SOUTH-EAST ASIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE MONOGRAPHS Adat and Dinas is a study of the dynamics of community organization in contemporary Bali and of the ambivalent relationship between village institutions (adat) and those of the Indonesian state (dinas). Profound links between earth, ancestral ties, and death ceremonial obligations form the cultural basis for co-operative relations in the village domain and for the defenceof local interests ADAT AND DINAS in engagements with the state. Most striking is the power and cohesion exhibited by the BALINESECOMMUNITIES IN banjar, the civic community in Bali and the primary focus of the study. The book traces THE INDONESIAN STATE the banjar's role in serving the collective needs of its members and the tensions implicit in its function as an intermediary in the implementation of Indones_ian develop­ ment policies. Adat and Dinas will be of general interest ,iii to social, cultural, and economic anthro­ pologists as well as to those with specialist interests in Indonesian culture and politics, the ethnography of Bali, rural development, and the role of local institutions in social ' change. ◄

Jacket illustration: Banjar ritual preparations (Photograph by Carol Warren)

Oxford University Press ISBN 0 19 588609 7 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 248 x 154 mm 400 pp. 13 tables 4 figs. 2 maps 25 b/w illus. South-East Asian Social Science Monographs

Adat and Dinas Adat and Dinas Balinese Communities in the Indonesian State

Carol Warren

KUALA LUMPUR OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS OXFORD SINGAPORE NEW YORK 1993 Oxford University Press, Walton Street, Oxford ox2 6DP Oxford New York Toronto Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi Kuala Lumpur Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo Nairobi Dar es Salaam Cape Town Melbourne Auckland Madrid and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Oxford is a trade mark of Oxford University Press Published in the United States by Oxford University Press, New York © Oxford University Press 1993 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, To Jim, Kris, and my parents without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press. Within the UK, exceptions are allowed in respect of any fair dealing for the purpose of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, or in the case of reprographic reproductionin accordance with the terms of the licences issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms and in other countries should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Warren, Carol. Adat and· dinas: Balinese communities in the Indonesian state/Carol Warren. p. cm.-(South-East Asian social science monographs) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-19-588609-7 (boards): 1. Balinese (Indonesian people)-Social conditions. 2. Balinese (Indonesian people)-Politics and government. 3. Balinese (Indonesian people)-Government relations. 4. Adat law-­ Indonesia-Bali (Province) 5. Village communities-Indonesia-Bali (Province) 6. Social structure--Indonesia-Bali (Province) 7. Community development-Indonesia-Bali (Province) 8. Bali (Indonesia: Province)-Social life and customs. I. Title. II. Series. DS632. B25W37 1993 307.72' 09598'6-dc20 92-35881 GIP r93

Typeset by Indah Photosetting Centre Sdn. Bhd., Malaysia Printed by Kim Hup Lee Printing Co. Pte. Ltd., Singapore Published by Oxford University Press, 19-25, Jalan Kuchai Lama, 58200 KualaLumpur, Malaysia Preface

THIS is a study of the dynamics of Balinese community organization in the context of the Indonesian state. My interest in community and cul­ ture began in 1969 when Jim Warren and I lived in a Sama/Bajau Laut settlement while teaching in Sabah, Malaysia. The Bajau were a boat­ dwelling people who had begun to settle and take on wage labour at that time. For a number of complex reasons they found it difficult to estab­ lish an effective basis for organizing themselves as a community in order to provide or to politically articulate their most basic needs. They wanted a primary school but were given funds for a mosque at a time when few were Muslim. Living as they did in a village built over the bay hundreds of metres from land, their most basic daily need was for fresh water; yet government-granted rain tanks were left to corrode in front of the home of the village head, while villagers paid dearly for water from a private facility. In 1975 I returned to Sabah for formal research. One of the conclusions of that study (Warren, 1983) was that, although mater­ ial advancement had indeed been achieved by a small minority of Bajau, the lack of corporate structure or values and the consequent inability of the people of the settlement to organize for common purposes had greatly disadvantaged the village as a whole. These institutional and cul­ tural factors exacerbated the effects of the cleavages which were taking place among the Bajau in the process of their incorporation into the capitalist economy and Malaysian political system. Since the looseness of Bajau society had made collective action difficult, it seemed important to look at social organization and change at the opposite end of the structural spectrum. By reputation, Balinese society was among the most highly structured of systems, so much so that Bloch ( 1977) could treatits proliferation of rules as something of an 'embarrassment' to anthropology. In his rather mechanist argument, social structure is correlated with institutional hierarchy. The complex­ ity, ritualization, and constant resort to customary rules and a timeless past in the present, in his view, function to disguise and legitimate inequality. At odds with Bloch's inference, what interested me in the Balinese case was the reputed insistence on principles of legal equality and consensual decision-making at thelevel of local institutions in a cul­ tural system that was otherwise said to be dominated by status competi­ tion and relations of patronage and dependency (C. Geertz, 1959, 1980; viii PREFACE PREFACE lX Boon, 1977). Bali was a logical place, then, to look at highly developed power and symmetric relationsin the local sphere, the chapters in Part II community organization and the relation between local social structures illustrate the importance of these institutions in providing collective and national development policies. goods, either directly through self-help initiatives or indirectly by using There was another aspect of this earlier research experience that led to their political and organizational capacities to claim resources from the the decision to do fieldwork in Bali. The Bajau example lent itself to an state. Here it is important to note that collective goods include not only explanation of social change heavily weighted in terms of economic fac­ the sort that development advisers would be concerned with-schools, tors. As an outcaste minority, the central aspects of their culture-their water, and other public amenities-but also ritual and aesthetic 'goods' animistic religious beliefs and boat-dwelling tradition-hadbeen so asso­ which are equally essential to Balinese conceptions of well-being. ciated with material poverty and powerlessness vis-a-vis land-based eth­ Finally, Part III deals with state intervention and the appropriation of nic groups that change for many Bajau meant consciously abandoning customary (adat) institutions to administrative (dinas) ends. The power what they now conceived their culture to represent. In the Balinese case, of local institutions in Bali has ensured that the relationship between on the contrary, social as well as economic development has been almost village and state to date involves a relatively balanced play of forces. The rhetorically identified with cultural continuity in both official discourse discussions of basic needs provision and of national rhetorical strategies and popular consciousness. Bali, therefore, also offered the prospect of a focus on the complementarities and oppositions between state and local broader consideration of the connections between cultural construct, interests. In this respect, the dangers of an overemphasis on hierarchy social practice, and political-economic change. and patronage in the analysis of Balinese culture and social relations Wolf (1986) expressed concern over the need to integrate what have become more apparent, for such interpretations can be made to rational­ become two disparate sets of literature-one, usually of a political eco­ ize paternalistic state policies directed at expanding central control. nomy cast, dealing with questions of social transformation, the other The broad framework of issues to be addressed posed a number of focusing on the symbolic domain. 'Recently anthropologists have in­ problems for research and writing. On the one hand, concentration on a creasingly been tempted to divorce social behavior from culturally single community was necessary to develop the depth of understanding encoded symbolic forms, rather than to inquire into the ongoing dialect­ that participant observation approaches at least begin to make possible. ical interpretation of the two realms.' (Wolf, 1986: 327.) The line of On the other, a single village might provide too idiosyncratic a case to argument dominating both of these approaches to the ethnography of make any kind of general statement, given the complexity and variation Bali, I will argue, has distorted the representation of Balinese culture and that has been so well documented in the ethnography of Bali. The com­ society, emphasizing the symbols of hierarchy of the elite tradition on promise was to live and concentrate my research in one locality, but seek the one hand and the pervasiveness of political patronage in social rela­ out comparative information from other areas on the most significant tions on the other. From both perspectives this has been at the expense questions. Most of my time was spent in the village which will be called of an adequate appreciation of popular culture and institutionalized Desa Tarian in this study. The background necessary for understanding symmetric ties. This research on community development and village­ local social process came from working with leaders and becoming state relations attempts to address these issues 'from below' by focusing absorbed in everyday life in the eight banjar adat (ten banjar dinas) that on how local knowledge and popular value are linked with corporate make up this large administrative desa. But case-studies from other vil­ community structures and collective action in the Balinese case. lages provided exceptional illustrations of the possibilities and limits of In order to understand the basis on which Balinese communities community development (in the case of Desa Sanur), and of the im­ organize for common purposes and the effects of their incorporation portance of religious value and customary law in explaining local solid­ into the Indonesian state, it is essential to reconsider existing research·in arities (in the Desa Siang dispute). In these villages I was largely the light of alternative evidence on local structures and everyday frame­ dependent on formal interviews and documents, without the richer per­ works of meaning. Part I of the study traces the foundations of local spective that long-term residence provided for Tarian. At the same time, institutions which are intimately bound up with corporate egalitarian the strength of the general arguments presented in the book lies in the relations and symbols. A complex of cultural values associated with connections it has been possible to establish between events and the earth, death, and collective ancestry is directly connected to conceptions significance attached to them in one place and time, and parallel of local citizenship. This is most apparent in the power and solidarities instances and interpretations elsewhere. I have drawn on evidence from exhibited by the banjar, the hamlet or civic community in Bali and the a wide range of sources, where possible comparing historical records primary focus of this study. I conclude that local social relations are and the work of other ethnographers with my own observations. much more fluid and decentred than traditional scholarship on the vil­ _Traditional texts proved important markers of value and practice, as lage (desa) would have it, but much more palpable than contemporary ftave letters to the editor of the Bali Post. Conversations in the local revisionist approaches would lead us to believe. coffee-shops complement information gained from attendance at banjar Having outlined the institutional basis for the expression of corporate and desa meetings as well as from village records. viii PREFACE PREFACE lX Boon, 1977). Bali was a logical place, then, to look at highly developed power and symmetric relationsin the local sphere, the chapters in Part II community organization and the relation between local social structures illustrate the importance of these institutions in providing collective and national development policies. goods, either directly through self-help initiatives or indirectly by using There was another aspect of this earlier research experience that led to their political and organizational capacities to claim resources from the the decision to do fieldwork in Bali. The Bajau example lent itself to an state. Here it is important to note that collective goods include not only explanation of social change heavily weighted in terms of economic fac­ the sort that development advisers would be concerned with-schools, tors. As an outcaste minority, the central aspects of their culture-their water, and other public amenities-but also ritual and aesthetic 'goods' animistic religious beliefs and boat-dwelling tradition-had been so asso­ which are equally essenti:µ to Balinese conceptions of well-being. ciated with material poverty and powerlessness vis-a-vis land-based eth­ Finally, Part III deals with state intervention and the appropriation of nic groups that change for many Bajau meant consciously abandoning customary (adat) institutions to administrative (dinas) ends. The power what they now conceived their culture to represent. In the Balinese case, of local institutions in Bali has ensured that the relationship between on the contrary, social as well as economic development has been almost village and state to date involves a relatively balanced play of forces. The rhetorically identified with cultural continuity in both official discourse discussions of basic needs provision and of national rhetorical strategies and popular consciousness. Bali, therefore, also offeredthe prospect of a focus on the complementarities and oppositions between state and local broader consideration of the connections between cultural construct, interests. In this respect, the dangers of an overemphasis on hierarchy social practice, and political-economic change. and patronage in the analysis of Balinese culture and social relations Wolf (1986) expressed concern over the need to integrate what have become more apparent, for such interpretations can be made to rational­ become two disparate sets of literature-one, usually of a political eco­ ize paternalistic state policies directed at expanding central control. nomy cast, dealing with questions of social transformation, the other The broad framework of issues to be addressed posed a number of focusing on the symbolic domain. 'Recently anthropologists have in­ problems for research and writing. On the one hand, concentration on a creasingly been tempted to divorce social behavior from culturally single community was necessary to develop the depth of understanding encoded symbolic forms, rather than to inquire into the ongoing dialect­ that participant observation approaches at least begin to make possible. ical interpretation of the two realms.' (Wolf, 1986: 327.) The line of On the other, a single village might provide too idiosyncratic a case to argument dominating both of these approaches to the ethnography of make any kind of general statement, given the complexity and variation Bali, I will argue, has distorted the representation of Balinese culture and that has been so well documented in the ethnography of Bali. The com­ society, emphasizing the symbols of hierarchy of the elite tradition on promise was to live and conce�trate my research in one locality, but seek the one hand and the pervasiveness of political patronage in social rela­ out comparative information from other areas on the most significant tions on the other. From both perspectives this has been at the expense questions. Most of my time was spent in the village which will be called of an adequate appreciation of popular culture and institutionalized Desa Tarian in this study. The background necessary for understanding symmetric ties. This research on community development and village­ local social process came from working with leaders and becoming state relations attempts to address these issues 'from below' by focusing absorbed in everyday life in the eight banjar adat (ten banjar dinas) that on how local knowledge and popular value are linked with corporate make up this large administrative desa. But case-studies from other vil­ community structures and collective action in the Balinese case. lages provided exceptional illustrations of the possibilities and limits of In order to understand the basis on which Balinese communities community development (in the case of Desa Sanur), and of the im­ organize for common purposes and the effects of their incorporation portance of religious value and customary law in explaining local solid­ into the Indonesian state, it is essential to reconsider existing research in arities (in the Desa Siang dispute). In these villages I was largely the light of alternative evidence on local structures and everyday frame­ dependent on formal interviews and documents, without the richer per­ works of meaning. Part I of the study traces the foundations of local spective that long-term residence provided for Tarian. At the same time, institutions which are intimately bound up with corporate egalitarian the strength of the general arguments presented in the book lies in the relations and symbols. A complex of cultural values associated with connections it has been possible to establish between events and the earth, death, and collective ancestry is directly connected to conceptions significance attached to them in one place and time, and parallel of local citizenship. This is most apparent in the power and solidarities instances and interpretations elsewhere. I have drawn on evidence from exhibited by the banjar, the hamlet or civic community in Bali and the a wide range of sources, where possible comparing historical records primary focus of this study. I conclude that local social relations are and the work of other ethnographers with my own observations. much more fluid and decentred than traditional scholarship on the vil­ .Traditional texts proved important markers of value and practice, as lage (desa) would have it, but much more palpable than contemporary have letters to the editor of the Bali Post. Conversations in the local revisionist approaches would lead us to believe. coffee-shops complement information gained from attendance at banjar Having outlined the institutional basis for the expression of corporate and desa meetings as well as from village records. Acknowledgements

SINCE fieldwork and writing had to be accommodated to teaching com­ mitments, this study was planned from the outset as a ten-year research project. Between 1981 and 1991 I spent a total of twenty-eight months in Bali. This included two intensive periods from January to July 1982 and from July 1984 to January 1985, with annual visits of one to three months before, between, and since the longer stays. Despite the in­ evitable disadvantages of fragmented fieldwork and time lost to the sheer organizational requirements of arriving and taking leave, there was, it turned out, redeeming virtue in necessity. The extended time-frame made it possible to focus on process and to follow up national policies and local projects which took years to implement or whose implications were not immediately apparent. Relationships, upon which ethnography fundamentally depends, also develop with time. The professional and personal relationships cemented over a decade are the basis of the book, a source of inspiration and pleasure as well as incalculable personal debt. The study is very different from what it would have been had the research been conducted in a single two-year period. Thanks to the help of a very large number of people, the process was ultimately more satis­ fying than any alternative I might have imagined. The project would not have been possible without the institutional support of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) and the sponsor­ ship of Udayana University. I thank them for permission to carry out this long-term project. The University of Western Australia provided generous research support and Murdoch University granted me leave from teaching to conduct fieldwork. Among the many individuals con­ nected with these institutions, I wish to thank Drs Wayan Geriya and Professor Dr I Gusti Ngurah Bagus, who acted as my sponsors, and Dr John Gordon, who supervised the doctoral thesis upon which this book is based. My gratitude is also due to my colleagues and students at Murdoch University for the intellectual stimulation and enthusiasm that strongly influenced the process of translatingfieldwork into text. One of the consequences of this perip�tetic approach to field research was the slow pace of acquiring even limited competence in the several levels and styles of the Balinese language. The late Dewa Putu Dani and, after his death, Ida Bagus Rai W anosari were my linguistic mentors, attempting to teach the rudiments of Balinese while coaching xv xiv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS me through the translation of often obscure and enigmatic texts. forcing me to rethink my assumptions. James Fox and Joel Kahn made Although by 1984 I was able to understand Balinese, and engage in con­ valuable comments and criticismson the original manuscript. versation and interviews with some confidence, I never achieved the Many families gave the logistical and moral support that brought this spoken fluency I had in Indonesian, or overcame the social discomfort effort to fruition. My husband and daughter accompanied me on several posed by the etiquette involved in the use of Balinese language levels. field-trips to Bali at the expense of their own projects and free time. Kris Consequently, most of the interviews cited in the text were conducted in discovered the trials and pleasures of crossing cultural boundaries when Indonesian or mixed Balinese and .Indonesian. The Glossary indicates she was plunged into fourth grade at the Tarian primary school. Jim, from which language important terms frequently referred to in the text whose academic interests transgress the boundaries between history and come. Dr Alfons van der Kraan, Wendy Haboldt, Arnold Vermeulen, ethnography, gave support and stimulus to my work. To the Sudhar­ and Esther Velthoen provided valuable assistance with the translation of sanas who provided our first introduction to Bali, to the family of Dutch language sources over the years. I Made Geriya and Ni Luh Sriatiwho generously extended their house­ I wish also to express my gratitude for the research assistance of hold to include the three of us throughout these years, and to Ni Ketut I Gusti Ayu and Ni Made Sikiani, who in 1982 conducted a household Ratna and Ni Wayan Puri, my deep appreciation for their caring com­ census and economic survey in Desa Tarian. I Wayan Sumerta made panionship. Further afield my father and mother, Charles and Elaine superb maps of every banjar in Tarian, providing an indispensable Schug, contributed both moral and practical support. My father found directory to each of the thousand households in the village. A further his second career in retirement as a computer consultant, producing survey of village structures and leadership patterns in other parts of Bali graphs and tables and solving the word-processing problems that arose was conducted in 1984 by I Wayan Suparta, who ventured with tape because I could never find time to read a manual. All know the depth of recorder and motor cycle to remoter cornersof the island on my behalf. my affection and gratitude. As well as language teacher, Dewa Putu Dani was an invaluable raconteur of local social history and legend, having grown up in the Credits royal court of Puri Tarian in the early part of the century. His vivid accounts were complemented by those of I Made Lebah from the very Permission is gratefully acknowledged from the New York Academy different perspective of a servant of the court in the same period. Both of Sciences for the use of photographs in Balinese Character by were wonderful story-tellers and treasuredfriends. Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson, fromJan Steward for the use of a I Wayan Gandera, who generously shared his time and ideas, deeply photograph by Jack Mershon, and from the National Geographic influenced the direction of the project and my enthusiasm forit. I Gusti Society for the 1969 kecak photograph. Basic Books granted permission Made Kwanji, I Wayan Sudra, Cokorda Anom Wardhana, I Made to quote from Local Knowledge by Clifford Geertz. Wasa, Ni Ketut Nyantet, I Ketut Darmaja, and Ni Ketut Saderi deserve Parts of the text have previously been published in articles which special thanks as well for the many long and pleasurable discussions over appeared in Contemporary Southeast Asia; Anthropological Forum; endless rounds of coffee. Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Working Papers; Among the many others whose knowledgehas been priceless and whose H. Geertz (ed.), State and Society in Bali; and P. Alexander (ed.), Cre­ friendship I can only hope to reciprocate in kind are I Ketut Artha, ating Indonesian Cultures. I Wayan Bambang, I Ketut Bamia, the late Ida Bagus Beratha, I Wayan Dana, I Made Dasa, Desak Ketut Dewi, I Nyoman Dharma, Desak Dherani, I Gusti Mayun Emang, I Made Gatra, I Nyoman Goya, I Gusti Wayan Kanti, Ida Bagus Kerti, I Wayan Koji, I Wayan Madera, I Ketut Madra, I Wayan Mandera, I Ketut Marta, Cokorda Gede Agung Mas, Ida Bagus Mayun, Ni Wayan Narini, Ida Bagus Oka, Anak Agung Rai, Ida Bagus Rai, Ni Ketut Ratih, I Wayan Reta, I Ketut Rentih, I Ketut Rudra, I Gusti Made Rumatenaya, I Wayan Rutha, Ni Made Sani, Ni Luh Sari, I Wayan Suparja, Ni Luh Suryani, I Made Suteja, I Nyoman Sutoya, I Ketut Suta, Ida Bagus Ngurah Suyasa, I Made Toya, Cokorda Rai Wiadnya, · Cokorda Yadnya, Ni Ketut Yanthi, and I Ketut Yasa. I have mentioned my dependence on the contemporary ethnographic work of numerous colleagues. Among these, I wish to thank especially Hildred Geertz, Henk Schulte Norctholt, and David Stuart-Fox for gen­ erously sharing the results of their own research and for constantly Contents

Preface viz Acknowledgements xzn Appendices xx Tables xxi Figures xxii Maps xxii Plates xxiii Abbreviations and Glossary xxv

PART! 1 ADAT: THE FOUNDATIONS OF VILLAGE CORPORATISM 3

1 The 'Village' in Bali: Principles of Local Organization 7 Pluralistic Collectivism and theSeka Principle 7 Banjar 11 Origin and Incorporation in Local Institutions 15 The Balinese 'Village': Old and New Types 18 The 'Village' as Banjar/Desa 21 Colonial Impact: Banjar and Desa Dinas 22 Desa Tarian 24 The Village Republic Reconsidered 28

2 Earth, Death, and Citizenship: Cultural Value and CollectiveSocial Control 36 Earth: Religious Conceptions 36 Village Land and Law 3 8 Village Sanctions: Expulsion 42 Death Rites and Banjar Power 46 The Siang Case 48 Death Beliefs: Ancestry and Locality 54 Disrupted Death Ceremonies 58 xviii CONTENTS CONTENTS xix 3 Myths and Metaphors: Hierarchy and Equality in In Face of Competing Interests: The Future of Sanur's Balinese Culture 68 Industries 202 The Dorpsrepubliek Myth 68 Conclusion 204 Patronage and Corporate Principles in Local Politics 72 Disrupted Death Ceremonies and the Ethnography of Bali 79 PART III 209 A Question of Balance 84 VILLAGEINSTITUTIONS AND STATE Myths and Metaphors 89 POLICY 211

4 Models of Leadership: Concepts of Authority and 8 Village Institutions in the Basic Needs Strategy 213 Popular Responsibility 99 Basic Needs in Indonesian Policy 214 Leadership Profiles 101 Implementing Basic Needs: Family Planning 217 Adat and Dinas 107 Water Supply: The Banjar Sangan Case 224 Rewards of Office 112 Whose Needs? 230 Leadership Recruitment Practices 116 Conclusion 231 The 'Popul�r' in Local Political Process 122 9 The Bureaucratization of Local Government 238 PART II 135 'Reforming' Local Administration 238 VILLAGECORPORATE STRUCTURE AND Implementation in Bali 247 COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION 137 The Impact of Reorganization: Sanur 251 Misplaced Priorities 253 5 Collective Consumptionin the Ritual Sphere 139 Official Images and Local Competencies 257 Community: Visible and Invisible 140 Comparative Perspectives 259 Worship of Village Ancestral Deities: Odalan 141 Conclusion 264 Ordering Elemental Forces: Macaru 143 Rituals for the Dead: Ngaben 146 10 Popular Political Culture and the Rhetoric of Collective Production and Consumption of Ritual Goods 150 NationalDevelopment 271 Cremation: Community and Life-cycle Ritual 153 Political Legacies 271 Collective Cremation 158 Corporatism: Village and State Constructions 277 Conclusion 162 Pancasila: Competing Discourses 278 State Rhetoric and Local Response 279 6 Swadaya Banjar: Self-help Community Conclusion 286 Development 167 Public Construction: Bale Banjar 167 11 Conclusion: Adat and Dinas 290 Public Construction: Schools 169 Local Knowledge/Local Power 290 Funding Sources: Collective Harvesting 169 Dinas and Adat 291 Funding Sources: Tourist Performances 172 Ambiguity and Ambivalence 294 Loan Funds 177 Contest and Accommodation 297 Banjar-based Development Projects: Other Examples 180 Conclusion 299 The Desa and Self-help Development 183 Swadaya Community Development 185 Appendices 303 Bibliography 331 7 Swadaya Development: The Case ofDesa Sanur 189 Index 350 The History of Sanur's Public Industries 189 Employment 193 Distributive Effects 196 Development Project Funding 197 Problems and Constraints 198 Appendices Tables

1 Desa Tarian; Biographical Sketches of Primary Informants 303 1.1 Desa Tarian: Household/Population Census by Banjar, 2 Desa Tarian: Awig-awig Banjar Pande 307 1917, 1931, and 1988 26 3 Desa Tarian: Administrative Desa Development Projects, 2.1 Inventory of Desa Lands 1979-1989 41 309 4.1 Desa Tarian: Leadership Profiles, 1981-1990 102 4 Desa Tarian: Major Banjar Projects, 1978-1991 311 5.1 Banjar Madya: Total Ritual Expenditure, May 1981- 5 Desa Sanur: Development Projects, 1969-1984 314 April 1982 151 6 Market Values and Exchange Rates, 1938-1990 328 5.2 Banjar Madya: Major Temple Festival Outlays of One Household over a 420-day Cycle, 1981-1982 153 5.3 Outlays per Participating Family for Collective Cremation, 1985-1986 161 6.1 Banjar Tegeh: Income from Collective Harvesting, 1966-1970 170 6.2 Banjar Madya: Income fromKecak Performances, 1966-1981 174 6.3 Ratio of Income to Labour-time for Harvesting (Banjar Tegeh) and Tourist Performances (Banjar Madya), 1966 and 1970 175 6.4 Banjar Madya: Major Expenditures, 1969-1981 176 7.1 Desa Sanur: Revenue from Levies and Village Industries, Selected Years 192 7.2 Desa Sanur: Monthly Expenditure on Salaries and Benefits for Employees, 1979 and 1984 195 7.3 Desa Sanur: Sources of Development Project Funds, 1969-1984 197 Figures Plates

4.1 Influence of the State on Local Leadership 100 Banjar ritual service. 1 7 .1 Profit Levels of PT Bank Desa and PT Bhakti Sanur, Banjar Madya's kecak performance, 1969. 135 1973-1990 201 Gotong royong--road repairs. 209 9 .1 Local Government AdministrativeHierarchy under Village Government Law 5/1979 240 Between pages 146 and 14 7 9.2 LKMD: Organizational Structure 243 1 Banjar Lagas roll-books and record of expulsion case. 2 Bale kulkul, Banjar Lagas. 3 Ngarap wadah (carrying the cremation tower to the cemetery), Desa Sekahan, 1936. 4 Close-up of men carrying the cremation tower, Desa Sekahan, 1936. Maps 5 Carrying the corpse-'the crowd ... splashing and pulling the coffin', Desa Batoean, 1937. 6 Ngarap play at a collective cremation, Banjar Kalih, 1985. 7 Cooking sate for a cremation ritual, c.1937. 8 The women of Banjar Pekandelan preparing rice for reciprocal gifts of food at a cremation, 1983. 1 Regional Map of Bali 6 9 The men of Banjar Pekandelan prepari�g sate and lawar for a 2 Desa Tarian 24 cremation ceremony, 1983. 10 Distribution of prepared foods by banjar men for a cremation ceremony, 1983. 11 Pemerasan offerings to accompany the spiritof the deceased. 12 Collectivecremation in Banjar Tegeh, 1985. 13 Odalan at the Pura Desa, Tarian. 14 Banjar youth group assisting in odalan preparations for banjar shrine. 15 Banjar Madya's bale banjar and bale kulkul built from the proceeds of tourist kecak performances. 16 The sign at theBeach Market Restaurant describing the purpose of Sanur's public industries. 17 Beach-front tables at the Sanur Beach Market Restaurant. 18 Sanur's village-owned service station. 19 Poster (BKKBN, Bali)showing family planning promotion through banjar meetings, youth education, PKK activities, nutrition, and credit programmes. XXIV PLATES 20 Women collecting water from the banjar public facility. 21 'The People's Aspirations for Development ... and the Results'; a cartoon in the Bali Post, 27 May 1989. 22 'The Five Credos of the Fifth Development Cabinet'; a billboard painted in Tarian for the 1988 desa competition. Abbreviations and Glossary

ONLY key terms and those used frequently in the text are listed here. Balinese terms are marked (B); the unmarked terms are Indonesian.

ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) the mil­ itary adat local customary law, institutions, ritual; connected with customary practices awig-awig (B) basic regulations (of banjar, desa, subak, seka) ayahan (B) ritual service obligations (to village, court) bale (B) pavilion ( also balai) Bandes (Bantuan Pembangunan Desa) presidential grants for village development; also sometimes known as Inpres Desa banjar (B) hamlet; local customary (adat) or government (dinas) unit bendesa (B) head of desa adat Bimas (Bimbingan Massa!) Mass Guidance Agricultural Programme BKKBN (Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berancana Nasional) NationalFamily Planning Co-ordinating Board BPPLA (Badan Pelaksana Pembina Lembaga Adat) Agency for the Guidance and Development of Adat Institutions-Bali bupati regional (kabupaten) head of government buta-kala (B) spirits of the lower world r;aka (B) Balinese twelve-month year equivalent to AD 79 camat district (kecamatan) head dadia (B) patrilineal descent group ( soroh) dalang (B) puppeteer desa (B) village; local customary (adat) or government (dinas) unit dinas government; official; connected with bureau­ cracy/administration dorpsrepubliek village republic (Dutch) dosa (B) fine for an adat offence xxvii xxvi ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY dresta (B) ancestral/customary practice negara state GBHN (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara) Broad Outlines ngaben (B) secondary mortuary ritual, usually by cremation for State Policy ngarap (B) to work or carry; to play or abuse the corpse or Golkar Golongan Karya, the governing party of Indonesia mortuary paraphernalia at death ceremonies gotong royong mutual aid; community labour ngu'opin (B) voluntary assistance Inmas (Intensifikasi Massa!) Mass Intensification Rice niskala (B) unseen, spiritual world Programme nusang (B) ritual washing Inpres (Instruksi ,Presiden) Presidential Instruction; pres- odalan (B) temple anniversary idential grant scheme Pancasila 'Five Principles' of belief in God, humanism, kabupaten region nationalism, democracy, and social equity; the Kahyangan Tiga village temple complex official Indonesian State Philosophy karang ayahan (B) residential compound attached to village services pamekel (B) retainer of the royal court karang suung (B) uninhabited residential compound parakan (B) servant to a royal household keamanan security, peace paruman (B) special meeting of krama kecamatan district patus (B) prescribed contributions in kind for death cere- kelurahan non-autonomous village; subdistrict unit of gov- monies ernment payonan (B) sale of trees (effectively of use rights to des a land) kepala head (of dusun, desa, lingkungan, etc.) PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia) Indonesian Demo- kesadaran consciousness, awareness cratic Party KIK (Kredit Investasi Kecil) Small Investment Credit pekasih (B) subak head klian (B) head (of banjar, tempek, pura, etc.) pemaksan (B) temple support group KMKP (Kredit Modal Kerja Permanen) Credit for Fixed pembangunan development Capital pemerataan equalization koperasi co-operative pengajug (B) payment for readmission to banjar/desa member- krama (B) corporate membership (of banjar or desa associa- ship krama tion) pengarep (B) foremost heir (also marep); full member of KUK (Kredit Usaha Kecil) Small Business Credit desa kulkul (B) wooden signal drum pengempian (B) secondary heir and subsidiary member of krama kuren (B) hearth, household desa lingkungan subdivision of kelurahan pependem (B) ritual burial of symbolic representations of natural LKMD (Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa) Village elements and village members at temple con­ Public Security Council secration LMD (Lembaga Musyawarah Desa) Village Consultative perascita (B) purification ritual Council perbekel (B) administrative village head; kepala desa Zomba desa village competition perbekelan (B) administrative village lontar (B) palm-leaf manuscript petajuh (B) head of tempek (elsewhere klian tempek) lurah head of kelurahan, non-autonomous village PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) Indonesian Com­ macaru (B) sacrificial offerings to nether-worldly spirits munist Party majenukan (B) visit a family, bringing contributionsof rice, etc., at PKK (Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga) Family death Welfare Association marep (B) foremost heir PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia) Indonesian Nationalist masyarakat people, society, the public Party meli setra (B) payment for use of cemetery by non-village mem­ PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) United Develop­ ber ment Party; Amalgamated Muslim parties mufakat consensual agreement PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia) Indonesian Socialist MUSPIDA (Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah) kabupaten task Party force, comprising heads of the government, punggawa (B) client-ruler in pre-colonial Bali; district head under court, military, and police thecolonial government musyawarah deliberation; discussion pura temple xxviii ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY puri (B) palace rampag right of confiscation under customary law Repelita (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun) Five-Year Development Plan sanggah (B) family house-yard temple sangkep (B) routine assembly meeting sawah irrigated rice land sebel (B) state of ritual prohibition sedahan (B) agricultural and tax-collecting administrator seka (B) prescriptive group or voluntary association sekala (B) visible, material world sentana (B) adopted heir sepekan (B) sanction, expulsion setra (B) cemetery (also sema) sima (B) local codes, usually unwritten SMP lower secondary school SMA upper secondary school soroh (B) patrilineal descent group (also dadia) subak (B) irrigation association Sudra (B) commoner caste swadaya self-help; self-reliant swakarya self-activating swasembada self-sufficient tanah ayahan agricultural land tied to desa services tata krama (B) local customary practice; regulations teba (B) uninhabited yard adjacent to house compound tegakan (B) membership share (dues, land, seat in village assembly) tegal dry agricultural land tempek (B) subdivision of banjar toya penembak (B) holy water provided at cremation triwangsa (B) the three Hindu upper castes-Brahmana, Satria, and Wesia undang-undang national law warung coffee-shop yadnya (B) ritual sacrifice, ceremony PART I Adat: The Foundations of Village Corporatism

ADAT has become the generic term for describing local customary prac­ tice and institutions throughout the Indonesian archipelago. Its conven­ tional translation as 'customary law' inadequately conveys the cultural depth and rhetorical essence of this defining feature of Indonesian life. 1 In a more profound sense than its usual rendering as 'customary law' or 'traditional practice', adat must also be understood to incorporate the moral ideal of 'social consonance' and the behavioural imperative of 'propriety' ( C. Geertz, 1983: 207-14). There is an underlying religious­ social vision of the necessary correspondence of cosmic and human rela­ tionships towards which it is directed. Of Arabic derivation, the term adat had been in common use throughout the Malayo-Muslim world and was applied to indigenous institutional forms in Bali and other parts of the Indonesian archipelago under Dutch colonial rule. The scholarly systematization of 'adat law' under the aegis of the Leiden adatrecht school and the reification of adat institutions through official recognition by colonial authority have been the objects of incisive critique in recent years (Holleman, 1981; Benda­ Beckmann and Strijbosch, 1986; Burns, 1989). Revisionist scholars have focused particularly on the 'invention of tradition' in Dutch representa­ tions of the desa adat (custom village) as an autonomous, corporate vil­ lage community-the ideal-type dorpsrepubliek (C. Geertz, 1963; Breman, 1982, 1987; H. Schulte Nordholt, 1991). In Breman's view the Dutch adat law school 'put an unmistakable stamp on this populist conception.. . . The village community has been erected as an almost sacred edifice.' (Breman, 1982: 194, 202.) The terms 'village' and 'community' indeed convey ambivalent images of co-operative, self-contained, and cohesive, but at the same time, parochial and static social groups. Both the positive and negative connotations of the village-community concept seriously misrepresent the complexities of rural social systems, as Breman (1982, 1987) and others (Popkin, 1979; Robertson, 1984; Wolf, 1986; Kemp, 1987; Wade, 1988) have stressed. In his thoroughgoing criticism of the liter­ ature on the Javanese village, Breman (1982: 189, 192) argues that the 4 ADA T AND DINAS ADAT: THE FOUNDATIONS OF VILLAGE CORPORATISM 5 archetypal representation of the solidary and autonomous village repub­ forebears, iterated and vitalized through community practice (tata lic is an unacceptable, even dangerous, reduction of a much more com­ krama), of which local regulations (sima, awig-awig) are codified expres­ plex social reality. This 'invention' of the village by colonial authority as sions. These concepts refer to common social, legal, moral, and religious a closely integrated community of peasant agriculturalists, practising relations which are fundamentally local and embodied in corporate insti­ primitive democracy and maintaining harmonious relations based on tutions. In these senses, adat is neither an 'invented tradition' of external mutual assistance and common interests, misrepresents the character of construction nor a seamless or changeless 'past in the present', but a pre-colonial rural social structure. In consequence, these stereotyped powerful framework of meaning and social action, variously institution­ conceptions act to the detriment of realistic assessments of the possibil­ alized across the Balinese landscape. ities and limits village institutions offer in a changing social and eco­ Part I of this study treats the ways in which corporate images frame nomic environment. In Indonesia, the village community 'fiction' proved Balinese conceptions of community and locality as these are manifested an unfortunate expedient, inappropriately justifying the adoption of the in religious and social relations focused on the banjar and desa adat. The desa unit as a cornerstone of colonial and post-colonial policy. More first chapter concerns the knotty problem of defining the 'village' in Bali, seriously, exaggeration of the egalitarian and cohesive character of vil- the variations in structure and ambiguities of conceptualization that lage relations ignored the internal class divisions and elite political inter­ remain problematic areas of contention for contemporary scholars. ests so often at root of the failure of community development Chapter 2 considers the core values at the centre of village social rela­ programmes (Breman, 1982: 192-4; see also Tjondronegoro, 1984: tions, bonds with earth and ancestry which mediate the cycle of death 11-40). and rebirth, bonds which provide a powerful cultural basis for local The thesis presented in Breman's work-that vertical alliances were solidarities. Chapters 3 and 4 counterpose the differing images and more important and horizontal ties less homogeneous and cohesive structures of corporatism that village and state represent, the first than traditional scholarship on the village community implied, and that premised on egalitarian and the second on hierarchically structured the desa as a closed and autonomous community was of colonial social relations. Here it is argued that the contemporary ethnography of manufacture-has unquestionable relevance for the study of contem­ Bali has tended to overemphasize hierarchic values in Balinese culture . porary Balinese village organization. But Breman (1982: 190, 223) at and vertical relations of patronage in Balinese social structure at the the same time warns that the critique of old stereotypes could easily lead expense of a fullappreciation of their egalitarian and horizontal counter­ . to the creation of new ones if not complemented by a closer analysis of points. Together the chapters which make up this part of the study form local institutions using primary data 'from below'. the groundwork for analysing the place of local institutions and popular Following up Breman's aside, this study reconsiders the question of culture in the Bali of post-colonial Indonesia. local corporatism, the bases, extent, and limits of local autonomy, and internal co-operative relations. While deferring to the important revi­ 2 sions of village-communityand village-republic 'myths' by contempor­ ary scholars-recognizing internal differentiation and the effects of state 1. See Burns (1989) on the contributions of adat as 'a national myth' to the develop­ penetration especially-the case will be made that there do exist sub­ ment of a sense of common identity among the colonized subjects of the Netherlands East stantive corporate community institutionsin Bali grounded in local adat, Indies. 2. Revisionist use of the term 'myth' fuses its conventional and post-structural senses and that serious practical consequences arise as much from underrating as fictitious and factitious (Breman, 1982; Spiertz, 1989; Burns, 1989; H. Schulte as overrating the social and symbolic foundations upon which they rest. Nordholt, 1991). Dorpsrepubliek and ad.atare treated criticallyin this literature as particular, Understanding the foundations of local organization as these affect pop­ historical fabrications constructed for ideological purposes as autochthonous. This usage is ular control over village affairs and the patterns of leadership which to be distinguished from the usual anthropological sense of the term as charter or deep operate in the local sphere is of critical importance in the analysis of structural explanation/resolution of surface experience. See also Hobsbawm's influential discussion of custom, tradition, and invented traditions (in Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). relations between village and state in the present. 3. Many of these words are·in turn of Sanskrit derivation and were much earlier in­ The adat concept gathers up a number of Balinese referents-dresta, corporated into Balinese. Dresta, usually translated as ad.at or ancient custom, originates sima, tata krama,3 to name a few-which converge in the generalized with the Sanslaitfor 'perceived', 'learnt', 'known'. Krama, referring to the corporate mem­ one. These have a field of meanings covering ritual obligation, social bership of desa or banjar, is said by Kaler (1983a: 51) to originate in the Sanslaitwikrama, institution, legal regulation, and ancestral evocation that infuse the 'noble action/service'. But Stuart-Fox (1987: 524) gives a more likely etymology deriving desa banjar, from the Austronesian karaman (from rama, 'father, elder'), the term used in pre­ Balinese sense of local solidarities in the and terms inad­ Majapahit inscriptions for village community. equately .translated as village and hamlet. Dresta, the closest Balinese equivalent concept to adat, is the customary basis of local institutions handed down from community ancestors with whom ongoing relations are maintained through ritual. It refers to the accumulated experience of 6

1 The 'Village' in Bali: Principles of Local Organization

Pluralistic Collectivism and the Seka Principle This seka pattern of organization gives to Balinese village social structure both a strongly collective and yet a peculiarly complex and flexible pattern. Balinese do almost everything, even the simplest of undertakings, in groups, in fact in groups which, as Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead have pointed out, almost invariably involve personnel clearly far in excess of what is technically necessary. The creation of a crowded, bustling, somewhat disordered and hectic social 4-< rame 0 environment-what the Balinese call ... seems to be requisite for the per- ...... formance of even the most elementary tasks .... This combinationof a somewhat �i antlike attack on the performance of important social activities-which the :::s cil Balinese themselves wryly describe as bebek-bebekan ['duck-like'] ... with a ten­ dency to direct any one group to a single end . . . leads to what one might call, -� paradoxically, a pluralistic collectivism. (C. Geertz, 1963: 84-5.) THE organization of local life throughout most of Bali bears little appar­ ent resemblance to the integrated social, political, and economic ideal­ type evoked in images of the traditional Asian 'village'. The desa adat ] (custom village) is rather more a ritual-symbolic entity than a practical 0 s s N administrative one. Unlike the dorpsrepubliek image of the Balinese desa 0 0 0 0 which Dutch scholars based on studies of remote communities they con­ 0 l/1 0 ,;... - sidered to represent original indigenous forms, Clifford Geertz. prefers I\ I\ to focus on the 'heartland' villages where the vast proportion of the population is located. There, desa 'refers most accurately, not to a single 111 0 bounded entity, but to an extended field of variously organized, vari­ ously focused and variously interrelated social groups' (C. Geertz, 1980: 48). Everyday life in the villages of South Bali is through these intersect­ z------ing but semi-autonomous corporate units of a special purpose character: the banjar is the civic community; the subak (agricultural associations) organize irrigation and other aspects of farming which require common co-ordination; the dadia or soroh is a kin-group based on descent through the male line;1 pemaksan (temple support groups) are respons­ ible for the maintenance of village shrines and the organization of much of local ritual beyond the life cycle and ancestral ceremonies of family and kin-groups; and seka include clubs and voluntary work-groups 8 ADA T AND DINAS THE 'VILLAGE' IN BALI 9 formed to do just about anything else. Banjar, pemaksan, and seka usu­ complement to the formal and obligatory social bond, iket. The atmos­ ally draw their memberships from within the desa, while subak and dadia phere of rame is achieved at temple ceremonies through the organized memberships frequently cross-cut it. The result is a complicated, never­ preparations of the pemaksan whose obligations are necessary prelim­ theless highly structured, arrangement of overlapping but non�co­ inaries to the 'spontaneous', enthusiastic, crowd-drawing outcome. The ordinate corporate groups, a pattern C. Geertz (1963: 85) termed night-watch in the home of a deceased banjar member will be rame, a 'pluralisticcollectivism'. popular expression of sympathy as well as a collective statement of the C. Geertz's 1959 article provides the classic description of the com­ obligations of neighbourhood solidarity, iket. In many contexts the in­ plex articulation of these units which constitute local social structure formal, expressive side of Balinese social action must be understood as throughout most of Bali. Banjar, subak, dadia, pemaksan, and seka are personal and collective commentaries affirming or negating the ideal formally independent and 'adjusted to one another only insofar as seems relationships enjoined by the formal requirements of seka membership. essential' (C. Greetz, 1959: 991), each recruiting its members for a dif­ The seka principle of organic unity is the central axiom of all local ferent purpose and recognizing no other principle of affiliation as oper­ corporate groups, prescriptive or not. Within the carefullycircumscribed ating within its legitimate sphere (C. Geertz, 1959: 1005). With the jurisdiction of each group, it demands precedence of the interests of the inevitable qualifications that arise in any attempt to generalize about whole over those of individual member parts and of the original, Balinese society, the location of one's house compound would likely founding group over internal subdivisions (Geertz and Geertz, 1975: determine a household's banjar membership; the water source for its 165-6). Consensual patterns of decision-making and resistance to the fields will decide what subak it must join; ancestral ties define dadia overt expression of private or factional interests within this domain are obligations; and personal interests or economic necessities establish the implicit values which follow from the organic emphasis of the seka con­ basis for joining voluntary seka. cept. It is possible to sum up the fundamental principles of incorporation The value placed on the group as a corporate entity is expressed in which characterize all of the intersecting units that make up local social the uses to which seka income may be put. Often all or part of the pro­ organization in the concept of seka itself. This term, meaning 'to be ceeds derived from seka activity will be spent on some collective good one', is apparently derived from the Sanskrit eka, 'one' or 'unity', and which at the same time symbolizes the body corporate. The frequent 2 the Balinese/Indonesian prefix sa!se, also meaning 'one'. Dictionary renovation of village temples and banjar meeting-halls, for example, definitions of derivations of the root word seka also suggest the solidarity serves social and religious purposes but it is also a positive expression of and group competitiveness which the term connotes: maseka-friendly the unity of the groups which support them. Even voluntary seka, whose or allied with; sekaang-compete as a group, join together in hostility or primary purpose may be income generation, frequently pool their competition; sekaang banjar-to be treated with hostility by the entire money until the six-monthly Galungan festival when part of it may be community (Kamus Bali-Indonesia, 1978). used to purchase a pig to be slaughtered and shared (nimpung) by mem­ In its broadest sense, the seka concept applies to both voluntary and bers. Voluntary seka often choose to spend all or part of the proceeds of prescriptive associations. Among the most important seka in local life, their labour on uniform clothing. 'It's not that it'snecessary, but you feel the banjar, subak, and pemaksan are permanent groups in which mem­ as one when dressed the same.' (Iwasa, 1984.) At Galungan, the harvesting bership under defined circumstances is obligatory. In contrast, the vol­ seka routinely has a set of shirts and blouses made for members out of untary clubs and work-groups, to which the term seka is most often their income and nimpung before dividing the remaining cash among applied in popular usage, are formed and broken up at the will of their members (I Miasa, 1982). A neighbour's only photograph of her now membership. These include harvesting groups (seka manyz), perform­ deceased husband was taken in the 1950s when the members of his har­ ance groups (seka gong, seka janger), clubs for the study and singing of vesting seka decided to use a portion of their earnings to travel to religious and poetic texts (seka kidung), and groups formed for a myriad Denpasar at Galungan for a group portrait (Ni Tinggal, 1984). of miscellaneous purposes: seka tuak (palm wine drinking club), seka The corporatist emphasis in Balinese social organization and cultural arisan (rotating credit society), seka iket (roofing group), seka semal value cannot be overstressed. Danandjaja (1980: 254) says seka (volun­ (work-group forhunting coconut squirrel), and seka teruna (youth club). tary association), patus (obligatory ritual contributions), and sangkep The prominence of the various kinds of seka in village life reflect the (assembly)3 are used interchangeably in Desa Trunyan. These and other high social value placed on collectivity in Balinese culture. Two power­ associated concepts, such as sima (customary codes) and krama (the ful dimensions of this collectivist orientation are expressed in the con­ collective membership), all identify the individual with the group. Seka cepts rame (spontaneous, bustling social activity) and iket (tightly banjar or krama banjar may refer interchangeably to the banjar as a body bound, prescriptive sociality) (cf. Lansing, 1974; Geertz and Geertz, or to its separate members as bearers of the collective relation. Members 1975: 84-5). Both are expressions of the importance of the group in do not belong as individual persons. They stand for component kuren, Balinese life and are mutually interdependent. Rame is the informal or hearth units built around a husband-wife pair and their dependants 10 ADA T AND DINAS THE 'VILLAGE' IN BALI 11 banjar/des a. who have rights and obligations themselves as subsets of the Banjar Kaler (1983a: 53-5) explicitly distinguishes the Balinese krama from the Indonesian anggota (member) by virtue of its non-individualist connota­ The primary focus of this study is the banjar, the seka which forms the tion. civic community throughout most of Bali. The term banjar is said to Integrally related to the principle that the whole is of greater derive from jajar, line or row, referring to the orderly rows of house significance than its parts is a corollary principle of the legal equivalence compounds (karang) which make up theresidential 'hamlet' associations of the parts (Geertz and Geertz, 1975: 165). Seka membership by within the encompassing 'custom village', the desa adat. Agung and definition demands equal contributions to the needs of the group and Purwita ( 1983: 18) cite a tenth-century Old Balinese inscription which equal shares in its product. Village residential land (and in a few desa, includes the word banjar in connection with temple contributions. certain agricultural land), for example, is distributed in equal parcels Common reference to banjar patus (obligatory ceremonialcontributions) (karang sikut satak or tegakan) and no member may accumulate more and banjar suka-duka (mutual help in joy-sorrow) suggest that these than one share. At the same time, real inequalities arising from dispar­ neighbourhood groups may have had their origin in the organization and 7 ities in ownership of private lands, wealth, rank, or household circum­ support of life-cycle ceremonies, especially those concerning death. stances characterize social life in Bali. Consequently there is an inherent Whatever its origins, the banjar is popularly regarded as a 'kin-like com­ tension between the formally recognized principle of equivalence and munity' (nyama banjar) and the use of the term, like that of many other informally acceded claims based on status or economic difference. such concepts, extends metonymically beyond the strictly institutional Nevertheless, the ideals of legal equivalence and balanced reciprocity sphere.8 have a central place in seka organization and gain explicit recognition in The constitution of Banjar Belong Gede in Denpasar insists that suka­ formal regulations as well as the proverbs and aphorisms of seka life: duka is the 'foundation and purpose of the banjar' (Sima Krama Banjar 'good, bad, shared together', 'give, receive', 'united as gamelan mallets Belong Gede, 1967: 9-10), and banjar everywhere devote significant striking'. energy and resources to these ends. As perhaps the most powerful of The separate but related unity and equivalence dimensions of the seka local corporate institutions in South Bali, the banjar functions as a ritual, principle suggest two slightly different • senses in which their activities social, and administrative community. The krama banjar organizes can be understood and point to the difficulty of definitively distinguish­ purification rites for the protection of constituent households and carries ing between the corporatist and collectivist aspects of seka organization out the most central of the Balinese rites of passage, those rituals related in practice. Banjar, subak, or pemaksan, as prescriptive seka, fit conven­ to death and cremation. It builds and maintains local public facilities­ tional definitions of corporate groups4 and are more likely to emphasize meeting-hall, market area, side-paths, and sports gounds-and may tax corporate primacy as an end in itself in decision-making, while voluntary and command the labour of its members for any purpose which they seka more typically treat the group as a means to collectively defined collectivelydetermine. It witnessesmarriage and the designation of heirs ends. But it is ultimately a matter of emphasis between whole and parts, and has authority over occupation rights to the house land on which its ends and means, and one that is constantly reevaluated as decisions are members reside. The dense social ties and tight solidarity ideally operat­ made on wide-ranging issues such as the division or pooling of income, ing within the banjar institution make it the focus for most social activ­ the procedures for conducting collective rituals, and the acceptability of ities and many economic ones. Mutual aid networks, credit societies and substitute labour or cash payment for service obligations. In banjar harvest seka, the innumerable drama and music clubs, and in some organization, corporate primacy is exemplified in regulations regarding places temple support groups are organized on a banjar basis or within the indivisibility of banjar property. Banjar codes stipulate that no one its bounds. It is rare, in fact, for voluntary seka. to recruit members leaving the banjar may claim a share of its property or, in the case of across banjar lines. inmigrants, reclaim the joining fee (penanjung batu). (This is normally A discussion of the main features of banjar organization and repres­ calculated on the basis of the current per capita value of banjar prop­ entation will serve both to describe this institution and illustrate the erty.) So, a member must contribute to increasing the value of the cor­ strong centripetal tendencies which underlie seka in general. porate whole but on exit may not devalue it. seka The power of norms is perhaps most clearly seen in cases of Awig-awig conflict where pressure is placed on either or both of the unity5 and equivalence6 principles. The most vehement adat disputes, such as the Seka share a common concern with the importance of rules, the rights of Siang case to be discussed at length in Chapter 2, are ultimately argu­ the membership as a whole to make them, and the obligation of every ments about the operation, not the priority, of corporate values. They individual to keep them. Seka are by definition 'bound by rules' (Dw Raka, are fundamentally about contending views on how the solidarity, equity, 1982). Oral, more rarely written, basic regulations, called awig-awig and shared rules that are supposed to be at the heart of seka relations (a: not; weg: loose, unruly) or sima (customary practices), encode ought to apply. these rules. Awig-awig desa set out the rights and responsibilities of the· 12 ADA T AND DINAS THE 'VILLAGE' IN BALI 13 collective membership (krama desa) and are especially concerned with perform labour services (Grader, n.d.: xxxiv; Korn Coll. 162/580). obligations towards village temples (principally the Kahyangan Tiga) Another set of collated texts in the collection, dated Is;aka 1 783 and and the various ritual prohibitions and requirements that affect the sanc­ 1829 (AD 1861 and 1907) but apparently referring to a much earlier tity and safety of village space. The striking feature of written awig-awig period, reports on the granting of an awig-awig to Desa Dauh Tukad banjar is their concern with death ritual. Whatever other matters may be (Tenganan, Karangasem) following the defeat of its religious leader, covered, they invariably contain a detailed reckoning of the assistance in De Doekoeh Mangku, who had resisted royal authority. Attached to it labour and kind required from members at funerary rites. On most are pledges of allegiance and protection between the village and the matters the awig-awig of component banjar will be compatible with that royal house of Karangasem (Korn Coll. 161/560). In other instances, of the overarching desa adat, but practical devolution to banjar in the however, references to royal authority are entirely lacking or appear to large desa of South Bali means that significant differences in customary reflectlittle more than deferential acknowledgement. practice do tend to develop over time. Within the desa adat of Tarian, Although considerable influences from official legal texts such as the for example, there are many instances where what one banjar prescribes, Adi Agama are evident in the form and language of awig-awig, in another prohibits. Grader's (n.d.: xxxii, 3; xxxiii, 6) estimation their content, unsystematic Written texts have an intrinsic sacral character in the Indic tradition organization, and cumulative addenda suggest that they must have been (Grader, 1969 [1940]: 232), but their moral weighting for the Balinese primarily of local origin. In the division of power between village and rests most profoundly upon the fact that these rules were created and state expressed in the borrowed Javanese proverb, Desa mawa cara, passed down from the ancestors, who are in fact identified with village Negara mawa tata (the Village is the bearer of custom, the State the deities. The awig-awig of Desa Bukti states that it is a gift of Ratu Gede bearer of law), the relative autonomy of the desa is, theoretically at least, Puseh, the divinity of the original temple of that village and one of a basic principle of customary law (Wiweka, 1971: 35 ff.). If the lan­ the names for the personified collectivity of the communal ancestors guage of awig-awig indicates that written codes were not entirely (Grader, n.d.: xxxiii, 4-5). Although today written forms are increas­ sui generis productions of local communities, their complete lack of ref­ ingly deemed necessary to assure recognition in the wider legal system, erence to matters of everyday concern presuppose that the preponder­ some informants insist that it is the unwritten awig-awig, or sima, which ance of customary practices structuring local relations remained is more powerful and binding for the krama (I Gandera, 1983; Ida Bgs Mayun, unwritten. Consequently, it would be a mistake to privilege written texts 9 1987;AAA1it, 1991). over the more typical oral sima krama. Written formulation of awig-awig was often precipitated by inter- or In accordance with another axiom proclaiming the relative autonomy intra-village dispute. The stress in written texts therefore is primarily on of desa-Desa, Kala, Patra (Village, Time, and Circumstance)-Balinese transgression of regulations rather than day-to-day practice. None pro­ regard customary law as locally determined and open to change. Any vide a complete set of rules, and those subjects 'regarded as so obvious member may propose that the krama reconsider its regulations in the as not to necessitate being written up' (Grader, n.d.: xxxiv, 3) cannot be normal course of monthly assembly meetings. The longer standing and treated as less significant than matters which warranted inclusion in writ­ more significant the custom, however, the more reluctant members are ten codes. Because written awig-awig are fragmentary and often exclude to make radical alterations. The power of local customary law lies not the most taken-for-granted aspects of local practice, the use of early only in the sanctions set down in the codes themselves, but in the pro­ texts poses problems forattempts at reconstructing forms of local organ­ found concern to maintain the fundamentals of the ancestral heritage ization in the pre-colonial period. Nevertheless, they add valuable his­ (dresta) that these represel;lt, for the ongoing relationship with the an­ torical depth and comparative evidence to ethnographic analysis of cestors which local institutions and customary law assure is essential for current practice. the well-being and protection of the community. The awig-awig of An important issue raised by these texts, but one that is difficult to Desa Aan published in the Appendix to Kinship in Bali (Geertz and resolve convincingly, is the question of the pervasiveness of the influence Geertz, 1975: 184) states: 'As we say, "the old ways are safest." We of the royal courts on local customary law. A number of old texts col­ must act according to religion, in order to bring about the well-being lected by Korn in the 1920s refer . to the nineteenth-century rulers of [safety, welfare, rahayu] of the village. Tal<:e good care of these rules.' Lombok and Karangasem, for example. 10 Passages in several of the texts indicate that their inscription was connected with internal disputes or Fines conflicts with royal authority, undoubtedly compounded by political intrigue among the Balinese states in this period. A royal memorandum There is perhaps no better illustration of the emphasis on equivalence of (pengeling-eling) 11 is attached to the text of the awig-awig of Desa Be­ right and obligation among seka members than in the precise tit-for-tat bandem in which Gusti Gede Ngurah Karangasem, intervening in a dis­ meting out of sanctions inscribed in awig-awig. Some of the written texts pute involving two banjar, reminds them to obey the call of the desa to consist almost entirely of a litany of fines to be imposed for any and 14 ADA T AND DINAS THE 'VILLAGE' IN BALI 15 every delict, such as failure to attend banjar meetings or to participate in cane, withwhich banjar meetings are opened and closed. It is the duty of collective work decided upon by the assembly. Even late attendance tra­ the outgoing sinoman (rotating messengers for each banjar subdivision) ditionally incurred sanction, and measuring devices were set to deter­ to supply the canang offerings. The canang pengeraos is an offering to the mine the precise point from which fines would apply. A coconut shell deities requesting them to witness the discussions of the krama and to with a hole in the base (jangi) was filled with water and anyone arriving bless and assure the observance of collective decisions. The canang after the water had run through was liable. Before pen and paper, lekesan includes small packets of sirih (betel chew), a symbol of com­ records of fines were kept on bound strips of lontar palm called pipil on mensality throughoutthe South-East Asian world. 14 The use of the cane which the name of each member was inscribed. A piece of twine would is an indication of the religious character of banjar meetingsand possibly be tied on the palm leaf for each fine incurred, to be tallied and paid up a symbolic equivalent of the common meal associated with meetings in at the six-monthly Galungan festival. A set of these pipil dating from the theBale Agung in the 'old' desa. (See Grader, 1969 [1940]: 162-7; 1940s is still in the possession of the head ofBanjar Lagas (see Plate 1). Goris, 1984 [1935]: 94-5; and the discussion below on old and new Today clocks and attendance registers serve the same regulating func­ desa types.) In the past the cane contained one quid of betel for each tions and the roll is called at every meeting or collective work session. member and was distributed at the end of the session. Today, fewer Fines for misdemeanours are normally small, as little as 25 rupiah (a adult men chew sirih, but a small number of lekesan are always prepared few US cents), 12 but increase steeply for ritual offences and those and taken symbolically by a few representatives of the krama at the con­ regarded as challenging the sanctity or authority of the krama, such as · clusion of assembly meetings. violence or a defamatory speech at banjar meetings. Due process norm­ ally involves three stages. Initially, a fine is imposed according to amounts set out in awig-awig. Failure to pay the fine results in its Origin and Incorporation in Local Institutions doubling at the subsequent banjar meeting. Refusal to submit to A fundamental value in Balinese culture-one which may become the sanction at the third ends in expulsion. Although fines themselves are source of tensions between ties of kinship and community in certain usually small, villagers always say the real sanction that lies behind them contexts, and more explosively between associated conceptions of status is shame (lek) in the face of other banjar members. hierarchy and equality-is the significance of 'origin' (kemulan, ka­ witan). Hildred and Clifford Geertz discuss it at length in relation to the Kulkul other ordering principles of Balinese life and summarize the (usually) Among the most powerful symbols of collective identity and consensus oblique oppositional relations it may establish within pluralistically struc­ is the kulkul, the slit drum whose signals call members to meetings and tured communities: to collective labour, warn of emergencies, and mark the events of death, · [E]verywhere that dadias have crystallized out at all, and embryonically even birth, and marriage in the life of the community.13 The published ver­ where they haven't, loyalties formulated in terms of kinship symbols and loy­ sion of the awig-awig of BanjarBelong Gede opens with an introductory alties formulated in terms of those of community or polity form opposite poles preface on the meaning of the kulkul and the regulations concerning its of group attraction. The intensely factional character of Balinese life, apparent use. The sound of the kulkul represents the voice of the banjar and from the time of the dynastic struggles of the nineteenth century to the popular 'symbolizes the harmonious fusion of the various thoughts and opinions massacres of 1965, is but the clearest evidence that the famous 'organic' quality among the membership' (Sima KramaBanjar Belong Gede, 1967). It is of Balinese culture is a delicate and tremulous thing-a result more of the com­ plex balancing of autonomous forces barely contained within restraining struc­ believed to have a spirit and personality of its own and is the recipient of tures than of any pervasive and unquestioning submission of sectarian interests kulkul ceremonial offerings. The is not only a signal, a convenient com­ to diffuse wholes. And of the autonomous forces that agitate Bali, none is more munication device, but also a powerful ritual symbol. To strike the dynamic than those summed up in the concept of the dadia; of the restraining kulkul is to mark collective obligation and signify community ritual structures, none more resilient than those summed up in the concept of banjar. states. If a death occurs during a village temple ceremony, for example, (Geertz and Geertz, 1975: 168.) the kulkul may not be struck and the deceased is regarded as 'only sleeping', so that the normal state of prohibition (sebe[) which would This opposition between values focused on settlement and citizenship otherwise fall on banjar members at the sounding of the kulkul does not and those based on genealogy and filiation is mediated by various struc­ extend beyond the immediate family. tural and symbolic arrangements. Customary restriction of jurisdiction and a hierarchy of precedence in which the needs of the hamlet (banjar) Cane outrank those of the descent group (dadia), and both outrank voluntary groups (seka), theoretically protect the integrity and determine the order Other important symbols of the solidarity and equality of members are of priority of local units where conflicts of interest between these differ­ the special offerings known as canang pengeraos and canang lekesan, or ently oriented seka might occur (C. Geertz, 1959: 1006). 'Taken together, 16 ADA T AND DINAS THE 'VILLAGE' IN BALI 17 within-group equality, cross-group segregation, and between-group of symbolic representations (kwangz) of all households in the desa among hierarchy prevent the baroque exuberance of Balinese social organ­ the burial items (pependeman) at the foundation and subsequent puri­ isation from drowning in its own complexity.' (Geertz and Geertz, ficatory renewals of the village temples. This establishes an identification 1975: 166.) between house temple (sanggah) and village origin temple (pura puseh) Because the demands of banjar membership may conflict with other and creates a common collective ancestry,16 the egalitarian implications loyalties, creating friction between or factionalism within these units, of which are evident in the resistance of certain title-groups to worship various compromises intervene between principle and practice. From in the village temples. place to place and over timedifferent ones among these planes of organ­ In so far as origin becomes the ground for claims to status and rank, ization may override, displace, or absorb the functions of others. however, the relationship between this and the seka principle becomes Powerful kin- or title-groups might come to dominate their hamlets or, an essentially opposed one: banjar as the Pande blacksmith groups often did, establish their own [I]t amounts to a struggle between the principle that the fundamental bond organizations around these ties. On the other hand, banjar may be struc­ among men is coresidence, sociality, and the principle that the fundamental tured to downplay the significance of kinship as Geertz and Geertz bond is sameness of naturalkind, genus. From theformer emerges the notion of (1975: 108) observed in Desa Pau where the four component banjar the desa adat ('custom village', to give a literalisticgloss for what is actually nei­ draw their membership from 'all over the village community, with care ther a village nor a body of custom but a metaphysical idea) as an expanse of tal,en that no two are absolutely adjacent neighbors and that no kinship sacred space within whose bounds the fates of all residents are supernaturally group is concentrated within one banjar'. intertwined. (A similarnotion-negara adat17-exists with respect to therealm of As noted above, banjar relations are regarded as kin-like (nyama ban­ the state.) From the latter emerges the notion that Balinese are divided into a jar/semeton banjar) 15 and in most of Bali where banjar organization is multiplicity of separate 'peoples' [wangsa] whose right arrangement in terms of Homo strong, these bonds are regarded as prior in certain contexts to ties of rank is crucial to the spiritual well-being of the world and everyone in it. hierarchicus and Homo aequalis are engaged in Bali in war without end. (Geertz relationship by marriage and descent. The precedence of banjar ties was and Geertz, 1975: 167.) explained as follows: Because of the fundamental egalitarianism of seka membership, 18 gentry The principle of neighbourhood is most important. Family is the second prin­ with power and wealth typically kept themselves apart from local institu­ ciple. Why are neighbours more important? In Bali we say they are nyama sane 19 paling kelih (family that are eldest/most responsible). If I have a sudden disaster, tions. Grader (n.d.: xxxiv, 4-5), commenting on the awig-awig of it won't be kin that will know first. The first to know will be my neighbour. If Desa Bebandem, notes: I'm suddenly sick, certainly I would call a neighbour first. Therefore he is like Triwangsa [upper 'castes'] who reside in the village do not belong to the krama theoldest brother-likekin. (GstKwanji, 1983.) desa.... [They] do not take part in the maturan (the presentation of offerings) Another saying makes the point: Pisagane sane maselat tembok, punika and the mabakti (worship) in the Pura Bale Agung. If they did this it would patut upamayang sekadi semeton sejati (The neighbour bordering your imply participationin the ancestor worship of the core villagersand other inhab­ itants who belong to the worship group of the Kahyangan Tiga which, in the wall should be regarded as true kin). In Dewa Dani's explanation, like eyes of fellow caste members and in the eyes of the general public, would mean that of Gusti Kwanji, 'near neighbours are more important than far kin' loss of caste. (See also Korn Coll. 162/574.) (DwDani, 1984). Another maxim, 'like salt', also evokes the sense of com­ mon substance and shared needs characterizing banjar relations ( Gst It is the demand for equal obligation in seka practice and the implication Kwanji, 1983). of equal status in the worship of a fused ancestry which leads gentry Many people with whom I raised the subject were quick to draw my groups to emphasize their extra-village ties and to refuse to worship in attention to the connection between the importance of the banjar and the Pura Puseh/Bale Agung or to seek to establish separate parts of the the significance of death ceremonies. On one occasion I was discussing temple for themselves. 20 service obligations with an artist while he was carving new doors for a In theory, there had been a segregated ordering of 'village' and 'state' temple shrine, his contribution to preparations for the major ceremonials (I use the latter term to refer to all supra-village power relations even then coming up. He commented that in Bali the orientation to the pub­ where they were in fact located, as was the court of Tarian, at the heart lic was still strong. 'In other places only the family has importance. In of the desa) in pre-colonial Bali. The transformations brought by colo­ Bali the banjar family is equally important. It isn't family, but it is banjar nial conquest, the revolution, and subsequent party politicization altered that take care of death rituals. Everyone has to die. How else could a the relations between these domains and reframed what had been for­ poor family carry out cremation?' (I Pasti, 1984.) merly construed as a largely complementary opposition between the The resolution of the apparent opposition between relations based on egalitarian and hierarchic relations upon which they were premised, into origin and on neighbourhood occurs at the ritual level with the inclusion an explicitly confrontational one. Accommodations had to be made in 18 ADA T AND DINAS THE 'VILLAGE' IN BALI 19 23 one direction or the other and could take one of a number of forms in the krama desa participate in the monthly meetings in the Great depending upon the balance of forces: levelling of status difference (the Council Temple (Bale Agung) and share the equal say and equal obliga­ absorption of gentry as ordinary banjar members observing identical tions implicit in full membership (tegakan) (Korn, 1924: 100 ff.). These labour and ritual obligations with others); formal restructuring so that restrictions on membership, and associated emphasis on seniority in status groups and banjar membership were made to coincide (the estab­ leadership, led Korn (1924: 242) to describe the 'old-style' desa as 'aris­ lishment of separate Banjar Satria, for example, or separate ritual sub­ tocratic republics', in contrast to the 'new-type' villages where the desa divisions, tempek or seka suka-duka, for handling ceremonies); or became a largely symbolic entity giving way to the 'really democratic' 24 concessions to status prerogatives (such as permitting the substitution of banJar which included all households in their membership. The latter, cash for labour or passive attendance at death ceremonies without 'new type' villages were characteristically found in the densely popu­ touching or carrying the body). In some communities, however, the lated, irrigated, lowland regions where the preponderant majority of significance of common labour, worship, and death duties turned these Balinese live. These Korn (1924: 59) termed 'apanage' territories where into explosive battle grounds in the war between homo hierarchicus and aristocratic power and Hindu-Javanese influence were thought to have homo aequalis. radically altered indigenous village structures. In fact such compromises merely extended accommodations which The Dutch were inclined to treat the 'new-type' villages as degraded had evolved in local communities long before, since the spheres of state forms of a once integral dorpsrepubliek. For example, De Haze Winkel­ and village were never as dichotomized as proverbial wisdom or man, controller of Badung, comments, 'A desa in South Bali is not a Orientalist scholarship would have it. At the same time, the oppositional unity, but an association of some banjars being more or less joined dimensions between their underlying principles were also more deeply together.' (Adatrechtbundels, 1918: xv, 2.) Grader believed that the ban­ realized in pre-colonial social structure and value than is often recog­ Jar, originally concerned with rituals directed towards the nether world, nized. The subject of conflict and accommodation between two became the instrument through which rulers of the principalities inter­ 21 significantly different conceptions of corporatism -based on corporate vened in village affairs (Grader, 1969: 168). The privileging of the egalitarian ( embodied in the seka and 'village') and corporate hierarchic 'authentic' village in the 'old-type' desa led to a general disinterest in (reflected in title/caste ideology and 'state') values-will be taken up at the banjar and/or a misconception of its role in the writings of many of length in later chapters. At this point, suffice it to say that significant these scholars. Liefrink's work on North Bali barely mentions banjar at ambiguities and powerful ambivalences underlie the conceptions of ori­ all, although there is considerable evidence of their importance in the 25 gin and social incorporation that give order and value to Balinese life. material he collected (Korn, 1924: 45). And despite the dozens of awig-awig banjar and voluminous notes on the subject in his collection, Korn himself devotes much less attention to this institution in his The Balinese 'Village': Old and New T ypes Adatrecht van Bali than one would expect (Grader, n.d.: xxxii, 2). While the pattern of decentred, pluralistic collectivism described by Consistent with the general overemphasis on the desa in Dutch scholar­ C. Geertz typifies the social organization of much of Bali, including the ship, what he did write, in Guermonprez's view (1991: 60), tended to villages in Gianyar and Badung regencies which receive most attention 'overestimate the political authority of the "old-Balinese" desa and to in this study, there are desa which more closely approximate the tightly underestimate in all cases the autonomy of the banjai. co-ordinate 'ideal' model. A review of the literature on what are gener­ C. Geertz has criticized the exaggerated emphasis in Dutch scholar­ ally regarded as two distinct types of village in Bali is important to our ship on the minority of communities of the 'old' type (1980: 4 7) and on understanding of the symbolic implications of the seka principle under­ the 'ur society concept' (1961: 500) running through this work. There is lying village organization of either type. an underlying diffusionist premise that these villages are archaic sur­ Dutch colonial scholars (Korn, 1924: 118 ff.; Goris, 1984 [1935]) vivals of original village republics whose mountain remoteness protected distinguished between what they described as old- and new-style villages their institutions from the thoroughgoing penetration of the Balinese 26 in Bali. The former, found typically in the remoter mountain areas, were kingdoms which occurred in the lowland areas. C. · Geertz objects regarded as natural communities, representative of the original indigen­ further to the opposition constructed between village republic and ous social structure and culture. Some of these villages retain substantial encroaching state in Dutch scholarship, the latter deeply Hinduized in agricultural lands tied to village services, a structure in which kinship cultural orientation, the former not. Neither village nor state in pre­ and seniority are important in determining access to village land and to colonial Bali could be understood without the other and focus on the related civic rights, and distinctcultural practices such as corpse disposal old-type dorpsrepubliek simply created a false opposition between the two 22 by burial or exposure rather than cremation. (C. Geertz, 1980: 45 ff.). In many of these villages the krama desa have a restricted membership Subsequent research has in turn reasserted some of the important of core villagers. Only those who take one of the fixed number of places contributions and conclusions of the Dutch school. Schaareman ADA T DINAS 20 AND THE 'VILLAGE' IN BALI 21 (1986a: 5) argues that there are far more villages possessing important The 'Village' as Banjar/Desa features of the old-type than the 'handful' C. Geertz suggests and that Desa adat are typically subdivided into several banjar in the densely they can in no way be considered 'marginal' to the interpretation of populated parts of southern Bali. Significantly, however, in a large contemporary Bali: 'I am convinced that most of the villages of the so­ number of communities, especially those found in the mountain areas, called "old Balinese" area really do possess a more traditional, indi­ banjar and desa adat represent two associations covering a single genous Balinese structure, particularly if one compares them with those bounded population.28 For Guermonprez (1991), this is critical evid­ from eastern Indonesian regions-but this does not at all mean that such ence that the relationship between the two could not have been founded "old Balinese" villages are inhabited by "Bali Aga".' Guermonprez con­ on the 'degenerative' displacement of the original 'old-type' desa struc­ curs on the significance of the old-type village structure for understand­ ture. Guermonprez treats the desa-banjar relation as a hierarchical struc­ ing Balinese society and culture more generally. Moreover, he suggests ture in Dumont's sense, the desa as symbolic and ritual totality that the legalist approach of the adat law school was important in laying encompassing the civic banjar. Within this relation the civic level (repre­ out the underlying conception of the desa as a totality, a perspective that sented in the seka banjar) is subordinate in value to the ritual one (repre­ was lost in the focus on competing political actors and groups in post­ sented in the encompassing desa) because of the primary significance war scholarship which adopted what he terms a 'utilitarian dynamic' placed on the principles of totality and of origin. His distinction, like that view (Guermonprez, 1991: 62). C. Geertz's village polity-constructed of Howe (1978), is strongly influenced by Dumont's work on hierarchy of separate institutions serving civil, economic, and religious functions in in India and undervalues in consequence the spiritual dimension of the the banjar, subak, and pemaksan respectively-does not in Guermon­ banjar institution and the very different sense in which the relation prez's view provide a more satisfactory representation of the 'elusive between desa whole and banjar part must be understood, one in which Balinese village' than did the dorpsrepubliek, and obscures the underlying conceptions of superiority and inferiority are inappropriate.29 It seems to cultural and structural continuity which can be found across the spec­ be more importantly conceived as a relation of identity and representa­ trum of Balinese community types. tion (the banjar is or acts for the desa in certain contexts) than one based It is questionable whether either old- or new-type village has sufficient on an encompassing hierarchy of value of a sacred-secular, superior­ empirical coherence to stand as more than an ideal-type model of local subordinate (inferior) sort. organization. In fact, the internal variations among old and new, moun­ Dutch scholarship also presented a dualistic view of the desa-banjar tain and lowland desa are greater and the distinctions between them less distinction, not along sacred-secular lines, but based on differing ori­ clear than any basis of classification implies. As Guermonprez entations of their spiritual concerns towards the upperworldly and (1991: 57) asserts, the fundamental conception of village territory as underworldly domains respectively. Grader's view is that the banjar was sacred space in which the land belongs ultimately to the gods who are primarily concerned with mutual assistance and protection from under­ ancestors and 'real social partners' is central to the meaning of desa in worldly forces, hence its social-religious importance in death cere­ Balinese cosmology, irrespective of structural variations. Whether the monies. '[T]he religious and ritual functions of the banjar are generally desa itself or the banjar in its name carries out purification (macaru) of chthonic in their origin. . . . In general it is possible to say that during the village territory and the worship of the deities of its temples, and purification festivals and during the death ritual the banjar comes to the whether by cremation or burial the spirits of the deceased are trans­ foreground; in many villages in the old Balinese areas the care of the formed into deified ancestors, the religio-social foundations of village life Pura Dalem and of the cemetery are specifically tasks of the banjar.' remain powerful underlying com:monalities of local organization across (Grader, n.d.: xxxiv, 6.) However, in some communities banjar have desa adat Bali. The ideal image of the as a corporate community sharing direct responsibility for desa temples rather than allocating this function collective descent from the original village founders who are worshipped to separate pemaksan associations (Korn, 1924: 45, 67).30 Balinese do as deified ancestors in the classic three village temples-the Kahyangan sometimes speak of a loose difference in the respective orientations of Tiga (Pura Puseh, Pura Dalem, and Pura Desa/Bale Agung) Temples of banjar desa sekala niskala 27 and toward (visible, concrete) and (invisible, Origin, Death, and Village or Great Council -may not, as C. Geertz abstract), and between the near and dangerous nether world and remote (1961) has argued, neatly fit actual village structure in most of Bali. But and anonymous upperworld. But it is important not to exaggerate this it remains a significant concept spoken to in symbol and ritual, and distinction either.31 Irrespective of whether the banjar is a civic and ritual reflected in the gestures and feelings, solidarities and conflicts of every­ subdivision of the desa adat, effectively forming a hamlet, or a second day life. corporate association of the same unit with different functions, the ban­ jar must be regarded as a practical executor and institutional expression of the desa adat itself. 32 22 ADAT AND DINAS THE 'VILLAGE' IN BALI 23 Guermonprez's contention, that a relation of structural totality exists from the provincial government. In some instances this de facto arrange­ in which the symbolic and spiritually oriented desa adat encompasses the ment has been maintained for decades. civic (but, it must be stressed, also spiritually oriented) banjar, has relev­ But even where banjar leadership is divided between two individuals ance across therange of structural types of Balinese villages. It is never­ (klian adat and klian dinas), as is more commonly the case in regions theless important to stress here that a tendency to symbolic and practical outside Gianyar, their activities are closely interdependent. In many devolution of the desa adat's authority does characterize desa that are spheres of village concern, it is simply not possible to divorce 'custom­ subdivided into many banjar. If for no other reason than size, banjar ( or ary' from 'civil' law. Both legal domains impinge heavily on marriage separate banjar and pemaksan where the latter organize village temple and inheritance, for example. At monthly banjar meetings customary affairs) for all intents and purposes act as and for the desa adat. In most and official items are jointly considered. As a result, the direct particip­ large villages krama des a rarely if ever meet. 33 Des a-wide adat issues and atory traditions of the krama influence banjar activity in the dinas sphere the organization of village ritual are handled by the adat head of the vil­ in a way that does not occur at desa level. Consequently, the adminis­ lage, the bendesa or klian desa, in consultation with klian banjar adat and trative desa is heavily dependent on component banjar to determine and klian pemaksan pura. carry out its policies. The continuity of the banjar dinas with its adat The banjar has to be understood as a manifestation of the desa adat, base is one of the sources of its practical effectiveness in contrast to the and is in common parlance often identified with it. 34 Ambiguity persists administrative desa. in everyday reference to desa and banjar adat as well as in the definition The relations between desa and banjar and between the customary of their legal and ritual province. 'The banjar and desa are one' ( Gst Kanti, and official (adat and dinas) units at both levels are conceptually and 1983), I was emphatically told, when trying to clarify which unit had the practically ambiguous, partly owing to the inclusiveness of part effective right to redistributeresidential land. With respect to Guermon­ and whole embodied in the notion of the corporate in seka organization, prez's interpretation, therefore,it is important not to treatthe 'hierarchy' and partly in consequence of the artificiality of separating functions that of idea value in the banjar-desa conceptual distinction as implying a ne­ could not actually be distinguished within the religio-civic framework of cessary subordination of banjar to desa in practice. As we shall see, ban­ local life.37 In line with the real ambiguities in Balinese usage (ambigu­ jar may more or less autonomously take on the interpretation and ities based on overlapping symbolic and practical associations), the term exercise of village adat in its most fundamentally significant aspects. 'village' is used here in a loose and sliding sense to refer to the combined banjar-desa totality.38 But it is only the banjar which can be understood as a 'community' in an effective social sense, at least in that part of Bali 39 Colonial Impact: Banjar and Desa Dinas to which this study refers. This is because size and scale make direct popular involvement at desa level (both adat and dinas) more difficult The Dutch reorganization of local government in the early part of the and because supra-village intervention has not to this point undermined twentieth century introduced a new organizational form, the perbekelan the fusion of social and religious concerns at banjar level which are or administrative desa, as the basic unit of colonial government. With embodied in adat and are the source of the banjar's extraordinary this the distinction between adat ( customary forms of social organization strength. In the village of Tarian where most of my research has been and regulation) and what is now called dinas ( official, bureaucratic conducted, from the pre-colonial period to the present, banjar have structures) was created. Both banjar and desa adat continued to exist as always held monthly meetings ( sangkepan) which the full krama banjar customary institutions and to function alongside their newly created are required to attend. No one recalls there ever having been meetings of administrative counterparts, banjar and desa dinas. The division between the krama desa.40 Because of the intensity of social interaction within the customary and administrativeinstitutions was most thoroughgoing at the banjar, the dense social and affective ties conventionally conveyed in the desa level, however, where administrative boundaries were rationalized concept of 'community' are restricted to this sphere. along demographic and territorial lines. Today, the boundaries of desa Except when there is reason to distinguish between adat and dinas adat rarely coincide with those of the administrative desa. functions, the term banjar will refer to the hamlet as both a customary Banjar, too many and too small to interest the new administrators, and official unit throughout. As I have pointed out, in all of the villages were less affected by colonial reorganization and at this level adat-dinas to which I will be referring, banjar adat and dinas either formally coin­ boundaries and functions remain more or less co-ordinate to the pres­ cide or are so identified in practice that it is impossible to make useful 35 36 ent. This is emphatically the case in the Gianyar region where a discriminations between them.41 At desa level this is rarely the case and I .single klian banjar typically carries out both customary and government­ will therefore normally distinguish between the desa adat and the admin­ administrative functions. The extent of the fusion of adat and dinas at istrative desa throughout. A brief description of the organizational struc­ banjar level is demonstrated by a number of cases in which, after inter­ ture of Desa Tarian will serve to illustrate the complex distinctions and nal fission, the klian of the new banjar adat operates also as klian dinas, historical connection between banjar and desa, adat and dinas units despite lack of official recognition of this role in the form of a salary there. 24 ADA T AND DINAS THE 'VILLAGE' IN BALI 25 Desa Tarian The administrative desa, or perbekelan, created by the Dutch, amal­ In pre-colonial times what is now the administrative village of Tarian gamated two desa adat, Tarian and Tegeh, which are subdivided into (see Map 2) was the seat of a prestigious and fairly powerful court allied eight contiguous banjar adat. Tegeh, according to oral and written tradi­ with that of Sukawati against the ruling house of Gianyar. The banjar tion, the original settlement in the area, is a single banjar/desa adat which included within its current administrative bounds were closely linked as alone supports its separate Kahyangan Tiga village temple complex. the core court 'city', or kuta, of theruling lord. In.consequence, this desa The more recently settled desa adat of Tarian, probably founded in the has a relativelyhigh proportionof triwangsa. Compared to theBali-wide late seventeenth or early eighteenth century with the establishment of a 42 figure of approximately 10 per cent, 19 per cent of the population of royal court in the area, incorporates the other seven banjar adat. Two Tarian are of title-groups claiming correspondence with the three Hindu of these-Banjar Madya and Banjar Lagas-are subdivided for dinas 'upper castes'. They are unevenly concentrated in the centre and north purposes, but share a single balai banjar, hold joint monthly meetings, of thevillage, constituting roughly one-third of the population in Banjar and continue to act as a unit for both adat and dinas purposes, although Pekandelan and Besaya, but are barely repr_esented in Banjar Tegeh, each subdivision has its own klian dinas who is also klian adat. The total Lagas, and Kalih in the south. number of officially recognized banjar dinas in the administrative desa is, therefore, ten. Most of the banjar of Tarian are more or less territorially MAP 2 defined, the sidepaths of the village forming the boundaries between Desa Tarian them, but this is not the case for Banjars Pande and Sangan. Their 43 N member households are interspersed among one another, the basis of banjar affiliation revolving predominantly around descent and title­ group identification. Banjar Pande mainly comprises members from the traditional blacksmith title-group and Banjar Sangan includes Brahmana, t Kahyangan Tiga r Pasek Gelgel, and other jaba ('outside', that is, non-triwangsa) groups...... Balebanjar The respective banjar dinas are identically composed. Bale tempek - The irregularity of Tarian's banjar today, closely paralleling relative □ Desa office '------' sizes in the 1917 census of corveeable households and the 1931 popu­ � ..Puri agung 200 metres lation census, is strong evidence that colonial village reorganization did ===::- Road not alter the banjar in the way that it did the desa adat (Table 1.1). The = Path division of the very large banjar of Lagas and Madya into two dinas units --- River is nominal and appears to have conformed to pre-existing adat sub­ A Bridge divisions for organizational purposes. The 1917 census predates village ____ Banjar boundary reorganization by colonial authorities in the Gianyar area below district level and as far as I have been able to determine from oral accounts rep­ resents the banjar divisions as they existed before Dutch penetration. Interestingly, Besaya, which was larger than Lagas in 1917, was not sub­ divided. Pande and Sangan, both small and geographically interspersed, should have been logical candidates for official rationalization. If attempts were ever made to amalgamate them into one banjar dinas unit of government, they were obviously unsuccessful.44 The integrity Qf the banjar adat from pre-colonial times and the spliced-on character of its dinas counterpart is a matter of great importance for understanding the centrality of the banjar in local affairs and in the implementation of national development policies in the present. Despite the disaggregated 'new-type' village character of Desa Adat Tarian (Desa Adat Tegeh could not be so classified), it retains many features analogous to those which supposedly distinguish the 'old-type' in the practices of banjar and pemaksan. Residential land (karang aya­ han) is village land (druwe desa), redistributed by banjar when it becomes vacant (putung). Here the principles that apply as well to vil­ lage agricultural land (tanah ayahan) in those desa which hold it operate 26 ADA T AND DINAS THE 'VILLAGE' IN BALI 27 TABLE 1.1 compromise positions were commonly concluded in advance and dis­ Desa Tarian: Household/Population Census by Banjar, cussion of most issues at sangkepan was not usually extended. Even so, 1917, 1931, and 1988 on one occasion when I did attempt to keep count of contributions to an animated discussion in Banjar Lagas, more than twenty members had 1917 1931 1988 some input during the half-hour exchange. Banjar Households Population Households Population Meetings in Pekandelan and Besaya were attended by under half their membership on the occasions when I was present. This compared with Sangan 12 208 73 403 over 90 per cent attendance in Sangan, Pande, Tegeh, and over 75 per Pantle 24 260 87 416 cent in Kalih, Lagas, and Madya. Pekandelan was the one banjar where Kalih 25 317 100 559 factional divisions had crystallized and overtly influenced local politics. Tegeh 35 266 82 531 It is also the site of the traditional ruling house and status distinctions Pekandelan 38 508 128 680 impinge on local practice to a greater extent than in other banjar. In the Lagas Kawan 15 170 46 291 } 48 } 443 } 150 } 949 case of Banjar Besaya low public involvement was undoubtedly related Lagas Kangin 33 273 104 658 to its non-compact geography and the fact that the banjar had become Besaya 56 625 184 1,081 so large that its adat functions had already devolved to tempek subdivi­ Madya Dauhan 32 401 123 732 } 61 } 770 } 264 } 1,490 sions where monthly meetings were also held. Proposals for formal Madya Danginan 29 369 141 758 fission into three banjar adat/dinas conforming to the current tempek had Sources and Notes: Algemeen Rijksarchief, Ministerie van Kolonien, 4 (September 1917), been under discussion in the banjar for some time. Relatively passive 32. (Thisdocument is a census of corveeable (dienstplichten) men and thosegranted dis­ leadership styles by the long-serving klian of both banjar may also have pensationor lightservice obligations because of theirstatus (pamidjian). This combined accounted for poor participation. figure may underrepresent the total number of households in each banjar in 1917. Under ordinary circumstances items concerning adat affairs provoke According to descendants of klian banjar at thattime, there was underreporting of the much more animated discussion than do those relating to official matters full number of men customarily obligated to village service for dinas (dienst) purposes (Gst Kanti, 1987; I Suta, 1987). I amgrateful to HenkSchulte Nordholtwho provided this which tend to take the form of pronouncements rather than issues for document.) See also Onderafdeling Gianjar, 1931, Korn Coll. 157/515 and Monografi debate. For example, the agenda for Banjar Pande in April 1982 in­ Desa [Tarian], 1988. cluded the upcoming national elections, plans for renovation of the bale banjar, and the revision of banjar regulations concerning the right of non-resident members to pay a levy (naub) in lieu of labour services to on a more restricted basis, but the concept of land tied to village service the banjar. While only three members commented on the announcement and citizenship is essentially the same. Purportedly in the new-type vil­ of campaign and election procedures and the klian's advice to vote lages religious authority became concentrated in the hands of one peson Golkar, heated discussion was provoked by the question of permitting rather than a council of elders (see Goris, 1984 [1935]: 93). The bendesa, non-resident members to pay an annual fee of Rp 5,000 instead of pro­ who in recent history in Tarian has had close ties to the court, always viding labour to the banjar.46 Although internal banjar affairs, especially worked with a council composed of klian banjar adat and klian pemaksan those concerning the use of banjar funds and labour or changes in awig­ 45 pura. Banjar assemblies (sangkepan) held every Wraspati Umanis in awig, normally induced the most active response from the krama, there the 35-day Balinese month retain a religio-symbolic character. were occasions where dinas-related issues generated heated discussion. To gain some impression of differences in atmosphere and practice, I Over the years of my research, several instances relating to the allocation rotated attendance at monthly assemblies among the banjar in Tarian. of government development projects and the limits of the klian's author­ Considerable variations in the formality of the meetings, leadership ity as a dinas official were subjects of intense debate-on one occasion, 47 styles, levels of attendance and participation were evident in this one lasting five hours. administrative desa. The smaller banjar of Sangan, Pande, Kalih, and Despite the formalities of dress (sarong, and in the old days, sash Tegeh had the highest levels of involvement in assembly deliberations. and kris), language (high Balinese when addressing the krama as a Attendance was also high in the very large banjar of Madya and Lagas, whole), ritual offerings, and pre-set agenda, I was impressed by the but discussions were more formally organized and there were fewer atmosphere of informal collegiality at banjar meetings. Members sat on interjections and inevitably a smaller proportion of the membership had the floor close together, sometimes leaning on one another, joking and the opportunity to speak. Both banjar frequently referred matters to gossiping before the meeting started, and grumbling assent or dissent committees which met in advance and canvassed public opinion inform­ throughout the proceedings. Old mixed with young, and in all but ally when contentious issues had to be thrashed out. Consequently, Banjar Pekandelan status-groups were not prominently distinguishable 28 ADA T AND DINAS THE 'VILLAGE' IN BALI 29 48 from one another. K.lian sat on the floor at the centre of thegathering strength from direct involvement in agricultural production. The with a small low table in front of them, in some banjar flanked by heads foundations of the corporate authority of the Balinese village (desal of tempek (petajuh) or the secretary and treasurer; in others these were banjar) are fundamentally religious and social. In this respect, those con­ dispersed among the membership at large. strUctions and deconstructions of the village republic image which premise community formations and local solidarities on a narrowly con­ The Village Republic Reconsidered ceived productionism share a common misapprehension. Several aspects of the patterns of pluralism characterizing local social organization in Bali diverge from conventional images of the village and are important to understanding the relationship of Balinese communities to the Indonesian state in the present. Closer analyses of the complexity 1. While descent, inheritance, and residence are theoretically patrilineal and patrilocal, of local social organization in Bali require revision of the stereotyped Geertz and Geertz (1975) and Hobart (1979) demonstrate that bilateral tendencies are reflected, especially among commoners, in the preferential endogamy and the substitute village-republic myth, challenging at the same time, however, its heir practice (sentana), when in theabsence of a son, a daughter may become the juridical counter-myth. 'male' heir. The first point to be made concerns the greater practical importance 2. The Kamus Bali-Indonesia (1978) lists two words of different pronunciation-seka of the banjar as opposed to the desa in the decentred village structure (sometimes written sekaa or sekehe) for group or society and seka meaning alternatively that characterizes the densely populated lowland areas of Bali. 'involuntary' or 'to be one'. Although Hooykaas is reported by Hobart (1979: 306) to believe that the words are unrelated, Balinese themselves define seka as 'to be one' (seka) Throughout most of Bali the desa adat is the formal repository and and the notions of unity and varying degrees of obligation are implicit in its fullest sense of guardian of ancestral customary practice (dresta), while it is banjar corporate association. See Hobart (1979: 259-308) for a thorough discussion of the which effectively implement local adat in the name of the desa and meanings associated with the seka concept, including its strongly egalitarian emphasis and which organize communitylife. The significance of the banjar as a social the varying senses of obligation and choice involved in voluntary seka membership. unit was not fully recognized by Dutch colonial authorities; nor is its 3. Sangkep comes from se-angkep meaning to group together as one (Yamapurwa Tatwa, §7a), or to speak as with one utterance (Cok Anom, 1989). role understood by the Indonesian government which continues to pre­ 4. Brown (1974: 32 ff.) defines fully corporate groups as those which have a defined dicate much of its rural development policy on notions of the desa and identity and membership, rules of closure, and presumptive perpetuity, as do all prescript­ of adat arising from colonial scholarship.49 ive seka-banjar, subak, pemaksan; voluntary seka lack presumptive perpetuity. Secondly, the already bewildering complexity which characterized 5. On several occasions when agents attempted to put together composite performing seka indigenous social structure in Bali was compounded during the colonial troupes foroverseas exhibitions, they were resisted by local on grounds that excluding part of the group violated the principle of seka unity. For this reason, and because of the period with the imposition of 'administrative' (dinas) units of local gov­ rivalry that often exists between seka, the Tarian seka gong refused to permit five of its ernment, distinct from the 'customary' (adat) sphere. Both colonial and members, personally selected by theMinister of Education and Culture, to join the troupe post-colonial governments have operated on the premise that the cus­ being sent to the 1964-5 New York World's Fair (Orenstein, 1971: 48). With the expan­ tomary basis of local organization could be conveniently segregated sion of the economy increasingly taking place outside of seka institutions and the involve­ from the official administrative one without fundamentally altering its ment of numerous performing groups over the last half century in a different aesthetic 50 tradition, there is now a much greater degree pf individualism in the arts as in other 'essence', an assumption that much of the data presented in this study spheres of Balinese life. Although the principle of absolute seka unity is not always upheld, disputes. the extent of resistance to internal differentiation is still considerable. When an agent tried Finally, it must be emphasized that the organization of agriculture is to secure the consent of two Tarian performing seka to send a composite troupe composed formally segregated from other public spheres in Bali. 51 The interesting of the dancers from one and the orchestra from the other to perform in Japan m 1985, feature of this separation is that local solidaritiesin the banjar are based both flatly refused. 6. The matter of equivalence arises frequently within subak over the distribution of much less directly upon the organization of productive resources and irrigation water. Sutawan et al. (1984: 112-16) provide a good example of the intricate much more explicitly upon cultural and social concerns, which are none ongoing processes of negotiation, adjustment, and renegotiation which are involved in the less closely related to Balinese conceptions of material well-being. accommodating conflicting interests. Seka principles are always constrained by real differ­ The fusion of customary religious and practical community matters at ences in power and strategic advantage among members as well as by the sheer practical banjar level, thecoincidence of the banjar dinas with its adat counterpart, difficulties of achieving precise equivalence. In the case they describe, the free-flow system previously in operation in one subak was felt to disadvantage downstream members. Over and the krama banjais direct exercise of decision-making functions three consecutive monthly meetings, complaints were made and alternatives proposed explain the extraordinary social and cultural significance it has in until a measured system of distribution was introduced (nguu). After several seasons under Balinese life. this system, upstream members began to register complaints that in the rainy seasons they In summary, the desa and banjar in Bali only loosely approximate were receiving comparatively less water than those downstream and wanted to shift to a Western notions of village and community. In contrast with the arche­ third distribution system. Downstream members resisted on the grounds that in rainy sea­ son the extra water they obtained was not at the expense of those at the higher end of the typal Asian 'village republic', they do not derive their institutional watercourse. On this occasion debate proceeded over five monthly meetings without 30 ADA T AND DINAS THE 'VILLAGE' IN BALI 31 resolution until the upstream group threatened not to pay their fines and levies, which 18. Village egalitarianism is stressed in the ideology and ongm accounts of Pujung brought the matter to crisis point. The subak head resigned and was replaced by a new described by Howe. All variants of the accounts he collected were agreed that 'notwith­ one, elected as usual by acclamation. Another three meetings ensued before a modified standing the fact that the original families were probably of different status, when they version of the original free-flow system was introducedin which thesawah furthest down­ arrived in Telepud, it was decided that these distinctions had to be suppressed .... They stream receive additional water. In operation for six years at the time of the study, there also agree that it is this equality and unity which is the most important element of the were renewed signs of discontent from downstream members who wished to reintroduce story.' (Howe, 1980: 16.) the nguu system. 19. In Tarian and many other villages, members of the ruling Puri only joined banjar 7. The Kersten dictionary of colloquial Balinese (1984) illustrates usage of one form of after the revolution. Several lesser gentry houses had done so during the colonial period the root word seka in a revealing sample sentence: ]pun tan naenin masuka-duka ring ban­ when they could no longer rely on clientage arrangements to provide the large-scale labour jar: mangkin sekaanga sareng sami; tan wenten madelokan (He didn't ever share the mutual needed for ritual purposes (A A Sepi, 1984; Dw Dani, 1984). These changes necessarily obligations (suka-duka) of banjar membership; now he is shunned (sekaanga) by everyone; involved considerable compromise in either or both of the competing principles of seka thereisn't anyone who will visit his household at death). equality and status hierarchy. 8. The term banjar is also commonly applied to loose neighbourhood clusters within 20. Noble families from Tarian maintained their own graveyard and temple, the Pura the hamlet: 'So and so lives in Banjar Apit Pangkung', a comer of Banjar Tegeh, or 'in Dalem Puri, on the outskirts of the village, to which related title-groups from neighbouring Banjar Serongga', a lane off the main road within Banjar Madya. It is sometimes used villages also belonged. After the revolution it was absorbed by the desa adat of Tarian to interchangeably with the larger desa unit as well. See below for a detailed discussion of the become one of the village temples, retaining its original membership as pemaksan. problematic distinction between banjar and desa. Spiertz (1989) notes a similarly sliding Tensions persisted over resistance by some triwangsa families to worshipping in the Pura application of the term subak. These metonymic extensions of concepts reflect an import­ Puseh/Desa. For some this was resolved when kwangi, symbolic representations of the ant aspect of the 'Chinese box pattern' (Geertz and Geertz, 1975: 166) of Balinese cor­ household, were included among the items buried under the restored temple shrines at the poratism which implies an identity of part and whole. major purification ceremony conducted in 1984. A few families of royal or priestly 9. Tarian's written awig-awig desa was put together in 1980 entirely fromoral sources descent, however, still refuse to worship there. since no written text could be found.There were fragments of banjar regulations (for an 21. It is important to recognize that both village and state represent non-individualist example, see Appendix 2), some in the traditional form of palm leaf (lontar) manuscripts, conceptions of the corporate whole. But implicit oppositions arise from the horizontal others in exercise books, but none that were comprehensive. premises of equivalence which underlie the seka type of corporatism, expressed with 10. See the Awig-awig Desa Basangalas and Awig-awig Desa Tihingtali (Korn Coll. modifications in village institutions, and the vertically structured totality predicated on 160/548), Awig-awig Desa Ababi (Korn Coll. 160/550), and Awig-awig Banjar Kanginan ritually and politically legitimated inequality, reflected-againwith appropriate concessions (Korn Coll. 160/556). Citations to the Korn Collection throughout the study refer to the to the counter-principle-in state institutions. microfiche version. The first number indicates the file number of the relevant section in 22. The pre-Indic practice of exposure or burial rather than cremation is considered a the Collection; the second is thefiche cardnumber. distinguishing feature of some of the so-called 'Bali Aga' (Aboriginal Balinese) commun­ 11. See Vickers (1990) on these commemorative attachments and the importance of ities.The ritual differences, however, should not be exaggerated. Where cremation is cus­ juxtaposition of traditional texts to our understanding of textual intent and Balinese per­ tomary in the new-type village, burial nevertheless customarily precedes cremation. In ception of event. His argument that important historical conjunctures and extraordinary both types of village secondary ritual treatment of the remains is prevalent, and ngaben is events were often marked by the writing or copying and collation of related texts under­ the term usedfor the crucial stage at which the soul of the deceased is released whether by scores the point made here regarding circumstances under which village codes would have cremation or not. been inscribed. 23. Desa Kubutambahan, for example, had a fixed membership of core villagers of 38, 12. In older awig-awig, fines were calculated in Chinese coins called kepeng. and Desa Blaju of 16 (Korn,1924: 242). These fixed places are in some villages said to be 13. The kulkul seems also to have signified autonomy. H. Schulte Nordholt (pers. com., based on the number of original founding families. Howe (1980: 143) reports a different 1989) has accounts from pre-colonial Mengwi where lords surrendered by giving their principle operating in Pujung, where the krama desa only became closed to additional kulkul to theking. members when the land set aside for living space (karang desa) was used up. 14. Sirih is incorporated in many Balinese ceremonies, including the marriage ritual 24. Actually, desa of the 'new type' still distinguish between full members (pengarep) where it represents the coming together of a couple in 'body and soul, breath and feeling'. who hold primary inheritance rights and responsibilities for the house yard, family temple, More generally, sirih symbolizes unity of feeling in the ancestral tradition (Bali Post, and cremation of the deceased, and secondary heirs (pengele, pengempian) who hold occu­ 13 August 1984; CokAnom, 1984). pation and use-rights but commonly have more limited rights and responsibilities within 15. Banjar neighbours may in fact be kin as well because of the preferential local the desa than do pengarep. Sometimeselection to banjar-desa officeis restrictedto pengarep, endogamy which operates among commoner groups (see Geertz and Geertz, 1975: 164). as stated in the Sima IZrama Banjar Belong Gede (1967: §9). However, pengempian in 16. The introductionto theSima Krama Banjar Belong Gede (1967: 6) says of thedesa some villages could become pengarep by walling up a section of the compound, building a thatit is a 'social group based on common worship, common work; that is having a com­ separate household shrine (sanggah) and a separate entryway (angku[), but assuming as mon ancestor shrine (ketunggalan sanggah)'. As noted above, Ratu Gede Puseh, a title of well the heavier labour obligations and levies this entails. the divinity of the Origin Temple, is one of the names for the personified communal 25. Korn (1924: 35) comments that concerning desa 'we have quite a bit of informa­ ancestors (Grader, n.d.: 4-5). The conception of common ancestry identified with the tion, while about the banjar, the literature is scarce and full of misunderstandings'. I should community as a whole also has parallels in other parts of Indonesia Q"ay, 1969: 307; note here that because the 1924 edition of Korn's classic study, Het Adatrecht van Bali, A. Dewey, pers. com., 1987). On the Ngaju Dayak, Scharer (1963: 157) says, the sangiang was accessible, I have used it throughout rather than the more commonly cited 1932 edi­ (the same term for ancestral deities as in Balinese) are regarded as 'the community elev­ tion.In the view of H. Schulte Nordholt (pers. com., 1989) it is less strongly influenced by ated to the eternaland the divine'. preconceptions of the evolution of Balinese village structures held by the Dutch scholarly 17. Although the term adat is sometimes also applied to customs associated with the establishment than the later edition of this work. The latter, however, is expanded and vertically structuredrelations of the Negara, as in this quote, I reserve its use for local cus­ makes use of a great deal more of the material contained in the Korn Collection. tomary practicesand institutionsto which its Balinese referents-dresta, sima, tata krama­ 26. See also Boon (1977: 54-5) who specifically criticizes Kora's classification into old­ are almost exclusively confined. type republic and new-type apanage villages based on differential penetration of royal 32 ADA T AND DINAS THE 'VILLAGE' IN BALI 33

