The Political Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 2, April±June 2006 The Agreement and the Politics of Consociationalism: A Critique

RUPERT TAYLOR

To date, as Adrian Guelke has written, than all alternatives put together', and `too little attention has been paid to the certainly within academia, as Bernadette drawbacks of consociational settlements'; Hayes and Ian McAllister acknowledge, and, as Rudy Andeweg has acknow- ethno-nationalism is seen to be `the most ledged in a recent scholarly overview of promising theoretical explanation for the consociational democracy, `the level of Northern con¯ict'.3 Generally, abstraction of many . . . critiques of . . . Protestants and Catholics are seen to consociationalism is rather low'.1 This constitute intractable ethno-national article directly addresses the state of groups with distinctive and di€erent cul- debate by contending that the Belfast tural traditions, values and needs. The Agreement (1998), as a consociational categories of `Protestant' and `Catholic' settlement, rests on and promotes an are taken to be synonymous with Ulster ethno-national group-based understand- Unionist and Irish Nationalist politics in ing of politics that is inherently illiberalÐ which on the one hand the Ulster Union- with the result that the space for a more ist Party (UUP) and Democratic Unionist deliberative form of democracy around a Party (DUP), and on the other hand the common citizenship agenda is foreclosed. Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn FeÂin, constitute the A consociational settlement main parties locked into a power struggle to maximise group interests. There are two core mutually reinforcing In such a context it is accepted as ideas behind the Belfast Agreement: one, axiomatic amongst political scientists that in the `nature of things' Northern and elite level policy-makers that to pur- Ireland is deeply, indeed irrefutably, sue a common rights-based resolution of divided between two competing ethno- the con¯ict is unrealistic. It is further national communities; and two, that con- maintained that democratic prospects sociationalism as advocated by a number are bleakunless institutional structures of highly regarded and in¯uential polit- are strategically crafted in such a way as ical scientistsÐnotably Arend Lijphart, to recognise and accommodate compet- John McGarry and Brendan O'LearyÐ ing ethno-national identities and interests provides the only democratic form of through power-sharing that ensures governance that can accommodate such group autonomy and equalityÐthat is, ethno-national antagonism.2 through consociationalism.4 The argu- The received wisdom in interpreting ment, stated by McGarry and O'Leary, the con¯ict is to see it is that `conventional' liberalism cannot as primarily being between two commu- come to terms with the importance of nities: Protestants and Catholics. Indeed, ethno-nationalism and as such `fails to in Interpreting Northern Ireland (1990), grasp what is at stake'.5 Speci®cally, fol- John Whyte concluded that this view lowing Lijphart's Democracy in Plural has been `supported by more writers Societies (1977), consociationalism holds # The Author 2006. Journal compilation # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2006 Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA 217 that `deeply divided' societies can be- `A liberal consociation?' come democratic through pragmatically driven elite-level bargaining for a form of Lijphart maintains that: `There is nothing executive power-sharing in which the in consociational democracy that people autonomy of contending groups is con- who are both consociationalists and stitutionally guaranteed and protected democrats have to be apologetic about'.11 through mutual veto rights, and where And with respect to the Belfast Agree- there is strong respect for principles of ment, McGarry and O'Leary have proportionality in elections, civil service proclaimed that the `consociational ar- appointments and government subsidies. rangements are liberal and consistent In line with this, the Belfast Agreement with democracy', that it is a `liberal con- accepts and legitimates the two ethno- sociation'.12 But this is not self-evidently national communitiesÐunionist and true. For, the Belfast Agreement has not nationalistÐreading of the con¯ict and appeared to markthe birth of a new era of seeks to promote a form of politics that democratic politics in Northern IrelandÐ treats them as ®xed, autonomous and sustainable peace is not in sight.13 equally valid. Notably, in terms of the The Assembly that came into e€ect on workings of the Northern Ireland As- 3 December 1999 lasted a mere 72 days sembly, the party politicians (elected before being suspended by the British via proportional