M. JSi Wr- INSTITUTE ©E AF1SDCAN STHJEME FOURAH BAY COLLEGE
university of sierra leone 23 JUIN 197*
Africana
Research
ulletin
FORMER FOURAH BAY COLLEGE CLINETOWN, FREETOWN.
Vol. Ill No. 1 Session 1972-73 OCTOBER 1972
Editor: J. G. EDOWU HYDE
Asst. Editor: J. A. S. BLAIR v.. AFRICANA RESEARCH BULLETIN
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...... James A. S. Blair
1. ARTICLES
Krio Ways of 'Thought and Ev-ression
ooooooooeooooooooooo» Clifford Fy1er
Initiative and Response in the Sierra Leone Hinterland, 1885-1898: The Chiefs and British Intervention
.. ». ... Kenneth C. Wylie and James S. Harrison
2. RESEARCH NOTE
A Note on 'Country' in Political Anthropology
...... C. Magbaily Fyle
3. REVIEW
W. T. Harris and Harry Sawyerr, The Springs of Mende Belief and Conduct Arthur Abraham
4. NEWS ITEM
Road Development Research Project - Progress Report
...... James A. S. Blair INTRODUCTION
The present issue of the Africana Research Bulletin contains as its first article a contribution from two former Visiting Research Scholars of this Institute, Professor Kenneth Wylie and Mr James Harrison» We are always glad to welcome to our pages the work of past visiting scholars and we hope that many more such contributions will be received.. This mutual co-operation between foreign scholars and this Institute is a manifestation of the approval in this country for genuine scholarly wrork to be undertaken, both by indigenous and non- national scholars. In a forthcoming issue of the Africana Research Bulletin the conditions and responsibilities of visiting research status in this Institute will be laid out clearly so that intending applicants may be familiar with the opportunities for research open to them.
Professor Wylie and Mr. Harrison's article focusses attention on the controversial period of late 19th Century Sierra Leonean history when British inter¬ vention became increasingly felt in the hinterland of the Crown Colony of Sierra Leone, Using evidence from both Mende and Temne areas, the authors indi¬ cate that the indigenous chiefs of the period were much less passive vis-á-vis contact with the British than has commonly been supposed. Indeed they show to an extent how the warrior chiefs used the skilfully British against their own enemies,
The re-interpretation of the history of the pre- colonial period of foreign impact is Sierra proceeding in Leone, as is indicated- in the work of Mr. C. Magbaily Fyle, .another Visiting Research Scholar of this Institute, who in a short research note, discusses the interpretation of the term in the "country" area now encompassing Northern Sierra Leone and parts of Guinea. Mr. Fyle is undertaking research into the Solima-Yalunka State as a ment for require¬ his doctorate from Northwestern University. ïire Clifford Fyle is a member of staff in the Department of English of Fourah Bay College, and also a former contributor to the Africana Research As an Bulletin. established authority on the Krio language of the Sierra Leone Creoles, Mr. Fyle's contribution is of special interest on this occasion because of the implications it bears in terms of the education in English of native Krio speakers, for he puts forward several theses about the nature of the Krio language, and includes comment on the rythm patterns of the language. He suggests that these individualistic rythm patterns are often carried over to the English speech of native Krio speakers and that more attention is needed to problems encountered by school-children being educated in a second language with very different rythm patterns. Mr. Fyle's paper was first presented in the Colloquia Series of the Institute of African Studies.
Mr. Arthur Abraham is yet another Visiting Research Scholar of the Institute of African Studies and in this issue raises some rather controversial points concerning "The Springs of Mende Belief and Conduct" the book written by the Principal of Fourah Bay College, Professor H. A. E. Sawyerr, on the basis of the field notes of Rev. W„ T. Harris, a European missionary amongst the Mende. Mr. Abraham suspects that biasses may exist'in the book as a result of its origin, and he presents his suspicions in a review article.
Regrettably, I must end by asking our subscribers to once again be patient with us, as this Bulletin is still appearing well behind publication date. Thanks to the excellent efforts of Mrs. Delia Carpenter this particular issue has been brought out in a very short period of time, and I express the gratitude of the Editors to her for her careful and consistent typing. It is hoped to bring out one issue of the Africana Research Bulletin every month until it is up to publication date.
James A. S. Blair Assistant Editor ARTICLES
KRIO WAYS CE THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION
Clifford Fyle Department of English Fourah Bay College
In this paper I wish to put forward five theses about the ways of thought and expression of the Krio people of Sierra Leone, Krio is a West African language and therefore, understandably, it has affinities with other West African languages in its environment. In addition it is a Creole language and therefore, again -understandably, it has affini¬ ties with others of the world's Creole languages. For these reasons, some of the points made here xvould hold good for other West African languages or other Creole languages, or both. This paper, how¬ ever, limits itself to a purely Krio viewpoint. What the paper tries to do is to throw some light on the workings of the Krio language, and perhaps through this on the workings of the Krio mind. It does not claim, though,that the language is a very peculiar language,, or that the Krio mind is a pecu¬ liar kind of mind.
The theses are as follows:
Thesis 1 - Krio is a thematic language, This means that in thinking or speaking about any subject, the Krio man usually first states his topic of discussion before proceeding to say something about this topic.
For example, consider the following well-known Krio sentences :
1. Da kaw we no get tel, na Gad go drgb in fiai. / The cow that riot has tail it is God will drive off its flies. / God helps those who cannot help themselves.
2. Pikin we se in mami no go slip, insef no go slip. ^ A child who says his mother not will sleep,
3. himself not will sleep. ^ Children who think they trouble their parents only succeed in
troubling themselves much more than the parents «
3» Da tin we de bien siks i big, yu no si we sevin twis? ? The thing that exists behind the number six it is big, you not see how the number seven is twisted? / An innocent facade may conceal the gravest dangers.
•'l0 Iodamasi monki, yu yon don don. / Lord have mercy monkey, your own has finished. ^ Alas, monkey, it is all over with you.
We see what happens in these sentences. Let us take a look at the first one. An Englishman, in making such a sentence, might say something like, "Only God will drive away the flies off a cow that has no tail". The point is that the Englishman would tend to put the word "God" first because the word "God" is the grammatical subject - "Only God will drive away . But not the Krio man. God or no God, it is the cow that he is talking about, "Cow that not has tail" is his theme, so he puts "cow" first and says "Cow that not has tail, it is God will drive away its flies."
The other sentences move in a similar manner. The point is that the Krio man makes a clear distinction between the grammatical subject and the subject under discussion, which we may call the "theme" subject. And he states this theme subject first. This often happens even where the theme subject is the same in meaning as the grammatical subject, as in sentence 2 where the theme subject "Child that says its mother will not sleep" means the same as the grammatical subject "he himself", and in sentence 3 where the theme subject "The thing that exists behind six" means the same as the grammatical subject "it" in "it is big". In general, a theme subject occurs irrespective of the grammatical function of any word or phrase in the rest of the sentence with which this theme subject may be equatable in meaning. For example, in sentence 1 the theme subject "Cow which- not has tail" may be equated only with the possess¬ ive pronoun "his" in the object phrase "his flies". Similarly in sentence 4 the theme subject "monkey" may be equated only with the possessive pronoun "your" in the grammatical subject "your own".
There is more to thematisation in Krio than this, but enough has been said to make the point. Indeed, this phenomenon of theme subject preceding grammati¬ cal subject is such a common one in the language that as I have argued elsewhere^, one has to make provision in .the description of Krio sentence struc¬ ture for an intrinsic pre-subject or thematic phrase so that whereas in English for example we can talk about subject, verb and object, in Krio we have to talk about pre-subject, subject, verb and object. That is to say, we have to recognise an extra gramma¬ tical unit that does not occur in the English sentence.
Theses 2 - The Krio man likes to express himself with emphasis in a manner that suggests that he wishes to give every thought, every idea, every piece of information a full and a clear significance. He is prone to overstatement rather than to under¬ statement.
I do not have any sociological evidence of a scien¬ tific nature, but it would seem to me that one of the most common traits of the Krio character is the love for exaggerated gossip, the tendency to blow up a little piece of information until it assumes quite significant proportions. Thus when a Krio man says of another that i tu lai (/ "he is too much of a liar") he'may mean that the person he is refer¬ ring to is a bona fide liar, but quite often he simply means that this is a person who is always full of interesting even if exaggerated gossip or who can make the unbelievable tall story sound quite credible. In this case "telling lies" becomes a matter not for adverse criticism but quite often for fond admiration. Another Krio expression used to indicate exaggeration is "put Iops en sol" "add pepper and salt., pepper and salt being the main condiments used in flavouring food and the expression indicating that ithe business of exaggeration, to the Krio mind, is that of making information savoury and interesting.
5. In his language the Krio speaker emphasises in many ways. One way is by means of adding extra and intrusive consonants such as /w/, /h/ and /y/. For example, instead of saying na so i ol ("It is thus he is old" ^ "he is quite old")the Krio speaker might say, na so i (w)ol"(adding an extra /w/ to the word "ol"). Or instead of saying di bobaawangut ("the boy is gluttonous") he might say di bibo (h)awangpt, adding this time an extra /h/ to the word awanp,; 3t. Or instead of saying una kam ("you come") he might say (y)una kam, adding an extra /y/.
Another way is by change of pitch. For example, instead of saying I don go fawe ("he has gone far away" ) he might say I don go fUTwe, giving the syl¬ lable fa extra high pitch and meaning "he has gone very far away". In addition, for more emphasis he might accompany this extra high pitch with(vowel lengthening and have instead I don go faaaaaaaawe, the amount of lengthening depending upon the degree of very far away-ness that the speaker wishes to indicate. Or he may decide to accompany the extra high pitch not by vowel lengthening but by repeti¬ tion of the whole syllable fa in question and he may have instead I don go fAwe or even I don go féi-fá-fà-fà-fá-fá-fáwe again repeating the syllable as many times as is consistent with his desire to emphasise. *
Having discussed repetition, we must say that repe¬ tition is a big subject in Krio. Repetition is used not only for purposes of intensifying effect as above but also for distribution. When repeti¬ tion is for distribution it is usually accompanied by pitch (i.e. tonal) change. For example, di bob3 tu rjik-pîk "the boy is too fond of picking up things"
but
\ A . di bobo tu pik-pik "the boy is a petty thief" (i.e. his is too fond of picking here and picking there).
I ,j os di álà-álà nomo "he just keeps on shouting"
6. but
f \ s / / I ,jos di ala-ala. nomo "he is being quarrelsome" (i.e. he just keeps on shouting here and there and e v.e rywhe re).
Also note
■Pi frog dCm se hon-hon, hon-hon, hen-hon, faon-hon The frogs are coaking continuously and every¬ where".
In this last example note that the onomatopoeic word hon is repeated once for purposes of distribution and becomes hin-hòn, and then the whole hm-hon construct is repeated for intensity as often as the speaker feels necessary.
'./hen repetition has been used for distribution it may also then be used for nicknaming and even for mockery. Tor example,
v v / namama kom-koni "jamama, the devil of cunning"
\ A bobo pik-pik "boy of the_thieving fingers"
s A ^ « i. bera lai-lai "Sarah the liar"
Like thematisation, repetition is so intrinsic to the Krio language that it has to be accounted for in its grammatical structure.
Thesis 3 - The ^rio' Blind conceives of a single, com¬ plete action as a series of related actions in a well- defined progression. The relationship is often expressed by the arrangment of verbs «in order, and the progression is that of inchoativeness followed- by action.
The inchoative verbs are firstly the "intention" verbs such as a,ja,ja (come round to at last), and wan (want to) and the "command." verb pas (get on withj"f secondly, the verbs kam and go with a causative force (get àround to doing somethingTf' thirdly, the "incipience" verbs such as bigin (begin) and stat fo (start to); and
7. fourthly, the initiation verbs such as p:rap (get up), 1 if (lift up) and bumbu (carry on the back)»
The motion verbs are firstly again the verbs kam. and £0 indicating this time incipience of motion; secondly the movement verbs such as tinap (upward movement), sidom (downward movement) and ron ("run", horizontal movement), and then once'"more, the verbs kam and go which may be used in the com¬ binations kam kam or go go or kam go to indicate thirdly approach and fourthly direction?»
