MERGERS &ACQUISITIONS IN CHINA IN THE 21ST CENTURY
A Comparison Study between Strategically Acquired and Financial- Sponsored Investments
Ruilin Xu Advisor: Professor Shannon Mudd 04/28/2011 Ruilin Xu
Abstract
This study compares the differences in the market perceptions and the actual performances of strategically acquired firms and of financial-sponsored firms in China from 2006 to 2009. Two main hypotheses here are: 1) A merger & acquisition (M&A) activity creates value for acquired firms, regardless of the types of investors;
2) Strategically acquired firms create less value over the same time period compared to the financial investor-backed firms due to the differences in the acquirers’ motivations. In order to prove these hypotheses, standard event studies that look at the cumulative abnormal returns of the acquired firms over periods of [-20, 20] and [-120, 80] are used.
Our results confirm that mergers & acquisitions do create market values for the acquired
firms. Our results also show that while in the short term the market perceives M&A
activities involving strategic investors to be slightly better, this difference diminished
after the 07-08 financial crisis. In the long run, the financially sponsored firms have
gradually performed better than the strategically acquired firms, especially after 2007.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my advisor and mentor, Prof. Shannon
Mudd: this paper could not have been written without your constant guidance and support.
Many thanks to the Haverford Economics Department: it is my huge privilege to learn from and work with all the professors and students.
Special thanks to Mr. Michael Kim’85 and Mr. Takaaki Tsubaki of PanAsia Partners.
And to my parents, Feng Li and Junqian Xu.
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Table of Contents
I. Background Information & Hypotheses ...... 8
II. Empirical Methodology ...... 17
1) Standard Event Study ...... 18
2) Nonparametric tests for actual performance during [-120, 80] ...... 21
3) Multivariate Regressions ...... 22
III. Data Overview ...... 25
IV. Results ...... 27
1) Standard Event Study ...... 27
2) Nonparametric tests for actual performance during [-120, 80] ...... 31
3) Multivariate Regressions ...... 33
V. Conclusion...... 36
VI. Appendix ...... 39
References ...... 46
List of strategically acquired transactions ...... 47
List of sponsor-backed transactions ...... 52
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Two different types of investors engage in mergers & acquisitions (M&A)
activities: strategic investors and financial investors. Both are active investors in emerging markets like China. Strategic investors entered China first in a wave of M&As that occurred within a limited number of cities in 1987. Due to China’s need both to reform its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and to develop its stock market, a second wave of acquisition activities (the majority of which were cross-border) occurred, between
1991 and 1996 (Chen, 2009). The third wave came when China joined the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 2001 as many Chinese firms realized that M&A provided a useful way to expand and better compete in the global arena.
While in recent years, the overall number of M&A deals in China has been increasing by an impressive 20% annually (China Business, 2005), that number hides a shift in the type of investors coming into China. According to a recent report from Bain
& Co (2009), private equity (PE) deals in China grew at a compound annual rate of 45% in 2000-2007(pre-crisis).1 The period of 2006 to 2007 was the height of the deal frenzy,
when credit was affordable and money was readily available. Total debt during this
period was six times cash flow, nearly doubled what it had been in 2001 (Finkel, 2010).
After 2007, as people became more cautious about easy credit, leverage buyouts were no longer “in fashion”, and the market went back to basic values and growth-oriented investing. Nevertheless, this growing trend continued through the first half of 2009, as deal volume topped $7.2 billion, nearly matching the total for all of 2008 (for the overall
1 This percentage increase here includes all types of investments (e.g., M&A, private placement) done by private equity firms. However, the deal data I use in Graph A1 (in Appendix) as well as for the rest of the paper comes from the transactions that are listed as “Mergers & Acquisitions” in Capital IQ. Although a fair number of transactions listed as “Private Placement” can be considered as M&A activities in terms of transaction size and acquired percentage to my discretion, in order to simplify the data-collection process and avoid further confusion, only the “Mergers & Acquisitions” deals are used here. Hopefully this explains why Graph A1 does not show the 45% annual increase as mentioned in the Bain report.
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trend from 2000-2010, refer to Graph A1). China is now on par with the region’s mature
economies such as Japan and Australia / New Zealand as a destination for new
investment.
Both types of investors continue their investment interests in China in the
21st century (see Graph A1). From the graph, while strategically acquired investments are
still the major type in China’s M&A activities and have been growing exponentially in
terms of number of deals, the number of acquisitions involving financial sponsors is
growing steadily as well, although at a much slower rate. Both types of acquisitions were
affected by the global financial crisis, but have shown signs of recovery.