authority and Hinduism as an overly dichotomized and one-directional interpretation of banjar, dadia, and tempek in Besakih, their organizational structure still presents one vari­ processes of change in pre-colonial Bali. Korn is in fact much more cautious on this ation on what is fundamentally the same organizational theme. matter. He considered it important to maintain the distinction between types, 'without, 31. For example, Dewa Dani commented that awig-awig banjar were concerned with however, wanting to say with Liefrinck that the "new-style" villages evolved from the the domain of the tangible, sekala, and awig-awig desa with that of niskala, but also said "old" and were founded at a later date. It would be quite possible to imagine that the so­ 'the banjar is the desa, which is why we don't have a separate kulkul for the desa' (Dw Dani, called younger villages have always been different from the so-called older villages, though 1984). they may be equally old, and that they were always constituted in the way they now exist 32. The relationship between the desa and banjar associations in Desa Gwang (i.e. side-by-side).' (Korn, 1924: 118.) He noted too the inconsistency in using geograph­ (Gianyar) appears to be one of mutual representation. 'In Desa Gwang according to the ical criteria to locate them since the two types of village could be found adjacent to one awig-awig that exists now, it is customary that someone who has been banished from the another and scattered throughout Bali. desa can request forgiveness of the desa through his banjar and in the case of banishment 27. Many communities have either more or fewer than the classic three which are re­ from a banjar can ask forgiveness of the banjar through the desa. The fine which he for­ cognized as village public temples. See Stuart-Fox (1987: 31-2) for a discussion of what feits is then divided between the banjar and desa according to a fixed formula.' (Korn, he considers the more fundamental binary sanctuary model comprising Pura Puseh and 1924: 35.) Pura Dalem, typical of the West Karangasem region. There the Bale Agung is usually 33. This is not a recent phenomenon. The respondent to Korn's questionnaire on ban­ located within the Pura Puseh so thatthe 'three sanctuary' concept of the Kahyangan Tiga jar and desa adat organization for Desa Tangkup stated that the functions of the krama is also encompassed in this model. But as Stuart-Fox points out, the two-temple concep­ desa there were exercised by the krama banjar and pemaksan. He said a seka desa did not tualization is a logical corollary of the dual classification system central to Eastern exist in Desa Tangkup and that sangkepan only took place in the respective banjar, subak, Indonesian religious systems and can be reasonably argued the older model. The and pemaksan to which desa members belonged (Korn Coll. 161/559). Kahyangan Tiga of Desa Adat Tarian, though a 'new-style' village, has an interesting his­ 34. Korn refers to an edict from Jembrana where the words banjar and desa are used tory to the designation of its temples. What is today called the Pura Puseh was originally a interchangeably (1924: 46) and also to Schwartz's comment that klian desa were usually single Pura Desa/Puseh containing the Bale Agung. With the forcible replacement of the called klian banjar (1924: 121). In parts of Bangli, the custom village, called desa adat else­ earlier ruling Gusti family in the eighteenth century by a branch of the Sul,awati dynasty, a where, is referred to as the banjar adat and tempek perform the role that banjar do in other new Pura was built adjacent to it on the north side. The latter is now called the Pura Desa regions (feroMangku Gede [Desa Songan], 1984; Perda 6/1986, §3). and contains the Bale Agung, with the original Pura Desa/Puseh now referred to as Pura 35. Korn (1924: 43, 230-1), however, states that 'amalgamation of banjar also Puseh. occurred with the same negative consequences [as desa]' and questions the Resident's 28. The interspersal of the two types is nevertheless quite common in South Bali. report that banjar organization has 'remained pure and untouched.... In an example from Nearly half the desa adat in the surveys so far available from the Law Faculty at Udayana Klungkung in the same Adatrechtsbundels (1924: XXIII), the old banjar chief of Sala University for Badung, Klungkung, and Karangasem regions were composed of single informs us that under a government rule his banjar was amalgamated with Peken and banjar. This is important to interpreting the relationship between desa adat and banjar as Pempatan into one Banjar Peken under a klian pangliman while he himself received the Guermonprez (1991) argues. Comparative studies of the oral histories and written texts titleof klian juru arah from Tempek Banjar Sala. In other words the chief was demoted to from these villages would provide insights into the various patterns of village organization messenger of corveeable people from banjar to ward.' It may well be that administrative throughout the island and the historical relationship between them. The administrative restructuring at this level had some impact where banjar organization was weak or non­ desa of Tarian contains the single Banjar/Desa Adat of Tegeh and the large Desa Adat existent; but in thosevillages where I have worked banjar dinas units conform closely to the Tarian comprising seven banjar. Interestingly, oral tradition and written chronicles indicate pre-existing adat arrangements. The census figures for 1917, 1931, and 1988 (see that Tegeh is the much older of the two (I Sudra 1986). Table 1.1) show that Tarian banjar retained their highly irregular size and composition 29. Howe (1980: 151-6, 167, 222, 290) develops an elaborate series of associations of throughout the century and indicate that no effort to rationalize the size or boundaries of binary value in which egoism, coarse behaviour, worldly-material interests, sexual activity, thesebanjar had significant effect. middle life, horizontal bonds, and banjar membership are associated, and opposed to 36. The Dutch seem to have tampered less with local structures in this principality refinement, impersonality, spiritual interest, seniority, and vertical-hierarchic relations which had allied itself with the new colonizers from the late nineteenth century at the associated with the desa. Although such oppositions are unquestionably significant in the expense of the other Balinese kingdoms. Balinese world view and may inflect certain banjar-desa orientations, I believe his applica­ 37. Korn understood this in a way that official policy and rhetoric has ignored from his tion of a dichotomous sacred-secular opposition and particularly the extension of time to the present. See his criti.;:al remarks (Korn, 1924: 230). Dumont's notions of hierarchy to the desa-banjar distinction tends to distort the relation 38. C. Geertz settles on a similarly loose usage of the term 'village'. For the Balinese it between them. is among other things a 'vaguely demarcated region in which the planes of organization 30. In the villages around Besak:ih, West Karangasem, studied by Stuart-Fox, banjar are intersect in such a way that the people living within the region have rather more ties with non-territorial and in function appear to be closer to what are termed pemaksan elsewhere, one another than they do with people in adjacent regions .... A village is ... a concrete as their major responsibility is temple support. Mortuary ritual responsibilities which are a example of the intersection of the various planes of social organization in a given, only primary obligation of banjar in other areas belong to kin-groups here, although dadia broadly delimited locality.' (C. Geertz, 1959: 1001.) membership also closely conforms to banjar membership. Tempek in Besakih are territorial 39. In some of the 'old-type' villages, banjar did not exist or did not have the same subdivisions of thedesa adat, as banjar generally are in other parts of South Bali, and there importance they do in most low-land settlements, probably because of the centrality of is a tendency for members of a banjar to be concentrated in neighbouring tempek. BesalJava has been made by Breman (1982) on the basis of historical sources, and by Indonesian EARTH, DEATH, AND CITIZENSHIP 37 (1980: 176) discusses the complex metaphysical connections between earth and the cycle of death and rebirth in Balinese culture, linking them to pan-Indonesian dualistic constructs in which birth and death are con­ ceptually parallel and the earth is considered as the primary source of life. He connects the negative side of the ambivalence which regards 2 earth as 'polluting', to valuations introduced with social hierarchy which dictate 'that whatever is below is inferior to what is above' (Howe, Earth, Death, and Citizenship: 1980: 188). Howe speculates that a partial transformation of pre-Indic Cultural Value and Collective complementary oppositions occurred with the grafting of hierarchic Hindu models on to indigenous ancestral and animistic conceptual Social Control schemes. The consequent ambivalence in Balinese metaphysics between equivalent and asymmetric valuations is part of a body of implicitly counterposed value schemes which are a matter of great importance to understanding local organization and interpreting relations between vil­ lage and state. WITHIN the strictly demarcated spheres established by adat, the power Even the nether-worldly chthonic spirits associated with the material of local institutions in Bali is remarkable. C. Geertz (1983: 177) com­ world, the buta-kala, although conceived in complementary opposition ments upon the exceptional degree to which Balinese obey their rules. to their upperworldly uranic counterparts, and potentially dangerous, Referring to the banjar in particular, he says that where it has jurisdic­ cannot properly be regarded as intrinsically evil or negative forces. They tion, its authority is 'supreme to the point of absolutism' (1980: 48). are, as a household member insisted while making the daily round of The basis of the authority the krama is able to exert as a collectivity over offerings to these spirits, 'a help to us if we treat them properly' (Ni Sari, individual members-making community life not only participatory, but 1984). Lovric (1987: 139) cites a traditional medical text to the same compulsorily so-ultimatelyhas to do withits rights over residential land effect: 'If caru [offerings] are made, all bhuta-kala extend their favours.' and its role in the disposition of the dead. The sources of these rights She points to the misleading application of dichotomous distinctions and responsibilities are deeply rooted in Balinese ancestral religion. between good and evil, positive and negative, derived from Western Goris (1984 [1935]: 81) points to two fundamental and closely con­ modes of thinking and argues for greater attentionto the ambivalent and 1 nected beliefs around which village ritual and social organization ambiguous in Balinese conceptualization (Lovric, 1987: 42-66) . This revolve: that the village territory belongs to the deities and that the living is certainly thecase with respect to the sea and the earth, which are both members of the desa must maintain contact with their ancestors to places of magical danger and at the same time sources of life and regen­ assure their livelihood and well-being. In this respect the foundations of eration (amerta). The panca maha buta-the five great elements of earth, local solidarity are essentially social and cultural rather than narrowly water, fire, wind, and atmosphere-constitute the natural universe and economic. Agriculture, which we might otherwise expect to be the represent the essence of material life itself. They are more properly basis of interdependence among villagers, is part of a relatively auto­ regarded as wild and intemperate when their self-gratifying impulses are nomous system in much of Bali. With the important exception of the not attended by ritual practice than as evil in nature or intent. banjar's right to harvest the fields of its members when it requires funds, It is in the positive, mediating sense that the earth, referred to as Ibu the organization of agriculture lies within the jurisdiction of separate ir­ or Dewi Pertiwi (Mother or Goddess Earth), finds significance in rigation societies and work-groups, the subak and seka. Nevertheless, vil­ customary constructions of the des a ( see Wiweka, 1971: 24). Village lage lands and the metaphysical significance attached to them are space and the earth itself link the living community with the ancestral intimately related to the power of customary law. To understand local deities. Earth is the focus of the agricultural cycle and of .the cyclical organization in Bali, we must trace the meaningful connections between transmogrify of the spirit essence (atma) from human to divine ancestral earth, death, ancestral bonds, and ritual-civic association. form. The 'touching the ground ceremony', napak pratiwi, which occurs three months after birth, signifies the initiation of a child as a human being in its return passage from deific to human social status. Pertiwi, as one of the panca maha buta, mediates between the creative and sustain­ Earth: Religious Conceptions 2 ing force of the supernatural and the material needs of humans. She There is an apparent ambivalence in conceptions of the earth as impure facilitates birth and is the resting place at death. In Balinese religion, as and polluting on the one hand and as a sacred object of worship, in the belief systems of many other Indonesian cultures (cf. Scharer, the mediator of agricultural and human life cycles on the other. Howe 1963: 22; Koentjaraningrat, 1967: 253; Jensen, 1974: 106-9; Forman ADA T DINAS 38 AND EARTH, DEATH, AND CITIZENSHIP 39 and Traube in Fox, 1980: 160-9, 299-311; Hicks, 1984: 2-3; violate the customary law of the village (tata krama desa) or ruin the reli­ Volkman, 1985: 49-50), the earth is both grave and womb, where gious harmony respectful of the ancestral deities (Hyang) of Pura planting and burial have parallel significance (Howe, 1980: 176, 262). saniiadji ... is forbidden. If a person dares to violate this prohibition ... The placenta, with its magically protective powers, is buried in the l certainly be the cause of sickness and conflict.' (Korn Coll. 3 it wil house yard at birth, as the body is buried in the graveyard at death. 150/505.)6 It is this connection between cosmic and social order that is The deities of death and fertility, Durga and Pertiwi, aspects of a single important to understanding why Balinese 'obey their own rules to a 4 female principle, control the exit and entry points to material existence. degree' C. Geertz (1983: 177) met with such 'astonishment and profes­ The centrally significant macaru rites are normally described as rituals sional delight'. The term tata krama conflates the corporate banjar/desa of purification or cleansing, but thesesacrificial offerings to the buta kala membership and the 'order', 'propriety', 'law', 'customary practice', or which form a part of all ritual are regarded by Balinese in a rather more 'way' of adat. This is implicitly the 'way' handed down by the ancestors propitiatory than exo:tcistic sense. The first macaru offering at a new set­ in the past ( manut dresta kuna) and overseen by them in the present as tlement 'immediately establishes a relationship between people and the deified village protectors. earth of that place' (Wiweka, 1971: 8). All ceremonies for thededication The connection between membership in the krama desa/banjar and of new buildings (melaspas) and for the periodic reconsecration and the rights and responsibilities associated with village land, death ritual, renewal of village temples (ngusaba desa, ngenteg linggih, etc.) involve the and ancestral obligation is fundamental across the spectrum of structural burial of valuables (pependem) in the earth. These ceremonies simultan­ forms found in Balinese villages and obviates any radical distinction in eously appease and transform the buta kala. They establish connections cultural orientation between old- and new-type villages. Use-rights to between residents and village soil and in turn the conditions for future village agricultural lands ( tanah ayahan desa) are attached to village prosperity through an ongoing reciprocal relationship with the super­ membership in a small number of the integrally corporate ('old-type') natural realm. According to the epic manuscript, Markandya Purana, desa; among the majority whose structure is disaggregated ('new-type' the initial effort to settle Bali by the legendary Markandya resulted in the villages), membership tends only to be associated with access to village illness and death of his followers. The second attempt succeeded after residential lands (karang ayahan desa). But in villages of either type, the conduct of a macaru sacrifice to the buta and burial of the five metals membership in the krama desa is tied to communal rights in the (panca datu) at the foot of Gunung Agung (Surpha, 1986: 9-11). At the cemetery and the desa temples. The primary obligation attached to these major temple ceremony in Desa Tarian in 1984, following a fire which rights is in all cases labour service (ngayah) to the banjarldesa. By exten­ ravaged the Pura Desa, symbolic palm leaf and flower representations sion this includes attendance at meetings, filling obligatory offices, and (kwangen) of all households in the village were buried as part of the observance of awig-awig. pependem, along with small packages (bhagia) containing representations Encompassing levels of religious and social signjficance are attached of the material things of the earth. The bendesa adat's explanation of to these classes of village land which extend out in concentric patterns the ritual as 'planting all the essentials of life so that they can be enjoyed from the conceptual core of a village, the soil7 on which the desa shrines by the next generation' (cok Anom, 1984) again links the concepts of and cemetery are built, to the earth inhabited by humans (karang planting/burial and regeneration with the mediating role of earth in ayahan), then to uninhabited agricultural land (irrigated sawah, un­ human well-being. irrigated tegal), and finally, uncultivated forest. Graduated, degrees of prohibition and ritual treatment are required in relation to each of these spatial zones. Menstruating women and villagers who are sebel (in a 8 VillageLand and Law state of ritual prohibition) as a result of recent death cannot enter temple space. The harmonious ordering of residential space is threat­ Village adat is basically about the ordering of relationships-human, ened by the birth of male-female twins to commoner couples (a danger­ material, and spiritual-in a system where cosmic and social forces can­ ous contact between opposites),9 by the infliction of leprosy, or the loss not be divorced. Not only are there analogies in the oppositional of social harmony through serious transgression of village awig-awig. qualities which characterize the human and the supernatural domains Temporary or permanent exclusion from village residential space is pre­ 5 (corporate is to individual as deific is to demonic), but the human com­ scribed in these circumstances. munity must play an active role in maintaining ritual and social order in Occupation of residentialland (karang ayahan desa), second in import­ its sphere to avoid upsetting the balance between the supernatural forces ance to village space set aside for the deities and the dead-in-waiting, is necessary to its well-being. The Sima Krama Samiadji (Buleleng) spells usually tied to membership in the banjar/ desa and to village service. out this deeply rooted connection between the safety and physical well­ Although house compounds normally pass to heirs by descent or adop­ being of the community and the maintenance of social harmony: 'To tion, they remain the corporate property of the desa adat, the bequest of 40 ADA T AND DINAS EARTH, DEATH, AND CITIZENSHIP 41 the ancestors, and theoretically cannot be sold. A means of circum­ TABLE 2.1 venting customary restriction on transfer of use-rights through the sale Inventory of Desa Lands of trees on the land (payonan) has long been accepted in most commun­ ities on condition that the new resident shoulders ayahan obligations Percentage of Desa AdatPossessing (meli ayahan). The principle therefore remains that desa land is inalien­ able from corporate responsibility of the adat community. Sale of resid­ KarangAyahan Tanah Ayahan Tanah Desa• ential land in this way mainly applies to teba, the uninhabited yard Region (Residential) (Agricultural) (Other) portion of the karang, behind or adjacent to residential dwellings Badung 70.5 - 64.5 (IWiweka, 1984; CokAnom, 1986). In some communities, according to an officer asem 71.6 47.5 48.1 in the regional Department of Government, it may only be sold to Karang Klungkung 75.4 13.6 39.0 people from the same village (A A sastra, 1987). However, in villages which Tabanan 37.7 - 39.1 regard themselves as adhering rigidly to ancient practice (dresta kuna), even teba cannot be distinguished from the karang as a whole and Sources: UNUD (1975a, 1975b, 1978a, 1978b). 10 neither may be sold (I Mica, 1984) . Despite the accelerating privatization •Including lands used to support temples (laba pura), village offices (bukti desa), etc. of landownership through official certificationin recent years, the sale of According to the Badung Report, tanah ayahan in that kabupaten exists only in tanah desa residential land other than teba is almost non-existent because ancestral Kecamatan Petang and is included within the figure. No listing is given for Tabanan and it is therefore unclear whether tanah ayahan and tanah desa are grouped spirits are housed in theshrines (sanggah) occupying the north-east cor­ together under the latter category or whether no tanah ayahan holdings exist. ner of every karang. Unfortunately, no figures are given on theactual quantity or proportion of total land area When a member dies without heir (putung), leaving an empty com­ which falls under these categories, nor do the data indicate whether agriculturallands are pound, the banjar is responsible for its reallotment. If no member of the irrigated or dry. deceased's descent group can be found who is prepared to take up these responsibilities, the karang is then allocated by drawing lots among non­ inventory for Gianyar is yet available. In that region there is a very inheriting banjar members (pengempian). Because an empty house high incidence of villages with residential karang ayahan, but few with compound constitutes a danger to its neighbours,11 when a house yard tanah ayahan. In the opinion of the heads of the regional Departments becomes vacant and is reassigned by lottery, the recipient must occupy of Government and Agriculture, the prohibition on sale of karang ayah­ it within a specified period of time and must take responsibility for the an was, in principle at least, universal in Gianyar (r Danu, 1984; I Wiweka, necessary offerings to placate the buta-kala of the place in the interim. 1984). Pointing again to the close connection between rights to village land and In some of the 'old-type' communities these lands were fixed and provision for the spirits of the deceased is the obligation for the banjar determined the number of krama who constituted full members able to itself or the new house-yard resident to cover the costs of cremation sit on the council. In other desa, redistribution of village agricultural (ngaben) for member-occupants who die without heirs, assuring their lands took place as new members were admitted through marriage proper passage to the next world and incorporation into the communal (cf. Adatrechtbundels, 1934: 67). Several villagers in Desa Kajang, ancestry.12 Bangli, reported that village dry land (tegal ayahan) was redistributed in The connection between agricultural land and local citizenship is this way until the imposition of taxes (Adatrechtbundels, 1924: 457) more tenuous. The 'classic' desa from the evidence available in Balinese which have been closely connected with the privatization of property texts and Dutch colonial records included dry (tegal) and irrigated rights up to the present ( see Chapter 11). Varying degrees of individual (sawah) agricultural tanah ayahan as well as residential karang ayahan. 13 rights to pawn or sell agricultural lands nevertheless seem to have co­ Some villages in Bali still retain agricultural land tied to village services existed with the concept of corporate property, desa often retaining which may or may not be sold according to local adat. Stuart-Fox residual rights. Sawah and tegal, as well as karang, could be resumed and reports that the village of Tegenan in Karangasem, where most of the redistributed when no heir succeeded the deceased (see Adatrecht­ land belongs to the desa, holds 50 hectares of tanah ayahan including bundels, 1924: 458, 463; 1934: 452). 12 plots of sawah and 50 plots of dry land. His data suggests that dry­ In 'new-type' villages which predominate in South Bali, Korn also land villages are more likely to have tanah ayahan (Stuart-Fox, found some evidence connecting agricultural lands to village member­ 1987: 56-9). Table 2.1 summarizes the Udayana University Law De­ ship. The regulations for several villages in Mengwi and for Desa partment's inventories of desa adat in several regencies in Bali. Only Gwang in Gianyar required that to become a village member, a person Karangasem shows a substantial proportion of desa with agricultural must clear a fixed-size piece of agricultural land (tjetjatu) to which the lands tied to village services, although a significant majority of desa in village retained residual rights of disposal and which could not be sold three of the four regencies maintain rights over residential land. No (Korn, 1924: 126-7) .14 Even in villages where there is no formal link 42 ADA T AND DINAS EARTH, DEATH, AND CITIZENSHIP 43 between agricultural lands and village service, privately owned sawah or And if a non-dependent person obtains a karang and catu (rice land), even tegal would fall to the banjar in the event of death of an owner without though he has not married, he must enter the banjar. If he does not do so, he an heir ( although where productive land is involved, it would be much must be expelled (sepekang) and put out of that karang. The karang must then less likely that a related claimant would fail to emerge), and would be be taken by someone prepared to fulfil his obligations in good faith. And when a used to defray the costs of cremating the deceased. Complex connec­ dependent has been married for one year, when called by the klian, he must join tions between citizenship, land, and death ceremonial obligations reveal the banjar. If, after being called by the klian three times, at three assemblies (sangkepan), banjar themselves in these customary practices. 15 Irrespective of the private sta­ he still has not joined the then he must be expelled as above, because he did not follow the collective will (wirasaning) of the banjar (seka tus of most agricultural land in Bali, its apportionment among heirs is banjar samt). (Awig-awig Banjar, 1922: §§4b-Sa.)17 associated with the heavier obligations of the primary household repres­ entative (pengarep) within the banjar/desa who has responsibility to spon­ Expulsion was apparently not an uncommon occurrence in the past. sor the mortuary rituals (ngaben) necessary to transform the souls of the Whole villages were founded by those banished from their place of deceased into ancestral deities and to support their worship in the family origin for adat offences. Desa Bangkah in North Bali is reported to have shrine and Pura Puseh. There are strong feelings that inherited lands, been settled by exiles from the village of Sembiran. Desa Patjoeng is handed down from forefathers, should not be sold except to cover the mentioned as having similar origins (Adatrechtbundels, 1934: 62-3). costs of cremation, although villagers would more typically pawn than Banjar Kestala was used as a place of exile for adat violators from sell land for such purposes. Tenganan Pagringsingan. These outcasts became sharecroppers on the The fact that primary heir-member (pengarep) status with respect, to extensive sawah belonging to Tenganan which the krama desa were pro­ the house yard and temple is tied to obligations to both deceased and hibited from working themselves (Korn, 1984 [1933]: 310-18). The community and that the formula for distribution of inherited agricultural only alternative in pre-colonial times would have been for such outcast 16 lands is normally also associated with this set of obligations, again villagers to seek refuge in a royal household (puri) . underscores the implicit bonds between individual, community, and Several families in Tarian were said to have been descended from ancestors. These bonds are mediated by rights to the use of village land exiles from other communities in relatively recent times. These included and obligations to contribute labour service. The disaggregation of the a Brahmana who was expelled because of his refusal to participate in so-called new-type villages such as Desa Tarian is therefore not total. carrying the body of a deceased fellow villager to the cemetery (Ida Bgs Powerful connections between community ritual-service and access to Wanosari, 1986). Villagers could also recall instances of expulsion from their desa land (even if this be limited to the cemetery and temples) are own community in the early part of the century, among them a Chinese expressed in the rights and obligations of village membership every­ who failed to carry out banjar duties and who was physically removed to where in Bali. the other side of the desa boundary, along with his house and his Balinese wife. The last expulsion from a karang in Tarian occurred in Village Sanctions: Expulsion 1947 when it was, interestingly, the klian of Banjar Lagas Kawan, I Menget, who was banished by the krama for an adat transgression. The strength of the banjar as an institution is tied up with express Aside from oral sources, a lontar fragment records the outcome of the Balinese conceptions of it as a moral community in the Durkheimian case and the sanctions imposed (see Plate 1). sense in which 'moral' is explicitly equated with 'social'. In fact, the I Menget's offence was to curse the krama during an assembly, Balinese term for the numerous fines which meet any and every derel­ reportedly in response to. criticism of his leadership (I Wasa, 1983; I Liab, iction of civic responsibility, 'dosa', also translates as 'sin' or moral trans­ 1983). This major breach of respect for the banjar and its spiritual state gression. These fines, which repetitiously punctuate awig-awig, operate was simultaneously a threat to the supernatural balance and material rather more as markers than sanctions in themselves, the real force well-being of the community. Expulsion is both pragmatic sanction and behind them being the inevitable shame or embarrassment (lek) that spiritual requisite when a serious transgression of customary law occurs. goes with failure to fulfil civic obligation in so highly organized a society. For several years I Menget lived in a hut on the rice land where he was a If, however, social sensibilities are insufficient to ensure the priority of tenant. He was finally reinstated at the request of his son, who had the corporate, draconian social and cultural sanctions may be invoked. remained in the family compound and taken his father's place in the Since rights to occupy residential land were tied to banjar/desa mem­ assembly. Reconciliation was accomplished through a formal apology to bership and the performance of ritual-civic services, the ultimate sanc­ the krama, the payment of a heavy fine (Rp 125, equivalent to US$60 at tion the village could impose on a member was expulsion from the that time) and most importantly the conduct of a purification ceremony village and the corresponding loss of rights to burial and cremation (perascita). These three conditions-representing a social, material, and there: ritual restoration of balance-are an essential part of formal restitution 44 ADA T AND DINAS EARTH, DEATH, AND CITIZENSHIP 45 for any adat offence serious enough to warrant expulsion. sat up all night with him. His kin pleaded, cajoled, threatened.All to no avail. In Local Knowledge, C. Geertz gives a graphic account of a case of Finally, the council expelled him (unanimously; all its decisions are unanimous), expulsion which took place during fieldwork in Klungkung in 1958. It and his kin-group, after one last desperate effort to bring him round, did so as occurred in consequence of a banjar member's unprecedented refusal to well, for, given the precedence of the council's concerns over its own in this matter, if it had not done so, all of its members would have shared his fate.Even take his turn filling an obligatory public office. Geertz's vivid description his immediate family-parents, siblings, children-had to abandon him in the is cited at length here because several aspects of the case are important end. Though, of course, their view, reasonably enough I suppose, was that it was to arguments I wish to make. Notably, the underlying propositions he who had abandoned them. (C. Geertz, 1983: 176-7.) regarding corporate primacy and village autonomy are identical to those raised a quarter century later in the Siang case to be discussed below, Denied all communication with family and neighbours, he ended up even though the customary right of expulsion from residential karang wandering the village as a homeless and deranged vagabond, surviving had been virtually abolished under pressure from government author­ on scraps of food occasionally thrown by erstwhile intimates. Most ities. remarkable in the late 1950s, when expulsion was officially discouraged, Regreg had been deserted by his wife and demanded that the krama was the fact that it proceeded despite the personal intervention of the banjar take some action to force her return. Although witnessing bupati, whose authority, as head of regional government and descendant marriage and divorce and certain legal implications of marital status are of the paramount ruler of Bali, was both bureaucratically and tradition­ banjar matters, since it is actually the couple (luh-muani) who join the ally legitimated: krama, personal relationships are usually left to individuals and kin­ groups. With all sympathy, the assembly concluded that the matter was At this point, however, a quite unexpected, and in its own way unprecedented, outside its jurisdiction. thing occurred. The highest ranking traditional king on Bali, who was also, under the arrangements in effect at the time, the regional head of the new Regreg would not, however, thus be comforted. When, seven or eight months Republican government, came to the village to plead Regreg's case for him .... later his turn to take office as one of the, in this village, five council chiefs hap­ This man ... [was] the most sacred figure on the island, as well as, in 1958 · pened to come up, he balked and his troubles really began. One becomes chief, anyway, the most elevated politically and socially. People still crawled in his again in this village at least ... in automatic rotation, the term being three years; presence, spoke to him in hyper-formal phrases, considered him shot through and when your time comes round ( quite rarely as a matter of fact; Regreg was with cosmic power at once terrible and benign. In the old days, a local exile such not blessed with much luck in all this), you simply must serve. This is a council as Regreg would most likely have ended up in his palace, or in that of one of his matter, inscribed again on those palm leaves together with the god-produced lords, as a powerless, protected outcaste dependent-not precisely enslaved, but disasters, exact and elaborate, attending its neglect; and refusal (so far as anyone not precisely free either. could remember, this was the first example) is tantamount to resigning not just When this incarnation of Siva, Vishnu, and other empyrean persons came to from the village but from the human race. You lose your house-land, for that is the village-that is, to the council gathered in special session to receive him­ village-owned here, and become a vagrant. You lose your right to enter the he squatted on the floor of the council pavilion to symbolize that in this context village temples, and thus are cut offfrom contact with the gods. You lose, of he was but a visitor, however distinguished, and not a king, much less a god. course, your political rights-seat on the council, participation in public events, The council members listened to him with enormous deference, a grand out­ claims to public assistance, use of public property, all matters of great substance pouring of traditional politesse, but what he had to say was far from traditional. here; you lose your rank, your inherited place in the caste-like order of regard, a This was, he told them, a new era. The country was independent. He under­ matter of even greater substance. And beyond that, you lose the whole social stood how theyfelt, but theyreally ought not to exile people anymore, confiscate world, for no one in the village may speak to you on pain of fine.It.is not pre­ their house-land, refuse them political and religious rights, and so on. It was not cisely capital punishment. But for the Balinese, who have a proverb,.'to leave the modern, up-to-date, democratic, the Sukarno-way. They should, in the spirit of community of agreement (adat, a sovereign word whose ambiguities I shall be the new Indonesia and to demonstrate to the world that the Balinese were not returning to at some length later on) is to lie down and die,' it is the next best backward, talce Regreg back and punish him, if they must, in some other way. thing to it. When he finished (it was a long oration), they told him, slowly, obliquely, and Why Regreg was so uncharacteristically resistant to public obligation for a even more deferentially, to go fly a kite.Village affairs, as he well knew, were Balinese, who obey their own rules to a degree an anthropologist, especially one their concern not his, and his powers, though unimaginably great and superbly who has come there fromJava not to speak of the United States can greet only exercised, lay elsewhere. Their action in the Regreg case was supported by the with personal astonishment and professional delight, is unclear. His co-citizens hamlet constitution, and if they were to ignore it, poxes would fall upon them, were, anyway, totally uninterested in the question of what his motivations might rats would devour their crops, the ground would tremble, the mountains be and could hardly be brought to speculate on it.... Rather, conscious of the explode. Everything he had said about the new era was right, true, noble, disaster for which he was headed, theysought, in every way they could devise, to beautiful, and modern, and they were as committed to it as he was. (This was dissuade him from his course and induce him to take the damned office. The true; the village was an unusually 'progressive' one; more than half the popula­ council assembled a half dozen times over the course of several months in tion were socialists.) But, well, no-Regreg could not be readmitted to human special session simply to this end-to talk him into changing his mind. Friends company. (C. Geertz, 1983: 178-9.) 46 ADA T AND DINAS EARTH, DEATH, AND CITIZENSHIP 47 Today, attempts to invoke the exile provisions of local customary law or banished, which has as a consequence whenever that family has a are met with decisive intervention by state authorities on the grounds death that it will be impossible to find a cemetery or a cremation site for that such practices are inconsistent with national principles (see Bali the corpse.' (Korn, 1924: 42.) Banjar are commonly referred to as Post, 14 January 1983). Nevertheless, the right of expulsion was a sub­ banjar suka-duka (mutual help, in 'joy-sorrow') or banjar patus (con­ ject raised several times during banjar meetings I attended and is re­ tributions in kind to assist those carrying out cremation ceremonies), garded as a legitimate, even necessary, sanction. When one member in and detailed accounting of obligations associated with the conduct of Banjar Kalih was threatened with expulsion over failure to repay a debt death ceremonies dominate awig-awig banjar. 20 The failure to contribute to the banjar, the assembly considered boarding up his compound patus is among the transgressions of local customary law which may entrance and placing an interdict ( sawen) on entry or exit, a customary result in expulsion. In Desa Buungan (Bangli) both tanah ayahan and sanction exercised also by subak when its regulations are breached. karang ayahan may be transferred to another family on this account Because the delinquent member bowed to banjar pressure before the (Adatrechtbundels, 1934: 471). Patus signifies corporate unity and social requisite third warning,however, the threat went untested. obligation in its quintessential form. 'It is patus that is most important, While authority to banish an offender from village residential land has patus that holds us together. If you do not give patus, it means you are been suppressed in recent years under pressure from state authority, not bound (iket). Patus is what holds us all, the rope that is strongest. external intervention has not been as effective with respect to the You could call it the fundamental law (undang-undang dasar).' (Dw Dani, exercise of related rights over the village cemetery and the conduct of 1984.) The patus contribution is regarded as the ultimate symbol of social death and cremation ceremonies. These remain jealously guarded pre­ bondedness, explicitly contrasted in Dewa Dani's explanation with the rogatives and have so far proved much more resistant to interference. pursuit of personal will (nganggeang kayun). The shrinking spheres of desa territory under local corporate control Banjar members who might otherwise be lax, periodically missing have to this point not diminished the dangers of expulsion from the assembly meetings or work sessions, would not consider neglecting krama, since sanctions associated with the symbolic core of the banjar/ the duties associatedwith deathceremonials. The meticulous attendance desa adat, the temple and the graveyard, retain the utmost potency. records of Banjar Kalih and Madya in Tarian show that while routine activities draw an average attendance of 60-80 per cent of membership, when the signal block (kulku[) is struck, calling members to carry out Death Rites and Banjar Power death ceremonialduties, participation is virtually 100 per cent. Absences recorded are never more than the one or two members who may be ill or The cemetery (sema/setra) as much as the Kahyangan Tiga is the have other serious reasons for non-attendance. defining focus of the Balinese desa: When death occurs, formal banjar obligations (those for which the The word desa has a different meaning in Bali than it does in Java. All those who kulkul is struck) include constructing the bier and other ceremonial are buried or burned at the same cemetery and who perform their offerings and preparations, washing the corpse (nusang), digging the grave, and umah dewa devotions to the god of the same (village temples) belong to thesame carrying the corpse to the cemetery for interment. It is also customary to desa irrespective of whether or not their dwellings constitute a separate group or visit (majenukan) the family of the deceased bringing contributions of are divided among separate settlements. (van Bloemen Waanders, 1859, cited in 18 rice,· coffee, and white cloth and to keep watch (gebagan) with the Korn, 1924: 114-15.) bereaved family for three evenings following the death. Wiweka (1971: 38) refers to the Kahyangan Tiga, the cemetery and its At cremation,patus contributions consisting of specified quantities of guardian shrine, the Pura Prajapati, as the sources of 'unity and a spirit rice, coconuts, and bamboo as well as labour assistance are required of of solidarity in village society'. This relationship derives from the banjar members. During cremation the banjar repeats the role it played centrality of the ancestor cult in Balinese social life. The power the ban­ in the initial death ceremony rituals, washing (nusang) and clothing jar is able to exercise is directly related to its role in death rituals, funda­ (masalin) the symbolic representation of the body to be cremated and mental in the cyclical passage between the worlds of sekala and niskala, carrying (ngarap) the sarcophagus and funeral bier to the graveyard. In and in the maintenance of relations between the living and deceased Tarian and nearby villages the customary final duty of the banjar is to ancestors. Guermonprez's (1991: 57) insistence that the Balinese com­ provide toya penembak banjar which is sprinkled over the corpse along munity must be understood as a partnership of the living and the dead with holy water from the family, village temples, and priest. It is said to deserves repetition.19 clear a path for the soul of the deceased and to free the soul from ties to The conduct of funerary rites in the name of the desa is the primary its fellow citizens. It also marks the end of banjar participation in the responsibility of the banjar. Korn is one of the few scholars who recog­ ceremony and of its state of ritual prohibition (sebel). In this region of nized the socio-political importance of this obligation: '[T]hose who Gianyar the provision of ritual water by the banjar is extremely import­ refuse to become members of the [banjar] association are declared dead ant. Taken from a stream near the cemetery, toya penembak banjar is 48 ADA T AND DINAS EARTH, DEATH, AND CITIZENSHIP 49 nevertheless regarded as holy water and sometimes referred to by the informal nature. Formal sanctions arise from village control of the cem­ more elevated term tirta. It is believed by many that without it the cre­ etery under local adat, while spontaneous disruptions of an informal mation ritual will not be effective. According to the klian of Banjar nature represent more or less subtle inversions of the central significance Pekandelan, a cremation held by Puri Tarian had to be repeated several of death ritual and the responsibility of the banjar for their conduct. The years later because toya penembak banjar had been refused ( Gst Kanti, ultimate sanction, because of associated physical and spiritual danger to 21 1984). family and community, is the denial of burial rights in the village A folk-tale from Desa Pujung provides another indication of the im­ cemetery. This sanction rests on the formal regulations set out in awig­ portance of banjar allegiance and its connectionwith death ritual and the awig. Alongside the right to occupy a house yard and to worship in the afterlife. In this social allegory a person from the village dies and his villagetemples, the use of thecemetery is a primary right associated with spirit goes on to the next world. There it is asked by the deity only one village membership and service. In the desa adat inventories, use of the question: Did the krama banjar attend your funeral rites? It has to con­ cemetery and occupancy of karang are described as 'recompense' fess they did not and is sent back to earth again (I Mica, 1984). A proverb I (imbalan) for fulfilment of ngayah duties (UNUD, 1975a, 1975b, first heard in Badung iterates the theme of moral-social evaluation by 1978a, 1978b). one's peers at death: Jele-melah bikas anake ane mati katentuang antuk The events which took place in a village referred to as Desa 'Siang' in bedik-liune nyama brayane di banjar ngatehang sawane ke sema. (The bad this study provide a salient example of the power of sanctions based on or good behaviour of the deceased is demonstrated by how small or village control over the graveyard and the intractability of aspects of large is the banjar family who accompany his corpse to the graveyard.) village adat in the contemporary period. The complex case raises a ( Gst Rai Mirsha, 1988.) number of issues pivotal to this study concerning the relationship The Balinese saying that to be outside the banjar is 'death' has more between banjar and desa, between the adat and dinas aspects of local than metaphoric significance. It alludes to the most important of banjar organization, and between village customary law and external authority. responsibilities and at the same time the deepest source of its collective It also gives some insight into the character of internal community power. Korn noted that to be 'declared dead' was conflict and collective social control. the most coercive measure to ensure conformityin the banjar. Members who do The protracted dispute, which eventually attained considerable notori­ not give a patus contribution and who are insensitive to the punishments that are ety, began in 1977 when a private inheritance dispute spilled over into implemented may if necessary be banished from the village and banjar.... The banjar politics and led to a confrontation over donated land on which the bad thing about this is that the banished person will not be admitted into any banjar assembly hall was being constructed.22 After challenging banjar other village. He is forced to confess guilt. But a Balinese is not easily persuaded leadership in an attempt to stop construction,and despite partial success or changed in his opinions. He can become a martyr for a cause when he is (building was never resumed and the klian banjar resigned under the. convinced he is right. When such a person has been declared dead and he has to stress several months after the controversy broke), the disgruntled look after the body of a member of his family, he will not be permitted to faction of twelve families attempted to secede from the banjar and estab­ conduct a funeral. Sometimes he may be permitted to do so with a payment of lish an independent one of its own within the same desa adat. The grave money. But assistance may not be given under any circumstance. It only secessionists claimed precedent in the fact that the parent Banjar Satria becomes apparent to what extent a person who has been declared dead is an itself had formedonly in 1952, drawing Satria title-group members from outcast when he has to face such a problem. He often confesses his guilt then. But when he does that according to some constitutions he has to pay all the several large banjar into a new non-territorial one. Furthermore, contributions which have been made by other members during the time he was although Banjar Satria operated as a de facto banjar dinas, its establish­ outcast. This is calculated from the tjatjakanpatus, the recorded list of members' ment had not been formally recognized by the government and was, contributions. (Korn, 1924: 135.) they argued, no more legitimate than the one they had just proclaimed. But on the grounds that a negotiated division is fundamentally different To this day the most forceful sanctions in Balinese communities are from unilateral secession by a dissident faction, both the parent Banjar unquestionably those which arise out of the central significance of death Satria and the desa adat of Siang refused to recognize any fission which ceremonies in Balinese culture and the role of the banjar in their con­ was not based on consensus.23 A protracted and bitter stalemate ensued. duct. A period of four years elapsed during which none of the parties involved was able to impose its will on the other, including the district The Siang Case and regional governments which on several occasions attempted to mediate the dispute. The twelve families refused to participate in banjar Communal responsibilities for aspects of corpse disposal and funerary meetings and communal work sessions or pay banjar levies. At the same ritual are the bases of a range of social sanctions both of a formal and time, they insisted that as a separate banjar suka-duka they remained 51 50 ADA T AND DINAS EARTH, DEATH, AND CITIZENSHIP members of the desa adat, and attempted to make temple contributions case, they attempted to persuade village officials to allow burial to pro­ directly to it. For its part, the desa adat refused to acknowledge the exist­ ceed immediately in the interests of decency, hygiene, and-not least in ence of the 'Dissident 12', as they became known, and returned their a district on the tourist track-its modern image. The response from contributions. According to its interpretation of customary law, unilat­ local leaders was adamant. The deceased was not a member of a recog­ eral secession from an established banjar was identical to secession from nized banjar and thereforehad no right under customary law to burial in the desa adat. Nor was non-recognition limited to the adat sphere. The the desa cemetery. They insisted that the strength of local adat and the 'good conduct' of the faction was in question and official validation of corporate basis of the banjarldes a would be irreparably damaged if a dis­ identity cards, job applications, or loan applications from the adminis­ senting minority could dispense with collective responsibility at will. trative desa was refused as well. Three days of marathon negotiations ensued before the seceding The twelve families were not for their part without powerful con­ families finally submitted to the, by then escalated, conditions for read­ nections outside the village. There were civil servants, police, and a mission. To avoid the faction reforming in future, the twelve families member of the regional parliament (DPRD) among their ranks. Early were distributed by lottery among the eight banjar comprising Desa on in the dispute the group made overtures to higher authorities to Adat Siang in front of a meeting of the entire village. They agreed to pressure Desa Siang to recognize their independent adat status. The pay a substantial 're-entry' fine (pengajug) based on the value of a pro­ regional Department of Government holds two thick files full of letters portional share in the corporate holdings of the community, amounting of accusation from the dissenting group, responses from banjar officials, in this case to Rp 432,000 (US$671) per family (well above the average advice from the bupati, and notes on audiences with the two sides. annual per capita income in Indonesia at the time). To re-establish Correspondence over the issue eventually reached as far as the Ministry harmony in the social order, they had to make a public apology and of Home Affairs in Jakarta. Throughout the prolonged stand-off, re­ conduct a purification ceremony (perascita). A document outlining the peated efforts by government officials and representatives of the agreement was signed by members of each of the reinstated families, the government supported religious body, Parisada Hindu Dharma, failedto perbekel, the bendesa, eight klian banjar, and MUSPIDA in front of the bring it to a conclusion. Nor did the resignation of the klian of Banjar public meeting held in the village square, after which lots were drawn to 24 Satria, when banjar leadership became an issue in the affair, or the decide their new banjar membership. death and replacement of the bendesa adat, affect the stalemate. The body was then permitted burial. What did ultimately break the deadlock was the death of one of the A number of significant issues concerning adat in contemporary Bali faction members. Indeed, the outcome was already foreshadowed in the were raised by the Siang case. First of all, there was the question of report of a meeting held some months before in the district office: whether membership in the desa adat was dependent on membership in '... the results will be tragic when one of the party of 12 families dies' component banjar, and implicitly whether the banjar held authority to (TRIPIDA report, 4/6/80). By all accounts of the event, it appears act as effective executor of village customary law. According to the dom­ everyone had been waiting for this ultimate showdown. Had they inant interpretation of local adat, it was. Refusal of burial rights was succeeded in burying their corpse, the seceding faction would possibly predicated on the assumption that loss of membership in the banjar have won the day, since disinterring the body would have brought con­ meant automatic exclusion from rights within the desa adat. Korn's siderable danger to the community as a whole and certainly more reference to the awig-awig of Desa Gwang suggests that such an inter­ strong-arm intervention by state authorities. Disinterment nevertheless pretation was not unique to this particular place or time: 25 has been known to occur in such cases, with emotionally traumatic In these cases where banjar have such extensive powers, the question of what is and spiritually disastrous consequences for the bereaved family. In one the domain and responsibility of the banjar and what is the domain of the desa is of two instances reported in recent years, the house compound was later a difficult question to answer.... To illustrate this it must be mentioned that in deserted, too hot and magically dangerous (tenget) for human habitation the regulations (awig-awig) of thebanjars in Desa Gwang in Kabupaten Gianyar (A A Sastra, 1984; I Reta, 1987). there is a stipulation that if someone goes to the desa requesting permission to As it happened in Siang, the twelve families attempted to bury the have a corpse disposal, bypassing the banjar, he will be knocked back. (Korn, body in thevillage cemetery under cover of dark in heavy rain, but were 1924: 42.) intercepted before the burial could be accomplished and forced to return home with the corpse. The regional government task force was again Because there is no clear distinction between banjar and desa authority, dispatched to- deal with what was by then a major crisis. The team, with jurisdiction in matters of residence, cemetery, and temple worship rights the acronym MUSPIDA (Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah), comprised is a matter of interpretation. The ideal remains one of corporate in­ the head of regional government ( the bupatz) and regional chiefs of the tegrity, but the disaggregation of these units in practice complicates the judiciary, police, and military. Reminiscent of the arguments put by the unity principle and creates ambiguities. Leaders in Tarian and Sanur bupati of Klungkung on the impropriety of banishment in the Regreg thought the interpretation adopted in Siang implied that the banjar had 52 ADA T AND DINAS EARTH, DEATH, AND CITIZENSHIP 53 outstripped the desa adat in importance (Cok Anom, 1984; Ida Bgs Beratha, 1984). however. This special meeting was of the regional Adat Forum, but was In a similar case elsewhere, the desa adat, while recognizing the banjar's chaired by the bupati, a dinas official who later headed the negotiating right of expulsion, permitted burial with payment for use of the cemet­ team during the final crisis.) At desa level, where civil and customary ery (meli setra), as if the ostracized person had come from outside the leadership are separate (Siang was only one of four desa adat comprising desa (A A Sastra, 1984). · the administrative village), the perbekel and secretary staunchly sup­ The relative inefficacy of civil officials from district and regional ported the position taken by banjar and desa adat throughout the dis­ government in the resolution of thedispute and the extent of local resist­ pute. But the obscurity of adat-dinas boundaries has more to do with ance to external pressure is also of note. Neither party was averse to their mutual implication in the Balinese sense of the 'civic' than in the appealing to civil instrumentalities when it was strategic to do so; but formal coincidence or otherwise of adat and dinas functions among local neither was at all responsive to the pressures which district and regional leaders. In Sanur, where adat and dinas leadership is clearly divided at authorities attempted to place on them. Government offices did at times banjar as well as desa level, villageregulations explicitly state that admin­ play a constructive third-party negotiating role. 26 But when the istrative services would be withheld in the event of expulsion from the 28 MUSPIDA team intensified pressure to proceed with the burial at the adat village. height of the crisis, Siang's leaders-both adat and dinas-considering Finally, the Siang case reveals the centrality, and concomitant ambi­ the matter to involve fundamental principles of local authority, guity, of the values of corporate priority and consensual decision-making vehemently resisted an imposed resolution. Reminiscent of the banjar's in local practice. At three stages in the conflict, meetings of the full polite 'go fly a kite' stance in the Regreg case described by Geertz, in 650-member krama desa were called, a very rare occurrence in a village Siang too, the community was implacable in its assf;rtion that local of that size. The first, in April 1980, met to determine whether the adat authorityin theadat sphere was ultimate. 'For their part the government leaders' interpretation of the previously unwritten awig-awig, which would not dare forbid [our decision to refuse burial] because that right is excluded the dissidents from the desa adat because of their withdrawal based on the awig-awig desa adat.' (A A Barwa, 1984.) from banjar membership, would be upheld. Support from Banjar Kauh Despite increasing government intervention in these matters, it is clear in Siang, a hamlet of commoners who were mainly poor sharecroppers, that the guardians of local institutions do not readily give up their had been recruited by the dissident faction on the basis of tenancy ties authority over the conditions of social inclusion and exclusion. For these and old neighbourhood loyalties. (The dissident families had previously reasons adat cases are regarded in provincial government circles as the been members of Banjar Kauh before joining the newly formed Banjar most intractable and sensitive of disputes. A further instance illustrates Satria in 1952.) It was apparently Banjar Kauh's objection to the desa the same tenacity of local claims to authority evident in Siang. In this adafs refusal to accept temple contributions from the dissidents that case, still unsettled since the 1970s, an expelled family was refused use precipitated the first extraordinary meeting (paruman) of the krama des a of the graveyard on the death of a member. Pressured by the govern­ adat. The public meeting, however, seems to have defused that sup­ ment, the banjar agreed to burial conditional upon a pengajug re-entry port. 29 The _klian of a neighbouring banjar described the event as payment, which the family later refused to present. So when the next follows: 'When the krama desa met to decide whether the old awig-awig death occurred in 1982, the banjar again tried to prevent burial. This would continue to be followed, there was a hand-count-democratic. time the civil guard was dispatched to ensure it proceeded. The banjar Only very few opposed this interpretation. Most of the people were then exercised its right of confiscation (rampag), taking a bicycle to the from Banjar Kauh, who, when they saw how the meeting was going, value of the fine owed. A decade later, the family remains outside the pulled down their hands.' (I Reta, 1987.) The second meeting, the morning banjar--with renewed confrontation likely at the next occasion of a after the aborted attempt to bury the deceased dissident, confirmed the death. The file remains on the Department of Government officer's desa adat's refusal of rights to use thecemetery. The final public meeting desk, along with a dozen or so other unresolved disputes, still 'in was called to witness the formal oath and signing of the agreement process'. which concluded the case. The effects of expulsion from the krama banjar manifestly extend The events in Siang point to the pervasive significance of adat as both beyond the adat sphere which is supposedly distinct from the adminis­ a site of social conflict and social constitution. The ideal of corporate trative one. During the course of the Siang dispute none of the dissid­ solidarity and cohesion was to be realized in the splinter group's view by ents were able to obtain new identity cards or good conduct letters establishing a separate association, and in that of the parent banjar, by necessary for all official purposes-job applications, loans, study, and so resisting it. The desa adat could have chosen to interpret adat differently, on. 27 In Siang, as in Tarian, the klian banjar carries out both adat and accepting the establishment of a new banjar or tempek, or permitting the dinas functions. The complication caused by overlapping roles was burial of thebody with the payment of the meli setra finewhich normally noted at one of the regional government meetings called to deal with the applies when an outsider for some reason has to be buried away from dispute. (Ambiguity of jurisdiction is not only a local phenomenon, his or her home village. In the final analysis, the outcome of the case 54 ADA T AND DINAS EAR TH, DEATH, AND CITIZENSHIP 55 depended on the conjunction of events and alignment of social forces, cause the family illness or trouble.' (A A Barwa, 1985.) 'It would not feel forces which lay primarily in the local sphere. Varying interpretations of right, because from the time of death until cremation they are felt still to the technicalities of customary law often became the battleground for be part of society.' (I Selah, 1987.) Throughout the period of interment, negotiating postures on quite other matters. Ultimately in Siang the ritual ties with the as yet uncremated are maintained through the offer­ many issues involved were distilled down to the one question of how ing of food and other favourites, such as cigarettes, rice wine, or sweets, and by whom thecorporate authority of desa!banjar was to be construed. to show that they have not been forgotten. 'We want to show that we 'It may appear to be cruel, but in my opinion, it became a test of the still care. It's a way of saying don't be disappointed because we are not strength of the desa adat system. . . . The government officials had. to able to carry out your rituals yet.' (Ni Puri, 1987.) As Forge (1980: 224) has come around in the end, because they had no answer to the dangers of observed, Balinese ritual relations are in essence territorially bound: weakening des a adatlaw.' (I Reta, 1984.) 'Balinese religion is not concerned with the relation between a congrega­ The twelve families are now dispersed among the eight banjar that tion or individual and a god or even gods that can take place anywhere:· make up Desa Adat Siang, where they are regarded by everyone I have both worshippers and worshipped are highly localized. It is not a "trans­ spoken to as hard-working and exemplary members of their respective portable" religion.'30 Balinese religion is essentially ancestral and funda­ krama (A A Barwa, 1984; I Puja, 1984; I Reta, 1984; Ni Narini, 1987; I Marga, 1988). Only mentally rooted in place.31 Reluctance to bury their dead away from one of the many villagers interviewed, the new bendesa adat, gave any Desa Siang and the ultimate submission of the twelve families to the impression of vindictiveness in discussing the case. On the contrary, the heavy penalties imposed by the desa adat must be understood in the others regarded it as a salutary but painful and regrettable affair. The context of these beliefs. one positive outcome many said was increased 'consciousness' Banjar assistance as an expression of the social component necessary (kesadaran) on all sides. The sentiments of the klian of Banjar Satria to spiritual-material harmony must also be considered here. Labour (elected in the midst of the affair, when the previous klian resigned) service is both a statement of tight community bonds and itself a ritual were widely held. 'In the end they became conscious of their error and offering. When one 'buys' a place in the cemetery with the meli setra rejoined the banjar. . . . We too became conscious that we were all levy, it is without the right for the kulkul to be struck or to call on banjar citizens together.... To this day there are two among them who have assistance. The Pujung foll<-tale, Badung proverb, and the importance paid only part of the fine. But, in fact, they are genuinely of poor means. of toya penembak banjar in Tarian and nearby villages indicate the From our point of view what is important is that they are conscious. In centrality of neighbourhood social ties in the transmogrify of the souls of my opinion, they truly are. By that I mean they have returned to the the dead.3 2 The denial of banjar participation implies the loss of full banjar and it is whole.' (A ABarwa, 1984.) ritual significance and threatens ritual effectiveness. For Balinese as for many other eastern Indonesian cultures, the fate of the soul is symbolic­ Death Beliefs: Ancestry and Locality ally tied to the fate of the body (Huntington and Metcalf, 1979). The importance of death ceremonies in Balinese culture and the clearly non­ To grasp fully the power of customary law and the deeper meanings Hindu basis of many beliefs and practices associated with them33 beg underlying community organization, an analysis of the symbolic dimen­ interpretation in the wider context of indigenous Indonesian ancestral sion of relationships between ancestral bonds, death ceremonies, and religions. It is to these beliefs that we must turn to begin to understand village land and labour would be necessary, only fragments of which I the profound meanings which underlie village social relations.34 am able to suggest here. In the Siang case it was technically possible for Death is a rite of pa,ssage of enormous significance in eastern the seceding group to withstand the crisis induced by the death of one of Indonesian societies where it is perceived as a very slow transitional its members, for the short term at least, by paying the meli setra fine to stage in the separation of the body and the soul, the individual and the use a cemetery outside the village. Indeed regional authorities attempted community. Death rituals effect the transformation and dispatch of the to arrange burial in the cemetery at Gianyar, but the desa adat there soul and the protection of family and community from the dangers asso­ refused 'because it was a case of conflict, not consensus (musyawarah), ciated with its passage. In Hinduized Balinese practice, an elaborate and also because they knew if they didn't recognize local adat here, then series of rites, many of them uncharacteristic of Indic tradition (Crucq, how could they hold on to their own?' (I Reta, 1987.) The alternative use of 1928: 117), bring about the transition through which the soul breaks its a public cemetery in Denpasar was also proposed, but never taken up material bonds and becomes fused with the collective ancestors (IWiweka, 1985). worshipped in the house and village temples. The immaterial essence of The strong sense in which burial outside the village is regarded as the soul is ultimately reincarnated-not into a higher caste (wama) as is both improper and disorienting to the soul of the deceased had much to the Indic ideal, but back again into its own community and descent do with the outcome of the case. 'The family would certainly not feel group.35 good about it. Maybe the spirit would feel lost and confused. It might The fusion of Hindu and non-Hindu elements in Balinese religion 56 ADA T AND DINAS EARTH, DEATH, AND CITIZENSHIP 57 seems to be associated with a number of ambivalent values and beliefs Pedanda Made tells her: 'When bones are removed from the graveyard, that may or may not refer to clearly distinguishable layers of diffused there is a special ritual for Banaspati Radja as graveyard ruler. This is to culture, but certainly do represent competing expressions of value, com­ secure his consent to their removal. ... When the bones are recovered, a peting discourses available to different social groups, and often equi­ young banana plant or even a small chicken will be substituted in their vocally recognized within all of them (cf. Hobart, 1978: 15). The place. This is . so the earth will not feel vacant by their loss and also to primacy of trance revelation over orthodox priestly or textual sources of have something alive to hold.' religious interpretation and action (cf. Connor, 1982; Franken, 1984 Otherthan priests (whether Brahmana or local temple priests) and the [1951]; Lovric, 1987) and the refusal to accept holy water from descendants of traditionalruling families, most triwangsa also bury their Brahmana priests by descent groups claiming prior ancestral origin in dead before cremation. Crucq (1928: 114) reports that even royalty Bali are the most emphatic examples (Adatrechtbundels, 1924: 455; might be buried for quite long periods when it could not have been the Goris, 1984 [1935]: 295; Guermonprez, 1991).36 But there are more costs of cremation which explain the practice.37 Indeed, those closest to modulated expressions of countervalue and practice that have received the other-worldly realm, children who have not lost their milk teeth little attention which bear on the power of local customary law and its (durung maketus) and world-renouncers who have mystically purified connection with ancestral beliefs. The positive valuation of prior burial themselves (kediatnika, but a traditionunstressed in Balinese Hinduism), in popular culture, for example, contrasts with elite practice, more in in neither case bearing any relation to inherited caste or title-group, are line with Indic tradition, of cremation without burial. buried only and do not require cremation at all. In the case of Brahmana Burial before cremation is frequently interpreted in terms of the priests who must be immediately cremated, the explanation given by relative 'impurity' of the commoner castes or their inability to afford the Pedanda Made to Mershon did not allude to inherent caste purity, but costly cremation ceremony (Hobart, 1978: 18; Howe, 1980: 293). But to the fact that the primary death rituals have previously been conducted most Balinese express a positive preference for prior burial that I think during initiation to priesthood: 'A Pedanda or his wife may never. be must be connected with the conceptions of liminality underlying double placed in the soil because they already have died once, mati raga-death ritual treatment of the remains (or their symbolic representations) of the body. They died from bondage to this world as they entered throughout eastern Indonesia (Hertz, 1960; Van Gennep, 1960; priesthood.' (Mershon, 1971: 214.) These 'anomalies' place a different Huntington and Metcalf, 1979) and the association of village soil with accent on popular conceptions of spiritual 'purity' and of 'purification' regeneration. Many said they would not want to be cremated straight ceremonies in Balinese religious belief and practice. Alternative inter­ away, but would prefer to 'rest in Ibu Pertiwi', the earth mother or pretations, focusing on the logic of facilitating transition while inhibiting goddess, for a while first (Ni Ratna, 1983; Ni Puri, 1985; Gst Kwanji, 1986). Dewa the dangers of contact between complementary and opposed sekala­ Dani (1983), an elderly member of a gentry title-group and an adamant niskala worlds do not necessarily or inherently implicate social hierarchic 'traditionalist' on matters of gentry prestige, expressed similar senti­ evaluations that concepts of purity/pollution do ( cf. Douglas, 1966). ments. Balinese refer to the waiting period of the soul in this liminal In conversation with two officers in the regional Department of state as miasa, with varying connotations of meditating and doing ser­ Government-one Brahmana, one Sudra-I questioned the cultural vice in the Death Temple (I Mica, 1984). preference for immediate cremation or prior burial. Both agreed that in There are also some negative conceptions regarding immediate the past all but priests and kings were buried first. Made Suarsa said cremation, although I cannot say how widely these are held. Some say if this was a difference between adat and agama-custom and religion. the body has not decomposed first and is too soon cremated, the 'According to agama [by which he meant official religion as promul­ deceased will surely feel the heat of the flames. On the occasion of an gated by the Hindu religious organization, Parisada Hindu Dharma], the immediate cremation (ngaben dadakan) I attended, a woman standing faster the process, the better, and so the idea that immediate cremation near by watched shivering with a facial expression I took to express was preferable had come with changing times (perkembangan jaman). In revulsion. After a motor-bike accident killed a member of Puri Tarian, the past you couldn't carry out a cremation unless the person had been there was comment that the aristocracy so frequently die before their buried for one year.' He said he knew this only from what he had heard time because they practise cremation without prior burial (Ni Puri, 1985). from old people, 'that it is important to return to the place of origin­ Another informant said popular belief contradicted the requirement that Thu Pertiwi, the first element, earth' (I Suarsa, 1985). His Brahmana the cemeteries be cleared of unritualized remains through mass crema­ colleague concurred. 38 One klian banjar similarly described the pressure tions (ngaben pranawa) before the major ceremonial 'cleansing' of the from Parisada Hindu Dharma to cremate as quiclbanjar people in his business. On the day of ation to the family concerned. cremation, when the body was brought out by the banjar and passed Spontaneous forms of disruption may involve little more than stalling about in the customary mock play-battle (ngarap-ngarapan) frequently or withholding the requisite banjar labour assistance. In a widely and described by observers with allusions to trance-like states of dissociation mirthfully recounted incident in Tarian, when the kulkul was struck, the (Mead Coll. N11; Bateson and Mead, 1942; Connor, 1979), they began banjar assembled in thehouse compound of the deceased. But instead of throwing it about. At this point the mother, apparently possessed by the assisting with the building of the bier and other duties, members busied spirit of her child, began screaming expressions of agony. In the end themselves with pointless tasks, tying and untying bits of twine­ the banjar walked off, refusing to continue its part in the ceremony. The delaying the rituals, while drinking their host's coffee and smoking his contractor had to hire workers to complete it, and soon after the inci­ cigarettes (I Yasa, 1982; I Toya, 1983; I Lebah, 1984). Their passive behaviour was dent, he and his family moved away. a quiet but pointed collective statement about the deceased's lax attitude Miles's informants told the story as a moral commentary on the con­ toward banjar responsibilities in life. In Made Toya's (1985) recounting, sequences of abrogating shared work responsibility and of status this particular response was exact retribution in kind: 'I remember very distancing in the banjar context. They made a point of stressing that 60 ADA T AND DINAS EARTH, DEATH, AND CITIZENSHIP 61 Brahmana in that banjar were extremely careful to involve themselves in repose of the soul, its passage to the next world, and relationship to the banjar activities. In urban areas there had also been an increasing living. I do not know of practices outside Bali in which social sanctions tendency to buy ceremonial offerings, circumventing customary recip­ are so explicitly connected with the conduct of death ceremonies. rocal labour exchange arrangements. This practice, all the more hiring Nevertheless the focus on social bonds is a universal phenomenon people to conduct the deceased to the graveyard, was regarded with occasioned by death.Johns (1985: 3) relates her Javanese grandmother's contempt (Doug Miles, pers. com., 1987). warnings on the potential consequences of her unsociable childhood Violent forms of disruption are treated by Indonesian authorities as tendencies: illegal violations. There have been court prosecutions on grounds of 'Don't be heavy lipped. When you die, no one will carry your corpse to the assault and disrespect towards the dead in cases of extreme corpse abuse grave. It will be left to rot in the house.' ... What my grandmother said to me (Connor, 1979). A seminar sponsored by the Governor's Office and the had been said before hundreds, if not thousands of times, handed down from Institut Hindu Dharma in 1979 proposed various means of discouraging generation to generation to be repeated as statutory warning in similar situations. the practice. But because disruption, ngarap-ngarapan, shades into a Nevertheless, I never heard of anyone in my town who died, however unsoci­ variety of customary and ritually legitimated forms of play,42 which are able, being left to rot. in effect extensions of the extremelyserious collective duty to convey .the The compelling need to reinforce social ties in the face of the threat corpse to the graveyard (the obligation to which the term ngarap 43 death poses to social integrity makes funerary ritual singularly sus­ refers), outright prohibition has proved impossible. Reluctance to ceptible to disruptive tensions (see C. Geertz, 1973: 162-4). In Bali, appear to transgress the principle of desa adat autonomy expressed in where the relationship of the dead to the living is so intensely felt and Desa, Kala, Patra the axiom undoubtedly also underlay the restrained where everyday life is so intimately dependent upon rituals connecting recommendations arising from the seminar. These included proposals the living community with its ancestors, the socio-cultural foundations that regulations for proper conduct of ngarap duties be written into of customary law-dresta (ancestral tradition) and sima (codified awig-awig to include sanctions against the 'negative' forms of the prac­ practice)-are inextricably bound up with popular conceptions of adat ke­ tice, and that participants be required to wear clothing, sing citizenship and indispensable to an interpretation of social and political kawin, and strike the accompanying gongs with a slow beat to establish a life. solemn atmosphere. The concluding decision of the seminar was to While sanctions are an inevitable part of the solidarity mechanisms of sponsor the investigation of customary ngarap practices across Bali and perduring social groups,47 my treatment of the subject should not be to conduct a public education and information programme on its 'true' allowed to give an unbalanced or misleading impression of the coercive meaning, especially in the context of national principles such as side of community life in Bali. Such occurrences are, in fact, quite rare. Pancasila. (See papers by Ida Pedanda Keniten, I Wy Surpha, and A serious incident in a generation, and in one neighbouring village Drs I G Rai Mirsha in IHD, 1979.) 44 among many, is sufficient to provide a salutary lesson on citizenship and Although not normally codified in awig-awig, such 'informal' sanc­ add semiotic significance to the slightest gestural forms of disruption. tions are nevertheless popularly regarded as having the weight of cus­ The reverse side of the coin is of course more important in everyday life. 'banjar tomary law behind them. Many times I heard it said law is the The virtually universal participation in banjar activity, preference for in­ karma', law of this-worldly punishment for neglect of community obliga­ banjar marriage, the enthusiastic contribution of labour and goods for tion. Reciprocity and mutual assistance lie at the heart of local law. 'If community goals, the informal reciprocal and redistributive exchanges banjar one is diligent about responsibilities, many come to help with the for which banjar relations provide a base-all underscore the importance funeral and bring contributions. This is reciprocity (imbalan jasa). 45 of these bonds, a source of intrinsic social satisfaction, as well as political Ngarap-ngarapan, that is traditional retribution (hukuman adat).' and economic potency. Forthcoming chapters consider the collective (Gst Kanti, 1983.) As Putu Wijaya (1977: 201) describes the response of empowerment these values and sanctions engender. one of the characters in his novel Tiba-Tiba Malam, 'Now she under­ stood the meaning of ostracism. Because death cannot be faced alone like working in the ricefields.' The disruption of death ceremonies should be interpreted as informal 1. Lovric (1987: 136), however, ·underrates the significance of the 'demonic' aspect as extensions of the formal rights of the village over the cemetery and a metaphor for natural and social disorder in Balinese conceptualization. I question, too, responsibility for aspects of death ritual and ceremonial preparation. her conclusion that cyclicality and transmutation, associated with the ambiguity and ambivalence she rightly emphasizes, eliminate the significance of polarity or opposition in Within the framework of the ancestral religions of eastern Indonesia, the Balinese meaning system. On both points, Howe's work, focusing on the conceptual 46 though not of orthodox Hinduism, the soul is believed liminally bound homology and metaphysical relationship between the social realm and the spiritual­ to the fate of the corpse. At a deeper level, part of the distress caused by material universe is a useful complement to the natural-medical orientation of Lovric. disruptive incidents is connected with fears that these may influence the 2. The traditional ruler of Karangasem described to Mershon (1971: 329) the use of 62 ADA T AND DINAS EARTH, DEATH, AND CITIZENSHIP 63 puspa (flower effigies representing the souls of cremated ancestors to be further purified) 150/505). In Desa Tarian, the sale of teba accommodates new households and, more in the royal Maligia ceremony as follows: 'When they walk the flower effigies, it is to get recently, businesses. In these cases the land, having been certified as tanah D, is taxable -good by planting good in the body of the goddess of Earth, Dewi Pertiwi.' and may be resold. Nevertheless, it carries ayahan obligations to banjar/desa. 3. The placenta is identified with the fourth and most powerful of the guardian 11. Space empty of human habitation and lacking ritual care is dangerous space. An brothers (kanda 'mpat) that accompany the birth. He is Banaspati Raja, the Lord of the empty house yard (karang suung) attracts theirascible buta-kala and without regular offer­ Graveyard, and the child's protector through life. The placenta, along with the material ings to placate them becomes tenget, dangerously hot (Bhama Kretih, §§16 ff.; Jawatan manifestations of the other 'brothers'-all identified as both buta and deities (Mershon, Agama, 1973: 3). 1971: 70)-are ritually buried in front of the meten, the northerly, elevated pavilion which 12. In one case, where a house yard along the main road in Tarian was leased to an is the place of birth giving and, according to Howe (1980: 74, 26 ff.), a symbolic womb. A (unrelated) art dealer from the same banjar for use as a gallery and workshop, the contract midwife told Mershon (1971: 71), 'Birth and death are two ends of life. When one has included responsibility of thelessee to pay for the cremation costs of any household mem­ gone home to the gods, Banaspati Radja guards our bodies while they are in this ground. bers who should die during the period of the lease. They continue to reside in the com­ Banaspati Radja, our little one, is our ari-ari [afterbirth] who protects us all our life against pound which forms part of the art shop complex. illness, spells, and leyaks [witches].' 13. See Korn (1984 [1933]: 319) on Tenganan where all rice land is owned by the desa 4. Here theconcepts of 'impurity' and 'pollution' sometimes associated with earth and adat, and also Astika et al. (1986: 16-17). In 'Tatulingga' (Karangasem) parcels of land soil (cf. Douglas, 1966: 123 ff.) must be understood in relation to the deeper meaning of are attached to membership in the banjar and desa (Schaareman, 1986a: 198). According danger implicit in contact between opposed spatial and temporal poles, since earth is the to the lontar text, Markandya Purana, the legendary founder of the first Balinese commun­ transitionpoint between birth, death, and rebirth. The state of sebel connected with cyclic ity distributedparcels comprising karang, sawah, and tegal to those who would be respons­ processes of menstruation, birth, and death is defined in the Indonesia-Bali dictionary as ible for religious sanctuaries (kahyangan desa) (Suasthawa, 1987: 29). The sima for Desa berhalangan-to have an obstacle, to be prevented from. Connotations of impurity may Samiadji [Buleleng] states: 'If someone from outside the desa wishes to live in Samiadji, well represent one instance of originally neutral oppositions taking on asymmetric codings that person must be given a place to live including pekarangan, tegal, and sawah.' (Korn within a Hindu value hierarchy, as Howe has suggested. Endicott (1979: 10) notes that the Coll. 150/505.) The village regulationsof Desa Tenaon in North Bali graded village labour Batek have taboos associated with menstruation, but that these have no negative connota­ service according to the kind of village lands held: sawah holdings entailed a full share; tionsof pollutionattached to them. See also Foster (1979) on hierarchy and equivalence in tegal and forest, a half-share; and house yards, a quarter share of labour service obligations Balinese sexual symbolism. to the desa (Korn, 1924: 110). The awig-awig for Desa Tihingtali [Karangasem] states that 5. Howe (1980: 215-44) proposes that Balinese conceptions of the inherent qualities a desa member who has not repaid a debt to the desa after the usual procedures will have a of gods and demons parallel ideal valuations of the human order. The deities are fused, sign of prohibition (sawen) placed on all his village lands-irrigated, dry, and residential­ anonymous, and restrained forms of the supernaturalessence (atma), as in society the seka and is prohibited fromharvesting untilthe debt has been repaid. Further, if a villager buys, principle subsumes individual personality within the legal framework of the corporate sells, or pawns village lands without approval of the krama, thenthat rice land, garden, and whole. The demonic beings are transmuted forms of the deities themselves. They are house yard may be resumed by thekrama and reallocated (Korn Coll. 160/547). material as opposed to abstract, multiple rather than fused, egoistic and lacking in self­ 14. The subject of how catu lands in South Bali came to be related variously to village control rather than altruistic and restrained. There is a homology between the super­ and court service obligations is a confusing one (see Kaler, 1983a: 32-4). Korn (1924: natural, social, and natural worlds in the macrocosmic-microcosmic ontology of the 127) believed pecatu to be village lands to which the encroaching rajas 'latched on', Hindu-Balinese universe. 'In other words men distinguish themselves from animals and all demanding palace services fromthose who were already liable to village service. C. Geertz other non-humans (except the gods of course) in that they live by rules and conventions criticizes the retrospective Dutch reading of 'pseudo-feudalism' into a relationship that and thus have to restrain their natural impulses in order to create social harmony.' (Howe, cannot, he says, be treated as a system of land law. Granting that the whole question of 1980: 225-6.) 'ownership' in pre-colonial Bali is a vexed one, he states that neither village nor state 6. Note, too, thedisasters which the krama banjarclaim would befall thecommunity if 'owned' pecatu. Instead, the 'owners' of pecatu lands were those whose services to either they do not uphold their awig-awig in the expulsion case recounted by C. Geertz (1983). village or state were supported by the produce of these lands (C. Geertz, 1980: 176-7). 7. Schaareman (1986a: 67) stresses the importance of the soil itself as an object of The point here is that rights to certain cultivablelands were contingent on the provision of worship and notes that within the temple compound 'it is not so much the buildings or the labour services to desa, not only of the old-type, and that land rights were almost always shrines of the gods that are sacred, but primarily the soil on which the temple has been qualified and overlapping. built, which is consecrated and has to be kept pure. It should be remembered thata temple 15. Minahasa adat is interesting in this regard. Reportedly, the person who paid the often contains a shrine for the Ngrurah, the guardian of the temple soil, not of the build­ funeral expenses for the last heir obtained rights to the deceaseq's land (Burns, 1989: 52). ings' (emphasis in the original). Howe (1980: 74) notes that in the typical Pujung house 16. In Tarian, if any substantial amount of agricultural land is to be inherited, the temple (sanggah), theshrine which occupies the ritually elevated north-east position is that primary heir (usually the youngest male child) would receive a double portion of the dedicated to the earth goddess, Pertiwi. Stuart-Fox (1987: 33) points to the parallel loca­ otherwise equally divided estate for support of the house-yard temple. When, as is usually tion in the Pura Puseh of high and low stone seats dedicated to the god of Mount Agung the case, no more than one cutak (approximately 0.25 hectare) is owned, this is not di­ and to Ratu Dasar (Foundation), expressing 'the important duality of upperworld and vided and goes entirelyto the pengarep. In nearby Desa Petulu the pengarep alone bears full lowerworld, thesky and the earth'. responsibility to contribute to village temples and in turn acquires full rights to land, with 8. The length of prohibition applies according to the degree of relationship-42 days the result that other descendants frequently left the village and sought livelihoods else­ forfamily of the same household, 11 days for those from outside, 3 days for the banjar. where (Cok Anom, 1986; I Beneh, 1989). Some suggested that the custom originated under 9. The birth of such twins, manak salah, is putative incest and only the gods, and the Dutch, to reduce the amount of labour service (kerja rodi) which could be demanded triwangsa claiming affinity with them, are permitted brother-sister marriage. See Boon by the colonial government ( Gst Kanti, 1986; I Suta, 1986). (1977, 1990) on the symbolic significance of twin-incest beliefs in Balinese culture. 17. This untitled awig-awig banjar, belonging to the lontar collection in Geriya 10. The origin of the distinction between the two parts of karang desa was apparently Banjarangkan, Klungkung, appears to be intended as a model or compendium of local the Dutch taxation system under which teba, classified as tanah D, was taxable, and the regulations, since it refers to no particular banjar or desa. Numbering 39 double-sided part of karang on which the residential dwellings and family temple were constructed, leaves, it is more complete than most of the early awig-awig banjar in the Gedung Kertya called 'PKD' (pekarangan desa), was not (Drs Griyadi S. H., 1984; see also Korn Coll. and Korn collections. Without much more extensive comparative study of early awig-awig 64 ADA T AND DINAS EARTH, DEATH, AND CITIZENSHIP 65