The action verbs are firstly the "voicing" verbs such as ala (shout), wispa (whisper) and suku-suku or suki-suki (talk in veiled tones); secondly the "giving" verbs such as gi (give) .and. bos (give news) and the "general action" verbs such as" pie (play), dai (die) and it (eat); thirdly, the "reporting" verb se_ (say) and fouthly the conditional verb pas (unless) and the "purpose" verbs nek (cause to be) and 1e_ (let) »
The order of all these verbs in a series is in every case as I have given, and this order is fixed in the language»
What this means is that, theoretically at least, the Krio man can string together up to twelve verbs in sequence in the same sentence. In actual practice, however, he never strings together more than about seven or so, often only two or three. I give a feiv examples (the verbs in the series are underlined).:
Pas grap kam ron go go tel - am we a se ^ "Hurry up and run to teTT~him what I say". (comiaand+initiation*incipient motion+movement* approach+direction+giving)
Na de o, troki kam bigin hala krai so in mami. dai f . "That was it» Tortoise started crying aloud in grief
that his mother had died". . (causation+incipience+voicing+general action+reporting)
sidom mek yu it ^ "sit down and eat". (movement*' purpose)
8» This is the phenomenon known as verb serialisation - this stringing together of a number of verbs in a sentence« However, we can also have sentence serial¬ isation, in which case it is not so much verbs as whole sentences or clauses that are strung together in one large sentence. Even in this case however the fixed progression, in other words the order of occurrence as indicated earlier, is always preserved he nay note the following examples:
I kam i kam tal mi se mi na fulmar. ^ "he came and told me I was a fooT1". (approach+direction+giving+rèporting)
Di dronkman gray i waka go na Mista N'ikul in shap go hala di t ok se'mek Mista Ni leu1 tros am rom ïhe drunkard went up to Mr. Nicol's shop and asked- loudly to be given drink on credit". (Initiâtion+moveraent+approach+direction+voicing+action+ reporting+purpo se)
Verb serialisation is certainly not peculiar to Krio. But no matter where else it occurs it seems to me that this kind of ordering is an index of a kind of working of the mind, this habit of seeing the total action as a series of related actions in a fixed and orderly progression.
Thesis 4 - To the Krio mind there is a clear distinc¬ tion between ownership and possession, so much so that the distinction appears in the structure of the language.
The expression of ownership is usually by a noun phrase within a noun phrase, as for example in
Mi mami in os "My mother her house".
Yu pikin in tresis "Your child his trousers". where the noun phrases in os (her' house) and in tresis (his trousers) occur within the larger noun phrases Mj mami in os and yu pikin in tresis. This construct of a noun phrase with in (third person possessive) appearing within another noun phrase is
9. a formal construct. Also, the phrases above may perhaps be more accurately translated as "The house of which my mother is the owner" and "the trousers of which your child is the owner"»
General possession, on the other hand, is usually expressed by a more straightforward noun phrase, as for example,
Yu mami os "Your mother's house" (may be her property but may very well be rented)»
Yu pikin trosis "Your child's trousers" (may be your child's property but may very well belong to another child)„
For the Krio man ownership is permanent, while pos¬ session may be simply the possession of usage. The point may be illustrated by reference to landed pro perty. Let us assume that a certain wealthy John Thomas gives away one of his houses to his sweet¬ heart, Gaily Jane. The transfer is quite legal, and Sally for all intents and purposes becomes the sole possessor of the property. To the Krio mind, however, especially where John Thomas's relatives are concerned, Sally never becomes the owner. John children and other descendants, even to generations yet unborn, may quite Justifiably in Krio circles refer to the house as mi dadi in os ("my father's house"), mi p;randadi in o s ('fay grandfather's housé') mi great grandadi in os ("my great grandfather's house"), and so on. And on occasions they might even simply refer to the house as wi os (our house) Sally Jane notwithstanding, once the house of John Thomas, always the house of John Thomas or his kin who represent him. To the Krio mind possession may be transient, but ownership is permanent to the end of time, or till everyone has forgotten.
Thesis 3 - The Krio man, in speaking his language, uses a fixed and regular rhythm. But whereas the rhythm of a language such as English is a triple- time or three-beat rhythm, the rhythm of Krio is a quadruple-time or four-beat rhythm.
10. The point about English being a triple-time language has been made by Abercrombie in such papers as "Syllable quantity and Enclitics in English" and "A Phonetician's View of Verse Structure" (English verse structure, that is to say)3. The point about Krio being a differently timed language, at least as regards the folk verse, was made by Eldred. Jones as far back as 1957^- 1 think it is to Jones's great credit that he stated in essence the position for Krio at least fully seven years before the- distin¬ guished phonetician Abercrombie stated the position for English- However, where Jones talks about a "two-beat rhythm" for Krio I prefer to talk about a four-beat rhythm, and even so my four beaks are the equivalent of only one of Jones's two beats. This way it becomes easier to assign fixed place values to every Krio syllable, and to avoid talking about syllables being "slurred over", as Jones does.
Without going into technical details one can illus¬ trate the differences between the rhythms of English and Krio by reference to one or two English sentences (Here 'and following each slanted line marks off a "foot" or a unit of rhythm, with three rhythmic, beats for English and four for Krio. The numbers 1, 1+ (=one and a half), 2, 3 and 4- refer to the number of beats taken up by a single- syllable or by a small group of syllables).
The symbol v indicates a missing beat.
An English speaker for example may say,
v 1 1 21 213 3 2 /vBut to the / souls of /fire I / give / more / fire
v ï ï 1113 1+1+11 / It is / possi ble to a/chieve / greater / ease of
1 1 1 v de/scription.
However a Krio speaker making these same sentences, would tend to say,
211 22 2222 2 / But to the / souls of / fire I / give more / fire.
11 11112 11 2 11.2 1 / It is possi/ble to a/chieve greater/ ease of
12 2 de/scription./
The Krio speaker, in other words, would he foisting on to English the rhythmic pattern of his native language. Incidentally, this is one reason why the English speech of native lírios often differs so radically from that of native English speakers, even though the words and the sentence structures they use might be identical. foetry is nothing more than language in use - expert use and great use if it is good poetry, but use all the same. Eon this reason we find that the rhythms of poetry are the same as the rhythms of prose. English poetry, like English prose, is basic¬ ally triple-timed. Consider the following example,
3 3111 1113 2 / Let /-me / not to the / marriage of / true / mindi
12 1111 wv 1+1+ 3 2 ad/mit im/pediments. // Love is / not / love
1 1+ 1+ v 1 1 1+ 1+ 3 wv
which / alters / when it alter/ation / finds / /
This is irregular verse, irregular not in the use of the triple-time rhythm or in the number of feet to a line, which are constant, but in the wide variations in the arrangement of syllables within the foot. It is this kind of wide variation in syllabic arrange¬ ment that one would find in much of Shakespeare, for example. But English verse can be much more regular Consider for example.
1 111 111 1 1 1 1 v I / sprang to the / stirrup and / Joris and / he,
111 1 11 112 1 I / galloped, Dick / galloped, we / galloped / _all three v
12. In contrast Krio folk verse, like Krio prose, is quadruple timed,. I illustrate with examples from Eldred Jones, A. "2 2 2 2 121 22 / Wetman / pikir, / sen am to / dokta /
2 2 22 12122 / dokta / se na / doti ma/lata /
,11 1.1 22 13. / ih am na di / gota / budum! / / and
B. "2 211 224 vv u-o / tel mami / Nansi / se /
vv 2 2 2 2 4 /v / Popo / rep na / fam /
2 22 22 22 2 Demi / monki / dçm don / it od / don
2 22 2 1 1 211 2 Dem / bel£ / big leks/ ban, l£ke / ban,
2 22 2 1. 1 4 vv Dem / bele / big lske/ ban. /
And finally that great favourite of my boy; ood days,
0o
2 2 2 2 2 12 12 Dsn / Limba / de go / Jeruse/lem
2 2 11 2 2 12 12 Den / tel I .ami / Nansi / sidom sa/ful,
2 2 11 2 2 12 1 2 Den / tek poli / mot, den / ben am, bsn / am
2 2 11 2 2 12 1 2 Dfcn / tek poli / wes, den / slap am, slap / am
13. 'Translations
A.
nite-man1 s child, send him to doctor Doctor says he-is dirty mulatto. Throw him in the gutter, hudum!
B.
Go tell woman Nancy say Pawpaw ripe in farm The monkeys they have eaten all completely Their bellies big like drum, like drum, Their bellies big like drum.
Co
The Limbas are going (to) Jerusalem They tell woman hancy, "bit down composedly, They take parrot's mouth, they bend it, bend it,
They take parrot's posterior, they slap it slap it ...
Conclusion
One thing that this paper might have underlined is the hidden and dangerous traps that lie in wait for the hrio speaker, as indeed for any other non-native English speaker, who attempts to learn and use the English language. Usually a good teacher can help him with vocabulary*" and structures and pronunciation. But thought habits and ways of expression almost always elude attention, and these are the things that die hard.
Dotes
1. Fyle, C. N. Beginning and Pinal Themes in the Krio Sentence Africana Research Bulletin Vol. I, No. 1, 1973":
14. 2o The verbs kam and go are the most versatile verbs in the language, In addition to the four functions mentioned above, 'these verbs arejalso movement verbs "in'their owg. bight - kam = {'come" and go = "go". Also the verb jro functions as an auxiliary verb, in which circumstances it carries low pitch (i.e. low tone).
3o In "Studies in Phonetics and Linguistics" - CUP, 1965»
4-. Jones, P. D., "The potentialities of Krio as a Literary Language", mi erra Leone btudies, Lev; Series, to. 9, 1957»
15. INITIATIVE ANN RESPONSE IN THE SIERRA LEONE HINTERLAND, 1885-1898: THE CHIEFS ANN BRITISH INTERVENTION
Kenneth C. Wylie and James S. Harrison Nepartment of Histn-y Herbert Ho Lehman College City University of New York
This article provides examples of African response and initiative during an era usually described as one of almost exclusive European prerogatives. Even in separate areas of the Sierra Leone hinterland, among peoples of quite different ethnic identity, and by no means united into large political units, there is continuity of African reactions to European aggrandizement. To have a comparative approach, combining the work of two researchers in two adjacent areas, within approximately the same span of time, is useful. We intend to illustrate how Africans acted when faced with the consistent challenge of British expanri-—ism and Imperialism. When viewed comparatively, these actions reveal a range of diplomatic, military and economic responses which clearly indicate that Africans were not mere pawns in an era of Imperial conquest. The final establishment of British hegemony took forms which were conditioned largely by African initiatives.
Violent action obviously attracts more attention among historians than the response of cooperation or accommodation. This is not to say that militant action has more validity than other less dramatic responses, but that resistance is a very visible response and with the passage of time its inherent drama is more readily recalled. Within the context of traditional African polities, it is misleading to class any particular kind of response as intrin¬ sically superior to another merely on an arbitrary basis. One easily focuses on personal heroism among those Africans who resisted with force, though they were perhaps less ultimately successful in terms of their objectives than those who chose other
16 courses. It is accordingly appropriate that we take our examples from African chiefdoms which resisted militarily as well as through political manoeuvres. It readily becomes apparent that both methods were capable of temporary success.
The career of Bai Simera Kamal of Masimera Chiefdom provides a clear example of open and forthright resistance to direct British intervention. When he was installed as chief in 1873'', he took control of a chiefdom which had already passed through two generations of inconclusive wars for control of the Rokel river trade^. This situation favoured profes¬ sional warriors over often hesitant traditional authorities and played naturally into Bai Simera's hands. Having served his chiefdom well through two decades of defensive war against Yoni chiefdom, he was frequently able to ignore societal restraints which limited the power of most chiefs^. Eventually he abandoned his defensive policy and embarked on an aggressive policy intended to unite the Temne of the Rokel region in a military alliance against the growing British power.
Bai Simera did not consider it a wise policy to engage in direct alliance with the pro-British faction which had gained strength as patterns shifted^". Bai Simera saw no advantage in accommo¬ dation because he recognized the wealth which could be extracted from direct control of the local and long distance trade would be a powerful level against the obvious expansion of British commercial enter¬ prise. His career as a warrior had been successful and he was a forceful man by nature. Indeed, shortly after his installation, in an apparent attempt to reassert control over the river trade and force the British to recognize his sovereignty, Bai Simera proclaimed an embargo on trade with the colony^. Having already pushed his military power into Marampa, Koya and Yoni (xvhich was for the moment militarily involved with the Kolifa and Kunike chief¬ doms), this action provoked a minor crisis. The Colony was forced to ragotiate, and a large meeting was arranged at Magbeli, during which Bai Simera thoroughly dominated the other participating chiefs, who included Bai Sehora of Yoni, Bai Koblo of
17. ílarampa and Bai Komp of Kolifa^h Up to 400 people were said to have attended this "durbar", which indicates its importance, and Bai Simera having demonstrated his strength, agreed to lift his embargo «
Though he was temporarily willing to negotiate with the British, Bai Simera was aware of the growing erosion of chiefly prerogatives and prestige which was manifest in the often arrogant behaviour exhib¬ ited by Creole and European traders as British influence pushed up the Rokel. Within a few months of the 1873 negotiations, he embarked on a fateful policy which led to long years of constant war with his pugnacious southern neighbours and finally to his downfall o
Colonial administrators rarely attributed commonsense to African chiefs, and in the case of "obstinate" leaders like Bai Simera Kamal, usually assumed that their policies were typically savage reactions to attempts by "superior" peoples to control them. Bai Simera's political astuteness, though, is easily seen in his attempt to contain the Yoni (who were a far more immediate threat to the British throughout the '70's than to Masimera). If he engaged in a full scale war the resulting disruption would bring Masimera to the full attention of the Colony. Any prolonged dislocation of the Rokel River trade would invite British intervention. Yet to decline aggres¬ sive action would give the upper-hand to the Yoni who reacted to British regulations and treaties with impunity. Had Bai Simera willingly subordinated his legitimate powers, including his rights to make war, negotiate peace, collect tribute and demand tolls on commerce,he might have benefitted by British protection, and from the regularization of trade and a steady personal stipend?. On the other hand he would prob¬ ably have been obliged to accept direct British sup¬ port against Yoni, and to subdue his own warriors who were the ultimate source of his power.