While both provide capital to the acquired firms, there are important differences
between strategic investors and financial investors. Strategic investors are generally firms
that operate in the same industry as their acquired firms. Beyond basic capital, these
investors provide the acquired firms with know-how, technology, management skills,
marketing techniques, intellectual property and clientele. Financial investors,2 on the
other hand, consist of private equity firms, venture capital firms and other financial
institutions whose primary goal is to supply investment capital to firms that require this
capital to grow. The investment is made with the expectation of earning a profit from the
capital investment. While these firms may choose to become involved in general
management decisions, it is less likely they will have the specific experience and knowledge of the industry to add more than this. The strategies of the different types of financial investors vary somewhat. Private equity (PE) firms are investment managers
2 In this paper, the terms “financial investor” and “financial sponsor” are often interchangeable. The firms that are invested by financial investors may sometimes be referred as “sponsor-backed”.
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that provide capital for a company through a variety of modes including leveraged buyout
and growth capital. Venture capital (VC) firms specifically target early-stage, high-
potential, start-up companies which usually have a novel technology or a unique business
model in high technology industries, such as biotechnology, IT, software etc. Due to the
fact that most VC-invested firms are private start-ups with very limited public
information attainable to analyze, in this study, we will be mainly focusing on the PE-
backed firms, which are more likely to acquire public firms whose financial data are
readily available to us.
Given these two types of investors, the question arises which type of investor
contributes more (as measured by changes in market values) to the acquired firm.
Investors may add value either through improved performance of the firm or simply by
affecting market perceptions. If there is a difference between the two types of investors, it is also helpful for us to think about the reasons why one investor is able to create more
values for their acquired firms than the other.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section I, I will review the
previous literature, summarize the motivations of both types of investors and examine
how they might differ in their impact on acquired firms’ value creation. I will also state
the main research question and the hypotheses. In Section II, I will introduce the
empirical model. In Section III, I will provide an overview of the data. In Section IV, I
will present the results of the empirical investigation. In Section V, I will present my
concluding comments, including a discussion of the limitations of this research and
suggestions on how future research can be done.
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I. Background Information & Hypotheses
A number of studies have sought to measure value creation from mergers and
acquisitions, primarily those involving strategic investors. Some studies find that
acquired firms experience positive value creation (Bain & Co., 2009; Cybo-Ottone &
Murgia, 2000). Caruse and Palmucci (2008) examine M&A activity in the banking sector
investigating the determinants of value creation among the characteristics of the banks,
regulation and the role of minority shareholders. They find a positive effect of M&A
activity on the performance of the acquired banks while the acquiring banks actually
experience a negative impact. In addition, looking at the cumulative abnormal return
(CAR) of the combined acquired and acquiring banks they find no significant effect. This
result points to the possibility of a redistribution of value between acquiring banks and shareholders of the acquired banks. Similarly, Tourani-Rad and Van Beek (1999) also find a positive effect of M&A activity for the acquired banks in Europe. However, they find that the M&A activity does not have a significant impact on creating value for the acquirers, indicating no net increase in value across the acquired and acquiring firms.
Other studies provide similar findings in industries other than the banking sectors.
M.C.Park, et al (2002) investigate how the market participants react to M&As involving telecommunication companies. Their paper shows that the market reacts negatively to
M&A announcements on the acquiring firms’ performance, and the negative reaction is greater for acquirers involving cross-border M&As than domestic ones. The reasons accounting for the differences in market perceptions between cross-border M&As and domestic ones, as concluded by Park, et al, are: 1) the premium paid for the required level of performance is impossible to reach even for the best managers; 2) M&A deals will
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become more complicated when cross-border cultural, financial and monetary effects are
factored in (Reed & Lajoux, 1998); 3) the inability to overcome system integration issues contributes to many M&A failures in the telecommunication industry. However, despite all these, people are still pursuing M&A activities in this industry as they are looking to achieve economies of scale through reducing average cost and expanding network.
Further, after looking at the initial market reaction before and after the M&A announcements using event studies, Park, et al examine the changes in revenue, operating income and net income of the bidder during the subsequent year: eleven out of seventeen bidders show negative changes in their net income – which means that value creation or synergy realization is not warranted even though it may increase the firm’s size.