texts, it is difficult to situate this particular manuscript in the genre. The characteristically belonged to the desa. Including the cemetery. This had to be acknowledged. This had been unsystematic format and repetition of topics (for example, the subject of death ceremonies the way things always were toward whoever.' (Wijaya, 1977: 227-8.) Recognizing this as andpatus obligations is treated in leaves la-4a, 7a, 8a, 13a-17b, and 22a-25b) suggest that just punishment for breaking the adat code, the family begs reconciliation and the body is it was based on a number of texts. As has been pointed out, customary codes were most finally put to rest with the assistance of the banjar-'dengan patuf, as it should be (Wijaya, likely to be set to writingas a result of disputation or some kind of disruption in the normal 1977: 230). course of local affairs. The composition or compilation of the Banjarangkan text is very 26. In fact, government efforts at conciliation came fairly close to achieving a negotiated likely connected with the impact of colonial policies. The Korn Collection 156/513 con­ solution in early 1981 by which the twelve families would form a tempek (subdivision of tains a list of desa, banjar, and pura in the district of Banjarangkan dated 1921, the year the banjar adat) within Banjar Satria. However, they resisted paying a fee for 're-entry' (lus before the date on this text, indicating a particular interest in this district by the colonial pasukan ayah-this was much lower than the pengajug fine they ultimately were forced to administration at the time. It is to my knowledge the only 'generic' banjar code of its kind pay as if new members purchasing a corporate share in the banjar) to the desa adat, argu­ and is a valuable document because of its broad-ranging content, the coincidence in ing they owed only missed contributions as if they had been on rantau, temporarily away significant detail with current or recent practice in many parts of Bali, and the unusual from the village; and so the negotiations broke down. Banjar Satria had been hesitant in extent of reference to banjar'-gentry relations. any case about the consequences of allowing them to remain a cohesive group within the 18. Dutch scholars have tended to exaggerate the significance of the Kahyangan Tiga banjar. as establishing the definitive character of the desa. Many desa adat do not in fact have the 27. At one point exclusion of the children from school was considered, but village classic three temples, and many have more than one cemetery. Across the gamut of officials decided that would be going too far and simply instructed the principal not to configurations, nevertheless, van Bloemen Waanders's stress on the equivalent status of enter their addresses on the school roles (I Puja, 1984). In the 1960s, though, when several village temple and cemetery complex in desa constitution holds. PK.I members in Siang refused to pay dues to the desa adat, their children had been 19. Ida Bagus Wanosari (1986) put it precisely in those terms when describing the refused entry to school (Ni Narini, 1987). According to H. Geertz (pers. com., 1986), two ngirim part of the cremation ceremony in which 'society that can be seen (nyata) and that members of a performing troupe in the village she was studying were unable to obtain cannot be seen (niskala) pays homage to the God of the Pura Dalem and requests that the passports to travel overseas with their seka because they had been expelled by their banjar soul receives a place thatis good'. and could not get thenecessary signatures as a result. 20. See Appendix 2 for an example. See also Awig-awig Bandjar Basangalas, Korn 28. These 1978 regulations, jointly decided by the Desa Council and the leaders of its Coll. 160/548; Awig-awig Bandjar Kasirnpar, Korn Coll. 160/551; Awig-awig Banjar, two des a adat, are as follows: 1922; Sirna Krama Bandjar Belong Gede, 1967. 1. Sanctions for Administrative Residents [that is, in-migrants who have not joined a 21. Opinions differ on whether the ritual is nullified by the absence of this toya!tirta. banjar adat] who have no fixed address or employment, or who break the law or are The bendesa of Tarian insisted it was a matter of personal interpretation. If the family con­ regarded as soiling the good name of the desa: (a) warning; (b) fine of Rp 2,500; cerned felt the ceremony had been deficient in some respect, they would probably repeat (c) refusal of administrative services; (d) expulsion from residence. it. But he had never come across anything with respect to nullified cremation rituals in his 2. Sanctions for Krama Adat: (a) warning; (b) fine of Rp 2,500; (c) labour service reading of religious texts (Cok Anom, 1985). The practice is, as far as I have been able to (ngayah) for seven days as instructed by the Bendesa Adat; (d) temporary expulsion determine, not known outside this region of Gianyar. from the krama banjar, with no social or administrative services for such period of time 22. The suit concerned the division of puri property as well as agricultural lands. It was as is determined by the banjar. brought to the civil law courts in 1971, where it remains to this day unresolved. Six years 29. They were also under pressure from regional authorities to stay out of the dispute. after the initiation of the lawsuit a section of the puri forecourt (ancaksajz), which could not Kabupaten files indicate the signatories were questioned by police for 'inflaming' the affair. in any case be divided among the heirs, had been offered to Banjar Satria for the construc­ 30. The bendesa adat of Siang made pointed reference to the connection between village tion of a bale banjar. Banjar Satria had been formed in 1952, and still in 1971 shared the residence and cemetery, claiming that if the dissident families were to bury outside, they use of another banjar's meeting house. Objections to the use of this land only surfaced should properly live outside as well (I Milet, 1985). after money had been raised and construction was well-advanced. It is possible that the 31. A kind of transference may be accomplished through ceremonial emplacement of donation of land for common purpose was at a later stage seen by the rival claimants to ancestral spirits, but there is a continuing sense of obligation to maintain ritual ties to the have potential implications for their legal suit. At any rate, while the contested land claim place of origin. ID health or fortune are commonly attributed by Balinese to a forgotten was the initial source of the conflict, the issue of banjar fission took on a life of its own. origin connection and the failed responsibilities to ancestral progenitors (leluur) which The land claim receded into the background and was barely mentioned in thecorrespond­ result. ence which took place over the next several years. 32. Conversely, at the death of a child who has not yet cut its permanent teeth 23. In practice, whether fission proceeds under conflicting circumstance seems to have (maketus), and who is therefore not a full social being, the kulkul is not struck and the a great deal to do with the size of the dissenting faction. Where party politics split banjar banjar is not called to assist with the burial. And, indeed, no cremation is necessary in this into sizeable factions in the 1960s, the tension was sometimes resolved by division. case. Such a child is regarded as still godlike, its soul not tied to the material-social world, 24. See Chapter 10 for a very impressive explicationof the principles of banjar leader­ and not yet influenced by feelings of enthusiasm or laziness (I Mica, 1984; Cok Anom, 1985). ship in one of the letters addressed to the klian from the protesting faction. 33. In orthodox Hindu religious tradition the cremation ritual does not have any direct 25. Such an event marks the climax in the novel Tiba-Tiba Malam by Putu Wijaya. One effect on the place of the soul in the next life. This is solely the consequence of karma, the ra of the protagonists, led astray by a philistine tourist, is expelled from the k ma for ignor­ person's own accumulated merit. But in eastern Indonesian cultural conceptions shared by ing his traditional obligations there. When his long-suffering wife dies, no one will come to Balinese thereis a strong sensein which the ritual treatment of the remains is of primary assist with the burial .. His daughter is driven to distraction by her father's wayward beha­ importance in the liberation of the soul. viour. In desperation she explodes at him, 'Look, mother is dead. Who will help with the 34. This approach would undoubtedly deepen insights into the relationship between burial? Beg forgiveness of the banjar!' (Wijaya, 1977: 201-3.) In the face of the father's conceptions of community and the ritual and beliefs associated with death. Analogous to stubborn passivity, the family are forced to bury the body alone, only to find the corpse the importance of in-village burial raised in the Siang case, Appell (1985: 27) reports that lying in the courtyard the next morning. 'Then consciousness (kesadaran) dawned. The according to Bulusu (Kalimantan) adat, it was a ritual offence to entomb a corpse in people of the desa had not been incited by anyone. Their leader was the adat that they all another village. Payment of a fine in the form of a valuable jar was imposed for doing so. respect. Subali had been put out of the desa. That meant he had no right to anything that Comparative study of the cosmology of eastern Indonesian cultures might form the ADA T DINAS 66 AND EARTH, DEATH, AND CITIZENSHIP 67 starting-point for interpreting autochthonous elements in Balinese ancestral religion. when it is time to depart for the cemetery there is anyone from the seka who does not Scharer (1963), Jensen (1974), Fox (1980), and Volkman (1985), to name only a few, come near the corpse, staying far, he must be fined 12 kepeng, and if there is a banjar present indicative parallels. See also Fox (1989). member who uses boreh [scented powder-ointment], he too is fined 12 kepeng. When it is rorasin nyekah 35. 'Once or [secondary cremation ceremonies] has been performed, the time to carry the corpse to the graveyard, if one of the banjar doesn't approach the litter, kamulan soul can finally be supplicated in the family temple at the [origin] shrine. When a the fine is 12 kepeng. On arrival at the cemetery, if there is a member who distances him­ child is born in the compound, the soul is conceived as corning from the temple.... self and doesn't want to come close, he will be fined 12 kepeng.' (Awig-awig Banjar, Analogously the same sort of cyclical movement can be detected with reference to the vil­ 1922: §16b.) kamulan lage as a whole. In Pujung the village Pura Puseh contains a shrine at which the 42. The spinning of the corpse as it exits from the household and as it enters the village ancestors may be propitiated. These souls are thought to reincarnate into village graveyard has both symbolic and play dimensions. Symbolically, it reverses the direction folk. After death the souls hover around the graveyard until cremation has been performed of the souls's entry into the world (CokPutra, 1984; I Mica, 1984). The 'play' is said to whip and they can be ushered back into the village. Some, however, are said to be impeded up enthusiasm and suppress revulsion induced by the corpse ·cconnor, 1979), although, through ritual mistakes or excessive sins and get no further than the Pura Dalem.' (Howe, ideally, self-control (gemes) and respectful sympathy (suka-duka) are supposed to over­ 1980: 317.) come these feelings. Bateson and Mead (1942: 243 ff.) indicate that exaggerated gestures toya penembak banjar 36. Insistence on the potency of in the Tarian area is perhaps and behaviour appeared to be consciously selected on particular occasions ( see also another example of deference to alternate sources of spiritual power. See also the interest­ 'Njoeh Tebel,' Mead Coll. Nll). H. Schulte Nordholt (pers. com., 1989) was told in Banjar ing legend recounted by Howe (1980: 17-19) which gives villagers in Pujung the right to Pacung in Blahkiuh, Mengwi that 'a good cremation has to have a lot of ngarap going on'. obtain water normally provided by a Brahrnana priest from their own village temple. 43. Ngarap simply means to handle, to work, to carry out, but in the context of death 37. A royal corpse was normally embalmed and preserved in the special pavilion, ceremonies refers specifically to the removal of the body from the household's ritual Bale Semengen, until cremation.The last ruler of Tarian was kept in this state for several pavilion, the bale dangin, to the bier for the washing ritual and conduct to the cemetery, years because the financial decline of the royal house prevented its being conducted on an both of which are banjar obligations. appropriate scale. But concepts of lirninality clearly also apply to the god-king. Dewa Dani 44. Contributors to the Institut Hindu Dharma Seminar (IHD, 1979) found no refer­ puri explained that popular pressure finally forced the to carry out the ceremony in 1936 ence to disruptive practices in traditional texts. Several awig-awig allude to them, however: when epidemics and harvest failures were attributed to the increasing danger of leaving the 'And the behaviour of the seka [banjar] charged with conveying the corpse to the graveyard soul of the deceased king in this exposed state (Dw Dani, 1982). Hilbery (pers. com., 1983) untilthe burning should be to follow the direction of those to whom the 'work' [ceremony] reports the same ambivalent feelings expressed in popular culture-of danger yet reluc­ belongs, to carry it out in sympathy as one krama banjar. And if one of the seka drops the tance to part finally with the deceased-among the Puri Ubud family following the death corpse or drops the tower or if it is drenched in a stream because it is allowed to tilt, or if of the greatly loved Tjokorda Agung Sukawati. in the cemetery he causes the corpse to be dropped, the fine is 25 kepeng. And if one of the 38. That the ancestral associations of the cyclical transformation from birth to death to seka does not carry the body or follow the directions of the person holding the ceremony rebirth mediated by earth are incorporated in the Balinese Brahrnanic tradition too is or of the klian, he must pay 25 kepeng as a substitute for his labour service' (Awig-awig lontar evident in and the teachings of knowledgeable Pedanda. The Y amapurwa Tatwa Banjar Kasimpar, Korn Coll. 160/551). The awig-awig of Karang Bangbang (Lombok) prescribes burial for at least one year before ceremonial treatment of the corpse 'so that it states: 'When accompanying the litter, the members must walk to the right and left and are can return to the womb of Thu Pertiwi, as if awaiting the time for birth' (Yamapurwa not allowed to throw water at each other in fun. The fine is 125 kepeng' (Adatrechtbundels, Tatwa, §§13a-b: 13-22). Pedanda Made describes the 'mother-father' offerings at death 1918: 272). In Banjar Pekandelan there is a fine of 5 kepeng which can be demanded by ceremonies as linking birth and death, the placenta and the graveyard (Mershon, the aggrieved familyif the body or coffin is dropped, 'but it would not be easy for a person 1971: 212). to get even 5 kepeng out of the banjal ( Gst Kanti, 1983). maperas, 39. The which takes place the day before the burning, was the most emotion­ 45. The disruptions themselves may in turn provoke retribution.According to Dewa ally laden part of the ngaben ritual, and is, like many other aspects of this ceremony, of Dani (1984), an individual unfairly dealt with might become suddenly wealthy, as did an indigenous, non-Indic origin (see Crucq, 1928: 113-14). In it a male and female descend­ artshop owner from Tarian whose father had experienced the brunt of 'banjar law', ant, or other younger relatives of the deceased, circle a large set of offerings ( tumpeng although not without justification in Gusti Kanti's view (1984). In the case of the Singaraja solas) three times, following behind the small outrigger boat that is to carry the deceased to ngarap incident, some of the instigators of the desecration were killed during the violence the next world. Looking through a toy telescope, they call out after the departing soul. The in 1965 (D. Myers, pers. com., 1987). soul responds, 'Can't you see me? I'm on my way to another world.' To comfort the 46. The lontar Sara-samuschaya states: 'Corporeal remains have no value, theycan be children, the departing spirit leaves gifts of cloth and a kris which are part of this most thrown away as useless; nevertheless they are given respect· and importance by the complex of the ngaben ritual offerings. The other ingredients of this banten are intended as family ...' (cited in submission by Ida Bagus Keniten to the Institut Hindu Dharrna supplies for the deceased and gifts which will gain it passage to its destination ( Cok Anom, Seminar,1979). 1985; Ni Puri, 1985). The 'ship of the dead' symbolism, so central to rites of passage in 47. Olson (1971) considers selective benefits and coercive sanctions of some kind to be other Indonesian cultures, is a striking aspect of this climactic moment in the Balinese the only means of attenuating the tendency for rational self-interested individuals to 'free secondary ritual for the dead. (See Plate 11 and an identical pemerasan offering in Bateson ride' rather than risk loss acting in the common interest. Popkin applies this argument to and Mead, 1942: 253. See also Hooykaas, 1956: 81; Scharer, 1963: 91; Huntington and peasant societiesmore generally. Different cultural constructionsof self-interest, of course, Metcalf, 1979: 70-3; Hicks, 1984: 117-18; Feldman, 1985: 38-9, 106.) need not necessarily carry the thoroughly individualistic connotationthat this concept does 40. Banjar do not seem to be powerful institutions in villages where they are not in Western culture. Despite his critique of 'romantic' visions of closed corporate com­ responsible for the conduct of death ceremonies. Stuart-Fox (1987: 45) says that the ban­ munities, even Popkin's model of 'rational peasant' behaviour recognizes that as an organ­ jar of Besakih are not involved in funerary ritual which has always been the concern of kin­ ization is· institutionalized over time, longer-term common interests become a groups in that region. Although the degree of involvement of banjar as opposed to kin in taken-for-granted part of group action and the immediate dependence of collective action death ceremonies varies considerably, banjar labour assistance and conduct to the upon selective incentives or sanctions diminishes (Popkin, 1979: 3, 257). graveyard are minimal requisites for a properly conducted ceremony in most parts of Bali. 41. The Banjarangkan awig-awig lists fines for distancing oneself from the corpse: 'If, MYTHS AND METAPHORS 69 involved with the foundation of some desa and imposing puri were not uncommonly situated (as in Tarian) at the desa centre, with lesser branch gentry houses in surrounding banjar. It is impossible under these circumstances to treat supra-local authority as entirely external to village relations. 3 Accounts of pre-colonial Bali reveal wide variations in the structural relationship between the gentry, their retainers, clients, and servant­ Myths and Metaphors: dependants (pamekel, roban, parakan), and village institutions. Hobart (1979: 488) reports disagreement among his informants in their assess­ Hierarchy and Equality in ment of relationships between the local puri, the desa, and the banjar. Balinese Culture Some described direct involvement of the rulers in the selection or approval of bendesa and klian. Among those in Tarian who were know­ ledgeable about local history, too, differences of opinion and interpreta­ tion were considerable. Most insisted that there was popular control over local leadership (klian and bendesa), but that consideration was inevitably taken of the acceptability of banjar and desa leaders to the The DorpsrepubliekMyth 2 court (Dw Dani, 1982; I Yasa 1982; Cok Anom, 1985; Gst Kwanji, 1985; I Toya, 1985). AN exaggerated image of the Asian village as autonomous, homogen­ Several of the written awig-awig in the Korn Collection contain refer­ eous, and unchanging pervaded colonial and academic discourse until ences to rulers and their retainers. They indicate that the power of the intensive historical and ethnographic studies in recent years began to courts formally restricted, and relations of patronage must have inform­ revise thisOrientalist construction. Certainly, the dorpsrepubliek image of ally compromised, the theoretical autonomy of village institutions. Little the village in Bali is open to many of the revisions Breman puts forth for work has been done on these important texts, however, and considerable its Javanese counterpart, some of these suggested earlier by C. Geertz care needs to be taken in interpreting them. Inscription of village codes, (1961) in his critical assessment of the axioms of classical Dutch schol­ by the very fact that they have been put to writing, indicate some excep­ arship. In the Balinese case it is particularly inaccurate to reduce the tional incident or dispute precipitating intervention. Certainly, a more complexity of local social structure to some version of an ideal-type thorough analysis of pre-colonial codifications of local customary law 'closed corporate community' (Wolf, 1957). The intersecting planes of should provide some insights into the nature of village-state relations organization, and the segregation of agricultural from residential struc­ before the imposition of colonial administrative mechanisms. Variations tures in the subak and banjar in particular, prevent us from treating the among the limited number of texts surveyed to date suggest that the Balinese desa as the bounded, co-ordinate unit that stereotyped concep­ extent of co-option of village headmen by the courts, and of participa­ tions of the 'village' conventionally implied (C. Greetz, 1959). Clearly, tion in village affairs by commoner retainers and by gentry3 outside the lowland Balinese villages were (and are) neither socio-economically ruling aristocracy differed markedly with distance from powerful court homogeneous, nor closed and tightly integrated. They have always been, centres and with other social, geographic, and historical circumstances. although in considerably varying degrees, socially and economically If the internal differentiation of local communities and involvement of stratified and organizationally decentred. Even within households, inter­ agents of the state require us to qualify images of independent and co­ nal differentiation exists between full desa members (pengarep) and those hesive villages, the competing rivalries that characterized the ruling aris­ who do not inherit the rights and obligations of primary heir.1 tocracy, the non-co-ordinate structure of village-state relations and the Pengempian generally pay half-contributions for temple ceremonies and ambiguous status of their respective spheres of authority undo also any other desa adat levies, and according to some constitutions they could conception of a stable overarching system of autocratic authority.4 The not be elected as heads of desa, although they typically had full civic hierarchy and patronage upon which the negara was built represented no rights in the banjar. more than one set of symbolic and organizational constructs among As the homogeneous composition of Balinese villages is qualified by others. H. Schulte Nordholt (1986: 20) questions the appropriateness of distinctions between and within households, the closed and autonomous Western conceptions of the 'state' in the pre-colonial Balinese context: 'I status of the desa is challenged by complex and pervasive sets of rela­ doubt that . . . the Balinese negara had . . . even the vaguest signs of tions which existed between villagers and the often multiple and com­ things like a bureaucracy, uniformity in regulations or government, nor a peting local courts (puri). The Balinese precept, Desa, Kala, Patra, monopoly of power in the center.' He describes it instead as structured referring to the relativity of adat according to 'village, time, and circum­ around an 'hierarchical order' based on parallel sources of authority in stance,' asserts the principle of village autonomy and the variation in the political and ritual domains. local practice encoded in awig-awig. But ruling lords were intimately H. Schulte Nordholt's pathbreaking work is the most important in this 70 ADA T AND DINAS MYTHS AND METAPHORS 71 vein on Bali. On the basis of a combination of archival research and structures and meanings grounded in popular culture and local practice. extensive ethnographic and oral historical studies of the Negara In the first place, the conception of the desa adat as an autonomous Mengwi, he presents a picture of a dual order of political relations or­ totality cannot be dismissed out of hand. The Balinese desa, as ganized on the one hand around complex networks of leaders and fol­ Guermonprez (1991) is at pains to point out, and H. Schulte Nordholt lowers 'which had nothing to do with the desa' and on the other around (1988b) accedes, presents itself symbolically at least as a corporate unit. a ritual order in which villages appeared to form the basic units of the The question here is whether that symbolism has practical social and negara. It was in this ritual domain that a hierarchy of temples linked vil­ political significancefor local authority. The evidence on everyday prac­ lage to state and where mobilization 'was organized by the royal centre tice and occasional dispute demonstratesthat the institutional expression itself (H. Schulte Nordholt, 1991: 8-9). Political power was achieved of desa symbolism may be decentred in most Balinese villages, but through patron-client ties mediated by agents of the court, pamekel, krama banjar, subak, and pemaksan perceive themselves as enacting the independent of village leadership, while the desa and banjar were re­ fundamental principles of seka unity and corporate equality embedded cruited as corporate units for maintaining the ritual order. in the overarching code. I do not subscribe to the view that the existence The horizontal divide between village and state presented in of vertical linkages should lead us to cast doubt on the corporate charac­ Orientalist scholarship is reconceptualized by H. Schulte Nordholt in ter of the village order, or its implications for local solidarity and hori­ 5 terms of parallel and interdependent vertical hierarchies-one political, zontal reciprocal relations, though we must certainly qualify simplistic the other symbolic-which integrated negara and desa in thepre-colonial conceptions of how these work and recognize their limits. The fact that order. In contrast to C. Geertz (1980), H. Schulte Nordholt (1986: 24) banjar, subak, and pemaksan as the practical bearers of this alter-identity shows a more balanced appreciation of the real political nature of the do not neatly coincide with the desa unit, where the Dutch vision of the negara and its rituals and of the symbolic character of the desa. While, in dorpsrepubliek placed it, should lead us to doubt suggestions that the his view neither village nor state can be regarded as cohesive entities, solidarities we find there were largely of external manufacture. both belong to the same hierarchic order. He argues that much more Ultimately I am concerned with the implications for the present of the important than any presumed 'village solidarity' was the question of myths and metaphors surrounding these images of corporate unity, whether or not one was subject to the protection of one of the powerful equality, and village autonomy on the one hand, and those of hierarchy lords of the region or the ruler himself (H. Schulte Nordholt, 1986: 15). and patronage associated with the state on the other. As one of his informants said, 'Local adat, what did it matter in those There are considerable differences in the use of the concept of hier­ days? It was the lord who decided about local adat, for he had power' archy in the work of Hobart (1975), Boon (1977), C. Geertz (1980), (H. Schulte Nordholt, 1986: 18). Like Breman, H. Schulte Nordholt Howe (1980), H. Schulte Nordholt (1986), and Guermonprez (1991). questions the corporate character of the pre-colonial village. Both assert These refer variously to stratified orders of authority, status, or cultural that the image of the 'traditional' desa as a democratic republic was value depending upon the context and the degree of influence from the an externally constructed one which suited the legitimating and admin­ work of Louis Dumont. But, although it would be a mistake to conflate istrative requirements of the colonial state (H. Schulte N ordholt, 1991: theirapproaches, the connection between hierarchies of value and power 6 7-16). relations is implicit in much of this work. Howe's most recent article, H. Schulte Nordholt makes skilful use of precisely the kind of local 'Hierarchy and Equality' (1989)-drawing also on the work of sources Breman urges to place revisionist deconstructions in perspect­ Guermonprez-does shiftthe focus significantly, but still locates 'egalit­ ive. But he interprets the evidence of local political action-several dra­ arian' structures and cultural values in the minority of mountain matic exhibitions of banjar activism which occurred in the 1930s and Balinese communities and transitional villages where, for primarily eco­ 1970s-in terms of Dutch-influenced adat constructs (H. Schulte logical reasons, the caste ideol9gy that he claims dominates lowland vil­ Nordholt, 1986, 1988, 1991). 'Adat was conceptualized as a distinct lages did not take hold. Howe does not appear to recognize the extent to domain and this provided the opportunity to formulate a kind of which this alternate 'egalitarian' complex has pan-Balinese cultural and counter-identity at a local level in order to avoid unwanted state interfer­ institutional referents. The overarching focusin the literature tends to be ence.' (H. Schulte Nordholt and Ruiter, 1989: 131.) This emphasis on on status rivalry and the centrality of a hierarchic ordering of value adat as colonial artifice does not take sufficient account of the popular around cultural idioms of purity, potency, and centricity or on vertical cultural sources of local solidarities. Although I have made some use of ties of a patron-client type based on unequal political and economic oral history, indigenous texts, and colonial documents, I do not have resources. The cumulative effect of the focus on hierarchy in the the material to present a coherent picture of pre-colonial relations. I can ethnography of Bali, the orders of value associated with it, and the rela­ only speculate on these in so far as the evidence from these sketchy tions of patronage it spawns, detract in my view from the parallel sources and from contemporary fieldwork contradict what seems to be significance of cultural and social practices that make no sense in these an overarching emphasis on hierarchic values and vertical social rela­ terms. tions in the contemporary literature on Bali at the expense of opposed 72 ADA T AND DINAS MYTHS AND METAPHORS 73 Hobart shows how the depersonalising, despecifying formal code of councils Patronage and Corporate Principles in Local Politics makes it unsuitable for the sectarian interests of patrons who therefore employ Hobart's (1975, 1979) work on Banjar 'Pisangkaja' in the village of orators to represent them and express pious sentiments on their behalf, while they pay fines for non-attendance and are able to carry out their divisive inter­ 'Tengahpadang', provides the most detailed consideration of patronage ests in ordinary language outside the council.... [T]he carriers of the formal in local politics in the literature on contemporary Bali. He directs atten­ code, because of the gradual impotence which it causes, are 'kicked upstairs' by tion to the important distinction between formally democratic principles the carriers of the informal code. (Bloch, 1975: 27-8.) of institutional autonomy, legal equality, consensual decision-making, and corporate priority embedded in banjar customary codes and the In Hobart's presentation the two coexisting and conceptually distinct actual influence of private economic and social interests which these political arenas are structurally opposed: principles theoretically exclude. Following Bloch (1975), Hobart (1975: 92) contends that restriction on the style of expression and sphere of arena structural relation principle of action actor competence of the banjar assembly 'leads to the use of alternative polit­ formal symmetricaVegalitarian moral orator ical relations [in the informal sphere], free of traditional restraints, based informal asymmetrical/hierarchic instrumental patron on patronage and factional ties'. While the unitary seka principle and rules of procedure in formal banjar contexts suppress explicit mobiliza­ By insisting on the subordination of the formal domain to instrumentally tion of factions, he contends that the competing interests of patron­ motivated behaviour in the informal arena, his interpretation subscribes oriented factions nevertheless do find expression in banjar politics to Bloch's implicit conferral of primacy on vertical over horizontal rela­ through an informal elite of orators. tions. 8 Unlike patrons (members of the traditional aristocracy, civil servants, A closer look at Hobart's case-studies from Tengahpadang suggest and agents of political parties whose status, office, or wealth make it that his emphasis on the role of patronage-based factional alignments in difficult for them to present their views publicly in the disinterested banjar decision-making is almost certainly overdrawn. His reference to manner regarded as ideal), orators tend to be individuals without 'factions' as tempek (Hobart, 1975: 82) indicates a clouded distinction significant extra-banjar connections and of comparatively poor circum­ between what he is claiming are informal alliances based on political stance. Their considerable influence in the assembly is based on per­ interests and the formal subdivisions (usually, but not necessarily, geo­ sonal qualities, knowledge of local adat, and skills in public speaking. graphic) that the term tempek normally designates (cf. Hobart, 1979: Hobart argues that a dual leadership pattern consequently emerges, with 141). It is therefore unlikely except by extraordinary coincidence that in orators operating directly in the banjar assembly, where corporate ideals all the instances described Hobart's 'factions' actually represented dis­ are supposed to predominate, and patrons exercising their influence on crete political interest groups. orators in the informal arena. Although close association with patrons In one of the cases meant to illustrate the workings of factional align­ would compromise an orator's credibility, covert alliances develop and ments, the election of a klian banjar is recounted in which '[f] our fac­ orators are able to use their skills to frame the factional interests of tions9 of approximately equal size existed, and each informally proposed powerful patrons in terms of principles acceptable in the public forum its own candidate' (Hobart, 1975: 88). In fact, this description fits con­ (Hobart, 1975: 83-5). ventional election procedure (see Chapter 4) in which each of the tempek This presentation of a shadow leadership pattern, allied to formal and constituting the banjar puts forth a nominee, all but one of whom norm­ informal political arenas and codes of expression, shares certain features ally stand down when some sort of consensus can be secured in the with Bloch's proposition (1975: 6, 12 ff.) that formalized rules and informal arena. The one remaining candidate is then chosen by ac­ speech forms are essentially vehicles of traditional authority and estab­ clamation. Candidates put up by tempek in such cases cannot be re­ lished power relations, a thesis he extends in a controversial later pre­ garded as representing opposed political interests in the sense in which sentation (Bloch, 1977) to include cultural and structural elaboration Hobart interprets these. The withdrawing nominees commonly take on more generally.7 At the local level, the Balinese case appears to reverse other offices as secretary, treasurer, klian tempek, or klian adat. In an­ Bloch's equation of the formal sphere with traditional authority of a other of Hobart's cases, where a contest for the position of klian dinas hierarchic nature, since the principles upon which banjar purport to did occur between the nominees of two of the four 'factiom', and where operate prescribe strict legal equality of members. But in so far as the votes had to be cast, the candidate who lost the election by a narrow banjar assembly cannot be used to express the power interests of indi­ margin was then chosen as klian desa (adat), and 'came to have more viduals directly, these, it is argued, are displaced to the informal arena influence than the klian dinas ... especially as he was not the puppet of a where they can be given free play. Through co-option of the orator as faction' (Hobart, 1979: 581). Where 'factions' actually refer to institu­ carrier of the formal code, these interests can then be reinserted in the tional tempek, significant reinterpretation of Hobart's material is neces­ assembly in a disguised mode: sary, including the interests alleged to be served by 'orators', among 74 ADA T AND DINAS MYTHS AND METAPHORS 75 whom are elected banjar and tempek heads (Hobart, 1979: 563, 583). the constraints of formal speech (high Balinese) and elaborated rules The category of 'patron' itself is rendered problematic by loose inhibit 'straight-talking' debate and restrict political participation to an definition and the inclusion of relationships to individuals from whom it 'elite' few, throwing politics into the informal arena where power struc­ may only be advice in domestic matters that constitutes the 'favours' tures and relations of patronage are able to assert themselves more sought (Hobart, 1979: 496). Such relationships of 'domestic patronage', freely. This interpretation ignores the extent to which corporate values argued to be the 'basic units of factional membership' (Hobart, 1979: impinge on the informal (but also public) domain informing everyday 552), were constructed by Hobart from indications by respondents of discussions in the coffee-shops and bale banjar. It also underrates the 'socially valued relationships' to 'someone in particular to whom they flexibility of the formal assembly context and the effect of shifting lan­ can turn for help', material or otherwise (Hobart, 1979: 497). Hobart guage levels, running commentaries, and grumbled expressions of dis­ (1979: 511, 520-1) acknowledges that the asymmetrical 'patron-client' sent on the periphery. Hobart's (1975: 77) description alludes to these connotation he places on these relationships is not necessarily shared by other aspects of the collective decision-making process: 'The style of his informants. Factional alignments appear to be construed from a pre­ debate in Balinese assemblies is distinctive-speeches are short and sub­ sumptive assignation of patronage to otherwise loose social ties of dued, rarely lasting more than five minutes, and consist of a series of kinship, neighbourhood, or friendship. The social and economic rela­ exchanges between rival orators until the mood of the meeting becomes tionships reported in Hobart's tabular data (1979: 498-511) are so thor­ clear [emphasis added] . oughly cross-cutting that their conversion into coalescent 'factions' In contrast to Hobart's (1979: 561) assertion that compromise solu­ would be difficult to demonstrate. Many of those described as 'patrons' tions 'are relatively infrequent as the implicit defeat of opposing factions do not fitthe conventional definition of the term as individuals of super­ is one of the main aims of assembly conflict', in my observation of the ior rank with sufficient access to political and economic resources to processes of decision-making in the eight banjar of Desa Tarian, con­ grant favours and instil obligations (Scott, 1972). 10 To describe recog­ tests of interest and principle usually did result in some kind of negoti­ nized relationships to a loose group of respected individuals (Hobart, ated resolution. Where conflicting opinions continued to be aired, or 1979: 551) as the basis of 'factional' alignments is to reify much more where a disaffected mood was evident from the tone of sideline discus­ fluid associations and undoubtedly exaggerate their political potency. As sion, postponement until the next meeting inevitably followed. In the Hobart (1979: 546) himself says, 'The membership of factions therefore interim a great deal of lobbying in the informal arena took place. But as seems to be based upon a range of criteria, such that they do not have the deliberations over nominees for village office discussed in Chapter 4 any clear constituent principle nor permanent political orientation.' The show, informal processes of consultation commonly transcend pre­ very fragmented character of the alignments he reports would render dictable personal or 'factional' loyalties and have ultimately also to be them relatively ineffectual in the face of the very strong unitarian philos­ framed in terms of common interest, a common interest that is not mere ophy of Balinese corporate groups.11 'appearance'. 12 A concept much more diluted than that of the 'faction' then is neces­ It is true that apparent consensus in banjar decision-making often dis­ sary to describe the alignments on particular issues which tend to guises what are in fact majority positions, as Hobart (1975: 88) rightly emerge in banjar politics. Along the continuum between parties, fac­ points out. One villager's account of the election of the klian in his ban­ tions, and networks, the typical pattern of informal lobbying which pre­ jar expresses well how this occurs: cedes assembly decision-making falls strongly toward the network end of ribut the spectrum, and a very loosely defined and cross-cutting network at It can get [ excited, disturbed]. This time it took several months of meet- that. The fluidity of the informal alliances reported by Hobart is striking. ings. First, several people were nominated publicly. Some declined. Others were considered by the committee, but there were objections to most. Finally, I Bedeg In another of his examples, the 'orator' of one 'faction' is persuaded, was put forward. This time the few people-maybe three or four-who may with no apparent difficulty, to change his position and support a can­ have preferred someone else were quiet, malu [embarrassed, shy], since most of didate other than that of his alleged 'patron' (Hobart, 1975: 86). In the banjar were satisfied. So it appeared unanimous. (I Madra, 1984.) assembly debate, Hobart (1975: 88) says, the results 'are never entirely predictable, as much hinges on the skill and performance of orators'. In a number of debates I observed, once the weight of argument (formal Because orators must appear disinterested to retain public regard, they speech and informal background commentary) fell strongly to one side, have a strong tendency to behave independently and even economic opposing speakers eventually fell silent. 13 incentives may not assure their political allegiance (see, forone instance, Again, in contrast to Hobart's (1979: 561) assertion that the defeat of Hobart, 1979: 560). opposition factions is an objective of assembly debate, the ultimate res­ The real question is to what extent vertical power alignments, how­ olution of contentious issues was rarely uncompromising in Tarian. ever fragmented, impinge on the processes of local decision-making. In Unsatisfied minority interests invariably resurfaced further down the the formal arena of the banjar assembly, Hobart and Bloch contend that track. This happened in Banjar Madya and Banjar Lagas on the issue of 76 ADA T AND DINAS MYTHS AND METAPHORS 77 collective cremations, and in Banjar Kalih over the question of leader­ purchasing gamelan orchestras, establishing a savings and loan associ­ ship. It is also well illustrated in the Su tawan et al. ( 1984) discussion of ation, and other public projects such as the bridge built in Banjar Madya subak debates proceeding over a decade in which the manner of water with materials provided by local merchants. It is also common for distribution was challenged and altered several times. In any situation schoolteachers or educated lesser gentry members to serve as secretary where a fragmented and fluid power structure assures no patron or or treasurer, as the former perbekel and head of a once-wealthy aristo­ political stance a long-term monopoly, the need to take account of cratic family has in Banjar Madya for the past 20 years. So long as it is minority opinion is evident. Accommodation and compromise are also understated and apparently disinterested, such activities enhance the elements of informal procedure ultimately necessary to accomplish the reputations of these individuals. But the extent to which this increases ideal of unanimity in the public forum.Nor did the formal requirements their capacity to press private interests in banjar affairs is heavily modu­ of polite speech and disinterested argumentation prevent outspoken lated. Suspicion of tendentious intent is very much a part of the collect­ expression of dissent. Allegations of impropriety on the part of banjar ive ethos of banjar practice and overt attempts to convert redistributive leadership were aired openly in the banjar of Kalih, Sangan, and only behaviours to personal advantage ultimately discredit them.15 slightly more obliquely in Pekandelan during the period of my research It would be incorrect to treat redistributive behaviours within a hori­ in Tarian. zontally structured group like the banjar as merely a corporate version of Whatever may have been the case in Tengahpadang, broad consulta­ 'clientelism'. Scott (1972: 97) radically distinguishes asymmetric ties tion and compromise or provisional accommodation are far more typical based on categorical groupings, where there are strong mediating hori­ outcomes of both formal and informal political processes at local level zontal connections among members, from properly patron-client ties than Hobart concludes. In Desa Tarian, clearly marked factional align­ which are dyadic and personal. 16 Since the contribution of talent or ments associated with patron-client ties were not a regular feature of materials from those who have them is taken for granted, they are not so banjar politics. 14 The private interests of individuals and groups with much given as demanded. Someone who stands out (menonjol) has to political and economic power did influence assembly politics most ser­ prove comradely equality (suspicions being otherwise), by underwriting iously through exclusion of issues from the assembly agenda when his commitment to the group in time or cash. The appearance of disin­ strong resistance was a foregone conclusion. This was especially appar­ terested subscription to the good of the seka whole is therefore essential. ent in banjar such as Pekandelan where caste-title distinctions -still As Hobart (1979: 386) remarks on a different issue, 'the loss of reputa­ carried considerable weight. More remarkable in my opinion was the tion as good villagers ... goes with theconspicuous show of superiority'. frequency with which matters of general concern did find their way This Balinese version of the classic peasant levelling ethos imposes a eventually into the public domain, even in the face of such resistance. redistributive onus in the corporate context, a kind of tribute acceding That talented individuals with little education or material resources deference to the superiority of the banjar institution. might become persuasive speakers and exercise considerable influencein The problem of reconciling the demand to demonstrate equality in local decision-making; that reputations could be built on the basis of one sphere (banjar citizenship) when it patently doesnot exist in another personal qualities and evidence of public service; and that ordinary vil­ (social position, economic wealth) is at the root of recurring banjar lagers did assert themselves as a matter of course in banjar discussions debates-for example, concerning distribution of food in return for ban­ warrant emphasis. Furthermore, the degree to which seka conventions jar labour services and concerning whether and in what circumstances curb the public expression of private interest and to which corporate payment for non-attendance at meetings or work sessions (naub) is imagery stands as a powerful dimension in the negotiation of competing acceptable. One banjar refused to adopt fines for non-attendance pre­ interests should not be underrated. cisely because members feit on balance it instituted a notion that collect­ What is also striking with regard to the actual inequalities that exist ive responsibilities could be dispatched with cash. Other banjar have among banjar members is that their implicit inconsistency with the escalated fines to ensure against members 'free-riding' when the oppor­ premises of legal-social equality places pressure on prominent or tunity costs for the alternative use of labour and time today ar� so con­ wealthy members to extend their resources to the corporate whole siderable.17 through loans, contributions in cash or kind to special projects, and Hobart's general argument regarding the constraints of formal banjar other kinds of public service. In virtually every banjar in Tarian at one conventions and his emphasis on the informal mechanisms utilized by time or another over the period of my fieldwork large loans were made powerful interests in Balinese communities is an important qualification to the banjar treasury by well-to-do members always without interest, to the normative descriptions of village organization in C. Geertz's clas­ often for indefinite periods of time, and not uncommonly commuted to sic essay (1959) and to the institutional approach adopted in this study. outright donations. Substantial contributions from merchants, civil ser­ But recognizing the importance of social and economic inequalities and vants, or landed individuals were made towards bale banjar construction, the operation of relations of patronage in the informal arena should not ADA T DINAS 78 AND MYTHS AND METAPHORS 79 lead us to conclude that ideal conceptions of consensual politics are ordering of values and relationships at local level relates to those vertical consistently subverted in banjar practice or have little bearing on its strUctures centred on the state and religiously validated hierarchic rela­ capacity for expressing general interests. tions. The segmentation and relative autonomy of village institutions in Bali lend themselves to shifting and permeable alignments on particular issues rather than to the more durable factional alliances typically associ­ Disrupted Death Ceremonies and the Ethnography of Bali ated with relations of patronage and dependence (Scott, 1972; Schmidt The question of the impact of asymmetric political and economic rela­ et al., 1977). The priority of corporate interests stressed in banjar ideo­ tions on local organization in Bali is connected with the larger question logy is taken seriously in banjar practice and the overt expression of of the centrality of values of inequality and symbols of hierarchy in private interests is strongly modulated. Highly divisive issues precipitate Balinese culture. I would like to return briefly to a consideration of the lengthy discussion which may carry over from one meeting to the next disruption of death ceremonies which I believe puts the relationship before even provisional resolution. Where factional alignments do form between hierarchy and equality in Balinese society and culture in a dif­ cohesive coalitions and persistently represent themselves as such within ferent perspective. Ngarap-ngarapan incidents have received very little the banjar, fission is a likely consequence. Many banjar split apart as a attention in the enthnography of Bali beyond the description of Bateson result of tensions over caste distinctions after the revolution and due to and Mead in Balinese Character (1942) and a more recent article by party factionalism in the period leading up to the upheavals of 1965. Connor (1979) on the phenomenon of corpse abuse, both of which The ferocity of local disputes such as the one in Siang has to be under­ allude to their political-social aspects. stood in the context of the intensity of the moral ideals of legal equi­ A friend's casual remark following a major cremation ceremony at valence and consensual unity which each side perceived the other to Puri Tarian in 1983 led me to look more deeply at the implications of have contravened. death ceremonies for the interpretation of court-village relations. She Hobart's later, unpublished thesis presents a more considered treat­ was a young teacher whose family had a close relationship to Puri ment of the subject of patronage and hierarchy than his essay in theBloch Tarian as descendants of a long line of servant-retainers who had been collection. It places in more balanced perspective the multiple frame­ granted various prerogatives by the court. This association continued works of action which operate within local institutions and the negoti­ into the 1960s. Her older brothers had been sent into service as youths able nature of meaning inevitably entailed (Hobart, 1979: 486 -7, during a period when their parents could not afford to feed their large 588 ff.). He concludes that vertical relations of patronage and depend­ family. She too had gone to the puri when she was about 12 years old, ency and horizontal relations of corporate membership throw up altern­ but was miserable and returned home after only a few days. The family ative propositions about appropriate action which are the subject of maintained ties of a ritual-social nature to the court, particularly because subtle and continual negotiation in practical decision-making. Here he of the marriage of an aunt into the former ruling family some decades explicitly recognizes the 'essential fluidity of the hierarchy of values per­ before. When the puri organized a major cremation ceremony (in keep­ ceived by the Balinese', which is ·'central to public debate and social ing with the current status of the descendant of the royal house as per­ change in Bali' (Hobart, 1979: 527). bekel, it was the most elaborate since the 1950s), her family was The degree to which relations between unequal social groups are requested to assist. After the ceremony she expressed surprise that it had mediated by culturally validated corporate institutions is of critical gone off smoothly. 'I thought the carriers would do something to the importance in the weight of interpretation of redistributive acts and in tower. Lots of people were peeved that the puriwasn't as generous as it the extent to which these can be translated into relations of domination. ought to be. They cut down on the meat served to those helping, and The organizational component of 'the normative filter through which they should have given presents of clothes or jewellery at least to those self-interested actions must pass' (Scott, 1985: 306) importantly of us who came every day.' (Ni Rathi, 1983.) From that point I became influences their outcome. The corporate mediation of unequal relations interested in the disruption of death ceremonies, not only as a sanction is critical in modulating the formation and location of 'symbolic capital'. within the framework of internal banjar social control, but as an expres­ Indeed in the Balinese case, I would argue that the metaphoric 'habitus' sion of the latent power in those horizontal relationships which local cor­ of village and state produce two counterposed loci of symbolic capital porate organization embodied. (cf. Bourdieu, 1977: 83 ff., 192 ff.). The collective 'misrecognition' that The disruption theme has important implications for the dominant Bourdieu (1977: 195) attributes to the 'endless reconversion of eco­ emphasis on hierarchic values in the interpretation of Balinese culture. nomic capital into symbolic capital' in reciprocal exchange is of a rad­ Celebrated instances in Tarian lore invariably involved individuals of ically different order in the banjar/des a and in the negara. Questions title or wealth, who failed to demonstrate their equal obligations as ban- - addressed here concern the manner in which symbols of local cor­ jar members (through contributing labour in particular) and/or to com­ poratism find institutional expression and how the ideally horizontal pensate adequately for their external claims to status through 80 ADA T AND DINAS MYTHS AND METAPHORS 81 appropriate redistribution. The traditional aristocracy and the nouveau But it was on the final day, The Annihilation, that the stream of status riche were equally likely to become targets of such disruptions. Miles's markers ... swelled to a torrent that swept even solemnity away .... The proces­ account of the violent case involving the family of a wealthy gentry con­ sion was a clamorous and disorderly affair throughout. It began with a mock tractor in a rapidly changing urban banjar in North Bali (Chapter 2) battlebetween the men trying to carry the corpse over the palace wall to place it on the tower and the crowd outside seeking to prevent them from doing so. It shows that such incidents could be clearly interpreted in terms of class ended a half mile or so farther on, with a series of similar battles as the corpse conflict in the politically polarized period of the early 1960s at least. The was brought down from the tower to its animal coffin and set upon the pyre.In bendesa adat of Denpasar attributed the last serious ngarap disruptions in between, there was near-hysteria: the wild spinning of the tower 'to confuse the his own desa to the 'malicious PK.I' (A A Kota, 1984) and Vickers (1989: spirit'; the pushing, shoving and tumbling in the mud; the laughing scramble for 170) recounts the near disruption of the cremation of the conservative coins and baubles; the relentless clanging of the war music. (C. Geertz, 1980: Dewa Agung of Klungkung by communist party activists in 1965. The 118.) death ceremony of a leading figure responsible for reporting the PKI Ultimately, however, the popular elements so striking in this account20 members killed in his village was disrupted many years later ( c. Melcher, are subordinated to an elite-culture interpretation: 1989). The perspective gained from looking at the disruption of death cere­ Yet forall that, the procession had a rigorous order: it was as calm and unruffled monies and its political-social symbolism goes some way towards re­ at its apex and center as it was tumultuous and agitated at its base and edges. dressing the court-centric presentation of Balinese culture in C. Geertz's (C. Geertz, 1980: 118.) Negara (1980: 123), where cremation is given central place as the sym­ The whole ceremony was a giant demonstration repeated in a thousand ways bolic expression of the mimetic draw of divine kingship as exemplary with a thousand images, of the indestructability of hierarchy in the face of the centre and of 'its semiotic capacity to make inequality enchant'. The most powerful leveling forces the world can muster-death, anarchy, passion, reversal of respect rules and the unleashing of the power associated with and fire. 'The king is annihilated! Long live his rank!' (C. Geertz, 1980: 120.) core values of ritual labour service (ayahan) and collective activity (rame) The ascriptivenature of theBalinese ranking system ... should not be allowed to in these disruptive practices enable us to set corporate egalitar­ obscure the in many ways more important fact that the whole of the society, ianism against status inequality, and levelling against prestige rivalry, as from top to bottom, was locked in an intricate and unending rivalry of prestige, concomitantly complementary and competing frames of reference and this rivalry was the driving force of Balinese life. The scale on which the around which Balinese culture revolves. Indeed, what is interpreted as rivalry was conducted was larger at the top, perhaps more unremitting,and cer­ status rivalry in Bali also includes a good measure of 'competing to tainly more spectacular. But the struggle of the lower placed to narrow the gap remain equal' (cf. Bailey, 1971: 19). 18 between themselves and the higher placed by imitating them, and to widen it As the title Negara suggests, the symbols and values of hierarchy between themselves and the yet lower placed by dis-imitating them, was univer­ and the state-the divine king cult and competitive display-are repre­ sal. (C. Geertz, 1980: 120.) sented as 'the driving force of Balinese life' (C. Geertz, 1980: 120), the There are passing concessions to other aspects of Balinese ritual which ground for playing out 'the ruling obsessions of Balinese culture: social C. Geertz (1980: 102; see also pp. 215-16) acknowledges 'had other inequality and status pride' (C. Geertz, 1980: 13). While admitting that statements to make, some of them in partial conflict with the point that the negara was but one axis of Balinese society (C. Geertz, 1980: 52), it the state ceremonies made: Status is all.' But in exaggerating the coher­ is nevertheless the privileged focus of this influential construction of ence and potency of one set of symbols while underplaying their ambi­ 19 Balinese culture. 'More than anywhere else in classical Bali,' C. Geertz guity and the significance of countervailing ones, the theatre state (1980: 116) says, 'more than the village, more than the household, more metaphor gives an illusory integrity to the 'elite truths' which are alleged even than the temple, the palace ... was where the vanities of Bali all to be the pivotal forces in Balinese life. came together, the conflux of the pretensions upon which the society Part of this impression is due to C. Geertz's tendency to a kind of cul­ turned.' turalist reductionism in which 'thick description' is constituted of elab­ Those cultural pretensions were expressed quintessentially in the royal orations on a metaphoric theme. In his ethnography of Bali the theatre cremation, 'thoroughly dedicated to the aggressive assertion of status ... state becomes a near-totalizing metaphor, reducing other cultural state­ a headlong attack in a war of prestige' (C. Geertz, 1980: 117). But the ments to peripheral counterpoint. Reference to the 'different messages' royal cremation was paradoxically not the staid affair one might expect expressed in village temple ceremonies, possession beliefs, rites of pas­ in a society whose dead kings were regarded as gods (batara). C. Geertz sage, performative traditions, and so on, appear in a footnote as a mis­ explicitly focuses on the counterpoint between the riotous behaviour of cellaneous collection of contrasting propositions (C. Geertz, 1980: the crowds and the controlled decorum of the priest and royal entourage 215-16). Many of them in fact relate to a powerful symbol system asso­ in his vivid synopsis of Helms's nineteenth-century royal cremation ciating earth, ancestry, community, and human transmogrification along account: lines suggested in Chapter 2. These present at least as coherent a 82 ADA T AND DINAS MYTHS AND METAPHORS 83 cultural value system and symbology underlying the 'Desa' as the of the deceased is the object of disruptive 'play', social distance itself is metaphor and symbolism of the divine king cult and the myth of the transgressed. 'The destruction of representational images is the destruc­ exemplary centre out of which the 'Negara' is constructed. tion of a hierarchy which is no longer recognized,' says Canetti (1984: 24 Oddly, in downplaying popular culture aspects, C. Geertz places him­ 19)-or here at least temporarily negated. But however transient, these self in closer company than he would no doubt wish with certain aspects reversals have to be recognized as cultural statements, reflective of real of a mechanist Marxist interpretation (see Bloch, 1977). In my view, the meanings and counterpoint frameworks groundedin relations other than ngarapan incidents and other forms of disruption in ritual, theatre, and dominance or acquiescence to elite cultural hegemony. Ludie and licentious transgressive symbols, reminiscent of Bakhtin's art (Boon, 1984; Vickers, 1989: 73) require us to put a substantially dif­ 25 ferent construction on the meanings of the cremation ceremony and carnivalesque, are also notable elements of cremation paraphernalia. more generally on thehierarchic values attributed pivotal status in recent Boon (1982: 202) suggests that TantricHinduism shares with tribal reli­ accounts of Balinese culture. At the very least it is necessary to displace gious forms the equation of sexuality with totality and represents 'a sort and decentre the hierarchic statements which aspects of the ceremony of nostalgia for this symbolic basis of solidarity in radically divided social did make. The bearers and accompanying crowd, whose irreverent orders like caste systems'. His intriguing proposition fits nicely with this behaviour offers a symbolic counterpoint to aristocratic decorum, subversive theme. Tantrism, no doubt originally appealing to related deserve to be treated as more than simply stagehands and audience in aspects of the indigenous Balinese world-view, embodies the transgress­ the 'puffed up rites' of the theatre state (C. Geertz, 1980: 117). ive in Hinduism and is deeply rooted in the folk-religion of India There is a politics of resistance and potentiality for subversion in play, (Dumont, 1980: 278-84). to which Turner, Bakhtin, and post-structural critics have drawn our Bateson (1973) analyses a Balinese painting on the theme of crema­ attention, and to which C. Geertz himself at other moments in his writ­ tion from the perspective of related sexual and political symbolism. 21 ing has pointed. Bateson and Mead (1942: 243), describing a crema­ Unlike C. Geertz's interpretation in which transgressive aspects are tion in the 1930s, noted the connection: hegemonically encompassed by the serene centre, in Bateson's reading, This activity, called 'ngarap bangke' or 'ngarap wadah' (literally, 'working the the picture can be seen as an affirmation that to choose either turbulence or body' or 'working thetower'), is noisy, riotous, and mischievous. When the car­ serenity as a human purpose would be a vulgar error. ... The unity and integra­ riers excel themselves in excitement, laughing and shouting, splashing up the tion of the picture assert that neither of these contrasting poles canbe chosen to mud in every stream and almost upsetting the cremation tower or tearing the the exclusion of the other, because the poles are mutually dependent. This pro­ corpse to pieces, it is usually said that they are 'very angry with the family of found and general truth is simultaneously asserted for the fields of sex, social the deceased'. Our observations indicate, however, that the degree of intensity organizationand death. (Bateson, 1973: 125.) of this riotous behavior increases with the social status of the deceased, the size Cremation symbolism speaks to fertility, cyclic renewal, and balance in of the tower, the newness of the body, and the number of carriers. Balinese cosmology as much as it does to the purity, power, and status In Balinese death ceremonies, play could erupt into violence, and oblit­ inequality of Indic hierarchy. erate the 'stillness at the centre'. Not only the symbols of status-the It is true that in the Balinese royal cremation 'play' was a largely co­ elaborately decorated tower and bull sarcophagus-might be destroyed, opted aspect of ritual, a 'licensed' reversal (Turner, 1978; Stallybrass but the body itself, the object of considerable ritual attention and in east­ and White, 1986). Nevertheless, its association with powerful disruptive ern Indonesian religious beliefs shared by Balinese _still joined to the yet practices makes it necessary to interpret popular participation in court 22 to be liberated soul. ritual in its resistant as well as supportive role: Recent theoretical The evidence on disruption of death ceremonies as social sanction approaches to the analysis of popular culture and consciousness place 23 and levelling device enables us to recognize 'play' elements in royal less emphasis on the antinomy between the double edges of the hege­ cremation ceremonies as expressions of popular culture. While inevitably monic ideological sword and more on the negotiative processes of resist­ complicit in maintaining the 'theatre state', these also contested the strug­ ance/accommodation between them (Moore, 1978; Abercrombie, Hill, gle for status that C. Geertz places at the centre of his interpretation-a and Turner, 1980; LaClau and Mouffe, 1985; Scott, 1985, 1990). focus that devalues other powerful and countervailing forces in Balinese The oppositional aspects of popular and elite orientations certainly culture and society. Parallels with Bakhtin's interpretation of European had an effect on the negotiation of meaning and practice within Balinese carnival as temporary liberation from the prevailing truth of the estab­ society, a point essential to make sense of the ambiguity and ambival­ ence of value with which Balinese culture manifestly is riddled from top lished order are worth drawing upon here. Rituals of reversal mark, 26 Bakhtin (1968: 109) says, 'the suspension of all hierarchical rank, priv­ to bottom. The 'high' culture of the priest and the court are as penet­ ileged norms and prohibitions' (see also Babcock, 1978; Stallybrass and rated with ancestral religious belief and corporatist seka symbolism as White, 1986). When the tower or bull coffin asserting the status claims the popular culture is touched by the imagery of Indic hierarchy. I can 84 ADA T AND DINAS MYTHS AND METAPHORS 85 only concur with those who reject the supposition that 'dominant' ideo­ between courtly standards and the surrounding sub literate world.' The logies are more consistent than those 'subordinated' to them point is made better stillin his quote from Northrop Frye: 'Yet there is a (Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, 1980: 141, 144; Scott, 1985: 319). genuinely "proletarian" element in romance too which is never satisfied Dewa Dani, whose views of Balinese culture were outspokenly of the with its various incarnations .. .' (Boon, 1977: 225). gentry tradition, insisted, 'The banjar knows no caste. Under the rule of The dialectic that produces Romance has poles more opposed than patus there is no gentry.... I was told by my father not to be ashamed to hierarchy and status rivalry. There is a deep-rooted populist discourse carry the body of a dead person, though he be Sudra, above my head. which lies yet further still to the other side. The spontaneous, icono­ Other triwangsa would be disgusted, but my father [who had been clastic, and egalitarian parallelism of the pantun, associated with the gen­ 30 bendesa adat] believed the dead to be higher than any living person.' eral pattern of 'paired speech' and the structures and values of (Dw Dani, 1982.) The obligation to carry the corpse of the deceased is the balanced dualism represented in cultures throughout the eastern 31 most serious of banjar responsibilities. The tensions between hierarchic Indonesian archipelago is an appropriate cultural metaphor for the notions of purity and pollution and egalitarian expressions of mutual missing counter-pole in the cultural dialectic of Bali. The tensions 27 regard make this obligation a source of serious conflict in some banjar. involved in death ceremonies and the dramatic expression they some­ On another occasion I asked Dewa Dani whether in his opinion the idea times evoke arise not simply out of the competitive status rivalry argued that there was no such thing as caste in the banjar was a post-merdeka by Geertz and Boon to dominate Balinese culture, but more profoundly idea. He replied that from olden days (jaman kuna) there were those because hierarchic relations and competitive values of the state and who were 'fanatik' about status and those who were 'fanatik' against it descent groups are so passionately fused with and evenly pitted against and that there had always been conflict between the two philosophies corporate structures and levelling values based on opposing principles of (Dw Dani, 1984). balance and formal equality deeply rooted in Balinese cosmology and local institutions. Logically these three literary metaphors can be argued to correspond A Questionof Balance to different modes of exchange and reciprocity associated with the cent­ James Boon's work, while self-consciously directed towards articulating ral institutions and relationships of Balinese life. Epic ideals, under­ the dynamics of social relations and dialectics of cultural value in Bali, scoring the hierarchic model of the state, provide the 'symbolic capital' nevertheless also underrates these counter-hierarchic statements which (Bourdieu, 1977) to rationalize modes of political domination and the culture also made: 'What rivals share is a set of hierarchical prin­ unequal material exchange relations. The reciprocal dialogue of the pan­ ciples that form the ground rules for the ongoing cultural argument.' tun speaks to the dominant concern for equivalence and balanced (Boon, 1977: 246; see also Boon, 1990: 74). The tension in his social exchange in the corporate egalitarianism of the seka and is reflected in dynamic is, like that of C. Geertz, between a fixed Indic ideal of purity the minute detail and tit-for-tat reckoningwith which awig-awig regulate embodied in notions of caste and an underlying Polynesian rank the reciprocal obligations and etiquette of collective life. Redistributive system-the first, divinely given, the latter pragmatically achieved modes of exchange represent the meeting ground of hierarchic and egal­ (Boon, 1977, 1986).28 But this model does not accommodate the full itarian models and reflect the negotiating processes of competitive ri­ 32 scope of Balinese cultural dialectics. valry and levelling these competing drives engender. To play a bit on Boon's (1977) literary metaphors of Epic and The tension between balanced and redistributive principles in local Romance, representing respectively the fixed hierarchic ideal of the social relations, and between levelling and status rivalry, is revealed most Indic tradition and the competitive status rivalry of Balinese political pointedly in the frequent debates and circuitous practices surrounding practice, I suggest his model requires a third point of reference, the ritual labour-food exchange. These obligations are tightly regulated by indigenous Malay-Indonesian literary form, pantun, as a metaphor for awig-awig with almost obsessive concern for the maintenance of equi­ the balanced and reciprocal orientation of local institutions.An appreci­ valence in exchange. In theory the objective is to help members con­ ation of the tension between the court-centric values revolving around ducting death ceremonies in particular to keep costs down, and to the ideal of hierarchy (Epic) and the village-centric principle of corpor­ emphasize the spirit of mutual assistance. But as we have seen, 'stingy' ate egalitarianism (Pantun)-each constructed in relation to the other distribution of coffee, cigarettes, and meat by those who can afford (C. Geertz, 1980: 46), each accommodated to, and therefore at the them, and who are expected to use circuitous means to demonstrate same time compromised by, the other-provides a critical missing link. their appreciation for banjar assistance, is often the cause of informal 33 Levelling, alongside status rivalry, is party to the dynamic of Romance.29 disruptive incidents. Boon's (1977: 2-3) definition of the Romantic metaphor concedes this The Banjarangkan Awig-Awig Banjar (1922: §15a) uncharacteristic­ in a way that his more general interpretation does not: 'Romance is a ally gives formal recognition to status differentiation in the calculus of popularization that embraces vernacular concerns, a compromise reciprocities associated with death ceremonies. 'A banjar member who is 86 ADA T AND DINAS MYTHS AND METAPHORS 87 Brahmana, Satrya, or Wesya carrying out a cremation has the right to developed around certain universal human situations and that generates request the work of banjar commoners two times. A commoner member common experiences, identifications and values: we and they, insider and out­ ( banjar tani) holding ngaben has the right to request the work of gentry sider, friend and enemy .... Kinship, language, birthplace, residency, religion, (pramenak) two times.' It further stipulates that gentry contributions of occupation everywhere stimulate a thrust toward organization and independ­ patus will exceed those contributed by commoners by an additional ence.. . . Every organization develops an impulse towards its own independ­ e .. . the two universal tendencies are alloyed and in the alloy the law of measure ( apatan = 1. 5 kg) of rice as 'payment' for carrying the corpse enc oligarchy bends more easily than iron. (Dahl, 1982: 33.) (upah negen). (Awig-Awig Banjar, 1922: §25a.)34 The Awig-awig Ban­ djar Basangalas, dated I<;aka 1834 (AD 1912), also refers to wealth-status It is certainly true that ideologies of hierarchy and inequality character­ variation in prescribing the distribution of meat connected with banjar ized court-village relations in pre-colonial Bali and that patronage and assistance. 'And if one who is great (ageng) holds a ceremony (karya) status competition remain characteristic features of Balinese social and and has guests and great wealth, then that person holding the ceremony cultural life in the present. But full recognition must also be granted to must increase the size of the meat [to the banjar].' (Korn Coll. 160/548.) those competing cultural values which speak to opposed conceptions of Both C. Geertz and Bloch, ironically from their opposed culturalist the nature of things if the interpretation of cultures is to findits proper and materialist vantage points, share an exaggerated emphasis on hier­ place in political and social analysis. The boisterous, disorderly, and archy in their respective conceptions of Balinese culture and social aggressive participation of popular culture expressed in the quintessen­ structure. There is no doubt that hierarchic relations were a central ele­ tial ceremony of cremation certainly dramatized something other than ment in the elaborate culture complex that Geertz says was the Negara unequivocal 'enchantment with inequality', or assent to the notion that and Bloch says mystified its power relations. But it is equally true that 'status is all'. structural complexity, ritual validation, and appeal to ancestral tradition I have tried to demonstrate that there is a third element in this are also the bases of counter-principles of formal equality, balanced re­ dynamic always alluded to but not fully credited in contemporary ciprocity, consensual decision-making, and local solidarity which d�serve ethnography-a populist-egalitarian model rooted in local corporate equal time in the study of Balinese society and culture. structures and reciprocal relations. It must be emphasized that this is Balinese values, especially those centring on labour and order, sup­ manifestly not the liberal conception of equality of the Western indi­ ported the corporate egalitarian code of village structures as much as vidual, but a corporate egalitarianism, referring to principles of equal they did the hierarchic code of the state. There is no doubt that the right and obligation in the context of the seka whole. Interpretations of political foundation of the traditional state was essentially about the 'egalitarianism' and 'democracy' that are attributed to banjar relations mobilization of labour (C. Geertz, 1980: 24; H. Schulte Nordholt, today (see Pendit, 1978: 29-34), and perhaps also the intensity of con­ 1986: 24).35 And ritual-political order was the ground of political legit­ frontation in the expression of local corporate values, are products of the imation (H. Schulte Nordholt, 1989). But labour and order also under­ grafting of twentieth-century ideologies on to local adat. lay the solidarity mechanisms of village structures, enforcing the In this respect some qualification of the historical character of the ideology of corporate egalitarianism and local autonomy. For the inter­ 'opposition' between hierarchic and egalitarian values may be necessary. dependent horizontal and vertical structures of Desa and Negara, power It is very possible that what was in the pre-colonial period no more than lay in the potential threat of the withdrawal of labour or loss of social a complementary opposition achieved clearly antagonistic expression control. The very high value placed on rame (crowded, busy activity), only in the revolutionary period. (Although I would not either discount marking the focal point of the labour-order theme, has also to be under­ Dewa Dani's assertion that there were always the 'fanatik' who saw these stood in the context of Balinese popular culture-hinting an indigenous relations in such terms.) Western concepts of dichotomy and negation version of the 'crowd in history' (Rude, 1980; Canetti, 1984 [1962])36 most certainly influenced Balinese views of hierarchic and egalitarian and a Balinese labour theory of value.37 As we have seen, the fundamen­ relations in the political sphere as nationalist ideas took hold. It must tal basis of membership in the desa adat is the obligation to contribute also be admitted that forBalinese, symbolic ambivalence appears to be a ritual service (ayahan). Kaler (1983a: 55) argues that it is shared ritual culturally comfortable modality, dramatically expressed in the irresolu­ service which creates the corporate unit of the krama from what would tion of the contest between Barong and Rangda. But the fact remains otherwise be a collectivity of individuals. that the symbolic assertions of the banjar/desa and those of the negara are Dahl's critique of the overweening emphasis on domination in polit­ only compatible so long as their social manifestations are situationally ical theory is relevant to this argument on the foundations of local com­ segregated. The relative autonomy of village relations from those of the munity and relative autonomy: state-Desa Mawa Cara, Negara Mawa Tata-was a condition of main­ taining the complementarity of that structural opposition of state and Views of domination ... are surely correct in emphasizing the strength and uni­ village institutions and values. versality of tendencies toward domination. Where their views go wrong is in underestimating the strength of tendencies toward political autonomy and mu­ Colonial policy seems on the one hand to have exaggerated the tual control. Throughout history relatively autonomous organizations have implications of status distinctions in attempting to fix caste hierarchy, 88 ADA T AND DINAS MYTHS AND METAPHORS 89 officially demarcating rights and obligations attached to it, so that title­ as key in any instance is open to negotiation among the participants involved. groups already involved in banJar perhaps became more status con­ Further, it may be suggested that it is possible that whether the values are indeed scious. On the other hand, it disenfranchised many traditional power­ ranked and so whether there is a hierarchy at all, may be one of the issues to be 42 holders, forcing them to become involved in village affairs from which decided in discussion.(Hobart, 1979: 612, emphasis added.) they had previously distanced themselves (A A Sepi, 1982; Dw Pt Dani, 1982). The consequence seems to have been an explosion of both status rivalry Myths and Metaphors and levelling drives which, paradoxically, together represent the most intense Balinese social movements in the post-revolutionary period (see To return to the 'village community myth' and its implications for our Boon, 1977: 217; H. Geertz, 1988: 16).38 interpretation of social relations in Bali, a perspective from the conjunc­ We will return to some of these themes in the concluding chapters in ture of the contemporary village and state reveals the continued potency considering Balinese political culture as it evolved during the post­ of the local domain. Interestingly, even people who take jobs in the cap­ banJar-desa revolutionary period. For the moment this complex of complementary­ ital and move away from their home village retain member­ opposed values forms the backdrop for discussion of the political and ship, continue to pay levies, and return for important village functions. economic implications of local corporatism in Bali. The stress in my The head of one provincial government department commented, 'All (takut) banJar.... analysis is on corporate egalitarianism, those values which ideally inform Balinese are afraid of their Even here, living in banJar. local collective action in Bali, emanating from the seka principles of cor­ Denpasar, I maintain a close relationship with my home If they porate unity and legal equality. In the Negara, local corporatism was ask to borrow money, forexample, even if I don't have it, I'll go out and ( and to a certain extent in the modern state of Indonesia, is still) fused borrow it from a bank.' (Gst Majun, 1984.) The strength of these symbolic with a different kind of corporatism based on paternal-hierarchic prin­ and social ties has practical political and economic consequences within ciples, but one which I must argue did not encompass the values and Balinese communities and for their relation to state institutions. When I practices of the village in the way that C. Geertz's interpretation or the interviewed high-ranking regional and provincial civil servants about the Dumontian conception of a hierarchic totality adopted by many ethno­ impact of the central government's bureaucratization policies (see banJar graphers of Bali would require.39 Chapter 9), they expressed confidence that the was an institution The difference between the Indian case, as Dumont presents it, and that was simply too tough for state penetration to be more than that of the Balinese would seem to be that the Negara never completely superficial. 'A Balinese administrator would have too much respect from encompassed the Desa, not only as a poor failure of fact, but also in his experience with his home banJar to tangle with anyone else's.' (r Weda, organizational principle, in cultural value, and in religious ideology.40 1984.) How else can one explain why Balinese must 'obey their own rules', but Invariably in the course of these interviews, discussion turned to the in certain contexts not their kings, as the krama banJar argued and the relationship between death, social interdependence, and the institutional banJar. raJa-cum-bupati accepted in the Regreg case? Despite their ambivalent power of the 'Very few people who move away ignore their vil­ banJar interdependence, the Desa and the Negara were each partly exclusive of lage of origin. We all have to die. Imagine if the fail to help at a death ceremony. Here you wouldn't pay anyone to take care of your the other. Neither Balinese religious conceptions nor its political practice 43 give grounds for conviction that an essentially hierarchic encompassing funeral as you do in the West. No matter how wealthy you are, in the of the contrary was or is fundamental in the Balinese 'orientation to the end you depend upon your neighbours.' (r Weda, 1984.) Unquestionably whole' as it applied to therelation between Village and State. 41 the values these administrators share concerning the importance of local adat On this question of ambivalent value in Balinese culture, Hobart's and their healthy respect for popular political expression in that (1979: 588) conclusions are largely compatible with my own: 'While one sphere have much to do with the informal modifications of state policy set of religious beliefs [Hindu ideology of caste purity] implies the to be considered in later chapters. unquestionable nature of hierarchy; another defends, by the proposal of Wolf (1957, 1986) more than most anthropologists influenced by superordinate ideas of causation [ancestral adat], the democratic basis of Marxist theory has stressed thesignificance of the symbolic and ceremo­ corporate groups.' He describes the tactical processes in which, not only nial in social constitution and social reproduction. Where Bloch ( 1977) plans of action or meanings attached to them become grounds for con­ asserts the function of 'so much structure' in supporting and mystifying test, but the hierarchy of values itself: vertical relations of hierarchy, Wolf's work points to the horizontal ties that ritual obligation may construct and reinforce. In peasant systems [I]n the negotiation of the relevance of alternative propositions ... it is also a these cannot be understood independently of one another. Village and question of deciding what is the hierarchy of values. This is sometimes repres­ state did not evolve separately, as C. Geertz (1980: 45 ff.) and others ented as if there was such a hierarchy and that the relationship between values have stressed.44 With respect to Bali, core values associated with order withinthe system were known, or potentially knowable.... In Tengahpadang, at (trepi, rukun), labour/activity (karya, ngayah, rame'), origin/ancestry least, it would be truer to say that the question of which value is to be regarded 90 ADA T AND DINAS MYTHS AND METAPHORS 91 (puseh, kemulan, kawitan), and social bondedness (seka, iket) are equi­ who would be acceptable to the puri and only such a person could safeguard the autonomy vocally appealed to by both hierarchic and egalitarian traditions. of the village (H. Schulte Nordholt, pers. com., 1989). In Desa Tarian there was one instance klian Both Negara and Desa were 'imagined' symbolically and realized in which an outsider was actually appointed to the position of in Banjar Besaya. He was Made Topa, a resident of Banjar Pekandelan, who came from a long family line of institutionally. 'Exemplary centre' and 'village republic' were of course retainers (pameke[) to the puri. It occurred in the early part of the century, a transitional more complete in their imagery than in their manifestation. Negara and period local people refer to as jaman setengah Bali, when the Dutch had little more than Desa were metaphors for a set of relations, one of hierarchic, the other nominal authority in Gianyar (Korn, 1924: 226 ff.; Dw Dani, 1984), and it is therefore of egalitarian, corporate unity. Both are 'mythic' in the sense that neither impossible to determine whether the Dutch reorganization of local government between of these symbolic totalities could be fully realized in the face of its prac­ 1917 and 1921 and especially the creation of specifically administrative offices under the 45 authority of the Punggawa and Perbekel (positions which in Tarian remained in the hands tical dependence upon, or the transgressions of, the other. C. Geertz's of the traditional ruler and allied noble families) may have been connected with this inter­ and Boon's interpretations underemphasize the political dimension of vention.The appointmentwas described as an exceptional incident arising from the failure the Balinese state and the symbolic foundation of Balinese village rela­ of Banjar Besaya for some reason to come up with its own head (Dw Dani, 1982; Cok Anom, tions. 1985; I Toya, 1985). triwangsa Earlier scholarship reified these images of village and state and exag­ 3. Dewa Dani, a with close ties to the Tarian court, described aspects of his own involvement from an early age in Banjar Pekandelan as like that of a 'spy' for the puri gerated the dichotomy between them. There was a consequent lack of (1984). His grandfather as sedahan gede to the last raja was responsible for the administra­ appreciation of the ambivalence and interpenetration of the egalitarian tion of puri land and finances; his uncle was adviser to the king and a teacher in the tradi­ and hierarchic principles respectively embedded in each. But if the con­ tional style. Many of the older generation had acquired their literacy in Balinese by struction of the 'village republic myth' in colonial and post-colonial pol­ attaching themselves to his household as youths. Dani's father also became adat head of (bendesa) icy had dangerous political consequences, so does its alter-myth. Tarian between the 1920s and 1940s. His position reflected the intimate connec­ tion of village and state in court-centred desa such as Tarian. See also H. Schulte Nordholt Contemporary critiques aimed at deconstructing the village republic and (1991: 9). corporate community concepts have effaced the partition between vil­ 4. Breman's (1982: 203) comments on Java apply all the more to Bali: 'The impression lage and state. Inadvertantly in the process, they have contribut�d to a of a strongly directed apparatus having an entirepopulation at its disposal cannot either be distorted privileging of hierarchy and inequality in their revisionist inter­ conceded. The loose, fluid character of the pre- and early colonial situation cannot there­ pretations of social relations and cultural valuation in Bali. fore be stressed too often. A high degree of social control was hindered first of all by the fact that structures by which power was exercised were anything but streamlined.' Representations of village social relations revolving around patronage 5. For Breman (1982: 215) the combination of internal differentiation and extra-local and devaluing the significance of horizontal bonds compound the effects power relationships 'negated the existence of the village as a social unit'. See Kemp (1987) of the older archetypal model of the 'traditional' village as conservative for a similar argument on South-East Asia as a whole. and unchanging. Both the image of the village as parochial and static, 6. It must be said that all these writers refer to egalitarian practices in certain Balinese and its alter-image as faction-ridden and hierarchically structured, in dif­ contexts, while still, however, stressing hierarchy as the central ordering principle of Balinese culture. ferent ways serve to rationalize paternalistic tendencies in central gov­ 7. See critiques by Howe (1978) and especially Bourdillon (1978). Bourdillon makes ernment policy. To reduce customary village institutions to colonial the important point that ritual and structure are as central to the limitation of authority as manufactures is to discredit the depth of local corporate claims to to its legitimation. authority46 and those autochthonous values and voices which speak to 8. This comes out more strongly in Hobart's published chapter in the Bloch collection balance and collectivity. The Desa was metaphor as much as myth, an (1975) than in his later, more comprehensive thesis (1979). In the latter, the Tengah­ padang case-studies are interpreted identically, but presented in a context which places available discourse about, and an argument for, relations of balance and much greater emphasis on balanced competition between ideologies of hierarchy and equity, perhaps no more perfectly realized than the myths and equality in Balinese politics (see 1;,elow). metaphors surrounding the Negara, but certainly no less. 9. In a footnote Hobart (1979: 583) remarks on the 'curious? fact that 'in every single ward [banjar] in Tengahpadang there were four major factions recognised'. Noting the congruence with favoured Balinese classificatory schemes, he speculates on the possible symbolic structure of 'factionalism'. The usual organizational subdivision of ban­ jar is in fact into four geographically oriented tempek, symbolically modelled perhaps, but 1. What disparities there are in inheritance rights associated with this distinction are without inherent factional import. intended to be balanced against the greater obligations entailed in covering the costs of 10. The sort of asymmetric economic and political bonds usually associated with fac­ cremation, ritual obligations in the family temple, and full dues for village temple cere­ tional politics are not significantly represented in the data. Only 11 per cent of the monies and maintenance. It is said that in the past it was sometimes difficult to find some­ patron-client ties in major political 'factions' described for Banjar Pisangkaja in Tengah­ one willing to take responsibility when karang ayahan fell vacant because it was easier to padang were established on the basis of tenancy relations; 58 per cent were associated with remain pengempian in one's own compound (Gst Kanti, 1984; I Sutoya, 1986). Nevertheless, relationships of descent or affinity, inevitably high given the tendency to in-banjar, in-dadia in Tarian today two-thirds of household heads are pengarep, indicating a fairly even redis­ marriage; and 30 per cent were based on no formal ties at all (Hobart, 1979: 540). The tribution of village residential land over time through adoption, lottery, and subdivision. lack of clear asymmetry is also evident among those Hobart identifies as 'domestic 2. According to some of H. Schulte Nordholt's informants, in pre-colonial Mengwi, patrons', the critical intermediaries in political 'faction' formation. The major categories of the royal courts generally approved the elected local leaders. Villagers knew in advance domestic patron to whom banjar members said they would go for advice or assistance 92 ADA T AND DJNAS MYTHS AND METAPHORS 93 were 'ordinary villagers' (41.3 per cent), followed by holders of 'traditional office' 19. C. Geertz has written a great deal on local organization which I think undercuts (36.5 per cent), and finally, 'government officials' (17.4 per cent). The second group many of his most polemical pronouncements on fundamental Balinese values. His 1959 included temple priests and klian of corporate groups (banjar, subak, etc.) as well as senior essay outlining the basis of village corporate organization and the 1975 book written with members of gentryfamilies (Hobart, 1979: 511). H. Geertz on Balinese kinship adopt a much more balanced perspective. What is striking 11. The fragmented factionalcomposition imputed to Banjar Pisangkaja would make it in C. Geertz's writings on Bali is that, while he recognizes other principles operating at difficultfor any one of these to carry significant weight in banjar decision-making, .even if other levels of the social structure, they do not seem to be granted the full status of 'cul­ they did represent discrete political entities. The largest among the four major and four ture' in his analysis (cf. C. Geertz, 1980: 19). In Bali 'cultural paradigms descend from minor factions Hobart isolates in that banjar had a following of only 17 per cent of total above and practical arrangements rise from below' (C. Geertz, 1980: 128). An elite­ membership, and is exceeded by the large proportion of banjar members (nearly one­ modelled representationof Great Tradition Culture characterizes C. Geertz's ethnography quarter) described as unaligned (Hobart, 1979: 545). of Bali despite his own structures against reification (1975: 29), functionalism (1975: 12. Scott (1985: 335) in the Gramscian tradition, argues negotiation and compromise 146), and his theoretical contributions on the essentially polysemic nature of symbolism to be essential elements in the construction and reinforcement of any ideology acquiring and meaning-reiterated in Negara itself, but relegated to a footnote (1980: 216). hegemonic status. In certain important respects patronage and corporatism are inherently 20. Covarrubias's description of high caste cremation ritual in the 1930s equally ex­ antithetic.As Skocpol's review of recent studies of thestate suggests, the necessity of divis­ poses these contrasts of demeanor. '[T]hen come the women with the effigies, then the ible benefits for the operation of differential distribution in patronage systems depends on towers and the bridges, carried by a wild mob of half-naked, shouting men who delib­ a very different 'issue content' of politics than that geared to thegeneration of indivisible erately choose the most difficult paths, falling into ditches and splashing each other with 'collective' benefits (in Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, 1985: 25). mud, almost toppling the towers over, and whirling them to further mislead the dead. 13. See also Ketut Reta's description (Chapter 2) of the dissipation of support for the The high priest rides in a dignified and mystic attitude amidst all this hullabaloo .... The dissident faction during one of the public meetings which decided their fate in the Desa remains are then handed down by the men lined along the runway until they reach the Siang dispute. ground.Each group carrying a corpse is attacked again by another party of yelling men 14. Some of the differences in our interpretations of patronage relations may well be who aim to take the body by force in fierce hand-to-hand battles. Clothes are torn to accounted for by the fact that Hobart's work was conducted very soon after the upheavals shreds and men are trampled upon until thevictorious party makes away with the corpse.' of 1965-6. The period leading up to the 1971 elections was one of high political tension (Covarrubias, 1972 [1937]: 374-5.) between Golkar and PNI when serious personal and political differences were close to the 21. 'Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight' (1975) is probably the best example. surface. As Scott (1972: 111) suggests, electoral competition tends to crystallize lat�nt fac­ C. Geertz beautifully develops the aspects of contest and reversal in this description of the tions out of looser patron-client clusters by increasing the potential rewards of allegiance. 'paradigmatic event' of the Balinese cock-fight. But again, the overall interpretation fo­ This contrasts significantly with the very depoliticized atmosphere in which I was working cuses on the paramount values of hierarchy and status rivalry. 'What, as we have already ten years later, but makes the political ambivalence of many of Hobart's examples all the seen, the cockfight talks most forciblly about is status relationships,and what it says about more strikip.g (see, for example, Hobart, 1975: 86). Cole (1983: 25) describes hamlet them is that they are matters of life and death. That prestige is a profoundly serious busi­ political relations in the late 1970s in the village of his study as formally egalitarian and ness is apparent everywhere one looks in Bali-in thevillage, thefamily, the economy, the corporate, underlaid by a patchwork of shifting patron-client blocs. He refers to 'what state. A peculiar fusion of Polynesian titleranks and Hindu castes, the hierarchy of pride is appears to be a more extreme example' presented in Hobart's study. I should point out themoral backbone of the society. But only in the cockfight are the sentiments upon which that the three villages which we studied-Tengahpadang, Utung, and Tarian-had been that hierarchy rests revealed in their natural colors.' (C. Geertz, 1975: 447.) dominated by strong and historically related royal courts. But the cock-fight is open to different interpretation (cf. Vickers, 1991b). If we focus on 15. Dewa Tentra, an army officer of some means who had married into Banjar Lagas, the obligation to commit one's cock to the test (on pain of fine where it is village­ was involved in the establishment of the new orchestra and dance troupe there in 1985. sponsored); thedesirability of evenly matched competitors;the emphasis on the centrebet Using this opportunity to establish his reputation in the community, he donated the cos­ which 'makes the game', but which is invariably an even bet and involves more or less pre­ tumes for the new group and spent a good deal of time organizing its affairs. But his scriptive collectivities of kin and neighbours; and the central statement of the cock-fight arrogant manner rubbed many members the wrong way and he was gradually sidelined that total triumph or humiliation in a game is based on chance, do we not find also state­ both within the performing group and in the banjar assembly. 'That's the way things are. ments antithetic to conceptions of status as either intrinsicor achieved? Is it not ultimately You can't expect gratitude,' he commented (1986). Meanwhile, another wealthy in­ focused on the contest between ideologies of balance and hierarchy, rather than on the migrant, who with Tentra had contributed a substantial share of the founding costs of the legitimacy of two alternative versionsof hierarchy? As Bailey (1971: 20) suggests, to admit troupe in interest-free loans and gifts, managed to retain his public credibility, keeping a of competition is to admit a kind of equivalence. The folk-tale of the poor Sudra hero lower profile as an ordinary playing member of the orchestra. Note, as another example, whose cock kills theking is interesting in this regard. In it status-rivalry and levelling values thatthe long service of Banjar Madya's esteemed treasurer did not in theend translate into achieve an ambiguous stand-off. Fixed hierarchy is challenged, defeated, and partially banjar support of his son's candidature for the office of village head which he had once reinstated when the·Sudra hero, whose good fortune is theconsequence of a selfless act of held (see Chapter 4). sharing, is adopted as king by the people, only to renounce his new status in the end. 16. The differencein thenegotiating situation of a well-organized labour union and that Having 'bet on theUnseen and won,' he joins a hermitage, leaving his son to become king of the single worker seekinga contract with an employer is an indicative analogy. The rigid (C. Geertz, 1975: 442). . adherence to rules of inclusion and exclusion and other forms of internal social control 22. Recall here the anguished screams of the possessed mother voicing the pain of her - that make a labour union powerful bear comparison with the principles of organization deceased child in the Singaraja ngarapan incident, and the distaste expressed by some which operate in banjar to ensure solidarity. Balinese at theidea of immediate cremationfor fear of feeling the flames (Chapter 2). 17. Interestingly, most banjar have no fines for adat service such as assistance at temple 23. An extremely violent episode is recounted by Mershon (1971) which occurred dur­ or death ceremonies, where attendance is virtuallyuniversal and where much more power­ ing the ceremonies for a woman in Sanur loathed by many in her banjar for reputed deal­ ful sanctions than financial ones may be invoked. ings in black magic. Her daughter, who was married to a wealthy Brahmana, arranged an 18. The concept of equality only emerges perhaps with that of hierarchy, but thisis not inunediate and elaborate cremation, using a seven-storey tower and bull. For various true of associated notions of balance and reciprocity. reasons associated with this woman's reputed power, and the upwardly mobile status of 94 ADA T AND DINAS MYTHS AND METAPHORS 95 her daughter, these procedures were deemed appropriate by the Brahmana who directed 28. See also H. Schulte Nordholt (1986: 19-20) who speaks of a hierarchic 'kingly' preparations. Mershon's mentor, Pedanda Made, officiated at the ceremony (Mershon, ideal order giving way in the recalcitrant real world to the perennial 'chiefly' conflict of 1971: 224-5). In the foray that took place as the corpse was carried to the graveyard on contest state politics. the day of cremation, the remains of the deceased were violently abused. The corpse was 29. Levelling must be understood as the political corollary to the 'sinking status' pattern dragged through a stream, covered in mud, and after being placed in the bull coffin for c. Geertz (1980: 16-18, 30-3) describes, a corrosive process that eventually dissolved the burning, attacked with an axe (Mershon, 1971: 236-9). social status of thoseon the periphery who lacked the political and economic means neces­ 24. Mead's notes describing the cremation procession of a Brahmana priest is again sary to make their claims stick. Although he states that in Bali one 'does not find the reflective of a popular unconcern for these symbols of status: 'The whole effect was ... descent [from titled rank] to mere commonality reported in some other Southeast Asian riotous, jolly, boisterous, the young men taking license to splash, kick, yell, throwmud and systems' (C. Geertz, 1980: 149), such beliefs are in fact widespread and Howe presents water on each other and on the towers, but there was none of the slightly frenzied high some striking examples of explicit status suppression in Pujung legend (Howe, 1980: 205; strung state that we saw at Njeohtebel, withthe exception of a very little for the Brahman's 1989: 58). The high degree of variation from one village to another in acceding preroga­ tower.... The high tower of the Pindanda caught against the trees and broke off, but did tives to high ranking title-groups suggests that in the pre-colonial period, before the ri­ not fall; it sent a great branch crashing down. People seemed rather pleased with the gidificationof the caste-ranking structure as a result of Dutch policy (H. Schulte N ordholt, smashing destruction, and not at all upset.' (M. Mead, 'Cremation at Kesiman, May 22nd 1986), status was closely connected with power, and 'descent' to commoner status, with or [1936]', Mead Coll. Nll.) withoutloss of title, was a common phenomenon. 25. The black and white sketches on the dingding api (wind wall) decorating one side of 30. See the edited collection by Fox (1988a) on ritual forms of paired speech in eastern theelaborate cremation coffins are drawn in ludic style. Exaggerated genitals, depictions of Indonesia. The focus in these essays in on oral composition at the formalized end of the bestiality, and disorderly composition contrast strongly with the regimental order at the spectrum.But they share with the more spontaneous and playful pantun the same dyadic centre of the cremation paintings illustrating Geertz's and Bateson's texts, typical of the language which Fox (1988a: 2) argues to embed 'fundamental metaphoric structures of 'traditional' style which dominates the modern commercial artistic genre. The dingding api culture' across eastern Indonesia. Those structures which relate to the features of Balinese sketches usually illustrateevents from theBimaswarga stories in which the wayang hero lib­ popular culture I am concerned with here include a balanced oppositional modality, the erates souls fromhell and portrayBosch-like visions of horrific punishment in the afterlife. primacy of the ancestral voice, and its collective representational expression. Some Balinese suggested the sketches are offered as representational expiation of sins. But 31. See the Fox, Valeri, and Traube essays in Maybury-Lewis and Almagor (1989) on these paintings are also full of puns and fun-poking. One I saw on the side of a great black the structural features of dualism in eastern Indonesia and its ambivalent relation to bull coffin at a mass cremation depicted a particularly horrible scene of the pa�sage of exchange and hierarchy. The cultures described evidence tendencies towards asymmetric souls, some grabbing the penis of a man standing at the edge of hell in their attempts to arrangement of their dual. structures and codes, but they also contain diarchic patterns escape. In the corner sat a Raksasa demon with floppy hat, large shoulder bag, and video which relativize or completely invert in one context the hierarchic relations that exist in camera, recording the scene for posterity. On the occasion of the Puri Tarian cremation in another. For an effort to theorize the relation between opposed centrist and dualist prin­ 1983 the bull sarcophagus and tower were followed by a float carrying a fabulous Rangda­ ciples across the spectrum of Indonesian cultures, see Errington (1989). See also witch with striped pendulous breasts and forward thrusting vagina large enough to crawl Alexander (1992) on hierarchy and equality in a Bornean society. Howe (1989) offers a through, contributed to the procession 'for fun'. Careful attention is also given to the bull's plausible explanation of the development of hierarchic patterns in lowland Bali from penis, usually decorated with bright pink thread and sometimes made mechanically mobile dualist-egalitarian models still prevalent in mountain communities. (see Covarrubias, 1972 [1937]: 373). 32. See Sahlins (1974) for the classic explication of negative, balanced, and generalized 26. A strilcing example of such ambivalence arose in conversation with Desak Ketut, a reciprocities. His generalized type is problematic, however, since it includes forms of triwangsa cloth-pedlar married to a civil servant. She had been devastated by the sudden exchange and redistribution which have different effects depending upon the structures death of a daughter two years previously. Although of comparatively moderate means, she within which they operate. I use the term redistribution here to refer to asymmetric and her family saw themselves as struck by material and spiritual misfortune until they exchanges in which some degree of authority, prestige, or legitimacy is received in return recently placed themselves under the care of a female spirit medium (balian) fromanother for material contributions. Wolf (1986: 327) criticizes his own work for failing to recog­ village. Desak and her husband were devoted to this woman of commoner status to whose nize the legitimating functions inherent in redistributive exchange which tends to increase powers and wisdom they attributed the change in their fortunes and thesuccess of the cre­ social solidarity, but at the same time to convert wealth into prestige and authority. See mation ceremony for their daughter. On her advice they had joined thefirst collective cre­ Hobart (1979: 207-49) for a detailed analysis of redistributive aspects of the local eco­ mation organized by their banjar. On the day we spoke of these matters Desak's husband nomy in bothneighbourhood and agricultural contexts. had gone to offer his help (she used the elevated term ngayah) with preparations for the 33. Chapter 5 outlines in greater detail the complexities involved in the ritual exchange anniversary ritual at the balian's family shrine. Desak related advice she had received from of food and services. In Tarian death rituals are the only ceremonies in which banjar are the balian in connection with her daughter's safe passage to the next world, including the prescriptively involved. However, banjar may be called upon for assistance and must information that there were no caste distinctions there, a fact she was quite prepared to be offered food in return (ninggu banjar) for any major ceremony. Customary practice of accept. In the same conversation, though, she mentioned her distress at the attentions her Banjar Lagas requires that for any life-cycle ritual in which a pig is to be slaughtered, in other daughter was receiving from a young Sudra man. She was aware of the contradic­ other words any ritual of significant scale, the banjar must be invited to assist and be reci- tions in her attitude and simply rationalized that however true it might be that there were procated accordingly. no spiritual differences in the unseen world, her family had to keep face, and would not 34. It is notable that this passage includes theonly reference to Indic 'castes' in the text. feel it proper to ignore family customs. Here the ambiguous implications of ancestral Status differentiationis subsequently referred to with the terms pramenak (gentry) and tani evocation are strilcingly evident. (masses), suggesting thatthese relations were more closely defined by wealth and power in 27. Ida Bagus Rai (1986) related an incident in which a Brahmana was expelled from pre-colonial Bali and that the fixing of 'caste' as a principle of status differentiation was his village for such an offence.High-caste members will always attend the funeral but may indeed a consequence of colonial policy, as H. Schulte Nordholt (1986) has argued. The not be obliged to carry the body in banjar where claims to status prerogatives are acceded. text, unusual in that it is not the legal code of a particular banjar, but apparently a com­ They must appear to be prepared to do so, but as there are always more members than pendium, was dated 1922 (l9aka 1844) and transcribed/composed by the father of the necessary to accomplish thetask, depending on local practice and sentiment, they may not current pedanda of Banjarangkan, Ida Pedanda Putra, in whose geriya the manuscript is be requested to do so. still held. Its style and structure indicate that it reproduces earlier collated awig-awig, but 96 ADA T AND DINAS MYTHS AND METAPHORS 97

