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A Survey of Network Performance Monitoring Tools
A Survey of Network Performance Monitoring Tools Travis Keshav -- [email protected] Abstract In today's world of networks, it is not enough simply to have a network; assuring its optimal performance is key. This paper analyzes several facets of Network Performance Monitoring, evaluating several motivations as well as examining many commercial and public domain products. Keywords: network performance monitoring, application monitoring, flow monitoring, packet capture, sniffing, wireless networks, path analysis, bandwidth analysis, network monitoring platforms, Ethereal, Netflow, tcpdump, Wireshark, Ciscoworks Table Of Contents 1. Introduction 2. Application & Host-Based Monitoring 2.1 Basis of Application & Host-Based Monitoring 2.2 Public Domain Application & Host-Based Monitoring Tools 2.3 Commercial Application & Host-Based Monitoring Tools 3. Flow Monitoring 3.1 Basis of Flow Monitoring 3.2 Public Domain Flow Monitoring Tools 3.3 Commercial Flow Monitoring Protocols 4. Packet Capture/Sniffing 4.1 Basis of Packet Capture/Sniffing 4.2 Public Domain Packet Capture/Sniffing Tools 4.3 Commercial Packet Capture/Sniffing Tools 5. Path/Bandwidth Analysis 5.1 Basis of Path/Bandwidth Analysis 5.2 Public Domain Path/Bandwidth Analysis Tools 6. Wireless Network Monitoring 6.1 Basis of Wireless Network Monitoring 6.2 Public Domain Wireless Network Monitoring Tools 6.3 Commercial Wireless Network Monitoring Tools 7. Network Monitoring Platforms 7.1 Basis of Network Monitoring Platforms 7.2 Commercial Network Monitoring Platforms 8. Conclusion 9. References and Acronyms 1.0 Introduction http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse567-06/ftp/net_perf_monitors/index.html 1 of 20 In today's world of networks, it is not enough simply to have a network; assuring its optimal performance is key. -
Know Before You Go
Know Before You Go NORWAY A Guide to Keep You Safe Abroad provided by: Pathways to Safety International Updated May 2019 KNOW BEFORE YOU GO: NORWAY 2 Let’s be perfectly clear, the number one way to prevent sexual assault is to not rape. While the responsibility of ending sexual gender based violence is on the perpetrators, this guide will offer general safety tips, country-specific information, and resources to help prevent and prepare travelers for the possibility of sexual assault abroad. GENERAL SAFETY TIPS: 1. Use the buddy system and travel with friends. 7 out of 10 2. Be aware of social and cultural norms. For example, looking at someone in rapes are the eyes when you speak to them is perfectly normal in the U.S., but in committed another country that could signify you’re interested in the person. by someone known to the 3. Recognize controlling behavior when entering a relationship. Most rape 1 survivors recall feeling “uncomfortable” about some of their partner’s behaviors victim such as degrading jokes/language or refusal to accept “no” as an answer, whether in a sexual context or otherwise.2 4. Avoid secluded places where you could be more vulnerable. Meet new people in public spaces and let a trusted friend know where you’ll be beforehand. Always have a backup plan in mind. 5. Trust your gut. Many victims have a “bad feeling” right before an assault takes place. It’s okay to leave a situation that is making you feel uncomfortable. Stay alert and aware in new social settings and places. -
Best Practices for Network Monitoring
White Paper Best Practices for Network Monitoring How a Network Monitoring Switch Helps IT Teams Stay Proactive 26601 Agoura Road, Calabasas, CA 91302 | Tel: 818.871.1800 | Fax: 818.871.1805 | www.ixiacom.com | 915-6509-01 Rev. B, June 2013 2 Table of Contents Monitoring Challenges in Today’s Business Environment .......................................... 4 Giving Monitoring Tools Full Visibility to the Network ............................................... 5 Easing the Path to Upgrade ........................................................................................ 6 Making Monitoring Tools Work Better ........................................................................ 7 Filtering ...................................................................................................................... 7 Load Balancing ........................................................................................................... 8 Packet De-duplication ................................................................................................ 8 Packet Trimming ........................................................................................................ 8 MPLS Stripping .......................................................................................................... 9 Keeping Network Data Secure ................................................................................... 9 Improving Productivity in IT ....................................................................................... 9 Filter Libraries -
Large Scale Monitoring of Home Routers