While Park, et al examine the value creation through M&As by looking at both short term market reactions (a month before the acquisitions to five days after the acquisitions) and long term firm performances (yearly changes in revenues profits),
Akdogu (2003) focuses on the announcement effect of all acquisitions on both the acquirers and their non-merging competitors in telecommunication industry. He compares the returns to acquirers and the acquired over multiple mergers and those of their competitors. He finds that the acquirers in the telecommunication industry earned
insignificant negative returns of -0.266% and the acquired firms (targets) earned positive
and significant returns of 13.59% on average during the two days (t=-1, 0) around the
announcement dates. His results show that the rivals of the acquirers experience negative returns, especially around the announcement period.
A major modification we have in this study that is different from the previous literature is that we focus on acquired firms only, rather than focusing on both the
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acquired firms and the acquiring firms (the investors). As some strategic investors and the
majority of financial investors are private companies, it is impossible to collect their stock prices over time to examine their performances. We will examine the effect of the different types of investors on the market performances of the acquired firms who were public before the acquisition and remained public after the acquisition. We will follow closely to the methods introduced in these papers.
In order to determine whether an investor creates value for its acquired firm, it is important to understand if value creation is actually a goal and a motivation for its initial investment. The different motivations of strategic vs. financial investors may play an important role in the level of value creation in the acquired firm.
There are many ways for a strategic investor to acquire a firm, and every mode of acquisition represents a different level of 1) extent of investment and risk; 2) degree of
ownership and control. Generally speaking, higher investment means higher risk, but also
allows more control and thus, higher profit. Clearly the strategic acquirers have different
motivations when they decide to acquire– some may want to acquire 100% of a firm to
expand their operations whereas others may want to obtain a minority stake to diversify
their products or test out a pilot project in an unfamiliar industry. The motivations for a
strategic investor to engage in M&A activities can be summarized as follows:
1. Expand to new market: Strategic investors foresee the substantial growth in China’s
economy (see Graph A2) providing an enormous potential market. An investment in
an existing Chinese firm is one strategy for entering the domestic product market
(Cooke, 2006). As the proportion of middle-class in emerging markets such as China
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and India grows over the years, many multinational as well as domestic investors have
increased their expansion effort in order to meet the increasing demand. When an
acquisition occurs, the parent firm will experience increase in its scale of operations
and obtain “a larger revenue and asset base” (Lumpkin, 2003). At the same time, firm
expansion can also extend the life cycle of a product that is in the maturity stage in a
firm’s home base but that has greater demand potential elsewhere. Companies may
choose to acquire a wholly-owned subsidiary instead of building a “greenfield
venture”3 because an existing enterprise lowers the cultural barriers in an unfamiliar
location and helps the acquirers to achieve their goals of expansion to new markets in
a timely fashion (Hill, 2009).
2. Reduce cost: Larger firms may benefit from economies of scale when they are able to
spread a large fixed cost over a larger base, thus reducing the cost per unit. Larger
firms may also have more bargaining power when dealing with suppliers so that the
variable costs of the products are reduced as well. Cost of production can be further
reduced in terms of local manpower and other resources, transportation and logistics
(Cooke, 2006), government incentives and the local tax structure (Chen, Chi, & Zhu,
2009), as well as achieving synergies by combining the resources of the two firms.
3. Reduce risk: Both foreign and local strategic investors are able to reduce their business
risks and financial risks by engaging in M&A activities (Chen, Chi, & Zhu, 2009)
through the diversification in their products and industries. While relocating their
plants in another country may help them reduce costs, it may also help them to reduce
3 Greenfield Venture: A form of foreign direct investment where a parent company starts a new venture in a foreign country by constructing new operational facilities from the ground up.
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risk through an economy that works differently than the one in their home countries.
Table A1 shows that China was the least negatively affected country during the 2008
financial crisis, which may explain the increase in M&A activities in China even after
2007 (Jo, Costa, Hallstrom, Tryhus, Winter, 2009). The relative economic stability
that China managed to maintain during the crisis is probably due to China’s large
growth rate as an emerging market as well as its relatively closed financial system that
places “China in a position in which it has ample liquidity and spending on
infrastructure to support the economy throughout the crisis” (Channel News Asia,
2009). The economic environment in China in the 21st century minimizes the risk of
China plummeting into a severe financial crisis and attracts investors both within and
outside of the country.
