleagues then started ably unhappy with this information Ian Wrigglesworth, with the help of on us. Simon was surprisingly cool and said that he couldn’t believe that a ‘New Ideas Group’, chaired by Des – and, to his immense credit never Steel would do such a thing. I said Wilson and Shirley Williams. This criticised our culpable neglect of him that, if he was right, it would pre- latter was charged with the not un- that night – but the others seemed sumably be possible for him to find known task of ‘thinking the un- to have had some sort of collective a way of getting an assurance on the thinkable’. It duly did so and some aberration. Stephen Ross, of whom matter. Jim suggested that I see Steel of its better ideas found their way I was extremely fond, wagged his myself and obtain a copy of the ad- into the manifesto, sometimes as lit- finger within inches of Archy’s face vance of his speech. I duly went tle inset boxes within the text. Other and shouted, ‘I can understand across to his hotel suite and was de- ideas were less sound, including one Michael – he’s always held these views nied access by the Special Branch to help first-time house buyers by – but you! You! Steel made you!’ It officer outside. So, in due course, I making capital grants to them. was bizarre. Eventually, after a lot watched the speech on a television was still a time when house prices more of the same, George Mackie, monitor outside the hall, and, despite were flying high and it was an eco- whose physical stature was somewhat being mentally prepared for it, I was nomic fact of life that house prices substantial, virtually frog-marched sickened to see the Liberal Party reflected the amount of cash avail- Archy away with him, and the meet- leader, without any warning to them, able in the market, so that any capi- ing subsided. The following morn- attack his own colleagues in public, tal grants made available to prospec- ing Archy told me that, when he had and to watch the cameras home in tive purchasers would put the price finally got away, he had got into his on Archy, Simon and on Maggie of houses up by approximately the car and driven around without any Clay – loyal Liberals who had done same amount. This was debated on journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 25 would clear it with Alan of massive city council resources Beith, which I duly did. against us by our city-councillor La- When I got back to the bour opponent, and an inability to House the next day I squeeze the Conservative vote. A bumped into Maggie reasonably accurate comment from Smart, David Owen’s per- one Conservative voter was that I sonal assistant. She was more dangerous than Labour! I laughed when she saw suspect that this was a common re- me and told me that sponse; after all, one cannot main- David had been breath- tain the kind of radical position ing fire and slaughter which goes with Liberalism and not whilst awaiting my call expect it to be understood from time and had stamped off to time. into his private room to However, I recall the moment take it. He had eventu- when I realised that we were not ally emerged smiling going to win. I was doing some day- and announced, time canvassing on a council estate ‘We’ve an even better when the news was broadcast that policy now’. David Owen, when pressed at a The Alli- news conference, had said that on ance manifesto was, I balance he would find it easier to do believe, a respectable a deal with Mrs Thatcher. In the in- and reasonable at- dustrial West Riding this was far tempt to maximise from being a seductive appeal to pro- the Alliance’s politi- spective ‘Alliance’ voters who had cal attractions. It wasn’t a been painstakingly weaned away Liberal manifesto but it represented from Labour over almost years, the report of the ‘New Ideas Group’ the best that could be produced from and whose views on Mrs T were and duly referred to the full joint a partnership which had ceased to more sadistic than salacious. The manifesto committee. As it happened fire the imagination of the elector- sharp change in the response on the it came up quite late on the latter’s ate. I got on fine with Ian doorsteps was predictably sudden. agenda when most of the SDP had, Wrigglesworth – which might shock probably sensibly, departed. I duly some colleagues – and we had no explained the economics of the pro- great difficulty in reconciling our Merger posal and it was agreed to drop it. I different perceptions in order to pro- There was little enough time to sulk then went to King’s Cross for the duce a readable final text, so much after the result. Steel launched him- train back to Leeds. I arrived at so that, from time to time during the self into the dash for merger, and yet home to be met by Liz saying that I more traumatic moments of the another futile attempt to protect the had to ‘phone Owen immediately. I merger negotiations, he would sug- cause from its leader had to be made. did so and was told that I ‘had played gest that he and I should be sent of The Harrogate Assembly of a dirty trick tonight by waiting un- to produce an acceptable format for was a very different affair from that til the SDP members of the com- both groups. of . I ran for election as Party mittee had gone and then getting This task completed, I headed President, as much to tackle a worth- this attractive idea defeated’. I went back northwards to grapple with fate while party job whilst out of Parlia- through the economic arguments yet in West Leeds. Our local association ment as anything else, but one could again and was met by a brief silence, agonised briefly over the description not, I suppose, escape from the con- then ‘OK – so what do we do for on the nomination paper and com- test between myself and Susan Tho- first-time buyers?’ I suggested that promised on ‘Liberal Alliance’. Add- mas tending to be depicted as rep- more assistance with ‘back-loading’ ing ‘SDP’ stuck in the throat. I reck- resenting different positions on the mortgages, i.e. lower initial interest oned that we would need a national Alliance and, by extension, on rates and higher later ones, would vote of around % for us to hang merger. I won, and Susan went to help first-time buyers but would not on and the final tally was some % the House of Lords. There are some have anything like the same finan- short of this figure. There were other rewards for being in the Liberal cial effect. Owen then said, ‘Can you minuses (including horrendous li- Democrats! explain this to Alex?’ Wearily, I did bels, legal actions on which were not In retrospect, when contrasted so and Alex conferred with Owen. finally won against Maxwell and with the special merger assembly at Then Owen asked, ‘Can you get this Murdoch until after the election), the Norbreck Castle – a somewhat through your side?’ and I said I including the legal but immoral use giant Fawlty Towers – in Blackpool
26 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 the following year, the delegates at the proposed party and, having asked much later why he ever ac- the Harrogate gathering were clearly proudly fought for the Liberal Party cepted the original draft, David Steel deliberately determined to get the for years, this was too much to still defended it as an acceptable best deal. The negotiating team stomach and I left – to be unexpect- statement. elected appeared to be weighted on edly door-stepped by John Sargent The special assembly was un- the side of those used to extracting who was waiting in the entrance of pleasant. It was as well ‘fixed’ as I used the uttermost farthing in tough po- Cowley Street on the off-chance of to do as Assembly Committee Chair. litical circumstances. I sallied forth a news item. I resigned over the Those opposed to merger had few to London for this vital task but name, not over the NATO nonsense. big guns and some of those col- found that one had reckoned with- I was still around for the ‘dead leagues who were called to speak out the ex-officio team members, parrot’ episode. Once again it pro- were not unduly helpful – some particularly those from Scotland and vided a vivid example of the party’s were genuinely too upset to cope Wales, who were far more con- leadership problem. David Steel was with the occasion. I suspect that I cerned to get a deal than to stand happy to let Robert Maclennan and made my worst assembly speech ever up for the Liberal Party. One Scot, his aides draft the policy statement and the vote was in any event a fore- Chris Mason, openly admitted that that was to accompany the comple- gone conclusion. I was, however, he was for ‘merger at any price’. And, tion of the merger negotiations. Steel more proud of the ‘manifesto’ that of course, we had a leader who was saw the draft and pronounced him- some of us wrote, printed and dis- often absent, didn’t understand what self satisfied with it. When Alan Beith tributed which put the case rather caucuses were for, and who found and other Liberals saw the final better than the constraints on debate solidarity a difficult concept. Tony document, at the eleventh hour, they permitted in the hall. Greaves and Rachael Pitchford have were horrified at its reactionary con- Even then I couldn’t bring my- done all that is necessary for an un- tents and realised that there was no self finally to abandon the cause en- derstanding of the whole disastrous chance of it being accepted by the tirely. I thought that if Alan Beith negotiation. Time after time Tony Liberal Parliamentary Party, let alone became leader of the new party there and I ended up on the .pm train the party in the country. There was was just a chance that it might be- from King’s Cross to Leeds with the bizarre press conference that come Liberal enough to encompass To ny miserably huddled in his duf- wasn’t, when copies of the draft had those who felt bereft. It was noth- fel coat. I would reach home around to be scooped up again from the ing personal against Paddy Ashdown, am and Tony, I guess, another hour press, and then the frantic efforts to whose company I’ve always enjoyed, or so later in Colne. produce an acceptable version in but simply a political judgement As so often in this sorry tale, the time to rescue the situation. Two based on an assessment of their rela- outcome could have been much bet- things are significant about this epi- tive consistency and awareness over ter. There was no need to form the sode: first, that the SDP’s real views the preceding years. I never paid a merged party on such disadvanta- on policy became starkly apparent subscription but I availed myself of geous terms – which, I would still to Liberals, but didn’t affect my col- the rule which let one’s membership argue, were and are an intellectual leagues’ judgement re the value of extend into the new party, so that I and political fraud. There came a merger; and, second, even when could campaign for Alan. Even that moment, late on in the negotiations when Bob Maclennan dissolved in tears as members of his team re- signed, and said that he would have to withdraw to consider his situa- tion. The Liberal team went back to the National Liberal Club absolutely clear that it was possible to achieve merger, if we so wished, on terms which would be palatable to the Lib- eral Party and which would entail few if any resignations. I was aston- ished to find that the immediate view of a majority of colleagues– the otherwise stalwart Alan Beith in- cluded – was ‘what will it take to get the SDP back to the negotiating ta- ble?’ That, as they say, was the defin- ing moment. Shortly afterwards the Liberals caved in over the name of journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 27 glimmer of a possibility was extin- of this. I believe that in there – of the late s and the s guished and I headed off into limbo, was a somewhat warmer feeling to- Grimond years had rooted itself in until it became bit by bit apparent wards the Liberals than towards the the determination to build, in Jo’s that there were enough people of SDP, possibly because of the pro-un- words, a ‘radical non-socialist pro- like mind, some of whom had kept derdog feeling that it was the Liber- gressive alternative to the Conserva- their local Liberal associations going, als who had ‘soldiered on through the tives’. This determination, as with to relaunch the Liberal Party nation- wilderness whilst the SDP had so- all political strategies, had continu- ally. In its small way it remains a journed in the tents of the ally to re-interpret itself within the forthright witness to a political cause unrighteous’. I don’t think that this context of the immediate political which has inspired so many indi- response should be oversold, but I agenda. Hence the struggle with the viduals for so many years, and which believe that it was there. Thorpe and Steel leadership cliques; has been treated so badly by some What I am more sure about is that hence the delicate electoral trick of who should have known better. had the Liberals fought all the seats suborning the mainly right-wing in which they had been building up protest vote whilst ploughing a dis- then the tactical, and ‘stature’, argu- tinctly radical furrow; hence the at- Conclusion ment for a Liberal vote would have tempt to develop an intellectually A number of questions arise out of been maximised and a significantly coherent and distinct philosophy in this somewhat diffuse narrative and higher vote could have been obtained. the teeth of an impatient Poujadist deserve whatever measure of objec- tive assessment is possible. First, would the Labour Party have reinvented it- Did the arrival of the SDP and the Liberals’ self without the SDP defections? I think the answer is ‘yes’, but only be- participation in the Alliance harm the cause of the final Conservative elec- Liberals’ political project? Unequivocally, tion victory of which drove the Labour Party into its ‘anything so long yes. as its not socialist’ desperation phase. I doubt whether, if the SDP MPs had remained within the Labour Party This is, of course, speculation and, element in the Liberal Party ranks; and fought on, the changes would indeed, the tactical opportunity and hence, above all, the dismay at have come any quicker and it is even would never have been conceded by the successful hijacking of this vital arguable that Labour would not have the SDP who were certainly not in and vibrant Liberal project, firstly by been able so easily to jump a genera- business to assist the Liberal Party. the Alliance and then, finally, by the tion to Blair had the SDP still been Whenever the argument of Liberal merger. around. If this analysis is right then it build-up was advanced in seat nego- It must not be thought that follows that the SDP – and by ex- tiations the SDP response was ‘and those of us who committed our tension the Alliance – has given us you’ve failed to win the seat – so let waking hours to this project over the current Labour landslide. Some us show you how’. many years had some sort of curi- of them are, indeed, active within it. Third, would it have been possi- ous umbilical and myopic attach- Second, would the Liberal Party ble to ignore the SDP’s formation and ment to the Liberal Party per se. Far have achieved the level of elec- to have fought them electorally with from it. Our commitment was, and toral support on its own, without the any chance of success? The answer is, is, to a coherent and highly relevant Alliance? I am inclined to think that alas, firmly ‘no’. For many years the set of Liberal values which we saw, it would have reached around the Liberal Party had tacitly garnered the and see, as the best chance of a civi- same mark had the SDP never been ‘none of the above’ vote without lised, peaceful and convivial world. formed and had the Liberal Party challenging that vote’s motivation, The Liberal Party was, by its con- therefore carried the third-party ban- and enough of it would have slipped stitution, its record and its promise ner alone. The protest vote indicators to the SDP in four-cornered fights the only vehicle for those values. Of were all in place and the party was to have blighted Liberal prospects. course, like all human institutions, in fine fettle, with good harvests of Fourth, did the arrival of the SDP it was flawed. Of course, the graph council seats in the years immediately and the Liberals’ participation in the of commitment and achievement preceding the general election. Alliance harm the Liberals’ political was far from showing a steady up- Within the Alliance vote in the project? Unequivocally, yes. It is this ward advance. But, at its heart, the Liberals polled significantly higher political disaster – for the country pre-Alliance party was sound and than the SDP. The SDP explained this rather than the party – that is the secure – not least in the sense that as being a consequence of the Liber- heaviest price paid for the way the one could rely on its instinctive re- als getting the ‘better’ seats – as de- eight years from unfolded. The sponse in a political crisis. fined by the SDP. I am unconvinced political inspiration – and education Nor must it be thought that those
