Intervention in Intrastate Wars the Military Planning Problem

Intervention in Intrastate Wars The Military Planning Problem

BY WILLIAM J. GREGOR

cholars Sebastian L.v.Gorka and David Kilcullen recently observed that modern Western counterinsurgency (COIN) theory is built on a handful of books based upon practitioner Sexperiences in a handful of 20th century conflicts.1 They also lamented that almost all the better known examples of counterinsurgency are limited to cases where colonial or post-imperial governments were fighting on the territory of dependent ex-colonies; conditions that are atypical of today’s insurgencies. Thus, they concluded that the translation of classic COIN doctrine to the contemporary threat seemed forced and misguided at best.2 The situation, however, is far worse than that. Drawing conclusions about how to counter insurgencies from a limited number of cases certainly brings into question whether those experiences can be generalized. However, expanding the range of cases not only increases the dataset but also challenges the doctrinal framework itself. It challenges the military doctrinal framework because understanding contemporary conflicts requires understanding those conflicts as politics, not as war. Classic COIN

It is easy to establish that U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine is informed by a small canon of classic commentaries. U.S. Army FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency lists in its bibliography works deemed classics. The books listed deal almost exclusively with colonial insurgencies in the 1950s and 1960s. Among the works are books such as Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice by David Galula, and Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency by Roger Trinquier. All the classics are offered as general theory. The tenets of these works are seen as applicable to all insurgencies even though most of the references were written before 1970 or deal with insurgencies that occurred well before 1970. The bibliography also has a section labeled special subjects in counterinsurgency. Those works are of more recent vintage but largely deal with the same set of insurgencies; for example, John Nagl’s Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, or Bard E. O’Neill’s 1990 work, Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary

Dr. William J. Gregor is Professor of Social Sciences and General J. Lawton Collins Chair for Operational Art, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

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Warfare. The references reveal a general fascina- states, “Insurgency and counterinsurgency are tion with the French experience in Algeria, and at the core of IW (Irregular Warfare).”5 U.S. and French wars in Vietnam, as well as Some observers of contemporary conflict nostalgia for communist or Marxist revolu- have noticed that contemporary conflicts differ tions. Conspicuously absent is any reference to from those of the past; that is, they do not ethnic or religious insurgencies and conflicts look like interstate war. General Rupert Smith such as the Algerian civil war 1991-2002. in The Utility of Force found it useful to distin- guish between interstate industrial war, the Contemporary Conditions Cold War, and wars among the people. The The tenets of FM 3-24 come from the study of primary distinction he drew was that wars insurgencies associated with mass political among the people are conducted by non-state movements, post-World War II anti-colonial- groupings.6 More recently, Emile Simpson ism, and the Cold War. However, John Mueller commented that contemporary conflicts can- has observed that imperial and colonial wars not be characterized as a polarized conflict, as ended in the late 1980s, and international a Clausewitzian duel between two opponents.7 Parties to the conflict frequently do not lie in clearly defined opposing camps. Nevertheless, John Mueller has observed that imperial and U.S. military commanders have long resisted colonial wars ended in the late 1980s, and making a distinction between war and other international wars between nation-states uses of military forces, military operations have declined. Most conflicts now fall into the other than war (MOOTW).8 Former Chief of category of civil wars. Staff of the U.S. Army General Gordon Sullivan remarked on the distinctions between war and MOOTW. wars between nation-states have declined.3 Categorizing “war” as separate from all Most conflicts now fall into the category of other uses of force may mislead the strate- civil wars. However, the term civil war masks gist, causing him to believe that the condi- the variety of armed intrastate conflict. tions required for success in the employ- Intrastate conflict can include rebellions, revo- ment of military force when one is lutions, secession movements, terrorism and conducting “war” differ from use of mili- coups d’état. Thus, intrastate conflict might be tary force in “operations other than war.”9 appropriately called political violence, not war.4 Unfortunately, the framework for mili- Nevertheless, despite official resistance to tary doctrine is war and the use of military distinguishing between the Clausewitzian con- forces regardless of the particular political set- cept of war as a duel and contemporary con- ting is considered war. The military operations flicts, the distinction is made in U.S. military the United States undertakes in response to doctrine, albeit indirectly. intrastate violence are doctrinally grouped The May 2007 edition of Joint Publication under the concept of irregular warfare. The (JP) 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United irregular warfare operating concept specifically States directly quoted Clausewitz’ On War, Book 1, Chapter 1, Section 24, “War is Merely