the term distrik at one point in the text (§10) shows that there was some revision of these underscoring the wama-caste system this priority of the whole does not permit of a differ­ in the process. It may well have been that the reorganization of power and status relation­ ential identification of any part with some greater approximation of the ideally valued ships under the colonial regime precipitated its writing. Large numbers of awig-awig and totality. (Despite Dumont's disclaimer, in my view this aspect of his concept of encom­ other local adat texts were being collected at this time throughout Klungkung and passment or transcendence inevitably implicates relations of power and domination.) All Karangasem at the behest of the Resident of Bali, Damste (H. Schulte Nordholt, pers. com., members of the seka are theoreticallyequal in their relation to it. But this equality is not the 1989; see also Korn Coll. 156/513, which indicates a great deal of attention was paid to equality of the Western individual, for the reason that the interests of individual member Banjarangkan and surrounding areas in 1921). It is possible that the sections cited here parts are all equally subordinate to the seka. It is difficult to accept, then, Dumont's represent some effort to reframe the basis of labour exchange relationships between status­ attempt to universalize the absolute necessity of hierarchy for the possibility of unity, or his groups on this vital matter of assistance at death ceremonies, which were being altered by denial of the intrinsic implication of domination in his use of the concept. For example, colonial policies. References to additional meat as 'payment' by gentry for banjar labour, extending the principle to male-female relations in the family, he argues: 'You may well appear to imply the continuity of some degree of their externality to the banjar, since the declare the two sexes equal, but the more you manage to make them equal, the more you concept of payment should not normally apply to in-seka services. will destroythe unity between them (in the couple or the family), because the principle of 35. Labour was the source of power, wealth, and status in Bali, as it was in all of the this unity is outside them and because, as such, it necessarily hierarchizes them with classical states of South-East Asia. 'Political power inhered less in property than in respect to one another.' (Dumont, 1980: 240-1). people .... The disagreements between various princedoms ... were virtually never con­ 40. Eastern Indonesian comparisons are again apt; Fox (1989: 51) says, 'The societies cerned with border problems, but with ... rights to mobilize particular bodies of men, even of eastern Indonesia do not have the encompassing religious coherence that Dumont has particular men, for state ritual and what was really the same thing, for warfare.' attributed to India; for this reason, hierarchy cannot be described as a single principle nor (C. Geertz, 1980: 24.) 'The masses attending such events were as important as the proper identified with a specific opposition, such as pure and impure.' order of the rituals for ... only large numbers of people made a ritual on this scale into a 41. Again, the manner in which thepart is identified with the encompassing totality and success. At the same time such mass rituals were manifest demonstrations of the power of at the same time remains equivalent to all other parts differs fundamentally from the Indic a ruler who had shown himself to be able to organize them. The masses showed nothing conception of hierarchy developed by Dumont (1980: 145) in which the parts are less than the manpower the ruler was able to mobilize.' (H. Schulte Nordholt, 1986: 24.) unequally valued according to the degree of their identitywith the whole. Fox (1989: 52; 36. For Canetti (1984: 15 ff.), the defining feature of the crowd and the source of its pers. com., 1990) prefers the concept of 'precedence' to 'hierarchy' in interpreting the rela­ power is the abolition of individuality, difference, and inequality, an inherently liberating, tion between dual categories/structures in eastern Indonesian cultures since this notion though ephemeral, experience. See also Vickers (1991a). does not imply encompassment or limit alternative modes of relationship. 3 7. The theme of labour as a measure of value and stage in the cyclic process is all per­ 42. The case in point concerned how to deal with the birth of male-female twins (inter­ vasive. The bendesa adat of Tarian described the significance of rotation at birth and cre­ preted ambiguously as a dangerous coming together of opposites on village land and/or an mation as follows: 'The three clockwise circles for rituals of life refer to entry to this world: imputed act of incest in impudent imitation of the gods and upper castes), which previ­ birth, life, work (karya). At death these are reversed to express a return to source, having ously required temporary expulsion and heavy ritual expense, Hobart (1979: 616) says, been born, lived and carried out work.' (Cok Anom, 1984.) The profound moral objection '... not only was the hierarchy of values at issue, but the protagonists were propounding to paying for assistance at cremationor for offerings is associated with thenotion of labour different views based upon the more or less systematic interpretation of circumstances in as an essential part of ritual (I Wiweka, 1984). Hobart (1979: 258) speaks of labour rather light of theirown dominant values. So the concepts of caste, purity, land and the status of than inheritance or ownership as a basis of certain rights over land. humans were all open to differentevaluations.' 38. Several local conflicts in the Gianyar region illustrate the intensification of both of 43. His comment underscores again the central value of shared labour as. a mark of these drives. In one notorious case triwangsa were eventually expelled over resistance to mutual respect. Dewa Dani (1984) said, 'It is regarded as humiliating to hire labour. To equal service obligations to the Pura Desa. In the course of renovating the original ancient conduct a proper ngaben, it is not money you need, it is respect.' temple after it was nearly destroyed in the 1917 earthquake, a padmasana shrine had been 44. Schaareman (1986a: 41), from ethnographic work in Karangasem, argues that the introduced forthe first time. H. Geertz speculates that the inclusion of this 'complex sym­ village and royal palace in Bali were always interdependent and mutually influential, but bolic statement of the Brahmana view of the cosmos' reflected the increased interpenet­ stresses that this relation did not at all render the dorpsrepubliek concept worthless: ' ... the ration of the structures of village and state. 'Erecting it may have been a ritual attempt meaning of the concept "village republic" --evenif the term may not be a perfect one­ toward resolving the ambiguous relationship of the nobles of Pura Desa B. If so, it was is not incompatible with the idea that the villages were never completely cut off from the only a compromise, but it was not until the 1950s and 1960s that the.real terms of the puri or the state.' One of the useful insights contributed by Marxist debates on the merits compromise became clear and, in the end, no longer tenable for many members of the vil­ of the Asiatic and Feudal Mode of Production concepts is that power structures in thepre­ lage' (H. Geertz, 1988: 15-16). Another case involved attempted secession by Brahmana capitalist state tended to have more or less dampening effects on local inequalities depend­ members of a banjar when it was insisted that their contribution to death ceremonies ing upon whether the links between village and state are primarily of a corporate-dependent would henceforth include carrying the corpse/coffin of lower-caste banjar members to the or personal-dependent nature. De Casparis's picture (1986) of the changing nature of cemetery, from which they had previously been dispensed. Intervention by govern­ state-village relations in Java based on old inscriptions is compatible with this view. In the ment prevented secession but also the imposition of the new regulations on Brahmana. In classic Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP), the centralized state and corporate village have 1986, police had to be deployed ( at the behest of a related officer in the force) to prevent a mutual interest in restricting the development of intermediate power bases. If H. Schulte disruption of the death ceremony for the leading Brahmana opponent of the banjar Nordholt (1989) is correct about the dual modes of integration of Balinese village and reforms (G. Robinson, pers. com., 1988). state-one ritual and mediated through corporate structures, the other occurring through 39. The seka principle I think raises important questions regarding the appropriateness personal ties of a political and economic nature, independent of the 'village'-pre-colonial of the conceptions of hierarchy and equality posed by Dumont (1980: 231-45) which Bali represents an interesting combination of the two. This line of inquiry may prove rele­ have so strongly influenced the interpretation of Balinese culture over the past two vant to sorting out the complex historical processes which are at the root, it seems, of the decades. There is clearly a conception of value hierarchy in the Balinese notion of seka ambivalent politicalorientations considered here. unity as it operates in banjar/desa, subak, etc., in the sense of a culturally ranl,ed value of 45. rri one reminder of this reciprocal dependence, the mysterious burning of the offer­ the corporate whole over the individual part. But unlike the Indic hierarchy of value ing towers for the royal Maligia post-cremation ceremony undertaken by the House of ADAT DINAS 98 AND Karangasem in 1937 was alleged in the village of Asak to have been caused by the slighting of one of its deities (Schaareman, 1986a: 41). Mershon's account (1971: 276) of the inci­ dent gives no mention of the Asak deity, but she notes that those who brought the fire wagon neglected to bring the hose, and that after the fire was fortuitously prevented from spreading by his own actions, theprince was so worried he stayed up all night to see that nothing else happened. See also Vickers's (1991a) analysis of a Ligya text from the. nine­ teenth century which highlights the relationship between the crowd and successful ritual. 46. See Stange's article (1991) addressing 'deconstruction as disempowerment' for a 4 parallel critique of contemporary interpretations of Javanese mysticism. Models of Leadership: Concepts of Authority and Popular Responsibility

MODEL conceptions of leadership in the local sphere follow logically from the seka premises of corporate priority and legal equivalence of members, 1 and differ from those associated with authority derived from the state (C. Geertz, 1980; Gesick, 1983; Errington, 1989). Klian (from kelihan, meaning elder-although local leaders are oftenrelatively young) are supposed to be popularly chosen servants of the whole. They have no · claim to personal authority over their members, nor should they be seen to represent interests other than those of the corporate group or obtain personal advantage from their position (Korn, 1924: 131, 137; C. Geertz, 1959: 995; Hobart, 1979: 71-2; Howe, 1980: 157). Popular views of leadership qualities were colourfully articulated in the comic sequence of a wayang kulit (shadow puppet) performance I witnessed at a village temple festival. The puppeteer (dalang) on this 2 occasion was an elderly Brahmana from Banjar Besa ya in Tarian. Through the clown-servants, Sangut and Delem, he satirized irrespons­ ible manipulation of local public office and pointed to model behaviours appropriate to a village leader vested with public trust: Delem: Wah, I want to get some work. Sangut: What kind of work? Delem: As a government official. Sangut: What kind of official? Delem: Anythingwill do. I'll just become a klian banjar. Sangut: Ah, but Delem, to be a klian banjar isn't easy. Delem: Why is that? Sangut: Well, there are three kinds of klian banjar: keleng banjar, kalean banjar, and kalian banjar. If Delem becomes keleng banjar [keleng is a term of con­ tempt, literally meaning penis], whenever there is banjar money to be looked after, you'd finish it offand everyone would say 'keleng-kelengan keliane, telah angge pipis banjare' (That's the dick-head klian who used up his banjar's money).3 If you become kalean banjar [kale: disorganized, undisciplined] this is like inflicting the banjar with an epidemic, because that kind of klian never takes any notice of the situation in his area. But if you are able, it's better to become a kalian banjar [kali in Balinese means fightor disagreement, but here 100 ADA T AND DINAS MODELS OF LEADERSHIP 101 appears also to refer to the Indonesian collective noun kalian, all (you)]. If Parallel patterns are described by Tjondronegoro for Java, where local there is conflict among banjar members you must resolve it, so that it doesn't organization is characterized by a two-layered structure with signific­ 4 get carried on to the courts. antly different orientations. The lower layer of the hamlet exhibits the Delem: Wah, if that's the case, better to become a perbekel. characteristics of a primary community. It is organized around the com­ a perbekel there are also Sangut: A perbekel? Well, my friend, if you become mon interests of grass-roots neighbourhoods or sodalities, and in his marabekel, perabekel, marabekelin. Now marabekel [maro bekel: three types: view contains elements of 'primitive democracy', direct participation in divide supplies]-if you become that kind of perbekel you use the road­ decision-making, and family-like co-operative relations (Tjondronego­ building money from the government for yourself. That's not good! If you 6 desa, become perabekel [pra bekel: not yet adequate] that's like you are now, Delem. ro, 1984: 235 ff.). The upper layer, the administrative is out­ You haven't a clue how a perbekel should behave. Now marabekelin [mara wardly oriented and more directly influenced by supra-village authority bekelin: please support] that's the kind of perbekei that is good! structures.At this point of articulation between village and state, there is Delem: Why is that? predictably a greater accommodation of hierarchic concepts incorpor­ Sangut: For example, there's a small child that isn't going to school because he ated inleadership models, and greater potential for local elites mediating doesn't have the money. You see the child crying and ask why. The child the two spheres to use their relationships with external power bases to answers, 'I can't go to school because I can't pay the fees.' The perbekeL,says, their own ends. marabekelin, 'Here are your fees. Now on your way to school.' That's because Unlike the klian banjar, the sosial character of Sangut's model perbekel perbekel sosial if you want to be a real you have to have a disposition towards is patron-like and depends upon his socio-economic status. This those who are without. phenomenon may or may not be due to the greater penetration of the In the end Delem decides there is not enough in it for him. Public desa by the pre-colonial state, as Dutch scholars assumed, but it is office is either too burdensome or exposed to ridicule to be worth the certainly connected with the establishment of the administrative desa effort. The laudable public figure, the 'ideal' presented in this comic apparatus during the colonial period. Under the Dutch the newly interlude, is socially responsible and careless of material reward: He is, created official district and desa heads (punggawa and perbekel) were as Sangut advises, sosial. In this clever play on language and etymology, appointed wherever possible from the lower ranks of the aristocracy who characteristic of dialogue in the clown-servant interludes so popular with had lost their functions in the reorganization of government in Bali Balinese audiences, 5 the dalang satirizes opportunistic and incompetent between 1906 and 1921 (Korn, 1924: 226 ff.; H. Schulte Nordholt, leadership. Values of public service, social harmony, and generosity and 1986: 34). All six administrative heads of Desa Tarian since the begin­ the distancing of external authority are lauded in the alter-images of the ning of the century have been from Puri Tarian or one of the local ancil­ ideal klian and perbekel presented. lary courts which had played a role in the administration of its realm in But there are also ambivalences in leadership values intimated here, the pre-colonial period. The incumbent throughout the 1980s was a particularly with respect to the redistributive largesse expected of the direct descendant of the last raj a of Tarian and of the punggawa appoint­ perbekel. These ambivalences arise out of the tension between the ed by the Dutch to administer the district which had previously been principles of balance and equivalence presupposed by seka ideology and under his father's authority. Even the adat head of the desa, the bendesa, the structures of political hierarchy and status inequality with which it in this century at least, has come more often than not from priestly or intersects in the real world of the wider social system. They point to a marginal noble families who had been retainers of the traditional ruler.7 significant divergence in the values and conventions which have become The fact that a substantial majority of those elected to the regional and associated with adat and dinas, banjar and desa leadership, differentially provincial assemblies today are triwangsa further reflects the continuity influenced as they have been by the hierarchic authority of the state in of convention that supra-local relations are the appropriate domain of its various historical forms (see Figure 4.1). gentry whose orientations had always been directed in marriage, religion, and politics beyond the village. In contrast, heads of local adat institu­ FIGURE 4.1 tions are rarely drawn from traditional elites. Leaders of banjar, subak, Influence of the State on Local Leadership pemaksan, and other seka are, if anything, remarkable for the typicality of their socio-economic backgrounds. They are more often than not young, of limited education, from commoner descent groups, and of moderate economic means.

Leadership Profiles The profile of banjar leaders in Tarian (see Table 4.1),8 where klian Note: Darker shadings indicate greater State influence. banjar filldual adat and dinas roles, is consistent with the general pattern 0 N TA BLE 4.1 Desa Tarian: Leadership Profiles, 1981-1990

Date Sawah Other Name of Term of of Primary Ownership Socio-economic Relation to Previous I

Banjar Tegeh IKt Suta 1962- 1942 lower secondary farmer 2.00 souvenir shop father and motor cycle grandfather- klian banjar (c.1917-1962) Lagas Kawan I Ny Sapa 1963-86 1943 primary souvenir pedlar 1.09 motor cycle I Wy Jagra 1986- 1958 primary carver 0.62 Lagas Kangin I MdDasa 1975- 1942 primary farmer 0.33 Kalih IKt Artha 1951-84 1935 primary merchant 1.91 shop/motor cycle IWy Bedeg 1984-8 1932 primary farmer IKt Bamia 1989- 1938 lower secondary retired army - minibus father-klianbanjar (1940s) MadyaDangin IWyMandera 1978- 1945 primary painter 0.38 motor cycle uncle-klian banjar MadyaDauh I Ny Sutoya 1977- 1943 primary painter 0.40 motor cycle house-city (1940s) jeep - father-klian banjar Pekandelan GstWyKanti 1972- 1939 primary painter 0.22 (1920s-1950)

Pande IMdKopi 1974-84 1948 upper secondary shop assistant - motor cycle I MdMara 1984- 1952 lower secondary carver Sangan I NyDharma 1981- 1949 primary farmer 0.40 Besaya I Md Toya 1942-61 1920 primary food hawker - - father-klian banjar 1979- (1930s)

Desa Perbekel Cok Gede 1978-89 1940 upper secondary regional * motor cycle descendant of assemblyman traditional ruler; father-punggawa CokAgung 1989-90 1933 upper secondary retired 0.28+ automobile descendant of civil servant * traditional ruler; father---punggawa Bendesa Adat CokAnom 1978-86 1936 lower secondary painter - - descendant of traditional ruler Ida BgNyana 1986- 1954 upper secondary teacher 0.20 motor cycle descendant of priestly family

*Extensive drylandholdings.