IEEE International Workshop on Intelligent Data Acquisition and Advanced Computing Systems: Technology and Applications 21-23 September 2009, Rende (Cosenza), Italy Large scale monitoring of home routers S. Costas-Rodr´ıguez+,R.Mart´ınez-Alvarez´ +,F.J.Gonz´alez-Casta˜no∗+, F. Gil-Casti˜neira∗,R.Duro× +Gradiant, ETSI Telecomunicaci´on, Campus, 36310 Vigo, Spain ∗Departamento de Ingenier´ıa Telem´atica, Universidad de Vigo, Spain ×Grupo Integrado de Ingenier´ıa, Universidad de La Coru˜na, Spain Tel: +34 986 813788, fax: +34 986 812116 E-mail: {scostas,rmartinez}@gradiant.org,{javier,xil}@det.uvigo.es,[email protected] Abstract – This paper describes our experience with reception power, memory usage or uptime are useful to concurrent asynchronous monitoring of large populations of detect and fix many potential problems. end-user broadband-access routers. In our real tests we focused on home/office ADSL Despite of the wealth of research in large-scale monitoring, which assumes that it is possible to inquiry individual nodes routers, although our results are valid for any other access efficiently, end-user access routers usually have manual legacy technology. We monitored the routers of the Spanish ISP interfaces, either HTTP- or telnet-oriented. They seldom and VoIP operator Comunitel (www.comunitel.es). With offer a direct interface to other programs. Moreover, the our approach, a full monitoring cycle of 22,300 such uptime of end-user routers is unpredictable. For all these routers took less than five minutes. reasons, commercial large-scale monitoring tools such as SNMP collectors are useless. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In This research is motivated by the fact that some telecom- section II we review the background, comprising academic munications operators do not let end-users buy their routers research and existing industrial solutions. -
Network Monitoring Using Nagios and Autoconfiguration for Cyber Defense Competitions
NETWORK MONITORING USING NAGIOS AND AUTOCONFIGURATION FOR CYBER DEFENSE COMPETITIONS Jaipaul Vasireddy B.Tech, A.I.E.T, Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, India, 2006 PROJECT Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE in COMPUTER SCIENCE at CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, SACRAMENTO FALL 2009 NETWORK MONITORING USING NAGIOS AND AUTOCONFIGURATION FOR CYBER DEFENSE COMPETITIONS A Project by Jaipaul Vasireddy Approved by: __________________________________, Committee Chair Dr. Isaac Ghansah __________________________________, Second Reader Prof. Richard Smith __________________________ Date ii Student: Jaipaul Vasireddy I certify that this student has met the requirements for format contained in the University format manual, and that this Project is suitable for shelving in the Library and credit is to be awarded for the Project. __________________________, Graduate Coordinator ________________ Dr. Cui Zhang Date Department of Computer Science iii Abstract of NETWORK MONITORING USING NAGIOS AND AUTOCONFIGURATION FOR CYBER DEFENSE COMPETITIONS by Jaipaul Vasireddy The goal of the project is to monitor the services running on the CCDC (College Cyber Defense Competition) network, using Nagios which uses plugins to monitor the services running on a network. Nagios is configured by building configuration files for each machine which is usually done to monitor small number of systems. The configuration of Nagios can also be automated by using shell scripting which is generally done in an industry, where the numbers of systems to be monitored are large. Both the above methods of configuration have been implemented in this project. The project has been successfully used to know the status of each service running on the defending team’s network. -
Proxy Auto-Config Files
APPENDIX B Proxy Auto-Config Files Revised: July 15, 2010 Overview Proxy Auto-Configuration (PAC) is a method used by Web browsers to select a proxy for a given URL. The method for choosing a proxy is written as a JavaScript function contained in a PAC file. This file can be hosted locally or on a network. Browsers can be configured to use the file either manually or, in Microsoft Windows environments, automatically using Group Policy Objects. This appendix explains the basics of using PAC files. How PAC Files Work A PAC file is referenced each time a new URL is loaded. The host, for example cnn.com, the URL, for example cnn.com/images/logo.jpg, and other information such as the local machine IP address can be evaluated and rules based on this information used to determine whether to send the traffic via a proxy or direct to the Internet. The following example compares the URL requested by the user, with the URL ipcheckit.com/data/. If the URLs match, the PAC file will instruct the browser to send the request direct to the Internet. This can be used if you need to exception a section of a Web site from going via the Web Scanning Services; if the user had requested only ipcheckit.com, this rule would not apply: if (shExpMatch(url,"ipcheckit.com/data/*")) return "DIRECT"; In the next example the local IP address of the machine making a Web request is evaluated. If the IP address falls within the IP address range 10.10.1.* then the PAC file will send the request to proxy182.scansafe.net. -