28 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 who held these views were somehow phy to find oneself recalling earlier conformist outlook such as was pro- strange denizens of some isolated and speeches. At the risk of demonstrat- pounded on many issues by George obscurantist sect who went to the ing the truth of this, I well recall the Orwell’, The Observer, October . I still have a full set of the published Liberal Party Council to hold hands Liberal Assembly philosophy debate titles, presumably because I did not al- to try and contact the living. These of . I was Assembly Committee low colleagues to borrow them. Number were colleagues who were passion- Chair and I wanted to experiment. , The Left and the Liberals, was a par- ate about the desperate conditions of The Thatcher victory earlier that ticularly prescient and relevant tract for their neighbours in those long ne- year provided an opportunity to do the times, written by one Jim Cousins, Labour MP for Newcastle-upon-Tyne glected, quasi-Indian-reservation, ur- so. We set aside an entire afternoon Central since . ban deserts that are misnamed as for a debate without a motion and It would be a very interesting and po- ‘housing’ estates. These were col- with only a vague structure of ab- tentially valuable research project to fol- leagues who saw the urgent need to stract concepts. It was an inspiring low up the subsequent careers of those find some way of making the eco- and formative session – which I elected as Liberal councillors in . See Michael Meadowcroft, ‘Jo Grimond logical imperative relevant to those still have on cassette – and I have – an appreciation’, in Liberator , De- who struggled to conserve anything, from time to time remembered say- cember . let alone energy. These were col- ing that electoral success ‘might fall One of the perennial ‘what if’ discussions leagues who took principled stands unbidden into our grasp, but politi- amongst Liberals involves pondering how on development aid, on the folly of cal success has to be worked for’. I different the Liberal performance in Oc- tober might have been had Jo the nuclear deterrence theory, and on dearly wish I had not been so accu- Grimond then been the party leader and the nonsense of nation-state war- rate nor, indeed, so prescient! at the height of his powers as he was ex- mongering. What is more, these were actly a decade earlier when the parliamen- colleagues who did all this in the teeth Michael Meadowcroft was MP for Leeds tary arithmetic was not as helpful. of Labour’s urban hegemony just as West – and a member of the Lib- The opportunity at the time to gain and much as in the depths of Conserva- eral merger negotiating team. He helped to entrench victories from Labour, cou- pled with the excitement of debating on tive complacency. It is these col- found the independent Liberal Party and at least equal terms with Labour, is shown leagues who survived everything that was subsequently its President. in the municipal electoral record of the the opposition could throw at them period but was apparently marginal to the and, for their pains, were traduced by Notes: party leadership’s national strategy. their erstwhile colleagues who had To meet the deadline most of this essay See the most recent, and most explicit, book on the affair: Simon Freeman with been seduced by the superficial was written whilst on mission in Cam- bodia – which may explain, if not ex- Barrie Penrose, Rinkagate – The Rise and sloganising of the Alliance years and cuse, its somewhat diffuse style. Fall of Jeremy Thorpe (Bloomsbury, ). had then been stampeded by the sim- See for instance Michael Meadowcroft, The Liberal Assembly included a plistic attractions of the merger. The Focus on Freedom – The Case for the Lib- private session at which a censure mo- result is a merged party with a stead- eral Party, (Liberal Party, ). tion from Dr James Walsh on the party Rachael Pitchford and Tony Greaves, officers re their treatment of Thorpe was ily declining electoral base, with vir- defended by the Party President, Chair tually no presence in areas that would Merger: The Inside Story (Liberal Renewal, ) (see review elsewhere in this issue). and Assembly Chair (Gruff Evans, Geoff otherwise be Labour-held, whose I once committed the ultimate narcis- To rdoff and Michael Meadowcroft re- commendable gains in seats are the sistic indulgence of looking up my own spectively). The three officers agreed be- consequence of tactical voting, and entry in the British Library catalogue, forehand that there was no point in con- and was surprised to see a number of tinuing to cover up the reality of the whose hybridity as a party guaran- Thorpe disaster and decided to confront tees a lack of that intellectual rigour early pamphlets listed which I could not remember writing! the Assembly with the bare facts. If the necessary to forge a visibly distinc- David once agreed to play the piano on motion was carried, all three agreed to tive image. In one way or another, camera for a ‘Children in Need’ televi- resign. Gruff Evans stunned the packed those of us who couldn’t reconcile sion appeal and then came to me in a room with his frank exposition of what ourselves with merger felt as we did panic in order to get the Granny Lee we had had to go through. I have no doubt that the motion would have been because we were conscious of the cal- Jazz Band to accompany him. We spent a whole morning recording I can’t give defeated but Tony Greaves and John lousness which – at the time, but far you anything but love which, when trailed Smithson decided – uniquely – to act as less evident today – epitomised the on air, no viewer was prepared to pledge conciliators and got it withdrawn. success of the quick fix over the po- cash to hear! I have the rushes of the At one Scarborough Assembly Cyril Carr litical crusade, and which clearly nei- whole recording session – they are avail- attacked the Young Liberals publicly. This able in exchange for a rather large brown led to the setting up of a ‘Commission’ ther esteemed our long struggle under the Chairmanship of Stephen worthwhile nor had any regard for envelope. David Steel, Against Goliath (Weidenfeld Te rrell QC to look at the status of the the party which had carried the Lib- and Nicolson, ); see for instance Young Liberals within the party. So far as eral banner with pride for so long, pages , , and . I know, no copy of the Terrell Report has Note, for instance, a typical Grimond survived – assuming that it ever existed. and which was still serviceable and comment: ‘There must be a bridge be- The February ’ election left no party very much viable. with an overall majority; Heath at- It is, I suppose, a sign of encroach- tween socialism and the Liberal policy of co-ownership in industry through a tempted to arrange a deal with the Lib- ing senility or even of political atro- type of syndicalism coupled with a non- erals to keep him in office. journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 29 How the Alliance worked ....
‘At one session, Steel stormed out .... [When he ‘David Owen has no tolerance for failure. He virtually told returned,] the photographer had to stand on his head to Jenkins to leave. He said, “you’re of no use to us now”.’ make everyone smile. [He] kept calling them Roy Rogers, Bill Rodgers, 1984 Dr Death and so on. They behaved like children, the way they fought and sulked.’ ‘I was against going to bed with the Liberals from the Consultant from Gold Greenlees Trott (who handled the beginning. We should have run against them in the early SDP account in the 1983 campaign) byelections and beat them into the ground. Then we would have had more clout in the negotiations.’ ‘From the beginning, I knew it would have been better David Owen, 1984 without involving Roy, but Bill and Shirley were vacillating .... In the beginning, it was truly a Gang of Three, and ‘Yes. We did make one tactical error. We underestimated we should have kept it that way.’ the capacity of the Alliance to make a mess of its own David Owen, 1984 campaign’ Norman Tebbitt (Conservative press conference, 1987) ‘The others could never have done it without me .... I was the founder. I delivered the Dimbleby Lecture. I made the ‘The press operations should have reflected the strategy first radical move ....’ more .... But of course there was no strategy really.’ Roy Jenkins, 1984 Graham Watson, on the 1987 campaign
For the Pact, see Alistair Michie and geries in Croydon whilst he went on par- of Derek Gladwin’s discomfort. Derek Simon Hoggart, The Pact – The inside story liamentary delegations overseas. Accord- was the long-serving Chairman of the of the Lib-Lab government, – (Quar- ing to Mary, Bill would also go through Labour Conference Arrangements tet Books, ). the post each morning searching for en- Committee and, when from time to time Both Christopher Mayhew and, later, velopes which might conceivably contain we compared notes, he used to pride David Owen told me that they were cheques from television interviews, etc.! himself on his ruthless ability to keep the convinced that, had Steel insisted that ‘no One could add ‘such as they were’; I am Conference under control. PR for Europe, then no Pact’ then it under no illusion that there was a dy- The ‘winnable seats’ list, to which was could have been delivered. It is interest- namic and well organised association in directed central financial and other sup- ing, also, that no Liberals secured places Croydon NW, but the point is still valid. port, always included the ‘traditional’ on important quangos during the Pact. In the s the Liberal Party indulged Liberal constituencies – for decades We were usually, in any case, far too oc- in fantasies about moving the Assembly Merioneth was a favourite target for aid cupied in undertaking speaking engage- to exotic locations. A project to hold it – but studiously avoided seats in indus- ments in far-flung outposts. I recall one in Douglas, Isle of Man, eventually trial areas. Leeds had support from the such event in Llanelli where, after an in- foundered because the Isle of Man’s then Joseph Rowntree Social Service Trust terminable train journey, I was given a predilection for birching young offend- but never received anything from any of civic welcome by the Assistant Town ers was thought to be potentially em- the HQ slush funds. Clerk – clearly an accurate local assess- barrassing politically. Another scheme to The evidence for this is among my po- ment of my status! Having thus been show European solidarity by holding it litical papers recently deposited with the well looked after and transported to each in Scheveningen, Holland, had to be British Library of Political and Economic planned venue, I spoke at a dinner which dropped because the party was advised Science (at LSE). I also used much of it in due well-lubricated course progressed that it was probably illegal to hold the during the committee stage of one of the to the hymn-singing stage and I had to AGM of the party outside the UK! local government bills in the – par- find my own weary way back to the sta- Contrary to the received truths about my liament, and it can therefore be found in tion for the sleeper back to London. antipathy to the SDP, I probably at- the Committee Hansard. ‘Leadership’, in this context, is not solely tended, and participated in, more SDP This tendency is even more the case with the Leader himself but that Parliamen- functions than any Liberal MP apart the Liberal Democrats, who appear to tary charmed circle which felt that it had from the leader. have impaled themselves on the memo- to impose whatever ‘corporate’ decision It may have been the Party Council, in rable slogan ‘End Equidistance’ with the it had alighted upon. In this context The Bath, I think, where Peter Freitag en- inevitable consequence that their vote Economist ( September ) com- gaged me in interminable conversation slumped in virtually all constituencies mented that ‘Social Democrats have lit- on the pavement outside the hotel venue. that would otherwise be Labour. tle difficulty in working with the much There was then a bomb warning and the Michael Meadowcroft, Liberal Values for a smaller group of smoothies that surround entire hotel disgorged on to the pave- New Decade (Liberal Publications Depart- Mr Steel.’ ment and milled all around us. Peter con- ment, ). William Wallace persuaded June , on Lib-Lab relationships; tinued his earnest colloquy with me, ob- me to write this booklet and gave valu- January , on the Lib-Lab Pact; livious to the emergency. Eventually the able editing comments. In particular he – January , on the Liberal-So- ‘all clear’ was announced and still Peter encouraged me to make explicit the dif- cial Democrat merger. impressed his views on me. We eventu- ference between Thatcherite ‘economic On arrival at Westminster in , I in- ally staggered inside to the Council liberalism’ and genuine ‘political liberal- herited Bill Pitt’s splendid secretary, Mary meeting with Peter totally unaware of ism’. Curiously, William’s drafts for the Walker, who regaled me with stories of the Irish interlude. recent Liberal International th Anni- regularly having to do Bill’s weekend sur- An extra source of glee was the thought versary manifesto incorporate laudatory
30 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 support for economic liberalism. and, therefore, against the official Lib- well as being unstable. Efforts to con- Michael Meadowcroft, Social Democracy eral Party candidate – in Broadgreen. tain the problem only exacerbated it and – Barrier or Bridge? (Liberator Publica- Sue Robertson, who ran the SDP Whips’ he eventually defected. tions, ). It is interesting that David office with great efficiency, once told me This was not the only reason for losing Steel began by believing that the SDP that I was David Owen’s favourite Lib- West Leeds. The pervasive and clever should fight one hundred seats (David eral MP. I implored her not to spread (though legal) use of city council funds Steel, Against Goliath, page ). this information. to promote the Labour candidate cer- To complete the ‘set’ I also wrote two I shared this office with Simon Hughes, tainly had an effect, as no doubt did a other Liberator Publication booklets: who has been a long-time friend. This highly unpleasant libel action which Liberalism and the Left (), and Liber- friendship was occasionally strained by took four years to win against the alism and the Right (). Simon’s addiction to clerical colonialism, Murdoch and Maxwell empires. As stated It was a time for setpiece debates and I in that his papers encroached inexora- elsewhere in this essay, Owen’s admis- took part in very well-attended occasions bly across the floor, forcing me into a sion that, if the coalition opportunity with David Marquand (which was pub- smaller and smaller corner! arose, he would prefer to do a deal with lished as Liberalism and Social Democracy The early chapters of the first edition of Mrs Thatcher rather than with Neil (Arena, LPD, )), Tony Benn, at the David Owen’s book, Face the Future Kinnock was a serious blow. Harrogate Assembly , and with Ken (Jonathan Cape, ), contained much These are in the papers recently depos- Livingstone, at LSE, in . that strikes chords with Liberals. See, for ited at BLPES. Roy Jenkins was reliably reported as hav- instance, the positive references to early Typically it was an abrasive and tough ing attempted to join the Liberal Party libertarian thought in the Fabian move- negotiation with Owen over the word- on three occasions: firstly in the late ment, pages and . ing of the motion, but, once agreed it s, when he was allegedly dissuaded The phrase comes from H. H. Asquith, stayed agreed. by Lady Violet Bonham Carter, then in referring to himself in contrast to the Radical Quarterly , Autumn . the s when the Labour Party was Coalition Liberals, November . Across the Divide, Liberal Values for Defence turning against European unity, and fi- For once, I kept a diary of those early and Disarmament (LINk, September nally at the end of his Presidency of the Parliamentary Party meetings and this is ). European Commission and before the in my papers recently deposited in the Britain United – The Time has Come, the SDP ‘project’ was mooted, when he was British Library of Political and Eco- SDP-Liberal Alliance Programme for urged by David Steel to launch the SDP nomic Science, at LSE. Government, . The same sweatered instead. David Steel has denied that Roy It was at this time that the role of the Policy and smiling leaders’ picture as on the Jenkins formally applied to join the Lib- Committee was enhanced with serious manifesto was on many posters around eral Party and told me that the only La- attempts to make it a genuine partnership the country, with the accompanying slo- bour MP actually to ask about member- between the Parliamentary Party and the gan ‘The only fresh thing on the menu’. ship was Neville Sandelson! party in the country. Also LINk (Liberal In West Leeds some wag added ‘Sell-by Roy Jenkins, in his short period in of- Information Network) was formed, par- date: th June’. fice as the first SDP leader, had a very ticularly with Leighton Andrews and Vir- Alex de Mont, David Owen’s econom- different style, and did not ruffle feath- ginia Morck, as a vehicle for new Liberal ics adviser. ers in the way David Owen managed to, thinking on topical issues. Pitchford and Greaves, Merger: The Inside hence the concentration on the Owen Contrary to what one what might have Story. leadership period. been assumed, the relationship between ‘I wouldn’t say that there was much One SDP recruit, Christopher Steel and Beith was neither warm nor wrong with the document itself’. David Brocklebank-Fowler, was elected as a cooperative. Alan Beith appeared to have Steel on the ‘Dead Parrot’ policy state- Conservative MP. no great belief in Steel’s capabilities and ment, BBC Radio , March . When I gently warned Barbara Lyons of David Steel appeared to suspect Beith of Merger or Renewal? A Report to the Joint this new challenge she looked surprised, permanently angling for the leadership. Liberal Assembly, – January , ‘Oh, I think we’ll be all right – they’ve See, for instance, the whispers that Beith Michael Meadowcroft. always been happy to vote for Edward’. knew in advance about the contents of Jo Grimond, when asked once in a tel- The only defector to resign and fight the the ‘Dead Parrot’ document but kept evision interview, whether the Liberal subsequent byelection, in Mitcham and quiet, hoping that it would bring Steel vote was to a large extent a protest vote, Morden, was a late recruit, Bruce Doug- down and open the way to Beith becom- replied, ‘Well, there’s a great deal to pro- las-Mann. His timing was exquisite, with ing leader – an allegation that I believe test about.’ the byelection taking place at the height to be wholly wrong and mischievous (see A typically biblical phrase used by Sir of Falklands hype. Bruce duly got clob- Ivor Crewe and Anthony King, SDP – Frank Medlicott at the Liberal Assem- bered. The Birth, Life and Death of the Social Demo- bly of , following his return to the One such difficult councillor recruit, from cratic Party (OUP, ), p. ). Liberal Party after spending years as the Conservatives, was in Huddersfield, One exception was the Labour Seats a ‘National Liberal and Conservative’ MP. where the man in question wrote long Committee, financed personally by Cyril Clement Davies, Liberal leader from and often accusatory letters on an antique Smith, but largely coordinated by me, to , once said that the National typewriter with a bi-coloured ribbon. He with the late Mike Harskin as its some- Liberals were ‘Liberals to save their souls went to the amazing trouble of switch- what capricious, often brilliant but oc- and National Liberals to save their seats.’ ing to the red half of the ribbon for the casionally wayward staff person. This ini- Jo Grimond was typically contrary, in letter ‘D’ every time he typed ‘SDP’! tiative produced material specifically of that he was opposed to the Lib-Lab Pact The SDP’s national nominee in Yorkshire use to those colleagues whose main op- but, generally and far from uncritically, was John Horam, who ended up as a ponent was Labour. supported the Alliance. Conservative Minister. The local situation was not helped by Alan Watkins told me that he anticipated These were Liverpool Broadgreen, the embarrassing hijacking of the Lib- it being a disastrous session but that it Hackney South and Shoreditch, and eral nomination for my vacated city had turned out to be one of the most Hammersmith. Official Liberal HQ council seat by a candidate who turned stimulating party conference debates he speakers spoke for the SDP candidate – out to be an undischarged bankrupt as had experienced. journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 31 The Merger Process An SDP Retrospect Willie Goodhart looks back at the merger process from the perspective of the SDP negotiating team. Could it have been handled differently?
In September representatives of the Liberal SDP conference) in Portsmouth in late August. This was a sad and angry event – so much so Party and the SDP sat down together to begin a that a supporter and opponent of merger came courtship that ended in marriage six months later. to blows one evening in a restaurant. The CSD The courtship was extremely difficult and on more adopted a resolution authorising negotiations for merger to proceed. than one occasion nearly ended in disaster. Yet the Shortly afterwards, the Liberals held their marriage has turned out to be remarkably happy. Assembly at Harrogate. This was a much more Like the White Nile and the Blue Nile meeting at cheerful occasion, at which the principle of merger was approved by an overwhelming Khartoum, the two streams retained their distinctive majority. However, a decision that was taken identity for a while but then merged into an almost there – to create a negotiating team of peo- indistinguishable whole. ple – was responsible for much of the subse- quent trouble. The Assembly decided to elect The merger negotiations started against the eight members of the negotiating team; by the depressing background of the SDP split. After time ex-officio members and representatives the failure to achieve a breakthrough in the of the Scottish and Welsh Liberals had been elections, some of us in the SDP felt that added, the number had risen to . It should we needed to start talking with the Liberals have been obvious that this was far too big to about merger. However, a vote at the SDP au- be a serious negotiating body. Meetings be- tumn conference in Salford (a gloomy event came far too long drawn out and turned into in a gloomy location, cheered up only by a bril- debates on party lines. Things would have liant maiden platform speech by the party’s gone far more smoothly if there had been no only new MP, Charles Kennedy) made it clear more than five or six negotiators on each side. that most of the party was not yet ready. Four However, once the Liberals had decided on years of tedious haggling over seat allocation such a large team, the SDP had no option but (single-party selection, joint closed selection, to follow suit. joint open selection – remember them?) and Another decision which was arguably the fiasco of the two Davids’ campaign in wrong, and for which the SDP was rather more changed people’s minds and convinced many to blame than the Liberals, was the decision to of us that merger was essential. include the two party leaders as members of This view was emphatically not shared by the negotiating teams. It was understandable David Owen. Over the opposition of nearly that Robert Maclennan wished to be a mem- half the members of the SDP’s National Com- ber of the team. He was extremely interested mittee (including my wife Celia) he forced the in party constitutional issues and very skilled party into a highly divisive referendum imme- at them. He had been responsible for devising diately after the general election. The ‘Yes to the SDP constitution (which I had drafted on Unity’ campaign (run from our house) won his instructions) and was naturally keen on about per cent of the vote. Owen refused playing an active role in the planning of the to accept the result and resigned as party leader, new party’s constitution. But his direct involve- being replaced by Robert Maclennan who had ment had two unfortunate consequences. First, opposed merger but was willing to accept the if the leaders had remained outside the day- party’s decision. This was followed by the meet- to-day negotiations they could have acted as a ing of the Council for Social Democracy (the kind of appellate body to which questions on
32 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 which the negotiators were dead- liance Commission on defence list. There was almost no regional locked could be referred. Second, policy. On other issues, there was lit- structure, and the words ‘Scotland’ Maclennan’s involvement meant that tle serious difference except on nu- and ‘Wales’ did not appear in the Steel necessarily became the leader clear energy, which the SDP sup- party constitution. Control of the of the Liberal team. It was the im- ported while the Liberals passion- party’s administration rested firmly pression of the SDP team – and I ately opposed it. in the hands of the National Com- think of the Liberal team as well – The cultural differences between mittee. The Council for Social De- that David was as deeply bored by the parties were much deeper. mocracy had limited policy-making constitutional minutiae as Robert Those of us from the SDP who paid powers but had no power to debate was fascinated by them. But these fraternal visits to Liberal Assemblies or decide on questions of party ad- were crucial to the negotiating proc- found them lively, stimulating and ministration. SDP local parties were ess, and the result was that the Lib- obviously much enjoyed by the par- very much under the control of the eral team had no effective leadership. ticipants. We also found them anar- party’s HQ. The SDP’s centralism On the one hand, David was unwill- chic and self-indulgent, with im- was understandable in the context. ing or unable to browbeat the more portant policy decisions being taken The Gang of Four were not certain obstreperous members of his team, with little or no preparation; too what kind of members their new with the result that the SDP was on many points of order and other party would attract; they were afraid several occasions enraged by the un- time-wasting technicalities; consti- that unless they retained tight cen- picking by the Liberals of issues tutional amendments being passed tral control it would end up as some- which we thought had been agreed. by unrepresentative groups of del- thing quite different from what they On the other hand, David was not egates at early-morning sessions; wanted. As it turned out their fears prepared to put up a stiff enough and annual pleas by the party head- were unjustified, but the centralism fight against us, with the result that quarters for a little financial support was hard to abandon. on some issues we won when this from the constituency parties. All The task for the negotiators was was not in the long-term interest of this contributed to the public im- to reconcile these very different cul- the new party. age of the Liberals as a well-mean- tures. This was a long and painful On policy issues the parties were ing but disorganised bunch, domi- process. I do not propose to go into not in fact very far apart. If that had nated by beards and sandals (and any detail about it; the merger ne- not been the case, it would not have anyone who thinks that that was not gotiations have been described fully been possible to form the Alliance. the public image should ask them- by Rachael Pitchford and Tony Even on defence, the Liberal Party selves why our opponents continue Greaves in their book, Merger: the never called for unilateral nuclear to call us ‘Liberals’). Inside Story (see review on page ). disarmament or withdrawal from The SDP, on the other hand, was Their book, though written from a NATO. The difference was that the perhaps too intellectual and too viewpoint very different from mine, is an excellent description of the negotiations and factually reliable. David was not prepared to put up a stiff They were of course not in a posi- tion to report on internal debates enough fight against us, with the result that within the SDP negotiating team, but these were far less interesting on some issues we won when this was not and dramatic than the internal de- in the long-term interest of the new party. bates within the Liberals. With the exception of John Grant (who was basically an Owenite and disliked Liberals – unlike the SDP – had a centralist. We were full of journal- the whole concept of merger) and, large unilateralist minority, and the ists, academics and lawyers. We had to a lesser extent, Will Fitzgerald, official position of the party was debates of high quality and produced the team worked on a common therefore less clearly multilateralist well-thought-out, well-written pa- agenda and had no great difficulty than the SDP’s. The vote at the pers on national policy, but we were in reaching a consensus on almost Liberal Assembly at Eastbourne basically uninterested in local poli- all issues. which did so much harm to the Al- tics. Few of us had much interest in We were also very defensive, fear- liance was not a call for unilateral- Focus leaflets on the aspects of com- ing that the Liberal Party, with its ism but a rejection of the absurd pro- munity politics which had, by , much larger numbers, would domi- posal for an Anglo-French bomb. enabled the Liberals to build a sig- nate the new party. This was to a This had been floated by the two nificant base in local government. considerable extent a mistaken Davids to try to make good the The SDP was also a very centralist analysis. In the first place, it is by no damage done by Owen’s rubbishing party in terms of organisation. Mem- means certain that the numbers of of the sensible ideas of the joint Al- bership was recorded on a national the Liberal Party were as large as all journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 33 that. In the absence of a central negotiations were, however, consid- therefore representative, conference; membership register and with the erably hindered by the Liberal Party and a deliberative policy-making practice in many constituency par- Council – a body whose main func- process. On these, we scored perhaps ties of keeping names on their lists tion appeared to be to intervene two and a quarter out of three. A long after they had stopped paying from time to time to reject agree- national register was adopted subscriptions, the claimed Liberal ments reached by the negotiating (though with a separate register for membership of , was probably teams. This strengthened the resolve Scotland). This was undoubtedly the a considerable exaggeration. In the of the SDP team to ensure that there right decision. Information technol- second place, there were many Lib- was no equivalent body in the con- ogy had of course only recently erals – not just those close to the stitution of the new party. made an effective national register SDP, such as Richard Holme and The negotiations involved a lot practicable, but the register has re- Alan Watson – who wanted a more of discussion about the federal struc- lieved local parties of a lot of time- efficient and coherent party struc- ture of the party. The SDP team had consuming record-keeping and sub- ture. Many of us had met such peo- little difficulty in accepting that our scription renewal duty. A national ple at constituency level and had own constitution was too centralist register has also made it possible for found them easy to work with. We (particularly for a party supporting the national party to communicate underestimated their influence, devolution in national politics!) and directly with its members, to finance partly because they were not ad- that a federal structure was necessary. its own activities more effectively equately represented on the Liberal The Liberals equally accepted that and to conduct party-wide elections negotiating team. the Scottish Liberals should be part on the basis of a proper register of The negotiations were helped by of a federal party rather than (as they members. The Labour Party has now the fact that relationships of trust had previously been) a legally inde- followed us into a national register were developed at two key levels – pendent body. There were, however, and the Conservatives will probably between Andy Ellis and Dick long arguments about the nature of have to follow suit. Newby as the parties’ Chief Execu- the federal structure – arguments The negotiations on the com- tives (helped by the fact that Dick which were rather more between position of the conference ended in had made it clear that he did not the Scottish and English Liberals the Liberals’ favour. Although vot- wish to become the Chief Execu- than between the Liberals and the ing membership of the Liberal As- tive of the new party), and between SDP. At any rate, agreement was sembly was, in theory, not self-se- Philip Goldenberg and myself as the reached, though it had to be substan- lected, the number of places allo- constitutional draftsmen. The close tially modified by the review of the cated to constituency parties was so working relationship between Philip Liberal Democrat constitution in large and there were so many al- and me enabled us to produce drafts . ternative routes to becoming an as- with great speed, and with the con- The issues on which the SDP felt sembly delegate (through bodies fidence that neither of us was trying most strongly were a national mem- such as the students’ or women’s or- to steal a march on the other. The bership register; an elected, and ganisations) that, in practice, any party member who wanted to at- tend and vote could do so. The SDP Now you see it, now you don’t; Alliance leaders Steel and Maclennan explain to team believed that this made assem- the media why the policy declaration is not available (13 January 1988). blies unrepresentative and, in par- ticular, gave the Young Liberals dis- proportionate influence. We were therefore anxious to limit the number of voting conference rep- resentatives to a level which would make it likely that there would be contests in most local parties for election to the conference. We did not achieve this. Although the al- ternative routes to conference were eliminated (except for students, whom we acknowledged to be a special case because they would not normally be active in their local parties) the number of places allo- cated to local parties (which was further increased by the re- view) was large enough to mean