...... 0 (.;.) 104 ADA T AND DINAS MODELS OF LEADERSHIP 105 presented by other studies which show leaders of local institutions in Generally, their roles as political, social, and religious leaders do not Bali roughly reflecting the average age, education, social status, and eco­ give them special status at home12 or in the community at large beyond nomic resources of the membership at large ( cf. Birkelbach, 1973; the regard they might win on the basis of conciliating and organizational Astika, Suwena, and Candradewi, 1986; Swarsi et al., 1986). The mean talents. These are the qualities associated with being appropriately sosial age of Tarian's klian banjar in 1981 was 41 years, ranging from the most for a banjar leader. Wibawa (prestige, authority) was a characteristic recently elected klian of Sangan who was 32 to the klian of Banjar connected with the state power that in some areas, Tarian among them, Besaya who was 61 and had served two terms as banjar head, from 1942 rubbed off on conceptions of desa leadership, but did not typically to 1961 and again from 1979 to the present. Eight of the ten had prim­ extend to images of leadership at banjar level. To be sosial has a sub­ ary school education; one had completed lower and one upper sec­ stantially different sense in the banjar context than that inferred for ondary school. Two klian owned no rice land (sawah); five owned less Sangut's perbekel, placing greater stress on a person's public-orientation than 0.5 hectare, but in two of these cases the land had been pawned. and manner of interaction (pergaulan) than on his authoritative Three had exceptional size holdings of between 1 and 2 hectares. demeanour or redistributive capacity. In both models the sosial concept However, agriculture was no longer the main source of income for fam­ is heavily loaded with moral implications,13 although of markedly differ­ ilies in Tarian and landholding does not give a good indication of socio­ ent gloss. economic standing by itself. Ownership of tourist related businesses, Other studies present much the same picture of the qualities of local shops, or vehicles used for public transport are more important assets leaders. Hobart says that those who achieved recognition as influential and together with landholdings set four of the ten above the resource 'orators', including some heads of banjar, subak, and tempek, notably base available to the typical household in Tarian which was dependent lacked wealth or extensive kinship ties. He concludes that local leader­ on some combination of farming, local marketing, and handicraft pro­ ship provides a channel for public achievement where opportunities to duction (carving and painting) to sustain itself. gain prominence in other arenas are restricted (Hobart, 1975: 79). Most of the klian of Tarian earned moderate incomes by local Birkelbach's (1973: 157-9) profile of several hundred heads of subak standards. In addition to their small part-time honorariums as banjar also supports their representative character vis-a-vis general member­ dinas officials, the majority obtained their main incomes from farming9 ship: 60 per cent were between the ages of 30 and 50 years old; 81 per or from the sale of paintings and handicrafts through art shops. One was cent had between 3 and 6 years of formal education; 78 per cent were of a food pedlar, another an assistant to the owner of an art shop in the commoner caste; and 69 per cent owned under 0.6 hectare of sawah. next town. Ketut Artha was well-off as a result of his landholdings and The results of his 1971 survey of two Balinese subak also reflect the ownership of a general store. Nyoman Sutoya supplemented a fairly tendency to disregard or downplay status and wealth differentials in the good income from the sale of his paintings with that from the rental of selection of these leaders. Subak members gave overriding weight to his jeep for public transport. He also owned a house in the suburbs of 'beliefs/opinions' and 'experience', as opposed to considerations of Denpasar. At the other end of the economic spectrum, the two klian family background or landed wealth, as the most important factors in whose rice land had been pawned were in the lower-quarter income the selection of leaders (Birkelbach, 1973: 156). groups in Tarian. Nyoman Dharma occasionally took day-labour jobs as A more recent study compares leadership styles in two Gianyar subak, well as working as a tenant on his own land; his wife sold coffee and one integrated into the government irrigation scheme, the other not. It snacks from a stall in front of their home to make ends meet. Made reports democratic leadership features characterizing the independent Dasa's family depended largely on the supplementary income he could Subak Timbul Baru, where it says the subak head (pekasih) and his make from occasional wood-carving and from the sale of pigs reared by assistants (klian tempek) were chosen without regard for socio-economic his wife and unmarried sister.10 status, and maintained a consultative and activist style of leadership In 1981, the most obvious indicator of variations in economic circum­ (Sutawan et al., 1984: 131). The study also notes that the economic stance among them was the possession of motor cycles by six of the resources of the last two pekasih of Timbul Baru were below the mean klian. This major durable consumer item indicated an above average for the subak membership as a whole. The democratic structure of standard of living, since only a quarter of Tarian households were in Subak Timbul Baru, where all leaders were elected and unrelated, possession of one at that time.11 Otherwise, economic differences, contrasts markedly with that in Subak Celuk where the pekasih had been significant as they were in the day-to-day provisioning of their house­ installed in office by the Dutch with the construction of a dam in the holds and the level of education they could eventually afford for their area and the irrigation system's integration into the government Public children (the children of Nyoman Dharma, Made Dasa, and Gusti Works Department network in 1941. The pekasih of Subal, Celuk had Kanti did not continue beyond lower secondary school for financial remained in office since that time, filling ancillary positions of klian reasons), were not reflected in markedly visible differences in lifestyle tempek with his relatives. He also enjoyed the use of a substantial piece among klian, or between them and other members of the community. of sawah as remuneration-0.6 hectare compared _to 0.1 hectare for the 106 ADA T AND DINAS MODELS OF LEADERSHIP 107 pekasih in Timbul Baru (Sutawan et al., 1984: 146, 198-9). The more ambivalently defined because of their cross-cutting reference authors found that close ties to the bureaucracy in Subak Celuk skewed points. the exercise of authority away from the control of members. In contrast to the backgrounds of banjar and subak officials, which Adat and Dinas tended to be typical of the community at large, wealth and status carry greater weight at the level of the administrative desa where there are In Tarian and throughout the Gianyar region, klian banjar combine both striking differences in the qualities considered desirable for office­ adat and dinas roles. This seems to have been the case since the early holders. When asked what the most important personal characteristics of colonial period, in contrast to the separation of customary and adminis­ a klian banjar should be, honesty (kejujuran) and public service (peng­ trative roles in some other regencies. An early colonial document, abdian) were invariable responses. While moral character was also showing the scheme of banjar and desa government under the reorgan­ stressed in discussions of qualities needed for filling the position of per­ ization of 1908-10, indicates that in Gianyar and Bangli, relatively bekel, it is notable that wealth and social status were regarded as essential unaffected by restructuring until much later, banjar customary leaders criteria as well. already doubled as administrative officials (Adatrechtbundels, 1924: 428). The desa secretary in Tarian said he could not consider running for In general, when conflicts of responsibility occur, adat functions the office of perbekel in the long overdue election there, 14 because supersede. Responsibility for organizing rituals will always come before anyone taking that office would have to be at least moderately well off or official commitments. As adat leaders, klian banjar witness weddings, the public would suspect misuse of desa money (cok Yadnya, 1987). The organize death ceremonies, and conduct routine and special banjar perbekel concurred and commented that the expectation of contributions assembly meetings (sangkepan and paruman) and work sessions (ngayah) to local causes exceed his salary (cok Gede, 1987).15 A member of the for ritual purposes. Klian are consulted by members when conflicts arise nominating committee remarked, 'We need someone who is both intelli­ over marriage, divorce, and inheritance, and in neighbourhood disputes gent and doesn't have to worry about money, because a perbekefs, pay is concerning straying livestock, boundaries, and access rights. It is the insufficient. A little goes in, but for ceremonies much more goes out.' demands arising from adat matters that best illustrate the social service (I Wenten, 1988.) A more cynical voice expressed doubt that a candidate's and moral leadership qualities that are expected of the klian's position. comfortable economic circumstance was much of a guarantee against Mediation in disputes between family members or neighbours is often corruption. 'They think it ought to be a wealthy person, but surely he's required. Klian also play a crucial role in protecting the customary rights not going to empty his pockets unless he knows he can fill them again!' of dependants and secondary heirs (pengempian) within a household (I Madra, 1987.) who might otherwise find their legal position transgressed by the There are notable differences then in the qualities associated with primary heir ( marep). office holding at banjar and desa level. The sosial character of Sangut's Serious problems arise when a banjar head is negligent in his obliga­ model perbekel is defined to a greater extent by his social and economic tion to uphold overlapping property rights under customary law, as status. The paragon imagery of noblesse oblige signals relations based on when the klian of one banjar (technically in his dinas role) approved the authority and patronage. On the other hand, in accord with the seka sale of land by the primary heir without consulting other family principle, klian banjar may aspire to respected-among-equals status, but members. Because the courts are expensive, slow, and reticent to make have no claim to social or political superiority. 16 When villagers describe decisions in disputes which involve adat-the outcome of which might a khan banjar as sosial, they refer to his public involvement-socializing very well be ignored by the litigants in any case-local resolutionof such in coffee-shops, visiting from house to house, and being generally matters is critical. As exemplified in Sangut's advice to Delem, the concerned and available. They and other seka heads are better described conciliating and consensus-building role of the banjar head has always as 'natural' leaders, chosen for their organizing talent and social spirit, been regarded as of paramount importance. This adat role demands a than are officials of the administrative desa, who, whether or not they combination of skills as counsellor, negotiator, and legal executor of possess such qualities, establish themselves in the public sphere prim­ banjar law and is a source of prestige and satisfaction as well as of arily on other grounds. considerable pressure for klian: Although overlapping relations and structural interdependencies banjar. adat dinas, banjar desa, Problems occur frequently enough in the And they have to be dealt with between and and prevent categorical distinction, delicately. If there is a conflict, we have to use extreme care and discretion in desa dinas banjar adat it is fair to say that and represent opposite poles in resolving it. When it's a small dispute, it is usually best not to get involved. But the spectrum of principles upon which village leadership rests. The if things get out of hand, like the other day with the mad woman, something has former is directly linked to external,vertically structured institutionsand to be done for everyone's protection.Once I took her child in to stay with us and authority relations and the latter is more constrained by internal, finallyhad to take her to the psychiatric hospital in Bangli because the rest of her horizontally structured ones. Desa adat and banjar dinas roles tend to be family were too frightened when she became aggressive to do anything.... Then 108 ADA T AND DINAS MODELS OF LEADERSHIP 109 there was the timeMade Dasa [klian of BanjarLagas] came in the middle of the resignation, 'we live in society' was an aphoristic assertion of the noble night, accompanying one of the members from his banjar who was worried act of submission to the public good or collective will-the pivotal seka about his daughter's involvement with a young man from here. So we went value. straight to theyoung man's house to discuss it with him andhis family andclear In Tarian traditional responsibilities of klian banjar as adat leaders are 17 the matter up. (I Sutoya, 1983.) compounded by heavy claims from outside in their second capacity as You can't ordinarily be direct when you want to deal with a problem in a family government officials. In their dinas roles, banjar heads are required to or make someone conscious of theirobligations. They often won't listen. Usually keep official census and family planning records, report changes in it is necessary to follow a circuitous route, approaching them informally in the residence, witness applications for identity cards, loans, marriage coffee shop and having a good chat first about other things, then in passing you registration, and land sale, organize labour service on government raise the matter. Perhaps it will tal,e several times to have some effect. If that projects, ensure law and order, and convey information on government person is not likely to be responsive to me, it's better to look around for someone policies to their constituents. They are responsible for enrolling and he/she respects and listens to, and see whether they can attempt to make the distributing students among the local primary schools. Once a month person aware of their responsibilities. (I Dharma, 1984.) they assist visiting clinic staff in weighing pre-school children at the bale Sometimes we have to tal,e the short end of the stick just to keep things quiet. banjar as part of the government's child health programme. Lil<:ethe time there was disagreement over food distribution at one of thecrema­ Klian dinas have a representative responsibility at desa level and make tion ceremonies. Sutoja [a wealthy art-shop owner from the next town] was a substantial contribution to its administrative affairs. In Tarian they paying for it because his mother came from here and the family was poor. have always formed the core of the village council in its various incarna­ Anyway, of course, many of the young men were being unusually generous in tions.18 Banjar heads play a major role in planning at desa level in the size of the meat they put on the sate sticks. All hell broke loose when in the addition to their officially defined functions in implementing govern­ end the calculations were off and there wasn't enough to go around. [Precise ment programmes within the banjar. It was their key role in the success numbers of meat sticks comprising part of the reciprocal foodgifts to banjar and guests are prescribed in awig-awig]. So I myself and the fourpetajuh gave up our of the family planning programme which finally drew provincial govern­ share to settle the matter. That's an example of the sort of everyday sacrifice ment attention to the importance of banjar leadership in development involved in being a leader. Don't ever let it get to the point where the banjar get programming. aroused! I can't count how many times I came home with no share of food. Because Tarian lies within the orbit of a major tourist centre and has a (I Dasa, 1989.) [His wife added, 'Ya, sometimes the children would be waiting all reputation for being an active and effective administrative desa, it has day with no one home to cook-only to have theirfather and I come home with more than the usual number of government projects funnelled through nothing!' (Ni Yanthi, 1989.)] it, as well as some development programmes of its own. Consequently, klian banjar I think if there were someone else willing to take on the positionof klian, I would over the course of a month, there would attend several lil<:e to step down. It isn't that the work is too heavy. Maybe about 35 per cent of meetings in the desa to discuss village affairs in addition to others at my day is taken up with banjar duties, andas I said I enjoy those things. But it is district or regional level concerning particular desa responsibilities which psychologically wearing. It's the responsibility that is so heavy. You're always they have divided among themselves, such as co-ordination of family thinking about this and that. If in the morning I have to perform some little planning, social welfare, school construction, and the savings and loan duty-it may take only a half hour-still it's no use going home and trying to co-operative. They manage to maintain a remarkably collegial style in paint. There is no hope of getting back your concentration or a quiet frame of their working relationship as the core executive group within the desa, mind. The best thing to do is go visit and talkwith someone. But if I'm forced to despite a moderate level of inter-banjar rivalry.19 All programmes and take the position on again, of course I will do it. We live in society. (I Mandera, policies are discussed at length at regular meetings between the desa 1983.) head and klian banjar. Because the perbekel of Tarian had been a The statement 'we live in society' was the most often repeated expres­ member of the regional assembly (DPRD) forhis entire second term, he sion of social philosophy I encountered during my research. It was the spent most of his time in Gianyar, leaving administration largely in the advice finally given by Gusti Kanti's father when he was conscripted as hands of the desa secretary and the ten klian banjar. klian; the reason why Nyoman Warjana said he gave up his second Several particularly active klian carry weighty desa responsibilities. teaching job to spend more time involving himself in local affairs; the When Tarian decided to revive the village co-operative which had explanation Anak Agung Dunia gave for the obsessively long hours he virtually collapsed as a result of the economic and political upheavals of spent in his own time gardening and tidying the grounds of the primary the mid-1960s, the klian of Madya Dangin and Tegeh were sent to school of which he was principal; the reason Made Gatri contributed to training sessions in co-operative administration and appointed to take on the purchase of the banjar's gamelan, although his father already had a the management of the savings and loan association, initially as volun­ share in another performing group and he himself had no talent or teers and later for small honorariums. One or the other is available in the interest in music. Often expressing mixed feelings of affirmation and co-operative office each morning to process deposits, withdrawals, and ADA T DINAS 110 AND MODELS OF LEADERSHIP 111 22 loan applications. Together they handle all accountingand reports to the commumties through such solidarity mechanisms. One of the klian regional office; both have reputations for being hard-working and banjar adat/dinas) 20 ( in another village, facing criticism at a village council responsible. A striking feature of banjar leadership is the general ir­ meeting for his minimal participation in the nation-wide desa competi­ relevance of formal qualifications to practical competence. W ayan tion, replied that he had been a PKI member and was disheartened by Mandera, for example, was only 33 years old when chosen klian, with the government's continued treatment of the PKI as a scapegoat. His little formal education and no family tradition of leadership. Judging public acknowledgement was reported in a letter from the bendesa adat, from his level of public involvement, meticulous record keeping, and the a veteran and an unusually avid Golkar member, to the provincial regard with which he was held in the community, the emphasis on in­ military commander. The letter requested an investigation and whatever formal criteria in choice of local leaders was well served in his and other action was deemed necessary for the sake of future security and order. cases. The extension of such informal qualities of leadership to the dinas Several years after the incident no action to remove the klian from office sphere has proved critical to the success of government programmes in had been taken, despite the intensification of anti-communist propa­ 23 Bali. ganda by central government in the 1980s and new moves against Although the perbekel as head of the desa is the pivot of local adminis­ alleged sympathizers which resulted in the removal of several civil ser­ tration in central government policy, he is rarely more than a co­ vants and police from their posts. ordinator and conveyor of instructions from district, regional, and I was unable to learn whether this inaction may have been due to provincial levels. The point was made by the perbekel of Tarian at the political connections and/or a desire in provincial circles to avoid outset of my research there: 'If you want to know what is happening in provoking tension in a banjar that had previously held strong this village, talk to the klian banjar. They are the ones who work with the Communist Party sympathies. The important point was that the people.' (cok Gede, 1981.) It is possible for a dynamic and charismatic bendesa's sentiments were not widely supported within the community. figure to turn the administrative desa into a centre of public attention There was no attempt at banjar, desa, or even kecamatan level to remove and involvement. This was certainly the case in Desa Sanur whose per­ the klian in anticipation of intervention that must have been expected. bekel, Ida Bagus Beratha, succeeded in using local organization to estab­ When I raised the subject in discussions with a klian from another banjar lish an innovative development programme based on village-owned in the same desa, he became visibly emotional, expressing disgust at the industries. But as will be evident from Beratha's own account of the behaviour of the bendesa. He indicated that disaffection was building up process of building Sanur's self-help projects over 20 years (see Chap­ in the community in consequence of the bendesa's tendency to make ter 7), he was critically dependent on the banjar of Sanur to make the 'political issues out of matters that should have nothing to do with scheme work. The same dependence upon local adat institutions and politics' (I Rawi, 1986). Concern was not that the bentlesa had overstepped leadership applied to central government programmes as well. his authority as an adat leader in a matter that properly belonged in the The overlay of dinas authority on adat leadership positions clearly dinas sphere, but rather with the impropriety of calling for unwarranted increases the power available to these officials. Concomitantly, however, external intervention in local affairs. their reliance on local support mechanisms makes it difficult to convert Although village officials in Tarian are not members of the civil this into a significant degree of personal political autonomy. The service, they are treated as such with respect to Golkar membership and requirement for their signatures on good behaviour letters (Surat are expected to campaign actively. I was in Tarian during the 1982 Kelakuan Baik) and of non-involvement (or non-relationship to anyone 21 election when leaders exercised varying degrees of open advocacy. At involved) in PKI political activities (Surat Tidak Terlibat G 30 S), is a the monthly assembly in Banjar Pande, the klian urged his members to case in point. All public service positions and many other official avoid emotional involvement and to vote Golkar in the interests of 4 applications require these documents, which puts village officials in a unity. 2 At others, klian reminded the members of the importance of position to make discretionary use of their local knowledge. In several voting and of exercising great care in castingtheir ballot. cases of adat disputes, such as those of Siang and Sangging, good behaviour letters were withheld for several years, and according to notes This time I simply instructed everyone: 'The important thing is not to make a on Council discussions in Sanur, would be under similar circumstances mistake choosing (salah pilih)'-just that. Perhaps this was being 'diplomatic' a there. bit. I wasn't telling them 'you must choose this way' because of course they Discretion may also work the other way to protect local people from know well enough. They're intelligent. But just so they don't make a mistake the negative effects of repressive national laws. Many klian turned a ticking the wrong box and have their vote disqualified. That was my point. But blind eye on the G 30 S issue where the children of implicated indi­ it could also be taken to mean 'don't make the wrong choice' in the other sense. (I Mandera, 1983.) viduals were concerned. They felt the victimization of children unjustified and signed the 'non-involvement' document in feigned ignor­ Nothing that could be called strong pressure was evident during that ance. Apparently past PKI membership remains unremarked in many election, however, and in one banjar, whose klian was more vociferous 112 ADA T AND DINAS MODELS OF LEADERSHIP 113 than most in his personal support of Golkar, a majority of votes went to The extensive social ties and reputation of a local leader are more the non-Muslim opposition party, PDI.25 There was a recognizably likely to be reflected in the informal offers of food and assistance on more relaxed and philosophical attitude among local officials after the ritual occasions. When Gusti Kanti's son married without advance plans 1987 elections, perhaps because Golkar had won so comfortably,26 in 1983, family, friends, and neighbours brought contributionsof coffee, although the PDI still polled a majority in Lagas. I was interested that cigarettes, and ducks. Kanti estimated that two-thirds of the approxim­ many people, including several klian, remarked on the importance of ately Rp 100,000 (US$100) cost of the ceremony was covered by these opposition parties in this election to 'keep the government straight'. gifts. Made Dasa too owed the modest buildings in his compound to friends and neighbours who, he said, 'pitied his circumstances' (1984). Even today, when labour exchange for non-ritual purposes is declining Rewards of Office in favour of hired work, such assistance is still forthcoming where a Traditionally, holders of desa and banjar office received minor remu­ combination of personal economic circumstance, public service, and neration in the form of a portion of offerings at village ceremonies and popular regard provoke a sense of reciprocal obligation. The entire dispensation (luput) from various labour obligations to other village cor­ krama of Banjar Lagas extended their help to Made Lebah for reroofing porate groups. These exemptions from certain services are still the main a pavilion and assisting at a tooth-filing ceremony in recognition for his form of compensation for adat leaders, although they would normally otherwise unpaid services as a music instructor for their new orchestra. join temple work sessions anyway, because, as several klian commented, Similar assistance came from Banjar Tegeh to the recently retired they would 'feel ashamed before the community' not to do so (r Bedeg, bendesa adat as an expression of gratitude for his years of service in reli­ 31 1984; I Mandera, 1989; I Bamia, 1990). It is unclear to what extent banjar and desa gious matters. But on no occasion were formal banjar services recruit­ heads received access to village land to compensate their services in the ed by local leaders beyond the usual prescribed ritual services applying pre-colonial period.27 Under the Dutch land was set aside for official to all members. desa administrators, including very small amounts for klian banjar dinas, The use of public monies is the subject of vigilant surveillance,32 but nothing for adat officials (Korn, 1924: 131, 237). I Liab and Made much gossip and, not infrequently, loss of reputation to local leaders. Toya recalled having the use of 0.13 and 0.08 hectare of sawah respec­ Wayan Suta told me his father was subjected to intense criticism for tively when they served as klian dinas in the 1940s. Korn notes that the mismanaging money when he organized the firstcollective cremationsin lands awarded by the colonial government were so small because this Tegeh in the early 1960s. When the practice was again adopted in 1985, was all that had been available under the pre-existing system (Korn, to avoid criticism Suta left the financial side of it entirely to a committee 1924: 131, 237). At neither banjar nor desa level were these bukti lands of families carrying out the ceremony. Similar procedures were adopted reserved for officials anything like the large bengkok holdings reported in other banjar for the same reasons CI Sutoya, 1987; I Dasa, 1988; I Dharrna, 1988). for village officials in Java.28 After the revolution, tanah bukti was A number of conventions exist for distributing financial responsibility resumed by the provincial government of Bali and used in exchange for and increasing public visibility of banjar funds, many of these practices land to build schools. Subsequently, dinas officials were granted hon­ of long standing. In some communities the banjar secretary (penya­ orariums. These amount to Rp 30,000 and Rp 50,000 (approximately rikan), heads of tempek (petajuh), or criers (kasinoman) were tradition­ US$43 and US$72 in 1982, but by 1989 worth only US$18 and ally entrusted with community finances. They were expected to display US$30) per month to klian dinas and perbekel respectively. In addition or report on public assets at the monthly meetings. Today there is typic­ the perbekel receives 0.5 per cent of the value of land sold in the village ally a treasurer elected to perform accounting and reporting functions. and both klian banjar and perbekel are entitled to small fees for signatures Other customary devices operate to restrict the concentration of on official documents.29 public money in the hands of office-holders. Fines are recorded but not Popular sentiment is inclined to err on the side of restraint when it paid until the six-monthly festival of Galungan when they are immedi­ comes to rewarding office.Public positions should never be so attractive ately redivided among members or committed to some special purpose. that they become desirable sinecures. In this the Balinese would certainly In the past, when banjar harvesting provided the major source of concur with Moore's view of the kind of incentives that lead to certain income, the harvested rice was either kept in a public storage house or forms of socially useful authority. 'There is no need to overreward divided among members who returned equivalent amounts of pounded people for theaccident of innate talents that they would develop and use rice (less a proportion for the labour expended) when needed for ritual without rewards. The psychological rewards of social respect and honor purposes. Where substantial banjar funds exist, they may be loaned to are probably even more effective for this purpose than strictly material members in fixed amounts and the interest used to pay routine bills. ones.' (Moore, 1978: 444.)30 The kind of authority a 'good' klian may Some awig-awig state that money and other banjar assets held in public exercise is of a moral-social nature and his reward is appropriately a trust must be brought each month to the assembly. Any amount modest reputation for a sosial character in the popular view. unaccounted for must be compensated by the responsible officer, or 114 ADA T AND DINAS MODELS OF LEADERSHIP 115 goods to that value confiscated (see Pengeling-eling Desa Tihingtali, in Chapter 9. In one instance which less clearly falls into this category, Korn Coll. 160/547; Korn, 1924: 132-5). Klian complained that they Nyoman Dharma, the klian of Banjar Sangan, had been nominated to could find themselves out of pocket if banjar books could not be receive one of 15 home reconstruction loans of Rp 100,000 made avail­ balanced, for fear that discrepancies would reflect upon them ( GustiKanti, able to the desa from the Social Welfare Department. The desa council 1984; r Suta, 1986; I Wy Sutoya, 1988). In Banjar Tegeh, which has substantial decided that each banjar would receive one or two of the loans, depend­ cash funds on loan to its members, current banjar regulations require ing on its size, to be allocated to a poor family. The loans were to be that all borrowings be brought to the meeting at the six-monthly repaid without interest over 2 years so that they could be redirected to Galungan festival when they are sighted publicly before they can once other needy villagers. _The allocation of Banjar Sangan's initial grant to again be loaned out to the membership. its klian became an issue at the subsequent banjar meeting which I With respect to compensation for government duties, klian complain attended. On that occasion, the banjar secretary responded in the klian's of being caught between public expectations on the one hand and those defence, asserting that, although he was not the only person in the ban­ of the government on the other. They feel they receive inadequate jar qualified under department guidelines, he was indeed deserving. The recognition of their services as dinas officials, particularly in comparison banjar executive committee (composed of the klian, secretary, treasurer, with civil servants who receive supplementary allowances and pensions and four tempek heads) had decided he should be the first recipient, as well as more substantial salaries. They complain that remuneration is given his services to the banjar. With no other member pursuing the not commensurate with the responsibilities they are expected to take on, mfltter, it was allowed to drop, although not without embarrassment to time-consuming duties which have been increasing in scope every year. the klian concerned. In Tarian, central government demands from village leaders are There is no question that banjar members regard scrutiny of such compounded by self-imposed tasks in the interests of local development, matters as their legitimate right, even when funding sources lie outside such as the revival of the village co-operative and self-management of the local sphere. Vigilant attention is focused on the use of public school construction projects. 'If we don't put the public good first, then resources and local information networks ensure that reputation nothing will ever grow and bear fruit. From a personal point of view sanctions are invoked when legitimate disposition is in doubt. Criticism there is a good and bad side to it. The good is a good name, although of the perquisites that occasionally come with administration of project maybe only God actually knows that. The bad is obvious if you just look funds for dinas officials is common and not without effect in a culture at my household; our personal economic situation suffers.' (r Dharma, 1984.) where social reputation is a matter of utmost concern: (1984) Ketut Suta and Wayan Mandera half-jokingly referred to their It's hard to imagine what the desa would do without Mandera and I. We run the work for the co-operative as cara nyaub ambengan: like harvesting ele­ Co-operative for just about nothing [Rp 20,000 honorarium per month = phant grass-you get tired, itchy, cut, and overheated without anything US$18]. Mandera is always saying 'Kerja-kerjanya mari, uangnya Zari' [work to show for it. come, money go]. It is true that we received a percentage of the cost of the On occasion, grant projects included perquisites for local officials. A materials that were used to build the schools last year. That was from the build­ Social Welfare Department pig-rearing project, for example, provided ing supply merchant-half to Mandera and half to me. It was appropriate that klian upah tuyuh, we be given a percentage, because we managed and supervised the whole thing one piglet for each of the as 'payment fortoil' in assist­ 33 ing the administration of the programme. In another instance two klian for more than two months without pay. Until we showed it could be done, no (Made Dasa and Ketut Suta) and the desa secretary (Cokorda Yadnya) one else was prepared to lift a finger. Inpres money for this year has arrived but were among five villagers to obtain concessionary loans for an experi­ nothing's been done with it yet. Mandera and I will sit quiet this time. I feel embarrassed. I don't want to be the object of talk. We've both talked it over and mental poultry-rearing project. As well as the strategic access their posi­ we're prepared to do whatever work is necessary without any compensation. If tions provided, they were chosen partly because they had some we work past 11 o'clock, just buy us rice withthe day labourers. (I Suta, 1985.) experience in animal husbandry and because it was hoped that as local leaders their success might encourage more households to take up such The resulting disquiet among other klian led the village council to home-based commercial enterprises. The 'opportunity' backfired in this handle self-management of that year's Inpres grant differently.This time instance, however, when disease wiped out a large number of these supervision was spread among a larger group from the desa council foreign-breed chickens and market manipulation by middlemen caused (mainly klian banjar) who took on supervisory duties in pairs on daily them severe financial losses on the remaining stock, leaving all the rotation and were paid a per diem wage for these duties equivalent to participants with major debts. that of the building tradesmen working on the project (Rp 2,500 per The line between compensation for service and unseemly advantage day). The council decided this was a fair compromise that compensated in such arrangements is a fine one. Open challenge was not uncommon the additional labour of those involved, spread access to modest supple­ when the distinction was blurred. Detailed treatment of two cases of mentary income among a broader group of active council members, and malfeasance which occurred during the period of study will be covered enabled savings of Rp 2.25 million out of a Rp 19.7 million project. 116 ADA T AND DINAS MODELS OF LEADERSHIP 117 This went into the desa co-operative towards future construction of a (1924: 113). The gods were also a part of the democratic process appar­ multi-purpose centre for sports, crafts, and the performing arts. ently: Striking a balance between the essentially social commitment that banjar service is supposed to reflect and the economic costs of time The function of klian desa in the new villages usually stays within the family, devoted to public duties is a matter of express concern to local officials. 'and it is the rule that the klianwho has not given any grounds for dissatisfaction with the way he fulfills his function, is succeeded at his death by his son'. The When income from alternative sources of employment in the handicraft choice is made by the members of the association in accordance with theindica­ industry in the late 1980s is becoming considerable, real losses involved tions of the gods .... The temple officials seem to take care that the will of the in time-consuming administrative tasks may be significant. Two banjar gods is in harmony with members' wishes. (Korn, 1924: 113, citing Liefrinck, heads in Tarian resigned for economic reasons in 1982 and 1986. In 1890: 312.) Sanur, too, I was told it was becoming increasingly difficult to get people to take local office for these reasons. Several detailed questionnaires regarding banjar and desa organization Another issue of muted but very real concern is the lack of parallel commissioned by Korn in the late 1920s reveal the range of customary honorariums for adat officials, when these roles are considered socially selection practices prevailing in different communities in Bali. In Desa more significant and when the effectiveness of official affairs rests so Julah (Buleleng), an 'old-type' village, a seniority system operated. Each heavily on adat institutions. The disjunction between rewards and time a village office became vacant, the person holding the next more responsibilities for dinas and adat office is one of the reasons why there junior position moved up to fill it and so on in sequence (Korn Coll. have been no attempts to split the two functions of klian banjar in 150/505).36 In Desa Selat (Karangasem), klian desa and secretary Tarian and other villages in Gianyar. Despite the double burden this (penyarikan) were normally replaced by one of their sons, although the entails, at least the small compensation attached to the position of klian unnamed respondent to Korn's questionnaire also referred to 'selection dinas gives some material support for service in both spheres. by the gods' and 'election' in the case of the other offices of pemangku, In recognition of civil dependence on adat institutions, corporate klian juru [tempek or banjar?], and kubayan (Korn Coll. 160/542). values do sometimes impinge informally on the distribution of dinas Finally, in Desa Tangkup (Gianyar), the pemangku were said to be rewards. In two nearby villages where the establishment of new banjar chosen by God (Sanghyang Widi), while klian des a, klian banjar, klian (adat) remained unrecognized as dinas units by the government for pemaksan, and penyarikan are chosen by 'God and the krama desa'. more than 20 years, 34 government honorariums are pooled and redi­ Asked further, 'But are they chosen by the krama, or the punggawa vided equally among all klian in the desa without regard for the official (district head), or do they inherit their position from father or grand­ status of the banjar they represent. The ten klian banjar, perbekel, and father?', the response was 'They are actually chosen by those people secretary of Desa Tarian contributed Rp 1,000 from each of their who will be under them.. . they do not receive their position from father government payments to provide a small honorarium for the bendesa or grandfather' (Korn Coll. 161/559). adat, and at least one klian divides a portion of his income among the In pursuit of the ethos of harmony and solidarity, there is preference petajuh who assist him within his banjar. These assistants from each tem­ for the appearance at least of unanimity and consensus in elections, and pek play an important role in keeping banjar affairs in both spheres discomfort with overt competition for office. Informants explicitly running smoothly.35 In Banjar Kalih they were paid a small monthly contrasted the Balinese system with the campaigning which they associ­ gratuity for organizing film showings and thereby given compensatory ated with the seeking of village office in Java: 'The idea of competing for recognition for their services to the banjar. Similarly in Sanur one of the office isn't pleasant. It is as if there were profit to be gotten. Perhaps in secondary aims of the desa industries was to provide some paid employ­ other areas like Java because there is bengkok land, it is possible to 37 ment opportunities to subsidize the organizational role of adat leaders. become rich from office. Here it's the reverse.' (I Mandera, 1987.) The friction involved in attempting to balance social obligation and Electioneering is perceived as conducive to factionalism and an indi­ material reward in these cases became a creative stimulus to increased vidual who actively seeks nomination is regarded with suspicion. Often social action. Such examples again signify the tight interdependence of the final choice of candidate is worked out in advance on the basis of in­ adat and dinas affairs in Balinese communities. formal representations among the constituent units-tempek in the case of banjar elections, banjar in desa elections. Klian invariably describe themselves as having been conscripted Leadership Recruitment Practices against their will. Indeed, many awig-awig contain provisions prohibiting Kornrefers to the typical pattern of leadership recruitment in South Bali refusal of public office (Korn, 1924: 112, 138),38 suggesting that genu­ desa adat as a combination of 'inheritance with election' (1924: 137), in ine reticence to assume the burdens of local office was not unusual. The contrast to 'old-type' desa where offices were filled on the basis of· newly elected klian of Banjar Kalih explained that he had been selected seniority or descent among. those inheriting full membership status in 1989 by default, being the only one of the nominees for klian who did 118 ADA T AND DINAS MODELS OF LEADERSHIP 119 not have any excuse for refusing, since he had recently retired from the banjar was replaced. Three others resigned, however, two for economic civil service er Bamia, 1989). Gusti Kanti's account of his attempts to resist reasons and one because of public pressure, over the following 5-year nomination in Banjar Pekandelan are classic. His father had been klian period. from 1921 to 1951 and he was considered a logical choice when the Conventional election procedure is for each tempek to put up its own incumbent office-holder stepped down in 1972: candidate. The outgoing klian may have considerable influence over the Nominees are usually chosen under public pressure at the monthly meeting. choice of candidates depending on the extent of his public esteem. Ahead of time people went around asking, 'What if you were put forward?' I Regardless of the procedures adopted, informal discussions that take asked not to be. From my father's own experience, he advised me against it. place in coffee-shops and balai banjar, tempek, and house yards, are Because, as the proverb goes, leading the banjar is like 'leading male ducks' [all normally more important in establishing consensus than the formal squawks and no eggs]. That was his experience. At the time we didn't have meeting, where final election is commonly by acclamation. The bendesa anything.... I had five children and there were no buildings except for the bale who had previously served as klian of Banjar Madya, had been heavily dangin, and that was leaking. Our condition was like the pigs roaming the involved in the selection of his successor: compound. So I said, 'you need someone as leader who has authority and stature ... but I don't have authority (berwibawa), so I refuse. What is more, I Respected figures in the banjar have to go around and lobby in each tempek first. am poor. I have to live. If you as banjar members have cash and I as head have 'Who in this tempek is considered good?' 'This one's o.k., this one not. ... So and to be responsible for thecash, maybe because I have to live, maybe I would 'eat' so is clever, but not responsible.' It's like collecting intelligence. From that we try it. Think about it.' ... I trusted that I had persuaded my friends, but when the to come to a generally acceptable candidate. Indeed we do discourage two can­ meeting came my name was one of the four [from each of the four tempek didates. If there is rivalry, besides creating divisions, those that feel their candi­ divisions of the banjar] put up. I got up and said 'Forgive me, but I am not pre­ date lost will cause problems later. (CokAnom, 1983.) pared to be nominated, not because it doesn't please me, or because I don't want The person finally chosen to replace Anom was not his initial prefer­ to shoulder the burden that you request. But you must understand that I am lower than all of you as a poor person.' But the committee said 'We are stilljust ence, but a young man with no connections, whose only previous teka-teki [working out the puzzle]. It isn't certain you'll be chosen. So why do experience of public involvement had been his activities in the young you make such a big issue of it?' (Gst Kanti, 1983.) people's group before marriage. Anom corroborated the reluctance which W ayan Mandera had expressed because of his youth and in­ At the next meeting he was elected. His father's consoling advice at the experience. No doubt the 'ordinariness' characteristic of local leadership time, despite earlier warnings, reiterated the philosophy of social duty is a consequence of processes which eliminate powerful individuals who that is aphoristic: 'Human beings are not like animals who eat and live might threaten competing interest groups. It is also the case that the lack alone, unbound (iket) to their environment. People are different.We live of exceptional qualifications or a strong power base leaves them more in society. Because we live and die in society, we have to put ourselves at vulnerable to public opinion at large. But the neutrality of a compromise its service.' ( Gst Kanti, 1983.) candidate does not necessarily imply malleability. Indeed a certain There is a tendency to look to descendants of previous headmen as boldness of character is also a positively valued quality of leadership potential candidates for klian. In much the same way as the son of a (Hobart, 1979: 489 ff.; Howe, 1980: 223),39 and one evident enough puppet master or a musician might be expected to have the necessary among the past and current klian of Tarian. Made Dasa said his own talent, inclination, and experience to fill his father's role, the son of a perception of a banjar leaders' role was inspired by stories of the former klian would be more familiar with the duties of office and, assertive character of I Renggung, klian of Banjar Lagas in the 1930s. perhaps more important, given the limited rewards of office, more When the banjar was called up for mandatory corv:ee work on the roads readily pressed into service. Nevertheless, only five of the fourteen klian (kerja rodz), on one occasion coinciding with harvest season, Renggung banjar who held office in Tarian between 1981 and 1989 were related in refused to carry out the directive and told the colonial authorities they some way to previous office-holders and only in Banjar Tegeh was there could jail him in place of the banjar (r Dasa, 1986). Dasa frequently an unbroken line of succession of related headmen over the last several recounted his own brushes with outside authorities and like several other decades (see Table 4.1). klian took pleasure in the reputation he had acquired sparring with Klian are normally elected for 5-year terms of office, a practice that bureaucratic officialdom. had been only loosely enforced in Tarian. It was fairly common to find Similar procedures operate at desa level with respect to the selection of banjar heads remaining in office until they requested to be relieved or bendesa and perbekel. Although state regulations impinge on the process until a dispute or public disaffection forced them to do so. When the of selecting the perbekel, the same lengthy, informal deliberations opportunity to replace incumbent klian arose with the introduction of proceed for months before an election is finally held. Each banjar is new government regulations there in 1984, only one of the ten klian asked to consider proposing a candidate and then several months of 120 ADA T AND DINAS MODELS OF LEADERSHIP 121 discussion within banjar assemblies and outside ensue. The fluidity of He is already on a pension from the army and his wife's business does very well. the process of assessing public opinion and establishing broadly accept­ But that doesn't mean it is certain he will be the final choice. We'll have to see banjar able candidates even at administrative desa level was an interesting what other candidates are put forward by other and feel out public opinion before we'd feel bold enough to bring it to a banjar meeting.(I Wenten, feature of the election cases I was able to pursue in any depth. A 1987.) primary schoolteacher who was a member of the village council and of perbekel the nominating committees for selection of the in 1978 and In fact strong resistance did surface in some quarters to Raka's 1988, explained his role in the delicate process of negotiation. His election, because, as an ex-military officer, 'many feel his manner too description brings out the shifting alignments from which political hard' (I Mandera, 1988). In particular, his forceful actions during the 1972 consensus is built and in which particularist loyalties of kinship or neigh­ elections had alienated non-Golkar supporters, including a respected bourhood might give way to other more broadly based considerations: village council member. W enten himself was many months later In the 1978 election Banjar Madya at first supported Anak Agung Rai's son, involved in encouraging a relative of the incumbent perbekel (and an since his father had been perbekel in the 1960s and has served our banjar as in-law of Ida Bagus Raka) to stand against him. This created a delicate treasurer ever since. But when Cokorda Gede was nominated by Banjar situation, leading Raka to allow his candidature to lapse by failing to Pekandelan and we compared them, we felt he was by far the better candidate. submit the necessary documents to regional authorities at the screening He was both more intelligent and experienced. General opinion was that stage. Cokorda was the better person for the job. Once that was clear, our candidate There is some disagreement regarding the propriety of single as had to be persuaded to step down. It is important to try to avoid overt competi­ opposed to multiple candidates in local elections. Although many tion.It is unpleasant and unsettling in the end for the one that loses and for his villagers believed that the underlying principle remains democratic when supporters; the result could be the loss of social unity.At that time it was left to canvassing takes place in the informal arena, others, persuaded by me to convince him that the best thing for him to do was to withdraw, so that there would be a single candidate. The problem was, he actually wanted to be democratic conventions of the Western tradition, said there should perbekel. He had no job and not much sawah. But I succeeded in persuading him properly be a number of formal candidates (I Madra, 1984; Ida Bgs Mayun, 1987; it would be better if he chose some other kind of work. (I Wenten, 1987.) I Dharma, 1988; I Dasa, 1990). They were more adamant about this at adminis­ trative desa level, where, for reasons of scale at least, the adequacy of Another account, in which family loyalties were tested, comes from informal processes is doubtful. bendesa adat the former oflntaran in Sanur. He described the election of Government policy discourages single candidate elections for the office the man who became the highly respected administrative head of that of desa head and requires a minimum of two nominations or 'some village some 28 years before, Ida Bagus Beratha. On that occasion, a method of ensuring that the single candidate does represent the majority banjar cousin from his own was put up as the opposing candidate: of the village' (Biro Bina, 1984a: 119). When there is only one nominee, I thought he was too young to be chosen, but because people pushed him he thisis normally accomplished withthe additionof an unmarked ballot box was encouraged to be bold and accepted nomination.As for me, it was like a (kotak kosong) forprotest votes. It is not unknown forthe blank box to win cock-fight, I wasn't brave enough to bet on him because I had already weighed elections, supporting the view that nomination processes are not always up his ability, his character, etc .... Fortunately, I didn't have to vote that day reflective of public opinion. A letter to the Bali Post (3 December 1984) because I was working in the post office until two o'clock. Anyway, [by then] it entitled 'Complaint Concerning the Fortunes of Our Desa' describes the was no more thana formality, so that there would be twocandidates. It wouldn't defeat of the single candidate by theblank box and asks 'Was the commit­ look too good if there were only one. (Ida Bgs Majun, 1987.) tee so out of touch or was one of their number an "enemy in the blanket", Both Majun and W enten claimed family and neighbourhood loyalties inciting the public to choose the kotak kosong?'. Wilkinson (1991) were not the final determinant of their political allegiances. Discussions describes an election in which there was active campaigning for the blank of the forthcoming Tarian election involved similar equivocation and box. only testing, tentative promotion of favoured candidates: While recent legislation introducing appointment rather than election of local officials deserves serious criticism (see Chapter 9), a number of For this election we [the banjar nomination committee] rather hoped to put up the regulations associated with the one village office which remains Ida Bagus Agung from here [ a wealthy shop owner and retired policeman who elective, that of desa head, are positive and important. The regularization had moved into Banjar Madya], but he declined because he felt his business would suffer. We need someone who is both intelligent and doesn't have to of terms of office and insistence on multiple candidates or some other worry about money, because a perbekel's pay is insufficient.A little goes in, but means of registering dissent are among these. Stipulations against hold­ for ceremonies much more goes out. The other person we felt would be a good ing more than one government position and limiting tenure of office also candidate is Ida Bagus Raka from Banjar Besaya. We [the desa council's nom­ facilitate greater popular control over leadership. Formal requirements ination committee] have already been to see him several times and he is willing. for election at regular intervals present the opportunity to replace leaders 122 ADA T AND DINAS MODELS OF LEADERSHIP 123 in a manner that does not appear to affront. Where office has relatively suryakin, menang ujurin (If you lose, they jeer; If you win, they want a limited rewards attached to it and shame accompanies overt dismissal, share); aluh abot (easy difficult: it's easy if you do things the right way, the Balinese are reticent to turn leaders out in the absence of gross difficult if you stray from the path the tiniest bit) (Gst Kanti, 1985); negen provocation (Birkelbach, 1973: 159). As noted above, Tarian's perbekel bebek muani (leading a flock of drakes-all squawks and no eggs); suryak of 10 years was only finally replaced when government regulations siu (a thousand shouts-overwhelming assent or rejection; jeers or against double office-holding were enforced. In the remote village of cheers). 'Tanahbelig', a virtual monopoly of the perbekel's position by one dadia There is a double entendre in the 'flock of drakes' and 'thousand was broken following theimposition of official regulations requiring for­ shouts' metaphors which refer to the wiles of public opinion. These mal election-with a serendipitous outcome (Wilkinson, 1991).4 0 images may be used in a derisory manner to infer a public of blind Provision for secret balloting has traditional precedents. Villagers followers (see Howe, 1980: 199). More profoundly they express the recalled occasions when banjar voted by placing a stick in one of several difficulties of bringing so many conflicting opinions into the consensual bamboo cups marked for each candidate. This seems to have occurred community imaged in concepts of krama, sangkep, seka. For all its in the fairly rare instances where more than one candidate emerged from emphasis on unity, solidarity, and the rule, Balinese culture also the preliminary nomination processes. The written constitution of acknowledges the variety of opinion and personal difference that make Banjar Belong Gede (Denpasar) is strict on these matters, however. It up a social group: Ada kene ada keto (There are some like this, some like states that its five klian adat must be chosen by written ballot every that); Paksi bina paksa (Each bird has tastes of its own) (see Pendit, 5 years and cannot be re-elected before another 5-year period has 1978: 29-33). elapsed. The klian dinas is to be chosen separately 'according to proced­ No discussion of leadership or local institutions can fail to take ures established by the government' (Sima Krama Banjar Belong Gede, account of Balinese conceptions of the 'popular', influenced unquestion­ 1967: §§9-10). ably by modern concepts of democracy (see Chapter 10) as well as There are presuppositions about the limited social categories from traditional practice. Korn saw something of an ethnic character in the which candidates for desa head should properly be drawn in Tarian. reluctance to concede authority and the irascible propensities of the Gentry status was so taken-for-granted a consideration in filling the Balinese civic sensibility (1924: 135, 242; see also Schaareman, 1986b), office of perbekel that it went almost unchallenged. Most of the potential and C. Geertz finds unexpected space for personal manoeuvre, if not candidates suggested for the upcoming election were of the traditional independence, in the fragmentary Balinese construction of social elite. Wealth, as we have seen, was also foregrounded. Although village relations: council members did raise the possibility of nominating a banjar leader This combination of a somewhat antlike attack on the performance of important with experience working on desa development projects, none were will­ social activities-which the Balinese themselves wryly describe as bebek-bebekan ing to stand (r Dasa, I Gst Kanti, I Mandera,I Marta, and I Suta, 1989). This was a sub­ ('duck-like') after the way masses of happily quacking ducks waddle along the ject I probed repeatedly, since all seemed prepared to accept a person roads and canals in tight formation_:_on the one hand, witha tendency to direct untried in village administration rather than move away from the prac­ any one group to a single end rather than employing the same group for mul­ tice of electing a candidate from the old elite. tiplepurposes on theother, leads to what one might call, paradoxically, a plural­ istic collectivism.The cross-cutting of social alliances means that almost no one klian There was a proposal from the village council, 'Why not put up one of the is completely engrossed in any single, totally comprehensive institution, without banjar?' jaman moderen, ... But we said no. Even though it is it doesn't feel right alternativeloyalties, to which he may have recourse against group pressures, and (tidak enak) puri. to forget relations with the Even if there is no one who really yet no one is ever obliged to ·operate entirely on his own,.independently of some banjar has it all together, he can of course depend on the heads. The last one has well-defined social aggregation. Balinese society is not individualistic, but it is for the past 6 years. He just comes in and signs things.... Even if it's only sym­ nevertheless, rather libertarian in its own peculiar and traditionalist way. For all bolic, at least it won't feel awkward as it would if one of us were put forward. the communalism, there is room for personal maneuver. (C. Geertz, 1963: (I Suta, 1989.) 84-5.) The selection of one among them would undoubtedly have induced In view of popular theory that village office should neither be coveted intense rivalry among the klian of Tarian, and in this regard the continu­ nor too highly rewarded, villagers might content themselves with ity of the association of gentry families with the domain of the adminis­ mediocre leadership for long periods without concerted attempts at trative desa has a pragmatic edge. replacement. But when public opinion is mobilized by a dramatic incident or when the cumulative effects of incessant gossip and rumour41 definitively label a local official as incapable, authoritarian, or The 'Popular' in Local Political Process corrupt, he will not normally last long. It is as appropriate to look for Numerous proverbs and aphorisms deal with the contentious aspects of signs of 'democratic' convention in the manner of disposal as in the the relationship between local leaders and their constituencies: Kalah manner of selection of village leaders. The mobilization of informal 124 ADA T AND DINAS MODELS OF LEADERSHIP 125 networks, as we have seen, is the usual way in which leaders are re­ The banJar decided, for reasons not elaborated in the article, that this cruited, diffuse mechanisms of critical response keep them in check, and should instead become 'public money'. The klian, however, objected a confiux of social pressure is the usual means by which they are and reported the banJar decision to the district head (camat). For this removed. Local leaders are expected to proffer resignation periodically offence, the banJar retaliated by fining him and removing him from to signify disinterested and self-sacrificing service: office. When he refused to pay the fine and later resisted the confisca­ tion of personal property to its value (the right of rerampag under adat Here unless you die it's impossible to find someone to replace you. You try to step down and they won't accept it, unless there's general dissatisfaction. Look law), he was formally expelled. Unlike the incident in Desa Siang, how­ at Pak Toya ... already eight times he's asked to be relieved and still at his age ever, the desa adat of which Banjar Kerta was a part (evidently also he has to hang on! So when the krama accepts the first offer to resign out of under pressure from several government agencies) did not support the hand as they did in Banjar Kalih, it's amazing, and you know something's banJar's expulsion order. It concluded that such punishment was not wrong. (I Dasa, 1989.) justified in this instance by the local awig-awig. Unnamed district and regional officials are quoted in the news report as intervening to prevent Typically, gossip and non-compliance from the krama are the means by the public from behaving in a manner 'inconsistent with the funda­ which an unpopular klian is embarrassed into stepping down. mental principles of the nation under Pancasila'. 'Banjar Kerta indeed When Cokorda Oka was chosen as klian of BanjarPekandelan, he turned out to has rights of autonomy to conduct its own banJar affairs, but that auto­ be utterly incapable and corrupt. In the end he was forced to step down in the nomy does not give it a free hand to expel one of its members,' com­ usual way. The people went on strike (mogok). When they were called to work mented a regional government official. No doubt with the recent or to meetings, theysimply didn't show up-that's the way Balinese have done it notorious Siang case in mind, the official expressed the fear that if let go from long ago. (Dw Dani, 1983.) the issue could have 'whipped up an adat case' (Bali Post, 14 Janu­ ary 1983). We prefer a leader to step down himself, rather than be voted out. Usually, when the public isn't satisfied, theystop co-operating untilit becomes evident to To return, then, to the model values of leadership posed by Sangut at the person that it would be wise to resign rather than risk public disgrace. the beginning of this chapter, there is little evidence that concepts of (I Dharma, 1983.) authority derived from hierarchically structured relations to the state apply below the level of the administrative desa, and even there they are Nevertheless, direct confrontations have their place too in thepopulist heavily modulated. On the contrary, klian banJar appear to be under politics of Balinese communities. I have already mentioned the case of constant pressure to justify themselves to their public. On several the klian of Banjar Lagas in Tarian who was not only removed from occasions during my fieldwork, banJar officials were publicly challenged office, but expelled from the banJar and his household in 1947 for by members at banJar assemblies: for failure to consult the krama verbally abusing the krama banJar (Chapter 2). So it is clear that the (Banjar Sangan), for misappropriation of government grant monies exercise of authority by local leaders is heavily constrained by customary (Banjar Kalih), and for poor administrative efficiency (Banjar conventions. I Menget was reputed to have been in other respects an Pekandelan). energetic banJar head, experimenting with developing fish-ponds and What is perhaps most surprising, given the constraints of public establishing a public rice storehouse (lumbung), but this did not prevent pressure, is that local leadership positions do attract capable people and his becoming the brunt of the strongest sanctions at the banJar's dis­ that they are not much more conservative than tends to be the case ( cf. posal-42 H. Schulte Nordholt provides another account from thecolonial Olson, 1971; Popkin, 1979; Wade, 1988). The onus of reputation risk period of popular strategies of resistance. Angered by the ambitious and the limited rewards of office do discourage many from seeking pub­ arrogance and corruption of their klian dinas who had also been lic positions. 'People here are reluctant to become klian,' commented a appointed adat head of the desa, his fellow banJar members built their member of my household after he had been conscripted as petaJuh. 'It's own desa temple and declared themselves a separate desa adat, success­ better to be just rakyat (the people) and follow the sound of the kulkul.' fully removing themselves from his authority (H. Schulte Nordholt, (I Md Geriya, 1985.) Wade describes similar pressures placed on leaders in 1991: 29). the Indian village he studied. He says that the pursuit of social honour A more recent case of popular attempts to assert control over leader­ and mutual economic interest were sufficient incentives to ensure inter­ ship, and one that also points to related issues concerning adat-dinas, est in village council positions. But these leaders were 'harmonizers, banJar-desa authority, and local autonomy comes from Banjar Kerta. conservers, risk-averters, not innovators. If the council were to try to There the klian dinas was punished for taking a banJar decision to out­ undertake more ambitious developmental activities, especially those that side authorities. According to a Bali Post (14 January 1983) report, the require an investment of tangible resources, leadership might be more of krama disputed the personal right of its klian dinas to a sum of a constraint.' (Wade, 1988: 129-30; see also Birkelbach, 1973: 161-2 Rp 210,000 in back-paid honorariums from the provincial government. on subak leadership.) 127 126 ADA T AND DINAS MODELS OF LEADERSHIP The sort of reticence Wade describes was reflected in hesitancy at building programme, he had circulated a three-page questionnaire administrative desa level in Tarian where the village council debated for among banjar households the year before. The responses were not several years how to carry out its plans for developing the savings and enthusiastic, and the project was shelved until circumstances might loan association into a general purpose co-operative. Several klian also prove more conducive. Made Dasa said he usually dealt with contentious issues by calling tread water on the issue of collective cremations, fearing resistance from 46 powerful sections of their banjar. But over time, and with varying together a number of 'respected figures' to talk the problem through in degrees of success, many of these projects did come to fruition. (See advance of the monthly assembly meeting: Chapters 5 and 6.) The stimulus of the national ideology of develop­ From each tempek I look for those who have initiatip. I have to think carefully 43 ment, traditional stress on corporate priority over private interest, who tends to think what way and work out who are likely to have alternative coupled with the usually constructive rivalry among banjar and the points of view. Those who may be contra especially must be included. If you can importance of public reputation, meant that to avoid negative compan­ get agreement from those who are 'stiff', those who are always objecting, it is ison, klian were often pressed beyond the path of least resistance. much easier.... There lies the art (seni) of engaging with the public. As long as a A reputation for social activism within the local sphere was one of the problem is worked through smoothly and properly, in the end our proposals will few opportunities traditionally available for talented people who other­ be accepted. In fact there wouldn't be much of a challenge and I myself wise lacked social or economic standing in Balinese society. The desire wouldn't get much satisfaction if there was no debate. (I Dasa, 1989.) for recognition and the constraints of reputation sanctions in the extra­ On the issue we were discussing, concerning changes in customary ordinarily large public domain of Balinese civic culture are in combina­ cremation practices, it took three meetings before even preliminary tion often catalytic. When the klian of Banjar Kalih was replaced in agreement of the krama could be achieved, and there were several sub­ 1984, it was largely because people felt he had done little for their banjar sequent revisions of the awig-awig after their first experiments with the by contrast with what they saw taking place in others. Two elections and new collective arrangements. Clearly, the klian's authority is not of the several corruption charges later, the new banjar head submitted to the sort which flows from imitating the exemplary centre (C. Geertz, 1980). assembly a '5-year plan' of innovations covering a broad range of adat As Keeler (1985: 112) remarks of the village head in Java, and certainly and community welfare issues which he intended to accomplish during more so for klian banjar in Bali, the local official is in 'constant negoti­ 44 his term of office. ation with his public'. That 'public' is neither homogeneous nor equally Dispersal of authority is another important feature of Balinese local well served by its leaders, but the 'flock of dral,es' and 'thousand shouts' organization which works to hamper changes that do not have strong metaphors speak to institutional practices and cultural understandings support and accelerate those that do. It serves also to retain a significant which stand in opposition to, and significantly mediate, the social degree of what Keeler (1985: 138) calls 'personal sovereignty' for inequalities in Bali that have received so much emphasis in contempor­ ordinary villagers. Tempek heads, other functionaries such as secretary ary ethnography. and treasurer, and sometimes an advisory committee share with the Paternal models of authority rooted in the traditional, colonial, and klian some of theresponsibilities of running the banjar. Ultimate author­ post-colonial state have more deeply influenced patterns of leadership ity is vested in the krama adat rather than its office-holders and may be and decision-making within the administrative desa than within the exercised more or less directly at its monthly meetings. Reputation risk banjar. These differences reflect broader contrasts in structural and is reduced by the spread of decision-making responsibility. cultural arrangements characterizing village and state institutions, and The implications of concepts of collective authority and direct parti­ the tension between hierarchy and equality in Balinese society. Two cipation through the banjar assembly cannot be overstated. The fact that contrasting conceptions of corporatism (the one horizontal, the other every member has routine obligations and some experience of public vertical) implicit in the core propositions underlying conceptions of vil­ responsibility, at least in filling mandatory turns as 'messenger' 45 lage and state are reflected in the subtly ambivalent cultural values sug­ (sinoman), prevents a clear break between leaders and members and gested in Sangut's models of leadership. between formal authority and the influence of informal leaders and power-brokers widely regarded as crucial to the effectiveness of local organization (Bailey, 1971: 299; Uphoff, 1987b: 33-5; Wade, 1988: 133). In consequence, klian are acutely aware of opposing views, and find it difficult to act without taking them into account. The klian of a 1. The principle of corporate primacy is predicated on dispersion of authority. Hildred Geertz's study of old inscriptions connected with the granting of a royal charter very active banjar in Sanur said, 'Usually in the banjar you can count on indicate that the krama desa as a whole was involved rather than being represented by 40 against, 40 in favour, and 20 who haven't decided. The job is to any individual authority figure (H. Geertz, pers. com., 1986). De Casparis (1986: 12) persuade the 20. If you're right, they'll go with you; if not, the other remarks on the lack of evidence of a village headman in any early Javanese inscriptions: way.' (Gst 'renaya, 1989.) To assess reactions to his proposals for a major 'Nothingis known about the manner in which decisions were taken, but it seems likely that 128 ADA T AND DINAS MODELS OF LEADERSHIP 129 the eldest or most respected member of the council acted as a chairman and led the dis­ 7. According to Hildred Geertz (pers. com., 1986), the position of bendesa adat had not cussions till the moment that a unanimous decision was reached on any individual been dominated by noble families until recent years in the village of her study. On the question. It is clear that the existence of such a council constituted some guarantee for the other hand, H. Schulte Nordholt (1989: 7) says that in pre-colonial timesin Mengwi, the autonomy of the village: a village chief, even if he was not appointed by thecentral gov­ bendesa was a vital link in the ritual mobilization of the royal centre. Dewa Dani's account ernment, would more easily submit to pressure from the centre than a collective body.' of his father's role as both bendesa adat and adviser to the court indicate that in some vil­ 2. Since the subject of the interlude so closely touched upon my research interests, I lages the aristocracy had significant influence over desa-level institutions. The bendesa of went to the dalang's home several days after the performance and requested him to repeat the large Desa Adat Denpasar stated he had been chosen in 1960 by the heads of the royal this segment for the recording which is the basis of this translation. houses of Pemecutan and Denpasar as was customary in thatvillage (A A Kota, 1984). 3. A klian from another village drew on the same didactic etymology during an Howe (1980: 150) says that in Pujung, a single banjarldesa adat in the northern moun­ interview: 'It is satisfying to become klian. Indeed the term klian in Balinese comes from tain area of Gianyar, the klian banjar is elected, but the office of bendesa is hereditary. The kelihan-elder. Sometimes if we do something wrongly, we become keleng. That is an tendency towards hereditary positionsin some of the'old-type' desa points to another basis expression of disgust. But if we do what is right, we become kelihan-elder, respected.' for the differences observed between sources of authority at banjar and desa levels, (Dw Batuan, 1984.) founded on internally developed status distinctions of a genealogical sort. See de Casparis 4. Covarrubias (1972 [1937]: 69) comments: 'The repugnance of the people against (1986) who suggests that in Java such internal differentiation was suppressed or co-opted having to appeal to the Kerta is only part of the Balinese policy of keeping the princes to the court as control by the royal centresgrew. from interfering too much in their affairs.' 8. Table 4.1 lists only the adat and dinas heads of banjar and desa, the core decision­ 5. See Zurbuchen (1987: 205) on the popularity of these wayang characters who hold making group in Tarian. There are also five klian pura for thetwo desa adat of Tarian and 'culture hero' status among Balinese audiences. The clown-commentators, called panasar Tegeh and eight klian subak (pekasih) who should be considered part of the local leader­ (base, support), link the different worlds of the deific and the everyday, the court and the ship network. Heads of subak, banjar, and pemaksan subdivisions (klian tempek, petajuh) commoner, distinctly represented in the languages of classical Kawi, high and low add another seventy or so individuals to the extensive formal structure of traditional local Balinese. Unlike the Kawi-speaking epic figures of the classic text, the panasar speak leadership and further indicate the degree of dispersion of executive authority character­ vernacular Balinese and in language and social position inhabit the same 'universe of istic of leadership patterns in Bali. discourse' as the audience (Zurbuchen, 1987: 183). Typically of these clown dialogues, 9. Only four actually engaged in farming themselves, two of these intermittently. Delem and Sangut use low Balinese and interject Indonesian vocabularies in their jest, Usually, other family members worked the land, or it was rented to tenants, a fairly often playing on differingmeanings of the same word in thetwo languages. The role of the common pattern in Tarian where agriculture was increasingly becoming a sideline comic interlude, presenting a powerful, popular, subversive voice in Balinese theatre, economic activity. In 1981, 22 per cent of the working population (male and female) in deserves note. Parody, improvisation, slap-stick comedy, and play on linguistic and social Tarian listed farming as their primary source of income. The figure dropped to 14 per rules disrupt the epic account and provide a counterpoint to the hegemonic message of the cent in 1988. During the same period, the proportion engaged in the handicraft industry dramatic text. The panasar, who translate and mediate on behalf of the audience, in many rose from 33 per cent to 49 per cent. The other major categories of employment were respects control the text and are differently situated in relation to it. These clown-servants selling (mainly women), which dropped from 14 to 12 per cent and government (in­ usually come in pairs: one is typically bombastic and full of self-importance, his absurd cluding teachers), remaining at 9 per cent. attempts to emulate his superiors offering a parody on social climbing and 'high culture' 10. Wives often bore the burden of supporting these families. Wayan Mandera itself; his companion does not miss an opportunity to hold his eider's exploits to ridicule. commented that during the long preparation for the village competition (Zomba desa) in He moves freely in and out of the text, between the past and present, and assumes the role 1981 he was unable to earn any income beyond his honorarium and depended heavily on of spokesman for the common people (Zurbuchen, 1987: 186). It is these bawdy and his wife's market earnings to cover the household expenses for their large family. During irreverent clowns that Balinese audiences come to see, and the 'play' aspect within the the same period GustiKanti's wife took on day labour to tide them over. heroic 'drama' that displays the thoroughgoing multiplicity of voices of Balinese theatric 11. Statistics on vehicle ownership give some indication of the rapid ,economic changes forms, epitomizing the dialogic heteroglossia Bakhtin (1981) celebrates. The similar talcing place in Tarian and other communities in Bali which had become heavily reliant on tradition in Javanese wayang performance is represented in Becker's (1979: 224) analysis tourism and craft production for export. By 1988 the figure for motor-cycle ownership as a 'clash of conceptual universes' between popular and elite traditions. McVey (1986: had more than doubled from 208 in 1981 to 575, representing over 50 per cent of house­ 23) notes that the clowns appear to be entirely indigenous additions to the Indic myth holds. Ownership of four-wheel vehicles rose from 21 in 1981, used mainly for commer­ cycles and are the main vehicles of critical popular comment on public affairs. But the cial purposes, to 179 in 1988, many of which were entirely for private use. Among village panasar must be regarded as preservers as well as subverters of cultural continuity, reviving leaders, the perbekel now owns a private car and two klian banjar possess utility vehicles and making relevant the epic tradition they mediate (Zurbuchen, 1987: 205; see also which return income as public transport. Bourdieu, 1977: 165-6). Boon (1984) argues that to place the subversive quality of the 12. On several occasions I arrived for interviews to find Nyoman Dharma, Wayan device of folly in too dichotomous an oppositional mode is to underrate and over-simplify Mandera, or Wayan Bedeg performing household duties-sweeping, minding the children, its ironic commitment to heterodoxy, in his opinion the ultimate subversive stance. ironing school uniforms, helping with the cooking, or making offerings. Balinese audiences were on the whole no more responsive to attempts to institutionalize 13. A popular aphorism on leadership goes: 'There are many who are clever, but a the counterpoint framewhen political parties made use of the wayang for propaganda pur­ person who is honest [or sosia� is hard to come by.' (I Suteja, 1982; Ni Puja, 1985; I Suta, poses than they had ever been towards the courtly, dramatic side of traditional theatre (see 1986; Ni Sriati, 1986; I Rutha, 1987.) also McVey, 1986). The vitality of Balinese theatre in Boon's view lies precisely in what in 14. The perbekel of Tarian was elected to theRegional Assembly in 1982 and according post-modern parlance might be described as its decentred, reflexive, and ambiguous char­ to the law should have resigned. During discussions at banjar meetings I attended, the acter. weight of public opinion favoured his retention, for want of an obvious successor, if 6. James Fox (pers. com., 1990) believes that despite far greater Dutch impact, the dispensation were possible to obtain. The long period that led up to his replacement, dukuh (hamlet) on Java shares striking similarities with the Balinese banjar. The dukuh which finally took place in 1989, offered frequent opportunities for discussion of village rather than the desa is the community of orientation for most of the population, and in leadership issues. some parts of Java also has responsibility for burial. 15. Aside from the modest salary attached to the position, the office of perbekel carries 130 ADA T AND DINAS MODELS OF LEADERSHIP 131 with it opportumtles for patronage in the appointlnent of village secretary and other 27. Korn reports that no village leaders enjoyed a fixed salary (1924: 122), but that in clerical positions, as well as 0.5 per cent from any sales of land in the village. Nevertheless some places (he mentions Blahkiuh, Bongkasa, Selat) heads of desa traditionally received a there are also significant redistributive claims on the perbekel, connected with the tradi­ piece of sawah known as pecatu klian or laba klian desa (1924: 131). In other villages, such tional status of those who have since the colonial era tended to fill the position. Many as Desa Tangkup, where no lands were set aside, klian sometimes received a double share people expressed theopinion that the pressures of office and the constant demands on his of accumulated fines when these were redistributed among the members (Korn Coll. generosity had contributed to the early death of the very popular perbekel of Sanur, 161/559). Ida Bagus Beratha (I Bagus, 1987; I Rutha, 1987; Ida Bgs Mayun, 1987; Barbara Lovric, 1988). 28. Zacharias (1979: 98) reports that bengkok holdings averaged 15 hectares for desa 16. When I enquired about Banjar Madya meeting notes stating that no licence would heads (lurah) in the fivevillages in CentralJava he studied in 1974. Hamlet heads received be sought to hold a cock-fight as part of the upcoming odalan ritual, Wayan Mandera said up to 4 hectares with total official lands amounting to 18 per cent of cultivated land in he had persuaded the krama that the banjar should no longer provide the pretext for these. these villages. The average area set aside as bengkok officelands for the fourteen villages in Personally of a somewhat modernizing and puritanical bent, he disapproved of the (since Tjondronegoro's (1984: 152-3) study was 14 hectares or 11 per cent of total rice land, 1981 illegal) betting that invariably accompanied any excuse for a cock-fight and often among the most fertile in the village. expressed satisfaction that the membership had come to this 'progressive' decision. Three 29. Rarely are these officially recognized charges paid to klian banjar. An upper days after our conversation, I passed a large crowd behind the bale banjar openly enjoying' secondary school graduate complained of the expense of applying for jobs because of the the prohibited cock-fights. Mandera, who sat passively observing from a distance, cost of forms and official fees for signatures at desa, kecamatan, and regional government shrugged and commented that it was easier said than done when people had it in their offices. The klian banjar, she said, was the only one who never asks for what he is blood. Made Dasa, on the other hand, became a local hero when he was hauled in by supposed to receive-'He takes pity' (Ni Puri, 1985). As of 1991 the Gianyar government regional police for gambling which took place in connection witha ritual cock-fight held in reportedly revised the distribution of the land sale tax to include hamlet heads in addition his banjar. to the heads of desa and district already in receipt of this commission. This is an unfortu­ 17. The romantic involvement continued, but at least it was established that if she nate extension of an inappropriate form of compensation to public officers and one which became pregnant, the young man from Banjar Madya would have to marry her. will likely bring the conflict of interest between adat and dinas roles to a head. 18. The original council in Tarian, the Dewan Desa, was founded after the Indonesian 30. See Uphoff's (1987a: 212-13) discussion of thekinds of leadership associated with revolution. Chapter 9 discusses subsequent transformations in the structure and function successful management of a collective irrigation project in Sri Lanka. Minimal compensa­ of village councils brought about by state policy. tion, selection by consensus, the exclusion of party politics, and rotating responsibilities 19. On the intensity of this rivalry traditionally, see Belo (1936: 12); Covarrubias (1972 among members were organizational characteristics which proved effective in generating (1937]: 207-8); and McPhee (1984 (1944]: 28). participation and relatively equitable distribution in his case-study, principles similar to 20. One Sunday afternoon, I met Wayan Mandera returning from the office which those which ideally operate in Balinese local institutions. would normally have been closed. He was rather pleased with himself, having finally loc­ 31. Although Cokorda Anom was the bendesa for the desa adat of Tarian alone, he ated the source of a discrepancy of Rp 25 on the monthly balance sheets due in Gianyar performed many of the same ritual and religious advisory functions for the separate desa the following day. adat of Tegeh. 21. G 30 S is an acronym for the '30 September Movement', the alleged coup attempt 32. On this subject Korn (1924: 135) comments, 'The control of the banjar possessions by the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) in 1965, whose suppression brought is exercised by the whole community. Not only at the 35-day meetings, but every day of Suharto's New Order government to power. the month, a member of the banjar can make use of his right to participate by contacting 22. See J. Sullivan (1992: 168) on the buffering role of local leadership and its limits. the administration when he has noticed something irregular or some neglect of the banjar 23. A number of circulars and confidential reports were disseminated to administrative possessions.' desa in recent years, warning of the public danger these elements still posed and encour­ 33. Since the contractto supply materials was awarded independently by the desa coun­ aging local officials to seek out the 'unreformed ex-PKI'. cil, and to the same local supplier who had handled previous public construction projects 24. Even Balinese who are quite critical of government policy under Suharto often at favourable rates by comparison with central government estimates, the grounds for support Golkar because they have been persuaded it is the only serious alternative to the treating these payments as 'kickbacks' are arguable, although they provoked envy and Islamic party, PPP, which as minority Hindus they perceive as threatening. There is also irritation among other klian. The payments were not secret and were offered, as far as I great fear of repeating the traumatic blood-letting of 1965-6. 'People realize it's foolish to have been able to determine, as a gratuity at the end of the project. Mandera and Suta, as get emotional over elections when they know they have to live together afterwards.' the co-operative managers and most active members of the desa-building committee, took (I Mandera, 1982.) The New Order has successfully inculcated negative associations with on construction management and supervision of the classrooms and teachers' cottages therole of party politics in those events and a positive image of protective army 'neutrality' with the same energy they devoted to other desa affairs. The Rp 125,000 which they each in the popular consciousness. The subdued and frequently ambivalent manner in which received from the building supply merchant, a member of Banjar Madya of which the PKI comes up in discussion is indicative of unconscious conflict between experience Mandera was klian, was roughly equivalent to the wages paid to a skilled tradesman for the and political rhetoric. Numerous people described these events as if the direction theytook same period. Their efforts led to considerable savings for the desa when it took on full self­ had been inevitable, even just, yet spoke sympathetically of individuals killed, whom they contractingresponsibility for lnpres projects from that year. See Chapter 8 for a discussion considered misinformed or atypical of the stereotyped PK.I party cadre. of local administration of national development projects. 25. Although it was a source of considerable embarrassment to its klian and other vil­ 34. In the one case, fission had been caused by tensions between the communist and lage leaders, Banjar Lagas's deviation was quietly ignored except in private conversation. nationalist parties among the membership; in the other, the division occurred along title­ One klian commented, witha mild degree of respect for its perverse tendencies, 'That ban­ group lines. jar did the same thing last time.. . . They have a reputation for being rather truculent, 35. Petajuh are traditionally recompensed through relief from certain levies, and like the though in other matters they work together well.' (I Mandera, 1983.) klian banjar adat, may receive a larger share of foods distributed at banjar feasts. But this is 26. Golkar received 78 per cent of the votes cast in Tarian, compared to 21 per cent for an acknowledgement of adat services, and many complained that no account is taken of thePDI, and 0.02 per cent for the Muslim PPP. In the 1992 election, Tarian, like the rest their significant assistance in dinas affairs (I Madra, 1984; I Swasta, 1986). of Indonesia, swung further to the opposition, giving Golkar 59 per cent and PDI 41 per 36. See Schaareman (1986a: 200 ff.) for an example of this system from contemporary cent. The national vote was Golkar, 68 per cent; PDI, 15 per cent; and PPP, 17 per cent. Karangasem. 132 ADA T AND DINAS 37. Reading the Bali Post in the desa office, Ketut Suta (1984) commented aloud on reports of an election result in Kedewatan which had been an upset. He exclaimed to general assent that village elections in Bali were starting to take the form of a 'kampanya, like Java!' Another klian remarked, 'In Java theypray to get elected, here we pray it doesn't happen to us.' (Gst Kanti, 1984.) For a similar view of the connection between the eco­ nomic attractiveness of bengkok lands and highlevels of 'investment' in campaigns for local office in Javanese villages, see N. Schulte Nordholt (1985: 123 ff.) and Prijono and Prijono (1983: 46-7). Another important difference between Java and Bali is the lack of strong formal organization in Javanese communities which Keeler (1985: 139) suggests may be associated with a propensity towards paternal forms of leadership at desa level. 38. See, forexample, the awig-awig for Desa Aan translatedin the Appendix to Kinship in Bali, which states: 'If a man refuses to be chosen klian, upon whom the village group has already unanimously agreed, he is fined 2,500 kepeng .... The length of service of the klian shall be five years. After that time he may resign, and a new electionis held. If a klian quits before this time of his own will, without fault, he is fined 1,700 kepeng.... ' (Geertz and Geertz, 1975: 187.) 39. The much loved clown-servants of the wayang, like Sangut and Delem, are the models for the alter-ethos of course (kasar), thick skinned (tebal muka, katos), and critical directness valued in popular culture alongside the values of aesthetic refinement (alus, senz) of the 'high' culture. 40. Wilkinson (1991) gives a witty description of the ploys and intrigue of the two competing descent groups which resulted in an initial victory for the blank ballot box (two in this case); the temporary appointment of an ineffectual district office clerk to administer the desa (who proved incapable of controlling the situation); equally ineffectual interven­ tion by the regional chief of police; protest letters to the editor of the Bali Post; a second election in which the opposition candidate was finally victorious-but for some months failed to take up the post! 41. See R. Guha's stimulating discussion of rumour as an autonomous form of popular political discourse and mechanism for mobilization in oral societies. In his interpretation, rumour is a uniquely collective and egalitarian discursive form in its obliteration of the distinction between communicator and audience (Guha, 1983: 251-77). 42. Neither did these events end his public role. After his return from exile in the 1950s, he became active in the establishment of the banjar dance troupe (I Liab, 1983; I Md Dasa, 1986). 43. In modern parlance this is often phrased in terms of an opposition between sosial and bisnis dispositions.Two of the klian eventually replaced by their banjar were described by others as too bisnis for the position (I Gatra, 1984; I Mandera, 1985; I Dasa, 1989). 44. The proposals encompassing adat and dinas matters included updating the awig­ awig banjar; introducing a SO-kilogram rice contributionfrom the banjar to member house­ holds experiencing a death in the family; reducing the interest rate on circulating banjar cash from 4 per cent per month to 1 per cent; establishing a gamelan orchestra; and resuming banjar control over film showings. Such forward planning was not uncommon among the banjar I studied. The notebook kept by the klian of Banjar Tegeh details similar short- and long-term plans under consideration in that banjar. These included repairing the bale banjar and the hamlet gutter system, collecting rice contributions at death, lowering banjar interest rates, promoting better household sanitation facilities, providing a support fund for children who would otherwise quit school, and reintroducing collective cremations (Buku Rencana Kerja Banjar Tegeh, 1982). All of the issues noted were addressed at assemblies and in most cases acted upon over the next several years. 45. This position rotates monthly among the members of each tempek. The sinoman is responsible for conveying information to member households, collecting contributions or fines, and may be entrusted with temporary guardianship of banjar property (see Korn, 1924: 132). 46. Social prominence generally had to be combined with a reputation for public­ mindedness to warrant inclusion in informal advisory groups. Education is increasingly important, and teachers are heavily represented in such informal advisory groupings. But as Dasa's statement indicates, all active and articulate individuals have to be accommod­ ated forthe smooth running of local affairs. PART II

Banjar Madya's kecak performance, 1969. (Courtesy National Geographic Society) Village Corporate Structure and Collective Consumption

VILLAGE social structure in Bali is largely divorced from direct product­ ive activity, agriculture being organized through the semi-independent subak system. This does not mean that the desa/banjar is irrelevant to the material well-being of its members, or that the organization of the eco­ nomy could be conveniently divorced from analysis of political, social, or religious spheres. On the contrary, the conclusions of economic anthropology, that these spheres can be distinguished only artificially in pre-capitalist systems (Polanyi, 1957; Sahlins, 1974; Godelier, 1977), apply emphatically in the Balinese case. While the capitalization of agri­ culture, tourist development, and commercial handicraft production have radically changed structural relations in the post-traditional eco­ nomy of contemporary Bali, banjar and other corporate institutions con­ tinue to have redistributive significance, providing the organizational basis for what may be termed 'collective consumption'. The concept of collective consumption was introduced by the soci­ ologist Manuel Castells (1978) to analyse social and economic questions which were not adequately confronted by established categories of either conventional sociology or orthodox Marxist theory. Castells's interest is the increasing importance and contradictory effects of state intervention and planning in the distribution of public goods and services. Paralleling the growth of state involvement has been the growing importance of social movements1 which are not necessarily class-based and which use their organizational resources, among other purposes, to assert claims for the redistribution of public goods. Production had traditionally been given prior importance in orthodox Marxist analysis, leaving little space for the treatment of other significant social phenomena in the political economy of the post-industrial societies which concern Castells (1978: viii)-'ideologies of the environment, the increasing intervention of the state, thecontradictory effects of urban planning, popular revolts, neigh­ bourhood organizations, urban politics'. Despite the very different analytical context of urban Europe for 2 which the concept of collectiveconsumption was intended, it neverthe­ less can be usefully adapted in discussing a number of issues raised by the Balinese case. If we define collective consumption broadly as the 138 ADA T AND DINAS shared appropriation and distribution of material, social, aesthetic, and spiritual 'goods' through community-based structures, it can be equally well utilized to explore a range of purposes banjar serve. The concept also encompasses non-economic aspects of the collective well-being of a social group: For the Balinese, artistic performance and the satisfaction of ritual obligation are collective 'goods', just as art galleries, libraries, 5 street theatre, and garbage-free streets may be culturally valued collect­ ive 'goods' for their French metropolitan counterparts. Collective Consumption in the From a theoretical standpoint, 'collective consumption' in Castells' work on post-industrial Europe points to contradictions and fills import­ Ritual Sphere ant conceptual gaps analogous to those raised in analysing contem­ porary Balinese social and economic structures. Collective consumption refers to the potential of an organizational sphere (an 'urban social movement' in Castells's work, the banjar in this) which, while cutting across class lines and not primarily concerned with production, can BALINESE villages are social and symbolic entities in which the concept serve to redistribute some of the material anl social assets of its indi­ of 'community' must be understood to include living and dead, humans vidual members. Equally important in the context of national devel­ and spirits. The Dutch scholar-administrator, V. E. Korn, attributed the opment policy, social movements or local institutions may provide the exceptional organizational strength of Balinese society to its religious organizational capacity to capture goods and services managed by the character: state. Here, collective consumption becomes an appropriate analogue to 'basic needs' strategies in national development policy. The chapters in What can be the force urging the Balinese people into staunchly united groups Part II focus on the role of village institutions in defining and satisfying that come togetherat fixedtimes of they ear for consultationin a way thatseems locally determined collective consumption goals. Part III considers the alien to the rest of Indonesia, and playing such an important part in the public relation between state intervention and local collective consumption in and domestic life of these islanders? That force is the service of the gods, who (K the context of the sometiines coincident, sometimes divergent 'develop­ constantly demand the attention and devotion of the people.... orn, cited in Goris, 1984 [1935]: 79.) ment' objectives pursued by village and state. Geertz and Geertz (1975: 12) also stress the extent to which religious values are inextricably interconnected with other aspects of social, economic, and political organization: 'A full study of Balinese religion 1. On the significance of new social movements, see Frank and Fuentes (1987) and would entail close investigation of virtually every aspect of the society­ the Mouffe and Fields essays in Nelson and Grossberg (1988). Unlike the Balinese com­ from farming and marketing methods to government and kinship. And munity organizations discussed here, new social movements may be temporary, single­ interestassociations andare by definitionnon-institutional. But like them, banjar and other conversely, any study of Balinese social structure must take as its base­ local institutions in Bali tend to be composed of cross-cutting class arrangements with the line the Balinese religious concepts and ceremonies.' advantages anddisadvantages for concrete outcomes that inevitably entails. Guermonprez (1991: 57) insists that scholarship on the Balinese 2. Insome contexts 'corporateconsumption' would technicallybe themore appropriate village has nevertheless in practice ignored or marginalized its funda­ terminologyhere, since the institutional needs of the communityas a whole may override mental spiritual and symbolic aspects in favour of a politically defined thoseof its individualmembers-for example, when the banjar exercises its rightto harvest collectively (Chapter 6) at the expense of private income to its members. In other cases, model, and failed 'to consider gods, ancestors and dead villagers as real however, such as the contribution of money and labour towards the extension of water social partners'. Although this study, too, is concerned primarily with facilities in several banjar in Tarian (Chapter 8), corporate activity may be directed to the village as polity, such an expanded conception of communal serving members' private needs. Because the term 'collective consumption' has an estab­ relations is central to understanding the adat foundations of village cor­ lished currency, as does theconcept of 'collectivegoods' in the literatureon interestgroup porate structures and the effectiveness of banjar as social institutions. organization and public policy (Olson, 1971; Wade, 1988), and because the collective/ corporate distinction is not clear-cut, the term is used loosely here to include the range of Many aspects of 'civil' society are inseparable in Balinese terms, even forms of economic actionvillages may undertake. analytically, from the religious. Therefore, no consideration of collective well-being can ignore the ritual dimension, which is unquestionably paramount for the Balinese. The discussion of collective consumption then begins appropriately with a consideration of the spiritual, social, and material 'goods' which villagers seek to assure through community ritual. 140 ADA T AND DINAS COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION IN THE RITUAL SPHERE 141 It is fair to say that ritual order is perceived as the fundamental pre­ In the myths of creationWidi is the transcendant spiritual unity out of which the requisite to collective and individual well-being in Bali. Social accord, material existence of man gradually differentiates.... [T]he traditional gods of physical health, and economic prosperity depend on harmony between the Balinese are their deified ancestors.... [T]he world of mankind is formed by coeval visible and invisible worlds-between sekala and niskala which a slow and progressive differentiation of Widi and this process is reversed as refer to complementary oppositions of material/immaterial, concrete/ ancestors gradually relinquish all ties to the living and fuse with the creating principle in which all distinctions are again obliterated. (Howe, 1980: 216-17.) abstract, and temporal/timeless dimensions of the universe (Howe, 1980; Lovric, 1987). Cosmic harmony in turn demands the spatial con­ Ancestors are believed in the indigenous tradition to be reborn ulti­ tainment and temporal reordering of opposed dimensions through peri­ mately into their own descent group, a belief that radically distinguishes odic rituals of renewal by individuals, kin-groups, villages, and at the Balinese Hinduism from its Indian counterpart, and points to essential more remote level of the entire realm, the state. differences in the concepts of 'caste' (wangsa, hereditary group, in Bali) For a Balinese community, the ritual ordering of village territory, the and karma in the two traditions (Boon, 1977; Howe, 1989). Con­ worship of its deities, the proper disposal of the remains of the dead, sequently the Balinese idea of 'community' has temporal-sequential as and the ceremonial treatment of their souls are collective goods of a well as spatialand relationaldimensions. prior order. Neglect or incorrect conduct of these rites endangers the The ordering of these relationships in space and time is essentially welfare of all. These rites invoke and reinforce corporate identity and concerned with the separation of opposed substances whose contact have important social, economic, and political implications. But concern would bring calamity. In the creation myth related by Howe with the pragmatic aspects of ritual practice and religious value here (1980: 168), the separation of the complementary opposites earth and should not be read as a reduction of intrinsic value to any mechanically sky (mother/son; life-giver/life-taker) is equated with life, and their con­ conceived 'practical reason' (see Sahlins, 1976). Balinese express pro­ tact with danger and death. So, too, in village space and time, physical found spiritual and aesthetic satisfaction at the proper conduct of ritual, distance and temporal sequencing through ritual and symbolic means for which the appropriate level of material provisioning, the contribution are necessary to avoid contact between opposed cosmic forces which of labour assistance, and inner intent are all regarded as intrinsically would seriously endanger the village 'order' in its widest and most important elements. To attempt to distinguish instrumental from disin­ culturally loaded sense. terested motivation in religious behaviour would be an utterly mis­ Three types of communal ritual correspond to the relation of the conceived academic exercise. Harmony between sekala and niskala is living human members to each of these forms of spiritual being: village both a good-in-itself and a means of securing personal and collective temple ceremonies involving primarily offerings to the visiting gods well-being. These are self-reflexive and inextricable propositions in (dewa yadnya-including regular odalan, and more elaborate usaba); Balinese conceptualization. 'purification' ceremonies involving propitiatory offerings to the demons (buta yadnya-usually macaru sacrifice, various forms of which are a complementary part of all ceremonial); and rituals associated with the Community: Visible and Invisible temporary safekeeping of the deceased and their ultimate reinstatement There are three categories of spirit with which the human community as to the realm of the ancestral gods through primary and secondary ritual a moral-social entity interacts: gods, demons, and deceased ancestors. treatment (pitra yadnya-utang, ngaben). In each of these cases com­ Howe describes the Balinese universe as a hierarchically structured (in munal resources are pooled to carry out ceremonials requisite to the Dumont's sense of the term) pantheon of gods (batara, dewa), people common spiritual good and protection of residents of the village· social 2 (jelma), 1J1alevolent spirits ( buta-kala), witches (leyak), and animals order. (buron) in that order. Abstract, anonymous, and quiescent gods, living humans, and disruptive and avaricious demons are mutually trans­ Worship of Village Ancestral Deities: Odalan mutable and are graded in each of these forms according to the degree to which they exhibit dispositions of (or capacity for) refinement and The village temple system explicitly symbolizes the integrity of the self-control, reflecting ideal social and moral values (Howe, sacred and mundane order in which living and dead, ancestral and 1980: 189-243). 1 divine interact as coeval members of the community. In its ideal form, The proper ordering of the co-residence of gods, demons, and the Kahyangan Tiga-the three main village temples of Origin (Pura deceased ancestors in village space, and the cyclical or periodic passage Puseh), of Death (Pura Dalem), and of the Village or Great Council between human. and ancestral, demonic and deific being in time, is the Hall (Pura Desa or Pura Bale Agung)-form the main focus of the vil­ main concern of village religious ceremonies. In Hindu-Balinese cos­ lage festival cycle. The maintenance of these temples and the rituals mology and ontology, these beings have an ultimate unity, which in the associated with them, according to Goris (1984 [1935]: 81), 'constitute life and ritual cycle is continually disrupted and reinstated. the object of the village's first and foremost task. This temple service 142 ADA T AND DINAS COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION IN THE RITUAL SPHERE 143 derives from two series of concepts, two basic ideas. The first is that the historically distant origin points through pilgrimages to make offerings ground belongs to the gods, and the second that the living population of ( maturan) at temple odalan and sometimes through continued financial the desa desires to maintain contact with its deceased ancestors.' These support of desa temples in yillages from which according to tradition religious values are expressed in rituals at the Pura Puseh, where the they came. For example, according to the klian desa of Boengan in anonymous deified founders and ancestors are worshipped;3 the Pura Bangli, villagers there long before had fled Desa Asti in Karangasem, Dalem, where thedeity of death is worshipped and where thepotential­ carrying their temple god and musical instruments with them after a ly dangerous liminal souls of the village dead await ritual release while military defeat. They nevertheless continued to support the desa temple their mortal remains rest in the cemetery near by; and the Pura in Asti and to perform and assist at its festivals (Adatrechtbundels, Desa/Bale Agung which is devoted to the living community. The Bale 1924: 463). Banjar Madya in Tarian indirectly inherited a ritual rela­ Agung in the shape of a long meeting house placed on a kaja-kelod tionship to Tegallalang when it took over responsibility for the sacred (mountain-seaward) axis is thought to have had its origins as a sacral and powerful Barong Ratu Gede from a seka which had in the early part men's house and place of worship for the patrilineal clans (Goris, 1984 of the century requested it from Puri Tarian. According to local legend [1935]: 95).4 which is closely connected to a story found in the court chronicle, Babad Routine temple maintenance and the conduct of periodic ceremonies Dalem Sukawati� the Barong mask was made for the local prince from constitute this 'first and foremost task' (Goris, 1984 [1935]: 81) of the the same wood as the Rangda mask of Tegallalang about two centuries desa adat. The system for organizing support of the village temple sys­ ago. Today whenever there is an odalan at either shrine, the krama of tem varies from one desa to the next. In some cases responsibility for the related deity send a committee to make offerings in their name. each of the temples is divided among the constituent banjar of the desa Ritual renewal of historical ties supports a remarkable collective memory adat. In others, including Tarian, temple congregations (pemaksan) have (in some cases a retrospectively constructed one-see Bateson, 1973; mixed banjar membership and operate independently with their own Franken, 1984 [1951]), again pointing to the interrelated importance of parallel leadership and organizational structure. Where a desa adat is origin, ancestry, and community in Balinese culture. small or composed of only one banjar, all members of the village may be required to support festivals in all three village temples. This is the case Ordering Elemental Forces: Macaru in Banjar Tegeh (part of the administrative desa of Tarian), which is a single banjar!des a adat. So the burden of material support varies con­ At the same time as the beneficent aspects of the gods must be invoked siderably according to the size of the desa adat and the number of and supplicated in the desa temples to assure their sustained life-giving temples it supports. The Kahyangan Tiga are the most important, but attention, there is a complementary need to placate the nether-worldly rarely the only village public temples. In Tarian, there is also a market forces who are equally a part of the Balinese universe. Balinese religion, temple (Pura Melanting), a water temple (Pura Gunung Sari), and fusing Hindu with indigenous animistic and ancestor-cult traditions, several other small sanctuaries of historic importance where ceremonies emphasizes the ambiguity of divine forces. The stress on complement­ are sponsored by the desa as a whole. ary opposition and transmogrification in the spirit world, associated with The main purpose of village temple ceremonies is the periodic re­ what Grader (1969 [1940]: 156-7) calls 'chthonic ambivalence', is to an establishment of direct contact with the gods, renewing relations with outsider one of the most difficult aspects of Balinese religion to under­ them and thereby assuring their protection and the continuity of their stand and certainly to discuss adequately.5 life-giving force. The gods of the village temples are local ancestral The 'demonic' beings, earthly spirits known as buta-kala, are con­ deities, sometimes conceptualized as Hindu figures, although the latter ceived as disciples (iringan) or metamorphosed -forms of the gods have lesser importance in village tradition (Howe, 1980: 188; Stuart­ themselves. They are gross and unrestrained in their appearance and Fox, 1987: 31). The essentially local character of Balinese religion has behaviour, the polar opposite to thecharacter of the gods. Without ritual been stressed by a number of scholars (Grader, n.d.; Forge, 1980), a attention, they pose great supernatural threats to the village in the form point which is critical to understanding the depth of the connection of epidemic disease, catastrophic crop failure, and other natural between spiritual, material, and civic values in Bali. disaster.6 They mlist be appeased to contain their disordering influence, Desa temples are only one set in the complex networks of temple and the danger their presence would occasion must be removed before systems which chart relations in partially distinguishable networks along contact with upperworldly deities may be initiated. All major rituals village, state, irrigation, and kinship lines (Geertz and Geertz, 1975: 14). therefore contain complementary offerings to demonic and deific forces These temple systems provide historical and social maps, marking past to avert danger and exhort order and renewal. and present relationships which define social groups. Individuals, While gods and demons are ever-present, their interaction with the descent groups, and sometimes whole banjar and desa maintain ties to human community has to be bounded in time and space to maintain the 144 ADA T AND DINAS COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION IN THE RITUAL SPHERE 145 balance necessary to the smooth cycling of life-forces. They are separ­ In thecentre of the ground an elaborate conglomeration of objects was arranged: ated, spatially and conceptually, into upper and lower, benign and dan­ food of all sorts, every kind of strong drink, money and house utensils, hundreds gerous, immaterial and materialized, timeless and temporal, nameless of containers of banana leaf with a sample of every seed and fruit that grew on and named manifestations of the same energy, or life-force. As the Five the island, and a piece of the flesh of every wild and domestic animal in Bali .... Great Elemental Forces (Pancamahabuta)-earth, water, air, fire, and The collection of all these ingredients had taken months and the majority were buta wilted and decomposing.... When they finished, 'new fire' and holy water were atmosphere-the compose the material world. The gods as im­ given by the priests to the heads of each bandjar, and the poor were allowed to material, upperworldly forces can only descend to earth without meta­ loot the offerings for money and other useful objects. Firecrackers exploded in morphosizing to their baser forms if they are prepared a ritually every direction and all the kulkuls in Den Pasar were beaten furiously, the 7 'purified' and undisturbed place. The gods are therefore invited to populace ran all over town in groups, often withtheir faces and bodies painted, reside in the desa temples located at the centre of the village only after carrying torches on the end of long poles, beating drums, gongs, tin cans or any­ offerings have been made to satisfy the intemperate buta-kala. In this thing that made a noise, yelling at the top of their lungs: 'Megedi, megedi! Get case, the caru sacrifice 'purifies' the area which has been 'polluted' by out! Get out!' (Covarrubias, 1972 [1937]: 279-81.) the concentration of buta-kala. In another sense, the caru facilitates the reversion of the spirit to its divine or benign form by offering food to In this way the demonic forces are feasted, then expelled from the appease (payupatin: payment for sins) its wrath (Putra, n.d.: 442-3). village. Supartha (1978: 93-4), however, denies the interpretation that Having been placated, it assumes a constructive character (Supartha, this noise-making ngerupuk part of the ritual is meant to 'expel' the 1978: 91); danger is staved and favour assured. demons. Rather, he says, it is meant to entertain and distract them from The caru, including its more spectacular form, the cock-fight (tabuh troublemaking and enlist their aid in their more beneficent aspect. Prior rah), is a complementary part of all ritual directed to facilitating contact to Nyepi, it is customary for all the palanquins and symbols of the with the deities. Villages perform major caru ceremonies on other occa­ deities (pratima) from the village temples to be taken in procession sions to contain chthonic forces during the dangerous periods of the (makiis/melastz) to the sea or other water source, where all the impurities Balinese year and whenever pestilence, epidemic, or other disaster of the earth are dissolved (Putra< n.d.: 58). There the local deities signals an imbalance between positive and negative forces in the local 'receive the gift of lifeforce (amerta) from Ida Sang Hyang Waruna to universe. Devastating epidemics which would call for extraordinary spread throughout the village' (Lagas, 1983: 34). ceremonies to deal with otherwise uncontrollable forces are less common The day following Tilem Kasanga, Nyepi (sepi: still, empty), the first in the age of antibiotics and tourism;8 but periodic purification cere­ day of the tenth month on the solar-lunar I<;:aka calendar, is the counter­ moni.es remain an essential part of the village ritual calendar. point to all the activities that make up everyday life, and especially con­ Throughout Bali, villages conduct caru on Tilem (new moon) of each trasts with the food and commotion provided to indulge, coax, and of the four months leading up to Sasih Kasanga, the most dangerous finally transform the buta-kala the previous night. No fires may be lit, ninth month of the Balinese calendar. Over the year the village territory food cooked, work or travel undertaken, or human passion indulged. is believed to experience increasing spiritual imbalance as a result of the The universe must reach its still point before its regeneratingforces can mundane pursuit of everyday life. Supartha (1978: 91) describes the be released again, initiallyunhindered by nether-worldly impediments. natural world as 'hungry' by Sasih Kasanga, after having satisfied its The Tawur Kasanga and Nyepi rituals reveal the double-sided human inhabitants' material needs through the year. There are also the propitiatory-pietistic and purificatory-regenerative character of virtually negative effects of human transgressions of social harmony, and the all Balinese rites. Ritual ordering in time and space involves cyclical cumulative concentration of nether-worldly forces over time to be re­ segregation and transformation. All 'exorcism' is a temporary reordering versed (Grader, 1969: 180). From the sixth month, disturbances to the prerequisite to regeneration in the life-death, separation-rejuvenation natural and social order are to be expected: hurricane-force winds and cycle. torrential rains threaten crops, livestock, and homes; disease spreads; Interestingly, in connection with the general argument that has been public discord and private passions flare. The culmination of the poten­ made regarding the moral-social character of the Balinese community, tially calamitous period caused by this cyclical state of collective im­ buta-kala tend to gravitate to the margins of residential areas­ balance occurs on Tilem Kasanga (new moon of the ninth month), the crossroads, graveyards, uninhabited compounds. The danger an empty last day of the Balinese I<;:aka year. On that day the culminating sacrifice, house yard poses to surrounding residents provides a spiritual rationale Tawur Kasanga, is held. The village, as sacred space and representation for banjar-desa authority over residential land and for their redistribution of the universe (buwana agung), in tandem with the wider macrocosmic by lottery when they fall vacant. Empty compounds, if not cared for forces, must be 'purified' in preparation for Nyepi, the day of silence, with regular offerings, become 'hot' (panes) and magically dangerous when cosmic balance will be restored (Lagas, 1983: 33). Before sunset, (tenget). at the crossroads of the desa, temporary altars are constructed and offer­ For the protection of inhabitants as much as for centrality and con­ ings made to divine, ancestral, and demonic beings. venience, bale banjar are usually constructed beside the crossroads at the 146 ADA T AND DINAS centre of the banjar. The busy atmosphere around the meeting hall dis­ tracts nether-worldly forces and dissipates their distemper. The mystic effects of central placement at the spoke of the wheel controlled by the buta of the four directions were described by the adat head of Tarian: Whoever deviates [from village law] within the territoryof the bale banjar will be cursed by the buta. Whoever acts well, the klian or penyarikan who performs his duties correctly, will be rewarded by these four buta. His thinking will be clear, his public service straight. So the location of the bale banjar is chosen for both geographic and mystical reasons. (CokAnom, 1985.) It is at the crossroads that the banjar perform macaru at the new moon (tilem) of the dangerous months to protect the village territory as sacred space, and ,whenever accidents or epidemics indicate disorder in the local relation between sekala and niskala. The sacrifice of animal blood at Tawur Kasanga on the day before Nyepi is said to be a substitute for human blood which would otherwise be taken. On these occasions, according to Grader (1984 [1939]: 222) ' ... the banjar still displays its time-honoured function of the nether-worldly worship group charged with care for the ritual purity of the residential village'. In the case of caru sacrifices, it is acting in the practical role of safeguarding the Banjar Lagas roll-books and record of expulsion case. residential community from invisible dangers, as it would organize a night-watch to protect its members from theft or human disturbance. Banjar Kalih recently built a shrine at the junction beside its meeting hall after several accidents occurred there.