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the Continuation of Policy by Other Means.”10 protracted, requiring a prolonged and persis- The latest version of JP 1 goes further. The tent effort of at least a decade to achieve a manual expressly refers to war as a duel on a political outcome.14 Hence, the planning larger scale.11 However, unlike General requirements are different from those of con- Sullivan, Chapter 1 goes on to divide warfare ventional war. Unfortunately, like JP 1, the into two forms: traditional and irregular. The Irregular Warfare JOC cannot separate itself previous edition of JP 1 did not make that dis- from the Clausewitzian framework and thus, tinction, but it did acknowledge that some- tries to use Clausewitz’ trinity: the government, thing was different about contemporary con- the population, and the military, to explain the flicts. In that manual, in the discussion of war difference between conventional and irregular termination, the doctrine added a vague third warfare.15 outcome to Clausewitz’ two categories, surren- der and negotiated settlement; the indirect IW campaigns are also protracted, requiring approach. That third category suggested that a prolonged and persistent effort of at least there was something different about how con- a decade to achieve a political outcome. temporary conflicts ended and, thus, these Hence, the planning requirements are conflicts differed from traditional warfare. different from those of conventional war. Unfortunately, the doctrine just could not specify how they differed. The current version of JP 1 does not discuss war termination. Yet, The military planning systems have also despite the division of warfare into traditional recognized that war among the people or irreg- and irregular forms the doctrine clings to ular warfare cannot be planned using conven- Clausewitz’ conception of war as a duel, leav- tional methods. Beginning with the aftermath ing little room for understanding intrastate of the conflict in Kosovo, new planning con- wars differently. cepts have been introduced, starting with The U.S. military’s commitment to a Effects Based Operations and Systemic Clausewitzian framework, however, cannot Operational Design and finally incorporating mitigate the pressure to respond to contempo- into Army planning doctrine a design method- rary military planning requirements. The plan- ology and into Joint Doctrine operational ning challenges are manifest in several ways in design. In recognition of the fact that irregular military doctrine. For example, version 1 of the warfare campaigns are typically protracted, Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating operational design is now a significant element Concept (JOC) defines irregular warfare as, “a of theater campaign planning procedures.16 It violent struggle among state and non-state is not necessary here to discuss the reasons for actors for legitimacy and influence over rele- introducing these planning methods and the vant populations.”12 This definition does not arguments for their inclusion in military plan- differ greatly from the definition of political ning doctrine.17 What is important is the mili- violence cited earlier. The Irregular Warfare tary’s recognition that planning for contempo- JOC notes too that IW is inherently a political rary conflicts needs new methods. However, struggle that differs from the political element the new methods have been introduced with- of conventional war.13 IW campaigns are also out any real effort to put aside the traditional

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Figure 1. The IW Trinitry

or conventional framework. Thus, the doctrine been merged with conventional military plan- labels the new planning methodology design, ning processes, which impedes effective use. but design of what? Design gives form to some A New Perspective concrete response to a problem, a building (architectural design), a product (product To assess what is wanting in both the counter- design) or a machine or structure (engineering insurgency theory and doctrine, and in plan- design).18 The conventional military planning ning doctrine’s application, it is necessary to system was built on a base of knowledge. define a standard with which to compare the Hence, conventional military operations are current doctrine’s approach. That standard planned using the assembled knowledge about needs to address both the insurgencies that those operations. That is why there is a well- inform the classic COIN canon and those that known military lexicon of terms associated followed. Fortunately, a work bridges that gap. with designing conventional military opera- In States & Social Revolutions, Theda Skocpol tions and a list of consistent military informa- reviewed the established explanations for revo- tion requirements. What then is the body of lutions, reexamined the French, Russian, and knowledge that informs design for wars among Chinese revolutions and produced a new the people? The obvious answer would seem explanation. Although the French and Russian to be current counterinsurgency and stability revolutions have not influenced U.S. counter- operations doctrine. Unfortunately, as will be insurgency doctrine, the Chinese revolution shown, that doctrine does not adequately figures prominently in the discussion of anti- comprehend the current security environment. colonial revolutions and the U.S. war in Additionally, the new methodology does not Vietnam. Skocpol’s explanation of the Chinese stand alone. Instead, the new methods have Communist success differs from the