4. Enjoy favorable regulations and incentives: In 1978, Deng Xiaoping, China’s first
Vice Premier, committed China to adopting the “Open Door” Policy which promotes
foreign trade and foreign investment. Since then, China opened up its economy and
has been readily creating opportunities that favor both foreign and domestic investors.
Both strategic investors and financial investors have been utilizing these opportunities
to actively participate in M&A activities. One such example would be China joining
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. As China enjoys lower tariffs and
provides a business environment that protects intellectual property, foreign investors
are more confident in investing in China. Another example would be 2005 China non-
tradable share reform: this reform addressed the problem that holders of non-tradable
shares were unable to benefit from the increase in share prices on the tradable share.
(Jingu, Kamiyama, 2009). Smaller holders of nontrandable shares and public –market
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shareholders used to have very limited influence either on the governance of these
companies or their investment decisions. The government instituted new policies in
2005 requiring companies to merge the two classes of shareholdings – in essence,
making the nontradable shares liquid. Over the next five years, all shares in China’s
SEOs were to become fully tradable. These reforms encourage the development of the
country’s M&A market by allowing industries to consolidate, improving corporate
governance at SOEs, and expanding capital markets (McKinsey Quarterly, July 2007).
5. Preempt competitors: Sometimes strategic investors may acquire their competitors to
gain monopoly power in its industry (personal interview with Mr. Rafael Fogel,
Partner of Falcon Investment Advisors).
Different from strategic investors, financial investors only have one motivation: they seek a return on their investment through one or any combinations of the following:
. Debt repayment or cash accumulation through cash flows from operations.
. Operational improvements that increase earnings over the life of the investment -
raising the firm’s valuation.
. Selling the business for a higher multiple of earnings than was originally paid.
As most PE funds are 8-10 years, the ultimate goal of PE firms is to let their acquired companies exit from their portfolio within the fund period. Majority of the acquired firms are held for around five years before their financial investors allow them to exit (personal interview with Mr. Takaaki Tsubaki, Co-Founder of Pan Asia Partners).
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There are many exit methods for the sponsor-backed companies. The graph below
illustrates the main exit strategies for the private equity investments in China.
Graph 1. Exit Strategies for China’s Private Equity investments (by case)
Other 17%
M&A IPO 13% 50%
SALE 20%
Note: Chart recreated from China’s Private Equity Market, Jingu, Kamiyam (2008). Based on the 152 exits from private equity in 2006. Source: Nomura Institute of Capital Markets Research, based on Zero2IPO
The pie chart above shows that going public is the most popular exit method for
the sponsor-backed firms in China, which indicates that most sponsor-backed companies
in China were private companies at least during the period when they initially received
investments from financial investors.4 Other methods include selling the portfolio companies to other investors (can be both strategic and financial) and buybacks.
Based on the goals for financial investors to obtain returns from their investment, we can conclude that the motivations for financial investors are as follows:
4 Despite the fact that most sponsor-backed firms are private, all the sponsor-backed cases used in this study are public firms due to the difficulties in collecting data for private firms.
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1. Invest in firms with growth potential: firms with good performance are more likely to have better earnings over the years and achieve higher market valuations over time.
Previous literature has shown that industries in China such as real estate, infrastructure, retail, telecom, and bioscience that are growing fast and in need of capital have become the “fertile grounds for global PE funds” (Banerjee, 2008).
2. Improve management: PE firms that have an investment philosophy of active investing in their portfolio companies help to improve the companies’ management team which can be the key for the growth of a company. While PE firms prefer not to change the original management, as owners of the companies they do sometimes interfere with the management when they see areas that need to be changed (Finkel, 2010). When a PE firm acquires more than 20% stake in a company, they are more likely to send in a part-time director on the board of that company to oversee the management (personal interview with Mr.T.Tsubaki).
3. Buy potentially undervalued firms: the surging capital market in China is creating opportunities for PE funds to exit the market at higher valuations. Finkel(2010) talks about the possibility of PE firms purposely buying undervalued firms and selling them for much higher values in the future. Firms are undervalued due to mispricing and market timing problems. Sometimes the market may not be able to access the true value of a firm based on the fundamentals such as revenue and profit. The reasons for undervaluation include economic downturns, industry fluctuations, one-time events associated with a firm. Any of these incidents may upset the market and change the short-term perceptions on the firm. Undervaluation may be frustrating to the management but it is a potential investment opportunity to investors. Once these problems are corrected or situation
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reversed, the firm will again be valued correctly. In these cases, although the financial
investors (and sometimes the strategic investors as well) are involved, they do not create
value for the acquired firms. According to Mr. Tsubaki, most of the Japanese PE firms are more interested in investing in “deep discounted” firms than actively creating values for the portfolio companies.