Rituals for the Dead: Ngaben The relationship of the living to the dead is of most immediate import­ ance in the spatial and sequential ordering of the local universe. As has been pointed out, the ancestral orientation in popular Balinese religion remains of much greater significance than Hindu concepts. The central­ ity of ancestor worship to the religious beliefs and feelings of ordinary Balinese and the associated stress on death ceremonies in popular prac­ tice are emphasized in Jane Belo's field-notes: A man who has a dead but uncremated father seems to carry the responsibility withhim all the time; his thoughts and plans revolve around this point. (Witness Gerebeg and van de Kardes' evidence of how often it comes up in debt perkaras [conflicts]). The feeling of the Balinese people along these ancestor-worship lines could easily have reinforced the handed-over Hindu ritual and not the rituals which were irrelevant to that feeling. Amongst the triwangsa much more fuss is made over weddings, girls' first menstruation, toothfiling? what else? which are relatively less important according to their scale in the jaba [com­ moner] rituals. (Mead Coll. N30, Odalan Sajan, 16-20 March [1937?].) It is the anonymous ancestral deities who are the founders and pro­ tectors of the adat village. And the conduct of rituals related to the liminal process of transition from living merriber to ancestral spirit is a central aspect of village organization. Life-cycle rituals (birth, tooth­ filing, marriage, etc.) are commonly handled by kin-groups alone in

2 Bale kulkul, Banjar Lagas. 3 Ngarap wadah ( carrying the cremation tower to the cemetery), Desa Sekahan, 5 Carrying the corpse---'the crowd ... splashing and pulling the coffin',. Desa Batoean, 1937. (Photograph 1936. (Photograph Bate­ Bateson and Mead, 1942: 244) son and Mead, 1942: 242)

4 Close-up of men carrying · the cremation tower, Desa Sekahan, 1936. (Photo­ graph Bateson and' Mead, 1942: 242) 6 Ngarap play at a collective cremation, Banjar Kalih, 1985. 9 The men of Banjar Pe­ kandelan preparing sate and lawarfor a cremation ceremony, 1983.

10 Distribution of prepared foods by banja.r men for 7 Cooking sate for a cremation ritual, c.1937. (PhotographJ. Mershon) a cremation ceremony, 1983.

8 The women of Banjar Pekandelan preparing rice for reciprocal gifts of food at a cremation, 1983. ..,�•-·•·-•...•.• •. ,,) 11 Pemerasan offerings to 13 Odalan at the Pura Desa, accompany the spirit of Tarian. the deceased.

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14 Banjaryouthgroup assist­ 12 Collective cremation in ing in odalan preparations Banjar Tegeh, 1985. for banjar shrine, 15 Banjar Madya's bale banjar and bale kulkul built fromthe proceeds of tourist kecak performances. 17 ·Beach-front tables at the Sanur Beach Market Restaurant.

16 The sign at theBeach Market Restaurant describing the purpose of Sanur's public industries. 18 Sanur's village-owned service station. 19 Poster (BKKBN, Bali) showing family planning promotion through banjar meetings, youth education, PKK activities, nutrition, and credit programmes.

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20 Women collecting water I from the banjar public .s facility. ]

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OJ ,- OJ - N COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION IN THE RITUAL SPHERE 147 South Bali. But the treatment of the dead is so important to the well­ being of the village as a whole that some aspects of death and cremation are prescriptive community obligations.9 And conversely, so central are death ceremonies to Balinese culture that the responsibility for their successful conduct represents a powerful village sanction. To my know­ ledge, it is only in the context of death ceremonies, and only those aspects conducted by banjar, that disruption practices occur. It is also in the context of mortuary ritual that collective consumption in the ritual sphere has its deepest meaning and most powerful expression. The death of a member is disorienting to personal relationships and .� social continuity in any society. But in one so strongly constructed •;:j OJ around the maintenance of temporal, spatial, social, and spiritual order this sudden disruption of cosmic harmony, not to mention the flow of Z �­ ::; everyday life, demands elaborate ritual response. In many South-East �z _j� {l Asian cultures, the period between death and liberation from bodily . :::,�:::::, :::, t::i� 00 -, ! 00 � .. YJ.!,;l! V) -: remains is spiritually liminal for the soul of the deceased and hazardous ::::, S!\1"'1- :::c O'I zC. .i:; z: er ... CZ: &.&.I = for the still-living. The latter remain in an ambiguous relationship to the C:CE c:c Cl.C-Z:�� E :C ,s :elf! :.:ca:c, . soul of the departed which is neither constrained by the social regula­ � �� s tions of the living, nor as yet fused with the beneficent ancestral source. ZC-\o::t LI.I� � - ~· Only after it is no longer tied to its material remains and receives proper 0 c:c .z - z -au- ·� ilc "4'::zZco z:­ I r< secondary ritual treatment, can the soul of the deceased be considered at Ci §g -�-tt'. z: - ···-� ...... ,'!!I: .El rest-released from its ambivalent and potentially dangerous liminal ..... -i_ ;ils��c.;ci: 'O 10 a:::t �,cll!IC 1:l state and transmuted into a more remote, anonymous, and benign !Q � :=i-!CE ....:c::3 z: -� spiritual force. - �-�-i:!�C:C �-:::,� =- = • ngaben, -= e0- C;:, Secondary treatment of remains in Bali, is most commonly by �ffi-' LLl i:ii:Ziji� lz:C:::::.5 (Kamus �i ��� :c cremation and the term is defined as a corpse-burning ritual i·i�­ Bali-Indonesia, 1978). But the term actually refers more generally to the �� �:!:���� "' =-!i� �ILr��-:1E!� secondary ritual which marks the end of the period of liminality and the �--� Z:C0� ..... ,! 5 c::::,;c...> �--'==� full separation of the soul fromits bodily remains and social bonds. This -- �� _,,;z��� z: . . ..:>Z:: .- does not everywhere in Bali involve burning the corpse. In some of the �:z:...... :s;�"""�z:== £, ... � . ::cii;;; -�c.r. � <::c a.: � =r = ::,,.,,c::t: ', old Balinese communities the term ngaben refers to the ceremonial sever­ $,-.._""'=_,,� -�.-c::,. .... Z:.g:E ing of the soul from the material remains through reburial or symbolic ����e_,��:e:=. ��:Z!S�����­ burning of an effigy.11 Throughout Bali these variations on the ngaben LUC:::C Q,,.• ,��z2i�z��� � ·�,i:2::s=?i�z� c:::::i?;z ceremony are analogous to the secondary ritual treatment of the dead in ::c�c:::,��-2i!;s�� other parts of eastern Indonesia. """ ��e��g�:Jie�u=i,�Z Suggestive of the more ancient meaning of the ritual, Supartha ""' "5:::3�-��ccu..1 .Z:r;j�:5 ��!ii::!:!:!��X: ::c (1978: 44-6) claims the term ngabenderives from ngaba-in, meaning 'to �ttj ,s "o give provisions'. He also proposes that popular beliefs regarding the pro­ visioning of the deceased for the next world may explain the emphasis on the scale of this ritual. It is certainly connected with the spiritual and emotional importance of the maperas exchanges between living and & deceased which occur on the day prior to the burning (see Chapter 2). Whether secondary treatment is by burial or burning, the exhumed � remains or an effigy of the deceased made of sandalwood is ceremonially N N washed, dressed, given food, and paid homage in the same manner as the ceremonies originally carried out at death and burial, and through identically termed ritual stages-nusang, masalin, pabaktian. Finally, the body and soul of the deceased and/or its representations are blessed with 148 ADA T AND DINAS COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION IN THE RITUAL SPHERE 149 holy waters, which, depending on local tradition, come from one or a When a death occurs, the kulkul is struck and the entire banjar as­ combination of sources: Brahmana or other priest (pedanda or seng­ sembles in the compound of the deceased to construct a bamboo and guhu), the deity of the family temple 'dewa kemulan', the village temples rattan bier (usangan) on which the corpse will be washed and carried to and in some Gianyar communities, the banjar itself. the cemetery. In some villages, the banjar also participates in the For all the differences in customary practice between Balinese villages, washing ritual itself, an expression of solidarity of profound significance. however, the basic pattern and purpose of the ngaben ritual is essentially At the very least, it has responsibility for conducting the body to the the same-to liberate the soul from its material remains and transform it cemetery and handling the burial. If the death occurs on a day when into a beneficent and anonymous ancestral spirit. Failure to accomplish burial is prohibited according to desa or banjar adat, all banjar men are this weighty responsibility reaps dire consequences for community as required to keep watch in the compound of the deceased throughoutthe well as family.The unpurifiedsoul (pirata), overdue for secondary ritual night. Keeping company with the bereaved family for three nights treatment, becomes an angry and irascible buta, stalking the graveyard following burial (ngebag) is customary, and provides an occasion for and threatening the village. The Yamapurwa Tatwa (§§lb, 2-6), gambling and gossip. Gifts of food and white cloth and assistance from describes the dangers of neglecting these ritual duties: '.. . the soul of banjar women are also customary whether or not they are formallyregu­ one who has had a correct death, left [buried] for more than a year, is a lated. In the case of a family of ordinary means, gifts may be sufficient restless spirit watching the cemetery, roaming the villages, causing sick­ to cover the materials needed for ritual purposes as well as food, coffee, ness, provocation; such are the dangers'. Similar consequences are and cigarettes for visitors. When the ngaben ceremony was held for our brought on by the incorrect conduct of ritual. The ritually unliberated neighbour's young child who had died the year before, gifts of cloth, soul of the deceased, still in the form of a buta cuwil (cuwil: unclean), is food, and money from kin and banjar covered all of the ceremonial rejected by Batara Guru and forced to return to earth where it creates requirements and the costs of entertaining guests. havoc, spreading diseases that cannot be cured, destroying village, The extent to which banjar assist with the ngaben ceremony varies priest, and any living creature (Yamapurwa Tatwa: §§2b, 24-32). The with place and circumstance. Symbolic of its kin-like relation to the village is put in a state of 'impurity', the gods desert it and 'all forms of deceased, the krama (whether krama banjar or desa also depends on buta invade' (Yamapurwa Tatwa: §§7b, 19-27). locality) are placed in a state of ritual prohibition (sebel or cuntaka Since the soul of the deceased poses dangers not only to kin who have pakraman) for a period of three days preceding the cremation.Relatives immediate responsibility for it, but to the village territory as a whole, it is and immediate family are sebel for longer periods depending on the not surprising that village regulations concerning proper treatmentof the degree of social distance (see Supartha, 1978: 42). dead are extensive, and that death and cremation ceremonial should be Awig-awig banjar devote considerable attention to the timing, quant­ an important aspect of collective consumption in the ritual sphere. ities, and conditions associated with patus contributions, which normally When a house yard becomes empty through the death of its holder consist of rice, coconut, and bamboo. The written fragments of the without an heir (putung), or where a destitute family is unable to con­ awig-awig of Banjar Pantle in Tarian deal entirely with patus obligations duct this ritual, especially when failure to do so would prevent major and indicate the precise amounts to be given in traditional measures: ceremonies, the banjar must itself carry the costs of a simple ngaben 'The patus contribution in Banjar Pande is rice apunjung [bamboo ceremony in order to accomplish the necessary protection of village ter­ cylinder holding rice approximately equivalent to 1.5 kilograms]; a ritory. bamboo stalk, one hand-span and three fingers in circumference; a Banjar are regarded essentially as organizations for mutual assistance coconut, two hand-spans and four fingers in circumference.' (See and have particular importance with respect to the collective con­ Appendix 2: Awig-awig Banjar Pande: §6.) sumption aspects of mortuary ritual. Among the range of functions that The importance of patus reflectsthe parallel centrality of reciprocity at banjar perform as adat and dinas institutions, there is no question that all stages of the cremation ritual. Patus is given to the family conducting the conduct of transition rituals for the dead are paramount. As I have the ceremony from other banjar members and cooked foods are pre­ argued earlier, responsibility for the conduct of death ceremonies is the pared in return for banja,r assistance on the three days of full labour source of the extraordinary strength of this institution. Banjar are com­ leading up to the cremation. On the day of the ceremony itself, just monly also referred to as banjar suka-duka (suka: joy; duka: sorrow), or before conducting the symbolic effigies of the spirit and material banjar patus (patus: obligatory contributions). Members may call on remains of the deceased to the graveyard for cremation, a ritual banjar for assistance with any ritual; but with the exception of the death commensal meal (tegakan, gibung) of rice (ajengan), meats (sate'), and of a child who has not yet cut its first adult teeth ( durung maketus), and vegetables (lawar) is served to the banjar along with cakes and rice wine. who is therefore not considered a full social member of the commun­ The members sit in groups of four around a tall serving platter ( wancz) ity, 12 banjar involvement in certain preparatory and ritual aspects of from which they take their food in common. Given the intimacy implicit burial and cremation is prescribed. in food sharing in Balinese culture and the elaborate rules of etiquette 150 ADA T AND DINAS COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION IN THE RITUAL SPHERE 151 associated with the consumption of rice, the communal consumption of TABLE 5.1 a meal is a heavily loaded social-symbolic act. Banjar Madya: Total Ritual Expenditure, May 1981-April 1982 The regulations surrounding the preparation and consumption of the patus meal underscore the delicate nature of this act and its egalitarian Macaru offering materials implications. The Awig-awig Banjar Pande prescribes fines for failure to (6th-9th month) refreshments for preparers Rp 69,810 Nyepi serve the patus rice on a wanci, for even the smallest impurity, or bit of per capita levy to desa adat rental of truckfor procession husk left in the cooked rice (§§10-11), and for standing before all have offerings Rp 44,100 completed the meal (§23). The Awig-awig Banjar [Banjarangkan] Odalan gede construction materials for temporary contains similar stipulations (§§14a, 25b). Cole (1983: 370) emphasizes (major) altars, etc. the symbolic affirmation of alliance between equals in these ritualized food and materials for offerings 'plate-sharing' events.13 The highly elaborated reciprocal rights and refreshments for preparers obligations regarding patus contributions are fundamental expressions of performances Rp 377,700 banjar adat membership. Dewa Dani described it as the undang-undang Odalan sepen materials and performances dasar banjar-the fundamental law of the banjar, the basis of its strength. (minor) as for major odalan but on 'It is patus that holds tight. If you do not give patus, it means you are not smaller scale; offerings made 'bound' (kaiket) .' (Dw Dani, 1984.) at home, not in bale banjar Rp 92,350 Total Rp 583,960 Collective Production and Consumption of Ritual Goods (US$895)

The foregoing discussion gives some indication of the importance of Source: Based on Banjar Madya, Cash-books, 1981-2. including collective sponsorship of community ritual within an analysis of the social and economic role of village institutions in contemporary Bali. Treating ritual activity as an end as well as a means of collective consumption requires us to consider the manner in which the local in kind and in services rather than cash. They are also complicated by economy is used to support these spiritually defined goods, while taldng the fact that unregulated, informal offerings and exchanges accompany account of the circulation of food and services within the ritual economy most ceremonial activities, and may, particularly in the case of death itself. ceremonies, outweigh the value of prescribed contributions. Although I The circularity of material provisioning focused on ritual in Bali and am restricting discussion here to the public allocation of food and the complex interdependence between religion, the arts, social organ­ services, it is important to point out the close interconnection between ization, and the economy can only be suggested by the scattered micro­ public and private circulation in the ritual domain. economic data available on the subject. Temple-owned lands (laba) With respect to ritual activity that falls formally within the public provide some of the resources for physical upkeep and ritual support, sphere, local records give some indication of the priority accorded although almost everywhere the income from these sources must be sup­ religious activities in the proportion of the budget consumed by ceremo­ plemented by contributions from temple support groups. It is not nial costs. Table 5.1 summarizes ritual-related expenditure by Banjar uncommon today to find tourist performing troupes established as a Madya in Tarian for the year from May 1981 through April 1982.14 It means of financing temple-group responsibilities in Bali. The popular covers all outgoing and incoming funds to the treasury. Barong-Rangda dance enacted daily for tourists at the Pura Desa in During this year no major banjar construction or renovation projects Batubulan . subsidizes village temple maintenance and ritual there. A or unusual ceremonies were undertaken. Ritual expenses included the significant proportion of the income from a kecak troupe formed by costs of caru between the fifth and ninth Balinese months, contributions Banjar Madya in Tarian in 1966 was put to building a shrine and related to the desa for Nyepi ceremonies, and the costs of the major and minor ceremonials for its spiritual protector Barong. Aside from sponsorship odalan which alternate every six months at the banjar shrine. Expend­ from the tourist industry, the arts in Bali are almost entirely subsidized iture on ceremonial activities can be considered typical for this year, through performance at public and private ceremonial. Banjar Madya although banj'ar which do not possess a shrine could be expected to spend typically hires at least one arja or drama gong and several wayang troupes significantly smaller proportions of their income on ritual. The expend­ to perform for both gods and public at its six-monthly odalan. This is in itures listed in Table 5 .1 do not include ceremonies at des a temples, addition to its own angklung and gong kebyar orchestras, whose members which in Desa Tarian are supported by separately organized worship are unpaid when they perform for the deities of their own village. groups (pemaksan) responsible for each of the temples, nor death cere­ The difficulties of tracing the economic implications of ritual are mony costs which are handled through a special account. These will be enormous because so much of it takes place in the form of contributions discussed separately below. ADA T DINAS 152 AND COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION IN THE RITUAL SPHERE 153 Expenditure on routine ritual activities represented more than half of TABLE 5.2 15 Banjar Madya: Major Temple Festival Outlays of One Household the total banjar budget of Rp 1,0 14,990. Each household made cash over a 420-day Cycle, 1981-1982 contributions towards banjar ritual amounting to Rp 2,500. These calcu­ lations do not include the value of levies in kind, which amounted to 2 kilograms of rice, 2 eggs, 3 coconuts (market value = Rp 900) per Cash (Rp) Rice Eggs Coconuts Labour (hrs)" household for the major odalan, or of labour services. Based on observa­ Pura Dalem tions at the major odalan in 1984, preparations absorbed more than Minor 1,500 * 3 1 12 1,750 woman-hours and 3,000 man-hours of labour, that is, roughly Major 2,000 5 4 1 15 7 hours per woman and 12 hours per man from each household in the Pura Banjar banjar, working in rotation over the 10-day period leading up to the Minor 1,000 * 2 3 3 ceremony. Major 1,500 2 2 3 19 Some of the ritual expenses are subsidized in Banjar Madya by Pura Dadia income from banjar-owned rice land. Much of the members' oµtlay Minor 1,000 1 2 2 4 cannot be regarded in any case as a material 'loss' to members, since Major 1,500 3 3 3 10 food and still-edible remnants of offerings are distributed during labour service and after the ceremony. Part of the expenditure on materials is Total 8,500 11 16 13 63 recouped when temporary buildings and unused goods are auctioned. Sources: Banjar Madya, Notebooks, 1981-2; 'Pesuan-Pesuan ring Rahina Odalan ring Not calculated in the goods used for producing collective offerings are Pura Dalem Gde, 1982' (mirneo); 'Pesuan-Pesuan Piodalan ring Pura Wasan, 1982' the foods each household uses to make its own elaborate offering towers (mirneo). of fruits and cakes (maturan). These are brought to the shrine during Note: Required contributions also include other items, such as raw materials for building the odalan and afterwards the 'leftovers' (lungsuran) are returned home temporary offering places and a large variety of ingredients for the offerings themselves and redistributed among kin and neighbours. which are normally obtainable from the house garden area. odalan desa alncludes male and female labour, but not offering preparations in the home. Comparable outlays are made for at whichever of the *From laba, i.e. temple- or banjar-owned rice land. temples banjar members necessarily also have pemaksan obligations, as well as for subak, dadia, and other shrines for which they may have inherited ties. More rarely held ceremonies, such as the usaba desa, ideally carried out every 10 years, involve much greater contributions. annual basis, would be equivalent to between 4 and 8 per cent of a low 17 The usaba ceremony conducted in 1986 for the combined Kahyangan income of Rp 120,000 - 240,000 per year. Labour services might be Tiga of Tegeh required contributions from each of the 82 members of valued at an additional 10 per cent, but since a significant proportion of the krama desa!banjar of Rp 60,000 in cash, 22 kilograms of rice, preparation would be scheduled at times which allow farmers and office 30 coconuts, 30 eggs, 3 ducks, 5 chickens, and small quantities of workers to continue their normal work with minimal interruption, this is numerous other raw materials such as oil, bamboo, palm fronds, and so not necessarily at the expense of income-producing activity. These on. The equivalent value of contributions in kind at then current market figures and estimates do not include the cost in cash and women's prices was Rp 20,000 per household, in addition to the Rp 60,000 cash labour-time of the household offerings (banten) brought to the temple levy. during worship. The size of these offerings is not normally regulated and Table 5. 2 indicates the expenditure obligations of one family in a 420- will vary according to the economic capacity of each household. day cycle of rituals at only the major temples outside the household to However, local custom results in some degree of conformity, and family which it belongs. These figures give only an indication of the commit­ pride or sense of obligation means that these private offerings tend to be ment in time and income devoted to public ritual among Balinese. substantial and elaborate. The contents are afterwards consumed at Poffenberger and Zurbuchen have made a valuable attempt to sketch home and redistributed to close neighbours and kin. out the economics of ritual in terms of family outlays for temple cere­ monies in a Karangasem village. Their example of the expenditure of Cremation: Community and Life-cycle Ritual one South Bali peasant family on temple ceremonials in a 420-day cycle involved 42 days labour, Rp 5,700 in cash, and contributions in rice, Collective consumption in the ritual sphere does not only occur through coconuts, and other goods which can be roughly valued at Rp 5,200 corporate community institutions. Kin-groups often combine resources 16 (Poffenberger and Zurbuchen, 1980: 122). Together, cash and goods to cover expenses incurred in the other major type of ceremonial, those contributed to alternate major and minor odalan at desa, banjar, subak, rituals connected with the stages in the life cycle of family members. dadia, and house temples in their example, calculated on an average With the important exception of aspects of death ceremonies, these are 154 ADA T AND DINAS COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION IN THE RITUAL SPHERE 155 normally organized and supported through the private resources of the Life-cycle events also provide the occasion for establishing and main­ household or patrilineal kin-group alone, although families conducting taining patronage ties and for satisfying redistributive expectations in the rites of passage may call on their neighbours as individuals or the banjar community. Poor families may attach their own cremation ritual to the as a unit for assistance, reciprocating (ninggu) with meals, coffee, and ceremony of a royal or priestly family and thereby diminish the expense cigarettes. Unlike community ritual in which contributions are minutely that would be involved in an independently conducted cremation. In this regulated and costs equally divided, the scale of family ritual is very way, hundreds joined the cremation ceremony for the dead raja of definitely articulated with social status and economic means. Where the Pemecutan in Denpasar as recently as 1986. In an unusual variation on principle of absolute balance is prescribed in the former, redistributive this theme of redistributive sponsorship, a nouveau riche art-shop owner principles overwhelmingly prevail in the latter. The average cost of a paid for the entire costs of the collective cremation held in his complete set of life-cycle rituals conducted for a single person is re­ Karangasem village (A. Ruddick, pers. com., 1988). ported by Poffenberger and Zurbuchen (1980: 126) for the Karangasem Whether any of these options (to combine ceremonies, pool re­ region as ranging from Rp 450,000 to 1 million rupiah for low-income, sources, or accept sponsorship) are taken up in a particular instance commoner household, and 1.3 million rupiah and up among middle­ depends on the material situation of the family involved and the relative income and gentry Balinese. In either case the expenditures on life-cycle weighting economic circumstance, social ties, or status considerations ceremonies represents over 3 years' income. are given in carrying out the ceremony. Corporate values of kin-group Too many mediating circumstances, however, affect the actual cost of or community do have palpable modulating effects on status competi­ family celebrations to consider the above calculations as more than tion and, as pointed out previously, the maintenance of ritual and general indications of the proportion of a family's resources which might reciprocal balance has the highest priority. Made Dasa spoke proudly of be devoted to carrying out these rituals. Combining several major rituals his cousin's generous assistance in supporting their major house temple such as tooth-filing and marriage or cremation on a single ceremonial ceremony as a demonstration of close family ties. His wife commented: occasion or joining with a number of relatives to carry them out permits odalan sanggah expenses to be shared and significantly reduces the burden on any one The in the cost at least 2 million rupiah. It was paid mostly by Made Dasa's cousin, Wayan Keted. Though he no longer lives in this com­ family. In one example provided by Poffenberger and Zurbuchen pound, it is his household of origin. Since this is his descent group also and we (1980: 126), pooling by a large extended family enabled them to cover couldn't afford the ceremony, he paid most of the expenses. It is important in the costs of a tooth-filing ceremony for thirty of their members for only Bali to be sure you don't neglect spiritual debts. (Ni Yanthi, 1982.) Rp 20,000 each, when a single family having the ritual performed inde­ pendently would easily incur expenses of several hundred thousand Also counteracting competitive pressures to go beyond one's means in rupiah. Where radical differences in economic circumstance exist among the case of cremations, where it is strongest, is the popular belief that related families, it is not uncommon for an extremely well-to-do house­ inappropriate scale may have adverse consequences. Offerings which are hold to subsidize relatives' ceremonies entirely. too elaborate and costly and exceed the traditional conventions for a Ritual responsibility presses more heavily on those who can afford it particular community or descent group can 'weigh down the soul of the and a number of beliefs and customary prohibitions ensure that broader dead' (Ni Sriati, 1985), who will in turn trouble those responsible, causing religious obligations are served in order to satisfy personal ones. For illness and even death in its distress. Poffenberger and Zurbuchen example, major ceremonies should ideally be carried out every 10 years (1980: 125) relate the story of a wealthy commoner household in Banjar or so at descent group temples for the well-being of descendent house­ Jegeg who had conducted an extremely extravagant ceremony. On the holds. The extent to which these households are likely to 'feel badly' at night after the cremation the deceased's family were aroused by strange thefailure to do so, depends on their financial means (I Toya, 1985). In the sounds. They rose to see the departed relative, 'his mouth stuffed with case of Made Dasa, the klian of Banjar Lagas, in whose compound was elaborate offerings, moaning that he was too heavy (i.e. too burdened located the core shrine (sanggah gede') of his subdescent group, an entre­ down with offerings) to enter heaven. A second, special ceremony had preneur cousin paid most of the costs of the major ceremony, although to be performed quickly to relieve the spirit of its burden and speed it on Dasa as primary heir (marep) had inherited this obligation with his its way.' house yard. Prior to such a ceremony it is necessary to ensure that rela­ Regional variations make generalization regarding life-cycle ritual tionships are properly ordered, and therefore that cremation ceremonies expenditure on the basis of Poffenberger and Zurbuchen's Karangasem for the deceased of those belonging to the family temple are carried out data difficult, except to support the conclusion that a substantial propor­ beforehand. It is also considered improper for a cremation to be held tion of income is devoted to these ceremonial activities throughout Bali. for one family member while an older lineal relative of the deceased Respondents in Streatfield's (1982: 400) survey on fertility decline remains ritually untreated. Such beliefs encourage redistributive re­ in three villages in Klungkung listed ceremonies above food and educa­ sponsibility for sponsorship of life-cycle rituals by more prosperous tion as the greatest expense involved in rearing children. My own data family members. on ceremonial expenditure in three banjar in Tarian (Sangan, Madya 156 ADA T AND DJNAS COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION IN THE RITUAL SPHERE 157 Dauh, and Tegeh) also indicated a high level of commitment to ritual Banjar responsibility for significant aspects of cremation ceremonial consumption. Out of 243 households, 170 carried out major rituals make this ritual the axis of the cross-cutting kin-group and residential during the 10-year period prior to the survey (1971-81), spending an principles of incorporation. The complexity of the regulations surround­ average of Rp 443,000 (US$930) per household. ing their conduct reflects the tension between redistributive and The greatest costs reported are invariably for cremation ceremonies. balanced principles of reciprocity which arise where such intersections Lavish expenditure by the old royal families, such as the 20 million implicate title-group prerogatives or patron-client ties of an economic or rupiah reportedly spent on the cremation of Cokorda Gede Agung political nature. The complex reciprocal or redistributive obligations of Sukawati of Ubud, is newsworthy in the national press (see Kompas, the social side of a cremation ceremony, more than ritual requirements 28 January 1979). But even a family of modest means would spend per se, account for the heavy financial costs incurred. Theoretically one several hundred thousand rupiah to carry out this most important of of the purposes of the requisite participation of banjar in death cere­ life-cycle rituals. In the 1982 Tarian survey 95 families out of 243 had monies is the practical one of alleviating the burden of conducting such conducted a cremation ceremony (sometimes combined with wedding a significant ritual. It has become, ironically, the costs of subsidizing or tooth-filing) during the previous decade, with an average outlay of banjar assistance, especially if the banjar is large, 18 that makes the ngaben Rp 568,275 (US$1,189) each. Several pawned or sold land in order to ceremony increasingly burdensome to carry out. Informants calculated do so. that rarely more than 30 per cent of total expenditure was actually for Heavy outlays for conducting ngaben are not a recent phenomenon, the ceremony itself; the rest went to cover the costs of food and refresh­ nor in relative terms restricted to the elite. In the 1930s Covarrubias ments provided for labour assistance and guests. Cigarettes and coffee (1972 [1937]: 362) reported costs equivalent to as much as 50,000 served during the lengthy preparations alone might account for a third guilders (US$25,000) for the conduct of this event by a royal family. of total costs (I Dharma, 1983; A A Kartini, 1985; I Wenten, 1987). Even the simplest ceremony he witnessed cost more than US$25 Complex regulations attempt to ensure balance and restraint. As a (approximately equivalent to 10 months' salary of a schoolteacher at means of reducing costs in Tarian many banjar amended their awig-azdig that time). In that case, a former servant had borrowed the money for to prohibit the provision of coffee and cigarettes and regulate the quant­ the cremation of her mother. One of Jane Belo's informants reported ities of meat provided in return for banjar assistance, with varying using up as much food for a cremation ceremony as he would have degrees of effectiveness. The desa also passed a regulation that there eaten in three years (Mead Coll. N30: Fieldnotes). should be no 'invitations' (undangan) within its boundaries. Since invita­ Although display and acquisition of prestige are undoubtedly major tion initiates obligations of gift and counter-gift, this prohibition reduced considerations in the lavish expenditure on ritual which Goris the preparations for invited guests to family and friends from outside the (n.d.: 128) described as the Balinese equivalent of a potlatch, it is mis­ village, and eliminated the obligation to reciprocate local contributions taken, I believe, to treat these as primary or immediate motivations. with ritual meals. Instead, in-desa contributions would be regarded as Cremation ceremonies in particular afford an important occasion for matempung, bringing gifts 'as if family', that is, as if sharing a worship reciprocal gestures towards living neighbours and kin and/or redistrib­ relationship to common ancestors in the same family shrine and there­ utive opportunities towards clients which certainly do operate in support fore without expectation of return (I Dasa, 1986). of status claims. But the most significant measure of appropriate cere­ But these regulations are cross-cut by informal deviations and adjust­ monial scale is regarded as the personal and social debt one owes to the ments usually arising from pressures toward redistribution. The diffi­ deceased forebearers to whom the ritual is directed (I Geriya, 1982; Cok Bagus, culty lies in applying a general rule in the face of competing (balanced 1985). The poorest among the klian of Tarian, a practical and thoughtful versus redistributive) sensitivities and claims. In Ban.jar Sangan, man committed to both economic development and retention of central religious and cultural values, had mortgaged his rice land, which he then the members decided at assembly that they were embarrassed not to reciprocate gifts and assistance and would continue to do so [contrary to desa adat regula­ worked to redeem as a tenant for 3 years, in order to afford the crema­ tions]. That causes problems when people come from other banjar and receive tion of his father and young son. He was quite aware that non-Balinese something in return. When it is their turn theyfeel obliged to reciprocate despite judged such a diversion of economic resources as wasteful and extra­ their own regulations. (I Dharma, 1985.) vagant, but reasoned that the land had belonged to his father, and his ability to use it today was only thanks to his inheritance of the fruits of A wealthy titled owner of a tourist home-stay in Tarian explained that his progenitors' labours. 'Wouldn't it be selfish to appropriate these she felt embarrassed given her comfortable material circumstances not benefits without a proper expression of gratitude?' (I Dharma, 1983.) 'How to offer coffee to the banjar. In a circuitous and delicate manner, so as can you ever repay the life given by your parents?' (I Mandera, 1984.) These not to appear either to be flaunting her wealth or to be unappreciative of were typical responses to enquiries on the economic burden of death the banjar's services, she had to 'request permission' to break banjar ritual. rules, offering to pay the stipulated fines for doing so (A A Kartini, 1983). 158 ADA T AND DINAS COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION IN THE RITUAL SPHERE 159 The 'anxiety' that so many spoke of in connection with organizing or to ancestors are involved. 'The young people tend to take the practical conducting these ceremonies was ultimately bound up with the problem point of view on the advantage of reducing costs, but the old see it as of balancing these opposing principles. Made Dasa told me it was neces­ disrespectful to the dead.' (Meeting notes, 1982.) sary to be extremely careful about feelings of banjar members, for the Predictably the three southern banjar with few gentry families among social meanings attached to reciprocal gestures are so profoundly felt. their membership were the first to adopt the practice. There the cost­ On one occasion he had to call a halt to preparations in progress and saving advantages and levelling ethos held sway. At one of the early hold an impromptu banjar meeting to resolve the mounting tension: assembly discussions in Banjar Lagas, the question arose: 'What about 'Even over the sate meat there was strong disagreement; some felt they those who can afford to carry out the ceremony in the usual way? Will were too small compared to the usual size.' (I Dasa, 1982.) In fact, one of they be forced to join the collective cremation?' Another's response, the most common causes of disruptive incidents at death ceremonies is 'Don't think about those who can affordit, thinkabout those who can't!' disgruntlement among banjar members when those having wealth or (Meeting notes, 1982.) Eventually a draft awig-awig was written, revised sev­ claims to status are thought stingy in the quantity or quality of food and eral times, and finally adopted by the banjar which provided for collect­ refreshments they serve. Haughtiness or overt display on the other hand ive and independent cremations to be held at alternate 3-yearly intervals. may be equally offensive. Banjar Lagas first experimented with collective ceremonies in 1985 along with Banjar Tegeh and Kalih. (klian desa) An assistant to the village head said that he spent much of his time Resistance was strongest in those banjar to the north with large num­ following up complaints villagers made against other villagers who had been too bers of triwangsa. As the klian of Banjar Besaya remarked, 'There extravagant in 'entertaining' guests. In one case during community-wide crema­ [Banjar Kalih] the poor can do something, the big come down a bit. ... tion preparations, a complaint was made against a family which was giving guests sate (pork on skewers ) with pieces of meat significantly larger than But here those who have, don't want to lower themselves.' (I Toya, 1983.) usual .... But collective cremations were ultimately introduced in Banjar Madya in Thus while we find a tendency for certain, and usually wealthier, families to 1986 and Banjar Sangan in 1988, both having large numbers of Satria attempt to raise or display their status through unusually elaborate ceremonies, and Brahmana among their membership. In these banjar considerations there is also a range of controlling mechanisms designed to keep the complexity of rank and prestige proved negotiable and were partially subordinated of ritual from escalating beyond the means of poorer members of the commun­ to other concerns. ity. (Poffenberger and Zurbuchen, 1980: 125.) The processes of compromise involved in Banjar Madya's adoption of But since banjar have responsibility for only some aspects of the crema­ the practice in 1986 are interesting because they demonstrate how finely tion ceremony, their capacity to contain competing pressures, parti­ pitted are the egalitarian and hierarchic values, reciprocal and redistrib­ cularly where memberships comprised heterogeneous socio-economic utive principles, which Balinese continuously juggle. They also illustrate groups, is limited. the ambivalent implications of notions of ancestral responsibility. The possibility of introducing collective cremation was first broached by leaders there in 1983 after Banjar Lagas had put together a detailed set Collective Cremation of written regulations with the intent of experimentingwith the practice. The practice of collective cremation, with long-standing precedents in Despite strong commitment from Banjar Madya's leaders and several of some parts of Bali, has been promoted by Parisada Hindu Dharma since its most respected citizens,20 it took three years of patient discussions the 1960s as part of its drive towards rationalizing Balinese religious before the assembly was prepared to attempt it. Not long after the practice in the direction of simplified ritual and reduced expense decision was taken and 32 families including six gentry households had (Connor, 1991).19 In Tarian, as in much of South Bali, it is usual for chosen to participate, differences of opinion began to surface. Several of each household or kin-group to have its own priest, separate sets of the titled families requested special concessions: offerings, ritual performances, and invited guests. In fact, all preparation and rituals but those associated with the burning on the last day were We almost had the same problem as Banjar Lagas, where some families demanded four or five soroan offerings. People here are afraid to carry out a cre­ normally conducted in the private space of the home. Collective crema­ mation unless a large number of others will do so because of the cost of recip­ tion enables a significant savings in materials and labour by centralizing rocating the labour of such a large banjar. [Madya Dangin and Dauh together the preparationsin the bale banjar or cemetery and sharing a single set of are composed of 250 krama, all of whom must take part since they constitute a the most complex offerings, as well as the priest and religious perform­ single banjar adat]. . . . Anyway the Cokordas and Anak Agungs were happy ances necessary for correct conduct of these rituals. The practice has enough to join for this reason under the original conditions agreed to at the been resisted by some in Tarian because of the perceived implications of banjar meeting [that there would be only a single set of collective offerings]. But sharing offerings among different descent- and title-groups and concern after the co-ordinating committee was formed, from one party came the request over so radical a departure from custom where the ultimate obligations for separate sets of soroan, because that was the prerogative of their warna 160 ADA T AND DINAS COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION IN THE RITUAL SPHERE 161 [caste] . Fortunately I was able to persuade them, before it got to the special TABLE 5.3 assembly meeting, that we couldn't possibly accommodate every individual's Outlays per ParticipatingFamily for Collective Cremation,1985-1986 wishes. The problem isn't so much the cost in materials-I think the bendesa estimated one offering of this type costs about Rp 30,000-but the labour Cash Rice Pork Value involved is enormous because its contents are so complex. In the end, it was Banjar (Rp) (kg) Eggs Coconuts Ducks (kg) (Rp) agreed each gentry family would get one additional soroan. (IMandera, 1987.) * * * * * All participants then shared the 4 soroan bebangkit as one banjar in Lagas 300,000 300,000 Tegeh accordance with the original agreement, but an additional soroan was 160,000 100 100 100 7 20.0 262,200 Kalih 175,000 60 60 60 5 * made for each of the six gentry families. As a result of the compromise, 213,600 Madya 75,000 141 110 150 10 28.5 219,400 Banjar Madya finally produced 10, instead of only the 4 soroan required for collective cremation, but less than the 28 that would have been *Purchasedfrom cash. The committee of consumersof BanjarLagas purchased allmajor necessary if the full request of gentry participants had been met. The requirements out of the cash payment of Rp 300,000 from each participant. Certain extra materials had to be provided by each of these families outside of woven offerings (jejaitan) had to be contributed in addition to this and a surcharge of the equal shares contributed for the common set of offerings. 50 per cent was added for each additional deceased person to be rituallytreated. Considerable discontent had arisen the previous year in Lagas where the costs of the added sets of offerings for the few gentry families involved were shared by all the participants. Commoners, therefore, reduction in labour-time expended by the banjar. According to awig­ were subsidizing the additional gentry offerings with both materials and awig, each household conducting a cremation has the right to call on the banjar labour. The bendesa, a landless member of the Tarian gentry, who whole banjar for a maximum of 4 days to assist with preparations. This had for many years encouraged the introduction of the collective prac­ precedes the final 3 days of the ceremony itself when banjar members tice, expressed disappointment that Banjar Lagas had failed to carry are divided among the households participating. In the case of Banjar through in a completely collective way. He felt that despite their being Madya's collective cremation in 1986, had the ceremonies been organ­ the first to adopt the new practice, they had in effect 'taken a step back­ ized on an individual rather than collective basis, the banjar could wards' (CokAnom, 1985). The klian ofLagas Kawan was himself unsatisfied technically have been called out 128 times for about 2 hours on each with this first effort which had fallen short of the equalizing intent of the occasion, requiring as much as 256 hours of labour-time from each collective practice. Aside from the issue of gentry offerings, theyhad not member in addition to full-time commitment for the 3 days of the scheduled the work tightly enough to prevent some participants from ceremony.21 By conducting the ritual collectively, members' labour com­ organizing private feasts for guests alongside the public celebration mitments were reduced to 50 hours (25 days of about 2 hours each) (I Dasa, 1986). prior to full-time involvement on the final 3 days. Notwithstanding the various degrees of compromise represented in The benefits of the collective cremation were not only material. There the collective cremation practices adopted by different banjar in Tarian, was a general consensus that the pleasure of working together in the bale costs in materials and banjar labour-time were in all cases considerably banjar instead of being divided among private homes was as socially reduced. Although many families still held feasts in their homes which rewarding as it was cost-saving (Desak Dherani, 1986; I Swasta, 1986; Ni Made, 1986). added to the expenses listed below, the objective of the new practice was 'People felt the spirit resembled a ritual outing (makiis)' (I Mandera, 1986). to minimize this aspect of ngaben ceremonial, and in most cases such Another commented, 'the unity and excitement in Banjar Madya was supplementary arrangements were either dispensed with or considerably amazing. From the time we began working, it was just like the days reduced. Table 5.:3 lists basic costs for each participating family in those when we performed Kecak. The enthusiasm really stood out.' (I Sopir, banjar which carried out collective cremations in 1985 and 1986. 1986.) 'There was none of the pressure or tension that sometimes occurs Variations from one banjar to the next depended upon the ratio of in the home: Is this or that done?-Or you think they're working too 'consumers' (konsumen) conducting ceremonies to assisting banjar mem­ slowly or drinking too much coffee, but you daren't say anything. In the bers; the scale of offerings and which of these were collectivized; banjar everyone enjoyed working the whole time.' (IWenten, 1987.) Wenten whether all aspects of the ceremonial paraphernalia such as the animal also stressed how valuable it had been as an educational experience for coffins in which the remains are burned were included in the public the youth of the hamlet to learn the meaning of the banjar, of death preparations; and whether the subsequent nyekah or ngasti rituals were ceremonies and of working together. General satisfaction with the out­ included as part of the collective ceremony or left to families to carry out come of recent experiments with collective cremation has been such that independently at a later occasion. five of the eight banjar adat in Tarian chose to carry out ngaben this way As important as lessening the costs to 'consumers' was the marked in 1988 when the Parisada Hindu Dharma again prescribed island-wide 162 ADA T AND DINAS COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION IN THE RITUAL SPHERE 163 'cleansing' of the cemeteries in advance of the major state Panca Wali orientation as the basic difference between our two cultures: Orang barat Krama ceremony to be held at Besakihthe following year. kesenangan merantau, orang Bali kesenangan upacara (Westerners take pleasure in travelling; Balinese take pleasure in ritual). She believed it was the lack of ritual satisfaction that made Europeans crave travel and Conclusion accounted for the special attraction of Bali to many tourists. As impressive as the colour, drama, and ritual complexity of Balinese The foregoing discussion gives some indication of the value Balinese ceremonial is the scale of resources and practical organization that are place on assuring balance and ongoing reciprocal relations with the essential constituents of a ritual event. C. Geertz (1975: 403) has com­ invisible members of the social group, as well as with neighbours and mented that the ceremonial occasion appears to be overwhelmed by kin. My emphasis on the shared contribution of labour and pooling of these aspects: resources in the ritual context as a form of 'collective consumption' is not incompatible with Tarian villagers' ascriptions of value. Not only are Ritual often seems ... to consist largely of getting ready and cleaning up. The heart of the ceremony, the obeisance to thegods come down onto their altars, is the spiritual ends sought valued as 'goods', but the shared labour which accomplishes these ends is a positively construed end-in-itself, heavily deliberately muted to the point where it sometimes seems almost a!). after­ 22 thought, a glancing, hesitant confrontation of anonymous persons brought loaded with moral implications. Ceremonial prescriptions and adat duties are adhered to with a sense of responsibility rarely accorded other physically very close and kept socially very distant. 23 activities. To do otherwise would be to break the invisible links which Howe (1980: 235) takes issue with Geertz's extension of the Mead­ make up the community of gods, mortal humans, and deceased deities­ Bateson notion of muted climax as an idiosyncratic Balinese cultural to-be; in other words, to invite catastrophe. Recognizing the weight of characteristic and what he regards as Geertz's implicit devaluation of the reciprocal obligation in the ritual cycle which links the community of ritual meanings in Balinese ceremonial. But there is an important point living and dead is necessary to interpreting aspects of Balinese economic about the impression of busy activity dominating a ritual event which orientation as well as the place of local corporate institutions which are warrants attention. Just as the offerings and thoroughness of form are the immediate concern of this study. expressions of purity of intention, also believed to influence ritual effec­ tiveness, so too the contribution of labour is an expression of meaning and value, and an intrinsic part of the ritual itself. In ritual contexts the word karya (work) is also the term for ceremony. 1. Leyak and animals are at the bottom of the pantheon, if my understanding is Certainly, Balinese conceive of the work they do and the offerings correct, because they are egoistic, amoral, and asocial. Humans, as intermediate forms of they make in a ritual context as reciprocal acts, repayments to super­ being, combine both good and bad, material and immaterial, individual and collective natural forces in exchange for the prosperity and protection they give. behaviours. They have the potential to become leyak if they follow the black arts in life, Putra (n.d.: 45 ff.) explains the importance of offerings (banten) and dewa when theirspirits are properly liberated from personality in death. It is sociability that sacrifice (caru) as 'return payments' (tawur, the High Balinese term for accounts for human's intermediate position in the hierarchy of being, since collectivity lies at the mid-point between disdained individuality and the anonymous depersonalized ideal caru, means 'to pay') in 'debt of gratitude' necessary to bring about cos­ (C. Geertz, 1975; Howe, 1980). Howe (1980: 217) makes the interesting observation that mic balance and assure continued human well-being. Supartha makes a among Balinese deities only Hindu gods have names, and even these identities are trans­ similar point. Material manifestations of thanksgiving as well as good mutable; ancestral deities are anonymous. Wiweka (1971: 25) remarks that human beings, intentions are necessary to 'reciprocate' through 'service' that which has because by nature social beings, occupy the highest position among living creatures. These been taken and enjoyed from the natural world (Supartha, 1978: 90 ff.). valuations provide important clues to the philosophical foundations of collective priorities. It is to the krama, the corporate membership, not individuals, that adat refers and to which Much of the contemporary literature on ritual produced by the the equation between social and moral action is drawn (Kaler, 1983a: 55). Institut Hindu Dharma and Parisada Hindu Dharma is of course con­ 2. There are two other classes of ceremony, resi yadnya, related to the consecration of cerned to provide economically rational explanations for ritual expend­ Brahmana priests, and manusa yadnya, rites of passage for the living. But these do not iture often considered extravagant by outside observers, particularly usually engage the whole membership of banjar or desa. non-Balinese government officials. At the same time, there is no ques­ 3. Ratu Gede Puseh is regarded as the personification of the collectivity of communal ancestors in their aspect as founders and first cultivators of the village -(Grader, n.d.: 4). tion that ritual activity as a reciprocal gesture, with material and social 4. In the so-called Bali Aga communities, such as Tenganan Pageringsingan, assumed well-being among its objectives, is central to Balinese religious concepts. by Dutch scholars to have retained an earlier form of village organization (Korn, 1984 My research assistant, looking at the statistics on ceremonial expend­ [1933]), public meetings and commensal rituals are held monthly in the Bale Agung. In iture revealed by our survey, commented on theextent to which her own the large 'new style' villages of Bali the Bale Agung no longer functions as an assembly family's economic activities were geared to ritual goals: 'That is the way hall, and the bale banjar has inherited its community meetingfunction. 5. Written texts predictably concentrate on the Indic explanations for religious prac­ it is in Bali. My parents worked only for ceremonies. My mother often tice and symbolism. These differ substantially in some instances from popular concep­ apologized for thefact that there was so little left over for her children­ tualization. The following discussion relies on both sources. just enough for food.' (Ni Sikiani, 1982.) Ketut Nyantet (1984) saw ritual 6. Buta-kala are the recipients of attentions in all communal ritual (caru) and in the 164 ADA T AND DINAS COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION IN THE RITUAL SPHERE 165 daily round of household propitiatory offerings (segehen). Leyak (witches), into which the historical reasons for the divergent customs in these cases, their persistence points to living humans can metamorphose if they develop the knowledge of certain magical prac­ the strength of belief that whatever practices were handed down from the ancestors must tices of 'the left', also inhabit theBalinese world, and interestingly are not generally objects be adhered to in order to assure their continued protection. The punggawa of Kintamani of cyclical communal ritual. Leyak, and the consequences of magic practices in general, are reported in 1922 that the local custom of leaving the grave open had been suppressed by normally dealt with individually throughemploying the services of a balian. Ambiguities in officials at the time (Adatrechtbundels, 1924: 469). But if a change was introduced, it was conceptualization of 'negative' forces, of course, prevent tidycategorization, but leyak are apparently short-lived, as Danandjaja (1980: 422-7) reports that the destruction of the largely personal, and buta-kala anonymous, representations of the dangerous forces of the corpse by exposure continuesthere to the present. universe, which proper ritual treatmentcan contain or transform.Beyond Howe's explora­ 12. Small children are considered close to the divine source. Their 'purification' tion, the symbolic-social significance of the difference between these two conceptions of through the ngaben ceremony is therefore not necessary. A baby who dies before its the demonic has not been treatedcomprehensively to my knowledge. 3-month ceremony (nelubulanin-to this age thesoul is not believed to be fully attached to As referents to values associated with individuality and collectivity, and possibly to its body and the baby is not permitted to touch earth-see Howe, 1980: 275 ff.), is buried distinctionsbetween the nature of relationsbased on kinship and on neighbourhood or ter­ only. Secondary ritual treatment for a child who dies before the loss of its baby teeth ritory, the differences in conceptualization and treatment of leyak and buta-kala would be (signifying loss of innocence and the beginning of culpability-Howe, 1980: 283) is limit­ of particular interest. By and large, witchcraftis a sporadic, individual, and interpersonal­ ed to a small ceremony (ngelungah) attended by thefamily only. After offerings are placed in fact, predominantly intra-familial-phenomenon. The basis of the power of a human­ on the grave site, holy water sprinkled, and prayers said for the speedy return of the child's become-leyak lies in the appropriation of spiritual knowledge to instrumental, individual spirit to its source, the grave mound is raked flat and the offerings buried (Supartha, ends. Magic of the 'right', according to Howe (1980: 236-7), leads 'to a complete under­ 1978: 42). The small scale and lack of banjar involvement were perhaps originally related standing of oneself and one's proper relation to god, other people and nature in general', to the factthat the soul of a small child, so tenuously attached to the material-social world while magic of the left-hand path is egoistic and self-aggrandizing. The leyak's powers cor­ and therefore readily released, was no threat to the community. respondingly tend to be directed to one-to-one engagements. Only individuals are normal­ 13. See Cole (1983: 370 ff.) regarding the decline of this practice. In recent years the ly attacked by leyak, whereas the demonic forms of the gods more frequentlybring disease custom has been replaced in many parts of Bali by the makan jalan in which the food is and pestilenceto entire villages. In Balinese mythology, the followersof Rangda, described wrapped up and taken home to eat. The reasons I was given by various people in Tarian by Foster (1979: 185-6) as a representationof 'a personal working of evil', are leyak. On for the decline of tegakan are identical to those reported by Cole (1983: 371-3): theincon­ the other hand, the followers of the protective Barong, the buta-kala, are also dangerous, venience of the elaborate communal meal and the delay it invariably caused to the but rather because of theloss of deific self-control than because of intentional perpetration proceedings of the final stage of cremation; the fact that it is customarily only the male of evil. Since the human community, and collectivity in general, is conceived as having a members of the banjar thatparticipate in the feast and thatdivision enables it to be shared moral-religious dimension, and is by definition, sacred, perhaps the leyak's art, being by their families at home; and finally, as a member of Lagas Kawan put it, 'because we're essentially personal and instrumental, is too low in the hierarchy of being and behaviour to embarrassed to eat together' (I Wasa, 1985). Cole finds this paradoxic since 'it is presum­ have potency on other than a one-to-one basis. ably from precisely this sentiment thatthe event derived its constructivesignificance in the 7. According to Howe (1980: 229 ff.), the metamorphosis of a god into a demonic first place, since participants are forced to treat one another as close social intimates'. He form may be caused by human neglect or transgression. When this occurs it necessarily speculates that it probably reflects a 'relative decline in the perceived need for strong leaves heaven and comes down to the earth since only the benign form of the deity can be expression of social unity . . . between otherwise disparate social groups' (Cole, manifest in the upper world. 1983: 372-3). The symbolic implications of equality in that unity were politicized in Bali 8. Ratu Gede, protector Barong of Banjar Madya, has not been called out to dispel during the 1950s and 1960s to such an extent that the tension between title-group status malevolent forces in the community in several decades. It is said to have been 'retired' . and banjar solidarity became highly sensitized. It is only Banjar Pantle, the one banjar in because of its age and the great respect with which it is held. It is now the subject of Tarian with a majority from a single descent group that maintains the practice of the rit­ elaborate odalan ceremonies in the banjar temple built specially to house it. ual communal meal to the present, although Banjar Madya has toyed withreintroducing it 9. In the 'old-type' Balinese villages, where kinship continues to form the basis of local (I Mandera, 1990). Banjar Pande's past klian stressed the corporate aspect of patus contri­ organization, the distinction is not made between family and neighbourhood responsibility bution and shared meal: 'The foods given in reciprocity for labour assistance [meat and for mortuary ritual. Unless otherwise stated, the following discussion refers to South vegetables] from the person conducting the ceremony can be divided and carried home. Balinese villages where neighbourhood rather than kin-groups provide the organizational But the part that comes from patus [i.e. the rice] and represents banjar wealth, something basis of the desa adat. given by the banjar, cannot be_ divided.' (Pantle Yasa, 1982.) Banjar Pande's awig-awig 10. Demonic and deific forces are said to emanate from the material and spiritual specifically states that 'the banjar patus meal cannot be divided except for those unable to aspects respectivelyof the person on death (Howe, 1980: 229-30). attend' (Awig-awig Banjar Pantle: §21). In fact, in the makan jalan arrangement, the rice 11. Indeed, everywhere in Bali the least expensive form of secondary treatment, ngaben part of the patus contribution is neither given by banjar members nor received back by pranawa, does not involve actual exhumation and cremation of the remains, but a symbolic them in cooked form, but the raw and cooked forms cancel each other out (sapih), thereby release of body and spirit in which a small amount of earth replaces the bones. In old permitting the division of the ceremonial meat and vegetable parts of the meal contributed Balinese communities, ngaben may involve destruction, disposal, or reburial of effigies by the host. In very recent years some banjar have distributed the equivalent in raw meat rather than burning (Adatrechtbundels, 1924: 452-69; Korn, 1924: 468,; Supartha, (2 kilograms of pork per household) at a later date in order to furthereconomize on time 1978: 46; Sirnpen, 1986). According to the awig-awig of Desa Bebandem in Karangasem, involved in preparation of the ritual meal. two different forms of ngaben are practised by separate groups within that one desa 14. The period chosen covers ten Balinese months totalling 350 days, the nearest prac­ (Korn Coll. 162/580). See also Nakamura's (1985) interesting study of the coexistence of ticable equivalent to a full calendar year. burial and cremation practices by different hamlets within the desa adat of Selat, also in 15. Non-ritual expenditure that year covered taxes on banjar rice land, electricity, Karangasem. He argues for a historical diffusion explanation, asserting that burial prac­ honorariums to members hired to keep the public area swept, refreshments for visiting tices are maintained by the original inhabitants of the desa adat, while cremation is health workers, and other officials. The remaining non-ritual expenditure included practised in the hamlets in which aristocrats claiming Majapahit origins reside. Whatever Rp 90,000 for the banjars participation that year in the province-wide desa competition. 166 ADA T AND DINAS 16. The cash equivalent of contributions in kind is my calculation, based on an average of prices in the Denpasar market listed in theBali Post for 9 March, 10 June, 9 September, and 2 December 1978. 17. Poffenberger and Zurbuchen (1980) provide an estimate of average monthly income at that time of Rp 10,000-20,000 per month for low-income households and Rp 30,000-80,000 for middle-income civil servants and hotel industry jobs, but they do not indicate the actual income of the peasant family whose ritual expenditures they tabulated. 6 18. The principle of corporate unity demands that the banjar adat as a whole participate in ngaben, whether or not that amount of assistance is of any practical use. Unless there are Swadaya Banjar: a number of families carrying out the ceremony among whom banjar labour and its reciprocation could be divided, the deployment and feeding of 250 members in a banjar Self-help Community Development the size of Madya, for example, is beyond the means of ordinary families. This is un­ doubtedly one of theprimary reasons for banjar fission beyond a hundred or so members, althougha strong sense of identity will often lead the membership to resist this tendency as has been the case in Banjar Madya to date. 19. In 1963, a form of collective cremation was adopted by several banjar in Tarian prior to the Bali-wide state ceremony, Eka Dasa Rudra, when all the cemeteries on the island were supposed to be cleared so that the entire realm would be 'purified' for the BANJAR collective consumption goals continue to be strongly oriented centennial ceremony (Stuart-Fox, 1987). This was the simplest (nista) form of cremation towards the ritual sphere. At the same time, new social and economic known as ngaben pranawa, involving the burning of symbolic representations of the activities independently taken on by Balinese communities to these and remains, after which holy water (tirta pengerapuh) is sprinkled over the graveyard to release any deceased who had been forgotten or for various reasons left uncremated. Then other ends have expanded significantly in the period since Indonesian the graveyards could be levelled. In most of the banjar in Tarian the 1963 cremations were independence. Traditionally, banjar built and maintained community only collective in the sense that the entire ceremony was conducted in the cemetery-with facilities such as meeting halls, market areas, and access roads. Today, a single Brahmana priest, accompanying gong, and requisite wayang lemah (ritual puppet tourist performing groups, transport companies, savings and loan soci­ performance without a screen) paid for jointly by participants.But not all the offerings and eties, movie theatres, and co-operatives are established for the direct preparatory activity were pooled as in a fully collectivecremation (ngaben ngempiuk). Even satisfaction of members' needs or to raise money for collectively deter­ in several of the banjar which did introduce the collective practice in 1985 and 1986, 1 adjustments to accommodategentry prevented it in the view of some from being regarded mined ritual and social purposes. This chapter concerns some of the as 'truly' collective (Cok Anom, 1986; I Mandera, 1987; I Suta, 1987). more typical forms of economic activity conducted by banjar and the 20. Among the most outspoken supporters was the bendesa of Tarian, who happened to collective goals towards which they labour. These examples further be a member of this banjar. His promotion of the collective cremation practice, despite his underscore the difficulty of distinguishing ends from means in analysing gentry background, was atypical. As a descendant of a disenfranchised branch of the tradi­ tional ruler, he had from his youth become politically active and highly committed to the collective activity, and the impropriety of reducing the treatment of religious reforms of the Parisada Hindu Dharma. 'development' to any narrowly economic dimension. 21. Until the last three days before the ceremony when food preparation begins, work is limited to a few hours on each occasion. From nguangun, the rousing of the corpse and spirit of the deceased, work begins before dawn and carries on through most of the day, Public Construction: Bale Banjar adding another 30 or so hours to banjar labour, regardless of which form the ceremony takes. If architectural prominence is an indication of the relative social signi­ 22. One practice of the modern West which was both incomprehensible and unpalat­ ficance of the institutions these buildings house, the imposing size and able to every Balinese with whom I discussed the subject was the fact thatwe pay strangers graceful lines of the open meeting hall, bale banjar� and signal pavilion, to prepare and bury our dead. This is something for which only kin and neighbours-as-kin bale kulkul, in modern Balinese villages reflect their ascendance over the (nyama banjar) could bear responsibility. palaces, now crumbling or converted to tourist accommodation. Bale 23. Commenting on the enthusiasm with which preparatory work for the collective cremation in Banjar Madya was being conducted, a member remarked, 'When it comes to banjar are monuments to local pride and the seka value of corporate gotong royong for the government, we might sometimes be slack, pay a fine and shirk it. It's identity. At the same time, these structures sometimes bear the scars of not all that important. But that is unthinkable when it comes to adat ... if someone dies, or internal division and reveal histories which contradict the ideal unity we ngaben serempak [collectively]-we are as one.' (I Sopir, 1986.) This is not to imply that theyare supposed to represent. When serious factional divisions arise, as Balinese do not ever find adat obligations burdensome. The financial outlays and labour in the Siang case, it is not uncommon that they are projected on to dis­ commitments increasingly have to compete with alternative uses of labour and resources. putes over the bale banjar. After the Banjar Satria conflict in Siang was eventually settled, the krama decided to build a new meeting house at a different site. The partially constructed bale banjar which was at the centre of the 4-year-long dispute was left standing as a reminder of the traumatic consequences of internal factionalism. The bale banjar of Banjar Titih in downtown Denpasar is divided into three separate parts, 168 ADA T AND DINAS SWADAYA BANJAR: SELF-HELP COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 169 kulkul, with three three shrines, and different roof levels, marking the Public Construction: Schools fission of that hamlet twice in the last 50 years (Gst Kompiang, 1984). The state of the bale banjar is a measure of community solidarity; and While the focus on banjar public buildings represented an elaborated the periodic investmentin renovating them seems to have less to do with stress on an old institution, the energy devoted to school construction their functional adequacy than with the satisfaction of needs of a more after the revolution was a thoroughly new commitment. During the representational nature. 1950s and 1960s, before the initiation of the presidential grant scheme Prior to the Indonesian revolution, bale banjar were more often than for expanding the primary school system (Inpres-SD), much of the col­ not fairly simple constructions, built of earth, bamboo, and thatch. But lective effort of local communities was devoted to opening up to the after independence, and well before tourism and agricultural commer­ general population educational opportunities which had previously been cialization raised incomes in many parts of rural Bali, significant available only to the elite. Informal banjar-based educational pro­ resources were being poured into the construction of banjar assembly grammes in adult literacy (PBH: Pemberantasan Buta Huruf) were halls and signal pavilions, now using brick and concrete, tiles and carved offered by volunteer teachers (see Grader, 1951) and a broad network wooden beams. As symbols of corporate identity, the bale banjar and of primary schools was constructed across the island at local initiative.In bale kulkul are objects of a considerable degree of inter-community ri­ Tarian two primary schools were built in 1954 and 1964 to serve the valry and are among the most impressive constructions to be found on village through cash levies and community labour. In Desa Mas, which theBalinese landscape. built four primary schools during these years, funds were raised by tax­ The building and periodic renovation of banjar assembly halls typic­ ing every landholder in the village one bundle ( teneh) of padi for every ally account for the most substantial investments by these hamlet com­ 0.25 hectare piece of sawah owned (about 30 kilograms or 4 per cent of munities today. The Bali Post regularly reports the construction of yield) and one coconut for every tree owned. C. Geertz (1963: 87) banjar buildings costing millions of rupiah and built entirely from mem­ describes the impressive efforts of an isolated community in Tabanan bers' own labour and resources. These articles invariably celebrate the whose assembly decided they 'lacked two items which had become of nationally touted Indonesian values of mutual aid (gotong royong) and altogether crucial importance in post-Revolutionary "modern" Bali: self-help (swadaya) epitomized in local public building programmes: good transportation facilities to the town of Tabanan, and an elementary school'. That hamlet committed itself to playing its role in modernizing Withthe greatest spirit of co-operation (kerja sama) and mutualassistance (kego­ Indonesia by establishing a transport line and building a school, using tongroyongan), the people of Banjar Kertha Bhuwana Kaja [East Den­ the income from one to support the other. It sold its rice land to pur­ pasar] ... built their bale banjar entirely by communityself help (swadaya murni masyarakat). Despite the limited means of this quite poor hamlet, its bale banjar chase a second-hand bus which ran a daily round trip to the regional is finally now ready to be used formembers ' activities.... [It] was built over four capital. The profits from the bus-line in turn were devoted to building years by swadaya murni masyarakat, costing around Rp 10 million.Along with the school and paying teachers' salaries (C. Geertz, 1963: 87-8). contributing their own gotong royong labour, some 200 banjar members paid dues in monthly installments which covered the additional costs of purchasing (Bali Post, land for an access way and the installation of electricity and water. Funding Sources: Collective Harvesting 11 September 1984.) Before tourism and agricultural modernization transformed the local banjar adat Banjar Gede, one of the in Desa Akah, Klungkung with a total of economy, cash was scarce. 130 KK [household heads] is busy building a multi-purpose bale banjar to replace its old one. Gotong royong labour is carried out in rotation by the mem­ In those times it was a headache to cover the costs of even the macaru rituals, bership assisting thetradesman who is also fromthat banjar. Its cost is estimated not to mention embarrassing.There were those who simply didn't have cash, at Rp 15 million, accumulated in stages by obligatory monthly levies on mem­ especially ifit was beforeharvest. You had to take pity. As manyas ninefamilies bers and additional voluntary contributions from those who could.afford them. out of the banjar might be unable to pay the10 rupiah levy.Naturally we had to (Bali Post, 12 August 1984.) make up the difference. So, I figured, the banjar must have some capital.If not, theseproblems wouldkill us. Today we have over a millionand a half rupiah [in Aside from its adat function as a place for community meetings and banjar funds] circulating at interest.' (I Suta, 1985.) ritual preparation, the bale banjar offers social space for informal gather­ ing and a place where musical instruments, radio, television, and sports For this reason and because collective work had a certain intrinsic social equipment owned by the banjar can be enjoyed. The area adjoining the value, well into the 1970s contributions for collective purposes were nor­ bale banjar is commonly used to provide market space and food stalls mally in kind and in labour-service. normally run by thewomen of the banjar. The assembly hall may double Income for major projects in those days was commonly generated as a movie theatre, performance venue, or art market for public income through banjar harvesting (banjar manyz). This was the one area of eco­ generation in addition to its normal public functions. nomic activity where the otherwise separate agricultural and residential 170 ADA T AND DINAS SWADAYA BANJAR: SELF-HELP COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 171 spheres did intersect. Banjar have traditionally had the prerogative of from contributing labour (GstKanti, 1983; I Suta 1985). The harvesting income collectively harvesting fields owned or worked by their members for a in Banjar Tegeh, as in other banjar in Tarian in the 1950s and 1960s, customary 10 per cent of the grain cut. The banjar daim on harvesting was used for constructing their bale banjar. The income was also used to rights overrides those of individuals or work-groups (seka manyz) who buy 0.25 hectare of rice land, to pay desa school-building fees for banjar would otherwise carry out this task. Because of the competing interests children and to cover some of the ritual costs which were particularly of banjar members as landowners, tenants, or members of harvesting heavy in this community because, as a single banjar/ des a adat, its small seka who might stand to lose personal income as a result, collective har­ membership had sole responsibility for supporting all three Kahyangan vesting was generally adopted only when large amounts of money were Tiga temples. needed for specific purposes. Until the 1970s, most banjar in Tarian For a number of reasons collective harvesting is no longer practised in harvested collectively whenever they had to raise money for rebuilding Tarian and surrounding areas. Whenever the banjar harvested collect­ their bale banjar or for some major ritual commitment. ively it was at the expense of the loss of private income to those of its Table 6.1 summarizes harvest income for Banjar Tegeh which still members who could otherwise hire out their labour through harvesting has records of its harvesting activities for the period 1966-70, during seka or for wages. This was one instance where household needs were which it was exceptionally active. likely to conflict with collective consumption interests. Hobart (1979: Each household contributed the labour of one member, male or 562-6) gives a detailed account of a debate among the krama banjar in 2 female. Banjar pengempi households, while only obliged to pay half of Pisangkaja concerning whether the banjar would continue to harvest col­ any cash levy, have full labour-service responsibilities and so particip­ lectively beyond the two seasons just completed. There apparently had ated in collective harvesting on the same basis as pengarep members, to been no question at earlier stages of the priority of banjar needs; but the banjar's greater advantage. At the height of harvesting activity in now that the purpose of renovating banjar public buildings had been 1967-8, when they were anxious to complete the bale banjar, the youth served, the option of accumulating more capital for indefinite purposes club also joined in. Typically work began at 6 a.m. and continued until (with the potential that posed for misappropriation) had to be weighed 10 a.m., then resuming from 2 p.m. to 5 p.m. During that timethe ban­ against the private needs of members. Speakers in support of continua­ jar team could harvest as much as 1 hectare (r Suta, 1985). Late arrival, tion argued for a larger cash fund which would enable rotating credit measured by the time it took water to drip through a hole at the base of loans to members and spoke of the intrinsic value of collective work: an empty coconut shell (jangz), incurred a fine. Only the village temple 'Co-operative work made the ward [banjar] like a single family. How priest (pemangku) was free from the obligation to perform harvest work, could they be united if they did not work together?' '[W]as it not better his duty being to arrange the offerings necessary to the success of the to work for the community than for money?' (Hobart, 1979: 563.) The project. No other members, including gentry families, were exempted opposed side aired rumours of favouritism and fiscal abuse by banjar leaders and called for consideration of the needs of poorer members TABLE 6.1 who were constrainedfrom pursuing their own livelihoods. From a com­ Banjar Tegeh: Income from Collective Harvesting, 1966-1970 bination of healthy scepticism, conflicting household income needs, and lack of a clear necessity for more funds, the final consensus was to cease Cash Income banjar harvesting. Labour Time HarvestShare Hobart argues that large work-groups are in any case less efficient and Year (banjar-hours) (kggabah) (Rp) (US$) productive than smaller specialized work-teams (seka manyz). He points to indigenous theory which expli�itly sets social against economic gain­ 1966 ±317 13,590 21,031 90 'the more people and the more convivial the system of labour used, the 1967 ±459 19,660 95,660 407 lower the harvest' (Hobart, 1979: 243). His observations in Pisangkaja 719 1968 ±404 17,310 234,300 indicate that the amount of grain harvested dropped by as much as one­ 1969 ±197 8,460 89,900 276 third when large groups were involved (Hobart, 1979: 242-3). But 1970 ±153 6,540 87,900 233 while lower amounts of grain harvested by banjar represent a loss to the Source: Based on Banjar Tegeh, Cash-books, 1966-70. owner or tenant and undoubted inefficiency per unit of labour-time Notes: Quantities listed under 'harvest share' represent the banjar's customary 1/10 share of invested, this did not necessarily mean lower production levels or a real the total amount harvested during that year. Entries in the cash-book were in only loss of income to the community as a whole, since harvested fields were roughly standardized measures of karung or ikat, and have been converted here to kilo­ customarily open to anyone for a second harvest stage by gleaning grams of unhulled rice (gabah) at rates of 100 kglkarung and 30 kg/ikat. Estimates of banjar hours worked are approximate only. Average output on those occasions when (munuh). It was usually women and children from the poorest house­ banjar work-schedules were included in the notebook provided the base figure used for holds who supplemented family income in this extremely labour­ extrapolating labour-timefrom harvest entries. intensive way, keeping the whole of whatever they collected. Members of 172 ADA T AND DINAS SWADAYA BANJAR: SELF-HELP COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 173 the household in which I lived recalled hard years when their family of of the kecak was regarded by everyone I spoke with as predominately seven children depended on gleaning to survive (r Geriya, 1982; Ni Rama, 1982). social. A primary schoolteacher, who was one of the initiators, described From this perspective, harvesting by large groups, of which the banjar its origins: manyi practice is one variation, cannot be dissociated from the redistrib­ In the beginning we had no other purpose than to utive aspects of work forms which have the effect of giving access to maintain solidarity, to keep the people of Banjar Madya united. In 1965 when 'G 30 S' occurred, all of income to broader sections of the community. Presumably the less Indonesia was in turmoil. We thought by occupying ourselves with artistic4 'efficient' the banjar or ngajakan 'invitees' (the type of large-group agri­ activity the whole banjar would feel united. That was the primary purpose. cultural labour to which Hobart refers), the more rice would be left for Later, it became a business, bringing income to the banjar, but that was sec­ resource-poor villagers to harvest through traditional gleaning rights. ondary. (I Netra, 1983.) The banjar was not the only corporate group that could call on har­ vest labour from its members, although it had prior rights to do so. The kecak was chosen because it required a large chorus that could Gusti Kanti recalled harvesting in the 1950s to raise money for the accommodate the whole of the then 200-strong banjar membership and music and barong performing seka to which he belonged, as well as for because it did not require expensive musical instruments or costumes. his banjar. In that period he guessed he spent an average of 10 days in a The exorcistic tenor of the kecak could not have been more appropriate month working without recompense for either seka or banjar. Although to the turbulent atmosphere in which it was formed. he said he experienced intense financial pressure as a result of having to Everywhere there was gossip and slander, friends killing friends. At that time balance these against other obligations, such as those towards the master you didn't know who was friend and who was enemy. Here everyone met in painter to whom he was apprenticed and towards his family, it did not the bale banjar. You could say it was almost obligatory-anyone who wasn't pre­ result in his withdrawalfrom voluntary-group membership (GstKanti,1983). sent would be embarrassed or frightened. There was discussion and cautioning: Collective harvesting by banjar was a labour-intensive means of 'Look what is happening there and there. We must stick together. We 5 kecak. raising public funds. The limited availability of cash and alternative must avoid turning on each other.' Out of that grew the idea of the employment options were an important but incomplete explanation for (I Netra, 1983.) investing so much time in generating income for corporate purposes. With the same force of obligation attached to normal civic duties to The appreciation of collective labour as a social activity is reflected in attend meetings and perform ayahan services, every household in the the proverb cited by Hobart and came up often in villagers' reminis­ banjar contributed one of its members to the large chorus required for cences of past banjar activity. The klian of Banjar Tegeh commented on the kecak. The very first performance in December 1965 was for the the pleasure taken in shared work during banjar harvesting: 'The atmos­ temple anniversary at the Pura Dalem. The following year, when the phere was wonderful-we sang; there was banter. What a shame there's political situation began to settle and a trickle of tourists returned to no recording of it. When we would harvest a ricefield as a whole the island, the banjar decided to turn the activityinto a commercial ven­ 3 banjar-hebat (exciting)!' (r Suta, 1985.) Since the 1960s, however, the ture. They enlisted the assistance of renowned dance teachers from relative availability of cash as opposed to labour-time has been more or Bona and Batuan, practising several hours a day to perfect their tech­ less reversed. Collective harvesting in Tarian has been entirely replaced niques. The first tourist engagement took place in August 1966, for by less labour-intensive and relatively more remunerative forms of which the banjar received the minuscule sum of Rp 300 (US$ l .28). In income generation. 1971 it experimented with adding Sanghyang performances to the repertoire since the banjar had traditionally performed this trance ritual during periods of epidemic. The Sanghyang was staged weekly at the Funding Sources: Tourist Performances Hotel Bali Beach for fees of Rp 7,000 (US$16.87) for each perform­ The tourist industry opened up a new means of subsidy to corporate ance, but was withdrawn after a year when a government ban was intro­ groups in Bali. The history of Banjar Madya's performing troupe offers duced on art forms classified as sacred ( wali).6 an interesting example of the complex intersection of 'traditional' and The treasurer of Banjar Madya kept meticulous records of every 'modern' goals of corporate activity. Formed initially to hold the com­ engagement, by whom each was commissioned, how much was received munity together at the height of the explosive political events of 1965 and how it was spent. Table 6.2 summarizes this information for each (r Mandera, 1982; Cok Anom, 1983; I Nesa, 1983), it eventually became one of the year in which the kecak troupe operated. Between 1966 and 1981 the most popular groups in Bali performing the spectacular kecak dance­ Banjar Madya troupe performed over a thousand times, initially receiv­ drama for tourists. Photographs of the Tarian troupe graced the cover ing fees equivalent to only a few US dollars for each performance.Later, and centrefold of National Geographic and Life magazines within a few as its reputation grew, the banjar was able to command somewhat more years of its founding. substantial fees of Rp 10,000-20,000 (US$24-48), although for a The original purpose and most important outcome of the formation smaller number of engagements. 174 ADA T AND DINAS SWADAYA BANJAR: SELF-HELP COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 175 TABLE 6.2 TABLE 6.3 Banjar Madya: Income fromKecak Performances, 1966-1981 Ratio of Income to Labour-timefor Harvesting (BanjarTegeh) and Tourist Performances (Banjar Madya), 1966 and 1970 Average Fee Equivalent Number of per Performance Total Income Value 1966 Year Performances (Rp) (Rp) (US$) harvest income _ Rp 21,031 BanJar . T ege h = Rp 0 78 per worker-hour 1966a 29 519 15,050 64 : labour-time 317 X 85 . 1967a 92 900 82,800 352 1968a 110 4,000 440,000 1,350 . kecak income Rp 15,050 BanJar Ma d a = = Rp 1.3 per worker-hour 1969 137 4,299 589,000 1,807 y : labour-time 29 X 2 X 200 1970 165 5,018 828,000 2,190 1971 218 5,697 1,242,000 2,993 1970 1972 102 7,902 806,000 1,942 1973 80 5,513 441,000 1,063 . harvestincome Rp 87,900 BanJar Tegeh . = = Rp 6.8 per worker-hour 1974 40 10,200 408,000 983 : 1 a b our-tnne 153 X 85 1975• 26 11,615 302,000 728 1976 8 13,125 105,000 253 . kecak income Rp 828,000 BanJar Ma d a = = Rp 12.5 per worker-hour 1977 0 0 0 0 y : labour-time 165 X 2 X 200 1978 0 0 0 0 1979 1 15,000 15,000 24 Note: Total hours worked are calculated as follows: Banjar Tegeh harvesting = banjar­ 1980 7 44,285 310,000 496 hours X 85 banjar workers; Banjar Madya kecak = number of performances X 2 hours 1981 1 50,000 50,000 78 each performance X 200 banjar workers.

