Freedom, , and Tradition Author(s): F. A. Hayek Reviewed work(s): Source: , Vol. 68, No. 4 (Jul., 1958), pp. 229-245 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2379464 . Accessed: 16/03/2012 11:49

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http://www.jstor.org ETHICS AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

Volume LXVIII JULY 1958 Number 4

FREEDOM, REASON, AND TRADITION*

F. A. HAYEK I with its flattering assumptions about powers of reason, T IHOUGH freedom is not a state of the unlimited nature but an artifact of civiliza- which has progressively gained influ- less articulate and less tion, it did not arise as a result of ence; while the on which English free- design. The institutions of freedom, like explicit tradition dom was based has been on the decline. all that freedomhas created, were not es- the political conceptions of tablished because people foresaw the As a result, French Age of Reason are today benefits they would bring. But once its the regarded as representative advantageswere recognized,efforts com- erroneously eighteenth century in general. menced to perfect and extend the reign of the is obscured by the of freedom and, for that purpose, to This distinction have called the learn how a free society worked. This facts that what we arose largely development of a theory of liberty took French tradition of British insti- place mainly in the eighteenth century in an attempt to interpret conceptions which and began in two countries-of which tutions, and that the of British insti- one knew liberty and the other did not other countries formed de- -England and France. tutions were based mainly on their two As a result, we have to the present scription by French authors. The when day two differenttraditions in the theory traditions became finally confused in the liberal movement of of liberty:1 one empirical and unsys- they merged and even leading tematic, the other speculative and ra- the nineteenth century drew as much on the tionalist-the first based on an inter- British liberals British tradition.2 It pretation of traditions and institutions French as on the the victory of the Ben- which had spontaneously grown up and was, in the end, Radicals over the were but imperfectly understood, the thamite Philosophical that concealed a second aiming at the construction of a Whigs in England difference which in more utopia which has often been tried but fundamental has reappearedas the con- never worked. Nevertheless, it has been recent years and the rationalist,plausible, and apparently flict between "liberal" totalitarian democracy.3 logical argumentof the French tradition, "social" or This differencewas better understood * This article is substantially the same as a chap- a hundred years ago than it is today. ter in the author's book, The Constitution of Liberty, now in preparation. In the year of the European revolutions 229 230 ETHICS in which the two traditions merged, the Encyclopedists and Rousseau, the Phys- contrast between "Anglican"and "Gal- iocrats and Condorcet are their best lican" liberty was still clearly described known representatives. Of course, the by a distinguished German-American division does not fully coincide with writer. "Gallican Liberty," wrote Fran- national boundaries. Frenchmen like cis Lieber in 1848, , Turgot (in his youth), is thought in the , and according to and, later, Benjamin Constant, and an Anglican point of view, it is looked for in the above all Alexis de Tocqueville, are wrong place, where it cannot be found. Neces- probably nearer to what we have called sary consequences of the Gallican view are that the "British" than to the French tradi- the French look for the highest degree of po- And, in , Britain litical in organisation, that is in the tion. highest degree of interference of the public has provided at least one of the founders power. The question whether this interference of the rationalist tradition, not to speak be despotism or liberty is decided solely by the of the whole generation of enthusiasts fact who interferes, and for the interest of which for the French Revolution, like Godwin, class the interference takes place, while accord- Priestley, Price, and Paine (or Jefferson ing to the Anglican view this interference would always be absolutism or aristocracy, and the after his stay in France), who entirely present dictatorship of the ouvriers would ap- belong to it.7 pear to us an uncompromising aristocracy of the ouvriers. II He adds: Though these two groups are now The fact that Gallican liberty expects every- commonly lumped together as the an- thing from organisation while Anglican liberty cestors of modern liberalism, there is inclines to development, explains why we see hardly a greater contrast imaginable in France so little improvement and expansion than that between their respective con- of institutions: but when improvement is at- ceptions of the evolution and function- tempted, a total abolition of the preceding state of things, a beginning ab ovo-a rediscussion of ing of a social order and the role played the first elementary principles.4 in it by liberty. The differenceis directly the of an Since this was written, the French traceable to predominance view of the world, tradition has everywhere progressively essentially empiricist a rationalist approach, displaced the English. To disentangle in England, and these terms the two traditions it is necessary to in France-whether we take their more look at the relatively pure forms in in their popular or in precise meanings. The main con- which they appeared in the eighteenth philosophical conclusions to century. What we have called the British trast in the practical lead has re- tradition was made explicit mainly by which these approaches as follows: "one a group of Scottish moral cently been well put, of freedom in sponta- led by , , and finds the essence the Adam Ferguson,5 seconded by their neity and the absence of coercion, in English contemporariesJosiah Tucker, other believes it to be realized only , and William Paley, and the pursuit and attainment of an abso- drawing largely on a tradition rooted lute collective purpose,"8 and "one in the jurisprudence of the common stands for organic, slow, half-conscious law.6 Opposed to them was the tradition growth, the other for doctrinaire delib- of the French Enlightenment, deeply erateness; one for trial and error pro- imbued with Cartesian : the cedure, the other for an enforced solely FREEDOM, REASON, AND TRADITION 2 31 valid pattern."9It is the second which, ciples-and to show with how little contrivance and as J. S. Talmon has shown in an impor- or political wisdom the most complicated apparently artificial schemes of policy might be tant book from which this description erected.'" is taken, has become "the origin of totali- tarian democracy." This "anti-rationalistic insight into The sweeping success of the political historical happening that Smith shares doctrines which stem from the French with Hume, Adam Ferguson, and tradition is probably due to their great others"' enabled them for the first time appeal to human pride and ambition. clearly to see how institutions and mor- But we must not forget that the political als, language and laws, have evolved conclusions of the two schools derive by a process of cumulative growth, and from different conceptions of how so- that it is with and within this framework ciety works; and in this respect the that human reason has grown and alone British philosophers had laid the foun- can successfully operate. Their argu- dations of a profound and essentially ment is directed throughout against the valid theory, while the rationalist school Cartesian conception of an independ- was simply and completely wrong. Their ently and antecedently existing human rather silly rationalist conception of the wisdom that has invented these insti- nature of a free society has discredited tutions, and the conception that civil liberalism with sensible people and has society has been formed by some wise rapidly led those who accepted it to the original legislator or an original "so- opposite of a free society; the British cial contract." The latter idea of intel- have given us an interpretation of the ligent men's coming together for