34 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 that most active party members to NATO in the preamble to the party structure, with the new party who wanted to attend conference constitution, and the name of the being left free to determine its ini- as voting representatives were able new party. In my view, the first of tial policy position. The compromise to do so, either as elected members these was necessary. There was a sig- – not in itself unreasonable – was or substitutes. nificant degree of concern in the that there should be a non-binding It has to be admitted, with hind- SDP about Liberal defence policy, policy declaration, agreed between sight, that the compromise over con- particularly in view of the East- Maclennan and Steel. The negotiat- ference membership has proved to bourne Assembly vote. While I be- ing teams played no part in its com- position. It was presented to the SDP negotiating team the evening before The name was another matter. This was its publication, after several hours of tense negotiations on the issues of the prime example of the SDP team’s more NATO and the name. It has to be effective negotiating skill enabling us to said, in the light of the furore which it caused the next day, that in the win battles which it would have been brief time we were given to study it better for us to have lost. none of us objected to it or saw it as likely to create problems, though it was hardly a ringing call to arms. be justified. There are advantages – lieve that this concern was largely What is strange is that David both in presenting ourselves to the unjustified, it undoubtedly existed Steel, who should have been far outside world as a substantial party, and, in the absence of a clear com- more closely attuned to Liberal sen- and in improving party morale by mitment to NATO on behalf of the sitivities, so completely failed to involving a large number of mem- new party, there was a real likelihood foresee that it would be unaccept- bers in the work of the party’s gov- that the SDP would have rejected able to his colleagues. This was a erning body – of having a large vot- merger. The Liberal argument that a self-inflicted wound, because the ing membership. The SDP’s fears that reference to NATO was inappropri- policy differences of the SDP and a large conference, mostly elected ate as part of the new party’s consti- the Liberals were (as I have said without a contest, would behave ir- tution may have been correct in above) less significant than the dif- responsibly have proved to be un- principle but ignored the political ferences of style and organisation. justified. realities. None of us could have It should have been relatively easy On the policy-making process, known that within four years not to agree an acceptable policy state- the balance swung back towards the only the Warsaw Pact but the Soviet ment – and indeed such a statement SDP, with the acceptance of the Union itself would have broken up was quickly hammered out, though principle that policy-making should – making the removal of NATO too late to save us from a serious be a deliberative process based on from the preamble in entirely attack of psittacosis. properly researched and argued uncontroversial. And yet, in the end, the merger policy papers commissioned by the The name was another matter. has worked. The SDP has given our Federal Policy Committee. The ac- This was the prime example of the party an efficient party structure and tual process adopted in the original SDP team’s more effective negoti- a well-regarded policy-making proc- Liberal Democrat constitution ating skill enabling us to win battles ess. The Liberals have given it inter- proved to be too elaborate and had which it would have been better for nal democracy and a commitment to be altered by the review, but us to have lost. The unwieldy ‘So- to community politics which has the principle remains. In practice, cial and Liberal Democrats’ was a been the foundation of its remark- almost all major policy commit- name which was deeply unpopular able success in local government. ments follow from the approval of with most of the party and subjected This is not a bad record. We built Policy Committee motions based on us to ridicule by our opponents. We better than we knew. policy papers. The process has given should have called ourselves ‘Liberal the Liberal Democrats a broadly co- Democrats’ from the beginning. Willie (Lord) Goodhart, a barrister, herent and well-argued set of poli- There was one last sting in the helped write the SDP and Liberal cies which could not, in my view, tail of the negotiations – the infa- Democrat constitutions, and has been had been achieved by the more in- mous ‘dead parrot’ policy declaration. chair of both parties’ Conference Com- formal methods of policy formation This represented a compromise be- mittees. He speaks in the Lords on home in the Liberal Party. tween the SDP demand that the new affairs and social security issues. The final battle of the negotiat- party should start with established ing process came down to two is- policies and the Liberal insistence sues – the inclusion of a reference that the negotiations were about
journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 35 The Two Davids Graham Watson examines how much the failure of the Alliance was due to the failures of its leaders.
The astonishing thing about the four years in which of the two. Owen was a moving star in the firmament, exploring new galaxies, picking up the Alliance was captained by Davids Steel and cosmic dust in the post-Keynes explosion. In Owen is the amount of time spent by hundreds of a new party, where many perceived the idealistic people in sterile argument about the manifesto to have been proven a losing propo- sition, he found room to develop these ideas. internal arrangements of the two parties’ Steel was firmly wedded to the John Rawls cohabitation. That their joint and several leadership ethic of social Liberalism, as was the Liberal failed to overcome this was without doubt its greatest Party whose policy-making process he never sought to dominate. failure. Steel and Owen failed to unite their followers Owen and Steel were never, in the latter’s behind a coherent vision of an alternative course to general election quip, ‘Tweedledum and Tweedledee’. On the contrary, they were de- Thatcherism. Why? cidedly ‘not bosom pals’. Relations ranged Richard Holme has described the Alliance from the acid spreading of stories by the Owen as a tragic comedy: in the first act (–) camp about Steel having suffered a nervous the political space opens for the Liberal Party breakdown to the farcical combined family to be taken seriously and the SDP to form; in lunch at Steel’s Pimlico flat where only claret the second (–) the two parties mount or whisky were on offer, while Owen liked the strongest third-party challenge since the lager and champagne. Nor were the woolly- war to the established two-party hegemony and jumpered Judy or the debonaire Debbie well almost equal Labour in the polls; and in the matched to smooth the course of conviviality third (the denouement, –) it all goes between their respective husbands. horribly wrong. No progress is made and the At work, both leaders were under attack. Alliance subsequently collapses in a hailstorm Owen was opposed in succession by Jenkins, of recriminations. Perhaps unjustly, but inevi- Williams and Rodgers and by a growing sec- tably, the buck stops at the top. tion of the SDP, in particular by those who A major difficulty lay in the similarity of their favoured merger with the Liberals. Steel’s strat- personal appeal. Both in their mid-forties, both egy of realignment was challenged ever more telegenic politicians, each ambitious and with a irately in a Liberal Party which, in Jo Grimond’s certain flair. They were natural rivals. But their words, tended at moments of greatest need to differences posed substantial problems too. Owen turn to putty in its leader’s hands. The furious represented the well-to-do, Oxbridge-educated, monotony of party controversy was a drag fac- English upper-middle classes. He was steeped tor in both men’s approaches to Alliance. The in the easy graces of money and cosmopolitan solidarity between them which it might have society. Steel sought refuge in a more calvinistic, engendered showed itself only in brief flashes self-denying, introverted Scots tradition. His was of uncharacteristic mutual generosity; the way of the campaigner for the common man. schadenfreude was the more ready emotion in While the differences might in other circum- both camps. stances have been complementary, each man Defence policy – the issue which, as Crewe tended to deny his hinterland and approach. But and King point out, disrupted the Labour Party these governed for each the ground rules on for much of the postwar period – became a which their relationship had to be based. And considerable problem for the Alliance. For the rules were different. For Steel, personal David Owen, a hawkish position was a talis- friendship was a prerequisite. For Owen, a busi- man. For Steel, it was a betrayal of mankind’s ness partnership would suffice. potential. Yet major decisions, such as the sit- The second determinant in the affair was ing of cruise missiles in the UK and the re- the difference between the political approaches placement for Polaris nuclear submarines, arose
36 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 during the parliament. Steel, with one eye on public opinion and the other on Alliance unity, attempted to move the Liberal Party away from what he regarded as a dangerous course of unilateral nuclear disarma- ment. Liberal opponents, some with personal ambitions to the leadership and others in opposition to merger, exploited the issue successfully to promote their case by wounding their leader (in the case of the former, only to back down from their policy po- sition a year later). Steel then let slip some details of the contents of the report of the joint commission on de- fence policy and Owen hastily over- reacted, thus dashing a subsequent attempt at compromise too close to The end of the road: Richmond at the end of the 1987 campaign. a general election for recovery. Agreement between the parties On issues of constitutional re- medium for communicating a dis- on individual policies was rendered form, agreement between Liberals tinctive message was severely limited. all the more difficult by a fundamen- and their SDP counterparts was In defence of the media, however, tal difference of approach between never hard to find. Yet as an issue of there was rarely a distinctive Alliance their leaders. Thatcherism was the interest to the electorate, constitu- message to communicate. order of the decade. Owen was pre- tional reform never found the po- Nor were the two parties organ- pared to come to terms with it; Steel tency in the s which it was to ised in any synchronous fashion to was not. Nor was public opposition generate a decade later. Despite the fight a common campaign. Much to Thatcherism ever quite strong Alliance’s best efforts, it was not suf- can be ascribed to mutual fear. If the enough to catapult the Alliance for- ficient as a basis for a winning cam- imbalance in numbers of MPs had ward. The runes of the opinion polls paign in a general election in which favoured the SDP before , feed- were pored over and re-read. The the two parties still talked of the is- ing Liberal paranoia, the converse business community was tested. But sues which interested them rather was true from ’ to ’. An early class warfare was still a powerful de- than those which interested the vot- Alliance slogan had been ‘working terminant of the island’s politics. Mrs ers. Would a consistent message have together’: yet while in some con- Thatcher’s troops had survived their been possible on other issues? Re- stituencies party members were be- wobbly start. She was at the centre form of pensions policy, attitudes to ing told by party headquarters to of Thatcherism, and neither Owen’s the National Health Service, ap- work together against their wishes, sub-Thatcherite posture nor Steel’s proaches to crime and policing, the in others they were ordered not to steely opposition to its social conse- merits of public versus private trans- unite behind a general election quences satisfied the appetite of a port; all were areas where disagree- standard-bearer even where local middle class engaged in a nihilism ment was never more than papered agreement was possible. not seen in Britain since the s. over. For the local government The obvious question to any third The Tories were blessed by a di- elections, the SDP launched its party is: ‘faced with the choice, which vided opposition. The Alliance could manifesto without informing the of the other parties would you put make little headway against a Labour Liberals of either timing or content. in to government?’ This proved the Party whose low water mark had The parties were engaged separately rock on which the Alliance was to been met under Michael Foot. Neil in creative thinking. founder. Interviewed on Weekend Kinnock, though never to enjoy the It is tempting in a third party to World on April , before the credit, had put his party back afloat blame the media for failing to give election was announced, Owen skil- on a rising tide. The Alliance’s in- fair coverage to one’s ideas. In the fully refused to be drawn on which ability to appeal to Labour support- s such concerns were amply jus- party he preferred, as had Steel on a ers was clear from its very lack of tified, as a former editor of The Times number of occasions. But on May, clarity. While Steel met the Notting- has made clear in a seminal auto- in a lengthy general election inter- hamshire miners and the TUC dur- biographical work. With control of view on Panorama in which the two ing the coal dispute, Owen courted the public print and broadcasting Davids were interviewed together by coal boss Ian McGregor, the govern- media in fewer minds, and with the ment’s hatchet man. Alliance unable to open them, the Concluded on page . journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 37 The Alliance and After The Travelling of a Necessary Road Was it all worth it? Stuart Mole looks back at the Alliance years.