representation) must government on 11 February 2000Ðat an identify and function as `nationalist, un- estimated cost of £33.4 millionÐ`that is ionist or other', and it is accepted that almost £500,000 per day'.14 In fact, over mutual veto power be held on matters the last six years the Assembly has been of key concern.6 Key decisionsÐsuch as suspended four times and at presentÐ the election of the First Minister and while it remains suspendedÐis costing Deputy First Minister, standing orders around £9 million per annum.15 The real and budget allocationsÐrequire cross- cause for concern, however, is not so community support either by parallel much that the Agreement has proved consent or by a weighted majority.7 More- hard to implement, but rather that there over, ministerial positions are `allocated are processes integral to consociational to parties on the basis of the d'Hondt politics that are inimical to liberal system by reference to the number of democracy. seats each party has in the Assembly'.8 There are a number of ways in which In addition, so as to advance respect and the Agreement can be shown to have equality for communal di€erence, the worked to encourage and reward those Agreement provided for a new Equality who pursue strategic ethno-national Commission and a Bill of Rights for group calculations and interestsÐand to Northern Ireland.9 have thereby reinforced and politicised There can, then, be little doubt that the ethno-national group divisionsÐin ways Belfast Agreement is a consociational set- that run counter to promoting liberal tlement, that it can `safely be identi®ed as politics. This can be most clearly shown consociational'.10 There is also little doubt with respect to the key aggregation that the Agreement is widely accepted mechanisms within the ambit of the and endorsed by elite decision-makers Agreement, namely: group designation and establishment politicians in Britain, in the Assembly; Executive formation; Ireland, and around the globe. The ques- and the electoral system. tion, however, is: Has it led to democratic The requirement that the 108 elected advance? members of the Assembly must accept communal registration as `nationalist, unionist or other'Ðthat then underpins 218 Rupert Taylor

The Political Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 2 # The Author 2006. Journal compilation # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2006 group veto powersÐlocks individual and in¯uence `in order to assert the rights politicians into group thinking and of [the] respective communities'.21 unequal rights. For, when it comes to This state of a€airs is compounded by decisions requiring cross-community the mandated electoral systemÐPR-STV support, the designation of `others' does (Proportional Representation with Single not carry meaningful weight. As Ian Transferable Vote) in six member consti- O'Flynn observes, `By e€ectively dis- tuenciesÐto elect members of the Assem- counting the votes of the ``others'' on bly. Contrary to optimistic expectations certain important issues, the agreement of scholars such as Benjamin Reilly, PR- privileges national over individual iden- STV has not, over time, had an e€ective tities'.16 The unfair nature of all this was moderating in¯uence.22 The choice of this shown when the election of the First and electoral system has not worked to signi- Deputy First Ministers in late 2001 saw ®cantly encourage tactical voting across the temporary redesignation of three Al- communal lines. In the 1998 Assembly liance party members of the AssemblyÐ election, survey evidence suggests that from `other' to `unionist'Ðso as to shore only about 9 per cent of lower preference up the institution. This went against the votes were transferred across the com- beliefs of most Alliance party members munity divide.23 And the results of the who favour a non-sectarian approach, 26 November 2003 Assembly election and it also dictated that these Assembly revealed that the single transferable vote members `lie' about their self-identity.17 has actually served, through strategic With respect to Executive formation, voting, to strengthen communal bloc vot- the form of power sharing encapsulated ing.24 Indeed, leading psephologist Syd- in the Agreement is one of an `involun- ney Elliott noted `it was all too evident tary' coalition that has been `less than that the political parties were familiar successful in achieving a collective char- with vote management tricks to combat acter akin to any recognizable govern- the voting power of the elector under the ment or executive body elsewhere'.18 single transferable vote'.25 The Executive functions by sharing out In fact, the results of the 2003 election power without collective cabinet respons- marked a dramatic shift to more po- ibility: the ten ministerial