delib- growth of civilization which is still the eration about how to make the world indispensable foundation of the argu- anew is perhaps the most characteristic ment for liberty. outcome of those design theories. It What they have given us in an account found its perfect expression when the of the origin of institutions, not by con- leading theorist of the French Revolu- trivance and design, but by the survival tion, Abbe Sieyes, exhorted the revolu- of the successful. Their account of so- tionary assembly "to act like men just cial evolution runs in terms of how "na- emerging from the state of nature and of tions stumble upon establishmentswhich coming together for the purpose are indeed the result of human action signing a social contract."'3 understood the condi- but not the executionof human design"10 The ancients tions of liberty better than that. Cicero or the "stumbling forward in our em- quotes Cato as saying that the Roman pirical fashion, blundering into wis- Constitution was superior to that of dom," of which F. W. Maitland some- other states because it where speaks. It stresses that what we but is much less the effect was based upon the genius not of one man, call political order of many: it was founded, not in one generation, of human contrivance than is commonly but in a long period of several centuries and imagined. As their immediate successors many ages of men. For, said he, there never has saw it, what Adam Smith and his con- lived a man possessed of so great a genius that the com- had done was nothing could escape him, nor could temporaries bined powers of all the men living at one time to resolve almost all that has been ascribed to possibly make all necessary provisions for the positive institution into the spontaneous and future without the aid of actual experience and irresistible development of certain obvious prin- the test of time.14 232 ETHICS

Neither republican Rome nor Athens, to us, and it is reasonable to observe them the two free nations of the ancient world, though the particular reason of the institution could thus serve as an example for the appear not.17 rationalists. To Descartes, the fountain- III head of the rationalist tradition, it was From these and other conceptions indeed Sparta whose greatness "was due gradually grew a body of not to the pre-eminence of each of its which successfully showed how-in the laws in particular . . . but to the circum- fields of law and language, of morals stance that, originated by a single in- and the whole institutional framework dividual, they all tended to a single of culture-complex and orderly and, end."15And it was Sparta which, as Tal- in a very definite sense, purposive struc- mon has pointed out, became the ideal tures might grow up which owed little of liberty for Robespierre and Saint- or nothing to design, which were not Just-and, we may add, most of the invented by a contriving mind but arose later advocates of "social"or totalitarian from the separate actions of many men democracy who did not know what they were doing. Like the ancient, the modern British This demonstration that something conceptions of liberty grew against a greater than man's individual mind may backgroundof a comprehensionof how grow from men's fumbling efforts rep- institutions had developed that the law- resented in some ways an even greater yers had been the first to gain. "There challenge to all design theories than are many things specially in laws and even the later theory of biological evolu- government," wrote Chief Justice Hale tion: For the first time it was shown in the seventeenth century in a critique that an evident order which was not the of Hobbes, product of a designing human intelli- that mediately,remotely, and consequentially gence need therefore not be ascribed to are reasonableto be approved,though the rea- the design of a higher, supernatural in- son of the party does not presentlyor immedi- telligence, but that there ately and distinctlysee its reasonableness.... was a third Longexperience makes more discoveries touch- possiblility-the emergence of order as ing conveniencesor inconveniencesof lawsthan the result of adaptive evolution. is possiblefor the wisest councilof men at first Since the emphasis we shall have to to foresee. And that those amendmentsand place on the role which selection plays supplementsthat throughthe various experi- in this process of social evolution today ences of wise and knowingmen have been ap- plied to any law must needsbe better suitedto is likely to create the impression that the convenienceof laws, than the best inven- we are borrowingthe idea from biology, tion of the most pregnantwits not aided by it is worth stressing that it was in fact such a series and tract of experience.. . . This the other way round; there can be little addsto the difficultyof a presentfathoming of doubt that it was from the theories of the reasonof laws, becausethey are the pro- ductionof long and iteratedexperience which, social evolution that Darwin and his thoughit be commonlycalled the mistressof contemporaries derived the suggestion fools, yet certainlyit is the wisest expedient for their theories.18Indeed, one of those among mankind,and discovers those defects Scottish philosophers who first de- and supplieswhich no wit of man could either veloped these ideas anticipated Darwin at once foresee or aptly remedy.... It is not necessarythat the of the institution even in the biological field;19 and the shouldbe evident unto us. It is sufficientthat later application of these conceptions by they are instituted laws that give a certainty the various "historical schools" in law FREEDOM, REASON, AND TRADITION 233 and language had made the idea that but to a larger extent embodied in tools similarity of structure might be ac- and institutions which had proved them- counted for by a common origin20 a selves superior-institutions whose sig- commonplace in the study of social nificance we might discover by analysis phenomenalong before it was applied to but which will also work without men's biology. It has been unfortunate that understandingthem. The Scottish theo- at a later date the social , instead rists were very much aware how delicate of building on these beginnings in their this artificialstructure of civilizationwas own field, re-imported some of those which rested on man's more primitive ideas from biology and with them and ferocious instincts being tamed and brought in such conceptions as "natural checked by institutions which he neither selection," "struggle for existence," and had designed nor could control. They "survival of the fittest," which are not were as far as possible from such naive really appropriatein their field; because assumptions, later unjustly laid at the in social evolution the decisive factor door of their liberalism, as the "natural is not the selection of the physical and goodness of man," the existence of a inheritable properties of the individuals "natural harmony of interests," or the but the selection by imitation of suc- beneficent effects of "natural liberty" cessful institutions and habits. Though (even though they did sometimes use this operates also through the success of the last phrase). They knew that it re- individuals and groups, what emerges quired the artifices of institutions and is not an inheritableattribute of individ- traditions to reconcile the conflicts of uals, but ways of doing things, ideas, interest. Their problem was how and skills-in short, the whole cultural that universal mover in human nature, self love, inheritancewhich is passed on by learn- may receive such direction in this case (as in all ing and imitation. The whole episode of others) as to promote the public interest by pursuing its "social Darwinism" has, in this field, those efforts it shall make towards own.22 merely tended to discredit an indispen- sable intellectual tool which had been It was not "naturalliberty" in any literal first developed here. sense, but the institutions evolved to secure "life, liberty, and property," IV which made those individual efforts A detailed comparison of the two beneficial.23Neither Locke, nor Hume, traditions would require a book; here nor Smith, nor Burke, could ever have we can merely single out a few of the argued, as Bentham did, that "every law crucial points on which they differ. is an evil for every law is an infraction While the rationalist tradition as- of liberty."24Their argument was never sumes that man was originally endowed a complete laissez-faire argument, with both the intellectual and moral which, as the very words show, is also attributes which enabled him deliber- part of the French rationalist tradition ately to fashion civilization, the evolu- and in its literal sense was never defend- tionists made it clear that civilization ed by any of the English classical econo- was the accumulated result of a hard mists.25They knew better than most of school of trial and error: the sum of their later critics that it was not some experience,in part handed from genera- kind of magic, but the evolutionof "well- tion to generation as explicit knowledge, constructed institutions" where the 234 ETHICS