By 1875 Bai Simera Kamal had come to represent a strong traditionalist movement which was opposed to alien influences. Thus he forged ahead, waging un¬ remitting war against his traditional enemies,
18. defying the "arbitration" of British agents, and asserting all the powers which a Temne chief could call upon in times of trial. His war against the Yoni went well at first, and by 1876 Bai Sebora of 3roni was suing for peace and seeking British help to negotiate an end to the fighting£>0 With victory seemingly so close Bai Simera was not willing to stop, and he refused negotiation, A year later events changed dramatically when Yoni settled with its neighbours Kolifa and Mabang, and turned full attention to Masimera, refusing in turn to negotiate when the Governor at Freetown attempted to intervene9 The tide had begun to turn against Bai Simera,
Yoni, nearly equal to Masimera in population, possessed a larger proportion of able-bodied warriors and in May of 1877 Bai Simera and his allies were surprised by a ferocious counter-attack which over¬ ran Masimera, burning villages and towns. One con¬ tingent crossed the Rokel and burned Magbeli^O, Even Koya, now a de facto British protectorate, was invaded and upcountry trade halted. The British urged negotiation, but again Bai Simera refused to talk. Taking advantage of a respite, he managed to rebuild his shattered forces and quickly led another counter-attack which plunged deep into Yoni, In December of 1878 Bai Sebora of Yoni agreed to meet Governor Rowe at Magbeli, and in January, having suffered another setback, Bai Simera reluctantly agreed as wellH. This ended the first phase of Bai Simera's attempt to re-establish and defend tradi¬ tional chiefly independence and to continue the wars of expansion and age-old raids and reprisals upon which so much of a Temne chief's powers depended.
The 1879 peace was short-lived. Bai Simera had too much at stake to allow other chiefdoms continued advantage. He did not wait long, and was soon allied with the anti-British faction in Koya, led by Bana Seri and Sengbu, two sons of the late chief Naimbana, These men opposed the pro-British Bundu family led by Lahai Bundu of Foredugu, who had become willing agents of the British^. in May one of Bai Simera's warrior leaders named Pa Misiri attacked Foredugu, destroying Bundu property and nearly capturing Bai
19. Sebora who happened to be in Foredugu at the time''3. The war spread rapidly and by the middle of the rainy season several more Koya towns were burnt, threaten¬ ing the Rihi area. Meanwhile Bana Seri had arranged to get the support of the Alkali of Port Loko - and Bai Simera, confident that tthings were going his way, struck across the Rokel and captured the town of Magbeli. By August he was engaged in a two-front offensive and managed to hold his own in the south'^.
By this time the British considered the war too serious to continue and Governor Rowe sent a column into Koya. Bana Seri and Pa Misiri were quickly routed. Fleeing north from Rowe's soldiers, the Temne warriors were suddenly attacked on their flank by Santigi Momo Raca (a sub-chief at Magbeli who had managed to survive Bai Simera's initial attack) and they were decisively defeated. Momo Raca took advantage of Masimera's weakness and marched his soldiers to threaten Port Loko. Thus within a year war had spread from the Ribi in the south beyond the Rokel into Marampa, to the borders of Maforki chiefdoml^.
Not fully comprehending the political situation in the hinterland (and largely underestimating the African capacity for concerted efforts) British memos and letters written in Freetown at the time of these wars do not convey an impression of co¬ ordinated effort by any particular interior chief. Indeed, these conflicts were part of a war which Bai Simera had planned largely by himself, which he directed through subordinates, and which eventually demanded his direct involvement16„ in the end his short-lived alliance with Koya and Port Loko brought him more trouble than he had anticipated.
Though he was unable to stage another major effort on the scale of the 1879 action, Bai Simera con¬ tinued minor raids and harrassments through 1881. British envoys were sent to parley with him in 1882, but he avoided them by deliberate misdirection. In 1883 he attended a large conclave on the Rokel where, as in the past, he overshadowed the other chiefs present.
20. Throughout these conflicts he continued to openly sell slaves captured in his many wars, a fact widely known throughout Temneland as well as in Freetown» Most of these unfortunates were absorbed into the still profitable system of slave-worked "farms"17, but some were sold outside» To Colony officials any traffic in slaves was a breach of treaty agreements (which Bai Simera had signed), and they felt bound to enforce its suppression when they found direct evidence that a chief was involved» The respite which the peace of 1883 brought to the Rokel was very short lived. Bai Simera could not
control the actions of recalcitrant chiefs - nor could he fully control the warriors under his command without a continuation of aggressive war policy which had brought him to power in the first place.
Bai Simera Kamal ruled at the end of an era: The British no longer made treaties to satisfy diplo¬ matic appearances, or to bargain as equals with powerful chiefs over legal jurisdictions, trade and duties. Unlike earlier Temne rulers Bai Simera faced a determined and increasingly intolerant imperialistic ethos, a view which categorized him as a savage, a "diplomacy" which looked upon all Africans as inferior, and which finally assumed that sub¬ jugation was ultimately correct"^,, The dilemma which Bai Simera faced was partly based on the extent to which British influence had spread into the interior, and partly on the fact that inter¬ vention in chiefdom affairs was "taken for granted in Freetown after at least 1880 if not earlier. Like all chiefs he placed great value on the Colony trade, yet he was determined to preserve his independence. These two objectives were increasingly incompatible of course, for by the end of the '70's at least, the growth of "legitimate" trade had begun to transform the economic structure of much of Temneland, Per¬ haps among all the Rokel chiefs, Bai Simera best understood the long-term effect of several decades of increasing European influence, especially the bald fact that as the chiefs learned to accept British support in negotiating conflicts, they became less able themselves to restore peace when renewed vio¬ lence broke out» By the early '80's few Temne
21» chiefs - excluding Bai Bureli in the north and a few in the extreme wist - took it for granted that waging war and making peace were powers which they could exercise without British support. Bai Simera eventually stood alone in this dramatic resistance to the spread of imperial influence up the Rokel from Freetown, Gradually, as we have seen, his allies were defeated or made their peace, intimi¬ dated "by British thre its and forced into co¬ opérâtion"! 9, As the .lighting along the Rokel and in Yoni finally degen3rated into chaos, he was eventually isolated and in the end he was defeated and taken prisorer.
In 1886 Bai Simera again aroused British attention, and Governor Rowe cut off his stipend20o For three years the administration in Freetown had attempted to arbitrate peace in Masimera and the adjacent chiefdoms, Creole traders had "been mistreated (often these men were scornful of the interior peoples and behaved with arrogance), and there were
renewed claims of traffic in slaves^'! „ In the mean¬ time the "Yoni Wars" had threatened the Colony, badly frightening Creole traders and provoking the inevitable British response. Plans were carefully laid in Freetown during 1886 and in November, 1887 Colonel de Winton led an expedition up-country which put a final end to the wars in general and broke the independent power of Masimera22#
The final alliance of Masimera with Yoni is curious because they were old enemies, Lawson in the Aborigines Department made a connection between the Yoni aggression and Bai Simera's actions, which he attributed to a desire to protect the only buffer Temne chiefdom,between Masimera and the expansionist Mende25„ He was not entirely wrong, though he failed to note the major reason for the brief alliance, which was that Bai Simera had belatedly recognized that only by supporting the Yoni could he hope to defend his own sovereignty,
De Winton advanced quickly, taking Robari - which was filled with Temne warriors - in late November, The warriors retreated to Ronietta, which was
22 „ immediately raked with a Maxim gun. The slaughter did not last long, and rumours spread that Bai Simera had died in Battle (some said at Robari, others said at Ronietta). As one scholar put it, "the backbone of Temne resistance was broken", and . shortly after Bai Simera, aged and tired, sur- rendered2Ao The force of British military techno- logy had been brought to bear decisively. Though he returned to his people after a short imprison¬ ment (he was ransomed by the British), Bai Simera never fought again.
Shortly after de Winton defeated the Temne-Yoni coalition in 1888, he proposed that a permanent police force be established to guard the Colony's border, and to ensure peace beyond the frontier. The Sierra Leone Frontier Police Force was there¬ fore established in 188925, His suggestion was very perceptive, and events shortly proved that such a force was necessary at least as far as British objectives were concerned.
British intervention was common to both Mendeland and Temneland and by sending the troops upcountry the newly arrived Administrator James S. Hay involved the Colony Government in already existing political struggles. In truth many of the "colonial" wars of the late 1880's were nothing more than British involvement in on-going up-country disputes. The peace which de Winton had accomplished in 1887 was characteristically short lived. In November 1888, Hay became aware of rumours circulating around the Colony that belligerent Mendeland chiefs were pre¬ paring to invade the southern littoral. In response to these threats, Hay ordered his commandant to be alert and sent additional troops to be stationed at Mafwe to protect southern trade routes26o Tim rumours soon proved accurate, and Bonthe District was invaded by the powerful up-country sovereign Chief Makaia.
Like Bai Simera, Makaia realized that economic con¬ trol was a prerequisite for wealth and therefore political power. For several years Makaia had engaged in small scale warfare in an endeavour to control the small but quickly growing coastbound
25« trade between the Mano and Jong Rivers, A shrewd and intelligent man, Makaia had laid the ground work for a concerted effort against foreign influ¬ ence by forming a loose coalition of Bum River chiefs to support him, Fear was one of the major factors cementing the relationship,, Although Makaia,and Mendigra his main ally, were"minor chiefs, however their combined forces were great enough to coerce their neighbours into compliance. Coupled with fear, the desire for gain in slaves, revenue from the control of trade routes and towns, and the initial looting, enticed chiefs into joining Makaia and Mendigra, Their expected attack not only disrupted commerce but threatened to engulf the coastal area and displace the British2?,
In response to Makaia's invasion, Captain Crawford, the British Manager of Sulima District, informed Administrator Hay that an expedition to Sulima was essential to curb Makaia's expansion and to reduce his influence in the southern Hinterland, Crawford considered the matter so urgent that in December he led an unsanctioned punitive expedition against the belligérents28o Makaia's less disciplined and poorly armed forces retreated and the pursuing British-led forces bruned several towns, Crawford's policemen were ably assisted by Chief Momo Jah of Pujéhun, one of Chief Makaia's rivals, and they com¬ bined to destroy Mendigra's main town of Mahama freeing numerous captives in the process. Governor Hay reinforced Captain Crawford in January 1889, and the Captain's augmented force of seventy-five police¬ men and Momo Jah's 800 troops proceeded up-country destroying towns and dispersing the remnants of Makaia's men. As Momo Jah and Crawford swept up- ccuntry, previously uncommitted Africans joined, taking the opportunity to revenge themselves on Makaia and profit by his defeat. Among those who supplied troops were Jah's brother Momo Kai Kai, and the powerful Chief Mackovoreh of Tikonko. As Makaia's position became even more precarious even his allies deserted to Jah and Crawford: this had the dual effect of depleting Makaia's army while augmenting his enemies29,
24, By February Chief Makaia's ill-fated attempt to seize control of trade had been thwarted. His army had dwindled and scattered, and it was rumoured that Makaia and his most loyal lieutenant Mendigra had sought refuge up-country with Nyagua of Panguma, Chief Nyagua, an influential Mende chief of the eastern Hinterland, was practically unknown to British administrators in Freetown,, In the early 1880's his sole official contact on the coast was with the Creole trading firm headed by S, B. A. Macfoy of Bonthe. Nevertheless, times were and changing when he granted asylum to the fugitive Makaia and Hendigra, Nyagua opened the door for direct con¬ tact with the British3c, pn the meantime, Captain Crawford had been succeeded by G. H. Garrett, a commercial agent turned Government administrator. One of Garrett's first duties was to negotiate for the return of the defeated chiefs, so that they could be punished for opposing the Colony Government. Accompanied by Momo Jah, Garrett visited Nyagua in March, and after some deliberations they negotiated a deal for the release of Makaia and a general peace settlement. Nyagua persuaded Garrett and Jah to eliminate the troublesome Wende villages, after which he would surrender Makaia. Wende consisted of thirteen barricaded towns housing a collection of mercenaries and slave traders who raided Nyagua's chiefdom and greatly curtailed his access to the coast. Momo Jah's troops easily performed the deed and in exchange, Garrett secured Makaia. Thus ended Makaia's war. Though his territory was beyond the current British sphere of influence, Makaia was treated as a subject chief and labelled a rebel. Sent to Freeto\m, he was found guilty of war¬ mongering by a tribunal and deported by a special ordinance of the Executive Council to Elmina on the Gold Coast31„
To cement the newly created peace between the Momo Brothers, Nyagua and other southern chiefs, Garrett negotiated a written contract. Tranquility seemed further assured in 1890 when Merdigra, who had eluded capture, initiated a Peace Poro^establishing an association of south eastern chiefs pledged to maintaining good relations with the British. Hence the 1890's opened with the concept of peace attested
25. to in both British and African styles. By a strange twist of fate, the independently aggressive behaviour which led to Tlakaia's downfall, was to be continued within a decade by the man who surrendered him.
