Asia-Pacific Policy Papers Series Moving (Slightly) Closer to Iran China’s Shifting Calculus for Managing Its “Persian Gulf Dilemma” By John Garver, Flynt Leverett, and Hillary Mann Leverett Johns Hopkins University The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies tel. 202-663-5812 email:
[email protected] MOVING (SLIGHTLY) CLOSER TO IRAN: China’s Shifting Calculus For Managing Its “Persian Gulf Dilemma” John Garver, Flynt Leverett, and Hillary Mann Leverett* Over the past quarter century, China has been challenged to balance a major interest in maintaining comity with the United States against its efforts to develop multi-dimensional cooperative relations with important countries in the Persian Gulf—including countries in policy conflict with Washington. This “Persian Gulf dilemma” in China’s foreign policy first took shape—and has challenged decision-makers in Beijing most consistently—with regard to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Over the years, the Islamic Republic has emerged as the de facto leader of regional resistance to America’s longstanding hegemonic position in the Gulf and the Middle East more broadly. As tension between Washington and Tehran has risen, U.S. demands on Beijing to cooperate with U.S. efforts to isolate and press the Islamic Republic have mounted. But, since the mid 1990s, China has developed an increasingly strategic energy relationship with Iran, reinforced by a variety of economic and technological cooperation agreements. And Tehran, for its part, has made China the focus of an emerging “Eastern orientation” in Iranian foreign policy. Beijing’s struggle to balance its interest in maximizing Chinese access to Iran’s hydrocarbon resources against its interest in preserving good relations—and, above all, avoiding conflict—with the United States is, in many ways, the quintessential manifestation of China’s Persian Gulf dilemma.