"rules and principles of contending in- V terests and compromisedadvantages"" The greatest difference between the would be reconciled,which had success- two views exists, however, in their re- fully channeled individual efforts to so- spective ideas about the role of tradi- cially beneficialaims. In fact, their argu- tions and the value of all the other ment was never anti-state as such, or products of an unconscious growth pro- anarchistic,which is the logical outcome ceeding through the ages.29 It would of the rationalistic laissez-fairedoctrine; hardly be an exaggeration to say that it was an argument that accounted both the rationalistic approach is here op- for the proper functions of the state and posed to almost all that is the distinct for the limits of state action. product of liberty and that gives liberty The difference is particularly con- its value. Those who believe that all use- spicuous in the respective assumptions ful institutions are deliberate contriv- the two schools make concerning indi- ances, and who cannot conceive of any- vidual human nature. The rationalistic thing serving a human purpose that has design theories based their necessarily not been consciously designed are views on the assumption of rational almost of necessity enemies of freedom action, natural and the nat- intelligence, -which to them means chaos. We have ural goodness of individual man. The here an instance of how different inter- evolutionary theory, on the contrary, pretations of facts may produce differ- showed how certain institutional ar- ences in values: because of an intellectu- rangementswould induce man to use his al error a particular manner of ordering intelligence to the best effect, and how human affairs has come to be regarded institutions could be framed so that bad as possessing superior value and to be people could do least harm.27The anti- more in accord with the dignity of hu- rationalist tradition is here closer to the man reason. If everything that is worth- Christian tradition of the fallibility and while is the product of deliberatehuman sinfulness of man, while the perfection- will, what matters is solely the forma- ism of the rationalist is in irreconcilable tion of that will and, so far as action of conflict with it. Even such celebrated society as a whole is concerned, of the figments as the "economic man" were collective will of society. Freedom thus not an original part of the British evolu- comes to mean participation in the for- tionary tradition. It would be only a mation of the collective will. slight exaggeration to say that, in the To the empiricist, evolutionary tradi- view of those British philosophers,man tion, on the other hand, the value of freedom consists was by nature lazy and indolent, im- mainly in the oppor- tunity it provides for the provident and wasteful, and that it was growth of the undesigned, and the beneficial function- only by the force of circumstances that ing of a free society rests largely on the he could be made to behave economically existence of such freely grown institu- or would learn carefully to adjust his tions. There probably never has existed means to his ends. The homo ceconomi- a genuine belief in freedom, and there cus was explicitly introduced,with much has certainly been no successful attempt else that belongs to the rationalist rath- to operate a free society, without a gen- er than to the evolutionary tradition, uine reverence for grown institutions, only by the younger Mill.28 for customs and habits and "all those FREEDOM, REASON, AND TRADITION 235 securities of liberty which arise from by no means the only significant, ones. regulation of long prescription and an- We understandeach other and get along cient ways."30Paradoxical as it may ap- with each other, are able to act success- pear, it is probably true that a successful fully on our plans, because the members free society will always in a large meas- of our civilization most of the time con- ure be a tradition-bound society.3' form to unconsciouspatterns of conduct, This estimation of tradition and cus- show a regularity in their actions which tom, of grown institutions, and of rules is, not the result of commands or coer- whose origins and rationale we do not cion, often not even of any conscious know, does not, of course, mean-as adherence to known rules, but of firmly believed with a char- established habits and traditions. The acteristic rationalist misconception- general observance of these conventions that we "ascribeto men of the preceding is a necessary condition of the orderli- age a wisdom more than human, and ... ness of the world in which we live, of suppose what they did beyond amend- our being able to find our way in it, ment."32Far from assuming that those though we do not know their significance who created the institutions were wiser and may not even be consciously aware than we are, the evolutionary view is of their existence. In some instances it based on the insight that the result of would be necessary, for the smooth run- the experimentation of many genera- ning of society, to secure a similar uni- tions may embody more experiencethan formity by coercion, if such conventions any one man possesses. The rationalistic or rules were not observed in most in- view, on the other hand, is blind to the stances. Coercion may thus sometimes significanceof those creations of human be avoidable only because a high degree activity which lie between the deliberate of voluntary conformity exists which creation of individual intelligence, on thus may be a condition of freedom. It the one hand, and the products of con- is indeed a truth, which all the great scious, organized effort, on the other. It apostles of freedom outside the ration- is in this range, however, that lies all alistic school have never tired of empha- that deserves to be called social in the sizing, that freedom has never worked proper meaning of the term, because it without deeply ingrained moral beliefs, is the product of society as such and and that coercion can be reduced to a not of particular individual minds. minimum only where the individuals can be expected as a rule to conform VI voluntarily to certain principles.33 I have elsewherediscussed the various A familiar instance of how a firmly institutions and habits, tools and meth- established tradition assists frictionless ods of doing things, which have emerged human intercourse is the manner in from this process and constitute our in- which in the Anglo-Saxon countries a herited civilization. But we have yet to general familiarity with the rules of par- look more carefully at those rules of liamentary procedure facilitates all pro- conduct which have grown as part of it, ceedings of groups of men. To one who which are both a product and a condi- comes from another milieu it is a source tion of freedom. Of these conventions of constant wonder how, as a result of and customs of human intercourse, the this, a committee of schoolboys in Eng- moral rules are the most important, but land or the United States is generally 236 ETHICS more effective than many a group of they have strong enough reasons to grave and learned scholars in Germanic brave the censure of their fellows. Un- or Latin countries. Many similar exam- like any deliberately imposed coercive ples could be given of how the general rules, which can