From these motivations and the observed M&A activity in China we surmise that financial investors have gradually realized the potentials in certain firms and industries and have gained confidence in China’s economy. As the study tries to compare the differences in values created for acquired firms between strategic and financial investors, extreme cases of buying undervalued firms and selling them in the short run are avoided
– the sponsor-backed firms in my data were all held by financial investors for at least one years to ensure that the financial investors here did put effort in helping the acquired
firms grow.
Note that this comparison of the effects of strategic and financial investors is one contribution of this paper. I have been unable to identify any previous literature that directly compares impacts of strategic investors and financial investors on their acquired
firm. The motivations listed above lead to the following thesis: financial investors are
more motivated to create value for their acquired firms whereas strategic investors are
more concerned about how the acquisition of the target firms can help them increase
combined profits. This leads to following two testable hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 1.An M&A activity creates value for firms acquired by either a strategic investor or a financial investor.
Hypothesis 2. Strategically acquired firms create less value over the same time period compared to the financial investor-backed firms due to differences in acquirers’ motivations.
In addition to testing these hypotheses, the empirical investigation will also examine a number of control variables expected to impact the level of value creation.
Various literature has shown that investment factors and acquired firm characteristics may all influence the value creation process to varying extents. We will further discuss the control variables in Section II.
II. Empirical Methodology
Three empirical methods will be used for this study: 1) a standard Event Study to establish whether the market attaches a positive value to the M&As by strategic and financial investors during the period surrounding the announcement; 2) a comparison between the distributions of cumulative abnormal returns prior to and after the acquisition to test the actual effect on returns; 3) an extended event analysis to determine whether there are longer term effects of the M&A activity on returns taking into account firm fundamentals and deal characteristics.
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1) Standard Event Study
The Standard Event-Study Methodology is used in several papers studying M&A value creations (Caruso & Palmucci, 2008; Akdogu, 2003; Silva & Miguel Diz, 2006).
This methodology basically examines whether the market attaches a positive benefit to the M&A activity be examining returns immediately before and after the M&A activity announcement. Previous research conducted a residual return analysis of the impact of an M&A event on the rate of return of the stockholder. The residual, or abnormal return
(AR), is calculated as the difference between the actual returns and a projected market
returns. The actual return is calculated based on the stock prices of the acquired firms in
two consecutive trading days. The projected market returns is calculated based on the
standard capital asset pricing model (CAPM):
(1) Rjt=aj+bjRmt+ e
where Rjt is projected return of a share j at time t and Rmt is the realized return on a
general market (eg, Shanghai SE Composite, Hong Kong Hang Seng, Singapore Straits
Times, S&P 500).
Firstly we estimate the coefficients aj and bj of each stock by using the ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression model. The market model was estimated over a 90-day
period beginning 30 days prior to each M&A announcement (the time period used to
5 estimate coefficients aj and bj is [-120,-30]). Next we use the CAPM model to estimate
the projected returns, Rjt for the 40-day period that is the focus of this analysis (20 days
prior to the acquisition announcement date and 20 days after the acquisition date, [-20,
5 This period is [-120,-20] for the 2009 deals.
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20]). ARs are then calculated as the differences between actual returns and projected
returns.
(2) ARjt= Rjt-actual- (aj+bjRmt)
An important consideration for the empirical investigation of the model is over
what time period to examine returns. While the actual date of the merger could serve as
time zero, we are concerned about whether an increase in firm value might occur prior to
the announcement due to speculation about the M&A activity itself. This would artificially inflate pre-M&A returns and bias our results from finding any positive affect
of M&A activity based on abnormal returns alone. For this reason we begin the analysis
20 days prior to the recorded announcement date (using [-20, 20] instead of [0, 20]).
In addition, instead of using AR, we use the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to
capture the total firm-specific stock movement for an entire period when the market
might be responding to new information. CARs are often used to evaluate the impact of
news on a stock price. In addition, it is the accumulated return that is the focus of
investors holding stock over a period of time.
To get the CARs cross-period and cross firm, first, we calculate the mean of the
CARs of all firms for a single day. After we obtain the CAR means for every day during
the [-20, 20] window, we use t-statistics to test statistical significance of CARs over this
time period.
(3) CARj(t=-20)= AR j(t=-20)