After the irritating Wende towns were decimated, Nyagua, the chief of Bambara Chief dom, began promot¬ ing trade with Bonthe and Freetown and allowed the British to establish a frontier police garrison at Panguma. This last move proved to be a gréât error, and within six years Nyagua' s authority within Bambara and his pre-eminence in the eadtern Hinter¬ land were threatened by the actions of the garrison in Panguma.
In the 1880's the famed Chief Faba, Nyagua's father, had been victorious in the third of à series of wars fought for control of the Kenema area. A brilliant military campaigner he succeeded in forging a large kingdom, and having attained political hegemony over a large section of the eastern Hinterland, Faba had settled his war chiefs at strategic locations. His budding kingdom straddled the borders of the soon to be declared Protectorate and the Liberian Republic530 When he became Paramount Chief in the late 1880's, Nyagua was determined to continue his father's work by expanding Bambara. It is not surprising, then, that he surrendered a fellow African, for the greater gain of peace on his western border¬ lands. Nyagua's expansionist programme and general warlike proclivities irritated the British officials who also had designs for the political and military control of the Sierra Leone Hinterland. The poli¬ tical relationship between Hyagua and the Colony was restricted to treaty agreements for the first several years. Nyagua built war fences around the Panguma garrison for the British, dug wellf, cleared roads for trade, supplied food and provided labour¬ ers for the garrison; for these services he received a small, stipend. The arrangement was initially viewed as a contractual setup, an agree¬ ment between two polities, and Nyagua's authority was undisturbed. Bambara had yet to come to Freetown's attention as a possible sore spot3^.
26. Nyagua and his chiefdom were projected into promin¬ ence during the early 1890's when he assisted the British in a punitive expedition, Nyagua sent a large army along with a British expeditionary force in the 1893-94- campaign and was instrumental in expelling Samori's Sofa army from the eastern Hinter¬ land, Again, the wily chief used the British to his own advantage. With the Sofa threat removed, Nyagua began annexing Kono territory to the north of his chiefdom in 1894-; at this juncture he became more of a liability to the British than an asset. When Captain Brown Cove at Panguma began interfering in Nyagua's internal affairs, he too considered the relationship a poor one. The relationship, which was a political convenience, deteriorated rapidly, and the British began insisting that as a treaty chief, Nyagua was subordinate to the Colony Government, Nyagua would brook no interference in his chiefdom, and in January 1896, he complained to Governor Cardew in Freetown that Captain Cove in Panguma was interfering with his jurisdiction^-?,, in the next two years the Frontier Police at Panguma became a supreme irritant to Nyagua, who must certainly have regretted the 1889 agreements.
When war broke out in the southern Hinterland in April 1898 against the imposition of a British Protectorate, Nyagua seized the opportunity to regain his status of political autonomy. Early in April he had conducted secret meetings at which he urged other chiefs to join with him and drive the British out of the Interior. His suggestion received little positive response, and to compound matters, his actions were reported to Acting District Commissioner Captain Blakeney by two infiltrators360 Panguma went through an uneasy period for over a month as both African and Briton awaited their opportunity, Blakeney seized the initiative, and after finding a cache of arms near Kenema, imprisoned the chief before he had an opportunity to take part in the war37. Several times in June, chiefs loyal to Nyagua attacked the police garrison in attempts to liberate their leader, however their efforts were unsuccessful. Panguma was relieved by two British columns, and Nyagua was transferred to
27 Freetown, i.fter the brief resistance movement in Mendeland had been quelled, largely with the assist¬ ance of Momo Jah, Iîomo Kai Kai and Kackevopel}, ITyagua was deported under a special ordinance to the Gold. Coast. Bambara was divided into three lesser areas so that the possibility of a successor of ITyagua's importance was forestalled38„
It is a historical irony that Eyagua followed Makàia into exile. The mantle of independent action and resistance to British arms and influence, which had passed from one to the other was not handed on. Byagua was considered such a dangerous figure politically that he was not allowed to return to Sierra Leone, and died in exile.
We have already seen that it is extremely enlighten¬ ing to investigate the activities of chiefs who utilized British power or the threat of British arms to achieve or realize their own goals. We must reiterate at this point that chiefs both in the north and south of Sierra Leone conducted their ©xternal political and military affairs to their best advan¬ tage. To use the blanket term accommodationist is not strictly correct because it carries the tinge of subordination. It is more historically sound to speak of alliances. Chiefs who initially cooperated with British administrators, as did Chief Eyagua and Bai Bureh, eventually opposed the extension of British power when the political relationship became less favourable. On the other hand there were many chiefs who continued their alliance with the British and eventually profited from the arrangement. It is this group which we will now closely examine.
One of the best known pro-British chiefs during this period is Madame Yoko of Kpaa Hende Chiefdom in the south-central part of Sierra Leone. Madame Yoko's_ accession to the paramountcy was not strictly tradi¬ tional. Although it is not unusual for a Mende woman to be the political head of a town or chiefdom39 Madame Yoko's case is, however, spectacular because she was not in the traditional line of succession. She followed her husband as chief. Chief Gbanya, a amous war leader who had entered into a friendship treaty with the British had requested that his
28. principal wife be installed on bis death, and Administrator Hay complied. Hence in 1885 Madame Yoko was recognized as the Paramount Chief of the large and strategically located Epaa Hende Chiefdom^O.
It seems that since she was confirmed in power by a British administrator, and since they gave legiti¬ macy and support to her authority, Madame Yoko was loyal to the British colonialist. Correspondingly, Hay must have realized the importance of her terri¬ tory for trade to the coast, and as a buffer between the Sierra Leone Colony and hostile up-country chief- doms. Also, a well calculated attack on. Senehu, one of Madame Yoko's towns, was instrumental in the reversal of British colonial policy in Sierra Leone. Hollowing the Yoni-Temne attack in 1887» Madame Yoko appealed to Administrator Hay to send troops to assist her in repelling the invaders; and this request resulted in de Vinton's aforementioned expedition.
Hot much is known about Madame Yoko and Kpaa Mende Chiefdom during the next decade. There is evidence that, despite imperial sanction, her power within the Chiefdom was far from absolute; her pro- British political posture had detrimental effects. When Governor Cardew proclaimed a Protectorate over the Hinterland in 1896» Madame Yoko reluctantly consented to the political changes. A group of dis¬ satisfied chiefs protested and formed a coalition opposed to her. They especially protested the man¬ date that they extract a house-tax from their people to support the new administration^. During these two tense years between the Protectorate Declaration and the collection of the house-tax in 1898, Madame Yoko's position was precarious. Many of her sub- chiefs became openly defiant, and verbally threatened her life. The erstwhile chieftainess weathered these oppositions and bolstered the support of loyalist chiefs by requesting additional Frontier Police to be stationed within her territory. The house-tax was an irritating issue, and some unscrupulous chiefs argued that Madame Yoko received the proceeds. In trying to further undermine her power, she was blamed for bringing the British into the area, a statement probably calculated at alienating those who suffered from abusive Frontier Policemen^.
29. The house-tax was such a burning issue that Madame Yoko, who was painfully aware of her people's resent¬ ment, tried to dissociate herself subtly., Ghe wrote Governor Cardew and requested that extra Policemen be sent to collect the tax and she correctly surmised that outlying towns would only pay through force, so she preferred to shift the onus by having Government forces rather than her own exact the tax^-3. In order to continue amicable relations with Freetown which demanded the tax, and at the same time maintain the uneasy equilibrium, in a reluctant Kpaa Ilende, Madame Yoko went so far as using personal funds to pay the bulk of the estimated tax. The remittance Was, thus, less of a burden to her people, and it served as evidence to Government arthorities that her chiefdom was co-operating with the scheme^.
These shrewd political manoeuvres were insufficient to stem the tide of rebellion, and in May 1898, her chiefdom was enveloped in the Iiendeland bar, a final concerted effort to drive the British out of the interior
Madame Yoko immediately allied with the British and provided troops to protect other loyal chiefs and combat the rebels. Her forées were led by trusted "sub-chiefs while Madame Yoko sat out the conflict under British protection. Following the partial restoration of peace in July 1898, her loyal sub- chiefs undertook energetic expeditions against the insurgents, with tacit British approval. Conquered territories were annexed freely, and by the Mar's end Epaa Mende had become the Protectorate's largest chiefdom. With the favourable conclusion of the War, British authority up-country was assured and Epaa Mende's new borders were confirmed. For Kpaa Ilende, in essence, the 1898 wars marked the end of terri¬ torial warfare and expansion,which had been initi¬ ated by Gbanya in the 1870's. Alliance in this case resulted in success for Madame Yoko in terns of terri¬ torial expansion, increased political power and a greatly enhanced reputation. Madame Yoko was held in great esteem by the British, and is regarded as the "Mother" of the Kpaa Ilende Confederacy.
In addition to chiefs who Joined the British from the beginning of hostilities, several powerful up-
country leaders were initially neutral éuring the .
30. first few weeks of the :Jar. They waited to see which force had the greatest chance of success. During the weeks preceding the Mendeland outbreak, Hinterland chiefs received ubiquitous threats from j _ 7. that all who They also faced a more immediate threat from village burnings and indiscriminate killings by the British» Two excel¬ lent examples which epitomize the transformation from anti-tax to pro-British are the Momo Brothers of Pujehun and BandaJuma»
Both homo liai liai and Momo. Jah were involved in the anti-tax protests, and continued their agitation into January. When their last ditch conferences with Cardew proved fruitless, the Brothers joined other southern chiefs in refusing to collect the tax. 'hen Frontier Policemen came to collect the tax, neither Brother paid willingly. Homo liai liai's towns were raided by constables, and Momo Jah1s produce and livestock were confiscated in efforts to force them to remit the tax. In March 1898, Momo Jah, who had previously eluded the Police, was captured and arrested for non-payment of the takt?. Rather than suffer imprisonment and further destruc¬ tion of their villages, both chiefs acquiesed. They quickly gained the enmity of neighbouring chiefs. By paying, the Homos had breached a fairly solid. African opposition, and also demonstrated that' Africans had money to pay, and would remit the tax under force.
The Momos were -very powerful. Cf Fula-Mende parent¬ age, they originally came into the area as war chief and graduallystrengthened their position until they became independent^B. After Makaia's defeat in 18§0 they accepted Frontier Police posts in their prin¬ cipal towns. In the early 1890's, Kai Mai moved to Bandajuma and with British support the two had great influence in the Kittam River region. After the end of the trade wars, they used superior geographical position to establish commercial control of the lower Kittam; they had contacts x-tith 3.B.A. Macfoy in Bonthe, and shared British concerns aboixt open trade in the south^9„
31. During early Hay of 1898, when war engulfed the southern Protectorate, the Homos maintained a brief and unsettling neutrality. On the 8th of Hay, Jah's main wharf was attacked by a large party of insurg ents50o Jah's neutral posture provided a ready excuse for Hakaia's old allies, and numerous Homo enemies to combine against the newcomers.