be changed only dis- adherence to rules, which often may be continuously and for all at the same far from rational and whose reasons time, growth of this kind makes gradual those who submit to them are far from and experimental change possible. The understanding, assists the effective col- simultaneous existence of individuals laboration of men. The often ridiculed and groups observing partially different propensity of Englishmen to form a rules provides the opportunity for the queue at any bus station, which is of selection of the more effective ones. course merely the result of the unques- It is this submission to undesigned tioned acceptanceof the rule "firstcome, rules and conventionswhose significance first served," is a humbler instance of and importancewe largely do not under- the same trait. Much of the difference stand, this reverence for the traditional, between Anglo-Saxon manners and the that, though it is indispensable for the more formal, courtly etiquette of the working of a free society, the rational- Continent is probably due to the fact istic type of mind finds so uncongenial. that the former have spontaneously de- It has its foundationin the insight which veloped to smooth intercourse in ordi- David Hume stressed and which is of nary life rather than from the organized decisive importance for the anti-ration- ceremonial of a hierarchic society. alist, evolutionary tradition-that "the There is an advantage in obedience rules of morality are not the conclusions to such rules not being enforced by co- of our reason."34Like all other values, ercion-not only because coercion as our morals are not a product but a pre- such is bad, but because it is supposition of reason, the ends which in fact often desirable that rules should the instrument of our intellect has been be observed only in most instances, and developed to serve. At any one stage that the individual should be able to of our evolution, the system of values transgress them when it seems to him into which we are born supplies the ends worthwhile to incur the odium which which our reason must serve. This giv- this will cause. It is also important that enness of the value framework implies the strength of the social pressure and that, although we must always strive to of the force of habit which insure their improve our institutions, we can never observance is variable. It is this flexi- aim to remake them as a whole, and that bility of voluntary rules which makes in our efforts to improve them we must gradual evolution and spontaneous take for granted much that we do not growth possible, which brings it about understand: We must always work in- that further experience leads to modifi- side a frameworkof both values and in- cations and improvements.Such an evo- stitutions which is not of our own mak- lution is possible only with rules which ing. It means in particular that we can are neither coercive nor deliberately im- never synthetically constructa new body posed-which, though observing them of moral rules, or make our obedience of is regarded as merit and though they the known rules dependent on our com- will be observed by the majority, can prehensionof what depends on this obe- be broken by individuals who feel that dience in the particular instance. FREEDOM, REASON, AND TRADITION 237 VII superior manner, but not the reason for handed down to us. The rationalist attitude to these prob- adopting it, has been of our conduct is lems is best seen in its views on what it The appropriateness not necessarily dependent on our know- calls superstition.35I do not wish to un- ing why it is so. Such understanding is derestimate the merit of the persistent our conduct appro- and relentless fight of the eighteenth and one way of making priate, but not the only one. A sterilized nineteenth centuries against supersti- world of beliefs, purged of all elements tion in the sense of beliefs which are whose value could not be positively demonstrably false.36 But we must re- demonstrated, would probably be no member that the extension of the con- less lethal than would its equivalent in cept of superstition to all beliefs which the biological sphere. are not demonstrablytrue lacks the same While this applies to all our values, justification and may often be harmful. it is most important in connection with That we ought not to believe anything the moral rules of conduct. These are, which has been shown to be false does perhaps, next to language, the most not mean that we ought to believe only important instance of an undesigned what has been demonstrated to be true growth, of a set of rules which govern or at least useful. There are strong our lives but of which we can say neither grounds why any person who wants to why they are what they are nor what live and act successfully in society must they do to us; we do not know what the accept many common beliefs, though consequences of observing them are for these reasons may have little to do with us as individuals and as a group. Yet it their demonstrabletruth.37 Such beliefs is against the demand for submission to will also be based on some past experi- such rules that the rationalist spirit is ence, but not on experience for which in constant revolt. It insists on applying anyone can produce the evidence. The to them Descartes' principle "to reject scientist is, of course, within his rights as absolutely false all opinions in regard when he demands, if asked to accept a to which I could suppose the least generalization in his field, to be shown ground for doubt."38The desire of the the evidence on which it is based. Many rationalist is always for the deliberately of the beliefs which in the past expressed constructed, synthetic system of morals, the accumulated experience of the race for a system in which, as Edmund Burke disproved in this manner. have been has described it, "the practice of moral however, that we This does not mean, duty and the foundations of society have reached a stage when we can dis- rested upon their reason made clear and pense with all beliefs for which such sci- demonstrative to every individual."39 entific evidence is lacking. Experience The rationalists of the eighteenth cen- comes to man in many more forms than tury, indeed, explicitly arguedthat, since those of which the professional experi- they knew human nature, they "could menter or the seeker after explicit easily find the morals which suited it."40 knowledge is commonly aware. We They did not understandthat what they would destroy the foundations of much called human nature was very largely successful action if we disdained to rely those moral conceptions which every in- on ways of doing things evolved by the dividual has learned with language and process of trial and errorwhere only the thinking. 238 ETHICS VIII of society than they are while they pur- An interesting symptom of the grow- sue their own aims within the limits set ing influence of this rationalist concep- by the rules of law and morals. It is the tion is the progressive substitution, in old story of Adam Smith's observation all languages known to me, of the word that "by pursuinghis own interest [man] "social" for the word "moral"or simply frequentlypromotes that of society more "good." It is instructive briefly to con- effectually than when he really intends sider the significance of this.41What is to promote it. I have never known much meant when people speak of a "social good to be done by those who affected to conscience" as against merely "con- trade for the public good."42What is " seems to be an awarenessof the frequently not understood but need not particular effects of our actions on other be stressed again is that to Smith and people, an endeavor to be guided in con- his contemporaries this result did not duct not merely by traditional rules but come from all individuals acting com- by explicit consideration of the particu- pletely as they pleased but from each lar consequences of the action in ques- confining himself to the sphere to which tion. It amounts to the demand that our the rules of law and morals confined action should be guided by a full under- him. standing of the functioning of the social The rationalist argument here over- process, and that it should be our aim, looks the point