38 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 1 INTERVENTION IN INTRASTATE WARS explanation found among the works in the Writing in 1979, Skocpol identified four classic COIN canon. Additionally, her work major families of social-scientific theories of has influenced more recent analyses of non- revolution. In her estimation, none was ade- European revolutions, such as Misagh Parsa’s quate. The first family of theory reviewed was book, States, Ideologies & Social Revolutions. Marxist theory. Marx understood revolutions Consequently, it is useful to begin a critique of as class-based movements growing out of COIN doctrine by reviewing Skocpol’s work. objective structural contradictions between the However, before discussing theories of modes of production and class relations revolution, it is important to highlight some related to property ownership. To Marx revolu- of the elements of Army and Joint design tions were not isolated episodes of violence.21 methodology to direct attention to those por- The revolution results from class action led by tions of the theory that relate to design. There a self-conscious, revolutionary class. Marxist are three primary elements to design: framing analysis clearly influences all theories of revo- the operational environment, framing the lution but specifically informs those who have problem, and developing an operational written about the insurgencies in Malaya and approach.19 The Army manual states that these Vietnam. activities are accomplished through dialogue Skocpol labels the second family of theory and critical and creative thinking.20 Nowhere aggregate-psychological theory. Aggregate- in the discussion of design can be found a dis- psychological theories explain revolutions in cussion of theories that guide the collection terms of a people’s psychological motivations and interpretation of data relevant to the per- for engaging in political violence or joining ceived problem at hand. Thus, planners oppositional movements.22 Ted Gurr’s book, assigned to develop the operation frame for Why Men Rebel, lies in the aggregate-psycho- the environment must puzzle about where to logical family. A third family consists of system/ begin. Similarly, when developing an opera- value consensus theories. These theories posit tional approach – that is actions to address the that political violence results from the actions problem and move the political system toward of ideological movements spawned by social the policy goal – planners are again without a disequilibrium. The fourth family embraces guide to assessing the relationship between political-conflict theory. Political-conflict theory actions and effects. To the extent that counter- rejects Ted Gurr’s notion that revolutions arise insurgency doctrine seeks to be scientific, i.e. from economic and political discontent. abstract and universally replicable, it makes no Rather political-conflict theory argues people distinction between rebellions, secession cannot engage in political violence unless they movements, or revolutions. In contrast, politi- are members of at least a minimally organized cal theory is context dependent and there is no group with access to resources.23 Skocpol guarantee that results can be replicated. Hence, rejects all these approaches in part because the review of theories of revolutions should they all argue that revolutions arise from well- highlight both data related to an operational defined purposes. All these theories suggest frame and elements of an operational that social order rests on the consensus of the approach. majority that their needs are being met. The concept that social and political order rely on

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some type of popular consensus does not find explanation has significantly influenced the empirical support from the survival of many study of revolutions since 1979. In contrast, blatantly repressive regimes.24 In contrast to U.S. military doctrine does not consciously these four families, Skocpol proposes a struc- recognize the existence of any of these families tural approach to revolutions. The structural of theory, and reflects the available theory approach to revolution argues that political when the classic COIN canon was formed. In violence arises in the context of the state, other words, doctrinally there are only two which is anchored in both the class-divided explanations of intrastate conflict, Marxist and socioeconomic structures and the interna- aggregate-psychological theory. Shortly after tional system of states. The internal and exter- publication of FM 3-24, Frank Hoffman, a nal relationships of the state and the state’s member of the manual’s writing team, com- response to the struggles and crises determine mented that in writing the manual the classi- whether the regime maintains the support of cists focused heavily on Maoist and colonial politically powerful and mobilized groups. wars of independence and over-generalized the According to Skocpol, the acquiescence or sup- principles drawn from them.26 The Marxist port of the popular majority is not a major influence is easily found in FM 3-24. For exam- element in a regime’s demise.25 ple, FM 3-24 states, “An insurgency is not sim- States & Social Revolutions provided a new ply random violence; it is directed and focused explanation of revolutions and established a violence aimed at a political purpose.”27 That fifth family in the theory of revolutions. That sentence comes directly from Marxist theory.

2005 visit to Kosovo by NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer meeting with Kosovo police.