Sources: Based on Banjar Madya, K.ecakNotebook, 1966-81; Cash-books, 1968-81. •Total income figures for the years 1966-8 and 1975 are estimates based on average fees ury. This income was used to construct an impressive set of community for those performances for which income entries were made in the kecak notebook. A sep­ buildings (see Plate 15), to buy rice land, and to subsidize banjar ritual arate set of banjar cash-books, kept by the banjar treasurer from 1968 included complete responsibilities, primarily the large 6-monthly odalan ceremonies for kecak details of income and expenditures related to performances, except for a section of Ratu Gede, the legendary and magically powerful Barong which had the 1975 book which had been lost. been taken over from Puri Tarian a generation before. Eventually, however, Banjar Madya's troupe became a casualty of the Rough calculations of the total labour-time involved in these activities changing nature of tourism. Package tour operators could increase indicate that even the low fees received by Banjar Madya for perform­ profits and cut transport costs by concentrating their performance com­ ances in 1966 and 1970 were favourableby a ratio of almost two to one missions on troupes closer to beach resorts. '[Guides] manipulated us in in comparison with income available from the harvesting activity taken the same way they did the art shops, playing one offagainst the other, to on by Banjar Tegeh in the same years. reduce performance fees and increase their own commissions.' Banjar harvest income was very low compared to prevailing wage (INesa, 1983.) Banjar meeting notes show difficulties cropping up as early rates and cost of living. Rice cost Rp 3/kg in 1966 and Rp 13- 40/kg in as 1973: '.. . struggle with travel bureau to get performances more often. 1970 and semi-skilled labour in 1970 would bring Rp 150 per day for Given that we face sluggish times, the dancers asked that their honorar­ 8-10 hours' labour. Construction materials were relatively inexpensive, iums be reduced to Rp 25, and no soap money.' (Banjar Madya, however. 'We could buy a cubic metre of wood with the equivalent of a Assembly Notebook, 27/12/73.) Progressively, resistance to travel day's harvesting by the banjar. At the time I bought a cubic [metre] of agents' attempts to force down contract fees and the pressure of compe­ extremely good wood for Rp 3,000. Today it would be impossible from tition from new performing groups closer to the mass-tourist locales of the proceeds of harvesting. I'd guess 10 days' harvesting wouldn't buy Kuta and Sanur resulted in a declining number of commissions. By that much wood now.' (I Suta, 1985.) 7 1981 the Banjar Madya kecak was finally 'let rest', from a combination Other than 'soap money' for the upkeep of performers' costumes and of economic factors, loss of trained female dancers who left the village to a small honorarium paid to the young female dancers (because their marry or attend upper secondary school, and sheer 'boredom' after involvement was not under the normal obligations of labour service to 16 years of activity (INesa, 1983; I Suteja, 1983). By then Banjar Madya had the banjar as was the case for adult members of the krama), all receipts substantial assets to show for its efforts. Table 6.4 lists the major from Banjar Madya's kecak performance went into the common treas- acquisitions and building projects taken on during this period. 176 ADA T AND DINAS SWADAYA BANJAR: SELF-HELP COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 177 TABLE 6.4 the kecak to their extraordinary collective enthusiasm. 'Guides insisted Banjar Madya: Major Expenditures, 1969-1981 on commissioning our troupe because it was exceptional-it had spirit that came from the pleasure we took in working together.' (I Nesa, 1983.) Total Expenditure Conversely, intensified banJar solidarity was attributed to shared activity. banJar Year Project Rp US$ 'I think doing this together for so long really made this tightlyknit (terikat). Farmers would work the fields in the morning, come home and 1969-72 bale banjar construction 1,700,000 4,497 rest, and then go out in the evening to perform-sometimes twice in a 1971 purchase rice land 0.24 ha 187,500 452 day. Often extras would go along for the fun of it.' (IMandera, 1982.) 1971 purchase rice land 0.27 ha 205,000 494 The buildings they constructed were expressions of the value of 1975 bale banja1"-omamental work 162,000 390 collectivity and shared work. To give some indication of the labour­ 1976 electricity installation 295,660 712 intensive commitments embodied in these community facilities-cum 1978 bale kulkul construction 2,480,160 3,968 collective symbols, the most substantial of Banjar Madya's expenditures, 1980 Ratu Gede shrine 1,193,255 1,909 for construction of the new bale banJar, represented the accumulated 1980 Ratu Gede consecration ceremony 586,450 938 income from some 400 performances during the preceding years 149 1980 road upgrading 93,150 (Banjar Madya, Cash-books, 1968-86; Kecak Notebook, 1968-81). 1980 office/storeroom 104,650 167 1,345,000 2,102 This does not take account of the large but unrecorded number of man­ 1980-1 embankments-all side-roads gotong royong 1981 tempeken meetingpavilions 1,000,000 1,555 hours of labour involved in the construction itself. Although the original kecak ceased performing in 1981, banJar pride in Sources: Based on Banjar Madya, List of Self-funded CommunityWorks, 1968-81; Cash­ corporate activity continued to be evidenced in the organization of col­ books, 1968-81. lective cremations in Banjar Madya in 1986 and 1988, and in a renewed commitment to the performing arts in 1987, when the assembly agreed The large bale banJar which can accommodate Banjar Madya's cur­ to commission the construction of a gamelan at the behest of the banJar rent membership of 250 at public meetings and a beautifully carved bale youth group.11 In 1991 the kecak was suddenly revived. Discussion at kulkul, decorated with tiles, fine black thatching normally reserved for the monthlybanJar assembly had turned to the need for major repairs to temples, and a Dutch colonial lantern, are the focal points of (mostly the bale banJar at some point in the future. The passing suggestion of male) 8 socializing in the hamlet. Elderly men rest there in the heat of the one of the members that they might consider starting up the kecak again day, children play ping-pong after school, and adults congregate in large to raise the needed funds struck spontaneous assent and the 250-strong numbers under the bale banJar and bale kulkul to gossip and play chess troupe was again performing regularly, weekly performances over the in the evening. In 1980 a new shrine to house Ratu Gede was built. Two year bringing in Rp 1 7 million to banJar coffers. Public enthusiasm was pieces of sawah had been purchased in 1971. They are tenanted to two striking. Even several members residing in Denpasar, dispensed (naub) landless banJar members with two-thirds9 of the harvest going to the for this reason from service obligations to the banfar for an annual fee, banJar for use at the odalan ceremony for Ratu Gede. returned on Thursday evenings to take part in the performance The bale banJar and rice land were paid for entirely with theproceeds (Cok Dalem, 1991; Dw Dharma, 1991). Very clearly in this case of modern eco­ of kecak performances. In the period of relatively high income nomic activity hooked into the tourist trade, the collective consumption (1968-75), kecak money covered routine maintenance costs as well as of broadly defined social, aesthetic, and religious 'goods' were para­ those for oda"/a,n and macaru ceremonies, so that no funds had to be con­ mount objectives of banfar income generation and labour commitment. tributed by banJar members. As in Banjar Tegeh, the village school­ construction cess levied by the administrative desa on all families with primary schoolchildren came out of Banjar Madya's treasury. A public Loan Funds radio was purchased for evening entertainment in the bale banJar, and coffee and snack stalls were built adjoining it. In subsequent years, as Agriculture and handicrafts on which most of the population of Desa income from the kecak engagements declined, it had to be supplemented Tarian depend provide irregular incomes and there is· great need of by other means of fund-raising-cock-fights, 10 levies, lotteries, and short-term credit for petty-trading capital, family ritual, school fees, and 'bars' (a series of evenings of food and entertainment organized in con­ unexpected medical costs. The lending of accumulated banJar cash at junction with the banJar youth clubs, usually during the Galungan­ interest to members provides an important source of small-scale credit Kuningan festival period). while raising income to cover routine banfar expenses. The practice also No one in Banjar Madya measured the value of their venture into the has the advantage of keeping the contents of the banJar treasury under tourist trade in material terms alone. Participants credited the success of public scrutiny. 178 ADA T AND DINAS SWADAYA BANJAR: SELF-HELP COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 179 Rates of interest among banjar vary according to the size of their cash under a year. Most borrowers in Madya held on to the principal, even fund and level of routine expenditure. In the late 1980s banjar in Tarian though they would have paid as much in monthly interest over the loaned their funds at between 1 and 5 per cent per 35-day (wuku) month. 2-year period at 5 per cent as the amount initially borrowed. There was These rates were in most cases not as low as interest on government­ never a lack of demand in any of the banjar in Tarian to take up cash subsidized concessional loans (KIK/KMKP or Bimas) of 1-1.25 per made available for loan, so the practice clearly served a need for small­ cent a month, schemes tied to specified small business and agricultural scale credit which was not being met from other sources. purposes to which there was restricted access. But banjar interest rates Banjar Sangan, the smallest and one of the poorest banjar in Tarian, were considerably better than those rates available in the illegal but cleverly schemed to establish its loan fund by drawing on members' out­ prevalent private moneylending sector of 10 per cent a month, 12 and side connections for acquiring the capital it needed. The banjar bor­ interest rates in many banjar compared favourably with standard bank rowed concessional funds under the names of two members who had rates of 2-3 per cent per calendar month on loans to individuals bor­ access to low-interest schemes through their salaried civil service posi­ rowing with collateral. tions in Denpasar. The half-million rupiah fund was loaned to members Loan conditions also vary with the size of the treasury and banjar at 2 per cent monthly-1 per cent being used to repay interest on the needs. In Banjar Tegeh where the cash fund of Rp 1.8 million is large in concessional loan and the other 1 per cent to create the capital base for relation to banjar size, there are few restrictions on the amount or period the banjar's own independent loan pool. After a substantial enough for which the loans are available. At 6-monthly intervals the principal internal fund had been established from this and other sources, and the must be brought to the assembly 'to be seen' and reloaned to members. loan repaid in 1984, the interest rate was dropped to 1.5 per cent, but In banjar where the treasury is small, fixed amounts are loaned to mem­ raised again to 2 per cent the following year because inflation was bers in order of request. Consideration may be given to need when eroding the capital value of the fund while banjar maintenance costs demand for loans exceeds availability of funds as it often does. which interest payments had to cover were rising. Banjar Kalih, with Ordinarily only interest is paid at monthly meetings. This is used to alternative income sources from public film showings, was able to cover routine banjar accounts and the surplus, if any, is then loaned out reduce interest on its rotating credit fund to 1 per cent in 1990. to new applicants. Borrowers repay the principal in a lump sum when Stability of banjar membership is an important consideration in the available or whenever major banjar expenditures demand that outstand­ widespread and successful circulation of credit in Balinese communities. ing loans be recalled. Often, however, the krama will opt to use a special Failure to repay banjar loans brings heavy penalties under local custom­ levy for such purposes rather than withdraw credit from circulation, ary law. Awig-awig specify that banjar have the right to forcibly seize which gives some indication of the importance attached to these loan (rampag) personal property to the value of unpaid debts. Banjar loan funds. funds are consequently very secure. I know of only one instance of near I questioned whether poorer members were not bearing a dispropor­ default in any of the Tarian banjar. The stubborn failure of the member tionate burden of banjar maintenance when interest payments on circu­ concerned to repay his debt precipitated a major debate at the assembly lating banjar cash were the main source of local funds, and especially in Banjar Kalih over whether confiscation or expulsion was the more where relatively high rates were involved. The klian of Banjar Sangan appropriate sanction in his case. But by the time the prescribed third and Banjar Madya indicated their banjar intended eventually to lower and final warning was to be issued by the krama, the debt had been set­ rates of interest, but would have to increase their capital base consider­ tled. ably before it would be possible to do so. Banjar Madya's 5 per cent rate The institutional strength and cultural importance of the banjar also was rationalized on the grounds of heavy expenses for rituals and main­ indirectly facilitates other rotating credit associations (arisan) which tenance when the kecak was no longer operating. The constant level of operate independently within banjar boundaries among women's, youth, demand and broad distribution of these loans suggests that even at such and neighbourhood groups. Although formal banjar sanctions cannot be relatively high rates, banjar credit served mutually beneficial functions. applied beyond the immediate sphere of the krama's own activities, the Banjar Madya's records indicate that its loans are reasonably well dis­ social interdependence and residential stability fostered by this institu­ tributed across lower- and middle-income groups within the hamlet. In tional base act as a qualitative indemnity against default, indirectly Banjar Madya Dangin, 61 of the 119 members held loans ranging from underwriting the circulation of credit in the village. Its importance for Rp 1,000 to Rp 14,000 during 1983-4. Gentry were also represented the security of government concessional loan schemes in Bali is widely among borrowers of both small and large amounts. Most surprising was recognized. A research report of the Faculty of Economics at Udayana the fact that few members chose to repay the principal until the circu­ University refers to the 'moral strength' of the banjar system as the lating cash was recalled, even when these were very small sums, or the rationale for organizing its experimental grant project for local painters borrowers relatively prosperous. Only seven of the borrowers (generally around banjar-based groups. 'Balinese are more afraid of being thrown those of poorer socio-economic circumstances) repaid the principal in out of the banjarthan of foreclosure by a banli::.' (UNUD, 1980: 7.) 180 ADA T AND DINAS SWADAYA BANJAR: SELF-HELP COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 181 According to the head of the KIK/KMKP division at the Denpasar During the first year of weekly performances, all income went to branch of Bank Negara Indonesia, the nature of banjar membership was cover debts incurred in setting up the group. Subsequently the banjar one of the reasons that his bank was fairly liberal in its loan assessment assembly decided that performers should begin to receive some com­ practices (r Dira, 1982). Banjar officials provided the character references pensation. In future 'pocket money' of Rp 500 (then 30 US cents) that were the principal eligibility criteria for the government's small busi­ would be paid to the seka members for each performance. The seka ness loan schemes (KIK/KMKP). 13 The bank officer in charge of con­ would handle its finances henceforth, turning over 20 per cent of pro­ cessional loans at the Bank Pembangunan Daerah, Gianyar, where ceeds to the banjar and paying banjar electricity bills, and retaining any 44 per cent of loans granted were under the KIK/KMKP scheme, also surplus for division among seka members at the end of the year (r Dasa, considered 'traditional foundations' of recipient groups as the major 1986). assurance of loan security. In fact, he said, his bank would waive Again, economic aspirations form only part of the equation. Aesthetic, requirements for security beyond the capital goods or equipment pur­ social, and religious objectives were also motivating factors. In the opin­ chased with loan funds (which technically should make up only 50 per ion of its music teacher, banjar sponsorship gave a special character to cent of collateral), where banjar-sponsored seka were formed (r Wicana, the seka. When I asked his opinion of its development and sound qual­ 1982). Reportedly less than 5 per cent of debtors were in arrears in Bali, a ity, he remarked: 'It's still young, still "stiff" sounding; but because it figure much lower than the Indonesia-wide default rate according to the belongs to the banjar, it's got great spirit.' (r Lebah, 1984.) Public appreci­ loan officer for Bank Negara Indonesia (IDira, 1984).14 In this respect ban­ ation was evident in the displacement of the banjar television from its jar organization itself constitutes social collateral for groups and indi­ previous position as focal point of evening entertainment. Instead, resi­ viduals who might otherwise not have access to official sources of dents gathered at the bale banjar and surrounding stalls to listen to prac­ concessional credit. Banjar as corporate entities were ironically, not eli­ tice sessions every evening. Their enthusiasm undoubtedly precipitated gible to borrow funds directly under these schemes. the renewed interest in performance in neighbouring Banjar Madya which the following year commissioned a yet more expensive set of gamelan instruments from descendants of the same craftsmen in Banjar-based Development Projects: Other Examples Tihingan that had struckthe gamelan for the Tarian Seka Gong after its Banjar are rarely involved so totally in the organization and performance triumphant return from Paris two generations before.15 aspects of artistic troupes as was Banjar Madya. More typical is the Banjar Tegeh began sponsoring a performing seka in 1971. Now with arrangement in Banjar Lagas, which recently purchased a gamelan and other sources of income, including interest on its substantial rotating established a performing seka under banjar auspices. Their decision to credit fund, it no longer takes a regular percentage of the seka's pro­ form the orchestra involved a substantial investment in instruments,cos­ ceeds. The seka makes large contributions when major expenses arise, tumes, modifications to the bale banjar, and in labour and materials to but otherwise serves the banjar primarily by performing at the 6-monthly reciprocate the services of professional music and dance teachers temple anniversaries in Tegeh's Kahyangan Tiga. In conjunction with a recruited from neighbouring Banjar Kalih. The banjar prevailed upon a hamlet-based seka, Tegeh also manages a rice mill granted by the gov­ resident military officer and an art-shop owner (the latter became an ernment in 1974. The operations of the mill are overseen by a commit­ active member of the orchestra) to loan the initial Rp 5 million tee of banjar and village temple officials, but are run on a day-to-day (US$4,400) needed to buy the set of gamelan instruments. The loan basis by the seka with profits (about Rp 50,000 monthly) divided equally was repaid, as usual without interest, over the next 2 years from the pro­ between seka, banjar, and temples. ceeds of performances and monthly levies on banjar members. Film showings have been an important source of income and of local Costumes and part of the gamelan costs were contributed by the two entertainment for Banjar Kalih since detachable plyboard walls were built donors. around its bale banjar so that it could double as a cinema. The managing Those banjar members who had musical experience or interest joined committee was originally composed of the three banjar assistants (petajuh) the seka, among them four members of the village-wide Seka Gong who were paid a small sum for taking on this role. Part of the purpose Tarian which has enjoyed an international reputation since the 1930s. If for starting the cinema business had been to provide some recompense any of these 'professionals' felt put upon by the social obligation to con­ for the otherwise unpaid public services of the petajuh and to eliminate tribute their services to the fledgeling group, it was never apparent. the necessity for periodic levies on members. Banjar members were Their participation in the practice sessions held every evening in the bale rostered to sell tickets and act as ushers, with free viewing in return. banjar was as enthusiastic as that of the novices. Daily practice pro­ Increased taxes on top of the already heavy distributors' fees (60 per ceeded foralmost a year before the group felt itself competent enough to cent of ticket sales) brought about a marked drop in income from film perform at village temple festivals and subsequently for small groups of showings by 1983. The banjar had earlier coped withwhat it regarded as tourists in its bale banjar. extortionate rental arrangements by under-reporting the actual number 182 ADA T AND DINAS SWADAYA BANJAR: SELF-HELP COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 183 of tickets sold. I was amazed to find these dutifully recorded in the ban­ month. Some of the proceeds were used to establish a co-operative gen­ jar notebooks as karcis gelap (secret tickets) and reported as such at eral store dealing in basic commodities. The co-operative buys in bulk monthly meetings. One of the petajuh justified this deception in the gen­ and retails these goods at an average of 5-10 per cent below local retail eral interest of the banjar which would otherwise lose out. Open book­ market prices. By 1987 the banjar industries had nine paid employees keeping within the banjar itself was not to be compromised, however. and an annual profit of Rp 26 million (increasing to Rp 56 million in Profits became increasingly unreliable due to competition from a similar 1991). enterprise in the nearby village and turnouts fluctuated depending on Profits have been used to renovate and expand the bale banjar which the popularity of films they received from distributors. Frustrated by now includes offices for the savings and loan association and a modern constant complications and irregular and declining income, members shop to accommodate the co-operative general store alongside the large became critical of the scheme and the assembly eventually decided to traditional open meeting space. The men and women of the banjar turn over the film business to a 12-member seka which until 1989 receive two uniform sets of clothing each year, one for adat and one for accepted the risks and profits and paid a fixed rental to the banjar for official purposes.A fund has been established to contribute assistance at use of the meeting house. the death of any member of the community. The family of the deceased Discussions over whether the banjar or seka should manage the cin­ receives a donation of 150 kilograms of rice and Rp 25,000. A portion ema revolved around the familiar issues of economic rationality versus of banjar industry profits has also been invested in new projects. The public interest which frequently arise in 'privatization' debates concern­ banjar recently purchased two water-scooters for rental to tourists and ing public-ownership policy in national government circles. Local critics built an open-air restaurant in 1988 next to the Bali Hyatt Hotel. The remarked that it was peculiar the seka was showing consistent profits savings and loan association had meanwhile negotiated to purchase when the banjar had not (r Geriya, 1985; I Puja, 1986; Ni Puri, 1986). Many banjar 46 are (0.46 hectare) of land belonging to local gentry on behalf of operate in conjunction with seka to provide paid employment to banjar members who did not own house land of their own. Each household was members, to relieve the administrative burden on hamlet leaders of man­ able to borrow Rp 4 million, the market price for 2 are, at 2.5 per cent aging banjar-sponsored enterprises, and to obviate opportunities for per month interest from the banjar savings and loan association, a rate misuse of public funds. The best means of serving public interest is a which compared favourably to the usual 3 per cent bank mortgage rate. matter of frequent debate and experimentation. In Banjar Kalih in 1989, under the leadership of a new klian banjar, the cinema business once again returned to banjar auspices-more profitably to date. The Desa and Self-help Development Banjar Pekandelan operates a small general goods co-operative store By contrast with the experiments in which banjar engaged, there has out of what had been the banjar office and storage room. It is well been a notable difference in the capacity of the administrative desa in stocked with school and household necessities and is the only general Tarian to generate popular commitment to development plans at this store in the vicinity of the banjar. In 1982 it was declaring an average single step remove from banjar level (see Appendices 3 and 4). Desa of only Rp 10,000 per month in profits, and was the object of public leaders had been discussing plans since 1980 to upgrade Tarian's criticism at a banjar meeting I attended because of poor management by savings and loan co-operative16 and build a large multi-purpose hall the member hired to run it. The klian defended the store on grounds (bale serba guna) which could serve as a village-wide indoor recreation that it kept prices on basic commodities in the area low, even if it did not facility and double in the evenings as a central venue where each of the return a handsome income to the banjar. It was in operation throughout dance troupes in Tarian could perform. Their ambitious plans included the period of my fieldwork, but never expanded significantly. converting the old, beautifully carved school building of colonial vintage These examples are the more notable in Tarian but do not exhaust into a museum for the performing arts and a village-owned gallery the range of economic enterprises which banjar there have adopted with which would be an alternative outlet for local artists and a source of varying degrees of success on their own or in conjunction with seka in income above and beyond the small annual village subsidy of their respective communities. Another striking example of a banjar­ Rp 1.25 million received from the government. The issue had been dis­ based development programme worthy of note comes from Banjar cussed at length at Desa Council meetings going back many years (Desa Semawang in Sanur. Semawang's approach is unusual by contrast with Council Minutes, 19/1/79, 31/10/80, 6/12/81, 30/5/82, 25/3/84, 17/2/85, the Tarian cases discussed here in the scale of its activities and its 4/8/85, 16/3/86, 22/6/86, 21/8/86, 23/11/86, 2/2/87). But desa leaders approach to expansion and diversification, largely modelled on the desa were reticent to take practical steps to accomplish it. Why was the ad­ programme to be discussed in the next chapter. Semawang began its ministrative desa so reluctant to borrow money via a bank, lean on art­ self-help efforts with a small savings and loan association, circulating shop owners to loan funds or post levies on the one thousand credit initially at 5 per cent interest, later dropped to 2.5 per cent per households in the village, as banjar frequently did? Hesitation arose as 184 ADA T AND DINAS SWADAYA BANJAR: SELF-HELP COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 185 much from lack of precedent and confidence at this institutional level, as commitment from the people when it's the desa,' a villager visiting the from concern about increased work loads and the risk of failure or pub­ office remarked in passing. In the end several of the prizes fortuitously lic criticism a major project would inevitably entail. Paradoxically, the fell to the des a which had been forced to take half the unsold tickets in its decision-making circle of the Desa Council comprised the same klian own name. The prizes were subsequently auctioned to bring in the banjar who had little difficulty exhorting their respective assemblies to equivalent value of the unsold tickets. Including funds from other make proportionallygreater commitments to their banjar. sources, the desa had raised a total of Rp 19 million by August 1987. On Occasionally banjar assemblies, no more inclined to tax themselves my brief returns in 1988 and 1989, the first stages of construction had unnecessarily, would go well beyond proposed commitments when pop­ been completed. Kiosks were being leased in advance to provide further ular projects were involved. This occurred in Banjar Lagas which had funds. But doubts remained about how and when the project would just recently paid off the cost of its new gamelan. The klian proposed finally be accomplished. that the banjar continue to tax itself to upgrade the coffee-stalls so that these could be used to sell souvenirs and drinks at the weekly tourist performances: Swadaya Community Development My suggestion was simply to repair all the old warung stalls which would cost Swadaya (self-help) has been a by-word of Indonesian rural develop­ about Rp 1 million. I proposed that if we each contributed Rp 15 a day-which ment policy since independence. It is an aspect of modern Indonesian amounted to giving up half a cigarette-what's more its better for your health, I ideology which has fused with local Balinese values to advance both old said!-then each family could easily manage Rp 500 per month. But masyarakat and new ends. In Peddlers and Princes (1963), C. Geertz has discussed at (the people) wanted it done better and quicker. One member proposed that we length the adaptability of traditional patterns of organization to modern give up a whole cigarette a day to make Rp 1,000 per month. So we are now economic enterprise in Bali. He demonstrates the positive advantages of building permanent kiosks of cement. We have designed it so that we can add a utilizing both seka-type horizontal bonds and vertical ties of patronage second floor later on for the youth group (pemuda-pemudz) to use for their own and loyalty for mobilizing capital and labour towards modern economic purposes. (I Dasa, 1987.) development. 17 In either case, he contends, the pressure of the 'collec­ That sort of support was never extended to the level of the adminis­ tive' places its constraining mark on corporate Balinese business style. trative desa which had difficulty extracting any levies at all beyond the The social or political foundations on which these commercial ventures few hundred rupiah collected through banjar for the organization of are constructed tend to inhibit thedevelopment of a growth-minded and purificationrites at Nyepi or Independence Day activitieson 17 August. economically 'rational' orientation in Balinese business (C. Geertz, If, as members of the desa, villagers were willing to tax themselves on the 1963: 123-7). scale they frequently did withintheir banjar (for example, in proportion Certainly in most cases of banjar self-help projects the objective of to the contributions made by the krama banjar of Lagas or Madya when economic activity is limited to the satisfaction of particular collective they raised funds to acquire their gamelan instruments) Tarian could consumption ends. When the kecak troupe of Banjar Madya began to have collected the Rp 35-40 million then needed with ease. experience difficulties in the early 1980s, it wound down its activities, at Prize money from the 1981 Village Competition and profits from first limiting engagements to special performances for state guests at managing Inpres construction totalling nearly Rp 4 million had been government request, and eventually ceasing activity altogether. 'It was invested in the co-operative to provide seed money for the project, but not worth all the trouble to organize for one or two performances. Also not until 1987 did they take decisive steps to start building. By then the the banjar didn't have any great needs after the bale [banjar and kulkuij estimated cost of the project, for which an architect and engineer from had been built.' (r Sutoya, 1983.) On the other hand, these projects may the village had donated plans, was over Rp 60 million and escalating have remarkable longevity (as Banjar Madya's 16-year commitment and fast. It was hoped that with unskilled labour contributed by villagers, the the ongoing activity of · the Barong performing troupes in Desa projected costs could be brought down. A lottery would be run from Batubulan attest), and produce spin-off effects in other spheres which which they could raise Rp 12 million and they would begin construction must also be treated as part of the development process. with whatever funds they had and hope that this might induce govern­ Although there is a general tendency for public enterprises to lack ment contributions and greater interest from villagers themselves. self-expanding momentum, this is not inevitably the case. The following The desa experienced considerable difficulty selling the large number chapter analyses an exceptional village development programme in Desa of lottery tickets issued for the questionably appropriate first prize of an Sanur which has been consciously attempting to balance collective con­ automobile. Talk in the village office during the month leading up to the sumption goals with those of employment and capital expansion. The draw centred around poor promotion and general embarrassment at Sanur example is also of interest because it is a rare case of a large-scale inflated hopes of public support. 'You can't expect the same sense of development initiative at the level of the administrative desa. 186 ADA T AND DINAS SWADAYA BANJAR: SELF-HELP COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 187 1. For other examples, see C. Geertz (1963: 87-90) who describes a number of mod­ performson a commission basis, and used the proceeds to purchase rice land. Along with ern business enterprises already being adopted by Tabanan communities in the1950s. a share in the income from a banjar-owned rice-mill and interest on credit loaned to mem­ 2. It is worth noting that women's labour has traditionally been equally valued with bers, it now has a range of sources of banjar income. that of men in harvesting organizations. Although the use of the sickle with new high­ 8. Women frequent the adjacent coffee-stalls set up by the banjar but rarely make yielding varieties of rice favours male labour, women are stillrepresented among themem­ informal use of these public buildings, although theydo attend certain public meetings and bership of seka manyi in Tarian. entertainments there. 3. Of the equally intensive collective labour during cremation preparations, Made 9. The division was initially 1 : 1 but included an obligation to sweep the public area Lebah said, 'When it was cremation season and the banjar was invited to work, we would of the banjar daily. The tenants later asked to be freed of this obligation in return for the meet in the early hours of the morning to pound rice. People did that work with such smaller 1 : 2 proportion of the harvest which is the more typical tenancy share on good enthusiasm.It was the greatest pleasure and the greatest enjoyment. Ya, it was entertain­ sawah in the Gianyar region, although land reform laws prescribe a 1 : 1 ratio and equal ment! Even though the pounders might be dirtied by the padi, it didn't matter. ... They division of the costs of production. The banjar now covers all input costs and hires another sweated and had a great time.. .. Even if there were only a little rice to be pounded, it had member to sweep instead (Banjar Madya, Assembly Notebook, 17/10/82). to be the whole banjar that did it.' (I Lebah, 1983.) 10. High on the list of preferred means of filling local treasuries, before a provincial 4. The association between art (senz), refined and sensitive temperament, and harmo­ government ban in 1981, was the sponsorship of cock-fights.Substantial funds could be nious social relations is a common theme in Indonesian literature and is regarded by res­ raised through sale of admission tickets and from a customary taking of 10 per cent on all idents as giving a special character to Tarian as a community. Dewa Dani ended a bets. An Udayana University honours' thesis on the use of gambling receipts for develop­ rendition of several legends revolving around the magical powers of local hero-performers ment purposes in one village between 1975 and 1980 found that 19 per cent of local pro­ and heirlooms, saying, 'In short it could be said Tarian society was exceptionally calm jects were funded from banjar-sponsored cock-fights (Widurayana, 1983: 71). When (tenang) and oriented to the aesthetic (senz). Perhaps it is a desa specially blessed by the Banjar Madya's receipts from kecak performances declined, the deficit was made up with gods.' (Dw Dani, 1984.) From a very different quarter, the camat who came from Singaraja takings from cock-fights.During 2 days alone in November 1978 they were able to raise in northern Bali considered the entire district in which Tarian is located as one of the more Rp 376,180. One-third of the construction costs of the bale kulkul were obtained in this delicate he had the experience of administering. He claimed he had to take more than way. Since the official banning of cock-fight gambling, lotteries have been substituted with usual account of local opinion because people were highly sensitive and critical, it being a considerably less public enthusiasm and a great deal of grumbling about the inconsist­ daerah seni. The term seni was also associated with the selfless contribution of one's talents encies of government policy. to public and religious service. Wayan Ayun, a carver with an international reputation 11. The banjar youth group virtually 'embarrassed' the krama into finding the extra from neighbouring Banjar Lagas, carved the struts for the Banjar Madya shrine and the Rp 3 million in funds needed when they succeeded in raising Rp 4 million during the horse for its Sanghyang performance without recompense. (Artistic service for one's own Galungan 'bar' and gave it to the banjar for this purpose (I Tinggal, 1987). The previous banjar is invariably without pay, but outside craftsmen would normally be reciprocated in year there had been some debate at assembly meetingon a proposal to sell part of the ban­ gifts or labour assistance.) People remarked that this was because he was a true orang seni, jar's rice land to finance the purchase of instruments. This met resistance. Many members reflecting notions that selfless offering of personal skills to public and religious ends regarded it as adat land, because it had been acquired from the proceeds of their collective expresses a refined spiritual and social sensitivity properly associated with the aesthetic labour and because it was devoted to supporting ceremonies for the banjar shrine. sense (A A Rai, 1982; Gst Kanti, 1982; I Gandera, 1982). 12. For example, Desak Putu was acting as an agent in Tarian for a Gianyar loan mer­ 5. In the end, there were no lives lost in Banjar Madya-like most of Tarian predom­ chant. In 1987 she had fifteen customers, most of whom were women needing capital for inantly PNI in its sympathies-during 'Gestapu'. Although a highly respected member was stocking their coffee-shops or market-stalls. They returned the principal ofRp 50,000 and dismissed from his public service position as a dresser at the regional hospital because of interest in daily instalments of Rp 1,000 over a 60-day period. Even at these exorbitant alleged PKI sympathies, he remains to the present an influential member of the banjar rates, she commented there was no shortage of customers, only of cash to loan advisory committee. (I Tinggal, 1987). 6. Corresponding to M. Picard's (1986, 1991) conclusions regarding the impossibility 13. KIK (Kredit Investasi Kecil) and KMKP (Kredit Modal Kerja Permanen) were ini­ of rigidly distinguishing the sacred from the profane in Balinese aesthetics, and my own tiated by the central government in the 1970s to encourage small business development. conclusions on theparallel ambiguitiesassociated with adat and dinas spheres in public life These schemes were abolished in 1990. See Chapter 8 for a discussion of government pol­ (Chapter 11), a sacred-secular distinction in the nature and object of particular art forms icy on concessional loans in this period. is not in Balinese conceptualization absolute. 'Secular' dances are those traditionally per­ 14. See Lempelius and Thoma (1979: 167) whose data indicate defaults were reaching formed as entertainment for gods and villagers in the outer courtyard of the temple (jaba) 10 per cent in some Yogyakarta banks in 1976. at religious ceremonies. 'Sacred' dances could be offered to tourists, according to Tarian 15. In the 1930s Covarrubias observed the same combined effects of the Balinese informants, as long as there were the appropriate offerings and 'permission' from the gods passion for the arts and hamlet rivalry. 'The ambition of every bandjar is to own the best (I Nesa, 1983; see also McKean, 1979: 298-300). Overlapping religious and economic orchestra in the neighbourhood. .. . Often the villagers own the instruments of a former usages are not modern blurrings. The sacred Barong of Banjar Madya and Banjar orchestra that has fallen into neglect and have to call upon outside orchestras for their Pekandelan were in earlier times cared for by seka who travelled the countryside feasts; but let them be spurned by a successful modern group in a rival bandjar and they (ngelawang) for the 35-day period following Galungan, the members dividing among will reorganize their gamelan at once-everybody helping with equal enthusiasm.' (Covar­ themselves thecoins thrownin 'payment' (ngupah) to the seka as they travelled fromhouse rubias, 1972 [1937]: 207-8.) See also Grader (1951: 402) on the stimulation and dissipa­ to house. The ngelawang practice always had both pragmatic and religious purposes. For tion of fads induced by intercommunity rivalry. the seka, it was art opportunity 'to put their barong to commercial use' (Gst Kwanji, 1983). 16. The Tarian co-operative like many in Bali suffered a devastating blow from ramp­ For each household, the offering of coins is made to ensure well-being. There is a story ant inflation culminating in the 1966 currency revaluation. (See 'Bahaja "1000 Jadi l" that Brahma and Visnu in their search for Siva disguised themselves as the entourage to a Semakin Terasa', Suluh Marhaen, 26 June 1966.) Attempts to revitalize it in the 1980s travelling barong, and it was they who decreed coins be given when the barong travelled were made more difficult when it was denied official co-operative status and funding as a (I Nesa, 1983). KUD (Koperasi Unit Desa) because priority given the co-operative located in the district 7. Banjar Tegeh subsequently established a legong dance troupe of its own, which still centre precluded the establishment of a separate official KUD in Tarian. Tarian's was 188 ADA T AND DINAS actually the longer-standing of the two and local people, who did not trust their funds away from their home village, made little use of the official unit. Their own co-operative operates to date only as a savings and loan association, but succeeded in expanding its loan capacity between 1981 and 1985 from Rp 82,000 to Rp 4,700,500. It is overseen by the Desa Council and its day to day management is capably handled by the klian of Banjar Madya and Banjar Tegeh who received training in a short government course. 17. My concernhas been with the role of theformer type of social ties in local develop­ ment projects, while Geertz's examples focus more heavily on the activities of the dis­ 7 placed oligarchy seeking new sources of sta'tus and patronage by utilizing traditional bonds of a hierarchic nature. Swadaya Development: The Case of Desa Sanur

The History of Sanur's Public Industries THE village of Sanur presents an exceptional example of a self-help development programme initiated by the administrative desa. Beginning its fund-raising in 1967 with a 5-rupiah levy on the sale of pigs reared in the village, and fuelled by the subsequent tourist boom in the area, Sanur developed a series of village-owned industries including a bank, restaurants, a laundry, and a pig-export business. In 1981 these pro­ duced a gross profit for the desa of Rp 83 million (US$129,400), 1 sub­ sidizing the costs of health, education, and infrastructure development in the desa, as well as providing employment for several hundred villagers. Sanur is a large village2 situated on the coast about 6 kilometres from the capital, Denpasar. With the completion of the 300-room Bali Beach Hotel in 1966 and the opening of a jet airstrip in 1969, Sanur became the first mecca for mass tourism to Bali. Between 1976 and 1982 its population rose from 10,000 to 15,000, by then including a substantial number of immigrants from other parts of Bali and Java seeking employ­ ment in the tourist industry (Sanur, 1982: 8). Previously, agriculture and fishing provided the mainstay of the local economy, employing 80 per cent of the working population. Well into the 1970s, the majority of the population (59 p�r cent according to Geriya, 1977: 78) still depended on agricultural production for their livelihood. In the early part of the following decade, however, the proportion of Sanur's labour force primarily dependent on work in agriculture and fishing dropped to 25 per cent and was estimated to have declined to 11 per cent in 1985 (Sanur, 1985: 2), giving some indication of the rapid change in the eco­ nomic structure of the area in this period. Ida Bagus Beratha, the administrative head of Sanur from 1959 until his untimely death in 1986, had been one of the prime movers behind the village development plan. In his words, Sanur's economic ventures were primarily intended to relieve the long-term financial burden that the support of community development goals would add to member families' already extensive customary obligations to banjar and desa for adat purposes: We realized therewas tremendous pressure on families with small resources who had to support themselves, their banjar, their desa adat, and finally the local SWADAYA 190 ADA T AND DINAS DEVELOPMENT 191 administration.Traditional responsibilities were now compounded by new needs establishing the foundations of the desa enterprises. Ida Bagus Beratha to improve health, education and other social services. The burden would and Ketut Rena, a former organizer of Sanur's co-operative, attended cripple those who already had enough difficulty making ends meet in their meetings at every banjar in Sanur to persuade the krama of the merits of households. How were people supposed to insure the welfare of their families if the plan, with only partial success in the early stages: burdens were constantly added from above? There were too many responsibil­ ities and too few rights. (Ida Bgs Beratha, 1984.) In fact it was extremely difficult. Dues had never before been levied by the desa . ... That is usually a banjar function.... We went to each banjar to explain 3 Beratha's personal involvement was something of a legend. I ori­ the purpose of the fund-raising. We argued that, unlike any tax levied by the ginally heard of the difficulties Sanur's leaders had getting started from state which would give them neither direct ownership nor a part in planning several klian in Tarian who had been hesitant to implement desa devel­ development, in this case they would see the fruits of their contributions in Desa opment plans there for similar reasons: the proverbial 'lots of squawks Sanur itself, and themselves participate in determining the direction of future and no eggs'-constant flack and little reward. Beratha's description of developments ... which would belong to them. (Ida Bgs Beratha, 1984.) the inception and early stages of the Sanur venture is lively and provides With the agreement and participation of several (but significantly not banjar-desa insights into Balinese perceptions of leadership, interde­ all) of the banjar of Sanur, the desa began accumulating a capital fund pendence and the sorts of problems faced by locally initiated self-help 4 by instituting a tax on land transactions in Sanur, a levy of Rp 5 on the development efforts. sale of pigs reared in the village, a tax on profits from the manufacture It was apparent in the years of economic hardship and political turbu­ of lime and a toll collected from commercial trucks usirig the Sanur lence following the revolution that improving public welfare would road. depend on villagers' own efforts: 'We realized that development, if it wasn't chased, wasn't going to happen by itself.' (Ida Bgs Beratha, 1984.) Next, we decided to try to export pigs raised by the women of Sanur. We There was as yet no sign of the Inpres and Bandes grant schemes of the borrowed the export licence held by PT Babian, which happened to be owned 1970s through which central government eventually took over primary by a member of the Desa Council, Ida Bagus Dewantara. We borrowed the cap­ responsibility forconstruction and maintenance of the public school sys­ ital to purchase the pigs: Rp 5,000 from Thu Polok, the wife of LeMayeur [a tem and local infrastructure.Since Sanur lacked village-owned land that Swiss painter living in Sanur since the 1950s]; from the owner of Naris could become a source of public income, the most promising alternative Bungalows, Rp 3,000; from the subak official, Rp 1,000; from a contractor in desa Sanur, Gusti Made Rem, we borrowed another Rp 1,000; then from the co­ was to develop its own income-generating enterprises. The estab­ operative here, which had almost collapsed at that time, we obtained a loan of lished a foundation (Yayasan Dana Bantuan Pembina Desa) to raise Rp 10,000. The rest came from the savings I happened to have, if I'm not mis­ funds that would form the capital base for future village development. talzen, Rp 25,000. From those borrowings totalling about 40-odd thousand Three projects were initiatedin the first year of thefoundation's exist­ rupiah we got together enough to send one truck of pigs to Java, from which we ence. Its initial effort was the construction of a secondary school, com­ made a profit of Rp 7,000 [US$30]! ... I myself rode in the back of the truck. pleted in 1967. Previously any students who wished to continue their The assistant village head and I slept on top of the pigs' baskets. I'll never for­ education beyond primary school had to travel 6 kilometres to get ... the joys and troubles (suka-duka) that came with our work-perhaps Denpasar. The labour for building the school and teaching in the early more often troubles at thattime .... (Ida Bgs Beratha, 1984.) stages was entirely voluntary. Sanur residents with some education and These early shared labours, in the shadow of the tragic events of skills were recruited as volunteer teachers. Beratha recounted the active 1965-6, had a profound effect on the focus of community development involvement of village leaders, who travelled themselves to western Bali in Sanur. 6 For the next 20 years desa activities'drew, strongly on the local to obtain the wood needed for construction. corporatist ethos of Bali suffused with revolutionary and nationalist Raising the starting capital for local public industries was another ideology. Notions of pooled resources, community involvement, and matter altogether. The difficulties experienced indicate how significant is public service figure positively in retrospective accounts of Sanur's this one step remove of the administrative desa from 'grass-roots' and recent history: 'Our bank director by day was out weighing pigs by the consequent dependence of village-level programmes on banjar night .. . that is gotong royong.' (Ida Bgs Beratha, 1984,) agency. The initiation of self-help development projects by the admin­ In the initial phase, however, it was no easy matter to persuade a re­ istrative desa is one of the unusual aspects of the Sanur case. In general, luctant constituency, dubious of the likely success of the ventures and desa are much less likely than banjar to launch projects independently of their prospective benefits.7 government instigation5 and support, partly because desa do not have the same customary base to tax village members for social purposes. We then entrusted to the klian banjar the task of trying to awaken the people's Banjar, having direct popular support, are more readily able to raise enthusiasm. Were they now 'conscious' (sadar) and did they trust that this effort funds and engage public participation. It is apparent from Beratha's would succeed? ... [The plans] had barely begun to catch fire.... We wanted to account that Sanur was heavily dependent on component banjar in establish a desa bank. It had been agreed that each family would depositRp 50 192 ADA T AND DINAS SWADAYA DEVELOPMENT 193 as starting capital in the bank.But contributions were still sluggish. By October industries, which quickly outstripped levies as a source of local public of 1967 we had only reached Rp 28,150. Imagine Rp 28,000 couldn't even pay funds. During this period, desa income from all sources rose from the salary of one person today, but Rp 28,150 was the starting capital of the Rp 1.8 million to Rp 83.2 million, with the proportion of revenue com­ banld It was barely half of our target, despite their [banjar] having given formal ing from local levies dropping from 50 per cent to a fraction of 1 per agreement to the plan. So we 'fished' about to find out whether we still didn't cent. have public confidence. It was apparent that we didn't. To this day there are The most remarkable feature of Sanur's public enterprise strategy is banjar that have not yet paid! [He laughed] Nothing is made of it now, of course-embarrassed! Whether or not they initially subscribed, all are banl, the fact that development was planned to incorporate self-expansion members today without exception by virtue of belonging to the desa. (Ida Bgs through regular reinvestment, with a proportion of growth feeding new Beratha, 1984.) projects as well as providing for a broad range of local collective con­ sumption goals. From its inception a proportion of village industry Ida Bagus Mayun, another of the founders of the programme and sec­ profits has been reserved for the expansion of existingindustries and the retary of the Foundation, described their progress in these early stages as establishment of new ones; 25 per cent of profits are retained by the unit painfully slow, moving 'like an antique rail car' (1987). Nevertheless, from which they are derived as reserve capital; 25 per cent goes to the despite the hesitant start, Bank Desa Sanur grew rapidly and by 1986 umbrella company PT Bhakti Sanur for reinvestment in expansion and had a capital value of Rp 100 million, deposits of Rp 1,700 million and in new industries and 50 per cent to the Desa Foundation to fund local a rate of return on total assets of 28. 7 per cent (Laporan Akuntan, PT development projects determined by the Desa Council and to cover rou­ Bank Desa Sanur, 1986). Capital from these early ventures was quickly tine administrative costs and salaries. In most other cases of local public ploughed back into expansion. Taking advantage of the growing tourist development projects, such as those in Tarian, the subsidy of particular sector in its backyard, Sanur launched its own Five-Year Plan (Repelita, limited collective consumption goals-ritual, educational, and health, for 1969-74) with the goals of expanding further the desa's business enter­ example-tended to become the end-point of public investment activity. prises and its managerial competence. Over the next decade a laundry, But in Sanur, equal emphasis was placed on the satisfaction of these several restaurants, a service station, and a motor repair shop were ad­ needs and on accumulation of capital for future growth. ded to the list of village-owned industries. Table 7 .1 details the revenue Administration initially posed serious difficulties, with village officials provided from levies and village enterprises at 4-year intervals between necessarily also acting as volunteer-managers: desa 1969 and 1981 and gives an indication of the rapid growth of Tallcing about administration in the early days, I have to laugh. Most of us doubled as village leaders and voluntary workers. I was perbekel, but I also rode on the backs of pigs to Java! ... At thattime desa employment wasn't an attract­ TABLE 7.1 ive proposition to skilled or educated people. So we had to draftretired civil ser­ Desa Sanur: Revenue fromLevies and Village Industries, vants as unpaid volunteers. But now, we have three university graduates in Selected Years (Rp) economics workingfor the desa. (Ida Bgs Beratha, 1984.) As the programme became established, an administrative structure of 1969 1973 1977 1981 increasing sophistication was instituted, involving professional managers Land sales levy 745,805 1,672,500 355,650 educated in economics or accounting. A part-time team of four in­ spectors trained in accountancy form the Financial Examination Board, Vehicle toll 133,720 415,050 171,800 8 Boat levy 21,575 20,000 139,650 appointed by the village council. The council itself has responsibility to Pig sales levy 12,080 13,325 36,680 15,430 approve the new budget and review accounts annually, at which time each banjar appoints its own review team to study the balance sheets. PT Banl,Sanur 595,752 2,968,977 22,174,022 50,453,797 PT Export-Import 306,663 2,357,521 2,722,952 1,087,169 Restaurants 1 and 2 8,848,865 13,390,261 28,467,861 Employment Laundry 100,668 158,947 1,270,510 Restaurants 3 and 4 1,328,975 One of the primary objectives of the desa's development plan was the Service station 327,768 reduction of unemployment, especially in the 1 %Os and early 1970s Motor repair shop 252,883 before the tourist industry began to take up the slack. Loss of income from the prohibition against collecting coral and from the appropriation Total 1,815,595 16,396,906 39,149,962 83,204,393 of dry farm land for the purposes of tourist development had been Sources: Hasil Penggalian Dana Desa Sanur, 1967-70; Ikhtisar Perincian Hasil Usaha keenly felt in Sanur in these early years of the economic transformation Desa, 1973-81. of the area (Sanur, 1982: 5). The first desa employees were hired in ADA T DINAS 194 AND SWADAYA DEVELOPMENT 195 1969. Starting with 6 paid staff in that year, Sanur eventually established circumstances comparability loadings may be awarded where the excep­ its own public service to staff the village-owned industries, schools, and tional skills of an employee are not compensated on the desa salary scale an expanded local administration. By 1984, the high point of expansion, to a level equivalent to outside employment. it had 305 staff (pegawai desa) on its payroll. Employment conditions and leave provisions for ordinary employees The structure and conditions of Sanur's public service were intended are generous by Indonesian standards. Employees work a 7-hour day, to parallel those of the national service (kepegawaian negerz). Until 1985 and a 6-day week. Overtime is paid at the rate of one and a half times when the downturn in economic conditions forced a change in policy the normal wage for the first hour over a 7-hour day and double time (see below), the wages and salaries of all personnel, whether employed thereafter, or compensated by paid time off. Overtime provisions do not in the desa administration, thebank, or one of the other industries under apply to executivesor departmentheads whose broad responsibilities are the umbrella of PT Sanur were fixed centrally by the Personnel Depart­ already taken account of in their salaries. Employees presenting a doc­ ment and Desa Council. Efforts were made to adjust scales in line with tor's certificate are eligible for sickness pay amounting to 100 per cent of those of the national civil service and employees in government indus­ salary for the first 6 months, 75 per cent for the next 6 months, and tries. In fact, Sanur village employees have some advantages over their 50 per cent for the second year in cases of chronic illness. All employees national counterparts. They receive their medicine and rice allowances are entitled to 12 days of annual leave (LKMD Sanur, Peraturan Pokok in cash; pegawai negeri do not, and frequently complain of the incon­ Kepegawaian, 1981). 9 venience of the system and poor quality of rice allotments. Employees I The Sanur civil service salary scale has five levels of threegrades each, spoke to also compared employment procedures operating in Sanur classified according to responsibility of the position and the level of edu­ favourably with practice in government and private industry where a cation and experience required. In 1984, basic salaries, excluding rice strong patron, substantial bribes, or long periods of voluntary unpaid allowance, health and social welfare support payments, ranged from service (abdi) are prerequisite to securing employment. Rp 114,400 per month for a grade level I-A employee with 15 years of Serious attention was given to developing procedures for the appoint­ service to the lowest level V-C with Rp 5,200 per month in the first year ment of personnel that minimized the role of patronage and favouritism, of employment (Sanur, Tabel Gaji Pokok, 1984a). Eighty per cent of a common problem for community-based public enterprises (Gondolf, 1988: 154).10 The desa issued a detailed manual of regulations in 1981, TABLE 7.2 covering job descriptions, pay-scales, and conditions of service, in order Desa Sanur: Monthly Expenditure on Salaries and Benefits to standardize hiring and promotion procedures as well as salaries and for Employees, 1979 and 1984 conditions across all desa bodies. Vacancies in the desa service were filled from lists of applicants to the central personnel department according to 1979 1984 qualifications and experience. Every banjar had a representative oversee­ ing employment procedures and efforts were made to ensure a reason­ Number of employees 210 305 able distribution of employees among the 24 banjar that composed the Total salaries 2,846,85 6,549,560 administrative desa. Otherwise, unskilled vacancies were filled according Merit increments 1,476,825 2,736,975 to the order of application. Non-residents were hired only when no local Medicine" 234,500 709,000 person with the necessary skills could be found, and consequently only Insurance 311,343 712,245 b 14 of the 305 employees in 1984 came from outside the village. Rice support 1,063,500 Employees are hired initially for a probationary period. After a year of Honorariums and casual wages 892,891 1,359,965 continuous satisfactory service, the employee is given permanent status Honorariums to teachers- SMP and SMA Wisata as pegawai desa with full benefits. Permanent employees are provided 1,180,000 Wages for street-cleaners 379,200 with insurance, uniforms, rice, and medical allowances. Merit loadings are available under a point system to those who demonstrate initiative Total 5,455,993 14,690,445 and responsibility. Productivity bonuses are paid to employees at the Average monthly income per capita end of a year in which the enterprise declares a profit. In order to main­ for desa employees 25,981 48,165 tain · attractive conditions, senior personnel now also receive fringe benefits roughly equivalent to those available in analogous civil service Source: Based on payroll records for October 1979 and October 1984, LKMD Desa positions and in private industry. Division heads are provided with Sanur, Bagian Personalia. "Rp 500 per family member in 1979; Rp 1,000 per family member in 1984. home telephones and motor cycles. The directors of PT Bank Desa bCash payment ofRp 1,500 per family member to a maximumof 5 children (3 children as and PT Bhakti Sanur have automobiles at their disposal. Under special of 1985). 196 ADA T AND DINAS SWADAYA DEVELOPMENT 197 employees were classified in the third- and fourth-grade levels, earning to the village council for these common purposes. An impressive range incomes between Rp 13,000 and Rp 51,000 per month (approximately of public facilities and services have been provided over the two decades equivalent to US$13 and US$51). 11 since Sanur began its development programme. It built middle (SMP) Basic salary does not, however, give a good indication of income from and upper (SMA) secondary schools, a kindergarten, a health clinic, and desa employment, since various support and merit payments typically a co-operative. It supported drama and art groups, and it has run train­ exceed the actual wage. Wayan Rudra, for example-a Lower ing courses and seminars on subjects fromagriculture to sewing and for­ Secondary School (SMP) graduate, married with two children-has eign languages, as well as in-service training programmes for those worked as a waiter in the Beach Market Restaurant since 1972 and in involved in its tourist-related industries. Entertainment and sports facil­ 1987 occupied a middle-level position (IIIB) on the pegawai desa scale. ities were funded, including the provision of public televisions to each of His basic monthly salary was Rp 36,900; but family welfare, health, rice Sanur's twenty-four banjar. Repairs of temples, schools, and other pub­ support, and merit payments amounted to an additional Rp 51,100 per lic facilities have been partially subsidized from the income generated by month. From this, 10 per cent of basic salary was deducted as obligatory village-owned industries ( see Appendix 5). Originally, all banjar received savings with the Desa Bank towards retirement, along with small contri­ annual grants for their own development projects. Subsequent to the butions to death and social welfare funds. This left a net monthly official restructuring of Sanur under the Village Government Law of income of Rp 84,000, roughly equivalent to that of a skilled tradesman 1979, these grants have gone instead to the three new government units in the private sector or a middle-level public servant (PT Bhakti Sanur which were created out of the original administrative desa. Bagian Personalia, Rekapitulasi Penghasilan/Potongan, 1987). Table 7.2 provides a breakdown of total expenditure on salaries and Development Project Funding benefits to village employees for comparable months in 1979 and 1984. Table 7.3 provides a synopsis indicating the relative importance of vil­ lage and other government contributions to the development projects Distributive Effects undertaken in Sanur. Only during Repelita III (1979-84) did govern­ Approximately 10 per cent of the households in Sanur receive direct ment sources of funds for local development exceed desa sources. This wages and benefits through the employment of one of their members by was largely due to an intensive Inpres school building programme the desa or its industries. But direct employment figures alone give only during that period, which accounted for Rp 166 million of the 175 mil­ a partial · indication of the degree to which local earnings have been lion granted by the central government. The remaining Rp 9 million expanded through the village development programme. There are also a large number of people whose incomes are indirectly attributable to TABLE 7.3 village initiatives. Petty commodity producers and traders find an outlet Desa Sanur: Sources of Development Project Funds, 1969-1984 for their produce-whether pigs or handicrafts-through the Sanur and Sindhu Beach Markets and pig marketing industry. Others obtain Desa incomes through co-operative enterprises set up by the desa with credit Desa Government:' Total Contributions from the desa bank. For example, sailing boats for tourist excursions (Rp) (Rp) (Rp) (Per Cent) were organized into four co-operative groups. Credit was made avail­ able, standard charges and rosters established, so that unbridled com­ Repelita I 8,377,461 500,000 8,877,461 94 petition would not drive prices too low and access to the tourist trade (1969-74) would be fairly distributed. The desa runs a public safety and security Repelita II 63,364,569 17,553,954 80,918,523 78 service (SATP AM) to co-ordinate and control the activities of petty (1974-9) traders and follow up complaints of theft or harassment. Thirty uni­ Repelita III 165,609,393 227,207,147 392,816,540 42 formed officers trained by police and paid from funds collected from (1979-84) hotels and businesses in the Sanur area are posted at three stations and a central office. Another twenty-five villagers are employed part-time by Total the desa as rubbish collectors. (1969-84) 237,351,423 245,261,101 482,612,524 49 Aside from the substantial percentage of village households supported Sources: directly or indirectly through des a· employment, everyone in Sanur Based on Daftar Proyek Desa yang Dibiayai dari Swadaya Desa, Bantuan Tk. II, Tk. I, dan Bantuan Pusat, 1969-84, LKMD Sanur. (See Appendix 5 for a full list of benefits from the amenities and public services that are provided from sources of development funding for projects in Sanur by village, region, province, and the revenue generated by desa industries and through relief from local central government.) levies. A fixed proportion of profits from desa enterprises is transferred "Includes central, provincial, and regional government sources. SWADAYA 198 ADA T AND DINAS DEVELOPMENT 199 went to road, sidewalk, and gutter extensions and repair. Notably, all with the need for sports grounds, school buildings, and other general central government grants were provided to the desa for infrastructure public amenities (Sanur, 1971: 21; 'Laporan Kepala Kelurahan Sanur, purposes, none for the development of productive enterprises which 1982'). would provide ongoing employment opportunities. Use-rights to much of the land needed in the early stages of develop­ The total ratio of desa to government funding over the entire period ment were obtained through informal representations by the village understates the desa contribution in real terms because of inflation and head, Ida Bagus Beratha. Large tracts of coastal property had been the steep devaluations of the rupiah in the last decade. It is doubtful that resumed by the provincial government in the 1960s at very cheap prices the scale or proportion of central government funding to villages from local residents. Resumption payments to owners of land taken up through the Inpres or Bandes programmes will be maintained in future by the Bali Beach Hotel were reportedly as low as Rp 300 per are. because of the decline in oil revenues which had provided the major Displaced tenants received no compensation. Beratha was able to use stimulus for Indonesia's rural development programme during the previ­ public disaffection with the forcible resumption and poor terms of ous five-year plan. In the 1987-8 Indonesian budget, Inpres funding exchange as a lever to obtain concessions from government and private was cut by 29 per cent (Pangestu, 1987: 17) and no Inpres SD grants interests. Beach front property was released by informal agreement with were received in Sanur or Tarian that year. provincial authorities for establishing the Sanur Beach market and restaurant complex. The Bali Beach Hotel was persuaded to allow the use of excess land it had acquired for Sanur's secondary school. These Problems and Constraints agreements, typically of traditional arrangements for land use, were While tourist development in the Sanur area provided a huge external informal and unwritten and inevitably under the circumstances fragile. source of potential income the desa could tap, it posed serious problems Following Beratha's death, the owners of the Bali Beach expressed the for community development as well. The 50 per cent increase in the desire to reclaim the land it had loaned to the desa for future develop­ permanent populationof the area during the 1970s put strains on public ment. The minimum cost for purchasing the requisite 25 are for an services which were not adequately dealt with by provincial and central alternative school site at 1988 prices would have been at least government funding. Sanur had no direct revenue from taxes on tourist Rp 100 million and as much as Rp 300 million by 1990 when land industries in the private sector, as sales and service taxes on hotels and prices were escalating wildly. Although government secondary schools restaurants go to the regional government (kabupaten). A considerable had been built in Sanur under the Inpres schemes (SMP Negeri in proportion of the costs of maintaining streets and public walkways and 1979, 12 years after the desa school; and SMA Negeri in 1986, 7 years repairs to government primary schools was borne by Sanur itself, and after Sanur's upper secondary school), they can accommodate less than project figures for the Five-Year Development Plans from 1969 through half of Sanur's high school age population, and so the need for the desa­ 1984 (Repelita I-III) show that most lnpres and Bandes projects sponsored schools remains great. Fortunately, the problem was fore­ required some supplementary support from desa coffers (see Ap­ stalled in 1990 when the Bali Beach Hotel, the Sanur Village pendix 5). Village reports (Sanur, 1982: 28-30) note the problems Foundation, and the Hotel and Management Training Center (BPLP) posed by unexpected short-falls in funds for government projects. A located at Nusa Dua agreed to establish a branch of the training centre case in point was the construction of primary school classroom buildings in Sanur to the advantage of all parties. The BPLP makes use of the in 1981/2 under the Inpres programme, which ran 20 per cent over buildings to offer its courses in late afternoon sessions, leaving the sec­ budget. It required the addition of Rp 14 million in local funds for com­ ondary school in normal operation during the mornings. pletion at a time when the desa budget was already committed to heavy The ambitious plans for expansion of Sanur's public industries began expenditure on the expansion of offices and the construction of a second to stall in the less favourable economic climate of the 1980s as infla­ restaurant in the Sanur Beach market complex. tionary pressures and competition from private capital accelerated. The Another problem posed by the rapid economic growth in the area has cost of transport and competition from new producers in Java led been the steep rise in the price of land since the 1960s. Because the desa PT Export-Import to stop shipping pigs to Surabaya after 1978. Sub­ did not possess communal land of its own, it had to purchase property sequently, sales focused on local buyers in Bali with an appreciable for its projects. Land in Sanur by the late 1980s, even away from the decline in profits. The fourth restaurant was closed in 1982 because it prime beach front area, was valued at Rp 4-5 million per are was not well located and experienced consistent losses. Efforts were (100 square metres). As of 1984 Sanur had acquired 178 are (1. 78 hec­ made to convert it into an art market, but this also failed. In 1986, the tares), at a total cost of Rp 46 million, to locate the bank, desa offices, Oka Inn in Kuta was sold because its distance from Sanur created and public health clinic (Sanur, 'Daftar Bangunan dan Tarrah, 1983'). problems in overseeing operations. Land had to be leased for its fourth restaurant and the service station. A promising plan to develop a garment industry in conjunction with Several desa reports raise the problem of land acquisition in connection the PKK women's organization did not get off the ground despite 200 ADA T AND DINAS SWADAYA DEVELOPMENT 201 efforts to integrate it closely with the bank, the desa co-operative, and Also directly affecting Sanur's programme were changes in the ap­ other desa industries. Problems included those of finding a secure and plication of taxation regulations in the mid-l 980s. Previously the village­ stable market and the limited and less direct experience of women with owned industries had been assessed at nominal levels. But instructions corporate organizational activity.12 The Department of Industry was from the Department of Taxation resulted in a dramatic increase in their brought in to offer training courses to members of the PKK. Priority tax liability from 1984. The sharp drop in the bank's income shown in was given to those women in Sanur who did not yet have jobs and the Figure 7 .1 was largely due to the Rp 11 million paid to the government Desa Bank offered a low-interest credit scheme to enable them to pur­ in taxes that year (compared to Rp 2.5 million in 1983). By 1990 chase sewing machines on small daily payments of Rp 100. A design Sanur's village-owned industries paid Rp 99.2 million-a third of its team was set up and a retail outlet established in one of the Beach mar­ profits-in tax to central government coffers, many times the value of ket shops. But the garment industry as a collective enterprise never over­ infrastructure and development grants Sanur received from government came the difficulties of co-ordination and marketing. A stable export sources in that year. arrangement would have been necessary to provide sufficient work for Part of the difficulty experienced by Sanur, in the view of the dir­ the number of women involved, since the local market producing ready­ ectors of PT Bhakti, has to do with the lack of a legal category and made clothing for tourists was saturated. In the end, most of the women special tax status for public enterprises at village level. Neither the legal found alternative outlets for their skills. status of 'PT' (Perusahan Terbatas: Proprietary Limited) nor that of The world economic recession of the mid-1980s and the drastic 'Koperasi' (Co-operative) is appropriate to the public purpose of decline in Indonesia's oil revenues led to major devaluations in 1983 and Sanur's industries, because profits do not go to private shareholders or 1986, producing serious inflation and a wage-profit squeeze for Sanur's to members as individuals. Since regulations applying to co-operatives industries. These pressures were exacerbated by increased competition restrict the purposes for which profits can be used, and would have from the private sector, much of whose growth was based on investment inhibited expansion and expenditure on public services, the Sanur from outside Bali. The consequences for Sanur were declining relative Village Council chose to register the village industries as private enter­ profits for desa enterprises, and the loss of some of its skilled personnel. prises instead. But as registered private businesses (PT) the village­ Village policy had been to increase desa salary scales to keep them as owned industries cari-y a level of taxation local leaders regard as closely as possible in line with those of the national civil service. In the inappropriate to the public purposes which industry profits serve. 1980s the latter rose dramatically to compensate for inflation. The aver­ age monthly per capita wage and support payments to desa employees FIGURE 7.1 increased by 85 per cent over the 5-year period between 1979 and 1984, ProfitLevels of PT Bank Desa and PT Bhakti Sanur, 1973-1990 from Rp 25,981 per month to Rp 48,165. In the same period total 130 profits from all major desa industries increased by only 29 per cent, from 117 Rp 58 million to Rp 75 million (heavily devalued), then fell to 104 Rp 53 million in 1985 while the wage bill continued to rise. In March '2 91 1985, again following national civil service increases, the Desa Council 78 decided to increase salaries in inversely graded rates from 20 per cent at 65 the highest grade to 60 per cent at the lowest. The desa's total wage bill i"' ] 52 increased in that year alone by another 41 per cent. 39 Wage growth in recent years has inevitably been at the expense of � -a- - -El"' ..q_ 26± �- ' both capital for expansion and for serving the collective consumption � 13 I]- _� goals of Sanur.13 The wage rise in 1985 affected the labour-intensive 0 desa industries (under PT Bhakti Sanur), where the majority of village­ '73 '74 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 '88 '89 '90 employees work, to a greater extent than it did the bank. In that year an Year interest-free loan of Rp 28 million from the desa bank, in addition to the regular transfer of 50 per cent of profits, was needed to supplement the 0 PT Bank Desa village foundation's revenue and subsidize its projects and the salaries of c PT Bhakti Sanur its employees. In 1985 bonuses were suspended across the board and in 1986 it was decided that annual wage increments would be halted for Sources: Based on Perincian Hasil Usaha Desa Sanur, 1973-81; Laporan Rugi/Laba the time being. Because a decent standard of living was one of the PT Bank Desa Sanur, PT Bhakti Sanur, 1983, 1984, 1985; Laporan Akuntan Soebandi desa's and Co. Public Accountants, 1986, 1987, 1988; Laporan Akuntan Drs. Ida Bagus objectives of the development programme, and since it has to Djagera, 1989, 1990. compete to keep skilled and experienced employees on its payroll, the Note: I have computed alternate year data for the period 1973-81 and annual data from wage-profit squeeze posed a serious policy dilemma. 1983. 202 ADA T AND DINAS SWADAYA DEVELOPMENT 203 The impact of the general economic recession, the regularization of The notes conclude that this competition should provide a challenge to tax, and differences of interest and philosophy led to internal tensions 'raise consciousness' (tingkatkan kesadaran) and reaffirmcommitment to and formal separation of the three units (the Village Development the paramount social welfare and 'equalizing' (pemerataan) objectives of Foundation, PT Bank Desa, and PT Bhakti Sanur) after the death of Sanur's development programme (Ida Bgs Beratha,Notebook, 20/9/1984). Ida Bagus Beratha in 1986, giving each autonomy in planning and In 1987 many people in Sanur, like Ida Bagus Mayun, expressed con­ wage-fixing. The issue that precipitated the break was the proposal of cern at the changed equation between what they described as the sosial the bank, on which Sanur had become increasingly dependent for its and the materi or bisnis orientation in Sanur's development programme. revenue in the 1980s, to establish higher pay scales for its employees. Officials of the bank defended their new found autonomy and differ­ Ida Bagus Mayun, then foundation secretary, considered this a radical ential rewards on grounds of economic rationality. They felt the greater departure from the fundamental principles which had guided early independence of the industries would provide the necessary incentives development: to compete more effectively. Employees in other industries and mem­ bers of the public on the other hand pointed to declining morale and Given the world recession, many desa industries had been experiencing diffi­ culties.Because theother sectors weren't doing as well, the bank was in practice loss of direction. Some of the difficulties experienced in recent years, having to shoulder most of the routine as well as development expenses of the especially the conflicting perspectives on the social and economic object­ desa. This differential increased the desire of the bank to obtain more independ­ ives of the original project currently voiced in many quarters, can be ence from the foundation in its operations, and especially to increase its pay attributed to the predictable effects of the general socio-economic trans­ scales relative to other village industries.I resisted. I reminded them it was only formation of Sanur. But in no small measure, Sanur's problems have the luck of the draw that theyhappened to be employed in the bank instead of also to be understood in relation to state interventions, in particular, the one of the other industries. 'Maybe', I said, 'many of you feel disadvantaged changes in village administrative structure and leadership imposed by when you see higher salaries outside. But remember we own this together.... central government since 1979.14 Everythinghere is open. Each year we hold a public meeting, so everyoneknows The subdivision of the original administrative village into two des a and the situation.... We must hold firm to the original idealism. We must not forget one kelurahan with implementation of the Village Government Law the history of how it began.... It is like an orchestra-the cengceng player, the meant that there was no longer a single Desa Council to which the vil­ gong player, the gending singer all have to do their bit to make the music. Like lage industries and the Sanur Foundation were ultimately responsible. the proverb 'Whether the burden be heavy or light, we bear it together' (berat sama dipikul, ringan sama dijinjing). But there were several that lacked con­ The dissociation of the administrative sub-desa units from the banjar sciousness (belum sadar) and I finally had to give up .... Recalling this story now adat also threatened the banjar-based scrutinizing mechanisms that had brings tears.... In the end I tried to rationalize.Perhaps like a tree, if we all hang been in place for overseeing employment and financial allocations. from the same branch and it breaks we will lose everything.For that reason we Beratha complained during the interview, 'Recently we had to register a finally let the bank stand on its own, with the stipulation that it not forget its protest because with Ministerial Decree No. 27, 1984 we saw that there responsibilities to consult the foundation on all matters ... because the founda­ was no klian [banjar] dinas. Without the klian dinas there will be nobody tion is the mouthpiece of the people. (Ida Bgs Mayun, 1987.) to examine records, no [representative] advisory group.' (Ida Bgs Beratha, For Mayun, the outcome of this debate was one of the disappointments 1984.) While Beratha was still alive the restructuring remained largely on which led him to retire from his positions as Sanur Foundation secretary paper and did not radically alter local practice. But in becoming a kelu­ and bendesa adat of Intaran to become a Hindu priest. rahan under the new legislation, Sanur had lost the right to elect all administrative officials. In April 1987, more than a year after Beratha's death, the new lurah of Sanur was finally appointed. After a series of proposed nominees were rejected by the provincial government, a naval In Face of Competing Interests: The Future officer who had spent the last 10 years away from his home village on ofSanur's Industries assignment in Java was transferred to become head of the kelurahan of Entries in Ida Bagus Beratha's personal notebook indicate that there had Sanur. already been considerable discussion in 1984 of the problems arising Unquestionably the exceptional results of Sanur's public activities from competition with private industry and broader changes in the soci­ over thelast 20 years owed a great deal to the dedication of a number of ety and economy. A number of skilled workers were leaving desa service individuals of whom Ida Bagus Beratha was the most prominent and for higher-paid jobs elsewhere and pressure was building to increase dif­ respected. External pressures on village political and economic affairs ferential wages. He noted that, while the opportunities provided by the coincided with Beratha's death, and local people tend to attribute the growth of tourism and private enterprise were unquestionably good for loss of dynamism and general decline in the fortunes of village industries the residents of Sanur, there was at the same time reason to be con­ with subsequent changes in leadership. As a desa employee remarked, cerned that it posed a threat to the community's collective orientation. 'There are lots of clever people. But someone who is sosial, who is wise 204 ADA T AND DINAS SWADAYA DEVELOPMENT 205 and can inspire, that is extremely rare.' (1 Rudra, 1987.) The death of Ida in Chapter 6, and in subak, seka, and temple-group activities. Bagus Beratha in 1986 and the retirement of Ida Bagus Mayun the fol­ Several elements of the Sanur case are relevant to the consideration of lowing year may well have marked the passing of the original leadership village-state relations in the following chapters. Notable were the institu­ and its clearly articulated vision of the priorities of community-based tional importance of the banjar which facilitated public participation and development. Unquestionably, the character of local leadership and the balanced central control of the programme, the popular responsibility of degree to which the village can maintain control over it are critical to the leadership in building and maintaining confidence in the new initiatives, continued success of Sanur's programme in the longer term. and the strength of local corporatist ideology in promoting a vision of Despite the evident decline in morale in recent years and some con­ development potential in thepublic sphere. traction in the number of enterprises and the level of employment they Clifford Geertz's observations on an analogous venture in Tabanan, could support, there have also been positive signs of revival. A propor­ where 16 banjar organized a successful co-operative in the 1950s,16 tion of profits are still being put back into the existing village industries. eventually expanding from retailing and rice trading into small-scale In 1987 the service station was expanded and modernized. The Beach manufacturing, have relevance to Sanur and community development in Market Restaurants underwent renovations, upgrading the kitchen and Bali more generally. 'Obviously, this enterprise, based on and growing bar facilities and adding attractive shaded beach-side tables. A new set out of traditional hamlet ties, has begun to approach independent, of open markets were built at the Sindhu end of the beach to provide fi.rmlike status. Yet it remains a quasi-political, diffusely social institu­ another outlet for the sale of handicrafts and souvenirs. Both profits and tion, for the sanctions which maintain it are not differentiated from the wages have again been increasing. From the low point in 1985-6, general sanctions of hamlet [banjar] life, and its continued viability annual profits declared by PT Bank Desa and PT Bhakti Sanur have depends very directly upon the broader processes of the particular ham­ risen steadily, reaching Rp 128 million and Rp 91 million respectively in let social organisations which support it.' (C. Geertz, 1963: 89.) The 1990. Average monthly wages including support subsidies for village following chapters will examine the Indonesian government's utilization industry employees had reached Rp 148,000, triple the 1984 figure. 15 of local institutions in pursuit of its development priorities, and the Politically, too, Sanur has been attempting to come to grips with its effects of its interventions in an effort to expand state control over grass­ own structuralproblems and those bequeathed by state policy. Tensions roots political institutions on those important broader processes of ham­ over the decision in 1986 to give autonomy to the village industries, and let social organization. public concernthat it might ultimatelyprove to be a harbinger of privat­ ization, resulted in a village-wide conference in July of 1988 which resolved to explore mechanisms to achieve flexibility without losing pub­ lic control over policy and to work towards re-merging thevillage enter­ 1. In 1983 the value of village industryearnings rose to Rp 89 million but was equival­ prises. To this end it was decided to reorganize the Sanur Village ent to only US$90,000 as a result of a major devaluation in that year. Even the steep increase in profits in 1990 did not surpass theUS dollar value of its 1981 profits after tax Foundation to enable it to take the place of the original village council (Rp 219 million = US$118,828), although before-tax profits did (Rp 318 million = (now subdivided as a result of village administrative reorganization) as a US$172,545). Sanur-wide representative body co-ordinating the village industries. No 2. Until 1979 Sanur was a single administrative desa, composed of two desa adat and further steps had been taken as of 1990, however. 24 banjar adatldinas. But subsequent to central governmentlegislation in 1979, to be dis­ cussed at length in Chapter 9, theadministrative village was divided into three parts-two desa and one kelurahan. These were to be subdivided into administrative wards (dusun and Conclusion lingkungan) which would no longer coincide with the original banjar. 3. The extent to which development programmes in Sanur represented a response to In a number of respects the Sanur example is obviously exceptional. otherwisedeclining traditional bases of status and patronage is difficult to assess. The fact The development of a major tourist resort on its doorstep created a huge that a considerable number of those filling executive positions within the village industry potential market for the village to tap. That it did so on its own initiative structure are drawn from high caste Brahmana families which 'ruled' Sanur in the pre­ colonial period, suggests that this kind of public involvement offered an alternative means and with considerable organizational ingenuity, however, was a remark­ of maintaining prestige in the new era. Members of this group had almost sole access to able achievement. The scale of local public ownership of modern indus­ education during the colonial period, making them the most likely leaders of new develop­ tries is probably unmatched in Bali and perhaps in Indonesia. While ments in any case. Beratha himself was of a wealthy Brahmana family. His father had been many communities own movie theatres, performing troupes, rice-mills, a member of the Raad Kerta in Denpasar, the customary law court established under the and other businesses, the self-expansive character of Sanur's develop­ Dutch. Surprisingly, he did not pursue his formal education beyond primary school, pre­ ment programme is an unusual aspect of publicly owned enterprise in ferring the study of Balinese adat and religious literature. Beratha and others involved in the early phases of Sanur's development seem to have combined respect for their tradi­ Bali. But it is nevertheless one version of a philosophy and practice of tional status as triwangsa with democratic and developmentalist ideologies that character­ collective value and action which finds expression in more limited form ized the post-independence periods. To whatever extent traditional concepts of authority throughout the island, in banjar-based projects such as those described motivated the actions of the elite, it is interestingthat thesedevelopments took place in the 206 ADA T AND DINAS SWADAYA DEVELOPMENT 207 public sphere and that considerable attention was given to institutionalizing procedures real terms would be shown for much of the period. Virtually all of the income from through banjar participation that placed constraints on the exercise of personal patronage. increased productivity was taken up in the expansion of employment and higher wages. By all accounts Beratha's personal economic circumstances were adversely affected by 14. The significance of the 1979 Village Government Law and subsequent ministerial both the demands of public office and the redistributive pressures which customarily went regulations regarding village administration which precipitated these changes will be dis­ along with wealth and status in Balinese society (Ida Bgs Mayun, 1987; I Rudra, 1987; cussed at greater length in Chapter 9. B. Lovric, 1988). 15. Average pay for bank employees was Rp 171,000 compared to Rp 135,000 for 4. Much of the following account is in Beratha's own words, translated from a lengthy those in other industries. The differential pay scales still rankled and continued to sour recorded interview in 1984, and from his notebooks. These are supplemented by more relations among the separate units. recent interviews with others involved in establishing Sanur's development programme 16. The Tabanan co-operative accumulated its capital by taxing each banjar member from the earliest stages, as well as several long-serving managers and employees of the one coconut and 2 kilograms of unthreshed rice a month (C. Geertz, 1963: 88). Sanur village foundationand industries. 5. Sanur was in fact designated as an 'experimental desa' by the Governor of Bali in 1956. Beyond the formation of a co-operative the following year, little in the way of com­ munity development initiatives appears to have been stimulated through the administrative desa at that time, however. 6. Both the concernfor social welfare and the popular doubts and suspicions indicated in the following part of Beratha's account need to be understood in the context of the political tensions of the period preceding and following the so-called 'Gestapu' coup and counter-coup which brought Suharto to power. The subject remains a sensitive and painful one for many Balinese and is discussed to the extent that it is possible to do so at this stage in Chapter 10. 7. Villagers' reticence was no doubt partly influenced by recent experience. Uncontrolled inflation and currency devaluations in 1965 virtually destroyed the co­ operatives which had been established throughout Indonesia. 8. As with other independently founded councils in Bali, the original village council in Sanur, called the Badan Pembina Desa, BPD (Village Guidance and Development Council), changed its name several times in line with government statute. As of 1973 it was called the Lembaga Sosial Desa, LSD (Village Social Council), and after 1980 the Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa, LKMD (Village Public Security Council). 9. A letter to the editor of the Bali Post (11 September 1984) airs these 'long-standing complaints'. 10. Employment records for 1984 indicate that employees were distributed among all banjar in Sanur, although disproportionately represented in banjar near the centre of the village. This may be due to the fact that those living in geographically central banjar would be more likely to seek employment in village industries or administration. On the other hand, it may be that patronage indirectly plays a greater role than is acknowledged. Those employees I spoke with insisted that this was not the case. A waiter at one of the restau­ rants who had worked for the desa for the past 15 years and who had a fairly detailed knowledge of the inner workings of the desa establishment was emphatic that the hiring system had been set up to avoid the sort of abuses that had developed in the national civil service in recent years. 'In the first place, we cannot employ whomever we wish directly to each unit. If there were a vacancy here at therestaurant, for example, it must be filled by the personnel department where every banjar has a representative overseeing procedures. They first look to see which banjar have the fewest currently employed by the desa. After that, whoever was the first to apply will be triedout. So it isn't possible to take someone on the basis of a family relationship or whatever. "Sistim family'' does not operate here.' (I Rudra, 1978.) 11. In 1990 the lowest level on the scale was eliminated because it was felt these wages were unreasonable. The average monthly salary paid to desa employees in that year was Rp 140,000, including support payments. 12. An entry in Beratha's planning notebook listed among a number of potential limita­ tions: 'Keep in mind thattraditionally women in Sanur never engaged in this sort of activ­ ity so that it is apparently something difficultfor them to accept.' (Ida Bgs Beratha,Notebook, 23/2/1984.) 13. If profit levels shown in Figure 7 .1 were adjusted for inflation (prices rose almost 6-fold between 1971/2 and 1984/5-Jayasuriya and Nehen, 1989: 334), little growth in PART III