Deploying F5 with Nagios Open Source Network Monitoring System Welcome to the F5 and Nagios Deployment Guide
DEPLOYMENT GUIDE Version 1.0 IMPORTANT: This guide has been archived. While the content in this guide is still valid for the products and version listed in the document, it is no longer being updated and may refer to F5 or 3rd party products or versions that have reached end-of-life or end-of-support. See https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K11163 for more information. Deploying the BIG-IP LTM with the Nagios Open Source Network Monitoring System Archived Deploying F5 with Nagios Open Source Network Monitoring System Welcome to the F5 and Nagios deployment guide. This guide provides detailed procedures for configuring F5 devices with the Nagios Open Source Network Monitoring System. Network Management Systems (NMS) provide insight to device and application performance, system stability, network trouble spots and a host of other items that affect a company's ability to provide computer network services. Recent advances in automated event correlation, data storage and retrieval, as well as open source systems that allow greater integration, have greatly improved today's Network Management Systems. The Nagios system and network monitoring application is an open source project. Nagios maintains network status information by polling objects for specific service responses. Examples of monitored network services include SMTP, DNS, HTTP, and so on. For more information on the Nagios project, see http://www.nagios.org/ or http://sourceforge.net/projects/nagios/. For further Nagios resources and information, see http://community.nagios.org/. For more information on F5 devices described in this guide, see http://www.f5.com/products/big-ip/. To provide feedback on this deployment guide or other F5 solution documents, contact us at [email protected]. -
Network Management
Chapter 12: Network Management Jian Ren and Tongtong Li, Michigan State University Introduction 2 Network Scanners . 25 OSI Network Management Model . .3 Packet Filters . 26 Network Management Layers . .4 Wireless Network Management 26 ISO Network Management Functions 6 Cellular Networks . 27 Configuration Management . .6 Location Management for Cellular Fault Management . .6 Networks . 28 Security Management . .7 Accounting Management . .7 Policy-based Network Management 29 What Is a Policy? . 30 Performance Management . .7 Benefits of PBNM . 31 Network Management Protocols 7 Architecture of a PBNM System . 31 SNMP/SNMPv1 . .8 Conclusion 32 SNMPv2 . 13 SNMPv3 . 15 Glossary 33 Remote Network Monitoring (RMON) 23 Acknowledgements 34 Network Management Tools 24 Network Monitors . 25 Acronyms 37 Abstract: The continuous growth in scale and diversity of computer networks and network components has made network management one of the most challenging issues facing network administrators. It has become impossible to carry out network management functions without the support of automated tools and applications. In this chapter, the major network management issues, including network management requirements, functions, techniques, security, some well- known network management protocols and tools, will be discussed. Location management for the wireless cellular networks will also be briefly described. Finally, policy-based network management, which is a promising direction for the next generation of network management, will be briefly described. Keywords: -
The Potential Harms of the Tor Anonymity Network Cluster Disproportionately in Free Countries
The potential harms of the Tor anonymity network cluster disproportionately in free countries Eric Jardinea,1,2, Andrew M. Lindnerb,1, and Gareth Owensonc,1 aDepartment of Political Science, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061; bDepartment of Sociology, Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, NY 12866; and cCyber Espion Ltd, Portsmouth PO2 0TP, United Kingdom Edited by Douglas S. Massey, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, and approved October 23, 2020 (received for review June 10, 2020) The Tor anonymity network allows users to protect their privacy However, substantial evidence has shown that the preponder- and circumvent censorship restrictions but also shields those ance of Onion/Hidden Services traffic connects to illicit sites (7). distributing child abuse content, selling or buying illicit drugs, or With this important caveat in mind, our data also show that the sharing malware online. Using data collected from Tor entry distribution of potentially harmful and beneficial uses is uneven, nodes, we provide an estimation of the proportion of Tor network clustering predominantly in politically free regimes. In particular, users that likely employ the network in putatively good or bad the average rate of likely malicious use of Tor in our data for ways. Overall, on an average country/day, ∼6.7% of Tor network countries coded by Freedom House as “not free” is just 4.8%. In users connect to Onion/Hidden Services that are disproportion- countries coded as “free,” the percentage of users visiting Onion/ ately used for illicit purposes. We also show that the likely balance Hidden Services as a proportion of total daily Tor use is nearly of beneficial and malicious use of Tor is unevenly spread globally twice as much or ∼7.8%. -