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The doctrine’s reiteration of Mao Zedong’s Chinese civil war that did not become avail- theory of protracted war just as easily might able until after the Great Leap Forward or the have quoted directly the orthodox pattern Cultural Revolution, but doctrine writers can from David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: be. There seems to be no military concern for Theory and Practice published in 1964.28 Yet, by evidence supporting the assertions in the clas- 1966, political theorists such as Barrington sic COIN references. Both Barrington Moore, Moore, Jr., had already begun to challenge the Jr., in 1966 and Theda Skocpol in 1979 placed classic interpretation of the Chinese revolu- emphasis upon the role the Japanese played in tion,29 which suggests that by 2006 the empha- the triumph of the Chinese Communist Party. sis on Marxist revolution was myopic. More recently, Anthony James Joes in Resisting The doctrine also is enamored with aggre- Rebellion challenged the classic COIN interpre- gate-psychological theory, although the doc- tation in a chapter labeled, “The Myth of trine does not explicitly acknowledge that fact. Maoist People’s War.”33 Nevertheless, FM 3-24 The attention to aggregate-psychological the- is content with examining only Mao’s self- ory can be inferred from the discussion of pronounced account, On Guerilla Warfare and legitimacy and the focus on the population. David Galula’s maxims. Similarly, the manual The objective of COIN is the development of cites T. E. Lawrence’s Seven Pillars of Wisdom as effective governance by a legitimate govern- an account of his attempt to organize Arab ment. Legitimate governments rule primarily nationalism, even though Lawrence’s account with the consent of the governed.30 The man- is largely fictional.34 The inclusion of Eric ual lists six measures of legitimacy that are col- Hoffer’s The True Believer among the classics is lectively interpreted to mean that the govern- particularly telling. The True Believer is clearly ment is supported by a sufficient majority of a work that might be considered among the the population who find that their basic needs aggregate-psychological theories of revolution, for security and services are met.31 These doc- except that Eric Hoffer was an atheist, long- trinal observations do not comport well with shoreman philosopher whose work is certainly the observation in Understanding Civil War that not an empirical study. Written in 1951, the civil war is more a function of greed than book represents Mr. Hoffer’s observations of grievance.32 These observations also stand in mass political movements prior to World War contrast to Theda Skocpol’s critique of the four II. Nevertheless, the COIN manual offers The families of theory she reviewed. They are, how- True Believer as a general explanation of why ever, consistent with Ted Gurr and aggregate- people join cults and supposedly al-Qaeda. psychological theories of revolution. Clearly, Mark Juergensmeyer’s book, Terror in The fact that the counterinsurgency doc- the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious trine presents a very narrow perspective of Violence, would have been more appropriate. intrastate conflict is clear. However, the nar- Arguments by warrant simply require the rowness of the perspective has other implica- acceptance of the author’s inferences without tions. First, the existing doctrine is supported a proper concern for the evidence that sup- largely by arguments by warrant, rather than ports the inference. This is a key shortfall by evidence. David Galula cannot be faulted because design begins with the need to for not considering evidence concerning the develop an environmental frame. Hence,

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design begins with the collection of evidence. that in many areas the cadre appealed to local Hence, classic COIN references and FM 3-24 concerns and that the movement created a do not directly support design. high level of popular fear, not conversion.39 Limiting counterinsurgency doctrine to Nevertheless, organizing the analysis of the two theoretical perspectives produces another CPN-M in accordance with classic COIN doc- problem for design. It constrains the collection trine tends, as Emile Simpson would argue, to and interpretation of data for both the envi- obscure rather than illuminate the dynamics ronmental frame and the operational of the Nepalese civil war. approach. A theory represents an intellectual Design Analysis commitment to a particular method of organizing, viewing, and explaining a phenome- As mentioned earlier, design begins with the non. Consequently, it directs attention to par- development of the environmental frame. ticular data and it guides interpretation. Whether following Joint or Army doctrine the Thomas A. Marks’ pamphlet, Insurgency In purpose of this step is to describe the current Nepal, shows the impact of classic COIN the- conditions and envision desired conditions ory. Dr. Marks devotes approximately ten per consistent with the policy objectives. The Army cent of the pamphlet to assessing the manual refers to framing as building a mental Communist Party of Nepal, (Maoist) (CPN-M) model to help individuals understand situa- action program. The CPN-M program was con- tions,40 in essence making sense of both the sciously Marxist but the conditions in Nepal situation and the policy objectives. Although did not support Marxist theory. Although FM 3-24 argues that the Army must learn and CPN-M demanded an end to capitalist exploi- adapt, Hoffman observed that the manual did tation, the economy of Nepal was not capital- not address environmental factors that require ist. There was no industrial base, 90 percent of us to rebuild our mental models.41 In other the population was rural, and 90 percent of words, it is more likely that planners following the farmers were classified as owner opera- the doctrine will collect and interpret data in tors.35 Contrary to Maoist literature the CPN-M accordance with the manual’s prevailing theo- could not draw resources from its base areas ries, Marxist and aggregate-psychological, since the base areas were among the poorest rather than accurately interpret new phenom- regions in the country.36 Additionally, despite ena. The planners will bring their theoretical the attention paid by the CPN-M and Dr. frame to the data. When planners do not have Marks to the action program, the followers and multiple perspectives to drive the collection the cadre were ignorant of both.37 The igno- and interpretation of data, their inferences can rance of the CPN-M cadre is even commented be logical but also impoverished. This can be upon by Emile Simpson in War From the seen in Hoffman’s article. Among the new Ground Up. Emile Simpson not only found environmental factors he sought to illuminate that the CPN-M guerrilla’s understanding of were trans-national and trans-dimensional Marxism was incorrect but he observed that actors.42 Yet, Skocpol’s reinterpretation of the understanding Nepal’s civil war in insurgent Chinese Communist Revolution decried the versus government terms would be overly sim- existing theories’ focus on intrastate conflict plistic.38 To be fair to Dr. Marks, his text notes and the neglect of the international context.