that, quite generally, the in conscious assessment of the concrete reliance on abstract rules is a device we facts of the situation, to produce a fore- have learned to use because our reason seeable result described as the "social is insufficientto master (or take account good." of) the full detail of complex reality.43 The curious point is that this appeal This is as true of the cases where we to the "social" really involves a demand deliberately formulate an abstract rule that individual intelligence, rather than for our individual guidance as where we rules evolved by society, should guide submit to the common rules of action individual action-that men should dis- which have been evolved by a social pense with the use of what could truly process. It is just as impracticablein the be called social (in the sense of being a second case that each individual should product of the impersonal process of for himself discover all the appropriate society), and should rely on his indi- rules as it would be for him to think out vidual judgment of the particular case. in each particular case all the implica- The preference for "social considera- tions of his decisions without relying on tions" over the adherenceto moral rules rules of thumb-even disregarding for is thus in the last resort the result of a the moment that the rules of human in- contempt for what really is a social phe- tercourse would not serve their purpose nomenon and of a belief in the superior if they were not the same for all. powers of individual human reason. We all know that in the pursuit of our The answer to these rationalistic de- individual aims we are not likely to be mands is, of course, that they require successful unless we lay down for our- knowledgewhich exceeds the capacity of selves some general rules to which we the individual human mind, and that in adhere without re-examiningtheir justi- the attempt to comply with them most fication in every particular instance. men would become less useful members Whether it is the problem of how to FREEDOM, REASON, AND TRADITION 239 order our day, or of doing disagreeable sense that they mostly assist in the but necessary tasks at once, or of re- achievement of other human values, fraining from certain stimulants, or of since we only rarely can know what de- suppressing certain impulses, we fre- pends on their being followed in the par- quently find it necessary to make such ticular instance, to observe them must practices an unconscious habit because be regardedas a value in itself, a sort of we know that without this the rational intermediate end which we must pursue grounds which make such behavior de- without questioning its justification in sirable would not be sufficientlyeffective the particular case. to balance temporary desires and to make us do what we should wish to do Ix from a long-run point of view. Though These considerations,of course,do not it sounds paradoxical that in order to prove that all the sets of moral beliefs make us act rationally we should often which have grown up in a society will find it necessary to be guided by habit be beneficial. Just as a group may owe rather than reflection-or, in other its rise to the morals which its members words, that to prevent ourselves from obey, and as their values may in conse- making the wrong decision we should quence ultimately be imitated by the deliberately reduce the range of choice whole nation which the successful group before us-we all know that this is in has come to dominate, a group or nation practice necessary to make us effective may also destroy itself by the moral be- in achieving our long-range aims. liefs to which it adheres. Only the long- The same considerations apply even run results can show whether the ideals more where the consequences of our which guide a group are beneficial or conduct that we want to avoid are not destructive. The fact that a society has direct effects on ourselves but effects on come to regard the teaching of certain other people-these are not so immedi- men as the embodiment of goodness is ately visible to us-and where the aim no proof that it might not be the so- must be that we should adjust our ac- ciety's undoing if their precepts are tions to the actions and expectations of generally followed. It may well be that others so that we avoid doing them un- a nation may destroy itself by following necessary harm. In this field it is not the teaching of what it regardsas its best only unlikely that any individual should men, sometimes almost saintly figures succeed in rationally constructing rules who are unquestionably guided by the which would be more effective for their most unselfish ideals. There would be purpose than those which have been little danger of this in a society whose gradually evolved; even if he did they members were still free to choose their could not really serve their purpose un- way of practical life, because in such a less they were observed by all. We have society such tendencies would be self- thus no choice but to submit to rules corrective: only the group dominated whose rationale we often do not under- by such "impractical"ideals would de- stand, and to do so irrespective of cline, and others, less moral by current whether we can see that anything im- standards, would take its place. But portant depends on their being observed this will happen only in a free society in the particular instance. Though the in which such moral beliefs are not en- rules of morals are instrumental in the forced on all. Where all are made to 240 ETHICS serve the same ideals, and dissenters whether the consequencesare beneficial. are given no opportunity to try a dif- We shall, indeed, not achieve the results ferent way, the rules can prove them- which we want if we do not accept that selves inexpedient only by the decline it is a prejudice or creed or presumption of the whole nation guided by them. so strong that no considerations of ex- The question which is acutely raised pediency should allowed to limit it. by such an experiment is whether the The argument for liberty is, indeed, fact that a majority of citizens are in the last resort an argument for prin- agreed on a moral goal is sufficientjusti- ciples and against expediency in collec- fication for the use of coercion,or wheth- tive action.44When one of the intellec- er it is not desirable that certain rules tual leaders of nineteenth-century limit the power of the collective to Continental liberalism, Benjamin Con- change the law irrespective of the de- stant, described liberalism simply as the sirability of the particular purpose- system de principes,45 he pointed to the just as the moral rules of individual very heart of the matter. Liberty not conduct precludecertain kinds of action, only is a system under which all govern- however good the purpose. It seems to ment action is guided by principles, me impossible to doubt-though it is but it is also not likely to last if this in fact rarely recognized and often even ideal is not itself accepted as the most explicitly questioned-that, if the re- general principle to be observed in all sults of collective action are to be sen- the particular acts of legislation. Where sible, the particular decisions must as no such fundamental rule is stubbornly much be judged in the light of general upheld as an ultimate political ideal rules, that there is, in short, as great a about which there must be no bartering need of moral rules of political as of for material advantages-as an ideal individualaction, and that the aggregate which, even though it may have to be outcome of our successive actions as a temporarily infringed during a passing society is likely to be satisfactory only emergency, must form the basis of all if the actions are held together by com- permanent arrangements-freedom is mon principles. almost certain to be destroyed by piece- There are obvious reasons why moral meal encroachments. The reason for rules for collective actions are developed this is that in each particular instance only with difficulty and very slowly. it will be possible to promise concrete But this should make those we have and tangible advantages as the result of achieved the more precious. There is a curtailmentof freedom,while the bene- probably none more important among fits sacrificed will in their nature al- the few such principles we have devel- ways be unknownand uncertain.If free- oped than that of individual freedom, dom were not treated as the supreme and it is as such a moral principle of principle the fact that the promises political action that it is most appropri- which a free society has to offer can al- ately regarded.Like all moralprinciples, ways be only chances and not certainties, it will serve its purpose only if its ob- only opportunitiesand not definite gifts servance is accepted as a value in itself, to particular individuals, would inevi- as a principle which must be respected tably prove a fatal weakness and lead without questioning in each instance to slow erosion. FREEDOM, REASON, AND TRADITION 241