portfolios are larised communal politicsÐwitnessing allocated to political parties in proportion the strengthening of the more hard line to their representation in the Assembly parties at the expense of the moderate following the d'Hondt electoral formula, centre. The DUP, which is opposed to such that the cabinet so formed is insu- the Agreement, received the largest per- lated from any e€ective opposition or centage of ®rst-preference votes (displac- censure. In a situation in which party ing the pro-Agreement UUP as the largest elites assign their own spheres of minis- unionist party in the Assembly), followed terial control, the Executive assumes the by Sinn FeÂin (displacing the SDLP as the form of `a series of political silos loosely largest nationalist party in the Assembly). connected by weekly meetings', where Support for the Alliance party dropped questions of ministerial accountability dramatically to under 4 per cent, its low- become especially contentious.19 For est level in thirty years, and the Northern example, unionist politician Robert Ireland Women's Coalition lost their two McCartney has openly accused Sinn Assembly seats. Clear evidence of in- FeÂin ministers of accepting `responsibility creasing ethno-nationalist solidarity is to no one but their own party'.20 It tran- that `the DUP and UUP accounted for spires, then, that Executive level politics 95% of unionist ®rst preference votes, a is not so much about sharing power, but signi®cant advance over their combined is more a contest for ministerial power total of 78% in 1998'.26 Within the unionist The Politics of Consociationalism: A Critique 219

# The Author 2006. Journal compilation # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2006 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 2 bloc the anti-Agreement members of equality of groups and individuals'.31 the Assembly now outnumber pro- This, though, is to beg the question as to Agreement members by over one-third; what has to be granted to groups that and following the 5 May 2005 Westmin- cannot be given to individuals.32 Can ster election, the party leader of the Ulster separate ethno-national group rights be UnionistsÐNobel Peace Prize laureate intellectually justi®ed against universalis- David TrimbleÐlost his Upper Bann tic rights? If so, how? In this regard, seat and subsequently resigned from his pursuance of the equality agenda and a leadership role. It seems an easy point to Bill of Rights for Northern IrelandÐas score against consociationalists: the rise conceived by the AgreementÐhas to an- in electoral support for the `hardliners' swer why groups should be given rights does little to raise the prospects of rein- over and above those of the individual, stituting Executive level power-sharing. and how this could be done equally. In these waysÐgroup designation, Ex- The equality agenda is unambiguously ecutive formation and the electoral sys- couched in the language of `two commu- temÐthe Agreement, as a consociational nities'; as Katy Hayward and Claire settlement, privileges `natural' pre-given Mitchell state, `the clauses of the Agree- ethno-national group categories and ment connected to equality are clearly promotes the pursuit of a group- intended to adjust the relationship be- di€erentiated politics that is reduced to tween Catholics and Protestants, nation- the `positional logic' of winning and alists and unionists'.33 In terms of the losing, of promoting and maximising Agreement, anti-discrimination legisla- communal advantage.27 In this regard, tion and public policies that advance though, if it is accepted that `all demo- `mutual respect' (such as governing the cracies' must `privilege freedom of polit- use of symbols and emblems) as well as ical choice over the ``natural'' categories of `parity of esteem' for cultural di€erence social life',28 then consociationalism is (such as support for the Irish language) fundamentally and systematically mis- ties equality to group membership. The taken in believing it can advance liberal problem with all this is not only that here, democracy. Consociationalism and liberal as elsewhere, gains and losses assume democracy pull in di€erent directions. zero-sum form amongst unionists and Consociationalists themselves contest nationalists, but that the idea that the that consociationalism is illiberal.29 `two communities' can be treated equally O'Leary holds that the Agreement is `a ¯ies in the face of prior acceptance of the liberal consociational agreement because con¯ict as being intractableÐfor equal it did not mandate that individuals must recognition requires one to adopt a uni- have group identitiesÐcitizens are free to versal standard of value against which exit from, and to adopt other, recognised groups can be equally judged.34 In any group