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Specifically, she wrote, “social revolutions can- unwillingness to depart from the conventional not be explained without systematic reference war framework. Into the mix is thrown the to international structures and world-historical concept of an Effects-Based Approach. developments.”43 Thus, the attention paid by However, the Effects-Based Approach figures doctrine writers to counterinsurgency theory more prominently in developing the opera- has left them blind to insights political theory tional approach than either the environmental made long ago. or the operational frame. Nevertheless, it too Army and Joint doctrine require planners is a problem. The concept of a center of gravity to describe the environmental frame by con- may be a misinterpretation or mistranslation structing a narrative and by developing a of On War. In the translation of On War by graphic. The causal explanation provided in Michael Howard and Peter Paret, the German the narrative is likely to be subjective and word schwerpunkt is translated as center of reflect the limited theoretical perspectives of gravity and as Emile Simpson has noted, the the planner. The method for developing the center of gravity is the physical representation graphic contains its own problems. Joint doc- of the enemy’s will.44 Schwerpunkt might also trine in discussing operational design and the be translated as focal point, the point of main environmental and operational frame layers a effort. In physics, the center of gravity or the system approach addressing complexity upon center of mass is a unique point where the the Clausewitzian derived concept of the cen- weighted relative position of the distributed ter of gravity. This reflects, in part, the mass is zero. Center of gravity is a simplifying Nirmal Dulal

Out of work protesters from the People’s Movement of Nepal challenge Nepal police.

PRISM 5, no. 1 FEATURES | 43 GREGOR construct that permits understanding the focal point in three levels. A military problem motion of a body despite a complex shape. It that can be addressed by understanding cen- is a simplifying method. Similarly, in military ters of gravity is not simple; it is complicated. planning the entire military problem can be Military doctrine describes insurgency and simplified by concentrating on the center of counterinsurgency as inherently complex. gravity. If, however, the military problem can Thus, describing the operational environment be understood in terms of the center of gravity, using the center or centers of gravity approach then the problem is not complex. Similarly, would not apply, but JP 5.0 mixes these meth- military doctrine also refers to centers of grav- ods with system analysis. Methodologically ity: tactical, operational, and strategic. In that this is an error. This befuddlement is found in case, the problem cannot be understood using JP 5.0 Figure III-4. That figure lists the key out- a single focal point but can be by finding the puts of the environmental frame as a system

Figure 2. JP 5.0 PMESII

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Figure 3. A Full Lattice Matrix

perspective of the operational environment present the analysis as a system, the planner and the centers of gravity. creates a graphic of a whole with little or no Another methodological problem related serious analysis. Naturally, the graphic will to developing the graphic is the doctrinal dis- always include decisive points and centers of cussion of the system perspective and system gravity. analysis. There is no actual discussion of how Military planners are not interested in planners should prepare and present an empir- complexity theory and not every military prob- ical description of the operating environment. lem is complex. They need to avoid what The figure provided in the manual, shown Michael J. Gallagher, Joshua Gelter, and below, is not actually a system. It is at best a Sebastian L.v.Gorka called the complexity confusing network. trap.45 To avoid judging every problem as com- The definition of a system requires that plex, planners need to recognize that military the elements that are interrelated work problems fall into a category that Todd R. La together to produce an output. Defining the Porte labeled Organized Social Complexity. boundaries of the system in design requires the Organized complexity refers to systems in planner to define what elements of a polity he which there are a moderate number of parts needs to understand. The planner is not interrelated to each other in interdependent ways. ested in the social, military, political or eco- Organized social complexity further limits nomic systems per se and it is difficult to com- attention to social groups with conscious pur- prehend information and infrastructure as poses whose members are engaged in relatively somehow separate from those systems. self-conscious interactions. In other words, the Additionally, the manual by arguing that sys- members are aware of their connections and tems analysis will produce a holistic view of that their activities impinge on the activities of enemy, neutral, and friendly systems creates others.46 Such a system might resemble that the impression that the visualization of the described by Robert Axelrod and Michael D. environment begins with, rather than ends Cohen in Harnessing Complexity.47 In any case, with a depiction of the system. In other words, the process of describing the system would rather than beginning the process of analysis begin by identifying the members (persons or with a description of the operational environ- groups) and their number, the relative degree ment and making a subsequent decision to of differentiation, and the degree and nature