Hay was the most crucial month in the Hendeland War, insurgents were sweeping from the interior towards the coast, destroying all vestiges of foreign influence. 'The Homos and other cautious chiefs were watching the tide of battle, and they decided to join the Colony Government in suppressing the rebels5i. The extremely astute Ivai Kai waited until Captain Carr had successfully withstood the initial attack on Bandajuma before lending support to the British. During the next few weeks, Kai Kai's support proved to be crucial; Captain Wallis makes this statement regarding the alliance: "We consequently had several thousand natives assisting us; but had it been the other way, I think there is little doubt that the station would have fallen"52„
In addition to defensive actions, the British pro¬ vided men for punitive expeditions. On the 21st of May, Kai Kai sent 300 of his men with Captain Gafford and fifty-one regular soldiers and Police¬ men to disperse a large gathering of rebel troops at Largo, Hakaia's old stronghold. Furthermore in June, Captain Wallis left Bandajuma with orders to reopen the Bum River for trade and communications and to destroy insurgent towns along the River. He marched to Pujehun with a company of thirty-one soldiers and Police. . At Pujehun, Jah supplied 4-00 of his men, and the column marched to Barmall on the Kittam, where Wallis embarked with 1C0 of Jah's men. They floated and oared downriver to Sherbro Island. Returning with supplies, they destroyed and looted :r towns, and fired on othèrs as they
By the midd.le of June, effective resistance to British and Allied forces had crumbled. As the rains began, chiefs in the Hafwe area began surrendering and dis¬ arming their men. It was at this juncture that the Momo Brothers launched a vigorous military campaign
32. against adjacent "disaffected" chiefdoms54„ in July and August they waged a private war- to extend their territorial suzerainty, making false charges of "insurgency", to justify prolongation of the Jar, Fearful of dissolving the crucial alliance, the District Commissioner allowed their raiding and looting to continued*
After pacification of the interior hy the Protectora Expedition, the Homos were in good standing with the British, and in an excellent position for reaping the "benefits of commercial expansion in the southern Hinterland. Although the declaration of the Protectorate in 1696 had brought a halt to continuée aggression by the Homos, however, the 1898 Wars allowed them to renew their consolidation of terri¬ tory with Imperial sanction. Since Jah's. son was killed on the Kit tain. Eiver expedition, the family legacy was continued by Kai liai's de s cendant s 56. With British power fearfully respected after the 1099 Expedition, the liomos were entrenched in power as a stabilizing force under the umbrella British rule. Through shrewdly manipulating the British during the 1898 Wars, the liomos had succeeded in completing territorial expansion just in time to have it solidified with the assertion of European power and control57. After 1899 chiefdom lines were legalized, so the Momos, Madame Toko, Pa Bundu, Mackavoreh and Pula Mansa benefitted in that the British no longer tolerated territorial wars.
There is also a long history of cooperation and alliance between the Terrine chiefs in the vicinity of the Colony and the British. Early in the nine¬ teenth century chiefs like Patina Brimah, the Alkali of Port Loko had much to gain from working with the authorities in Freetown, partly because the latter did not readily use their severely limited military forces in the interior, and because their influence outside the colony vias tenuous and changeable. Even when the British began to devote, more, attention to the control of trade routes - especially under Hill's governance - the Alkalis who ruled Port Loko between 1852 and 1872 had continued the policy established by Fatma Brima and they had signed treaties, agreed to help arbitrate conflicts
35 = and generally continued to do pretty rueh as they pleased even as. they "signed away" further concessions!)®.
When in 1872 leku Kamara vas installed as Alkali ~ with the usual British sanction - the British had begun a more activist policy which represents the earliest stage of the "new expansionism", and as we have seen, led eventually to more direct assaults on the prerogatives of the chiefs. Throughout the devastating Yoni wars, which had regularly involved Kaforki as a "pro-British" chiefdom and as an ally of Marampa, Seku Kam ara pursued the policy , But, increasingly, as the wisdom of his collaboration came under renewed attack from his sub-chiefs, his ability to keep the peace within his own chiefdom suffered5°e Since the sub-chiefs (especially in these large ferine chiefdoms) did not always benefit from the British alliance, they might well have undermined the Alkali's relationship with the Colony by foment¬ ing trouble which would he blamed on the Alkali, At least one official in Freetown believed this to he the case®®. Even these problems did not shake up the relationship substantially, though British inten¬ tions must have become increasingly evident to all. Unlike much of Hende country, this region had long been an area of fairly consistent British attention and the Temne leaders had plenty of time to observe the sequence of events at close hand.
When lioriba Bangura came to the throne of Port Loko in 1885, the "scramble" was underway. Nevertheless this most "stable" of the independent Temne chief- doms continued its policy of alliance. That same year Governor howe went up to Fort Loko to "witness" rioriba's installation, and gradually the British determination to intervene began to affect changes in the cooperative policy that had served Ilaforki for so long®'"',
LaP.ay Denzer has suggested that the expansion of British authority in the interior between 1878 and 1896 (the period between the creation of the Government Interpreter's Department and the establish¬ ment of the Protectorate) "did not alarm the chiefs"®2t, Outwardly this may seem to he the case, since few chiefs, especially those engaged in overt cooperation,
34. expressed alarm through "official" channels» How¬ ever, in addition to the oral testimony which indi¬ cates considérable reaction on the part of the traditional authorities*^, the official records themselves reveal a great deal. Under the guiso of regular collaboration, the "big men" and the chiefs actively contrived to support policies which would more effectively counteract foreign incursion» Hence in 1887, in response to a British directive which prohibited him from giving "...ofa" traders^ permission to pass through, his territories, the Alkali of Port Loko continued his own diplomatic relationship with Samory65. Host chiefs had con¬ tinued to make war whenever they felt it would bene¬ fit them, and. indeed the "big men" did not cease their involvement in the slave trade to the north which still provided sporadic profits660 Even as they cooperated in British efforts to "pacify" the ■Rokel area, the authorities in blaforki chiefdom, and to a lesser extent in Marampa, played a kind of double game» Working closely with the British to encourage the furtherance of the interior legitimate trade, and collaborating in the attempt to bring Bai Bureh of Kasse to bookw, they also conspired to support chiefly candidates who would bolster tradi¬ tional practices» Thus in early 1887 the Alkali had asked for government stipends to be paid, to two newly selected sub-chiefs, though the government in Freetown had not "authorized" any such process68„ It is evident that the chiefs with the longest record of close alliance with British power were the quick¬ est to recognize the newer threats to their sover¬ eignity, even though these very chiefs had acquiesced to a large degree in the growth of British influence in their territories» Bending to the wind, they remained flexible in order to protect the most pre¬ cious of their institutions from direct intervention» Thus, until the Hut Tax bar of 1898 forced them to a final decision, the policy of cooperation was not clear-cut »
Between about 1888 and the middle of the next decade a virtual revolution in the interior system of trade had taken place» Partly this was the result of the French imposition of "export duties" on the trade passing down to Sierra Leone from the interior, and partly the result of the successful British
35. intervention in the actual system of the trade after the Rokel area was "pacified" by Governor Howe in 1887. The most obvious consequence of this was noted by Native Affairs Department Secretary Parkes, in a memo written in 1895» He described "an abnormal
depression ... . " in the trade, which had become so severe that there was a temporary cessation of trade in palm nuts69. This, combined with the almost total abolition of the trade in slaves consequent to Samory's failure to hold his position north of Sierra Leone, had a profound effect on the chiefs of both llaforki and Marampa, among others. Pot only did it reduce enormous^ their income from traditional levies, but it alienated the sub-chiefs end "big men" who as the heads of large heterogenous trading- compounds or strategically located towns, had tended to support the chiefs in the previous policies of cooperation and alliance. Thereafter, those repres¬ enting traditionalist values, who preferred resist¬ ance and a kind of xenophobic rejection of anything European, seemed to have gained the upper hand.
This is not to say that the Alkali of Fort Lcko or Dai Koblo of Masimera dared openly oppose the British. Even through the years when the Frontier Police were introduced and complaints poured into Freetown, these chiefs continued a close relationship. This even included allowing cases to be appealed to Freetown by certain sub-chiefs, and direct restric¬ tions on "war-boys" activities in the nortb70. But, the knowledge that local prerogatives were strongly undermined, and that British intervention now extended beyond mere interference in local wars had become widespread. It was no longer possible to pretend that the benefits which important chiefs accrued in return for cooperation were worth the concomitant loss of sovereignty. The Frontier Police incidents are only the most stark examples?^. Far more subtle and pernicious, in the eyes of the "big men" and others who directly suffered from the loss of economic advantages, was the seeming impot¬ ence of the chiefs in the face of British determina¬ tion to gain complete control over the external relations of each chiefdom. As in liendeland even family matters increasingly came under the eye of the British and their agents?2.
36. Between 1892 and 1898 these cooperative chiefs had initiated policies to undermine the spread of British influence, even as they carried on the guise of open alliance„ Like certain hende chiefs we have dis¬ cussed, they knew that continued support of their own subordinates and the strength of their prestige- rested on their ability to covertly continue tradi¬ tional practices?? and maintain their territorial integrity and economic wealth. At the same time they collaborated with the British in those areas where the British had previous experience or know¬ ledge. Hence as feeling mounted and "big men", sub- chiefs, traders, warriors, and even common farmers began to grumble and advocate violence^, these same chiefs, especially Bai Koblo and the Alkali, con¬ tained the insurgent feeling by a surreptitious policy. That they "conspired" with one another is ohvious. It was natural for them to consult with advisors, neighbouring chiefs, warriors, even those leaders whose opposition to the policy of cooperation had threatened their local power. By 1896, when the Protectorate was declared and it became known that they would be forced to give up many of their judi¬ cial powers, all of their wai'-mal-cing and treaty- making prerogatives, most of their economic privil¬ eges, and would have to pay a house-tax to the British, it is not surprising that cooperation became almost impossible. All along, in the areas of Temne- land with the closest ties to Freetown, the alliances had been difficult at best, frequently impossible to enforce in border areas, often used by the chiefs simply to increase their personal wealth, and always tentative. Now, even though the example of Bai Aimera's failure still loomed large, the warriors could not be diverted, the "big men" appeased, the sub-chiefs bought off.
Between the declaration of 1896 and the oubreak of war in February of 1898, the power of Alkali Horiba (who was elderly and ill .anyway) waned v/hile the faction who wanted to fight waxed. It was in Maforki Chiefdom, indeed in the town of Port Loko itself, that the first acts of rebellion occurred?-7 ; in the very place where cooperation and alliance had been tested for nearly a century and where British influ¬ ence seemed strongest. Gradually, and with devast¬ ating effect, the policy of accommodation had changed.
37- In Marampa, far from the belligerent influence of Bai Bureh of Xasse76, ana closer to Masimera where the /orce of British power had been dramatically demonstrated, open alliance continued. Bai Iloblo, though, was unable to prevent large numbers of his warriors from joining the rebellion, and throughout the fighting, food and other supplies from Marampa (and several other "cooperating" chiefdoms) flowed into the war zone?7.
It will probably never be known to what extent Bai Kobla acquiesced in secretly supporting the war, or whether he directly opposed it, as was later claimed, ■'hat seems obvious is that even in a chief dom where "cooperation" existed, the reality beneath the formal and legitimate process was quite different.
Henceforth, following the V/ars of 1898, Mende and. Temne chiefs negotiated with the British not as independents, but as clients of the Freetown Government under the form of colonialism known as in¬ direct rule. Their options for individual initiative investigated in this paper, no longer existed. The only options left were severely limited and existed within the new colonial framework; gone forever were territorial autonomy, control of economy, aggres sive diplomacj'' and the power to wage war.
MOTES
1, Sierra Leone Archives, Government Interpreter's Letterbook, 1882-1884, "Memo to Governor from Lawson", 16 March, 1885, 99-100. (Subsequent citations from the Archives will be abbreviated SLA, and Letterbook references and the like will be abbreviated similarly after the initial ref¬ erence in each case.)
2. C.O. 1886, African IJo. 532. "Information re the Different Districts and Tribes of S.L. and its Vicinity", (Memo supplied by T. G. Lav/son, and "arranged and carried out" by J. C. E. Parkes, 29-30). Masimera had fought a long series of
38. 2»cont wars with its neighbour Yoni, to the immediate south, shifting back and forth more than once from brief alliance -- against the Lende further beyond Yoni*s borders - to open warfare» This rivalry continued until the British stopped it,
3. E. Ade Ijagbemi, A History of the Temne in the Nineteenth Century, University of Edinburgh" Thesis, ("1968), 221. These restraints ofton made it "legally" impossible for a chief to make war without the approval of his "council",
4. ibid,, 222
5. C. 0. February 1886, African No. 332, 29-30.
6. ibid., 30.
7. By thenid 1873's the chiefs of Koya, Kaffu Bullom, Loko Masama, Samu and Marampa had surrendered de facto many of these prerogatives. For specific trecaties relating to this see, C. W. Newbury, British Policy Towards Nest Africa: Select Documents 1786-1374, (Oxford. 196877 242-279' ~ "
8. C. 0. African, No. 332, op.cit., 30.
9. ibid.
10. ibid.
11. SLA, Government Interpreter's Lettorbook, 1878- 1880, 23 January 1879. 7T.
12. C„ 0. African No. 332, "Quiah" op.cit., 36.
13. Ijagbemi, op cit., 234.
14. SLA, GIL, 1879-1881. "Letter to Rowe from Lawson1'. November, 1879, 9° The Freetown Government did not see these wars as related events, largely coordinated by Bai Simera.
39» 15» SLA, GIL, 02_o_cit- , August, 1380, 203-205 = Between late '79 and the early 'GO's many of Laws on'.s memos, to the Governor refer to this expanding "trade" war, which was interpreted in Freetown as a typical series of tribal
reprisals o In some correspondence it was - referred to as "domo Racca's Jar" though Lawson seems'to have known bettero
16. ibid,, (he was almost captured when leading his own warriors past Homo Eaca's stockade).
17= 3LA, Aborigines Department Letterbook, 1882- 1886," "Havelock to 3ai"Simera" 21 September 1882, 26. This memo, refers exclusively to the slave traffic and warns Bai Limera to cease his involvement.