identities, but are also free to insist case, it is not even established as to why that they belong to none (to ``others'')'.30 ethno-national groups should be treated This, however, is misleadingly put: indi- equallyÐafter all, and the history of viduals do not have the autonomy of Northern Ireland bears this out, some exiting from group designation per seÐ might be oppressive. `others' is a group designation. In this The issue of a Bill of Rights for North- respect the Agreement does stand in ern Ireland confronts the same set of direct violation of the individual right to problems. In a paper published in The freedom of association. Political Quarterly (2001) on `The Protec- O'Leary further claims that `a liberal tion of Human Rights under the Belfast consociation, is an association of commu- Agreement', O'Leary asserts that any `Bill nities based on recognition of the mutual of Rights should, so far as is possible, 220 Rupert Taylor

The Political Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 2 # The Author 2006. Journal compilation # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2006 guarantee the power-sharing logic of the In his book Liberal Virtues (1991), Agreement'.35 In particular, the Agree- Stephen Macedo writes `Public justi®ca- ment stipulates that in drawing up a Bill tion must . . . be critical in that objections of Rights the Northern Ireland Human have been sought out and reasonable Rights Commission has to `re¯ect the alternatives confronted or anticipated'.40 principles of mutual respect for the iden- Does this hold for the Belfast Agreement? tity and ethos of both communities and In essence, the Agreement was grounded parity of esteem'.36 Just how, though, can in prior decisions of the British and Irish this be done? governments, supported by United States If notions of `separate but equal' could diplomacy, and brokered through ethno- not be intellectually upheld through any national elite-level group-interested bar- appeal to reason or developed through gaining between party leaderships in any accepted principles of social organ- which the ethno-national `nature' of the isation in the American South or in apart- con¯ict was taken as a given background heid South Africa, why should it be any condition. True, the Agreement was sup- di€erent for Northern Ireland? In fact, ported through the 22 May 1998 public there is no clarity as to the way forward; referendum in which the `Yes' campaign for as Michael Meehan acknowledges, engaged people outside formal institu- `international rights instruments relating tional politics.41 The referendum was to minorities o€er no concrete guidance passed with a 71.1 per cent `Yes' vote in on how to develop this . . . and formulate Northern Ireland and a 94.4 per cent vote rights relative to the Irish context'.37 in the Irish Republic, but there was a clear When it comes down to it, McGarry and sense in which the Agreement was `sold' O'Leary's argument that `Authentic col- through spin-doctoring and obstruction- lective equality requires that both groups' ism. As Paul Dixon has argued, `little (national) identities be accepted as attempt' was `made by Northern Irish equally valid and legitimate'38 is one politicians and the two governments to that is theoreticallyÐand therefore prac- persuade rather than manipulate'.42 And in ticallyÐimpossible to establish. this latter regard, Dixon points to the use of such tactics as creating `constructive Consociation and deliberation ambiguity' and `necessary ®ctions'. The point here is that the Agreement The consociational position does, how- was bargained at elite level, teÃte-aÁ-teÃte, not ever, have recourse to a further line of defended in wide-ranging deliberation in defence. For, scholars such as John the civic public sphereÐpeople were not Dryzekand Ju È rg Steiner have argued motivated to thinkthrough the issues or that, in general, consociationalism is discuss them with others. Hence, here open to deliberative politics, whereby again, the Agreement represents a form citizens are `amenable to re¯ecting upon of politics that runs counter to virtuous and changing their preferences and practice whereby, following Cicero, one views'.39 However, the nature of the might expect elite interests to `care for the Belfast Agreement suggests otherwise. whole body' politic.43 As consociational settlements are driven Nowhere, though, has deliberative by bargaining based on ®xed ethno- politics been more foreclosed than with national group interests, cost±bene®t regard to the unresolved overarching calculations trump deliberative politics constitutional question: Will Northern time and again. This can most clearly be Ireland remain part of the United King- shown with respect to the crafting of the dom or become part of a new Ireland? To Agreement and the manner in which it a large extent the Agreement is seen by faces the future. unionists as safeguarding the union and The Politics of Consociationalism: A Critique 221