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of their interdependence. A small number of Where he begins the analysis will depend on members with little differentiation and low the policy guidance he has received and the interdependence would not constitute a com- contemplated use of military force. He will still plex system. Similarly, if the dependence were face the problem of defining the members or hierarchical; that is, resources or influence groups that compose the system but it will be flowing one way from top to bottom the sys- possible to develop and interconnect subsys- tem would not be complex. It would be a tree. tems defined differently. There will still be the If every member influenced every other mem- requirement to specify what factors will con- ber in the system then the system could be stitute dependent and independent variables displayed as a full lattice.48 in the causal chain. For example, in some pol- The world, however, displays few actual icy contexts it might be useful to examine pov- trees and probably even fewer full lattice erty as a cause of civil war, in others the civil matrixes. What that means is that any depic- war might be the cause of poverty. Second, tion of an actual system would be semi-lattice. understanding that the system can be decom- A semi-lattice system might have some groups posed into subsystems enables the planner to displayed with an abundance of inter relation- avoid the problem identified by Emile ships but those groups might only be loosely Simpson. He will not need to be tied to connected to other groups. Thus, the full sys- Clausewitzian polarity; the motivations of the tem of interest would be decomposable, albeit participants will not need to be understood in not fully decomposable, into subsystems. The similar terms and their rules for interaction subsystems can be analyzed independently to can be analyzed separately. That will be impor- explain the internal interactions and then the tant for moving from the environmental and interaction between subsystems might be problem frame to defining an operational explored separately. If the system were fully approach. Lastly, it will make possible, decomposable then the system would present although perhaps unlikely, that the graphic a situation similar to that conceived for centers that accompanies the narrative actually con- of gravity. It would be complicated rather than veys information, instead of being a prop for complex. the briefer. Systems analysis or the system perspective should aid the planner’s assessment of a com- Military doctrine recognizes that plex security environment. However, it must counterinsurgency is more political than be understood as a method separate from military but political theory is rarely consulted. those used for conventional warfare. Combining systems analysis with conventional planning requirements in the context of cur- What does the admittedly abstract discus- rent counterinsurgency doctrine creates an sion of organized social complexity mean in impediment to developing an operational practical terms for design and military plan- approach, the third step in design. As Gian ning? First, it means the planner does not need Gentile put it, counterinsurgency becomes a to start development of an environmental strategy of tactics. Despite the call for system frame from the concept of a whole system. analysis, focus is always on the population as

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the center of gravity and, regardless of the pol- In the space of this paper, it is not possible ity or the nature of the conflict, the operational to provide a comprehensive survey of relevant approach is always long-term nation building theory concerning intrastate war, but it is pos- and efforts to win the hearts and minds of the sible to make some initial recommendations. people.49 The Clausewitzian framework of war First, planners should take direction from as a duel contributes to this problem. In irreg- works in the family of structural conflict the- ular warfare operations such as stability opera- ory, such as States & Social Revolutions. Military tions and counterinsurgency, the United States planners working on the environmental frame military always intervenes to aid a failing gov- should consciously attempt to understand ernment. In the recent example of Libya, the how the regime worked, if ever, prior to the responsibility to protect concept sees the fail- current exigency. For example, it would have ing government as the predator and hence, been useful in assessing the situation in Egypt intervention is always on the side of the rebels. in early 2011 to describe how the Mubarak Yet, in the case of intrastate war, the parties regime had maintained its rule and particu- should not be understood as two opposing larly, how it maintained the support of influ- camps and U.S. security interests may not be ential elites and obtained the acquiescence of best achieved by aiding one or the other. The segments of the population. In that category, current civil war is Syria is a case in point. If systems analysis and design are to produce cre- Indiscriminate violence is counter-productive ative operational approaches then new theo- in civil war. Using violence discriminately retical perspectives are needed. requires the user to clearly understand his purpose and to assess how the population Benefits of Political Theory will judge the use of force. Ernest R. Alexander observed in “Design in the Decision-Making Process” that design is a mix between search and creativity.50 A significant Marina Ottaway’s book, Democracy Challenged: rational element in the design process is sys- The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism, provides use- tematic search and information retrieval. He ful insights into the working of the Egyptian also observed that superior searches might be government as well as the role of elections and an indispensible ingredient of creativity.51 the problem of succession in semi-authoritar- Systems analysis, properly employed, offers a ian regimes.52 Misagh Parsa, whose work draws new method for understanding the environ- from both the structural and political conflict ment and displaying information. However, families of theory, identifies structural vari- without a broader set of theoretical perspec- ables that set the conditions for conflicts but tives, there is little chance of drawing useful do not determine their occurrence, timing or inferences about causal relationships and the process. Parsa argues that the actual dynamics military actions that will achieve intended of revolutionary conflict are related to the effects. Military doctrine recognizes that coun- exploitation of opportunities, organization, terinsurgency is more political than military mobilization options, and perhaps, most but political theory is rarely consulted. importantly, coalition formation.53 The government’s opponents are rarely a coherent