18. SLA, ALL, 1882-1886, "Rowe to Bai Simera", 8 February, 1886, 267= This is evident in other memos as well, especially those written by Rowe himself. One might consider this a reflection of events elsewhere, in East Africa as well as in Berlin.
19. SLA, ADL, 1882-89, "Havelock to Alimahy Conteh, Chief of Maconteh, Hasimerrah", 32. This shows how one of Bai Simera's sub-chiefs was turned against him, joining the British to "put the country in order again".
20. ibid., "Rowe to Bai Simera", 8 February 1886,
267 =
21. SLA, GIL, 1885-86, "Lawson to Bai Simera", 21 November 1885, 100-101.
22. ibid. "Lawson to Governor" 9 January 1886, 146-147=
23. SLA, GIL, 1887-88, "Lawson to Governor", 27 October 1887, 30.
24. Ijagbemi, op. cit., 296-98.
40.
* 25o House of Commons. Accounts and Papers: Colonie- and Possessions - sierra noone. Report uo_ncr_ Tía,jesty' s Commissioner and Correspondence ou the subject of the insurrection in the Sierra LooneProtectorate, 1898. Port I - Report and Correspondence. tart II - .evidence and Docu¬ ments. (London, 1399) I, 168-69. This is_ historically known as C ho.1 me r s i í en o rt and is cited hereafter as CP.
26. bhA, Governor's Despatches, 1888-1897? 29 November 1888.
27o SLÂ, GD 1888-1891, 10 January 1889=
28. ibid.
29. ibid.
30. C. Pyfe, "European and Creole Influence in the Hinterland of Sierra Leone before 1896", Sierra Leone Studies, MS No.6(June 1956) 113-123»
31. C. Pyfe, Sierra Leone (London, 1962) p.483-84-.
32. The Poro Society is a fraternal body having religious and political powers; it establishes and enforces the cultural norms in Mendeland. See Kenneth Little, The Mende of Sierra beone (New York, 1969) 183-85? 240-4-7.
33. D. oimpson, "A Preliminary History of the Kenema Arpa". S-L-S, NS, (July 1967), 52-62. 34. CR II, 524.
35. SLA, Governor's Confidential Letter Book, 1894-1896, 18 January 18%
36. CR, 114.
37» Simpson, op. cit.
38. CR 1, 114, 525. (Nyagua's Testimony).
39» International African Institute, ethnographic Survoy of Africa: Sierra Leone (London, 1950).
41. 40» Field Potes » ta Lamboi, Valunia"Chiefdom (July, 1972)»
41. Cardew publicly proclaimed that the tax was intended to pay salaries for up-country admin¬ istrators and Police, however, its true func¬ tion was to create a wage-earning body of labourers to help exploit the Hinterland's economic potential. mLA Confidential Governor'g
Despatches 1894-99 , 9 d 10 Key 1899»
42. CP I,69 II, 428 (Madame Yoko's Testimony).
43. CR II, 783=
44. CR II, 431 (Madame Yoko's Testimony).
43. Chiefs in .Southern Sierra Leone staged a mass insurrection late in April, 1898, that continued for four months. The war was noteworthy for the attempt to eradicate all symbols of European presence. For information see CR I (entire).
46. CR II, 661. British officer up-country reported- such threats to Governor Cardew.
47. CR II. 829-30.
48. The Momo Brothers were originally sub-chiefs, yet due to their diplomatic and military skill were able to gain autonomy. Their history is traced by R. C. Ganga, "Strangers and Brothers in Sierra Leone: The Sherbro Rivers as Corridors of Power". Unpublished, MS in author's possession.
49. Ganga, op. cit.
30. CR II, 386.
51. One British captain wrote a personal account of the Ilendeland insurrection, see C. V. Wallis The advance of our West African Empire. (London, 1903)T"
42. 52. Wallis, op. cit., 155-5^o
55» i"bid. , 16.
54. CR II, 250-91. From this point on, the Momos used the British alliance to further their own aggrandiz ement.
55. ibid.
56. The Kai Kais are a commercially, socially and politically important family in modern day Pujehun. (1972;.
57» Ganga, op. cit.
58. C.O. 1892, African Mo. 421, op. cit., No. 27, 165. Among these concessions were such things as the independent right of Christian mission¬ aries to reside or "exercise their calling", and establish schools within the territory of the chiefdom. This would, of course, directly threaten the religious beliefs upon which much, of the chief's authority was based.
59. C.O. African 532, Lawson and Parkes, op. cit., 25. The" "sub-chicf " who made the most trouble- was Almamy Brima Sanko, a representative of the Susu family which still controlled a large section of Port Loko called oendugu, and in some ways a virtually independent force within Maforki chiefdom.
60. ibid., Lawson wrote that the "unsettled state" of affairs in Maforki during these years up to 1884, was the result of Alkali Seku Kamara's inability to control his most powerful sub- chiefs.
61. H. 8. Hodgson, "Sketch of Port Loko", S.L.S. OS, No. XVII, (1952), 42.
62. LaRay Denzer, "Sierra Leone - Bai Bureh", West African Resistance, ed., Michael Crowder, (Few York, 1971), 237.
45. 53. Interviews with nlhaji Kali Kamara, Port Loko (1965) Pa líokk Dawo Lunsar, (1971)> Pula Mansa Binbinkoro II, (Petiru, 1970), Pa Kapr BuncLu, (Eogbanj'oa, 1970). This appears true not only of the northern, but of the central and south¬ ern chiefdoms.
54. SLA, ALL, 1886-1887, "Hay to Alikarli of Port Loko", 4 January 1887> 101. Sub-traders were sent by Samori to Sierra Leone to purchase firearms.
55- He had first opened the possibility of a kind of economic alliance with Samory's caravaneers some time earlier. Besting noted this in 1886, ibid., "Besting to Alikarlic- Borubah", 10 August, 1886, 18. Probably this was one means in the Alkali's mind, of protecting himself from a threatened "Sofa" attack into Temneland.
66. SLA, ADL, 1882-1886, "Havelock to Alikali, and other chiefs", 3 August, 1886, 26. Many of the heads of heterogenous compounds, usually known quite literally as "big men" in Temne, continued their intimate links with the interior trade to the Futa Jallon and later to Samory's Empire, which included slaves, though not limited to that traffic. Samory's wars and the need for slaves in the interior in the '80's and '90's certainly provided a demand. The chiefs had little choice but to acquiesce, and collect what they could in traditional levies.
67. SLA, ADL, 1887-1889, "Hay to Alkarli- of Port Loko", 11 March, 1889, 331.
68. SLA, ADL, 1886-1887, op. cit., 102.
69. ibid., 123»
70. SLA, ADL, 1890, "Parkes to Santiggi Binneh Sankoong of Port Loko", 14 May, 1890, 73; and. "Ilav to Alikarlie of Port Lokkoh", 31 March 1890, 4.
44. 71. Denser, op. cit., 250-253.
72. SLA, IADL, 1895-1896, "Parkes to Alikarlie of Port Loko'!, 21 June 1895. 34.
73. Phis included the buying and selling of slaves. SLA, LADL, 1893-1894, "Parkes to Col. secretary", 13 March 1893, 44-45.
7--'-. Interviews with Aljaji Kali Kasara, (fbrt Loko, 1965) ..
75. CP 1, 34-38.
76. SLA, I.ADL, 1896-1898, "Parkes to various chiefs", 24 December 1896, Ho. 543, 175-176; and "Parkes to Colonial Sec.", 176. Bai Bureh's influence grew enormously after 1896, when the conditions of the Protectorate declaration became widely known.
77» CR 1, 38-39, and Interview with A1 jaji Kali Kijmara, op. cit., 1965»
45. RESEARCH NOTE
A NOTE ON ' COUNTRY1 IN POLITIC. ,L ANTHROPOLOGY
C. Ilagbaily Fyle Northwestern University
This note is intended to give precision to a parti¬ cular type of political entity existing in Upper Guinea'1 in pre-colonial times. This unit, which we here call "country", is prevalent in Upper Guinea but its existence Las neither been appreciated nor clearly understood.
A failure to appreciate the nature of some of these entities has led some researchers in Upper Guinea to misrepresent them. Leland Donald, who has done some anthropological work on the Yalunka, failed to realize the existence of political units transcending the village or town level, but not in themselves states. This led him to conclude that the oolima state was "a federation of a group of villages under the direction of a single chief"2.
Yves Person, who has done much work on the Nandinka of Upper Guinea, used the iiandinka term "kafu" to describe political units which we here call country. He describes a kafu as involving "a clearly defined territory in which a maximal lineage exercised poli¬ tical prerogatives. It is the apex of a pyramid which embraces a definite number of villages, them¬ selves composed of extended families"3. Person goes on to use the term kafu to describe similar political units among Yalunka, Gankaran Soso and other ethnic groups.
Person's definition is not all embracing;, for if one translates (as one should) the word kafu to mean country, then not all countries have only one maxi¬ mal lineage at the top of which is found the minimal family exercising authority. Lineag~e implies cohe¬ sion resulting from descent from an identifiable ancestor. This definition could apply to some coun¬ tries where exist one maximal lineage, but others, like the Yalunka, spread all over Upper Guinea, do not contain a maximal lineage.
46. Kotos
1. Upper Guinea generally refers to the region between the Gambia and Liberia and including Puta Jallon (Y. Person, "Ethnic Movements and Acculturation in Upper Guinea", African Historical Studies, Eo. IV, 3, 1971 p.671). The two major states represented in this geo¬ graphical area therefore are the Republic of Guinea and Sierra Leone..
2. L. Donald, Changes in Yalunka; a study of adaptation to a changing cultural environment, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oregon, 1971 p.121.
3. Y. Person, Samori, IFAN Dakar, 1968 p64. Author's translation.
4. Monographie de Faranah, Repertoire.des Archives Nationales de la Republique de Guinee, 20.10.08 ID 11-2.
5. The Mende examples are from. A.Abraham, "Ftise of Traditional Leadership among the Mende", M.A. Dissertation, University of Sierra Leone, 1971, chaps. Ill and IV.
6. V. Dorjahn with A. S. Tholley, "A provisional History of the Limba with special reference to Tonko Limba Chiefdom", Sierra Leone Studies, No. .12, 1959, P.279.
7. See M. Sahlins, "The Segmentary Lineage System" in R. Cohen and J. Middleton eds. Comparative Political Systems.
8. This is the subject of my dissertation which is now being; written.
49. REVIEW
Wo T. Harris and Harry Sawyerr, The Springs of Mende Belief and Conduct, Freetown, Sierra Leone University Press, 1968,
Reviews of a work which deals with the value-system of a people are usually expected to he treated within the methodological framework of theological and. anthropological approaches to the study of cosmology. In fact, the review by Malcolm Riiel^ of the above work takes such a line. The present paper, however, attempts to take a different view. The writer prefers to appraise the work within the context of Sierra Leoneana, i.e. literature on Sierra Leone as a whole, and and more particularly within the context of Mende culture.
It is a truism that despite our much vaunted glory as the Athens of West Africa, Sierra Leone today suffers from a dearth of historiographical matter. Therefore any work that adds to the penurious collec¬ tion is useful. There are very few studies of sub¬ stantial intellectual value on Sierra Leone. The bulk of the literature is 'colonialist' literature, which has to be reinterpreted within the African con¬ text. Thus the basic value of such literature, often out of print, and flooded with Eurocentric biases, is as raw data for research purposes rather than as readable texts even at University level.
The 'conversations and notes' of Rev. Harris which have resulted in the present work are laudable in their very attempt "to set down what I believe to be essentially Mende and to sift out what has more recently been superimposed by a corrupt form of Islam". Professor Sawyerr found the notes so sin¬ gular and "not available anywhere else" that he decided to tailor the material into a shape fit for publication. He was so fascinated by the uniqueness of Rev. Harris's material that his main concern while reshaping it, has been "to expand the scope of the material". Thus the conceptual framework largely remains that of Harris.
50. It therefore "becomes abundantly clear that the work is that of a European Christian missionary writing about the religion of an African people he had set out to .evangelise. Implicit in the work of evangel¬ ization is the assumption that an inferior culture is being raised from barbarism to civilization. While trying to convert the Mende, it is only reasonable to assume that any interest in the people was firstly paternal - in true colonial tradition - and only secondarily academic or intellectual. Sawyerr perhaps tries to rectify this by indulging in "some theological and psychological discussion where it seemed desirable", and therefore adds an academic dimension by adding interpretation to description. Yet the danger inherent in a colonial missionary writing about an African religion has not been totally dissipated by Sawyerr's inter¬ vention. Thus the reader finds the unhappy employ¬ ment of the term 'primitive' (p.55), which is down¬ right value judgement.