x mum possible number of occasions. As rationalism which By now, the reader will probably against the naive reason as an abso- want to ask what role there remains for treats our present must indeed continue the efforts reason to play in the ordering of human lute, we David Hume commenced when affairs, if a policy of liberty demands which "turnedagainst the enlightenmentits so much refraining from deliberate con- he and undertook"to whittle trol, so much acceptance of the spon- own weapons" of reason by the use taneously grown and undirected. The down the claims first answer is, of course, that, if it has of rational analysis."46 first condition for such an in- become necessary to seek limits to the The use of reason in the ordering appropriateuses of reason in this field, telligent affairs is that we learn to to find them is itself one of the exercises of human what role it does in fact of reason. But the fact that the stress understand and can play in the working of here has necessarily been on those limits play society based on the co-operation does not mean that reason has not also any many separate minds. This means most important positive tasks. We are of we can try to remold so- not questioning that reason is man's that before intelligently we must understand most precious possession. All our argu- ciety functioning and realize that, even ment is intended to show is merely that its where we.believe that we understand it, it is not all-powerful and that the be- we may be mistaken. What we must lief that it can become its own master learn to understandis that human civili- and control its own development may zation has a life of its own, that all our yet destroy it. What we have attempted efforts to improve things must operate is a defense of reason against its abuse within a working whole which we can- by those who do not understand the not control entirely, and with regard conditions of its effective functioning to which we can hope merely to facili- and continuous growth. It is an appeal tate and assist the operationof its forces that we should learn to use our reason so far as we understand them. Our intelligently, and that in order to do attitude ought to be similar to that of so we must preserve that indispensable the physician toward a living organism: matrix of the uncontrolled and non-ra- like him we have to deal with a self- which is the environmentin which tional maintaining whole which is kept going reason can grow and effectively alone by forces which we cannot replace and operate. which we must therefore use in all we here The anti-rationalistic position try to achieve. What can be done to taken must not be confounded with any improve it must be done by working sort of irrationalism or any appeal to with these forces rather than against mysticism. It is, not an abdication of them. All our endeavor at improvement reason, but a rational examination of must always work inside this given the field where reason is appropriately whole, aim at piecemeal rather than put in control, which is advocated here. total construction,47and use at each Part of this argument is that such an stage the historical material at hand intelligent use of reason does not mean and improve details step by step rather the use of deliberate reason in the maxi- than attempt to redesign the whole. 242 ETHICS None of these conclusions are argu- lar field-power which brooks no alter- ments against the use of reason but native and is in its essence based on a only arguments against such uses as claim to the possession of superior wis- require any exclusive and coercive dom-and against the consequent right powers of government; not arguments to preclude the emergenceof better solu- against experimentation as such, but tions than the ones to which those in arguments against all exclusive, monop- power have committed themselves. olistic power to experimentin a particu- UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

NOTES 1. Tocqueville remarks somewhere: "Du dix- und Adam Ferguson (, 1907); and T. E. huitieme siecle et de la revolution, 6taient sortis Jessup, A Bibliography of David Hume and Scot- deux fleuves: le premier conduisant les hommes tish Philosophy from Francis Hutcheson to Lord aux institutions libres, tandis que le second les Balfour (London, 1938). menant au pouvoir absolu"; cf. also the observa- 6. See especially the work of Sir Mathew Hale tion by Sir Thomas Erskine May (Democracy in referred to in n. 17 below. Europe [London, 1877], II, 334): "The of 7. On Jefferson's shift from the "British" to the the one [France], in modern times, is the history "French" tradition as a result of his visit to France, of Democracy, not of liberty: the history of the see the important work by 0. Vossler, Die ameri- other [England] is the history of liberty, not of kanische Revolutionsidee untersucht in ihrem Ver- Democracy." On the absence of a really liberal tra- hdltnis zur europdischen (MUnchen, 1929). dition in France, see E. Faguet, Le Libiralisme 8. Talmon, op. cit., p. 2. (Paris, 1902), especially p. 307. 9. Ibid., p. 71. Cf. also the contrast drawn be- 2. See E. Halevy, The Growth of Philosophical tween what the author calls "ideal liberalism" and Radicalism (London, 1928), pp. 17-18. "pragmatic liberalism" in L. Mumford, Faith for 3. Cf. J. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Living (New York, 1940), pp. 64-66. Democracy (London, 1952). Though Talmon does 10. Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of not identify "social" and "totalitarian" democracy, Civil Society (, 1767), p. 187. I cannot but agree with Professor H. Kelsen ("The 11. Francis Jeffrey, "Craig's Life of Millar," Foundation of Democracy," Ethics, LXVI, No. 1, Edinburgh Review, IX (1807), 84. Pt. II [October, 1955], p. 95, note) that "the an- 12. D. Forbes, op. cit., p. 654. tagonism which Talmon describes as tension be- 13. Quoted by Talmon, op. cit., p. 73. tween liberal and totalitarian democracy is in truth 14. M. Tullius Cicero De re publica II. I. 2. Cf. the antagonism between liberalism and also II. XXI. 37. and not between two types of democracy." 15. Ren6 Descartes, A Discourse on Method 4. Francis Lieber, "Anglican and Gallican Liber- (Everyman ed.), Pt. II, p. 11. ty" (originally published in a South Carolina news- 16. Cf. Talmon, op. cit., p. 142. paper in 1848), reprinted in Miscellaneous Writings 17. "Sir Mathew Hale's Criticism on Hobbes's (Philadelphia, 1881), pp. 382, 385. Dialogue of the Common Law," reprinted as ap- 5. An adequate account of this philosophy of pendix to W. S. Holdsworth, A History of the growth which provided the intellectual foundation English Law (London, 1924), V, 504-505 (the for a policy of freedom has yet to be written and spelling has been modernized). Holdsworth rightly cannot be attempted here. For a fuller appreciation points out the similarity of some of these argu- of this Scottish-English school and its differences ments to those of E. Burke. from the French rationalist tradition, see mainly 18. I am not referring here to Darwin's acknowl- Duncan Forbes, "'Scientific' Whiggism: Adam edged indebtedness to the population theories of Smith and John Millar" (the Cambridge Journal, Malthus (and, through him, of Cantillon) but to VII [August, 1954]), and my own lecture, "Indi- the general atmosphere of an evolutionary philos- vidualism, True and False" (Dublin, 1945), re- ophy which in the nineteenth century governed printed in Individualism and Economic Order most thought on social matters. Though this influ- (Chicago and London, 1948). Compare also Gladys ence has occasionally been recognized (see, e.g., Bryson, Man and Society: The Scottish Inquiry H. F. Osborn, From the Greeks to Darwin [New of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton, 1945); York, 1894], p. 87), it has never been systematical- W. C. Lehmann, Adam Ferguson and the Beginning ly studied. I believe such a study would show that of Modern (Columbia University, 1930); most of the conceptual apparatus which Darwin H. Huth, Soziale und individualistische Auffassung employed lay readily fashioned at hand for him to im 18. Jahrhundert, vornehmlich bei Adam Smith use. Duncan Forbes has suggested to me that the FREEDOM, REASON, AND TRADITION 243