There was a time, early in the life of the Liberal most frustrating of all, in . Perhaps it was the iron that entered the soul after the Democrats, when political pedigree mattered. bloodletting and internecine struggles of the Indeed, it revealed itself in the familiar stereotypes: late ’s which saw some former colleagues on sharp suits, Volvos and hands dirtied by mailshots both wings of the old Alliance opt not for merger and reconciliation but for illusion and for the SDP; corduroy and sandals, Morris Travellers, oblivion. Or perhaps, once merger had become and ink-stained Focus hands for the Liberals. a reality, it was the sheer grind of keeping a third party in British politics on the road, brav- History was everything: who had been at ing the disappointments – long on hope and the defining battles of the early days of the Al- short on almost everything else. liance – at Warrington, at Croydon, at Crosby Today, I doubt if party activists give a sec- and at Bermondsey? Who were founder mem- ond thought to the provenance of their col- bers of the SDP, and what had been the sacri- leagues. Certainly, the stereotypes can no longer fices that had been necessary for those, in par- be sustained. We are all – male or female – ticular, who had taken the difficult route from sharp-suited, mobile-phoning, Peugeot own- the higher echelons of the Labour Party? Who ers now. had done what in the seat negotiations – and Indeed, the Liberal Democrats, a new party to whom? What mattered most: Westminster no longer, are a force in the land. We control, credibility, and connections with the great and or significantly influence, councils across much the good, or street credibility, and years of com- of Britain, with nearly , councillors on munity politics and municipal power? principal local authorities. Most remarkable of Of course, it was a divide to do with sub- all, there is now a parliamentary party of real stance and interest, as much as with history substance, comprising MPs. This is the largest and style. Many had a lot to lose by gambling third force in parliament since the days of Lloyd on political realignment. Some had put at risk George, despite a rather modest national their parliamentary seats and staked their repu- vote of just over %. A new generation is be- tations and careers, in the process turning their ginning to emerge for whom the Alliance is backs on erstwhile political colleagues. That no more than a distant memory. was particularly true of the Gang of Four: Roy But, in , with a brave new political Jenkins, David Owen, Shirley Williams and world waiting to be born, none of this could Bill Rodgers. have been foreseen. Could it have turned out Many on the Liberal side had also invested differently? After all, the events of that year much in the status quo: in assiduously culti- promised a great deal. By the time of the spe- vating otherwise barren electoral territory; in cial Labour conference at Wembley, in January building a precious local government base; or , the prospect of a substantial break-out in actually winning and holding a parliamen- from the Labour Party had become tary seat. Nor had David Steel any desire to unstoppable and, with the birth of the SDP in end his respectable career as Liberal leader as March , the extent of the electoral possi- the one who had destroyed a proud and once- bilities were becoming apparent. Alone, the great party. SDP registered extraordinary levels of support. And then there came the moment when But, combined with the Liberal Party, the differences between Liberals and Social Demo- whole really did seem greater than the sum of crats ceased to matter at all. Perhaps it was the its parts and, for a time, led both Conservative shared disappointments of electoral hopes and and Labour in the opinion polls. True, the Lib- hubris cruelly dashed – in l, in l and, eral Party, after the Orpington byelection vic-
38 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 tory of , had briefly achieved down into third-party status and alternative, as the most effective ve- something similar, but never at such consigning it to be ground between hicle for radical realignment. Sir consistent levels of support, not at the two-party millstones. But it was Cyril Smith, the former Chief Whip, such heights (with the Alliance ac- not to be. put it more succinctly: the aim tually cresting the % mark at one Could the SDP have ignored the should be to strangle the new party point). Liberals, gone out on their own and at birth. What destroyed the dream? Was hoped to clear their rivals from the It is a hypothesis worthy of ex- it the ‘Falklands Factor’, which field by putting everything into an ploration, and one which perhaps turned Mrs Thatcher from being early ‘blitzkrieg’? I think not, al- deserves more original research and Britain’s least popular national leader though some might have dreamed a greater historical perspective than on record into one of its most popu- so. But most recognised from the that offered by a decade or so. But lar ever, with the Tory Party surging outset that, even if they considered certain facts are well established. to an unassailable lead of % in the the Liberals an insufficiently ad- There is no denying, for example, opinion polls after the capture of equate or attractive vehicle for po- that David Steel deliberately encour- Port Stanley? Or was it the descent litical realignment, competition with aged Labour dissidents to proceed of the Alliance from the frothy it would be electoral suicide. That with the new party, once he was sure heights of ambition, idealism and certainly was the view of Tom Ellis, that something like the SDP was hope into the murky realities of the then MP for Wrexham, who cir- possible. Indeed, he went further and practical – and worse, coalition – culated to Labour defectors a secret discouraged at least one prominent politics? paper demonstrating the madness of Labour politician from joining the Liberals, judging that the welcome accretion of a handful of Labour The Alliance will be seen as important MPs over time would have nothing like the potentially cataclysmic im- period in the creation of a new kind of pact on British politics that the launch of a breakaway group would multi-party and consensual politics, very have as a fresh political force. different from the old adversarial two-party What if he had done the oppo- site? What if the Liberal leader had system. offered a sympathetic shoulder to potential defectors and encouraged the fracture of the Labour Party but But the general election of a third party in competition with the enticed recruits into the ranks of the showed it to be a close-run thing. fourth in a two-party environment. Liberals, rather than elsewhere, The Liberal-SDP Alliance polled Besides, whatever the froth of opin- warning those tempted to think oth- .% – well over . million votes ion poll ratings and media hype, erwise that a new party would have – which was the best result since the some knew that life at the wrong no future and would be rigorously election when the Liberals had end of the British political system opposed? Some would have joined scored .% of the vote. Then, a was tough. Progress could not be the Liberals. Perhaps Roy Jenkins. marginally higher vote share had made just by advertising and Possibly – but not immediately – netted the Liberals seats. But, in mailshots. It needed grassroots or- Shirley Williams. Probably not Bill , with its vote too evenly spread ganisation and bodies on the ground, Rodgers – ever. Certainly not – ever and insufficiently concentrated in and the SDP just did not have the – David Owen. The new recruits more than a few areas, the tally was numbers where it mattered most. would have been far fewer and the just Members of Parliament If there was no realistic way for- public impact correspondingly less. (mostly Liberals). Of the Labour ward for the SDP than an accom- But Liberals would have been flat- MPs (and Conservative) who had modation with the Liberals, that was tered rather than threatened by their formed an instant SDP parliamen- rather less so for the Alliance part- new allies. Change would have been tary party back in , scarcely a ner. For the Liberal Party, there was digestible. The trauma of seat nego- handful survived. an alternative strategy: to capitalise tiations and policy bartering, and of Had the Alliance managed to on the steady disillusion by voters interminable internecine warfare in edge ahead of Labour (which did with the two-party system (and in an Alliance supposedly offering the disastrously, barely managing % of particular with the then Conserva- British people a new kind of poli- the vote), all might have been tive Government); to encourage po- tics, would have been avoided. Given changed. In such circumstances, the tential Labour defectors to join the the Liberal Party’s six million votes remorseless dynamics of the two- Liberals, rather than form a separate in February , its growing local party system would have worked in party; and, above all, to present the government base and its increasingly the Alliance’s favour, pushing Labour Liberal Party, rather than any new effective campaigning style, it is not journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 39 unreasonable to believe that it might also beneficial, with each partner in time of the European referendum of have done at least as well as the Alli- their own way bringing strengths to , the experiment of the Lib-Lab ance electorally, if not better. the Alliance – and later, the merged Pact of – and, in particular, Could the Alliance itself have party – which the other had been the creation of an Alliance which, for been better constructed? There is a unable to supply. Undoubtedly, the a moment, promised everything but great deal which, with the luxury SDP helped in the development of which, in time, may have been of hindsight, many would wish un- a greater professionalism – in party shown to deliver far more than we done. The public rows over seat ne- structures, in internal decision-mak- realise. gotiations, the disputes over policy ing and membership, in public rela- Over more than years, Liberal (particularly defence), the dis- tions and fund-raising. It also en- Democrats (in whatever their pre- aster of a ‘Prime Minister designate’, couraged a greater rigour in national vious manifestation) have learned and, in the elections, the im- policy creation and in the develop- through these experiences – and possibility of two parties and two ment of new ideas (not least through through the realities of using and leaders, ostensibly part of a single opening up new and fertile sources sharing power in local government force, campaigning in different parts of thought in academia and else- – that ‘coalition’ politics is a neces- of the country and frequently where). It brought in recruits who sary component of the new politics; wrong-footing each other. No were substantial and respected fig- and that the third force needs to be doubt it could have been done bet- ures, but it also attracted many more, strong and mature enough to cope ter. But certain realities would not some of whom had never before with the contradictions and pressures have changed. Once the decision been involved in politics. which such a system entails. had been taken to proceed with the For their part, the Liberals had That is surely the reality of the creation of a new party, some pe- a ready-made organisation at con- present, and Paddy Ashdown’s strat- riod of coexistence with the Lib- stituency level, attuned to the re- egy of ‘constructive opposition’. He erals became an inevitability. A new alities of third party politics and must now lead his parliamentary ‘merged’ party, constructed from the honed by disappointment and ad- colleagues along a difficult path outset in part upon the existing Lib- versity into a force of considerable which involves both working with eral Party, would not have been re- tenacity and commitment. These the Labour Government, on a Joint motely possible. were the ‘political missionaries’ of Cabinet Committee, to help deliver Once the Alliance was formed, which Dick Taverne had spoken, constitutional reform, and maintain- the most destructive strategy, in my who had developed formidable ing the Liberal Democrats’ separate opinion, was to hold to the view that campaigning skills and an ability to identity and electoral credibility by political allies might in time become win and use power at the local gov- providing vigorous opposition party competitors. Such an approach ernment level. Liberalism itself – in where the issues demand. It is a per- would in any case have been disas- policy terms or in the approach of ilous task, requiring courage and de- trous for both the SDP and the Lib- individual activists – also proved to termination. But it is the surest way erals had it become reality. As it was, be a useful antidote to tendencies of delivering the greatest prize of all the existence of such a notion fed which sometimes erred towards an – proportional representation. And suspicions and distrust and inhibited over-rigid, centralised and authori- it has come a step closer with the moves towards ‘organic’ merger. tarian view of politics. setting up of an independent com- The only realistic approach – and Above all, I believe that the Alli- mission on electoral reform – one which most embraced, with ance will be seen as important pe- chaired by that great architect of po- varying degrees of enthusiasm – was riod in the creation of a new kind litical realignment, Lord Jenkins – to to work for an ‘ever-closer union’, of multi-party and consensual poli- recommend a broadly proportional an Alliance which was a meeting of tics, very different from the old alternative to Britain’s present first- minds and hearts rather than the re- adversarial two-party system. Back in past-the-post electoral system. sult of mere political expediency. November , in his Dimbleby If proportional representation can Even so, it was a process that took lecture, Roy Jenkins had seen the be achieved, the dream of the Alli- the best part of decade and was two-party system as a citadel, from ance - the shattering of the old two- deeply enervating and traumatic for which it was necessary to break out, party mould – will have been finally many of those involved. It might if political realignment, the free flow attained and its purpose surely fully have been done sooner and possibly of ideas and fundamental change justified. with less pain; but, in some shape or were ever to be possible. David form, it was always the price which Steel’s leadership of the Liberals in- Stuart Mole was head of David Steel’s the Alliance – by its very nature – volved an odyssey – stretching over office, and now works for the Common- was bound to pay. the course of a decade and more – wealth Secretariat. He fought Chelms- There is no denying that there building upon the ideas of cross- ford for the Alliance in and . was much about this time which was party cooperation developed at the
40 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 One Man’s Pride Owen and his Impact on the Alliance Tim Clement-Jones regrets the lost opportunities of the Alliance years.