Technical and Legal Overview of the Tor Anonymity Network
Emin Çalışkan, Tomáš Minárik, Anna-Maria Osula Technical and Legal Overview of the Tor Anonymity Network Tallinn 2015 This publication is a product of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (the Centre). It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of the Centre or NATO. The Centre may not be held responsible for any loss or harm arising from the use of information contained in this publication and is not responsible for the content of the external sources, including external websites referenced in this publication. Digital or hard copies of this publication may be produced for internal use within NATO and for personal or educational use when for non- profit and non-commercial purpose, provided that copies bear a full citation. www.ccdcoe.org [email protected] 1 Technical and Legal Overview of the Tor Anonymity Network 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 3 2. Tor and Internet Filtering Circumvention ....................................................................................... 4 2.1. Technical Methods .................................................................................................................. 4 2.1.1. Proxy ................................................................................................................................ 4 2.1.2. Tunnelling/Virtual Private Networks ............................................................................... 5 -
How Speedy Is SPDY?
How Speedy is SPDY? Xiao Sophia Wang, Aruna Balasubramanian, Arvind Krishnamurthy, and David Wetherall, University of Washington https://www.usenix.org/conference/nsdi14/technical-sessions/wang This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI ’14). April 2–4, 2014 • Seattle, WA, USA ISBN 978-1-931971-09-6 Open access to the Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI ’14) is sponsored by USENIX How speedy is SPDY? Xiao Sophia Wang, Aruna Balasubramanian, Arvind Krishnamurthy, and David Wetherall University of Washington Abstract provides only a modest improvement [13, 19]. In our SPDY is increasingly being used as an enhancement own study [25] of page load time (PLT) for the top 200 to HTTP/1.1. To understand its impact on performance, Web pages from Alexa [1], we found either SPDY or we conduct a systematic study of Web page load time HTTP could provide better performance by a significant (PLT) under SPDY and compare it to HTTP. To identify margin, with SPDY performing only slightly better than the factors that affect PLT, we proceed from simple, syn- HTTP in the median case. thetic pages to complete page loads based on the top 200 As we have looked more deeply into the performance Alexa sites. We find that SPDY provides a significant im- of SPDY, we have come to appreciate why it is chal- provement over HTTP when we ignore dependencies in lenging to understand. Both SPDY and HTTP perfor- the page load process and the effects of browser compu- mance depend on many factors external to the protocols tation. -
Defending Against Malicious Cyber Activity Originating From
TLP:WHITE Product ID: A20-183A July 1, 2020 Defending Against Malicious Cyber Activity Originating from Tor This advisory—written by the Cybersecurity Security and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) with contributions from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—highlights risks associated with Tor, along with technical details and recommendations for mitigation. Cyber threat actors can use Tor software and network infrastructure for anonymity and obfuscation purposes to clandestinely conduct malicious cyber operations.1,2,3 Tor (aka The Onion Router) is software that allows users to browse the web anonymously by encrypting and routing requests through multiple relay layers or nodes. This software is maintained by the Tor Project, a nonprofit organization that provides internet anonymity and anti-censorship tools. While Tor can be used to promote democracy and free, anonymous use of the internet, it also provides an avenue for malicious actors to conceal their activity because identity and point of origin cannot be determined for a Tor software user. Using the Onion Routing Protocol, Tor software obfuscates a user’s identity from anyone seeking to monitor online activity (e.g., nation states, surveillance organizations, information security tools). This is possible because the online activity of someone using Tor software appears to originate from the Internet Protocol (IP) address of a Tor exit node, as opposed to the IP address of the user’s computer. CISA and the FBI recommend that organizations assess their individual risk of compromise via Tor and take appropriate mitigations to block or closely monitor inbound and outbound traffic from known Tor nodes. 1 CISA Alert published April 2020: Continued Threat Actor Exploitation Post Pulse Secure VPN Patching.