# The Author 2006. Journal compilation # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2006 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 2 by nationalists as signalling a united Ire- put into question, with governance landÐa state of a€airs that results in the becoming multilevel and multiform.49 present remaining inherently con¯ictual Under the sway of Third Way social as it feeds uncertainty and anxiety about policies and special European Union pro- the future. The Agreement makes pro- grammes (supported through the Peace vision for a poll for the people of Northern Fund), governance has increasingly be- Ireland to determine by simple majoritar- come tied to the active participation of ianism whether Britain or the Irish Repub- voluntary and community organisations, lic holds ultimate sovereignty over and ideas of `joined-up' government and Northern Ireland.44 By proposing, how- partnership structures have prolifer- ever, `to settle the dispute over democratic atedÐnotably involving Belfast City sovereignty by means of the principle of Council and district partnerships that majority decision', the Agreement post- pursue social inclusion projects.50 Today, pones the question and reverts `to the the Northern Ireland Council for Volun- problematic principle which provoked tary Action has over 5,000 organisations the original crisis in Northern Ireland'.45 on their database (with total assets ex- The standpoint of the Agreement rests ceeding £750 million) and it is estimated on the grounds that there are irreconcil- that `three out of every ®ve adults in able claims at stake here, but the counter Northern Ireland have an association point is that this has not been incontro- with some form of voluntary or commun- vertibly established. Rather than adhere ity organization'.51 And yet, here, the to the majority principle, it can be main- potential for civil society to advance tained that a common citizenship agenda democracyÐthrough, for example, pro- be sought through democratic delibera- moting social integration or encouraging tion, that democratic deliberation `is best active civic involvementÐhas again not suited to those decisions which are been well served by the Belfast Agree- important, or otherwise intractable, or ment. If anything, the post-Agreement both'.46 Besides, why should the con- period has witnessed the depoliticisation stitutional question be so starkly posed of civil societyÐas the fate of the Civic as a single-choice option divorced from Forum well illustrates. wider transformative trends?Ðespecially The Belfast Agreement incorporated a when increasing global interconnected- 60-member Civic Forum, with signi®cant ness (economically, culturally and pol- voluntary and community sector mem- itically) has resulted in a declining bership, to `act as a consultative mechan- signi®cance of national sovereignty and ism on social, economic and cultural state borders, and led Britain and Ireland issues',52 but rather thanÐas hopedÐ to become two of the world's most globa- promote deliberative politics,53 it has lised countries.47 As Seyla Benhabib ar- lacked in¯uence. This is true in a number gues, `territoriality is fast becoming an of important respects: the composition of anachronistic delimitation of material the Civic Forum is beholden to powers functions and cultural identities'.48 There held by the First and Deputy First Minis- has been a dispersal of power to sub- ters; it has struggled over how to position national, transnational and global levels itself `between the legislative Assembly such that beneath and beyond the level of and society in general';54 it is guided by a formal institutionalised politics attached chair that sees the Civic Forum as being to the state, issues of governance and civil `in politics but not of politics';55 and it has society have assumed new import. been sidelined by suspicious and hostile Indeed, in Northern Ireland, more and power-brokers (especially `hardliners') in more the importance and capacity of the Assembly and civil service.56 In sum, central government involvement is being the Civic Forum is widely seen to have 222 Rupert Taylor

The Political Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 2 # The Author 2006. Journal compilation # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2006 failed, having come to constitute a space liners', with a `new loyalism' concerned which civil society does `not control'.57 to `create real alignment in politics on Altogether then, consociationalism economic and social issues',63 and a new proves hostile to deliberative politics: respect within