Scottish geologist may be one of mode of its formation necessarily produced a cer- the chief channels through which the Scottish evo- tain consistence and analogy in its different parts, lutionary philosophy reached Darwin. so as to give to the whole a sort of systematic ap- 19. See Arthur 0. Lovejoy, "Monboddo and pearance. For unless every new institution which Rousseau" (1933), reprinted in Essays in the His- was successively introduced has possessed a certain tory of Ideas (Johns Hopkins, 1948). reference or affinity to the laws and usages existing 20. It is perhaps significant that the first clearly before, it could not possibly have been permanent to see this in the field of linguistics, Sir William in its operation. Wherever a Constitution has ex- Jones, was a lawyer by training and a prominent isted for ages, and men have enjoyed a tranquility Whig by persuasion. The connection between these under it, it is a proof that its great and fundamen- fields is best shown by one of the most complete, tal principles are all animated by the same con- though somewhat late, statements of the basic ele- genial spirit. In such a constitution, when any law ments of the Whig doctrine, in , contrary to the spirit of the rest is occasionally Lectures on Political Economy (1809-10), printed introduced, it soon falls into desuetude and ob- in Collected Works of Dugald Stewart (Edinburgh, livion; while those which accord in their general 1856), IX, 422-24. It deserves quotation at some character and tendency, acquire additional stability length, not least in view of its great influence on from the influence of time, and from the mutual the last group of Whigs, the Edinburgh Review support which they lend to each other. Of such a circle: "The English Government (it is said) has law we may say with propriety that it is unconsti- been the gradual offspring of circumstances and tutional, not because we dispute the authority from events, and its different parts arose at different which it proceeds, but because it is contrary to the times;-some of them from acts of the legislature spirit and analogy of the laws which we have been prompted by emergencies, and some of them from accustomed to obey. long established customs or usages, of which it is "Something similar to this obtains with respect not always possible to trace the origin, so that no to languages. These, as well as , are the part of it is sanctioned by an authority paramount gradual result of time and experience, and not of to that which gives force to every other law by philosophical speculation: yet every language, in which we are governed. It is pretended, therefore, process of time, acquires a great degree of system- that there are no fundamental or essential prin- atical beauty. When a new word, or a new combi- ciples in our government, which fix a limit to the nation of words, is introduced, it takes its rise from possibility of legislative encroachment, and to the same origin with every other expression which which an appeal could be made, if a particular law the language contains;-the desire of an individual should appear to be hostile to the rights and liber- to communicate his own thoughts or feelings to ties of the people. But surely the conclusion in this others. But this consideration alone is not sufficient argument does not follow from the premises. For to justify the use of it. Before it is allowed by good do we not every day speak of laws being consti- writers or speakers to incorporate itself with those tutional or unconstitutional; and do not these words which have the sanction of time in their words convey to men of plain understanding a very favour, it must be shewn that it is not disagreeable distinct and intelligible meaning, a meaning which to the general analogy of the language, otherwise no person can pretend to misapprehend, who is not it is soon laid aside as an innovation, revolting, disposed to cavil about expressions? anomalous, and ungrammatical. It is much in the "It appears to me, that what we call the consti- same manner that we come to apply the epithet tution differs from our other laws, not in its origin, unconstitutional to a law. but in the importance of the subject to which it "The zeal, therefore, which genuine patriots have refers, and in the systematical connexion of its dif- always shewn for the maintenance of the Constitu- ferent principles. It may, I think, be defined to be tion, so far from being unreasonable, will be most that form of government, and that mode of ad- strongly felt by the prudent and intelligent, because ministering it, which is agreeable to the general such men know that political wisdom is much more spirit and tendency of our established laws and the result of experience than of speculation: and usages. that when a Constitution has been matured by such "According to this view of the subject, I appre- slow steps as ours has been, on consequence of the hend that the constitution, taken as a whole, ought struggle of able and enlightened individuals, jealous to modify every new institution which is intro- of their , and anxious to preserve them, it duced, so that it may accord with its general spirit; may be considered as the result of the accumulated although every part of this constitution taken sepa- experience and wisdom of ages; possessing on that rately, arose itself from no higher authority than very account the strongest of all possible recom- the common acts of our present legislature. mendations, an experimental proof of its excellence, "To illustrate this proposition it may be proper of its fitness to perpetuate itself, and to promote to remark, that although the Constitution was the the happiness of those who live under it." gradual result of circumstances which may be re- 21. I am thinking here primarily of Herbert garded as accidental and irregular, yet that the very Spencer, whose distinction seems to me mainly to 244 ETHICS consist in having spoiled a good argument by the published in 1858 and included in his Essais de crude and insensitive way in which he applied it. Morale et de Critique (Oeuvres Completes, ed. But there is still something we can learn from some H. Psichari [Paris, 1948], II, 45 f.) observes: "Le of his contemporaries, like Walter Bagehot. liberalisme, ayant la pretention de se fonder unique- 22. Josiah Tucker, The Elements of Commerce ment sur les principes de la raison, croit d'ordinaire (1755), in R. L. Schuyler (ed.), Josiah Tucker: n'avoir pas besoin de traditions. La est son erreur. A Selection (Columbia University, 1931), p. 92. . . . L'erreur de l'6cole liberale est d'avoir trop cru 23. That for Adam Smith in particular it was qu'il est facile de creer la liberty par la r6flexion, certainly not "natural liberty" in any literal sense et de n'avoir pas vu qu'un 6tablissement n'est solide on which the beneficial working of the economic que quand il a des racines historiques. . . . Elle ne system rested, but liberty under the law, is clearly vit pas que de tous ses efforts ne pouvait sortir expressed in , Book IV, qu'une bonne administration, mais jamais la liberty, chap. v (ed. Cannan, II, 42-43): "That security puisque la liberty resulte d'une droit ant6rieur et which the laws in Great Britain give to every man superieur a celui de l'Etat, et non d'une declaration that he shall enjoy the fruits of his own labour, improvisee ou d'un raisonnement philosophique is alone sufficient to make any country flourish, plus ou moins bien d6duit." notwithstanding