Lib Dems, like their Liberal predecessors, are by and discussions. If Owen, instead of radiating dis- trust and paranoia in the period between the large forward-looking, optimistic creatures. In that general elections, had built on the legacy of ‘the respect we have been spoilt by the successes of the partnership of principle’ left him by Roy Jenkins past years. Leapfrogging the mainly positive he could have become leader of a powerful joint movement and even a joint party. memories of the s to the Alliance era is therefore David Steel suffered from a bad virus im- an uncomfortable process. Last September’s Liberal mediately after the ’ election and took a sab- Democrat conference at Eastbourne – the scene of batical. Owen was widely admired by many at the time. If he had seized the initiative and built the ‘Euro-bomb debate’ in – brought back bridges between the parties instead of deliber- memories of the inter-party and internal tensions ately blowing them up, in time, with his en- of the Alliance years ergy and public profile, he could have become leader of a merged party. This would have been David Owen and his apologists would, I am a formidable force at the ’ election rather sure, like to think that this was the age of the than the quarrelsome two-headed creature it gods and Titans when superhuman political appeared to be, and, at the top, was. feats appeared possible. Certainly many in the Owen, however, saw the relationship as media seemed to believe that he was a colos- purely pragmatic. He was clearly keen to ditch sus bestriding the Alliance. The tale, however, the Liberals as soon as the SDP could politi- ended in the classical way, with human frailties cally do so. The Jenkinsites, like the Liberals, causing downfall. Dr Owen’s fatal arrogance led saw the Alliance as a meeting of policy minds. to a tragic waste of leadership, human effort Owen and his followers clearly had a different and most of all political opportunity. vision, bound up with a view of him as a ‘man For many it was a disappointing time of failed of destiny’ sure to lead the SDP to political ambitions which still occasionally require treat- glory provided it remained a disciplined force. ment by expert political therapists. I, for one, This emphasis on discipline and the destiny of am still angry in retrospect about the waste of one man was of course anathema to Liberals. energy that went into internal wrangling, and Owen’s argument was that the separate party the missed political opportunities. Having – de- identities needed to be preserved so that each spite hiccups over seat allocation – started to could blossom under PR when it was achieved. build relationships so well between the parties The irony is that without close cooperation before the general election, it is galling to this could not be achieved, and Owen’s behav- look back and think how little progress we made iour was not likely to encourage this. politically over the period from to . After the ’ election, as relationships be- For the election manifesto, it is true we tween the two lawyers’ organisations, the Asso- negotiated on policy between the parties, but it ciation of Social Democratic Lawyers and the was a fairly amicable process. Joint home and Association of Liberal Lawyers, were so friendly legal affairs policies were thrashed out over and constructive, Anthony Lester and I, the re- breakfast at Eric Avebury’s house in Pimlico be- spective chairs, fondly imagined that the next tween Simon Hughes, Ian Wrigglesworth, Eric obvious step was to make joint policy in key Lyons, John Harris and myself. We did have some areas of legal affairs such as legal aid, or a pro- differences of principle, but this did not sour the posed Ministry of Justice. We set up powerful journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 41 joint groups to reach joint conclu- sions. This was instantly frowned on by the Doctor. Under Owen’s lead- ership this way of working was her- esy in the SDP. Joint working parties and official joint policy papers were initially forbidden (until it was utterly clear that a commission had to be set up for defence policy in ). In the end, despite strenuous representations our papers could not be made offi- cial joint publications and the law- yers’ associations published them themselves as joint papers. I remember sitting in a Com- mons committee room shortly be- fore the election at a joint meeting of the two parties’ policy committees, arguing over the posi- Menu’, seemed laughable. We all to be done then if it was to be done tion of commas in the joint state- seemed stale by then. at all. He may not have always been ment of defence policy – with Many of the problems of the fully in touch – or wanted to be – Nancy Seear threatening to walk out merger negotiations and the reaction with the Liberal Party during his pe- – reflecting that things could have to merger proposals were in them- riod as leader, but on that occasion been very different. Instead of every selves the result of scar tissue, such he certainly reflected its mood. item in the manifesto being negoti- as this, formed during the Alliance The SDP stance on the negotia- ated between the parties, often on a years, when closer relationships and tions was reached in the shadow of line-by-line basis, policies could, as fraternisation were not encouraged. Owen, with the hope that if the SDP with our Ministry of Justice proposal, This was discouraging enough for terms were tough enough, he would have been thrashed out in joint Liberals but little did many of us be reconciled to merger. Some of the working groups over a period of know at the time how difficult life aspects of merger which caused such years. The joint manifesto could have was for those in the SDP who disa- difficulty and were only finally re- been the distillation of already- greed with Owen’s line. I can only solved later, such as the name of the agreed policy positions. admire their tenacity over those years party and some aspects of the pre- Even worse than the manifesto in staying with the SDP and argu- amble, could have been resolved ear- deliberations, the structure for agree- ing for merger when the time came. lier, I believe, if it had not been for ing strategy and organisation for the I was reminded of my own posi- this doomed belief. As a result it has general election was byzantine tion on merger before the election taken us years longer than it in the extreme. There were two tiers when I recently came across a Sep- should have done, under Paddy of committees: the ‘Leaders’ Advisory tember edition of Limehouse Ashdown’s generalship, to make the Committee’, which became the joint Grit (a publication produced by the major parliamentary breakthrough Alliance Strategy Committee; and left of the SDP), on the front page many of us have worked for and the Joint Planning Committee. In of which is an article by me headed dreamed of since we joined the party addition there were separate election ‘Stuff Merger!’ arguing that the two or its predecessors. committees for each party, each with parties’ cultures were very different The contrast between the two their own budget. All this has been and merger was not desirable. If we men’s contribution could not be documented in all its ineffectiveness had been able to work out a more greater. Don’t tell me that one per- by Des Wilson in Battle for Power. positive and cooperative way of son can’t have a major impact on The ’ general election itself working between the two parties, politics. It’s just sad that Owen’s featured not only twin campaign without suspicion and paranoia, then should have been so irredeemably managers (John Pardoe and John the post-election pressure for merger negative. Harris), but twin heads for every would not have been nearly so great. function. However well we got on It was hardly surprising, in the Tim Clement-Jones was Chair of the with our opposite number – and in light of the frustration and wasted op- Liberal Party –, during the merger the candidate briefing area I was for- portunities of those years, that David negotiations. He has chaired the Liberal tunate in John Roper – most of us Steel raised the banner of merger im- Democrats’ Federal Finance and Admin- who had any depth of involvement mediately after the election, especially istration Committee since and was said ‘never again’. The poster slogan, when Owen had tried to rule it out deputy chair of the election cam- ‘The Only Fresh Thing on the so completely. All credit to him. It had paign.
42 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 Merger Hopes and Fears Were They Realised? Alliance into merger: how has it worked? Rt. Hon. Alan Beith, MP examines the myths and the realities.
It seems an age since a number of us were the Tories at the one after. The Social Democrats who backed merger, condemned to endless meetings in often miserable and had to put up with undisguised bitterness – but never smoke-filled – rooms for the merger and calumny from others in their party as a negotiations between the Liberals and the SDP. Was result, saw merger as essential to the continu- ance of their mission to provide an electable it really only ten years ago? Were we once in separate and responsible alternative to the Tories. They parties? Did the process of merger really have to be realised that what they had achieved in detach- so painful and damaging, given that the party which ing so many from the Labour Party and at- tracting significant new support would not last emerged became, after the first couple of years, a if they remained in competition with the Lib- very congenial party to be in and one which is now erals. They hoped to advance many policies enjoying well-deserved success? which they found they shared with Liberals. Then there were the fears which made the It is instructive to look back to the hopes negotiations so difficult. Liberals feared that and fears which surrounded the Alliance and Liberal identity in the minds of voters would the merger. Liberals hoped to prevent the dis- be lost, and that Liberalism itself could be dan- sipation and division of their potential support gerously diluted in the philosophy and poli- which resulted from competition between the cies of the new party. They feared that the SDP two parties. (The effect of such division was was not committed to grassroots campaigning. vividly displayed in the later election of William They feared that the new party would be cen- Hague to the House of Commons. Either the tralised and undemocratic in its internal struc- SDP or the Liberals could have won that tures. Liberal critics of the merger package byelection if both had not been standing.) Most feared that ‘the real Liberal legacy of over , Liberals shared the SDP mission to ‘break the councillors and a local campaigning force’ mould’ and draw new support from alienated might ‘just melt away’. voters, although they believed that many in the Social Democrats feared that the new party SDP underestimated the campaigning task and might retain what they saw as an amateur ap- romanticised the prospects of early success. proach, a disorderly method of policy-making Some Liberals hoped that the central organi- and a tendency for a limited number of activists sational skills and presentational flair shown in to have disproportionate influence. And even if the SDP launch could be productively mar- they did not themselves have these fears, they ried with Liberal experience in grass-roots knew that others did and were anxious not to campaigning. They hoped to release energies lose too many people to the Owenite camp. At wasted in the duplicated processes of the Alli- times they feared that the vote for merger at ance. Some Liberals – although I was not one the SDP conference could be lost, although in of them – believed that the merged party would reality the Owenites had accepted that merger replace the Labour Party, by pursuing a strat- was going to happen and seemed to be looking egy which would fatally wound Labour at the forward to being left on their own. Key battles next election and move into position to tackle in the negotiations, such as the ill-fated deci- journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 43 sion on the party name, were haunted positioning Labour. Liberal identity not shone through, for some Social Democrats by the Success for the Liberal Demo- confounding the fears of many Lib- ghostly apparition of the dreaded crats was slow to come, but it was erals at the time of merger. Doctor holding a sign pointing his painstakingly built at grassroots level, Those key SDP members who way for ‘Social’ Democrats and the while a more professional approach have contributed most to the Lib- other way for ‘Liberal’ Democrats. It to national organisation was devel- eral Democrats are the ones who was that perception rather than mere oped simultaneously. , council- seemed most at home in it. Their stubbornness which led SDP nego- lors and campaigners did not disap- instincts were Liberal and they had tiators to insist on the inclusion of a pear. The party organisation did not confidence that the new party they reference to NATO in the party’s prove to be an undemocratic mon- had helped to design was serious about winning power and modern- ising its methods. Bob Maclennan is Success would not have been possible, an example: at times he was a mind-numbingly intransigent nego- however, had the party’s Liberal identity tiator in the merger process, but in not shone through, confounding the fears the new party he has been largely responsible for ensuring that we are of many Liberals at the time of merger. close to the achievement of a series of key Liberal policies on constitu- tional issues. As Party Presidents, original constitution and on a name ster – a more orderly conference and both he and Charles Kennedy have for the party so unmemorable that policy-making structure has largely understood and fostered the inter- most people have now forgotten proved its value. It was particularly nal democracy of the party which is what it was. It probably contributed necessary in setting out a full range now unique among the three main to the near-fatal decision of the lead- of policies in the party’s early years, parties. A few careerists in the SDP ers of the two parties to promote the although the policy-making ma- ranks who did not feel at home in ‘dead parrot’ policy document Even chinery now appears to have been the Liberal Democrats are now David Owen found it rather too rather too cumbersome and not suf- Blairites, but the others have main- right-wing, at least at the time. ficiently geared to campaigning. tained and in many cases helped to So, were these hopes and fears Now at last, however, the new shape a genuinely Liberal identity for realised? The main political hope was party’s hopes are being realised. It has the new party. certainly not realised at the begin- a record number of MPs and is over- Alan Beith has been MP for Berwick- ning. A combination of the disunited shadowing the official opposition in on Tweed since . Liberal Chief Whip picture presented by the merger ne- effectiveness in the House. The Lib- –, he is currently Deputy Leader gotiations and public confusion over eral Democrats are the second party of the Liberal Democrats and spokesman the party’s name and identity meant in local government. The party has on Home Affairs. that it was in no position to with- set much of the policy agenda for stand what turned out to be very un- the new parliament, particularly but Notes: favourable political circumstances. not exclusively on constitutional is- Rachael Pitchford and Tony Greaves, The new party had disastrous Euro- sues. Success would not have been Merger: The Inside Story (Colne: Liberal pean election results and hit % in possible, however, had the party’s Renewal, ), p. . the opinion polls. Liberal fears of a loss of identity were briefly realised when the new party, in defiance of Gladstone Lecture the cumbersome negotiated settle- ment on the name, resolved to call by Roy Jenkins itself the Democrats. It took a re- 6.30pm, Thursday 14 May versal of that decision in October to restore damaged morale, and Strathclyde University, Richmond Street, Glasgow the climb back to viability began with successful local elections in Followed by dinner at Ingram Hotel May , followed by the East- David Steel bourne byelection success. Speakers include The idea that the new party Tickets for lecture free; dinner £20+wine; contact would replace the Labour Party be- came clearly unsustainable even dur- Judith Fryer, 0141 423 0336 (after 6.00pm). ing John Smith’s leadership, and was Organised by Greater Glasgow Liberal Democrats buried when Tony Blair set about re-