The Mende are here said to be "like other primitive peoples ... and regard nature as full of spirits". The term is now generally accepted in both relig¬ ious and anthropological studies to be inaccurate. As Geoffrey Farrinder explains2 Primitive Religion "means either religion as it appeared in its earli¬ est forms among mankind, or else religion that has remained in the lowliest stages even in modern times"
Unfortunate also is the reference to "the days of inter-tribal wars" (p.26) when defensive settlements were built by rivers and shrines were built on the spot where the heroic defenders were killed. The concept of inter-tribal wars is one lasting legacy of colonialist propaganda that is only now being challenged. The historian of Sierra Eeone, Christopher Fyfe? makes the point that the term is a 'misnomer'. The present writer in his current research work is committed to proving the fallacy and myth of 'tribal wars'. This misinterpretation was meant to justify the colonial intervention and its consequent colonialist hegemony. Moreover, riverside ceremonies are not easily circumscribed in scope. It is possible to have many ceremonies
51. originating from particular and peculiar circum¬ stances. Chief Kposowa of Sembehun Junction recently told the present writer that the river¬ side ceremony at Bumpe is meant to propitiate the spirits of the original possessors of the land who were forcibly evicted. Unable to withstand the onslaught of the invaders, they made their way to the river where their footsteps xvere discovered, but there was none of them anymore. It is believed that they still live there as spirits.
There is also the unwanted presence of an inappro¬ priate concept like 'clan' (Chapter 5* passim)-. Whatever the validity and utility of the employ¬ ment of this terminology for other ethnic groupings in Africa, it certainly is misconceived when used in relation to Mende culture. There is no clearly recognizable group beyond the extended family, or that brings a number of extended families into a definite set of socio-political relations that can be called a clan, and which is just the next stage to the 'tribe' as a whole. Where an ethnographer discovers 'clans' among the Mende, he had them up his sleeves. Beyond the general extended family, there are no clans among the Mende. Where there is a semblance of a clan, it is in a most rudimentary form. It does appear that the authors have used the term clan loosely, and often as interchangeable with family. Kenneth Little^ carefully evades the use of the term. Only the Kuwulokoi "fulfils some of the roles which in other societies are performed by a clan ...". There is thus the implicit admis¬ sion of the absence of clans among the Mende. The Kuwulokoi (literally a compound) is composed of Maweesia, which are described as 'the basic social unit' and. translated as 'a household'.
Again, one is puzzled by the fact that Sawyerr does not question Harris's opinion of the influence of "a corrupt form of Islam". To say that any adapta¬ tion of the Islamic faith to local circumstances in the African context makes it a corrupt form is to say that all sects of Christianity other then the Original Christian Church are corrupt forms too! Yet the fact that the former is stated while the
52. latter is ignored, reveals a more or less unconcious Eurocentricism. Besides, the authors have not quite succeeded in the herculean task of setting down the 'pure' Mende religion shorn of the influence of Islam. While the idea of diviners as tot )gbeblaa (p.54) is generally correct, the concept betrays a very strong Islamic influence. In fact in modern usage, reference to t ,.t ogbsimi invariably is to a Muslim diviner. This is not to deny that there are other diviners who are not Muslims, such as Y)ng o- IJ)t jgbEblaa, who are now virtually extinct, but about whom no mention is made in the book. As a matter of fact, diviners are not categorised, and only that umbrella term is used to cover them all in the book. No religions are static, and given the longer influence and impact of Islam on West Africa, one might say that Marris was too sanguine in the task he set before himself.
It is doubtful whether it is proper to group Mende religion with other West African religions and classify it as polytheistic. The question whether they are a monotheistic people must be left to theological and cosmological theorists^. But the Mende believe in one supreme God, Ngew), at the apex of the spirit world. The beliefs are given a his¬ torical dimension by giving their origin, just as the authors have done. It is thus of most common occurrence among the Mende, and generally accepted as evidence of knowledge or wisdom, when during the course of ordinary conversation, a participant makes a historical analogy of the situation. Usually the form is: "It was ïike this in olden times that a man ...".
The authors have attempted to give several such historical bases for Mende beliefs. The Mende belief-system is thus more or less the sum total of the social values derived from empirical phenomena. But unaccountable customs "were brought down from God". Yet two points are conspicuously absent from the book in this context. Firstly, is the conno¬ tation of the term Mende itself. It is generally accepted to mean Meiq de, i.e. hear and say. So that the Mende are a sceptical people who hear
53. "before they say anything. What this actually indicates is that historical experience is at the root of their belief-system. From all over Mende country there are accounts of events which histori¬ cally made the people take (or not take) specific actions. The book has several examples of such 'stories' as to why this or that is done or not done, even though there may be different examples from different parts of the country.
This is directly related to the second point of conspicuous absence - that of the details relating to the 'land spirit' ndogb )yosoi (p. 4-5). 'The most important aspect of the belief stemming from the nd )gboyosoi experience is that it is a clever spirit which punishes the Mende man for stupidity. This aspect is absent even in the account by Kenneth Little^1, (London, 1951)»
The full name of nd3gb :>yosoi is Blama ndpgb^yosoi. When a Mende is asked to carry out something that is evidently stupid, he quickly replies, "If I do that, let Blama flog me". There are generally two stories explaining the basis of this belief and both of them teach the same moral. The first is. that of a man who went to the swamp to cut thatch for roofing houses. Having tied the bundle and set out for the town, it suddenly began to rain. He quickly sought shelter under a grove, and put the thatch by his side. Then came along Blama noogbo, who saw the plighted man rubbing drips of water from his body. "What are you doing here old friend?" asked ndegbj. "I came to cut thatch, but since it started raining, I have decided to wait till it stops raining before continuing to the town, replied the man. Then Blama ndpgb^ suggested to the man that he put the thatch on his head, which he did. "Go out into the rain", ndjgb3 exhorted, and the man did. "Are you getting soaked?" he asked, and the man replied "No.'' "Then proceed to the town with the thatch," ndgb3 told the man. As the man proceeded to the town, nd:>gbgot a very good cane and chased him. He whipped him solidly as the man ran, adding, "Never be a fool. It is this thatch with which houses are roofed and they
54, don't leak»" When the raan arrived in the town he told his story, and since then no Mende man does stupid things, lest ndDgto will flog him, the "belief goes =
The other story is of another man who went to the "bush to cut k-)pwei, a creeping plant used as rope. The man gathered the bundle by the wayside, and went looking for ropes to tie it up. Then Blama nd3gbo came along. "What are you doing here?" he asked. "I came to cut this kiowei, but I'm looking out for a rope to tie the bundle," replied the man. "Then give me one," demanded ndpgbi. He struck a rock with it, and the liana split into several parts. He gave the man two to tie the bundle at both ends. After that ndogbi helped him to put It on his head, and bade him goodbye. As the man made for the town, nd^gbu sped after him, whipping him soundly with the advice: "Never be a fool. Don't look a for rope to tie ropes. When you get to the town tell the people that I, Blama nd^gbo, flogged you for being a fool." The"man gat to the town with cane marks all over his body, and he explained what had transpired between him and ndigbo. Thence¬ forth, the Mendeman ceased to be a fool, we are told.
The ndigb pyosoi is a mischievous spirit and the authors rightly indicate this; but it is about all they say - appearing sometimes as a hairy man, it leads hunters astray. Kenneth Little describes him as "a man with a white skin and long white beard", who tricks lonely travellers into following him deep into the forest. The nd^gb)yosoi can trick anyone, not just hunters. The mother of the present writer once told him how her uncle was cajoled into thick forest and was only discovered after three days of intense searching. He was weak, exhausted and speechless, and could not explain what exactly had happened. It was believed that fld )gboyosoi "carried him away".
Nd3gb )yosoi apparently takes many forms, but is readily recognised by his inverted toes, and the presence of a big black ant between his big toe and
55. the next. Before making an appearance, his presence in the vicinity can be detected by the smell of bul¬ rush millet. His appearance can be forestalled by pouring out in loud voice, abusive language, espec¬ ially directed against his mother. This can repel him. Otherwise he may appear and perform one of his numerous tricks. The present writer's mother's younger sister once narrated how she was frightened in a farm hut by the n " osof, who without appearing, produced sounds of chickens all around the place. She repelled him by abusing his mother with severe vulgarity and sprinkling snuff around the farm hut.
Ndogb ryosoi is also believed to make stupid people take loads of wood, and when they are eventually discovered, they are still carrying the loads on their heads while standing by a house. At other times he can lead a traveller astray by creating a broad clear road away from his destination. This is perhaps the most common way of tricking people and getting them lost.
On the matter of burial rites, the authors "cannot in the present work enter fully into a discussion (p.30). But certain points of amplification are necessary. The way a corpse was dressed for burial was vividly described by M. Laborde in 1881, when he visited Mende country7:
"I went to the house and I saw the body laid out on the mud floor in the follow¬ ing manner. The head was bound round the forehead with a piece of red cloth, the jaws were tied with a white cloth and a white turban was on the head with a new clay pipe filled with tobacco on the chest. The face was smeared with the usual clay mixture ... . After a short time, the body was wrapped in a country cloth and also tied. The corpse was then carried outside the fence the town7 and buried."
56. This account reaffirms the belief in life after death, since the deceased is equipped with the things he normally needed in life. Important men or Kings were buried with slaves. Moreover, it shows that the digging of graves outside the town is not of recent origin, contrary to the statement on page 31 that "Nowadays, graves are usually out¬ side the towns", but "in old days, graves were dug sometimes in the house itself, sometimes under the eaves near the house, or in the family compound'". It is difficult to conceive of the whole town being the graveyard, kamba.jei in Mende.
The point is clarified by the accoxint of William Budge who Journeyed into Mende country in 1879®: -
"Although some of the Mendis, parti¬ cularly the Chiefs, are buried inside their houses, the common people are buried outside the towns, and at each a burial, there is ceremony ... the corpse is \vrapped in mats and country clothes; men are buried in their gowns, women in their wrappers (sic), as they wore them among the living. If the deceased had been poisoned, killed in a fight, or murdered in cold blood, he or she, is addressed by a relative after being laid in the grave, and enjoined to come back and avenge the act. If the death has been natural, the corpse is then enjoined not to look back, but to go on where God leads. Earth is then thrown into the
grave in ... handfuls the grave being afterwards filled up, and neatly dressed on the surface. The family and relations of the deceased mourn or "cry" for a month, having first shaved their heads, the men putting on a saffron-coloured gown, the women, a wrapper of the same hue; the latter take off all their ornaments and put on a necklace of bamboo fibre. When the month expires, the hair is allowed to grow."
57. It seems as if the tewe,jamei ceremony on the third day for a woman and fouirth for a man, was the only ceremony in the burial customs (p.32). It does appear however, that another ceremony was performed "at the end of mourning", i.e. "after a month". According to Budge in the same account quoted above,
"...in the case of the well-to-do people, a cow ... is killed, cut up, and cooked in a variety of ways everybody being free to come and partake. Palm wine, rum and gin are likewise provided for the guests, and according to the liberality of the host or hostess, the mourning festivities are kept up for 3 or A successive days which are spent in drumming, dancing, eating and drinking. On such occasions, no one can with impunity create a 'row' or 'palaver'."
In all probability, this is the fortieth-day cere¬ mony, called tewe,jama wai,'i.e. the great crossing of the river, or more commonly today, Llabi nani. On this day, the spirit of the deceased is supposed to make a last visit to his former house and there¬ after will never return. Therefore, the whole premises should be thoroughly cleaned up for this ceremony, to please the spirit.
In the section dealing with Curses Uttered with the help of Medicine Men (p.59 ff), there is a small misunderstanding about sondu, which is referred to as "the sondu curse". Sondu itself is a curse, or the act of swearing. So that it is a tautology to refer to "sondu curse". Sondu is positive, as when one curses another; or it can be self-induced where a number of people are brought together for a particular act and they swear (,jondu) on a medicine, which is like taking an oath, to ensure secrecy or proper conduct or tenacity to the ideal for which the oath is taken. Thus it is again a tautology to refer to "sondu oath" as Malcolm Ruel does. Sondu can also be more general, as when a curse is placed on food or any object for that matter. It is then said "sondui 13ma", i.e. there is sondu on it.
58. Where there are imprecations for evil to "befall the offender, it is kpegbe (not kpefcpe as it appears on pp.65 and 1067". Kpegbe is also a curse, hut it represents a state of helplessness in the imprecator, who has no power to avenge a wrong, and resorts to kpegbe which is a direct appeal to God to intervene on his behalf and bring justice. Sondu,perhaps has no clear equivalent in English. It represents a whole gamut of cosmological connotations, which it is better to define at the outset before proceeding to use the term. Otherwise confusions and contra¬ dictions are likely to arise in the interpretations. Sondu as a concept per se should be more closely examined.
Ngelegba jondui is "one of the most powerful /and common/ curses" uttered with the help of medicine men, but it is the only one mentioned. Another of equal importance is humi jondui, where the medicine appears masked up. It is regrettable that in this context insufficient mention is made of this in regard to destroying social evils (p.79).