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block committed to a particular action pro- ravaged by civil war. Therefore, governments gram and a common goal. Instead, as Parsa must use their limited military resources judi- observed, the revolution brings different social ciously if they are to use violence effectively as groups together. Thus, counterinsurgency a means of control. No hearts and mind theory might entail efforts to prevent the creation of here except for attention to the different impli- an anti-government coalition. Recent events in cations for how violence is used. Egypt suggest that any group seeking to over- Indiscriminate violence is counter-productive throw the Egyptian government must get the in civil war. Using violence discriminately Egyptian army on its side. requires the user to clearly understand his purpose and to assess how the population will judge the use of force. The planner would be Every intrastate war will have its own wise not to make that assessment based on a characteristics and the causal relationships broad concept of a culture. He should have observed in any given case may not be detailed understanding of the local popula- applicable in another. tion. Barrington Moore Jr.’s book, Injustice: The Social Basis of Obedience and Revolt provides some insight to what might be common Despite the emphasis on aggregate-psy- norms.56 chological theory in counterinsurgency doc- Kalyvas’ definition of civil war leads natu- trine, recent works suggest that approach is not rally to an investigation of how rebels and gov- useful for understanding intrastate war. ernments seek and establish control over ter- Understanding Civil War applies the quantita- ritories. U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine also tive Collier-Hoeffler model of civil war onset has that focus. However, not all rebellions aim using “most similar system design” to compare to replace governmental structures. Some in cases in Africa (volume 1), and the Caucasus Africa simply extract resources for their own (volume 2). The authors found that the proxy benefit. Jeremy M. Weinstein’s book, Inside measures of grievance, with the exception of Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence, iden- ethnic dominance, were not prominent factors tifies factors that shape the development of in the onset of civil war.54 Instead of focusing rebel organizations and how violence is used. on popular grievances, it might be more useful His review of the theories of rebellion revealed to pay closer attention to the use of violence that most theories conceptualized rebel orga- and to government and rebel control. The Logic nizations either as social movements or as of Violence in Civil War suggests concern for states in the making.57 That observation is con- survival determines whether people adhere to sistent with the Marxist and aggregate-psycho- a particular faction or the government. Stathis logical approach to rebellions and military N. Kalyvas argues that military resources trump doctrine. What makes Inside Rebellion useful is the population’s prewar political and social Professor Weinstein’s micro approach to preferences in spawning control and “control understanding the rebel organization’s eco- has a decisive impact on the population’s col- nomic and social endowments and how those laboration with a political actor.”55 However, endowments influence the rebel structure and military resources are limited in a country strategy. Inside Rebellion, therefore, informs the

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military counterinsurgency planner when he studies, to identify for the planner not only the attempts to assess the insurgency’s structure. right questions to ask but also to suggest what FM 3-24 provides a list of questions about the the answers might mean. The proper response insurgent organization; such as, “Is the organi- to Drs. Gorka and Kilcullen call for a wider zation hierarchical or non-hierarchical?” or “Is range of counterinsurgency case studies is the organization highly structured or unsys- greater attention to understanding intrastate tematic?”58 These questions are not particularly war. PRISM helpful. The questions tell the planner what to ask but provide no insight into what the answer means. So what if it is hierarchical? Empirical studies of recent rebellions address the implications of the organizational data and, more importantly, suggest what that data mean. Recent political theories of revolutions and civil war are not the answer to all a military planner’s problems. Every intrastate war will have its own characteristics and the causal Notes relationships observed in any given case may not be applicable in another. Therefore, every inference should be treated as a working hypothesis until the inference is tested in the 1 new setting. Nevertheless, moving outside the Sebastian L.v. Gorka and David Kilcullen, “An Actor-centric Theory of War: Understanding the literature that considers counterinsurgency as Difference Between COIN and Counterinsurgency,” the focus into the literature that focuses on JFQ 60 (1st Quarter 2011), 15-16. intrastate war and political violence provides 2 Ibid., 16. 3 a means to break the reliance upon personal John Mueller, “War Has Almost Ceased to Exist: An Assessment,” Political Science Quarterly 124, experiences during counterinsurgencies in the no. 2 (2009), 301. anti-colonial era. Additionally, by developing 4 H.L. Nieburg’s definition covers much of an explanation for the success or failure of the what will be discussed in this paper, “acts of revolutionaries, secessionists, or rebels these disruption, destruction, injury whose purpose, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, theories identify data from the social, political, implementation, and/or effects have political and economic systems that may be relevant to significance, that is, tend to modify the behavior of developing an environmental frame and to others in a bargaining situation, that has conse- quences for the social system.” H.L. Nieburg, Political defining the problem. These theories also sug- Violence (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1969), 13. See gest operational approaches to counter the also Fred R. von der Mehden, Comparative Political insurgents. They also avoid the counterinsur- Violence (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973). 5 gency literature’s problem of addressing every Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, 11 insurgency as if the political goals, and hence, September 2007), 10. the insurgent’s strategies are the same. It might even be possible, if there are sufficient recent

