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Counterinsurgency Strategies for Effective Conflict Termination : US Strategies in El Salvador

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Counterinsurgency Strategies for Effective Conflict Termination : US Strategies in El Salvador Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1990-06 Counterinsurgency strategies for effective conflict termination : US strategies in El Salvador Heigh, Suzanne M. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/27755 AD-A237 496 lil I!1iiIIII III IrI I II~ NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California THESIS COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE CONFLICT TERMINATION: US STRATEGIES !N EL SALVADOR by Suzanne M. Heigh June, 1990 Thesis Advisor: Scott Tollefson Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 91-03066 91 ll ~l iw2,, r,,,,,.... 14I Unclassified SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No. 0704-0188 Ia. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION lb. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS UNCLASSIFIED 2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE 4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b. OFFICE RYMBOL 7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School NS Naval Postgraduate School 6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Monterey, CA 93943-5000 Monter-,', Ca fornira 9391.3-50C0 8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL 9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ORGANIZATION 8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS PROGRAM PROJECT TASK ELEMENT NO. NO. NO. IACCESSIONWORK UNIT NO. 11. TITLE (Including Security Classification) COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE CONFLICT TERMINATION: US STRATEGIES IN EL SALVADOR 12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) HEIGH, Suzanne Marie 13 TYPE OF REPORT 13b. TIME COVERED 14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 15. Page Count Master's Thesis FROM TO 1990, June 227 16. SUPPLEMENTAL NOTATION The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 17. COSATI CODES 18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse If necessary and identity by block number) FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP Low-Intensity Conflict, Counterinsurgency, El Salvador, US LIC Strategy. 19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) This study examines problems which the United States faces in its support of efforts by governments in less-developed count, ies (LDCs) to defeat revolutiona.y insurgents. The US has in the past been drawn into supporting conflicts for a protracted period, at increasing political, economic, and military cost, without receiving apparent benefit nor approaching a favorable end to the conflict. This thesis attempts to answer the questions of why the US encounters problems In its support of counterinsurgency efforts and why it has difficulty in effectively terminating this type of low-intensity conflict (LIC). This study makes the assumption that to achieve the long-term goals of stability, democracy, reduced conflict and reduced dependence on US assistance, the best outcome for the US in most cases of insurgency is to obtain a negotiated settlement to end the conflict. After producting a list of factors necessary to produce a negotiated settlement to terminate an insurgency, the study examines the various COIN counter-insurgency strategies used in El Salvador to see how they affected the factors indicating progress toward achieving a settlement. The study concludes that while the US has improved in its COIN strategies by developing a combined strategy which emphasizes other than military efforts, limiting its direct military involvement, and increasing the use of small-unit tactics and other appropriate LIC methods there are problems within the US military and political organizations which inhibit the US ability to achieve effective termination of the insurgency and of its support efforts. These problems include the lack of consistent pressure on the host government and military to 20 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILTIY OF ABSTRACT - 1 a. ABSTRAC r SECURITY CLASSIFICAT!O. X UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED Am,, "P.'T.' k,iiUc-assfied 22a. NAME OF RESPONIR!F INDIVIDUAL 220. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 22c. OFFICE SYMBOL Scott Tollefson (408) 646-2863 NS/To DD Form 1473, JUN 86 Previous editions are obselete. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE S/N 0102-LF-014-6603 Unclassified Unclassified SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Biock 19, Abstract: (continued) reform and to compromise on settlement conditions, the persistence of the desire within the US administration to achieve a military victory, and limitations in the types of economic assistance the US offers to the host government and the way this aid is administered and distributed. DD Form 1473, JUN 86 (Reverse) SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited Counterinsurgency Strategies for Effective Conflict Termination: US Strategies in El Salvador by Suzanne M. Heigh Captain, bnited States Air Force B.A., Cornell University, 1984 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS from the 7' NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 1990 Author e M. Heigh Approved by: Scott Tollefson, Thesis Advisor Frank Te i, Second Reader Thomas C. Bruneau, Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs iii ABSTRACT This study examines problems which the US faces in its support of efforts by other governments to defeat revolu- tionary insurgents. The US has in the past been drawn into supporting conflicts for a protracted period without receiv- ing apparent benefit nor approaching a favorable end to the conflict. This thesis addresses why the US encounters problems in its support of counterinsurgency efforts and why it has difficulty in effectively terminating this type of low-intensity conflict (LIC). This study assumes that the best outcome to achieve US long-term goals in most cases of revolutionary insurgency is a negotiated settlement. The study develops a list of factors considered necessary to produce a negotiated settlement of an insurgency. It then examines the various counterinsurgency strategies used in El Salvador, analyzing their effects on the factors needed to achieve a settlement. The US has improved its approach to counterinsurgency. However, there are problems within US military and political organizations which inhibit the US' ability to achieve effective termination of an insurgency. These include the lack of consistent pressure on the host government and militazy to reform and to compromi3e on settlement conditions and the desire within the US administzation to achieve a military victory. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ......... ................. 1 II. INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY ... ....... 9 A. TYPES OF INSURGENCY ..... ........... 9 B. INSURGENT STRATEGIES ... .......... 12 C. INSURGENT TACTICS ... ........... 13 D. PHASES OF AN INSURGENCY .. ........ 14 E. GUERRILLA STRATEGY .... ........... 15 F. EXTERNAL SUPPORT .... ............ 17 1. Support to the Insurgents ..... 17 2. Support to the Government ..... 18 G. REASONS FOR U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY SUPPORT ....... ................ 20 H. REASONS FOR US PROBLEMS IN COUNTERING IN'JRGENCIES ...... .............. 23 1. US Strategic Culture .. ........ 23 2. Constraints on Use of Military Power 33 3. Need to Form Strategy Consistent with Cultural Constraints .. ........ 34 4. Further Constraints on US Policy 35 III. NEGOTIATION THEORY APPLIED TO INSURGENCY 37 A. POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF INSURGENCY . 38 1. Outright Win by One Side . ...... 38 2. Capitulation .... ............ 39 3. Stalemate ..... ............. 40 B. THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS .. ........ 42 1. The Agreement to Negotiate ..... 42 2. Insincerity of Offers to Negotiate . 44 C. TERMINATION CONDITIONS .. ......... 46 v 1. Compromise . 46 2. Inflexibility ... ........... 47 3. Contribution of Changes in Political Leadership ..... ............. 48 4. Necessary Conditions .. ........ 49 D. BARGAINING POSITIONS ... .......... 50 E. RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL ... .......... 51 F. IDEOLOGICAL AND POWER POLITICAL VALUES 53 G. NECESSITY OF DE-IDEOLOGIZATION AND DEVALUATION ..... .............. 55 H. ADJUSTMENT OF NEGOTIATION CONDITIONS . 58 1. Room for Compromise .. ........ 59 2. Barriers to Compromise ........ 60 3. Means of Overcoming Compromise Barriers ...... .............. 61 4. Necessity of Unbiased Mediator . 64 I. COMPONENTS OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT 65 1. Military Settlement Issues ..... 67 2. Political Settlement .. ........ 68 J. COMPLIANCE ...... ............... 72 K. ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT ...... .............. 73 IV. STRATEGIES TO ACHIEVE CONFLICT TERMINATION . 78 A. A STRATEGY OF MILITARY VICTORY . 81 1. Sudden, Severe Blow .. ........ 86 2. Graduated Escalation .. ........ 87 B. HIGH-LOW STRATEGY ... ........... 88 C. DUAL-TRACK OR 'FIGHT AND TALK' STRATEGY 89 D. INDUCE STALEMATE ................ 90 E. DE-ESCALATION ..... ............. 91 vi F. DEALING DIRECTLY WITH OPPOSING EXTEPNAL SUPPORTERS ...... ............... 93 G. STRATEGY OF DISSOLVING THE UNITY OF INSURGENTS ...... ............... 93 H. STRATEGY OF APPROPRIATE INTELLIGENCE AND SURGICAL USE OF FORCE .. ......... 94 I. STRATEGY OF INCREASING THE GOVERNMENT'S POPULAR SUPPORT .... ............ 96 J. COMBINED STRATEGIES WITH SEVERAL GOALS 97 K. EFFECTS OF COIN STRATEGIES ON TERMINATION INDICATORS .. ......... 98 1. Mainly Military Strategies
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