44 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 SDP intact and, at the conclusion of the talks, he even embarked on a late mission to convert David Owen to Reviews the merits of merger. The spectre of a strong Owenite party competing with the merged party, or even blocking merger altogether, was fre- Merger Most Foul quently used by both Maclennan Rachael Pitchford and Tony Greaves: and Steel to force the Liberals to compromise. Steel seemed con- Merger: The Inside Story vinced that the Liberal Party would unite behind the necessity of anaes- (Liberal Renewal, 1989) thetising Owen’s political appeal. Ultimately, he was wrong and Reviewed by Mark Egan Meadowcroft spurned merger to keep the independent Liberal flag flying, although Steel probably re- Reading Merger: The Inside Story, it is difficult to imagine garded that as a price worth paying how Pitchford and Greaves had any time to contribute to for the success of the merger. the negotiations which led to the merger of the Liberal Party While Liberals voted on January by votes to and the SDP, so painstaking must their note-taking have been to back merger, the policy dec- at meetings. laration which accompanied the new party’s constitution was quickly This short volume lays bare the de- NATO in the preamble to the con- abandoned. Pitchford and Greaves tailed discussions at every meeting stitution, the creation of an English reveal little about the writing of the of the two parties’ negotiation teams, party rather than several autono- ‘dead parrot’ largely because it was as well as the Liberal team’s own mous regional units, and the ac- left almost entirely to the two par- meetings, and various Liberal Party countability of party officers and ties’ leaders. Alan Beith’s recollec- Council meetings and Assemblies the Federal Policy Committee to tions of this incident would be along the way. Both writers have a the conference and the membership much appreciated, especially be- ‘committed standpoint – Liberal, at large. cause he saw the document in ad- radical and activist’ and they make In the words of Michael vance of its publication but failed no apologies for it. Regardless of Meadowcroft, another member of to convince Steel that it would their own position in the negotia- the Liberal team, ‘David Steel puts prove wholly unacceptable to his tions, their’s is the only contempo- far less premium on trying to keep party. The ‘dead parrot’, redolent of rary record of the merger talks, be- the Liberal Party united’ than did the ‘stench of Thatcherism’ accord- ginning in September and con- Maclennan. Maclennan’s brief was to ing to Greaves and Pitchford, shred- cluding the following January. strike a deal which would keep the ded the credibility of the SLD and The authors indicate throughout that the outcome of the talks – both Owen resigns as leader after SDP vote for merger negotiations (7 August 1987) in terms of the new party’s consti- tution and the policy document which accompanied it – was unsat- isfactory. In their view, while the SDP team remained united behind their leader, Robert Maclennan, in defence of the policy and constitu- tional issues which had initiated the Gang of Four’s break from the La- bour Party, David Steel repeatedly undermined the Liberal position, selling the party out to the SDP. Maclennan and his team took the talks to the brink on numerous oc- casions, each time forcing a Liberal climb-down on issues including the party’s name, the reference to journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 45 its leaders at the moment of its ure. Pitchford and Greaves often be- trol of the party machine; internal birth. Revealingly, Paddy Ashdown, come engrossed in their own par- disagreement then ceases as soon as the MP least involved with the ticipation in the talks, littering the an election is called. merger negotiations and therefore text with unnecessary references to Sykes examines the experience of least tainted with the embarrass- long-forgotten policy papers, wise- the and ’ election campaigns, ment they caused to ordinary party cracks by the negotiating teams and and, more broadly, the history of the members, was swiftly elected leader references to the food and drink or- SDP and the Alliance, in order to of the new party. dered during nocturnal sessions, discredit the Downsian economic The book’s main drawback is that without clarifying exactly what was theory of elections (which would, of the mass of detail it contains – who at issue. This is a shame because the course, have predicted Conservatives said what and when, how negotiat- negotiations were historic, the only and Labour converging on the Alli- ing positions were decided and aban- instance in this country of two in- ance position, instead of maintain- doned, concessions granted and dependent political parties jointly ing quite distinct programmes) and, withdrawn on each side – tends to deciding to pool their resources to in particular, the ‘myth of unified obscure the reader’s understanding of form one new entity. A broader, parties’. In the former, she is not whether or not the talks succeeded more objective academic study of wholly convincing, especially when in their aim of creating a new party the talks is still required. In the viewed from the perspective of May which amalgamated the best ele- meantime, this book is an indispen- , but in the latter, which is the ments of its two antecedents and, if sable guide to the merger process. main theme of the book, she is en- not, who was responsible for the fail- tirely successful. In particular, she shows how intraparty competition and conflict can drive leaders and activists to make decisions which Falling Apart may be entirely rational in terms of their own perspectives and strategies, Patricia Lee Sykes: while being utterly disastrous when Losing from the Inside: The Cost of Conflict in seen from the outside. Hence the book’s title. the British Social Democratic Party The SDP is of course a perfect case study for this approach. Born (Transaction Publishers, second edition, 1990) out of conflict within one party, and Reviewed by Duncan Brack dedicated to ending the strife-rid- den mould of British politics, within a tragically short period it found it- Patricia Lee Sykes’ book makes an interesting addition to self descending into a new set of antagonisms: with the Liberals, over the sparse collection of studies on the SDP and the Alliance, the seats share-out and major policy and is about the only one to be rooted in political theory. disagreements; between Jenkinsites and Owenites; to merge or not to First published in , and in this edition revised to take merge. Sykes painstakingly traces the account of merger and the first months of the Liberal history of these internal struggles, Democrats, the book sets out to nail Anthony Downs’ from the foundation of the SDP through to merger. ‘economic’ theory of party competition in a democracy. Despite its thorough treatment of the basic hypothesis, the book could Writing in , the American in order to win power. be a good deal better written; per- sociologist Downs formulated a This simple model was later re- haps Transaction Books competes model in which voters try to gain fined by other theorists; intuitively with the bigger publishers by not maximum utility from the outcome there is obviously something to be employing editors. The two chapters of elections, and parties attempt to said for it. But, as Sykes observes, setting out the background of La- maximise their chances of winning. relatively few academics have ever bour and SDP history are annoy- Parties’ political ideologies will de- examined closely the internal struc- ingly superficial and simplistic; the velop to maximise their electoral tures of parties and how this may af- chapter on the different roles played appeal, and will therefore converge fect their electoral behaviour and by journalists (‘representative’, ‘scep- towards the centre from both left and success. Even those who have done tic’, ‘prophet’) is interesting but tan- right. Downs presupposed that par- so tend to view internal faction- gential; arguments are laboured; and ties were single units or cohesive fighting as being essentially about irritating clichés are liberally de- teams, following rational calculations which leader or group can seize con- ployed (seats are never ‘won’ or
46 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 ‘gained’ but always ‘stolen’). The epi- The best chapters deal with the Jenkins believed that he was form- logue, added after merger, might two election campaigns and their ing a new party. Actually, there were have been better omitted, since it was run-ups and aftermaths, spotlighting two formations of the SDP but, as written at the lowest possible point the internal rivalries within the Gang we know, only one SDP ....’ in the new party’s existence, and of Four, and the growing animosity SDP supporter and journalist, much space is taken up with point- between Steel and Owen. The sham- ‘I do not believe the Dimbleby lec- less speculation over the future of the bles of the campaigns – ‘joint’ me- ture has any major significance in the Owenite SDP and the Greens – but dia operations that couldn’t coordi- creation of the SDP .... I found the read it and remember how bad nate with each other, a basic failure Dimbleby lecture an impediment for things were in . to agree on any coherent strategy, concentrating people’s minds on the The introduction and conclusion, leadership manoeuvring with an eye need to try and fight genuinely from which explore the Downsian theory to internal struggles after the elec- within.’ and its faults, are much better. So too tions – are examined in painful de- David Owen, is the chapter tracing the opinion tail. The – defence commis- polls’ reflections of Alliance disagree- sion and debates are described thor- ‘I suppose we’ve always had differ- ments, and Alliance leaders’ views of oughly and accurately. And the ent approaches to the party. Owen the polls and public opinion, which Downsian assumption of unified disapproved of my Dimbleby lecture. help to explain their own personal parties fighting rational and focused He was not ready for it. He is not as strategies and differences. Steel’s election campaigns is left in shreds. radical as I am .... I made the first ‘challenge’ to Jenkins at Ettrick Where the book is most inter- radical move. It’s a paradox, isn’t it? Bridge in the midst of the ’ cam- esting and enjoyable is in its use of – that people should consider Owen paign, for example, followed polls interviews as source material. Sykes the radical. Well, there are a great consistently showing Steel to be approached her topic systematically many paradoxes in politics.’ twice as popular as the SDP leader. and thoroughly, interviewing at Roy Jenkins, Bill Rodgers’ throwing down of the length most of the key players, many ‘In the two-leader thing was a gauntlet to Steel over the seats ne- of whom are quoted throughout problem .... So, you see, we had to gotiations in December is Losing from the Inside. A few exam- traced to his own self-image as the ples will suffice, and more are repro- have the Ettrick Bridge meeting .... At the same time, we thought the guardian of SDP party interests (and, duced elsewhere in the Journal. Read problem was simply Jenkins .... We in this narrow context, his action was ’em and weep. a success – though the Alliance im- thought we dealt with the central ‘David Owen, an ambitious, talented problem when we got rid of Roy. mediately fell seven points in the young man, found himself without Didn’t work. The problem was not polls). Jenkins was a consensus poli- a party, and so he decided to form a tician, Owen a conviction one; per- Roy. It was dual leadership itself.’ new one .... [At the same time] Roy John Pardoe, haps that was the basic tension that tore the SDP apart. And so on. To merge or not to merge ....
‘Ill-feeling between the pro-mergerers and anti-mergerers thoroughly and obviously than the Liberal Party has ever has grown into bitterness, and there has been angry talk been.’ on both sides of fighting each other in the next general Martin Horwood election. If that really happens, the future of the third force ‘We have not gone through all of this just to add to Dr. can be defined shortly: none.’ David Owen’s credibility.’ Economist 5 September 1987 Tim Clement-Jones ‘The Liberal Parliamentary Party was lined up behind the ‘The country is not demanding that we merge. The two leaders like warders surrounding a pair of newly- country could not care less whether we merge or not .’ recaptured prisoners. Bob Maclennan was asked whether Claire Brooks any of them would comment on the foundering policy document. ‘They will not be allowed to open their ‘If that is what you want, all I can say is goodbye. mouths’, he replied.’ Goodbye to every one of you.’ Bruce Anderson, The Times, January 1988 Michael Meadowcroft
Opponents of merger sometimes talk as if the Liberal From the Liberal merger debate, 23 January 1988: Party is going to be abolished, that the new party will not ‘We will create a Frankenstein party with ready-made be Liberal. If that were so, I should be voting against divisions. From the word go we will be divided more merger.’ David Steel journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 47 drawal from the EEC passed as policy. Shirley Williams and Tom Bradley refuse to speak from the Research Notes platform on behalf of the NEC. October James Callaghan resigns as Labour Chronology leader. November Key Alliance dates 1979–88 First round of Labour’s leadership election (Healey , Foot , Silkin Compiled by Mark Pack , Shore ). November 1979 they will leave Labour if it supports Michael Foot elected leader of La- withdrawal from the EEC: ‘There are bour (defeating Healey –). May some of us who will not accept a November General election won by Tories. De- choice between socialism and Eu- Owen announces he will not be feated Labour MPs include Shirley rope. We will choose them both.’ restanding for Shadow Cabinet. Williams. June November June Williams warns that a centre party Williams announces she cannot be Social Democrat Alliance (SDA) re- would have ‘no roots, no principles, a Labour candidate again with its organises itself into a network of lo- no philosophy and no values.’ current policies cal groups, not all of whose mem- bers need be in the Labour Party. June December Roy Jenkins delivers lecture to Labour proscribes SDA. November House of Commons Press Gallery, Roy Jenkins delivers the Dimbleby calling for a realignment of the ‘radi- December lecture, ‘Home thoughts from cal centre.’ Meeting in Williams’ flat, including abroad’. Ivor Crewe and Anthony King, who June outline considerable possible support November Labour’s Commission of Inquiry for a new party. Bill Rodgers gives speech at backs use of an electoral college for Abertillery: ‘Our party has a year, not electing the leader and mandatory much longer, in which to save itself.’ reselection of MPs. 1981 December July January Meeting of Jenkinsites and others SDA announces plans to run up to Jenkins returns from Brussels. considering forming a new party or- candidates against Labour left- January ganised by Colin Phipps (Robert wingers. Maclennan declined invitation). Liberals publish ten-point plan for August economic recovery. Several Labour Open letter to members of Labour MPs publicly welcome it. 1980 from Owen, Rodgers and Williams January published in Guardian. May Gang of Four (Jenkins, Owen, Local elections. Liberal vote changes September Rodgers and Williams) agrees to is- little, though seats gained with large David Marquand speaks at Liberal As- sue a joint statement following advances in Liverpool and control of sembly. David Steel says Labour rebels Wembley Conference. Adur and Hereford. have six months to leave the party. January May September Labour Special Conference at Wem- Labour Special Conference at Wem- Group of MPs, led by Michael bley. New electoral college for elect- bley. Policy statement Peace, Jobs, Free- Thomas, publish statement in The ing the leader gives trade unions the dom, including pro-unilateralism and Times, calling for major reforms in largest share of the vote (%, with anti-EEC policies, supported. Owen Labour’s structure. % for MPs and % for constitu- deeply angered by vitriolic heckling ency parties). September – October Labour during his speech. conference at Blackpool votes to January June change method for electing leader. Limehouse Declaration issued by Owen, Rodgers and Williams warn Unilateral disarmament and with- Gang of Four.