The section on To Halei (p.68 ff) should perhaps have come under a more embracing title like 'negative sanctions'. The scope would then be increased to include several other forms of negative sanctions, which are 'medicines' put on crops parti¬ cularly to prevent stealing. Several of these con¬ sist of simple natural objects such as charcoal, red rock earth, snail shell, etc. supposed to pos¬ sess power to punish any tresspasser. The nonuli falling into this category is rightly said to pro¬ tect the rice farm from witches, but has the addi¬ tional function of ensuring a good harvest by steal¬ ing rice from neighbouring farms. When it fails in this task in spite of offerings made to it, it is soundly whipped.
There are a number of mistranslations, but one appreciates the difficulty encountered with a tonal language in which a slight shift in the emphasis on a syllable entirely changes the meaning of a term. So is the case with hakE, (p.115) which is a vio¬ lation of moral obligation to others, in the book
59. it is equated with, 'a thing' 'a (heavy) load' . This latter is haryka or hankei, quite different from hakeio Hakei derives from ha (die) and ks (report) „ In hake, it is implied that the offender will have to he reported and. will he punished for the wrong he has committed when he dies o Nya longj hi towema-hani ghua a saa as a diviner may advise, is not "I want you to offer a sacrifice for fame" (p.58), It means "I want you to offer a thing of fame as sacrifice".
Besides mistranslations, there are a number of printing errors: valves for halves (p.48), dialectic for dialectal (p.28), Footnote 23 of Chapter 3 is missing (p.139), and on page 96 is written 'hota o nya g Dhu' for 'hota lo nya gobu'. Above all Braithwaite Wallis's name is printed as Ellis on pages 68, 112, and 140, There are also spelling mistakes, like Dz dweí for (D),i pwei or Dzalpi for (D),jaloi (p.41),
The foregoing however, need not detract from the intrinsic value of the hook. The above amplifica¬ tions are undertaken in the interest of scholarship. The hook is admirably meticulous in its numerous descriptive details of the many religious activities of the Mende, knowledge of which no one individual can admittedly possess. Not only are there varia¬ tions in the observation of rites among different parts of the Mende, hut many of the practices described are gradually disappearing. The hook is the first of its kind to examine the cosmology of a Sierra Leone people, and may perhaps maintain a particular position as a classic. It is hoped that consideration of the pitfalls to which attention is drawn in this paper will he constructively useful in furthering our knowledge of Sierra Leone culture in general and of the Mende in particular.
Arthur Abraham
60. NOTES
1. Ruel, Malcolm, in Sierra Leone Studies, NS 25 June 1969, pp.37-3^=
2. Parrinder, Geoffrey, West African Religion,. London, 1969, p.7 =
3. Fyfe, Christopher, Sierra Leone Inheritance, London, 1964-, p.226.
40 Little, Kenneth, The Mende of Sierra Leone, London, 1967, p. 10;,.
5. cf. Bohannan, P., African Outline, Penguin, 1964, p.205=
6. Little, ibid.
7. Public Record Office, London, C0267/344-/60.
8. Public Record Office, London', C0879/17/214/18 enc.5=
61. NEWS ITEMS
ROAD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH PROJECT - PROGRESS REPORT
The intention of the Institute of African Studies to launch a programme of inter-disciplinary research into the effects of the construction of a major new highway in the Central and Eastern parts of the country, was first reported in the Africana Research Bulletin Vol. I, No. 4- of July 1971 • After prelinin- ary investigations, the study was officially launched on 1st January 1972._ The Project learn consists of members of staff of Eourah Bay College who partici¬ pate on a part-tine basis, as well as a number of field assistants who work full-time on the Project. The research is funded by Eourah Bay College, and thanks are expressed to the Principal of the College, Professor H. A. E. Sawyerr, for releasing the neces¬ sary funds to allow the Project to proceed.
It is the objective of the study to examine at the local, regional and national level, the effects of constructing a major new highway through an area that was previously ill-served (or in some parts not served at all) by communications. The focus of the study is the new highway from Matotoka in Tonkolili District to Koidu in Kono District, a distance of almost exactly 80 miles. Previously the road dis¬ tance between these two points was in excess of 200 miles, and the new road may therefore have produced considerable alteration to traffic flows in the country at large. One of the first tasks under¬ taken earlier this year was a traffic count to ascertain the volume of traffic using the road. It was quickly determined that outside the aemi-urhan area of Central Kono, traffic densities were very low (e.g. 157 vehicles in 24 hours at Makali in Tonkolili District) and that the proportion of passenger carrying vehicles to total vehicles was very high - on average 79»3% of all vehicles for sire observed points on the road. It is initially pre¬ sumed that the veiy light distribution of feeder roads and the fact that after Koidu on-going lines of communication are very poor are probably the two main factors contributing to the low density of
62. traffic. These factors do not deny however the con¬ clusion that it becomes very necessary to investigate the cost of construction of the road and compare it with the saving in user-cost that is resulting from its construction, in conditions of low traffic den¬ sities. It is hoped that a report of the traffic count, and of an associated origin and destination study, will be produced in due course. Initial '• investigations indicate'that the road construction has been fairly high cost, perhaps as much as Le170,000 per mile (£85,000;.
It is argued that the investigation will be of much wider relevance than for Sierra Leone alone, because the effects of reconstructing a new road in a prev¬ iously little developed area, may have many similar¬ ities wherever the construction occurs. There are relatively few studies examining the effects of road construction in Africa, and it is accordingly a difficult task to anticipate the results of the road construction so that questionnaires can be compiled and research designed. Various preliminary enquiries are therefore being instituted before the final series of hypotheses for testing are established. A base is being established by the use of oral tradi¬ tion and government records from which more recent influences have effected change. The area in question has since the nineteen-thirties, experienced consider¬ able mining activity and one of the most difficult tasks is to differentiate the effects of mining from those of road development. It is however felt that the diamond mines of Kono, although they obviously yield a very strong attraction to a large number of immigrants are not different in nature from the wider range of regular wage jobs which attract job-seekers into cities all over the world. It is thus felt that the proximity of the road over much of its length to diamondiferous areas does not necessarily mean that the conclusions reached about highway construc¬ tion and its effects in this area of Sierra Leone will not be applicable elsewhere. The occurrence of a full census in 1963 the year before construction of the road began and the existence of an aerial photo¬ graphic coverage for the early 1960's assist in the task of establishing the nature of the area before the construction of the road began in 1964.
63 o Migration from rural areas to urban centres can clearly be expected in an area where the agriculture is predominantly subsistence, and it may be antici¬ pated that the- construction of a new road will accelerate this process. Accordingly, Dr. L. E. Mills, the demographer on the team, has prepared a series of questionnaires to investigate the nature and pattern of migration into and out -of a small chiefdom tora on the road, the tora of Matotoka. This town was selected because it was previously the subject of a fairly detailed study in 1961 by Dr. P. K. Mitchell, théh of the Department of Geography at Fourah Bay College. This enables a detailed study of change over time to be made. Initial indications are that Matotoka has more than doubled its population in eleven years, and that the inflow of immigrants has been particularly swift since the new road was first motorable although by no means complete in 1967- The information was obtained by a complete house by house survey of Matotoka and the information thus gathered is now being processed. Characteristics of the migrants such as age, sex, religion and education and characteristics of the migration such as distance travelled, purpose of migration and number of com¬ panions will soon be available for analysis and explanation.
One objective of the study is to produce results that will be relevant to government planners and policy makers, as at present a very considerable proportion of the development budget of Sierra Leone is going on the development of communications, especially the construction of roads. Some time was therefore spent in contacting and discussing the Project with Ministry officials, and from these discussions areas of common interest were discerned. Thus for example a survey of new house construction along the line of the new road, was of considerable interest to the Ministry of Housing and Country Planning, who were concerned with the possibility of extensive ribbon development. For in the Provinces of Sierra Leone land ownership is in the hands of the Paramount Chief and. his tribal author¬ ities, so that outwith the few urban council areas
64.. there is no control over the use of land except that of the traditional authorities whose guiding principles were devised for a static situation or at least one of slow change and who therefore find it difficult to adapt to the priorities of a modern: age. Before this survey was instituted, it was discovered that the Forestry Division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources were anxious to ascertain to what extent improved distribution of metal window frames and other non-wooden house¬ hold construction materials was affecting the demand for wood in the construction of a house. Thus a combined questionnaire was devised to obtain some evidence on each of these matters. At the sane time the Project Team were interested to establish to what extent this new house construction was being undertaken by strangers and to what extent by indigenes of the area of construction. Initial enquiries show that most house construction seems to be undertaken by strangers, but mostly by strangers who had resided for some considerable time in the area, and who probably derived their prosperity from some activity in the area.
A more intensive study of entrepreneurs in the Central Kono area was envisaged at the beginning of the Project, because one of the main reasons justi¬ fying the construction of the new road was that it would give the urban centres of Central Kono a chance to establish industries and enterprises other than diamond mining and associated trading. Strangers predominated amongst the entrepreneurs interviewed and several of the businessmen noted that the road was in fact detrimental to their business because it allowed larger scale operators in Freetown and elsewhere in the country to undersell them on their own door-step. Initial indicators are therefore that the road may well have had a much less economic¬ ally beneficial effect than anticipated. It is intended that the results of this entrpreneurial study and of various of the other investigations mentioned will appear from time to time in the Africana Research Bulletin and el s eithere. The main results of the study willhowever be published as a monograph.
65 While Professor Peterson, the historian is endeavour¬ ing to establish the effect of road development by clarifying the situation at the time road development in the area began, Mr. J. A. S„ Blair is approaching the same problem by investigating the differences between the characteristics of villages in areas near to motor roads and of villages remote from roads Thus a sample of 77 villages, containing a total population of just under six thousand persons, was investigated. The quota sample was stratified into four main categories of villages, representing 'Road' and 'Control' Areas in each of the two dominant ethnic areas (Kono and Temne). The villages were further sub-stratified into size categories accord¬ ing to 1963 census figures, and a census was then taken in each of the selected villages. Five sched** ules were used to ensure detailed recording of village, household, individual and absentee character istics, the village schedule being further divided into objective and subjective sections. A wide range of economic, cultural and demographic character istics was recorded, and the data acte now being coded. Some of the villages in the control areas were as much as 25 miles from the nearest motor- head, and therefore represented a very backward stage in development. It is envisaged that some veiy interesting .comparative information will emerge from this study and already there is an indication that ethnicity considerably affects household size in this area, the Temnes in both road and control areas, tending to have much larger households than the Konos. More relevant to the question of the effect of road building, it is true of both ethnic areas that households away from the road are consider ably larger than those within a relatively short walking distance. This presumably reflects the higher rates of emigration from areas nearer lines of communication, and there is clearly an important implication vis-a-vis agricultural labour require¬ ments. It is too early yet to draw any final con¬ clusions from this study, but the entire survey was completed by the end of September 1972.
66. The processing and analysis of the data gathered is envisaged as the main task of the next nine months, together with further field trips to follow up specific lines of enquiry. At the same time it is anticipated that discussion papers will he given ty members at meetings of the Team and in course of time, these' will form the bases of the chapters for the final monograph. In this way the Project should reach a conclusion some time during the "1973-74- academic session.
James A. j3. Blair.
67
AFRICANA PUBLICATIONS FROM FOURAH BAY COLLEGE
All the undernoted publications are available from the Manager, Fourah Bay Colleg Bookshop, Freetown, Sierra Leone.
1. Published for Fourah Bay College by Oxford University Press. »
W. T. Harris and Harry Sawyerr, THE SPRINGS OF MENDE BELIEF AND CONDUCT 1969. Le3.50
Christopher Fyfe and Eldred Jones, eds., FREETOWN. A SYMPOSIUM 1968. Le4.20 '• H. L. Van Der Laan, THE SIERRA LEONE DIAMONDS, 1965 Le2.75.
2. SIERRA LEONE GEOGRAPHICAL JOURNAL. M.B. Gleave ed., annually at Le2.50. (overseas) per copy. 3 THE SIERRA LEONE BULLETIN OF RELIGION. P. E. S. Thompson, ed., annually at Le 1.50 (overseas) per copy. 4. SIERRA LEONE half STUDIES, J. E. Peterson, ed., yearly at Lel.50 (overseas) per copy. 5. SIERRA LEONE GEOGRAPHICAL ASSOCIATION Occasional Paper No. 2. A selection of papers from Vols, 1-9 of the Bulletin of the Association at 90 cents per copy. 6. G. D. Field, BIRDS OF THE FREETOWN AREA, Le0 7S BIRDS OF THE FREETOWN PENINSULA shortly to be publishi d 7. A. Ijagbemi, GBANKA OF YONI shortly to be published 8. J^S^T^ Thompson. SIERRA LEONE'SJAST— Books, Periodicals, Pamphlets and Microfilms in
THE MARY KINGSLEY BUILDING. FOURAH BAY COLLEGE
Maurice Printing Works 0300.1.74