Freedom, Reason, and Tradition Author(S): F
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Freedom, Reason, and Tradition Author(s): F. A. Hayek Reviewed work(s): Source: Ethics, Vol. 68, No. 4 (Jul., 1958), pp. 229-245 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2379464 . Accessed: 16/03/2012 11:49 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Ethics. http://www.jstor.org ETHICS AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY Volume LXVIII JULY 1958 Number 4 FREEDOM, REASON, AND TRADITION* F. A. HAYEK I with its flattering assumptions about powers of human reason, T IHOUGH freedom is not a state of the unlimited nature but an artifact of civiliza- which has progressively gained influ- less articulate and less tion, it did not arise as a result of ence; while the on which English free- design. The institutions of freedom, like explicit tradition dom was based has been on the decline. all that freedomhas created, were not es- the political conceptions of tablished because people foresaw the As a result, French Age of Reason are today benefits they would bring. But once its the regarded as representative advantageswere recognized,efforts com- erroneously eighteenth century in general. menced to perfect and extend the reign of the is obscured by the of freedom and, for that purpose, to This distinction have called the learn how a free society worked. This facts that what we liberty arose largely development of a theory of liberty took French tradition of British insti- place mainly in the eighteenth century in an attempt to interpret conceptions which and began in two countries-of which tutions, and that the of British insti- one knew liberty and the other did not other countries formed de- -England and France. tutions were based mainly on their two As a result, we have to the present scription by French authors. The when day two differenttraditions in the theory traditions became finally confused in the liberal movement of of liberty:1 one empirical and unsys- they merged and even leading tematic, the other speculative and ra- the nineteenth century drew as much on the tionalist-the first based on an inter- British liberals British tradition.2 It pretation of traditions and institutions French as on the the victory of the Ben- which had spontaneously grown up and was, in the end, Radicals over the were but imperfectly understood, the thamite Philosophical that concealed a second aiming at the construction of a Whigs in England difference which in more utopia which has often been tried but fundamental has reappearedas the con- never worked. Nevertheless, it has been recent years democracy and the rationalist,plausible, and apparently flict between "liberal" totalitarian democracy.3 logical argumentof the French tradition, "social" or This differencewas better understood * This article is substantially the same as a chap- a hundred years ago than it is today. ter in the author's book, The Constitution of Liberty, now in preparation. In the year of the European revolutions 229 230 ETHICS in which the two traditions merged, the Encyclopedists and Rousseau, the Phys- contrast between "Anglican"and "Gal- iocrats and Condorcet are their best lican" liberty was still clearly described known representatives. Of course, the by a distinguished German-American division does not fully coincide with writer. "Gallican Liberty," wrote Fran- national boundaries. Frenchmen like cis Lieber in 1848, Montesquieu, Turgot (in his youth), is thought in the government, and according to and, later, Benjamin Constant, and an Anglican point of view, it is looked for in the above all Alexis de Tocqueville, are wrong place, where it cannot be found. Neces- probably nearer to what we have called sary consequences of the Gallican view are that the "British" than to the French tradi- the French look for the highest degree of po- And, in Thomas Hobbes, Britain litical civilization in organisation, that is in the tion. highest degree of interference of the public has provided at least one of the founders power. The question whether this interference of the rationalist tradition, not to speak be despotism or liberty is decided solely by the of the whole generation of enthusiasts fact who interferes, and for the interest of which for the French Revolution, like Godwin, class the interference takes place, while accord- Priestley, Price, and Paine (or Jefferson ing to the Anglican view this interference would always be absolutism or aristocracy, and the after his stay in France), who entirely present dictatorship of the ouvriers would ap- belong to it.7 pear to us an uncompromising aristocracy of the ouvriers. II He adds: Though these two groups are now The fact that Gallican liberty expects every- commonly lumped together as the an- thing from organisation while Anglican liberty cestors of modern liberalism, there is inclines to development, explains why we see hardly a greater contrast imaginable in France so little improvement and expansion than that between their respective con- of institutions: but when improvement is at- ceptions of the evolution and function- tempted, a total abolition of the preceding state of things, a beginning ab ovo-a rediscussion of ing of a social order and the role played the first elementary principles.4 in it by liberty. The differenceis directly the of an Since this was written, the French traceable to predominance view of the world, tradition has everywhere progressively essentially empiricist a rationalist approach, displaced the English. To disentangle in England, and these terms the two traditions it is necessary to in France-whether we take their more look at the relatively pure forms in in their popular or in precise meanings. The main con- which they appeared in the eighteenth philosophical conclusions to century. What we have called the British trast in the practical lead has re- tradition was made explicit mainly by which these approaches as follows: "one a group of Scottish moral philosophers cently been well put, of freedom in sponta- led by David Hume, Adam Smith, and finds the essence the Adam Ferguson,5 seconded by their neity and the absence of coercion, in English contemporariesJosiah Tucker, other believes it to be realized only Edmund Burke, and William Paley, and the pursuit and attainment of an abso- drawing largely on a tradition rooted lute collective purpose,"8 and "one in the jurisprudence of the common stands for organic, slow, half-conscious law.6 Opposed to them was the tradition growth, the other for doctrinaire delib- of the French Enlightenment, deeply erateness; one for trial and error pro- imbued with Cartesian rationalism: the cedure, the other for an enforced solely FREEDOM, REASON, AND TRADITION 2 31 valid pattern."9It is the second which, ciples-and to show with how little contrivance and as J. S. Talmon has shown in an impor- or political wisdom the most complicated apparently artificial schemes of policy might be tant book from which this description erected.'" is taken, has become "the origin of totali- tarian democracy." This "anti-rationalistic insight into The sweeping success of the political historical happening that Smith shares doctrines which stem from the French with Hume, Adam Ferguson, and tradition is probably due to their great others"' enabled them for the first time appeal to human pride and ambition. clearly to see how institutions and mor- But we must not forget that the political als, language and laws, have evolved conclusions of the two schools derive by a process of cumulative growth, and from different conceptions of how so- that it is with and within this framework ciety works; and in this respect the that human reason has grown and alone British philosophers had laid the foun- can successfully operate. Their argu- dations of a profound and essentially ment is directed throughout against the valid theory, while the rationalist school Cartesian conception of an independ- was simply and completely wrong. Their ently and antecedently existing human rather silly rationalist conception of the wisdom that has invented these insti- nature of a free society has discredited tutions, and the conception that civil liberalism with sensible people and has society has been formed by some wise rapidly led those who accepted it to the original legislator or an original "so- opposite of a free society; the British cial contract." The latter idea of intel- have given us an interpretation of the ligent men's coming together for delib- growth of civilization which is still the eration about how to make the world indispensable foundation of the argu- anew is perhaps the most characteristic ment for liberty. outcome of those design theories. It What they have given us in an account found its perfect expression when the of the origin of institutions, not by con- leading theorist of the French Revolu- trivance and design, but by the survival tion, Abbe Sieyes, exhorted the revolu- of the successful. Their account of so- tionary assembly "to act like men just cial evolution runs in terms of how "na- emerging from the state of nature and of tions stumble upon establishmentswhich coming together for the purpose are indeed the result of human action signing a social contract."'3 understood the condi- but not the executionof human design"10 The ancients tions of liberty better than that.