48 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 January majority cut from , to ,. fecting to the SDP in order to stand Nine Labour MPs join Council for Jenkins stands for Alliance: ‘This is again under his new party’s colours). Social Democracy my first defeat in years of politics June and it is by far the greatest victory January End of Falklands war. in which I have participated.’ Owen tells his local party he will not July be standing for Labour in the next September Jenkins defeats Owen to become election. Liberal Assembly at Llandudno. SDP leader. Jenkins and Williams address fringe February meeting. Motion calling for an elec- September Advert published in Guardian sees toral pact overwhelmingly carried. Williams elected SDP President. people declare their support for Steel calls for delegates to ‘Go back the Council for Social Democracy, to your constituencies and prepare and elicits , letters of support. for government.’ 1983 Alec McGivan appointed organiser. SDP rolling conference travels by February February train between London, Perth and Simon Hughes wins Bermondsey Council moves into offices in Queen Bradford. byelection. Anne’s Gate. Williams resigns from NEC. October March Croydon North-West byelection Darlington byelection: SDP candidate February won by Liberal Bill Pitt. slumps to a poor third; Labour’s vic- Two Labour MPs resign whip to sit tory saves Michael Foot’s leadership. as social democrats. October Healey just defeats Benn’s challenge May March for the Labour deputy leadership. Local elections. Alliance’s national Ten Labour MPs and nine peers re- vote slips, though number of seats in- sign whip so sit as social democrats. November creases. Thatcher calls general elec- Crosby byelection won by Shirley March tion for June. Williams. Christopher Brocklebank-Fowler May becomes only Conservative MP to December Ettrick Bridge meeting: Steel at- join Council. Gallup poll shows % would vote tempts to remove ‘Prime Minister- Liberal/SDP. March designate’ title from Jenkins. Official launch of SDP in Con- June naught Rooms, Covent Garden at- 1982 Mrs Thatcher wins general election; tracts more than press. Alliance (.%) almost catches La- January bour (.%). Liberals win MPs April Rodgers breaks off negotiations with (from ), SDP (from ); Rodgers Anglo-German Königswinter con- Liberals over seat allocation for and Williams defeated. ference: Rodgers, Williams and Steel forthcoming general election. meet and agree on the outlines of June March an alliance between their parties. Foot announces he will not restand Jenkins wins Glasgow Hillhead as Labour leader. May byelection. Local elections: Liberal vote rises June April thanks to increase in number of can- Jenkins resigns as SDP leader. didates; take control of Isle of Wight Liberal-SDP negotiations over divi- and hold balance on eight county sion for seats for general election June councils. Small number of independ- concluded. Owen becomes SDP leader unop- posed. ent social democrat candidates make April little impression. Argentina invades Falkland Islands. July Liberals fail to win Penrith & Bor- June May der byelection by votes. Publication of A Fresh Start for Brit- Local elections. Liberals win five ain, a joint Liberal-SDP policy state- times as many seats as the SDP, July ment, along with photo-opportunity which makes a net loss. David Steel starts three months’ sab- of Steel and Williams sitting on the batical. lawn of Dean’s Yard, Westminster. June To r ies gain Mitcham & Morden September July (byelection caused by Bruce Doug- SDP conference at Salford rejects Warrington byelection: Labour’s las-Mann resigning his seat on de- proposals for joint selection of Euro journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 49 and Westminster candidates and any June July chance of merger before election. Alliance Defence Commission re- ‘Yes to Unity’ campaign launched by ports, avoiding decision on Polaris SDP pro-merger members. replacement. Owen and Steel sub- August 1984 sequently explore options for Anglo- SDP votes %–% in favour of French cooperation over nuclear May merger negotiations. Local elections. Alliance makes net deterrent (the ‘Euro-bomb’). August gains of seats. July Owen resigns as SDP leader. June Liberals narrowly fail to win New- European elections. Alliance wins castle-under-Lyme after hard-hitting August .% and no seats but SDP wins campaign which draws criticism Maclennan becomes SDP leader. from David Steel. Portsmouth South byelection. September September September Liberal Assembly votes to open ne- Steel defeated at Liberal Assembly Liberal Assembly in Eastbourne de- gotiations on merger. feats leadership over European co- over calls to withdraw cruise missiles December operation on nuclear weapons. from Britain. Merger negotiators agree on ‘New Liberal Social Democratic Party’ (or 1985 1987 ‘Alliance’ for short) as the new par- ty’s name, but forced to rethink af- May January ter Liberal Party Council protests. Local elections. Alliance gains over ‘Relaunch’ of Alliance at Barbican seats and out of English rally. Joint Alliance parliamentary county councils end up under no spokesmanships announced. 1988 overall control. February January July SDP wins Greenwich byelection. ‘Dead parrot’ policy document (Voices and Choices for All) issued and Liberals win Brecon & Radnor March then withdrawn. byelection. During July (and again Liberals hold Truro in byelection in September), Alliance briefly tops caused by David Penhaligon’s death January opinion polls. in a car accident in December . Special Liberal Assembly in Black- pool approves merger by to September May , subject to a ballot of members. Successful SDP conference at Local elections: Alliance gains over To r quay represents high point of seats. Labour losses and Con- January SDP strength and self-confidence. servative gains lead Thatcher to call SDP conference in Sheffield ap- December general election. proves merger by to (Owenites largely abstain or are ab- Audience of over million watches June sent), subject to a ballot of members. John Cleese present party political Mrs Thatcher wins general election. broadcast on PR for SDP – possibly Alliance’s vote drops by .%. SDP March the most-watched PPB ever. falls from to seats (Jenkins loses Liberal and SDP members’ ballots Hillhead) and Liberals from to . give majorities for merger (Liberals , – ,; SDP , – ,). 1986 June May Owen gives press conference where March Liberals win Ryedale byelection and he appears to reject any attempts at Press launch of Social and Liberal just miss West Derbyshire. Local elec- merger. Democrats. tions: Alliance gain control of Adur June March and Tower Hamlets and make a net Steel announces to media support Constitution of new party comes gain of around seats. for merger. Owen fails to receive his into force at midnight. May message before being contacted by the press and accuses Steel of trying March Owen reacts furiously to Steel’s hints Owenite ‘Continuing SDP’ to bounce him. to press that Alliance Defence Com- launched. mission report will recommend no June March replacement for Polaris nuclear sub- SDP National Committee decides to Public meeting to launch Social and marine fleet. hold a ballot on whether to negoti- ate over merger with Liberals. Liberal Democrats.
50 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 Marquand, Liberalism & Social De- mocracy (Liberal Publications, ) Bibliography Stuart Mole, The Decade of Realign- ment: The Leadership Speeches of Key sources on Alliance history. David Steel – (Hebden Compiled by Mark Pack Royd, ) Matthew Oakeshott, The Road from Limehouse to Westminster (Radical Books and booklets Ralf Dahrendorf, After Social Democ- Centre for Democratic Studies in racy (Unservile State Paper, ) Industry and Society, ) Leighton Andrews, Liberalism versus the Radhika Desai, Intellectuals and So- David Owen, Face the Future Social Market Economy (Hebden cialism: ‘Social Democrats’ and the (Jonathan Cape, ) Royd Publications, ) Labour Party (Lawrence & David Owen, A Future That Will Paddy Ashdown, After the Alliance Wishart, ) Work: Competitiveness and Com- (Hebden Royd Publications, Henry Drucker, ‘All the King’s passion (Penguin, ) ) Horses and All the King’s Men’, David Owen, A United Kingdom Peter Bartram, David Steel (W.H. in Paterson and Thomas (eds.), (Penguin, ) Allen, ) Social Democratic Parties in Western David Owen, Personally Speaking to Alan Beith, The Case for the Liberal Europe (OUP, ) Kenneth Harris (Weidenfeld & Party and the Alliance (Longman, R Eccleshall (ed.), British Liberalism: Nicolson, ) ) Liberal Thought from the s to David Owen, Time to Declare Alan Beith, The Fullness of Freedom s (Longman, ) (Michael Joseph, ) (Hebden Royd Publications, To ny Greaves & Rachel Pitchford, David Owen & David Steel, The ) Merger: The Inside Story (Liberal Time Has Come (Weidenfeld & Ver non Bogdanor (ed.), Liberal Party Renewal, ) (reviewed in this Nicolson, ) Politics (OUP, ) issue) S. Padgett & W. Patterson, A History Duncan Brack, The Myth of the So- M.B. Hamilton, Democratic Socialism of Social Democracy in Postwar Eu- cial Market (LINk Publications, in Britain and Sweden (Macmillan, rope (Longman, ) ) ) William Paterson & Alistair Thomas Duncan Brack (ed.), Why I am a Lib- Stephen Haseler, The Tragedy of La- (eds.), The Future of Social Democ- eral Democrat (Liberal Democrat bour (Basil Blackwell, ) racy (Clarendon Press, ) Publications, ) Roy Jenkins, Partnership of Principle William Rodgers, The Politics of Ian Bradley, Breaking the Mould? (Secker & Warburg, ) Change (Secker & Warburg, ) (Martin Robertson, ) Roy Jenkins, A Life at the Centre Hannan Rose (ed.), Where Next?, Ian Bradley, The Strange Rebirth of (Macmillan, ) Radical Quarterly special edition, Liberal Britain (Chatto & Windus, Jeremy Josephs, Inside the Alliance ) (John Martin, ) David Steel, Partners in One Nation John Campbell, Roy Jenkins David Marquand, Russet-coated Cap- (Bodley Head, ) (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, ) tains: The Challenge of Social De- David Steel, Against Goliath: David N. Carter, Is There Life After Hanging? mocracy (SDP, ) Steel’s Story (Weidenfeld & (Centre for the Analysis of Social David Marquand, The Unprincipled Nicolson, ) Policy, Bath University, ) Society (Fontana, ) Hugh Stephenson, Claret and Chips: Ken Coates, T¡he Social Democrats: John Martin (ed.), The Meaning of The Rise of the SDP (Michael those who went and those who stayed Social Democracy and Other Essays Joseph, ) (Nottingham ) (John Martin, ) John Stevenson, Third Party Politics Chris Cook, A Short History of the Don MacIver (ed.), The Liberal since : Liberals, Alliance and Lib- Liberal Party – (Fourth Democrats (Prentice Hall, ) eral Democrats (Blackwell, ) edition, Macmillan, ) Michael Meadowcroft, Liberalism and Patricia Lee Sykes, Losing from the In- Ivor Crewe & Anthony King, SDP: the Left (Liberator Publications, side: The Cost of Conflict in the Brit- The Life and Death of the Social ) ish Social Democratic Party (Second Democratic Party (OUP, ) (re- Michael Meadowcroft, Liberalism and edition, Transaction Books, ) viewed in History Group Newslet- the Right (Liberator Publications, (reviewed in this issue) ter , December ) ) David Thomson, The Shock Troops of Arthur Cyr, Liberal Politics in Britain Michael Meadowcroft, Social Democ- Pavement Politics? An Assessment of (Transaction Books, ) (re- racy – Barrier or Bridge? (Libera- the Influence of Community Politics viewed in History Group Newslet- tor Publications, ) in the Liberal Party (Hebden ter , March ) Michael Meadowcroft & David Royd, ) journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 51 Shirley Williams, Politics is for People (Penguin, ) Henry Drucker, ‘All the King’s The Two Davids Des Wilson, Battle for Power (Sphere Horses and All the King’s Men’, continued from page Books, ) in Paterson and Thomas (eds.), Sir Robin Day, Owen said he would Peter Zentner, Social Democracy in Social Democratic Parties in Western regard the Conservatives as ‘the lesser Britain: Must Labour Lose? (John Europe (OUP, ) evil’ and that Labour’s position (on Martin, ) S.J. Ingle, ‘The Alliance: Piggy in the Britain’s security) was ‘unacceptable’. Middle or Radical Alternative?’, The pass was sold. Articles Hull Papers in Politics , The Liberal-SDP Alliance never Vincent McKee, ‘Factionalism in the quite made the grade. While the Lib- Anon, ‘Social democracy doesn’t SDP, –’, Parliamentary Af- erals’ strength was growing, particu- thrive abroad,’ Economist fairs , larly in local government, the party March Michael Meadowcroft, ‘Eastbourne had not been able to consolidate its Te rry Barton & Herbert Doring, Revisited’, Radical Quarterly , new support. Nor had the SDP ‘The Social and Attitudinal Pro- caused sufficient defections from La- file of Social Democratic Activ- Michael Meadowcroft, ‘Steeling the bour to sustain a long-haul campaign; ists’, Political Studies , Party, Radical Quarterly , and it had failed almost entirely to John Bochel & David Denver, ‘The Alan Butt Philip, ‘Europeans first and attract prominent Conservatives. SDP and the Left-Right Dimen- last: British Liberals and the Eu- The two Alliance leaders found sion’, British Journal of Political Sci- ropean Community’, Political themselves locked in a pantomime ence , Quarterly : , horse, each pulling in different di- John Curtice & Michael Steed, ‘Turn- R. Pinkey, ‘An Active Political Strat- rections, with large sections of both ing Dreams into Reality: The Di- egy: Liberals in Power in English parties cheering the resulting con- vision of Constituencies between Local Government’, Local Gov- fusion. Just entering middle age, nei- the Liberals and the Social Demo- ernment Studies : , ther had the experience to analyse crats’, Parliamentary Affairs , Geoffrey Pridham & Paul Whiteley, his situation and plan a way out. John Curtice, Clive Payne and ‘Anatomy of the SDP: Is the Party Though Owen had served briefly as Robert Waller, ‘The Alliance’s Structurally Top-Heavy?’, Govern- Foreign Secretary after one or two First Nationwide Test: Lessons of ment and Opposition , junior ministerial positions, and Steel the English Local Elections’, William Rodgers, ‘The SDP and the had completed eighteen years in Par- Electoral Studies , Liberal Party in Alliance’, Politi- liament and seven as party leader, David Denver & Hugh Bochel, cal Quarterly , neither had substantial experience of ‘Merger or Bust: Whatever Hap- Colin Seymour-Ure, ‘The SDP and life outside politics. Nor was either pened to Members of the SDP?’, the Media’, Political Quarterly , entirely convinced that the game was British Journal of Political Science , worth the candle. In a cruel symbi- otic twist to their relationship, how- ever, each was determined to pre- Books on Liberal History and vent the other from scooping the prize. If there was ever a prize to British Politics scoop, they succeeded. In any event, the third force had to wait a decade We sell second-hand and hard-to-find books and before beginning to realise again the potential it had shown in the ephemera on Parliament, elections, politicians, Lib-Lab agreement. parties, and women in politics at competitive prices. Graham Watson was head of the Liberal Visit our website: leader’s private office in the House of Com- http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/ mons –. In he became the first 6196/ Liberal Democrat to be elected to the Eu- ropean Parliament. He is currently seek- or ask for a catalogue: ing a publisher for his book on the Alli- phone 01372-376002 or write to: ance in the – Parliament. Notes: Jaime Reynolds The quote is David Steel’s, in a televi- Political Bookcase, 10 Yarm Court Road, sion interview. Ivor Crewe and Anthony King, SDP: The Leatherhead, Surrey KT22 8PA Birth, Life and Death of the Social Demo- cratic Party (OUP, ).
52 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998