these and twenty other absurd 30. Joseph Butler, Works (ed. E. Gladstone; Ox- regulations of commerce: and this security was per- ford, 1896), II, 329. fected by the revolution, much about the same time 31. Even Professor H. Butterfield, who better that the bounty was established. The natural effort than most people understands this, finds it "one of of every individual to better his own condition, the paradoxes of history" that "the name of Eng- when suffered to exert itself with freedom and se- land has come so closely associated with liberty on curity, is so powerful a principle, that it is alone, the one and tradition on the other hand" (Liberty and without any assistance, not only capable of in the Modern World [Toronto, 1952], p. 21). carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, 32. T. Jefferson, Works (Ford, ed.; New York, but of surmounting a hundred impertinent obstruc- 1905), XII, 111. tions with which the folly of human laws too often 33. See, e.g., Burke, "A Letter to a Member of incumbers its operations." It is of some interest the National Assembly" (Works [World's Classics that Smith's general argument (ibid., I, 421) about ed.], IV, 319): "Men are qualified for civil liberty the "invisible hand" "which leads man to promote in exact proportion to their disposition to put moral an end which was no part of his intention" occurs chains upon their appetites, in proportion as their already in Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws (Book love of justice is above their rapacity and presump- III, chap. vii), in the statement that "thus each tion; in proportion as they are more disposed to individual advances the public good, while he only listen to the council of the wise and good, and in thinks of promoting his own interest." preference to the flattery of the knaves." Also 24. J. Bentham, Theory of Legislation (5th ed.; , in the "Debates during Virginia London, 1887), p. 48. Ratifying Convention, June 20, 1788" (in J. Elliot 25. See H. D. MacGregor, Economic Theory and [ed.], The Debates, Resolutions, and Other Pro- Policy (Oxford University, 1949), pp. 54-89; and ceedings, in Conventions, on the Adoption of the L. C. Robbins, The Theory of Economic Policy Federal Constitution, etc. [Philadelphia, 1863 ed.], (London, 1952), pp. 42-46. III, 536): "To suppose that any form of govern- 26. E. Burke, Thoughts and Details (in Works ment will secure liberty and happiness without any [World Classics ed.], VI, 15). in the people is a chimerical idea." And 27. Cf., e.g., the contrast between Hume: "Po- A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (P. Brad- litical writers have established it as a maxim that in ley, ed.; New York, 1945): "Liberty cannot be es- contriving any system of government, and fixing tablished without morality, nor morality without the several checks and controls of the constitution, faith" (I, 12); and "No free communities ever every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to existed without morals" (II, 198). have no other end in all his actions than his private 34. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Green interest" (Essays, I, vi. The reference is presumably and Grose, eds.; London, 1890), Book III, Pt. I, to Machiavelli: "The Lawgiver must assume for Sec. I ("Moral Distinctions Not Derived from Rea- his purposes that all men are bad" [Discorsi, I, 3].), son"): "The rules of morality, therefore, are not and R. Price: "Every man's will, if perfectly free conclusions of our reason" (II, 235). The same idea from restraint, would carry him inevitably to recti- is already implied in the scholastic maxim, "Ratio tude and virtue" (Two Tracts on Civil Liberty est instrumentum non est judex." [London, 1778], p. 11). 35. Cf. H. B. Acton, "Prejudice," Revue Inter- 28. See J. S. Mill, Essays on Some Unsettled nationale de Philosophie, Vol. XXI (1952), with Questions of Political Economy (London, 1844), its interesting demonstration of the similarity of Essay V. the views of Hume and Burke. Also the same au- 29. Ernest Renan, in an important essay on the thor's address, "Tradition and Some Other Forms principles and tendencies of the liberal school first of Order," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society FREEDOM, REASON, AND TRADITION 245

(1952-53), especially the remark at the beginning not the overt forms that rise readily to the surface that "liberals and collectivists join together against of attention that are most worth our while. We tradition when there is some 'superstition' to be must learn to take joy in the larger freedom of attacked." See also Lionel Robbins, The Theory of loyalty to understand in explicit terms. Complete Economic Policy (London, 1952), p. 196 n. analysis and the conscious control that comes with 36. Even this is, perhaps, putting it too strongly. complete analysis are at best but medicine of so- A hypothesis may well be demonstrably wrong and ciety, not its food" (p. 558). Cf. also p. 549. still, if some new conclusions follow from it which 38. Descartes, op. cit., Part IV, p. 26. prove to be true, be better than no hypothesis at all. 39. Burke, Preface, A Vindication of Natural Such tentative though partly erroneous answers to Society. important questions may be of the greatest impor- 40. P. H. D. Baron d'Holbach, Systeme Social tance for practical purposes, though the scientist (London, 1773), I, 55. Quoted in Talmon, op. cit., dislikes them because they are apt to impede prog- p. 273. ress. This fact is of wide application. Man may 41. Cf. my article, "Was ist und was heisst often be better adapted and more effective as a 'sozial'?" in A. Hunold (ed.), Masse und Demo- result of his "irrational" habits than of his rational kratie (Zurich, 1957). thought, be better guided by beliefs which are false 42. Adam Smith, op. cit., I, 421. but which in his ordinary circumstances lead to the 43. Cf. Tocqueville's emphasis on the fact that right action than he would be by attempting to be "general ideas are no proof of the strength, but guided by intellectual understanding. rather of the insufficiency of the human intellect" 37. Cf. D. G. Mandelbaum (ed.), Selected Writ- (op. cit., II, 13). ings of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture, and 44. It is often questioned today whether in social Personality (University of California, 1949): "It action consistency is a virtue. The desire for con- is sometimes necessary to become conscious of the sistency is even sometimes represented as a rational- forms of social behavior in order to bring about istic prejudice, and the judging of each case on its a more serviceable adaptation to changed con- individual merits regarded as the truly experimental ditions, but I believe it can be laid down as a prin- or empiricist method. The truth is exactly the oppo- ciple of far-reaching application that in the normal site. The desire for consistency springs from the business of life it is useless and even mischievous recognition of the inadequacy of our reason ex- for the individual to carry the conscious analysis plicitly to comprehend all the implications of the of his cultural patterns around with him. That individual case, while the supposedly pragmatic should be left to the student whose business it is procedure is based on the claim that we can prop- to understand these patterns. A healthy uncon- erly evaluate all the implications without reliance sciousness of the forms of socialized behavior to on those principles which tell us which particular we which we are subject is as necessary to society as is facts ought to take into account. 45. B. Constant, "De l'Arbitraire," in C. Louan- the mind's ignorance, or better unawareness, of the dre (ed.), Oeuvres Politiques de Benjamin Constant the health of the body. working of viscera to the (Paris, 1874), pp. 91, 92. of the imagination form is signifi- In great works 46. S. S. Wolin, "Hume and Conservatism," cant only in so far as we feel ourselves to be in its American Political Science Review, XLVIII (1954), grip. It is unimpressive when divulged in the ex- 1001. plicit terms of this or that complex arrangement of 47. Cf. K. R. Popper, The Open Society and Its known elements. So, too, in social behavior, it is Enemies (London, 1945), passim.