Animal Learning & Behavior 1999,27 (1),24-25 Kanzi: A new beginning STUARTG. SHANKER York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada E. SUE SAVAGE-RUMBAUGH Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia and TALBOT J. TAYLOR College ofWilliam and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia Ape language research has been marked by constantly shifting demands made by those who feel that only human beings can acquire language. Kako (1999)continues in this tradition, but his paper marks a significant shift. For Kako concedes that Kanzipossesses rudimentary syntactic skills; but he ques­ tions whether Kanzipossesses morphosyntax. Rather than searching, yet again, for some linguistic el­ ement that Kanzi has not mastered, we feel it would be more productive, for reasons we explore, to focus now on what exactly Kanzican do and how this came about. The history of comparative studies in animal learning On the surface, this is an intriguing idea, and one that and behavior has been marked by the constantly shifting should not, in principle, be too difficult to investigate. But demands made by those who want to preserve some even ifwe demonstrate that Kanzi and Panbanisha under­ species-specific attribute that will distinguish human be­ stand the use ofmorphological endings, it would be rash to ings from all other primates. Thus, it was argued that only suppose that this would finally lay to rest the discontinuity man uses tools, plays games, exists in a complex social thesis. To see the force of this point, one need only con­ structure, and knows that other members ofhis species pos­ sider the debate currently raging about the so-called lan­ sess minds. Inrecent years, it has been argued that only man guage gene. Myrna Gopnik has argued for the existence of possesses language-that is, that grammar, in the sense de­ such a gene on the grounds that the affected members ofthe fined by Chomsky, is part ofthe human birthright. Edward KE family, an extended family in which, over the past three Kako's (1999) "Elements of Syntax in the Systems of generations, 15 of37 family members have suffered from Three Language-Trained Animals" (1999) continues in this specific language impairment (SLI), all demonstrate the tradition; but Kako's argument takes a significant step for­ same genetic mutation (see Fisher, Vargha-Khadem, ward-a step that, perhaps, marks a turning point in these Watkins, Monaco, & Pembrey, 1998; Gopnik, 1990).Thus, debates. as with other nativist attempts to subsume various linguis­ Whereas earlier discontinuity theorists had insisted that tic disorders (e.g., Williams syndrome, autism, aphasias) Kanzi's performance on both comprehension and pro­ under a generativist umbrella (see Pinker, 1994), Gopnik duction tasks "provides no evidence ... that he was at­ approaches SLI as a way ofvalidating the thesis that uni­ tending to even so simple a syntactic feature as word versal grammar is part ofthe human birthright. order" (Wallman, 1992, p. 104), Kako concedes that Kanzi Gopnik's basic problem, however, is that 20%-50% of has amply demonstrated this ability. Inother words, Kako the children diagnosed with SLI recover fully. Because concedes that Kanzi does indeed possess language, in the she is postulating an irremediable mechanical breakdown, sense ofgrasping the basic properties of syntax. Hence, she must convince us that these subjects only appear to the point ofbifurcation between animals and man, he feels, contravene her thesis. Her solution is that "although the comes down to the more precise question ofwhich com­ language-impaired subjects sometimes appear to produce ponents oflanguage are species-specific. But unlike earlier the 'correct' surface form, further analysis of their per­ critics ofape language research, Kako does not approach formance as a whole shows that these forms are produced this issue dogmatically. Instead, he raises the possibility not by a hierarchically organized system ofabstract rules ofperforming certain experiments to decide whether Kanzi operating on grammatical categories but rather by very and his younger sister, Panbanisha, possess specific sub­ specific compensatory strategies, including memoriza­ systems oflanguage, such as morphosyntax. tion of inflected forms as unanalyzed lexical items and the conscious application oflearned explicit rules" (Gop­ nik, Dalakis, Fukuda, & Fukuda, 1997, p. 115). Correspondence should be addressed to S. G. Shanker, Department This argument represents an extension of Pinker's of Psychology, Atkinson College, York University, 4700 Keele Street, (1994) dual mechanism hypothesis that, whereas in the North York, ON M3J 1P3, Canada (e-mail: [email protected]). case of the normal child, the mastery of regular inflec- Copyright 1999 Psychonomic Society, Inc. 24 KANZI: A NEW BEGINNING 25 tional forms involves the acquisition of an implicit rule by such-and-such a neural structure. But Kako is appar­ (that is applied unconsciously), and irregular forms are ently unhappy with the nativist view ofan innate language learned (memorized) on a case-by-case basis (and applied module. (For example, on p. 2 ofthe article, he seems to consciously), in the case of SLI, the subject learns all verb be suggesting, contra nativists-and thus, the poverty of forms using the latter process. In other words, while the the stimulus argument-that the principle of structural normal subject is able to extract morphological rules for dependency is something that the human child learns.) regular inflectional endings from the language that they Hence, the overall question that Kako raises at the end of hear, the SLI subject is unable to construct implicit rules his paper is whether the primate brain in general is suf­ for morphological processes on the basis ofthe input they ficiently plastic that, should the organism be exposed to receive. All inflectional forms are learned by the latter human language input at (or before) birth, the neural strategy. Whereas the normal child acquires these abstract structures required to process the various subsystems of rules without any formal instruction and applies them un­ language would form, and if not, which structure/sub­ consciously, automatically, and effortlessly, the SLI sub­ system relationships lie beyond the processing capacities ject can only acquire them from formal speech-language of the nonhuman primate cortex. But this way of fram­ therapy. Thus, they use memorization as a compensatory ing the problem runs the risk ofcollapsing back into the mechanism-that is, the subject stores inflected forms as modularity thesis-that is, ofsupposing that the brain con­ unanalyzed wholes (for regular as well as irregular forms). tains distinct language-processing centers and that lan­ One can safely assume that, even if we showed that guage is a hierarchical system that is composed ofdistinct Kanzi and Panbanisha can indeed demonstrate their mas­ subsystems. But the more we learn about neurobiological tery of the subcomponents that Kako has identified, this development, the more we begin to understand the sig­ would do nothing to silence the determined discontinuity nificance of dyadic interaction for a child's-or a non­ critic of ape language research. For it is always open to human primate's-socioaffective, communicative, cog­ such a critic to fasten on to some aspect ofthe apes' per­ nitive, and linguistic development (see Greenspan, 1997; formance (e.g., reaction time latencies in their responses) to Schore, 1994). argue that, contrary to the enthusiastic reports oftheir "lan­ What is perhaps most significant about Kanzi s up­ guage-trainers" (sic), their behavior is not linguistic, for bringing is precisely the fact that he was not "Ianguage­ they cannot acquire grammar. Rather, they, too, must have trained." On the contrary, Kanzi was raised in a human memorized inflectional endings on a case-by-case basis as environment in which he received the type of enriched unanalyzed wholes, or performed sorr.e other cognitive attention that a child with regulatory problems receives feat that gives the illusory appearance of language use. if she is fortunate enough to be diagnosed early. And like The problem here is that such objections place the em­ such a child, Kanzi has developed linguistic and cogni­ phasis on the wrong issue. Rather than focusing, yet tive skills that far surpass anything that our earlier pre­ again, on some putative linguistic element that Kanzi may conceptions about nonhuman primate capacities led us or may not have mastered, it would be more interesting, to expect. In this respect, Kanzi does not represent the end and more productive, to focus on the question of what ofa story in animal research that began with the work of Kanzi can do and how this came about. But in address­ the Kellogs and the Gardners; rather, he represents a be­ ing this question, we quickly come up against the fact ginning in our understanding ofthe importance and the that Kako's argument proceeds from a generativist pre­ complexity ofthe interplay between neural and environ­ conception about the nature of language, a preconcep­ mental factors in primate development. tion that leads him inexorably to search for some species­ specific component oflanguage. For Kako accepts from REFERENCES the start the view that language is an autonomous, de­ contextualizable biplanar code and the interrelated tele­ FISHER. S., VARGHA-KHADEM. E, WATKINS, K., MONACO, A., & PEM­ BREY, M. (1998). Localisation of a gene implicated in a severe speech mentational view that language serves as a vehicle to trans­ and language disorder. Nature Genetics, 18, 168-170. mit ideas from the mind ofone agent to that ofanother. GOPNIK, M. (1990). Feature-blind grammar and dysphasia. Nature, 344, This picture oflanguage and linguistic interaction has 715. been subjected to intense scrutiny by functionalist and GOPNIK, M., DALAKIS, J., FUKUDA, S. E., & FUKUDA, S. (1997). Famil­ ial language impairment. In M. Gopnik (Ed.), The inheritance and integrationist linguists. Yetnowhere does Kako consider innateness ofgrammars (pp. 111-140). New York:Oxford University the significance for his argument of the point that "lan­ Press.