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6 General Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The 28 Ibid., 1-6 and 1-7 and David Galula, Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Alfred Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New Knopf, 2007), 374. York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 2005), 44-58. 7 Emile Simpson, War From the Ground Up: 29 Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Twenty-First-Century Combat as Politics (New York: Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, Oxford University Press, 2013), 54-57. 1966), 162-201. Barrington Moore’s work is represen- 8 In 1995, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07 was tative of the systems/value consensus family of named Military Operations Other Than War. The theories. current version of JP 3-07, dated 29 September 2011 is 30 FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 1-21. labeled Stability Operations. Stability operations are a 31 Ibid. type of irregular warfare operations. 32 Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, 9 David Fastabend, “The Catagorization of Understanding Civil War vol. 1 Africa (Washington, Conflict,” Parameters XXVII (Summer 1997), 79. D.C.: The World Bank, 2005), 17-18. 10 Joint Publication (JP) 1 Doctrine for the Armed 33 Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The Forces of the United States (14 May 2007), I-1.( History and Politics of Counterinsurgency (Lexington, 11 JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2004), 191-208. States (25 March 2013), I-3. 34 See Scott Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia: War, 12 Irregular Warfare JOC, 6. Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the Modern 13 Irregular Warfare JOC., 18. Middle East (New York: Doubleday, 2013). Professor 14 Ibid., 20. Efraim Karsh’s review of this book in the Wall Street 15 Irregular Warfare JOC, 7-9. Journal, August 10-11, 2013, was entitled, “Seven 16 Army design methodology is found in Pillars of Fiction.” See also Efraim Karsh and Inari Chapter 2, Army Doctrine Reference Publication Karsh, “Myth in the Desert, or Not the Great Arab (ADRP) 5-0 The Operations Process (May 2012), 2-4 to Revolt,” Middle Eastern Studies. 33, no. 2 (April 1997), 2-11. Joint operational design is discussed in Chapter 267-312. III, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (11 August 2011) 35 Thomas A. Marks, Insurgency in Nepal and in Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (Carlisle Barracks, PA: SSI, December 2003), 2. (CJCSM) 3130.01 Theater Campaign Planning Policies 36 Ibid., 11. and Procedures (31 August 2012). 37 Ibid., 15. 17 Those interested in the evolution of the 38 Emile Simpson, 227-228. planning methods might want to read my article in 39 Marks, 17. PRISM concerning this matter. William J. Gregor, 40 ADRP 5.0 The Operations Process, 2-5. “Military Planning Systems and Stability Operations,” 41 Hoffman, 73. However, Mr. Hoffman took PRISM 1, no. 3 (June 2010), 99-114. the phrase from David J. Killcullen, “Countering 18 Ernest R. Alexander, “Design in the Decision- Global Insurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28 Making Process,” Policy Sciences 14 (1982), 280. (August 2005), 615. 19 ADRP 5-0 The Operations Process (May 2012), 42 Ibid. 2-6. 43 Skocpol, 14. 20 Ibid., 2-5. 44 Simpson, 132. 21 Theda Skocpol, States & Social Revolutions 45 Michael J. Gallagher, Joshua Gelter, and (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 7. Sebastian L.v.Gorka , “The Complexity Trap,” 22 Theda Skocpol, 9. Parameters XLII, no. 1 (Spring 2012), 5-16. 23 Ibid., 10. 46 Todd R. La Porte, “Organized Social 24 Ibid., 16. Complexity: Explication of a Concept,” in Todd R. La 25 Theda Skocpol, 32. Porte, ed. Organized Social Complexity (Princeton, 26 Frank Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Insurgency,” NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 5-6. Parameters XXXVII (Summer 2007), 71. This article 47 Robert Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen, was republished in Parameters XLI (Winter 2011-12). Harnessing Complexity (New York: Basic Books, 2000). 27 Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 48 La Porte, 8-9. 1-13. 49 Gian P. Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: Population Centric COIN and the Army,” Parameters XXXIX, no. 3 (Autumn 2009), 6-7.

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50 Alexander, 281. 51 Ibid., 287. 52 Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (Washington, D.C.: Caregie Endowment for International Peace, 2003). 53 Misagh Parsa, States, Ideologies & Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaraqua, and the Philippines (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 25. 54 Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, 18. 55 Stathis N.Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 111 . 56 Barrington Moore, Jr., Injustice: The Social Basis of Obedience and Revolt (White Plains, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1978). 57 Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 34-36. 58 FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 3-19.

PRISM 5, no. 1 FEATURES | 51 AUTHOR

SSgt. Jocelyn A. Guthrie

Congolese soldiers with the FARDC being trained by American contractors wait for instructions during training at Camp Base, Kisangani in May 2010. The FARDC was rebuilt as part of the peace process following the end of the Second Congo War in July 2003.

52 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 1