republicanism towards the constitutional question has been legalism and inclusive dialogue.64 postponed and civil society has been A turn away from consociational poli- depoliticised. In such ways, the Agree- tics towards a deliberative approach to ment turns its backon, rather than faces, politics would, it can be argued, do much the future. If, following Benjamin Bar- to `broaden perspectives, promote tolera- ber's argument in Strong Democracy tion and understanding between groups, (1984), politics `is the art of inventing a and generally encourage a public-spirited common destiny for women and men in attitude'.65 For crucially, as Dryzekar- con¯ict',58 the Agreement has little to gues, `there are mechanisms endogenous commend it. The Agreement has hardly to deliberation which promote the ex- encouraged the kind of virtuous citizen- pression of interests in public interest ship propounded by such political terms'.66 To this end, political will would theorists as Nicolo Machiavelli and James best be redirected to the pursuit of such Harrington.59 Consociational politics has initiatives as deliberative opinion polling, worked to systematically close down the citizens' panels and juries, public issue space for people to question conventional forums, and multi-option electronic understandings, to collectively think referendums.67 through the issues, and extend political Most substantively, it follows that the imaginings. Belfast Agreement be succeeded by some form of National Issues Convention or Conclusion `Deliberation Day'. As proposed by Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin in the con- As made evident from the above critique, text of American presidential elections, a the Agreement, as a consociational settle- `Deliberation Day' would constitute a ment, is hardly `the product of an civic holiday on which people meet in a imaginative consensus of the citizen's series of small and large group sessions to autonomous wills'60Ðbut why should engage in deliberative debate on matters this not be the standard by which the of pressing concern.68 In the Northern future of Northern Ireland be justi®ed? Ireland context, such an initiative could Particularly when, in terms of political be held, with the support of philanthropic theory, the premises of the Agreement foundations prepared to engage in are not justi®ed. To view the con¯ict as creative philanthropy,69 to enable citizens being in `the nature of things' driven by to forge a common destiny and to crea- irreconcilable ethno-national group inter- tively consider the political design for a est is presumptive, inscriptive and far constitutional convention, at whichÐas from progressive.61 Surely, the social with the creation of the American Repub- world is created and constructed by the lic in Philadelphia in 1787Ðelected dele- debates that we have about itÐit is not gates would meet face to face to simply tied to the `nature of things'. determine the future form of govern- Already, there is an increasing disengage- ment.70 After almost forty years of con¯ict ment from, and decreasing respect for, it is perhaps about time to encourage all consociational politics, with around citizens to freely deliberate, to generalise 35 per cent of people in Northern Ireland outside the frame of maximising ethno- claiming to be `neither unionist nor national group bargaining, and to askthe nationalist'.62 Moreover, there are clear question: `What is good for the political signs of deliberation amongst `hard- future of us all?' The Politics of Consociationalism: A Critique 223

# The Author 2006. Journal compilation # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2006 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 2 Notes 11 Arend Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa, Berkeley, University of California This paper was ®rst presented at the Press, 1985, p. 112. Seventh Mediterranean Social and Polit- 12 John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, ical Research Meeting, Florence and Mon- `Consociational theory, Northern Ireland's tecatini Terme, Italy, 22±26 March 2006, con¯ict, and its Agreement. Part 2: What organised by the Mediterranean Pro- critics of consociation can learn from gramme of the Robert Schuman Centre Northern Ireland', Government and Opposi- for Advanced Studies at the European tion, vol. 41, no. 2, 2006, p. 277; John University Institute. McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, `Stabilis- 1 Adrian Guelke, `Civil society and the ing Northern Ireland's Agreement', The Northern Ireland peace process', Voluntas, Political Quarterly, vol. 75, no. 3, 2004, vol. 14, no. 1, 2003, pp. 61±78; Rudy pp. 213±25. B. Andeweg, `Consociational democracy', 13 Stefan Wol€, `Conclusion: The peace pro- Annual Review ofPolitical Science , vol. 3, cess since 1998', in JoÈrg Neuheiser and 2000, p. 531. Stefan Wol€, eds, Peace at Last? The Impact 2 See, in particular, Arend Lijphart, `Con- ofthe Good Friday Agreement on Northern sociation: The model and its application Ireland, New York, Berghahn Books, 2003, in divided societies', in Desmond Rea, pp. 205±32. ed., Political Co-Operation in Divided Societ- 14 John Morison, `Democracy, governance ies: A Series ofPapers Relevant to the Con¯ict and governmentality: Civic public space in Northern Ireland, Dublin, Gill and and constitutional renewal in Northern McMillan, 1982, pp. 166±86; and John Ireland', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, The vol. 21, no. 2, 2001, p. 292. Northern Ireland Con¯ict: Consociational 15 David Gordon, `Dormant Stormont: Public Engagements, Oxford, Oxford University foots £9m bill for idle Assembly', Belfast Press, 2004. Telegraph, 26 August 2005. 3 John Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland, 16 Ian O'Flynn, `The problem of recognising Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, p. 244; individual and national identities: A lib- Bernadette C. Hayes and Ian McAllister, eral critique of the Belfast Agreement', `Ethnonationalism, public opinion and the Critical Review ofInternational Social and Good Friday Agreement', in Joseph Ruane Political Philosophy, vol. 6, no. 3, 2003, and Jennifer Todd, eds, After the Good p. 144. Friday Agreement: Analysing Political 17 Jocelyn A. J. Evans and Jonathan Tonge, Change in Northern Ireland, Dublin, Univer- `The future of the ``radical centre'' in sity College Dublin Press, 1999, p. 35. Northern Ireland after the Good Friday 4 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societ- Agreement', Political Studies, vol. 51, no. ies: A Comparative Exploration, New Haven, 1, 2003, p. 27. Yale University Press, 1977. 18 Alban Maginness, `Rede®ning northern 5 John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, Ex- nationalism', in John Coakley, ed., Chang- plaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images, ing Shades ofOrange and Green: Rede®ning Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, p. 286. the Union and the Nation in Contemporary 6 The Belfast Agreement: An Agreement Ireland, Dublin, University College Dublin Reached at the Multi-Party Talks on Northern Press, 2002, p. 37. Ireland, April 1998, Strand One, para. 6 19 Ibid. (Cm 3883, available online). 20 Robert McCartney, `Power shift that suits 7 Ibid., para. 5(d). the Sinn Fein agenda', Belfast Telegraph, 8 Ibid., para. 16. 27 September 2004. 9 Ibid., para. 5(b)(e). 21 Maginness, `Rede®ning northern nation- 10 PatrickWagner, `Northern Ireland after alism', p. 37. the Good Friday Agreement: On the way 22 Benjamin Reilly, Democracy in Divided So- to peace or con¯ict perpetuated?', Global cieties: Electoral Engineering for Con¯ict Research & Information Network Management, Cambridge, Cambridge Uni- (www.grin.info), 2004, p. 19. versity Press, 2001, pp. 134±41. 224 Rupert Taylor

The Political Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 2 # The Author 2006. Journal compilation # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2006 23 Geo€rey Evans and Brendan O'Leary, Markus SpoÈrndli, and Marco R. Steen- `Northern Irish voters and the British±Irish bergen, Deliberative Politics in Action: Agreement: Foundations of a stable con- Analysing Parliamentary Discourse, Cam- sociational settlement?', The Political Quar- bridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004. terly, vol. 71, no. 1, 2000, pp. 78±101. 40 Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizen- 24 William A. Hazleton, `Suspended vote: ship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Con- The 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly elec- stitutionalism, Oxford, Clarendon Press, tion', The Political Quarterly, vol. 75, no. 3, 1991, p. 46. 2004, p. 229. 41 Colin Irwin, The People's Peace Process in 25 Sydney Elliott, `Northern vote sees over Northern Ireland, London, Palgrave, 2002. 80 per cent of transfers stay within main 42 Paul Dixon, `Political skills or lying and parties', Irish Times, 1 December 2003. manipulation? The choreography of the 26 Hazleton, `Suspended vote', p. 232. Northern Ireland peace process', Political 27 Consider Arthur Aughey, The Politics of Studies, vol. 50, no. 4, 2002, p. 739. Northern Ireland: Beyond the Belfast Agree- 43 Cicero, On Duties, Cambridge, Cambridge ment, London, Routledge, 2005. University Press, 1991, p. 33. 28 Alain Touraine, What is Democracy? 44 The Belfast Agreement, Constitutional Is- Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1997, sues. p. 67. 45 Richard Bourke, Peace in Ireland: The War of 29 Brendan O'Leary, `Debating consocia- Ideas, London, Pimlico, 2003, p. 3. tional politics: Normative and explanatory 46 Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, arguments', in Sid Noel, ed., From Power p. 174. Sharing to Democracy, Montreal and King- 47 Foreign Policy Globalization Index for 2003 ston, McGill-Queen's University Press, (available online). 2005, pp. 3±43. 48 Benhabib, The Claims ofCulture , p. 180. 30 Brendan O'Leary, `The protection of hu- 49 Morison, `Democracy, governance and man rights under the Belfast Agreement', governmentality', p. 300. The Political Quarterly, vol. 72, no. 3, 2001, 50 Colin Knox and PaÂdraic Quirk, Peace p. 354. Building in Northern Ireland, Israel and South 31 Ibid., p. 353. Africa, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2000, 32 Consider Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: chapter 3. An Egalitarian Critique ofMulticulturalism , 51 Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Cambridge, Polity, 2001. Action, State ofthe Sector III: Northern Ire- 33 Katy Hayward and Claire Mitchell, `Dis- land Voluntary and Community Sector Alma- courses of equality in post-Agreement nac, Belfast, 2002. Northern Ireland', Comparative Politics, 52 The Belfast Agreement, Strand One, vol. 9, no. 3, 2003, p. 296. para. 34. 34 Consider, Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of 53 Cathal McCall and Arthur Williamson, Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global `Governance and democracy in Northern Era, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton Uni- Ireland: The role of the voluntary and versity Press, 2002. community sector after the Agreement', 35 O'Leary, `The protection of human rights Governance, vol. 14, no. 3, 2001, p. 369. under the Belfast Agreement', p. 355. 54 Vikki Bell, `In pursuit of civic participa- 36 The Belfast Agreement, Rights, Safeguards, tion: The early experiences of the Northern and Equality of Opportunity, para. 4. Ireland Civic Forum, 2000±2002', Political 37 Michael Meehan, `Towards a Northern Studies, vol. 52, no. 3, 2004, p. 570. Ireland Bill of Rights,' Liverpool Law Re- 55 Ibid., p. 574. view, vol. 23, no. 1, 2001, p. 46. 56 McCall and Williamson, `Governance and 38 McGarry and O'Leary, The Northern Ireland democracy in Northern Ireland', p. 378. Con¯ict, p. 189. 57 Christopher Farrington, `Models of civil 39 John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and society and their implications for the Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations, Northern Ireland peace process', School Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, of Politics and International Studies, p. 170; JuÈ rg Steiner, Andre BaÈchtiger, Queen's University Belfast, 2004, p. 6. The Politics of Consociationalism: A Critique 225

# The Author 2006. Journal compilation # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2006 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 2 58 Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: loyalism', in Coakley, ed., Changing Shades Participatory Politics for a New Age, Berke- ofOrange and Green , p. 111. ley, University of California Press, 1984, 64 Kieran McEvoy, `Law, struggle, and polit- p. 53. ical transformation in Northern Ireland', 59 Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Harmonds- Journal ofLaw and Society , vol. 27, no. 4, worth, Penguin, 1974 [1532]; and James 2000, pp. 542±71. Harrington, The Commonwealth ofOceana 65 Simone Chambers, `Deliberative demo- and a System ofPolitics , Cambridge, Cam- cratic theory', Annual Review ofPolitical bridge University Press, 1992 [1656]. Science, vol. 6, 2003, p. 318. 60 Barber, Strong Democracy, p. 168. 66 Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, 61 Also see, Rupert Taylor, `Northern Ire- p. 169. land: Consociation or social trans- 67 Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The formation?' in John McGarry, ed., Renewal ofSocial Democracy , Cambridge, Northern Ireland and the Divided World: Polity Press, 1998. Post-Agreement Northern Ireland in Com- 68 Bruce Ackerman and James S. Fishkin, parative Perspective, Oxford, Oxford Uni- Deliberation Day, New Haven, Yale Uni- versity Press, 2001, pp. 37±52. versity Press, 2004. 62 The 2001 Northern Ireland Life and Times 69 Luc Tayart de Borms, Foundations: Creating Survey, cited in Jonathan Tonge, The New Impact in a Globalised World, Chichester, Northern Irish Politics? London, Palgrave, West Sussex, John Wiley, 2005. 2005, p. 82. 70 James S. Fishkin, The Voice ofthe People: 63 David Ervine quoted in James Public Opinion and Democracy, New Haven, W. McAuley, `The emergence of new Yale University Press, 1997, p. 134.

226 Rupert Taylor

The Political Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 2 # The Author 2006. Journal compilation # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2006