Gotong-royong-road repairs. Village Institutions and State Policy

. THE self-help programmes described in Part II illustrate the potential for local provision of collective goods in Bali in areas of common interest as wide-ranging as ritual obligation, the arts, popular entertainment, credit, employment, health, education, and transport. The same institutional base proved important for the promotion of national development pro­ grammes there, particularly after the revision of Indonesia's policies to include a basic needs framework in the mid-1970s. Despite high economic growth rates which averaged some 7.5 per cent throughout the 1970s, critics of Indonesian development policy under the New Order pointed to continued underemployment and poverty among a significant proportion of the population. The results of village-level studies challenged optimistic assessments based on aggreg­ ate macro-economic statistics (Astika, 1978; Collier, 1978; Hansen, 1978; White, 1979). These critiques reflected a wider international debate over developmentalist approaches that had ignored structural factors and were premised on the assumption that growth would have a generally positive effect across the spectrum of social groups. Evidence that high rates of increase in Gross National Product had not resulted in improvements in living standards for lower socio-economic groups in many 'Third World' countries like Indonesia led to some revision in the international development agenda (ILO, 1976). These changes were ini­ tially signalled by Robert MacNamara, then chairman of the World Bank, during a speech pointing to the political risks of ignoring the worsening situation of the poorest 40 per cent in developing countries. The World Bank made the 'basic needs' issue a cornerstone feature of its policy in 1978 (Streeten et al., 1981). The basic needs approach revised the policy emphasis from one focused solely on production and capital accumulation to one which included distribution and basic consumption requirements in the areas of nutrition, health, education, housing, water, and sanitation. It was not, however, a radical departure from conventional development for­ mulae premised on growth through capital accumulation and expansion of infrastructure. Targeting a minimum floor of consumption needs was conceived in liberal policy as an 'investment' in human 'resources' that would ultimately facilitate the primary objectives of economic growth and political stability (Lisk, 1977). Adequate standards of health and 212 ADA T AND DINAS education were prereqms1tes to making the poor more productive. '[B]etter education, nutrition, and health are beneficial in reducing fertil­ ity, raising labor productivity, enhancing people's adaptability and capacity for change, and creating a political environment for stable development.' (Streeten et al., 1981: 4.) The political consequences of ignoring distributive questions came to 8 the fore in the mid-1970s in Indonesia. Domesticpolitical pressures and a new international climate of opinion forced a greater interest in rural Village Institutions in the welfare. At the same time, these forces precipitated moves to strengthen Basic Needs Strategy central government's grasp on grass-roots political processes. In the last decade the state has established a more direct and intrusive presence in village life than at any time in the past. The following chapters consider a number of implications of increas­ ing state intervention in rural Bali. Chapter 8 looks at basic needs policies which have on balance increased thelife chances and thelevel of THE New Order government in Indonesia has staked its claims to legit­ material resources that are available for collective and private consump­ imacy since taking power in 1966 on its development programme and tion in Balinese communities. It argues that village institutions have been its capacity to maintain political stability. Obviously for the rhetoric of pivotal to basic needs provision. The mutual interest in better standards pembangunan (development) and keamanan (security) to have some of living for rural villagers generally reflected in basic needs policies is effect, the rural majority of the population have to see some tangible not paralleled in the political sphere, however. There, the strategic advantages at local level. And so the question of distributing some of the advantages of utilizing local institutions in pursuit of distributive policies material benefits from economic development is of considerable political and the government's interest in controlling them to ensure its political importance. hegemony are at odds. An analysis of the attempts to impose a unified In the 1970s popular ferment over the issue of equity in Indonesian and hierarchically oriented administrative machinery upon village struc­ development threatened the political position the Suharto government tures through the Village Government Law is the subject of Chapter 9. had secured for itself. Popular disaffection culminated in explosive The concluding chapters consider the broad cultural and social process­ demonstrations against foreign investment and corruption in 1974, es of community life in contemporary Bali in the context of growing which were met by a crackdown on dissent. But the political backlash political and economic penetration by the state. against the deficiencies of the New Order programme could not be ignored and triggered revisions of the single minded pursuit of growth and strident capital accumulation of the First Five-Year Development Plan (Repelita I, 1969-74). The connection between political dissent and the new redistributive policies of the 1970s is put pointedly by Sjahrir. In the Indonesian case it helps at least to understand the relationship between the enrolment rate of primary school (that has been· increasing only since 1973-4) and political events in 1973-4. One could also perhaps speculate what could have happened to political stability if the oil boom which increased government revenue tremendously in 1973 -4 did not happen? (Sjahrir, 1986: 122.) Eldridge (1980: 3) also points to the Jakarta riots as the primary stimu­ lus to the introduction of basic needs policies in Indonesia. Windfall increases in oil revenue during 1973-4 and 1978-9 fortuitously coin­ cided with political necessity and permitted the inclusion of social welfare policies in subsequent five-year plans without affecting the cap­ ital intensive growth strategy upon which New Order policy had been predicated from its inception. In the Third Five-Year Plan (Repelita III, 1979-84) the provision of basic needs became an explicit policy goal. It was foreshadowed by 214 ADA T AND DINAS VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS IN THE BASIC NEEDS STRATEGY 215 President Suharto's 1978 speech to the Indonesian Parliament in which introduced in 1973 to increase access to basic education through he pledged his government to the 'eight-paths to equity', specifically central-government funding of school building programmes and including basic needs of food, shelter, education, health, employment, teachers' salaries. Indonesia had low literacy and primary school and participation in development (Eldridge, 1980: 12). The 1983 attendance rates and very little central government involvement. Under Guidelines for state policy (GBHN) for the subsequent five-year plan Sukarno and in the early years of the New Order, local communities stresses the relationship between this revised orientation in development were urged to take on school construction themselves. As we have seen policy and political stability: 'During the Fourth Five-Year Plan the in Tarian and Sanur, villages devoted considerable energies to this task. direction and wisdom of development that was vigorously adopted Even so, at the time of the student demonstrations in 1973-4, it was during the Third Plan must be continued and accelerated in order to projected that by 1979 no more than 55 per cent of primary school-aged make more evident that a higher standard of living, education and wel­ children would be enrolled, largely due to the slow rate of school fare, one that is more equitable and just, will be experienced by the construction (Sjahrir, 1986: 103-5). The building of thousands of whole populace, thereby strengthening national defence' (GBHN, 1983: 29; primary schools under Inpres SD has been one of the New Order's most emphasis added). beneficial and least controversial development programmes, expanding rural employment while broadening educational opportunities. The effect of Inpres SD was to raise primary enrolment across Indonesia to Basic Needs in Indonesian Policy 85 per cent by 1980 (Sjahrir, 1986: 103-5). In 1984, 78 per cent of In a number of key areas-notably in education, health, and family children between the ages of 6 and 1 7 were attending primary and planning-the basic needs strategy has had considerable impact across secondary schools (World Bank, 1987a). Indonesia. Substantial funds were channelled into rural development Desa Tarian's fourth primary school was constructed in 1974 under through the village subsidy, road and school construction programmes, the new Inpres scheme. Later, two new schools and several additional and concessional loan schemes. Some of these programmes included classrooms more than doubled the capacity of the local primary school village administration directly in the proposal and co-ordination of small­ system in little over a decade. Private teachers' association sponsored scale projects. In particular, the innovative Presidential Instruction middle and upper secondary schools (SMP and SMA PGRl) make use (Inpres) scheme involved a degree of devolution to local government of these public buildings in the afternoons, but no government-funded in certain aspects of rural development planning and implementation secondary school exists in Tarian as yet. In Sanur, Inpres funding was (Morfit, 1986; Fox, 1988b).1 first received in 1976 and over the followingdecade enabled the addition Annual subsidies fixed at Rp 1,250,000 through the 1980s were of four primary schools, middle and upper secondary schools, as well as distributed to every desa in Indonesia for local development projects new classrooms to its already well-established network. 5 Thirteen 2 under Bandes (Dana Inpres Bantuan Pembangunan Desa). These primary schools and four secondary schools (two government and two grants now require submission of a project proposal and stipulate that a village funded) now service the educational needs of this large com­ matching value should be made up of self-help (swadaya) contributions munity. from the desa, usually in the form of communal labour (gotong A factor of some weight in explaining the positive results of Inpres SD royong). 3 Although rarely adequate for more than repair work on local has been the level of decentralization in its administration. Deter­ public buildings, these and other Inpres projects did inject funds into mination of procedures for implementing the Inpres projects was left to rural construction,4 and took some account of the importance of regional government (Sjahrir, 1986: 105). Notably in Bali the policy community involvement in rural development. They also provided adopted by most kabupaten was to allow villages to subcontract or man­ valuable experience in planning and co-ordinating local with national age construction themselves. The klian of one of the banjar in Desa development objectives: Siang stressed the advantages that self-contracting afforded: 'We in the banjar as well as the seka and young peoples' groups (pemuda-pemudz) The first time we received Bandes money it was in fact wasted. No one knew can all raise money by doing some of the work ourselves. Every time we what to do with it and it was the cause of a great deal of debate and conflict have school renovations, the banjar takes it on. I always demand that we within the desa. In the end they divided the money among the banjar, but since do it ourselves.. .. Besides giving work here, the buildings are better. there was no planninginvolved it was not used properly and there was nothing much to show for it in the end. Subsequently it was required that a plan be Why? Because they are ours. If they called in someone from outside, I submitted from the desa each year in March setting out the intended use of wouldn't trust them.' (Dw Batur, 1984.) funds and stipulating that an equal value in labour should be contributed from These sentiments are supported by the general findings of Develop­ the desa. (I Dasa, 1986.) ment Programme Implementation Studies (DPIS) evaluations under­ taken under the auspices of the Harvard Institute for International The most significant and broadly based of these programmes was Development. These studies found building quality high in Bali where undoubtedly Inpres SD (Presidential Instruction for Primary Schools), 95 per cent of Inpres SD projects were locally self-managed (swakelola). 216 ADA T AND DINAS VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS IN THE BASIC NEEDS STRATEGY 217 This was in contrast to DPIS findings in South Sulawesi, where received a sufficient boost from the programme (I Sender, 1990; Ida Bgs Windia, construction was contracted to firms chosen by the bupati, and where 1990). there were general complaints about the low quality of construction and lack of involvement at district and village level (DPIS, 1982, cited in Implementing Basic Needs: Family Planning Sjahrir, 1986: 114). Making its own contracting arrangements with local construction The delivery of basic needs projects in Bali generally depended in one firms and sharing supervision among klian banjar, Tarian built its way or another on banjar agency. I want to examine in detail two schools to higher specification standards than those stipulated under the instances of programme implementation in Tarian-one concerning project. Floor tiles were used instead of cement, as well as thicker glass family planning and the other water supply-which will enable us to and larger beams than officially specified. Savings effected by self­ glean some understanding of process in the linkage of village and state. contracting in 1984/5 saved Rp 2.25 million of that year's Rp 19. 7 mil­ What constitutes public participation? How are popular responses given lion Inpres school building and renovation grant which was then expression? And how do banjar leaders negotiate their often conflicting deposited in the co-operative towards future construction of a multi­ administrative and representative roles? The family planning example purpose exhibition hall. The same procedures in 1985/6 enabled the allows us to look at the means by which a national policy to control desa to build an office for its recently revived co-operative in addition to population growth was translated into a popularly accepted 'basic need' the teachers' cottages covered by the grant. through banjar mediation. The water supply case reflects something of a In this period the central government also began to underwrite reverse process. In that instance a banjar was able to use its institutional low-interest credit schemes (KIK and KMKP) for small business in strength to capture public resources from the state for the collective response to criticism that the development potential of the 'little person' benefit of its members. These examples illustrate processes of accom­ had been ignored in government programmes focusing on large-scale modation through which collective consumption goals and national pol­ enterprises.6 Subsidized rates of 12 and 15 per cent for KIKand KMKP icy objectives could be made to converge, at least where community respectively were half the commercial rates. In Tarian, KIK/KMKP institutions have sufficient power to ensure that participation is more loans have been used extensively by owners of handicraft industries. than a rhetorical concept. But, with the exception of projects such as those undertaken by the Undoubtedly the most celebrated example of the utilization of the Faculty of Economics at University Udayana (UNUD, 1980, 1981),7 banjar for the promotion of national development policies has been its the concessionary credit scheme more typically served established enter­ role in the Indonesian family planning programme (Hull, Hull, and prises which McLeod (1983) argues might well have afforded the Singarimbun, 1977; Harrison, 1978; Hull, 1978). The Central Bureau higher market rates. The requirements that borrowers have collateral to of Statistics lists Bali's annual population increase as 1.42 per cent com­ cover half the value of the loan and that businesses be registered (and pared to 2.15 per cent for Indonesia as a whole (BPS, Statistik Indonesia, also therefore liable for tax) to be eligible, made it difficult for an indi­ 1986). According to figures from the National Family Planning Co­ vidual starting up a small industry to gain access to this form of credit. 8 ordinating Board (BKKBN) for 1985, Bali had the highest rate of con­ Nevertheless, as noted in Chapter 6, the banjar system provided a traceptive use-a 74.5 per cent prevalence rate among eligible couples kind of social collateral underwriting the reputation of member bor­ (based on the number of married women aged 15-44 years)-of any rowers and enabling the dissemination of concessionary loans on a province in Indonesia (Streatfield, 1986: 2). This compares with a broader basis than technical requirements would otherwise have per­ national rate of 52.2 per cent (Streatfield, 1986: 2) and the World Bank mitted. Whether or not McLeod's assessment that subsidized credit was estimate of 23 per cent of eligible couples using contraceptives in generally wasted on small pribumi (indigenous) business people who 'middle income' developing countries, the group in which Indonesia is would have had access to other credit sources (McLeod, 1983) is cor­ now classified (World Bank, 1987b: 134). To give some indication of rect, KIK/KMKP loans were used widely in Bali to expand labour­ the local effect of the programme, by 1990 Tarian had only enough new intensive cottage industries which had export potential. The Bali Post enrolments to hold first grade classes in four of its six primary schools, (3 December 1984) reported that of the Rp 188 million loaned to small and plans were under way to convert one of the schools to other business by banks in Bali during the first three quarters of 1984, purposes. Rp 78 million (41.5 per cent) were under the KIK/KMKP scheme. In Sistem Banjar was introduced in 1975-6 after the success of earlier 1990 the KIK/KMKPsubsidized credit scheme was abolished, partly in efforts at increasing the use of contraceptives through a broad network response to economists' criticisms9 and the changed national economic of district-based clinics reached a plateau at about 35 per cent of eligible climate, but also, according to branch managers of Bank Negara couples. Provincial family planning authorities decided that the banjar Indonesia, because the government believed small industry had already was best placed to further the programme because of its organizational 218 ADAT AND DINAS VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS IN THE BASIC NEEDS STRATEGY 219 strength and influence (BKKBN, 1977: 24). Banjar heads were sent to programme has achieved considerable national and international atten­ training seminars and liaised with district-based family planning field­ tion as a result of the extent and rapidity of birth rate decline. The workers to provide information and contraceptives. They were made Balinese case challenged classical demographic transition theory which responsible for registering eligible couples, compiling quarterly statistics assumed that higher levels of socio-economic modernization (measured on current contraceptive use, and motivating acceptance in their com­ in terms of increased urbanization, industrialization, per capita income, munities. and education) were necessary to induce significant changes in fertility At banjar meetings members were exhorted to contribute to the patterns. With 95 per cent of its population living in rural communities nation's development and their families' well-being by adopting appro­ as of the 1971 census, 70 per cent of its workers still engaged in primary priate methods of birth control. Each bale banjar exhibited a family plan­ production, an average annual per capita income below US$140, and ning map with variously coloured symbols indicating the contraceptive female literacy under 40 per cent, Bali was not approaching the 'thresh­ history and current method in use for each household, so the family old' of economic modernization by any of the indicators normally planning status of the whole community was public knowledge. A sub­ regarded as prerequisite to fertility decline (Streatfield, 1986: 3-5). ject once regarded as a private affair became a topic of general interest Streatfield's research on three villages located in the Klungkung region openly discussed at banjar meetings and in coffee-shops. The klian of explored the prevalence of contraceptive use and the reasons why family Banjar Tegeh remarked, 'It would not ever have succeeded if it hadn't planning achieved such unexpected general acceptance in this still gone through the banjar. Before everyone was embarrassed to tall( about predominantly low-income, rural area. While suggesting official stat­ such matters. Now it is normal. At each assembly meeting we discussed istics were somewhat inflated, 14 his 1980 survey data nevertheless indic­ family planning until everyone understood sufficiently.' (I Suta, 1983.) ated an impressive current contraceptive use rate of 50.8 per cent for the Indeed, KB, the Indonesian abbreviation for family planning (Keluarga study villages in one of the most conservative regions of Bali (Streatfield, Berancana), has become a popular topic of conversation everywhere in 1986: 69). Bali. Family compounds are decorated with posters urging contraceptive Surprisingly, Streatfield (1986: 97) found no substantial differentials use and performers regularly play on the theme in the comic sequences in fertility levels or contraceptive use along social and economic lines, 15 in shadow puppet plays and traditional drama.10 suggesting that 'whatever forces were at work to reduce fertility operated Widespread acceptance of the value of practising contraception did across all sections of the community simultaneously, and to a similar not come easily. A news item in the local press reports numerous extent'. But Streatfield did find significant variations in current use rates obstacles to the adoption of family planning and notes that only 102 among the twelve banjar in his survey villages. These ranged from 30.4 'acceptors' were officially on the books in the whole of Kabupaten to 60. 7 per cent, with substantial differences in prevalence levels among Gianyar in 1967/8 (Suluh Marhaen, 2 September 1971). Initial resist­ banjar within any one village and no correlation between the level of ance was due to many of the same factors which inhibited adoption in acceptance in these banjar and distance from the family planning clinic. other parts of Indonesia. Religious beliefs, primarily the fear that birth The most isolated banjar surveyed had one of the highest prevalence reduction might prevent ancestral reincarnation, posed problems.11 rates of 58.2 per cent. Given the minimal correlations found between Women were concerned about the potential medical side-effects of family planning acceptance and other socio-economic variables, the various methods, especially the IUD favoured by the provincial family differential by banjar is quite significant. Streatfield (1982: 302, 429) planning authorities because of its higher continuation rate. And some interprets it as reflecting variations in the interest of klian banjar and the women found the intrusion of male medical practitioners acutely organizational capacities of particular banjar assemblies to motivate embarrassing.12 members (see also Poffenberger, 1983: 54). Although women still worry about the side-effects of the most The leadership role of the klian unquestionably has been important in convenient contraceptive devices, 13 they speak positively today about the the success of Sistem Banjar. As the klian of Banjar Sangan remarked, independence and extra-domestic economic options that fertility control they were expected to be the 'point of the lance' (ujung tombak) of facilitates. A primary schoolteacher with two children emphasized the government policy (I Dharrna, 1982). Poffenberger (1983: 54) notes that in difference in attitude between her generation and that of her mother, two coastal Karangasem banjar where very low rates (11 and 16 per also a teacher, who 'bore twelve children because she was afraid to use cent) of contraceptive use were recorded in his study, klian banjar (who contraceptives [privately available since the mid-1960s]. Nowadays were in this case also descent group elders) 'did not approve of contra­ women are "conscious" (sadar) and have become very enthusiastic ceptives and slowed the development of locally favourable social norms users.' (Ni Sri, 1984.) toward the adoption of family planning methods'. Where klian came out In statistical terms, Sistem Banjar has been remarkably successful. strongly for the programme, both Streatfield and Poffenberger conclude Census data show a rapid decline in the total fertility rate in Bali from they significantly influenced receptivity among the membership. 5.96 to 3.50 between 1971 and 1980 (Hull and Hull, 1984: 97). The Pressure was certainly exerted on banjar heads to reach target figures 220 ADA T AND DINAS VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS IN THE BASIC NEEDS STRATEGY 221 for new recruits. Official letters from the Governor of Bali in 1976 and only Rp 27,000 a month in income. I talked to him-'Look I have only two 1977 instructed klian dinas to sign up five new acceptors from each of children and even with those two I'm barely able to raise them properly.What their banjar to mark the anniversary of the programme (BKKBN, 1977: happens when your children are in school all at once? How will you pay their 28-30). However, Streatfield notes that reports of compulsion among fees and what will be the cost of feeding so many?' In the end he became con­ villagers he surveyed were rare. Of his respondents 7.4 per cent gave scious (sadar). (I Dharma, 1982.) 'government pressure' as the primary reason for accepting family Usually I go directly to the home.. . . In some cases I've gone as many as three planning. Specific responses under this category ranged from an indirect times beforebeing able to convince a family.They have to thinkof thefuture of sense of obligation to comply with government policy to direct pressure their children and the economy. In this banjar about 40 [of 50 eligible couples] exerted by the family planning fieldworker or banjar head. A few are acceptors. (I Dharma, 1984.) respondents reported threats of fines and one of expulsion from the This sense of personal responsibility to provide a model with respect to village (Streatfield, 1986: 117-18). In the course of my research I heard contraceptive use was assumed with varying degrees of seriousness by occasional complaints about the reliability of clinic services, but none Tarian leaders. Younger klian did tend to have small families and older suggesting that couples considered themselves under excessive pressure ones jokingly bemoaned the fact that these methods had not been Klian to join the programme. themselves frequently expressed available in their time (I Gst Kanti, 1983; I Toya, 1986). After his wife's ambivalence where national objectives on population control met local difficulties with available contraceptives resulted in an unplanned fifth resistance, each of which in context they considered well-founded. pregnancy, one of the klian went to the local Puskesmas for a Banjar Lagas in Tarian recently received a national award for its vasectomy. The family planning officer there described this as a exemplary promotion of family planning. For Made Dasa and his wife, 'pioneering' decision, but it did not result in a dramatic increase in the Ketut Yanthi, persuading banjar members had been no easy task. Like proportion of men seeking to take responsibility for contraception in other klian (and in this case often more acutely their wives), Dasa found their households.16 On the other hand, the klian of Banjar Madya Dauh himself constantly caught between bureaucratic demands and local and his wife wanted a fourth child 'so that there would be a Ketut' and resistance, especially in the early stages when the risks attached were joked that they had to wait discretely until after the desa competition banjar entirely uncertain. Ketut Yanthi (1984) said she was the first in the (Zomba desa) to proceed with having her IUD removed (rsutoya, 1983). to have an IUD inserted and was suspected of having 'all sorts of inten­ Other than a few days' subsidized stay in the capital to attend a tions' from marital intrigue to scheming for a prize in promoting its training seminar, banjar heads did not initially receive any special adoption among other banjar women. compensation for their strategic contribution to government policy From the other end, zealous departmental officials with regional objectives as 'motivators' and record keepers (BKKBN, 1977: 30). targets to reach surveyed village statistics compiled by klian dinas and Their critical role in the family planning programme later became a occasionally made an issue of individuals not yet practising KB. Pressed rationale for the introduction of the small honorariums which klian dinas on the question of a particular couple who continued to refuse to join now receive.17 Periodically, achievement awards (piagam) such as the the programme after their fifth child, Dasa successfully defended their one Banjar Lagas received in 1986 are distributed. More rarely, a local case on principles of customary law as well as national ideology: 'Adat leader or long-term acceptor is awarded a trip to Jakarta.18 The purusa [patrilineal custom of Bali] was reasonable justification for not combination of incentives and bureaucratic pressures undoubtedly doing so when they had thusfar not succeeded in producing a male heir. accounts for some of the over-reporting of acceptors (or the failure to And anyway, according to Pancasila, there cannot be even the slightest report drop-outs) which occurred in the early years. compulsion.' (I Dasa, 1986.) Moral authority, personal influence, and example are ordinarily the All that time it was a real problem. Gianyar had a very low percentage of banjar headman's only 'powers' in his relations with banjar members. acceptors. Now we are among the top ranking, so there's no longer any banjar The klian of Banjar Sangan described his approach as follows: pressure. Every in Tarian has reached 80 per cent or more if you don't count people who are just married and planning their first child.... Suta [klian We at thebottom are the point of thelance (ujung tombak).... People inthe desa of Banjar Tegeh] once reported 95 per cent, but he was playing a bit-looking aren't going to listen to some government official who can afford to have six forJakarta! (I Dasa, 1986.) children.We have to provide an example. My wife started using an IUD in 1974, before Sistem Banjar. We had three children at that time [one of whom In remote areas where Puskesmas facilities were difficult to reach, subsequently died] and already we felt the burden.... I tryto encourage families klian themselves dispensed condoms and follow-up supplies of pills at that have not yet joined to take up KB.Especially if a family has already got monthly banjar meetings (BK.KEN, 1977: 21). In most South Bali three children, I feel it is important to persuade them to consider the long-term villages like Tarian, where the district clinic services were near by, the consequences. They have to think of the future of their children and the banjar community network was none the less an important adjunct to its economy. For example, one man withfour children and a parent to supporthad services. 222 ADA T AND DINAS VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS IN THE BASIC NEEDS STRATEGY 223 Many women using the pill and IUD did have problems, with bleeding espe­ channels was not generally perceived as intrusive (Streatfield, 1986: cially. I would make sure they went to the Puskesmas clinic and got treated 119-20). or had the form of contraceptionchanged. It was very important for everyone to Another favourable factor contributing to the remarkable outcome of be assuredthat if any problem was experienced with one sort of contraceptive,it the family planning programme in the Balinese case was the broad would be changed immediately.The klian of course would know right away if a network of health clinics throughout the island. Bali had one of the banjar difficulties-otomatis. couple in his were having Not so the Puskesmas highest ratios of public health facilities to population of any region in officer sitting at a desk in town. (IDasa, 1984.) Indonesia-one clinic for every 2,188 eligible couples, compared to the Health workers concurred. According to the clinic doctor, 'They are Java-Bali average of 5,944 couples per clinic (Hull, Hull, and Singa­ grass roots and we're outsiders. We attend meetings to answer ques­ rimbun, 1977: 14). The existence of this conducive infrastructure was tions, but it has to be left to the klian to push the programme.' itself thanks to the efforts of many Balinese communities like Sanur (Dr Budiarta, 1982.) Popular acceptance is now such that a young couple which built their own local health centres in the 1950s and 1960s, later who do not adopt some form of contraception after the birth of their to be staffed and run by the Health Department. second child-and more often than not today, after the birth of the The Indonesian family planning programme unquestionably took full first-would be the exception. All of the married women of childbearing advantage of the highly corporate orientation of Balinese community age in the household in which I stay and their circle of young married life, the social pressures that traditionally operate within banjar com­ friends are currently contraceptive users, and the subject of the reliabil­ munities, and to some extent the rivalry that exists between them. But ity and side-effects of various contraceptive options is an ordinary topic beyond statistical success, the open and enthusiastic acceptance of the of conversation among them. Village records show a decline in the value of family planning supports a conclusion that the diffuse process annual population growth rate in Tarian from 1. 9 per cent in the 1981 of popular consensus building from the banjar level up was at least as statistics to 1.1 per cent in 1991. important as administrative strategy and recruitment of banjar leaders in The moral authority and local knowledge of banjar leaders were implementing this national development objective. The role of the invaluable assets in meeting the family planning programme's objectives. monthly banjar meeting in this regard was central. It not only provided a But it would be a mistake to overemphasize the role of leadership to the forum for disseminating information on the government programme, exclusion of other institutional featuresof local organization in assigning but also for exchanging information based on personal experiences, ulti­ credit for the rapid and broadly based acceptance of family planning in mately building a responsive climate of opinion and providing the basis Bali. Attempts to use the local system to impose practices not regarded for informed decision-making by member families. In Banjar Lagas, dis­ as coincident with the interests of any significant sector in the commun­ cussions at six consecutive banjar assemblies focused on family planning ity are notoriously unsuccessful. The klian of Banjar Madya, for ex­ before any kind of general acceptance began to emerge (IDasa, 1984). ample, was unable to prevent illegal cock-fighting, despite his general The banjar women's associations (PKK) also held meetings attended popularity and personal distaste for gambling or the risk of heavy pen­ by Puskesmas fieldworkers to discuss the subject, but my impression is alties imposed by the government after 1981. In the case of the family that informal networks among women complementing formal banjar planning programme, national objectives came to be seen as corres­ channels were more important in promoting acceptance of the pro­ ponding with the genuine needs of ordinary families. gramme than the PKK organization itself. Streatfield (1986: 118-19) Streatfield's (1986: 142-7) assessment of the relative importance of draws similar conclusions based on indirect evidence from his survey. different factors in the success of Sistem Banjar places greatest emphasis Undoubtedly the influence and involvement of the PKK varied from on the influence of the collectively determined attitude of the banjar one banjar to another, but lacking a traditional foundation as a separate assembly itself. Consciousness of the shortage of agricultural land, women's group and having none of the social sanctions associated with limited alternative employment opportunities, and the importance and the krama banjar, its capacity to focus the energies of women on com­ expense of education for their children, along with the public con­ mon goals is relatively more limited. The government's promotion of the formism characteristic of banjar life, appear to have most significantly organization in recent years has not dramatically enhanced its profile in affected the decisions of individual families to join the programme. His local communities. The hierarchic and derivative structure of the PKK study shows a revealing difference in Balinese attitudes toward institu­ (see Chapter 9), and the fact that so many of the schemes promoted at tional channels for exerting social pressure, as opposed to advice-giving kecamatan and kabupaten levels 'assume quantums of leisure time and in the private capacity of relative or friend. The great majority of surplus funds not possessed by women outside the middle class' Streatfield's respondents indicated that they would not attempt person­ (N. Sullivan, 1983: 159), has left the organization more or less irrelevant 19 ally to influence a couple who already had five or six children to adopt to the needs of rural women. family planning, whereas group influence exerted through formal banjar The rapid fertility decline in Bali is an example of dramatic social 224 ADA T AND DINAS VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS IN THE BASIC NEEDS STRATEGY 225 change instigated by government policy. It is notable that decentraliza­ potential of the corporate solidarity which ideally underpins hamlet tion of planning and administration characterized the programme from social action. top to bottom. Hull, Hull, and Singarimbun (1977: 13) point to the The provision of accessible and safe water supplies is one of the key unusual flexibility of the Family Planning Board which, they stress, basic needs for improving public health and saving domestic labour. functions as a co-ordinating rather than managerial body. The latitude Obtaining water absorbs a great deal of women's time in particular. given the provincial BKKBN meant that programmes could be adapted Studies show that rural women without direct access to water supplies to take account of cultural differences, local needs, and structures. spend from 1 to 4 hours per day fetching water for household needs and Promotional material was developed in Bali with a clear perception of that the task consumes up to 12 per cent of the day's caloric intake villagers' needs. For example, posters presenting images of everyday (Rogers, 1980: 153-6). Water supply became one of the main basic life-women rearing pigs, men ploughing fields, or attending banjar needs targets in Repelita ill and N, coinciding with the UN Drinking meetings (see Plate 19)-with which rural Balinese could readily Water Supply and Sanitation Decade. In 1980 only one-fifth of identify, differ markedly from those produced at national level depicting Indonesia's population was estimated to have access to adequate water very middle-class, Westernized families. BKKBN Bali, for its part, supply and sanitation facilities. With the assistance of multilateral aid, respected banjar processes of deliberation in its efforts to establish the including funds from Australia, Indonesia made commitments to raise programme (Bali Post, 17 September 1984). 20 the coverage of safe and adequate water supplies to nearly two-thirds of Many other factors contributed to the receptivity of Balinese families its population by 1990 (King et al., 1986: xviii, 59). to birth limitation. Hull points to extended family structures and In 1982 the Public Works Department had introduced a piped water neighbourhood work-groups (seka) which reduced social dependence on project in the nearby village (chosen because it was a prime tourist des­ the nuclear family and on children to achieve economic security.21 The tination) which happened to be the centre of the district (kecamatan) in high proportion of Balinese women who work outside the home, the which Tarian is located. There were satellite extensions of the facility to intense effects of economic and population pressures, the impact of surrounding villages, but only Banjar Pande in the north of Desa Tarian modern communication and education, and the efficient distribution of was included under the 1982 programme because of funding con­ contraceptive supplies serviced by the government were important straints. In 1983, on very short notice, Tarian was informed that it was contributing factors (Hull, 1978: 5 ff.). But in asking 'where credit is next in line for 'ABRI Masuk Desa' (the Armed Forces Come to the due?', Hull goes on to say, 'It is obviously not sufficient to cite the Village), a programme meant to lift the image of the military by government's policies and programme.... The well-established clinic involving them in community development work. As well as repairing system, active leadership and high degree of community involvement ... walls to the village temple in Banjar Tegeh and widening the main road, [were products] of Bali's unusual social and cultural makeup inherited it was to extend fresh-water facilities to three new locations in Tarian. by the programme. The strength of the system was the strong service The desa would have the labour of a military unit for a period of 14 days orientation it derived from the group solidarity of the culture.' (Hull, and receive one quarter of the costs of materials needed for the project, 1978: 6-7.) with villagers providing the remaining three-quarters of costs and In the case of family planning in Bali, central government exploited communal labour (gotong royong). Under the 1983 ABRI project, the existing local institutional framework to achieve its policy objectives, the Public Works Department was prepared to allow only three new but the outcome was clearly a negotiated and mutually beneficial one. storage tanks on grounds that limited pumping capacity at the water 'In the beginning it was the government that had need of KB. But now source precluded the addition of further facilities. It determined the it's the reverse-the desire comes from the public. Now the objectives of location of the concrete tanks to the east and south.of the original facil­ the people and the government are joined (terpadu).' (I Dasa, 1986.) ity in Banjar Pande, bypassing the northern most Banjar Sangan because of its small size and its supposed proximity to the already existing tank in the neighbouring banjar. Water Supply: TheBanjar Sangan Case At their monthly assembly meeting, Sangan members expressed anger If the banjar finds itself a tool in the service of the national government's at the decision. Located at the highest altitude in Tarian, there were no development strategy, it is also true that it provides the organizational private wells and access to fresh-water streams was considerably more basis for the promotion of collective interests which may not coincide difficult than for banjar further to the south. For those living at the very with bureaucratic determinations. I will describe here in some detail a north of Sangan, the distance to the tank at Banjar Pande along the main particularly interesting incident which occurred in Tarian in relation to a thoroughfare was simply too great. In fact, they were further from basic needs programme for fresh water provision. The case illustrates Pande's tank than the people of Banjar Pekandelan who had been the importance of banjar organization in the assertion of popular inter­ selected to obtain a new facility. They insisted that the matter be recon­ ests vis-a-vis the state's rural development programme and the political sidered at a forthcoming open village meeting when representatives of 226 ADA T AND DINAS VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS IN THE BASIC NEEDS STRATEGY 227 the regional government and military would be present. instead to invite desa and military leaders involved in the project to a That meeting, held at the centrally located bale banjar of Pekandelan, banjar meeting to hear their grievances. Through a combination of pass­ was evidently intended only as a public relations exercise. The regional ive resistance, the implicit threat of a more militant response (the poss­ government representative from the kabupaten began his speech by ibility of sabotage of the pipeline was rumoured) and the persistent naming the new Indonesian Cabinet recently chosen to carry out representations of its klian, Banjar Sangan obtained tacit, but unofficial, Repelita IV and outlining the progress of family planning, village electri­ consent to have the pipe 'pass through' its tank. fication, and irrigation projects in the area. Then a military officer dis­ As with the family planning issue, questions of the role of corporate cussed ABRI's participation in the current project as a means of structure and leadership come to the fore in this case of successful expressing gratitude to the public: 'Since the army comes from the manipulation of government policy to local ends. Streatfield's conclu­ 22 people, it cannot simply take food for nothing and sit in the barracks.' sions on the role of banjar 'conformism' and solidarity mechanisms in When the meeting was finally opened to public comment, the klian changing attitudes to contraceptive use are even more clearly displayed from Sangan pressed his banjar's case. A young farmer who had been in the processes which brought about a resolution of the fresh water elected to office only the year before, he was obviously not comfortable issue: with this audience composed of so many officials and villagers from The Geertzes sum up this conformist attitude as follows: 'it is better, the outside his hamlet. But he spoke at length and with insistence. 'The Balinese say, to be wrong with the many than right by yourself' (1975: 115). It people in Sangan were bypassed when the fresh water project was intro­ might be anticipated that this reluctance to be 'right by yourself' would result in duced to Tarian last year. The new project excludes us again. We are weak, indecisive leadership. But the system of consensus decision-making has expected to let the pipe pass through our banjar without benefiting from the importantfeature of avoiding placing fullresponsibility for the consequences it.' In an irrefutable appeal to the national ethic, he added, 'Under of a decision on the shoulders of one person. Rather the responsibility for Pancasila, development must be equalized (diratakan). If there is to be success or failure is diffused equally over the entire group. This permits the peace (keamanan) and unity (kepaduan) in the community, all must be decisive action so characteristic of the Balinese even though the individual treated with fairness (keadilan).' members of the group may, in other aspects of daily life, prefer to avoid taking At this point the army liaison officer replied that he had already raised decisions which expose them to heavy responsibility. (Streatfield, 1986: 147-8.) the matter with department officials in Gianyar but that until pumping In the Sangan case, the klian was unquestionably his banjar's surrog­ capacity could be increased, regulations prohibited the addition of ate throughout the dispute. A young, inexperienced leader of a com­ another tank: 'In the short term, of course, some benefit and some lose. moner descent group, he did not have the education, traditional rank, or But be patient. Eventually it will be possible to build tanks in each wealth one might expect to lend much security or authority to his section of each banjar. We can't expect everything at once.' When he forceful stance. He was impelled by his representative responsibilities to finished, Sangan's klian raised his voice again: 'When could the hon­ the resolute krama banjar to confront military and bureaucratic officials: ourable representative from Gianyar guarantee that Sangan would have 'People were really angry here, you know. I had to battle (berjuang) on its turn? Without any assurance of further additions to the water system, this issue, to the point of being aggressive.' (I Dharma, 1983.) But he also how can we be expected to wait?' The meeting was closed with appeals made it clear in this and several subsequent discussions of these events for calm and suggestions of further consultation that did not sound that he had been absolutely dependent on banjar solidarity to win the promising. case. 'It would have been useless if I simply tried to debate the issue on Within two weeks, however, Banjar Sangan had almost completed the my own, without any power to back me up.' (r Dharma, 1984.) The dif­ construction of its own water tank, with ABRI assistance. When I fusion of responsibility was also brought out in the manner in which the expressed surprise that the issue had been resolved in their favour so 'strike' was planned and carried out. In Dharma's words: quickly and despite bureaucratic regulations to the contrary, the klian said the banjar had become 'hot' and had to have its legitimate needs The people in Sangan had become quite emotional over it. This kind of issue Bali Post satisfied. Again referring to Pancasila principles, he emphasized that if could easily get out of hand. You read often in the of conflicts over banjar the government 'wanted peace and order (keamanan), it had to be con­ piped water. The atmosphere in the was not calm, but there was still the chance to resolve it fairly. We had to be careful to stick together and not to get cerned with evening out (meratakan) development and making sure that reckless. At the meeting . . . after one member suggested we refuse to join in (musyawarah)'. ordinary people were consulted (I Dharma, 1983.) gotong royong withABRI, there was a long and agitated discussion between those When no resolution to the demands expressed at the public meeting that understood and those that didn't. There were some that were afraid of was forthcoming, the banjar met again and decided to use the occasion standing out on our own, but they were finally persuaded. At the end of the of joint gotong royong exercises withABRI to make a public statement of meeting, I gave the order to work the next day: 'Gotong royong tomorrow, in its collective dissatisfaction. On the day Banjar Sangan was rostered for front of the desa office! Bring tools and drink.' The next day I struck the kulkul, labour service, themembership en bloc failed to turnup, sending its klian but not one person showed up. I went by myself. When the commander of the ADAT DINAS 228 AND VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS IN THE BASIC NEEDS STRATEGY 229 military unit asked me where were the people, I told him, 'I gave the order last and doesn't want to work or accept orders.' The outcome was that the district night. Why they haven't attended, I can't yet say. I haven't received a report. If military commander agreed to take the matter up with the Public Works you would like to find out for yourself, come tonight. I'll call a meeting. It is Department, and told us to go to it without waiting for official approval. We better that you come directly to hear for yourself the reasons why no one came started the next day and it was finished in a week. (I Dharma, 1984.)24 to work, so there is no questionof misrepresentationfrom me.' [I interrupted his narration to ask, was it actuallya 'strike'(mogok)?] Yes, a strike!Exactly! So they In fact approval did not come from the bureaucracy before comple­ came to the meeting-the military officer and the desa secretary. The perbekel tion of the project and there was some subsequent harassment from the (village head) was too scaredto come, actually, so he sent the secretary, who did Water Authority (IKK) when the water was due to flow some weeks not want to come either, but had no choice. There must have been panic over it later: in the desa! [When the IKK official asked what the unauthorized tank was doing there] I There was some suspicion in Banjar Sangan that desa officials said, 'We were told by ABRI to build the tank. It is up to you whether or not informally had something to do with the selection of sites for the three you fill it, because you're the one in authority.If you want the people to be calm tanks.It was more than a coincidence that the perbekel's puri was located and peaceful, please go ahead and fill it!' I spoke like that.I knew what else he in Banjar Pekandelan, one of the three banjar to receive a water facility. was fishing for. I know the kind of games they play. From Ida Bagus Raka too it The Pekandelan location was in fact closer to the original tank in Banjar was suggested I arrange a gift for the commander for the closing ceremony of Pande than was Sangan's, allegedly the reason for Sangan's application the ABRI Masul� Desa project as an expression of gratitude. 'O.K.' I said, 'We being turned down. Tile desa secretary, a triwangsa connected by have many painters in Sangan.' So I gathered together the painters. That was a delicate matter, trying to persuade them so that they didn't feel ruffled. Some marriage to the perbekel's family, was a member of Banjar Madya, which were annoyed and flatly refused to sacrifice their painting like that. The person also was allocated a tank. A Brahmana military officer from Banjar who offered his in the end wasn't even someone who benefits from the water Besaya in a later interview admitted having proposed to the commander because he lives alone far to thenorth and feels no need of it. That's what lead­ in charge of the project that his banjar be given priority in the allocation ership is about-running around organizing things-lots of ta& and little of water facilities on similar grounds to Sangan's claim of difficult response. In this case I was feeling aggravated, but controlled myself because I access. He was subsequently appointed by ABRI as its liaison officer for know trying to come to agreement (musyawarah) is like that. (I Dharma, 1984.) the Tarian projects, and played an important role as an intermediary in klian the Sangan dispute, although no one there was apparentlyaware that his The of Sangan personally felt a 'gift' to the army commander was earlier overtures had contributed to the initial failure of Sangan's an appropriate reciprocal gesture for the support and assistance the banjar application. According to him, it was KODIM, the provincial military had received. The testing remarks of the public works official, on commander, that finally determined the locations when the Public the other hand, he described quite contemptuously as bribe-:seeking, banjar. Works Department insisted no more than three facilities could be unworthy of any gesture on the part of the The significance of the institutional framework provided by banjar serviced (Ida Bgs Raka, 1984). The accounts of other klian make it clear that there was a great deal of jockeying among all the northerly banjar to organization and its ideology of corporate solidarity was impressed upon 23 obtain priority (I Gst Kanti, 1983; I Mandera, 1983; I Toya, 1983) . It was apparently me by the stark contrast between the collective action generated in this those three communities which had supra-banjar political connections incident and an analogous water supply situation in the Bajau village in that were initially selected. From the point at which the 'strike' took Sabah, Malaysia, where I carried out earlier research (Warren, 1983). kampung air place, however, the issue was negotiated directly between ABRI and The Bajau village was a built out over the bay at a consider­ Banjar Sangan, bypassing the desa. able distance from land and one of its most basic needs was con­ sequently for fresh water. Yet the village head felt free to monopolize Before the meeting we [klian banjar and heads of tempek] went to everyone to one of the three rain tanks donated by the Malaysian government, while make sure all agreed we had to take responsibility collectively.I was afraid of the the other two corroded in front of his house. Meanwhile, the rest of the outcome if people spoke individually and gave different reasons. So we planned village paid exorbitant rates for water from an in-migrant Bugis entre­ it all carefully. At the meeting I turned it over to the commander to ask for preneur who had invested in a private pipeline to his house. The differ­ himself. So one of our prominent people stood up and spoke for everyone: 'We of Banjar Sangan adrnicopenly we committed a wrong in not carrying out our ent responses of these two communities could not be attributed to duty to participate in ABRI Masuk Desa. It is not lightly that we boykot a significant differences in their leaders' powers or in the commitment of directive from the government. In fact, there is a matter that has caused the their respective central governments to the provision of basic needs. dissatisfaction of people here-100 per cent. It concerns the fresh water tank Rather, the lack of corporate structure and associated tradition of organ­ which we should have gotten. ... We were prepared to do our part ized community action in the Bajau village made it extremely difficult to (berswadaya).... From where did the decision [to exclude Banjar Sangan] come, attempt pooling for the common benefit or to exert public pressure on we want to know? It is a bit like a child thathas been promised it will get some the government-appointed village head to ensure equitable distribution clothes. When in theend nothinghappens, naturally the child feels disappointed of donated resources. Collective inaction was also related to the 230 ADA T AND DINAS VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS IN THE BASIC NEEDS STRATEGY 231 thoroughgoing individualist value system that the Bajau had adopted in management from desa to kabupaten in 1990, despite the positive gains the transformation of social and economic relations which accompanied that had generally been credited to the earlier policy of local manage­ their shift from semi-nomadic subsistence fishing to settled wage-labour ment (Sjahrir, 1986: 114). Not only did the desa lose the opportunity to and petty entrepreneurial activity (Warren, 1980, 1983).25 put profit from self-contracting towards its own projects, but village In the four banjar in Tarian obtaining piped water, the contribution of officials complained about the poor quality of construction materials labour and cash for construction was shared by all banjar members, even used, in their estimates barely worth two-thirds of the value stipulated in though nearly half of the households in Banjar Pekandelan and Banjar officialspecifications ( Cok Yadnya, 1990; I Suta, 1990). Madya already had access to water supplies from private wells. The Many of the cross-bred piglets introduced in the Social Welfare general obligation to contribute to infrastructure costs for collective Department project for low-income families were too young when deliv­ consumption purposes in the name of banjar solidarity, 'atas persatuan ered and died soon after. This precipitated criticism that there had been banjar', whether or not individual households required use of the water cuts taken somewhere in the bureaucratic pipeline and that local pur­ 26 facility was unchallenged (r Mandera, 1983) . chase would have ensured a better outcome (r Dasa, 1984; I Suta, 1985). When an experiment to introduce smallholder commercial chicken farms failed due to a combination of market forces, bureaucratic corruption, and Whose Needs? disease, it left the five participants in the pilot project (including the The family planning and Inpres programmes met and in some respects klian of Banjar Lagas Kangin, Banjar Tegeh, and the desa secretary) exceeded central government objectives. Numerous other programmes with million rupiah debts to show for their considerable investment of 28 were subsequently to become dependent on banjar for implementation. time and energy. In the wake of the model success of the family planning initiative, a The experimental nutrition projects introduced in several banjar in nutrition information and child health screening programme partially Tarian, involving a great deal of voluntary time and labour, eventually sponsored by Unicef was organized through the banjar (BKKBN, dissipated when the minimal Social Welfare Department funds for 1982). Public health officers now make monthly visits to each banjar, purchasing food for the monthly demonstrations failed to materialize. where they are assisted by the klian in weighing pre-school children. Initially enthusiastic about the benefits of tying the project to monthly Separate sets of records are kept by the health department field officer check-ups for infants at the banjar meeting house, banjar officials and and klian banjar, and a progress chart is retained by the parents. Where volunteers from the women's and youth groups became disillusioned at children experience weight decline, vitamins are dispensed or the wasted time and energy (r Dharrna, 1984). The klian of Banjar Besaya parents advised to take them to the Puskesmas clinic at the nearby dis­ claimed there was a drop-offin attendance at infant check-up sessions in trict centre. On occasions when I attended these sessions in four differ­ his banjar after the department repeatedly neglected to provide the ent banjar, from 45 to 80 per cent of pre-school children listed on the vitamin supplements for children who showed weight-loss (I Toya, 1983). banjar register were brought for weighing. Repeated experiences like this inevitably diminish local responsiveness Other basic needs programmes organized under banjar-desa auspices to these programmes. A fairly general level of cynicism had begun to in Tarian during the 1982-6 period included: a pig-rearing project for take hold in Tarian, usually directed at intermediate officialdom rather poor families identified through data collection during the previous vil­ than macro-development policy. On the abortive animal husbandry pro­ lage competition and another for those with disabled members; emer­ grammes, where villagers invested in special feed and medicines only to gency relief after hurricane winds damaged twenty homes; a home lose the promised rewards_ through animal disease or market manipula­ renovation project; vocational training and credit packages to develop tion, one villager remarked acerbicly, 'That's what we call help that kills.' local production of handicrafts and home-based animal husbandry (IPanti, 1985.) Concerning the disappointing outcome of the nutrition pro­ enterprises. Often, however, these fell short of objectives as a result of gramme and alluding to the state's interests in the basic needs agenda, bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency or the sheer inadequacy of the the klian of Sangan commented, 'The government is not paying atten­ programmes to local needs.27 tion to what happens to its programmes. Until there's unrest (kacau), Leaders in Tarian and other desa expressed frustration at the substan­ they won't bother.' (r Dharrna, 1984.) tialloss in real value of materials received for projects when delivery was kabupaten managed through the (r Puja, 1984; I Dharrna, 1985; I Suta, 1985). The Conclusion Social Welfare Department grants for home improvements were offici­ ally set at Rp 100,000 per family, but the real value of materials deliv­ Unquestionably the shift in emphasis on the part of the Indonesian state ered by the department was equivalent to only Rp 85,000. Cement, for towards the provision of basic needs was meant to cement the identi­ example, was listed on delivery documents as Rp 4,000 per cubic metre, fication of nationa). development policy with locally perceived interests. while it could be purchased locally for Rp 3,000. Similar effects accom­ Both the family pfanning and water supply cases show that rhetorical panied the withdrawal of (now substantially reduced) Inpres SD grant identity of interests can be given real substance where well organized 232 ADA T AND DINAS VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS IN THE BASIC NEEDS STRATEGY 233 and responsive institutions are capable of making the relationship out government policy in the basic needs sphere, promoting perpetua­ between village and state a more reciprocal one. 29 In the case of the tion of values based on mutual obligation (gotong royong) and self­ fresh water issue, Banjar Sangan's organizational acuity enabled it to sufficiency (swadaya). But indicative of their relatively low priority and exert political power to place its priorities on the agenda of government awkward relation to macro-development strategy is the patchwork instrumentalities. nature of many of these social welfare projects which are often poorly Such an established organizational base as the banjar at the same time conceived and co-ordinated within the complex bureaucratic hierarchy. offers clear advantages to a national government in the implementation Moreover, at the same time that self-help, consultation, and local parti­ of its policy objectives. The customary practices of monthly meetings cipation are exclaimed in central government rhetoric, its political (sangkepan), collective work (ayahan/gotong royong), and traditional policies seem designed to subvert the local mechanisms which make sanctions against non-participation (dosa) provide a ready means of dis­ their realization possible. The crucial importance of real public involve­ seminating information, collecting data, and obtaining labour for public ment and of community control over local political process and leader­ works, not to mention the service these institutions are expected to pro­ ship illustrate� in these responses to basic needs projects and in the vide to the state in the domain of 'law and order'. 30 The Indonesian self-help programmes discussed previously are urgent considerations in family planning programme benefited from the organizational mech­ assessing Indonesian rural development policy. The implications of anisms and cultural vitality that operate within banjar communities in changes in the village-state administrative apparatus throughout Indo­ adopting Sistem Banjar to ends which served both national objectives nesia will be the subject of the following chapter. and ultimately local interests. Similarly Inpres SD responded to educa­ tional and employment needs in rural Bali, while local management ensured greater efficiency and broadened benefits in the use of state funds. L Morfit (1986: 68-71) points out that decentralization in Inpres programming was a The changing macro-economic picture in Indonesia, accompanied by side-effect of the urgency of providing rural employment and basic infrastructure, rather a significant shift in the dominant economic paradigms achieving thana direct objectiveof thenew policy initiative·itself. Decentralization was relatively lim­ currency in the international arena, has resulted in a number of policy ited, however, since central government specification of purposes and funding levels cir­ changes which may be signalling the demise of the basic needs agenda. cumscribed the degree of discretion which local authorities could exercise. This was also the case with the foreign aid assisted Provincial Area Development Programme (PDP), Inpres funding which reached a high of 24.5 per cent of the national where devolution was an intended objective, but where intervention in project planning development budget in 1978/9, was cut by 29 per cent in the 1987-8 and monitoring inevitably reduced the extent of autonomous initiative actually open to budget following an unprecedented whittling the previous year (Morfit, local government. But see Gow and VanSant (1983: 441-3) who tr�at the degree of de­ 1986: 68; Pangestu, 1987: 17).31 The abolition of subsidized credit for volution accomplished in Indonesia less critically by contrast with rural development small business in 1990 and the promotion of privatized family planning policy elsewhere. See also K. Davey (in Devas, 1989: 169-72) for a condensed discussion of the tensions between centralist and decentralizing pressures in financial arrangements (KB Mandiri) are other indicators of diminished commitment to the affecting local government. funding of basic needs programmes. 2. See Fox (1988) for a discussion of the history and operation of the Village As the decline in oil revenues puts greater pressure on development Development Grant Scheme which was initiated on a very small scale in 1969 with grants expenditure by the Indonesian government, there will inevitably be yet of Rp 100,000 (US$275) to stimulate the development of local infrastructure. The greater emphasis on self-help development and increasing reliance on amount of the grant doubled in 1974-5 and increased regularly until 1982/3 after which it remained fixed until the end of the decade at Rp 1.4 million, equivalent to about unpaid or underpaid labour service. But as the Banjar Sangan example US$1,800 in 1982, but only US$760 at 1987 exchange rates. In 1990/1 the amount was and Bowen's case-studies (1986) also demonstrate, compliance with raised to Rp 3,500,000, including Rp 700,000 specifically designated for projects of the state demands for its version of 'participation' in rural development women's organization, the PKK. projects through the appropriation of unpaid local labour is not auto­ 3. These contributions frequently represent only paper commitment. Gotong royong matic. These demands necessarily must be balanced against individual, labour is not easily recruited beyond banjar bounds and the utilization of a labour pool of 32 perhaps a thousand adult male villagers is inappropriate to thesmall scale of these projects. household, and community needs and priorities. The Bali Post (2 December 1984) reports several problems in the use of grant funds at Basic contradictions remain between the Indonesian government's both central dispensing and local recipient ends. It refers to a declining spirit of gotong express development objectives of capital-intensive modernization on royong, over-ambitious projects which become impossible to complete with the limited the one hand and equity through the provision of basic needs on the funds provided and frequent delays in receipt of grant money. other. The latter have depended on small-scale projects implemented 4. See Appendices 3, 4, and 5 for lists of those projects in Tarian and Sanur which were supported by Bandes and Inpres grants. through local institutions and traditional exchange relations, largely to 5. See Appendix 5 for a breakdown of state and local spending on school construction ameliorate the maldistributive effects of the first. Certainly village-level in Sanur from 1969 through 1984. 6. KIK (Kredit Inv,estasiKecil) and KMKP (Kredit Modal Kerja Permanen) provided institutions have been taken for granted as useful structures for carrying ·'" 234 ADA T AND DINAS VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS IN THE BASIC NEEDS STRATEGY 235 capital for the development of small business. A maximum of Rp 5 million could be bor­ some form of contraceptive at that time may have been overstated. But it is probably a rowed for a period of up to 3 years at 12 per cent interest per annum under KIK and fairly accurate account of the number of eligible couples who had ever used contraceptives 5 years at 15 per cent under KMKP. Concessional credit had been available for many and gives a reasonable indication of the relative use rates of different contraceptive prac­ years to agricultural producers under the Bimas 'mass guidance' rice-intensification pro­ tices there.Province-wide statistics for thatyear show a slightlyhigher rate of IUD use rel­ gramme. Credit supplied to farmers under Bimas was intended to promote macro­ ative to other methods than do Tarian's: IUD-82.2 per cent; pill-8. l per cent; economic policies rather thanbasic needs and was plagued from the outset by high default condom-3.3 per cent; other modern methods-6.4 per cent (BKKBN Quarterly Reports, rates and inflexible central controls (Hansen, 1978; Kem, 1986; Sjahrir, 1986). Many of cited in Streatfield, 1986: 9). the problems experienced by the Bimas programme were attributed to poor communica­ 17. This amounted to Rp 17,500 (US$28) as of 1980 (Streatfield, 1986: 18), which tion and lack of consultation. 'Bimas Gotong Royong became a symbol of government was raised to Rp 30,000 in 1982 (Biro Bina, 1984d: 162), equivalent to US$43 at that inefficiency and coercion . . . arousing animosity of both peasant and local officials alike'. time, but less than half that value by 1988. (Hansen, 1978: 326.) 18. When Tarian reached the 75 per cent acceptor rate, it was invited to send a rep­ 7. These were aimed at freeing artists from the often extortionate dependence on art­ resentative to Jakarta to receive an award. The Village Council decided to send the klian of shop owners for supplies and marketing. The Economics Faculty study found that artists Banjar Besaya, not because his banjar had the highest acceptance rate, but because he was never received more than half of thesale price of their work (UNUD, 1980: 3). the eldest and longest-serving klian banjar and was soon due to retire. 8. Many potential borrowers were also deterred by demands for kickbacks of up to 19. There are PKK at banjar level which do have active programmes. In Banjar Lagas, 10 per cent from bank officers processing loan applications. a scheme provides piglets to be raised by members who share half the selling price, usually 9. See Kern (1986) for a critique of subsidized credit schemes froma free market per­ Rp 40,000-60,000, with the organization.The PKK share is used to purchase more stock, spective. The new small business credit scheme (KUIZ) is government regulated but not with the difference going to the treasury. After accumulating a cash fund of a million subsidized. At 20 per cent in 1990, theseloan rates were still considerablybetter than bank rupiah last year, PKK members decided to have a set of traditional-style blouses made loans on the open market, typically around 30 per cent. which could be worn for both ritual and official occasions. More typically, PKK activities 10. In a shadow play I watched at a temple odalan in 1984 theservant-clowns who pro­ at banjar level are limited to organizing arisan rotating funds, an important source of credit vide the comic interludes and contemporary commentary that are the main source of their for women to be sure. But on the whole, as the experience of Sanur's garment industry popularity withBalinese audiences engaged in a hilarious exchange, playing on the punned (Chapter 7) suggests, the PKK has not developed the organizational base necessary to misrendering of KB as 'Keluarga Besar' (Big Family). assure the commitmentof its member to long-term projects. 11. These were promptly refuted by the Parisada Hindu Dharma which published a 20. Streatfield (pers. com., 19 April 1984) became increasingly convinced of the import­ booklet arguing that nothing in Hinduism forbids family planning and that since ancestral ance of the banjar and its customary basis for the success of family planning and other spirits are fused in the deity Sang Hyang Widi before rebirth, the number of children born government programmes. In his 1986 publication he compares family planning statistics does not affect reincarnation (Oka, 1971). for several banjar in Jembrana, westernBali, with adjacent Muslim communities where the 12. Although there is not the sensitivity to male-female contacts that exists in many banjar system does not operate. He takes the differing prevalence rates averaging 35.9 per Islamic communities, and birth attendants in Bali are often male, some rural women were cent in the Muslim kampongs, compared to an 80.2 per cent rate for the neighbouring distressed at the manner of treatment by male doctors in the alien atmosphere of public banjar as support for his hypothesis that 'thecontinuing strength of the banjar as the basic hospitals and clinics. 'I was shaking with embarrassment when the doctor performed the social unit among Balinese Hindus almost certainly plays a vital role in the explanation of insertion in hospital. His talk made me furious. "Don't be embarrassed. Just pretend I'm the rapid and widespread acceptance of program family planning in Bali' (Streatfield, your father," he said! Not one, but three doctors examined me at once!' (Ni Dami, 1984.) 1986: 151). Obviously, religious differences and the population politics of minority non­ 13. Heavier bleeding, cramps, and spontaneous abortion are associated with nm use. Hindu residents in Bali may be equally important factors in explaining the differential.But In Streatfield's (1986: 121-2) survey, 54 per cent of women who had ever used thenm the high degree of variationindicated by the statistics gives some additionalsupport to the reported that they had experienced problems with it; half of these stopped using this form general argument. of contraceptive as a result. 21. Countervailing values exist, however, in that large families were traditionally associ­ 14. Both Streatfield's (1986) and Poffenberger's (1983) village surveys found current ated in Balinese culture with masculinity, status, and prosperity. The capacity to mount use rates well below official BKKBN statistics. Differences between Streatfield's survey expensive rituals partly also depended on the support of extended family including adult results and the statistics compiled by BKKBN, based on quarterly banjar reports, were of children. the order of 15.7 per cent, his data showing 50.8 per cent compared to the BKKBN figure 22. This and following quotes are taken from my notes of the meeting (6 August 1983). of 66.5 per cent of all eligible couples as current contraceptive users. Much of the appar­ 23. Banjar to the south in Tarian did not have the same difficulties with water access ent discrepancy in banjar-based BKKBN statistics was explained by the unrecorded and were to receive assistance in the form of pumps at a later stage. See Chapter 9 for removal of IUDs from previous users, however (Streatfield, 1986: 68-70). discussion of a corruption charge which arose in connection with the allocation of these. 15. A modest differential of 0.8 children-ever-born (CEB) is reported between highest 24. I had not attended this meeting, but the klian's account was corroborated almost and lowest educational categories; among occupational groups the differential is 1.1 CEB; verbatim by that of the military liaison officer, except that the latter recalled a long silence by economic status it was 0.5 CEB. There were minimal differences in fertility rates before anyone replied to the demand for an explanation of the banjar's failure to carry out according to title-group, but no differential was reported correlated with land-ownership. their obligations, which he interpreted as embarrassment over their provocative behaviour The one category which showed a marked difference in contraceptive use was that of (Ida Bgs Raka, 1984). female civil servants because of the combined effect of several factors-higher incomes, 25. Esman and Uphoff provide similarly contrasting examples of activism in develop­ higher levels of education, and job-related incentives to small families (Streatfield, 1986: ment programmes associated with differing levels of local organization and participation in 91-7). two pairs of communities in India and the Philippines (1984: 7-11). For other examples 16. According to statistics compiled by the local clinic as of 1981, 3 men from Tarian of the impediments to community actionposed by ethics of individualism and family inde­ had been sterilized, compared to 52 women; 55 used condoms, compared to 375 women pendence, see studies of peasant communities in Western Europe in the collection edited registered as using nmsand 24 women using the pill (Puskesmas Quarterly Report, June by Bailey, especially that of Adams (in Bailey, 1971: 177-81) whose informants them­ 1981). The total figure of 509 out of 689 eligible couples in Tarian (74 per cent) using selves blamed individualism and a weak ideology of community for poor management of 236 ADA T AND DINAS VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS IN THE BASIC NEEDS STRATEGY 237 common lands and the failure of other projects of public benefit. along a moderately trafficlced tourist route and fetched a high price, enabling him to pur­ 26. Equity and corporate solidarity principles applied at banjar level, not beyond. chase an equivalent size plot of sawah in another subak and repay his loan with the differ­ Per capita construction contributions varied according to the size of the banjar and there­ ence. They claimed that thosefrom other villages who had been recruited were also ruined fore the number of members among whom costs could be divided. They ranged from by the programme and complained bitterly of market manipulation by both private and Rp 750 per household in the largest Banjar Madya to Rp 4,000 per household in Banjar public dealers and of KUD corruption (I Dasa, 1985; I Suta, 1985). Sangan. Monthly utility charges of Rp 300 were borne individually by consumers. Two 29. Where local needs and institutions did not coincide so well with central policy and years after Sangan's successful 'struggle', pumping facilities were enlarged and the Public practice, outcomes were not spectacular. Government waste-disposal campaigns, more Works Department began to seek new customers in order to cover the costs of the up­ concerned with pleasing tourist sensibilities perhaps than with public hygiene, have not graded service. Withthe expansion of capacity, Banjar Besaya added two new public tanlcs been as successful in persuading people of the coincidence of their kehidupan sejahtera to serve members further south, and Banjar Madya extended its pipeline in 1986 for the (welfare) and pembangunan negara (national development) as family planning clearly has. convenience of residents to the east and west of the central facility. In 1985 the Public See, for example, a Bali Post article (9 April 1981) titled 'KB Sistem Banjar Sukses: Works Department made piped water available directly to homes in Tarian. Consumers Mengapa Kebersihan Sistem Banjar Tidak?' (Family Planning System Banjar Succeeds; could choose to pay for a private pipe and metered water at an average cost of Rp 2,000 Why Doesn't Sanitation System Banjar?) per month direct to their house compound or continue to use the public facility at the 30. Traditional responsibilities for protecting the population against fire, theft, and lower fixed rate of Rp 300. At present, roughly equal numbers of villagers depend on the physical attack are readily extended to policing for the state. (Night-watches, for example, public and private facilities, reflecting on the one hand the high demand for convenient are organized by banjar particularly during election periods.) I happened to be working in provision of fresh water, and on the other, the large number of families who could not the village office the day the first news of the Tanjung Priok incident broke. One of the afford the costs of a direct pipeline. klian present remarked, 'The banjar would never let such a thing get out of hand. You 27. The scale of the home renovation programme grants and the distribution pro­ have only to strilce the kulkul and everyone would be out on the street. And that would be cedures adopted in Tarian did not facilitate the co-operative labour exchange that was the end of it.' (I Suta, 1984.) There was no mention of the somewhat analogous events of supposed to be built into that programme. This might have been feasible if they had 1965, which all over Bali tested presuppositions of local solidarity. chosen to concentrate the grants in a small number of banjar. But given the recent tensions 31. Appendix 3 shows the dramatic drop off in Inpres SD funding in Tarian from its over the distribution of fresh-water facilities, this would have been unacceptable to those pealc in 1982/3 of Rp 33 million to Rp 14 million in 1985/6, Rp 3 million in 1986/7, and banjar forced to wait. In the view of the klian of Sangan, himself a recipient no funds at all in the following year. (see Chapter 3), the project had been carried out in a less than ideal manner. Tl;iis was 32. The coincidence of local and national interests was apparent in Banjar Petulu's use attributed to the thin spread of grants among banjar (one or two in each depending upon of road-building project (Project Padat Karya) funds to raise money for local purposes. size), to the fact that labour exchange was more difficult to organize now that people had There collective consumption goals were compatibly adapted to government objectivesfor become 'a bit bisnis' oriented, and to the small size of the grant whose inadequacy for any better public access and communication. Even in this case, however, the corporate needs substantial renovations meant that work had to be postponed until additional funds could of both village and state must be weighed against lost income opportunities for wage­ be obtained (I Dharma, 1984). In his own case, Dharma had borrowed an additional earners whose gotong royong labour filled banjar coffers (used to purchase a gamelan Rp 200,000 froma bank and anotherRp 120,000 from the rotating credit society to which orchestra), not their household's. The labour utilized was considerably undervalued in he belonged to add to the grant, but was still unable to get together enough to rebuild the terms of very low wages of Rp 600/day being offered by the government under the pro­ small sleeping pavilion (balai daja) of mud bricks which had been levelled. Eventually the gramme. Extremely remote banjar have often had to contribute uncompensated gotong ro­ money was used to refinish and extend his wife's coffee-stall with an attached sleeping yong service and materials to ensure communication or educational facilities for which room at the frontof the compound. In the village of Siang, where there were a larger num­ government financing is either inadequate or entirely unavailable. For example, the ber of grants, it was decided to distribute them in groups of ten among three banjar. Bali Post (4 February 1983) reported that in addition to Rp 5 million from government There, an agreement that an equal number of labour-hours would be exchanged among sources, villagers in two remote communities (Tiyingan and Semanilc) contributed recipients in the same banjar seems to have worked. As in Tarian, the money was to be Rp 4,000 per household and voluntary work on weekends for 2 years on a road construc­ repaid to the desa after 2 years withoutinterest for redistribution to otherfamilies. In both tion project that was still incomplete. Tarian receives greater attention from government desa complaints about discrepancies between officialvaluation of materials and those actu­ departments than remote communities because it is located close to a major tourist centre. ally delivered were voiced (I Puja, 1984). The original water tank in Banjar Pantle, for example, was a spin-off of the main project in 28. The fiveparticipants from Tarian obtained low-interest credit for coop construction the next town, primarily intended to benefit tourists accommodated in home-stays there materials, feed, vitamins and fast-growing hybrid chicken stock, and were given a 3-day rather than the local population. course in modem animal husbandry techniques. I watched Ketut Yanthi and Made Dasa construct a large, elevated bamboo structure, and was impressed by the care and enthusi­ asm they demonstrated in their daily cleaning and feeding routines. But the market price supposedly guaranteed through the regional co-operative (KUD) failed to materialize, and they found that as soon as their stock reached maturity, the price per kilogram dropped rapidly from Rp 1,000 to Rp 900, then Rp 800, and finally Rp 650 per kilogram, well below production costs. Pick-up arrangements via the regional KUD were delayed, leaving participants paying for feed when maximal growth had already been achieved, on top of which KUD representatives expected an unofficial 'cut' ofRp 25 per kilogram out of the market price. For those who were persuaded to persist, the final blow was a series of dev­ astating epidemics which wiped out remaining stocks. Ketut Suta spent the next few years paying off the debt he had acquired in joining the project. Made Dasa was only able to do so finally by selling his 0.25-hectare piece of rice land. He was fortunate that it had been THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 239 heavily on the latter. According to the explanatory notes appended to the legislation, the previously existing heterogeneous situation in which each region had its own style of local organization constituted an obstacle to the 'guidance and intensive direction' necessary to an improved standard of living and to the effective conduct of government 2 9 (UU 5/1979, Penjelasan: 28). Some features of the legislation, such as those related to regularization The Bureaucratization of of electoral practices, financial accounting, the involvement of women, Local Government and the role of village councils appear at first· sight to offer positive reforms to aspects of desa administration. Apparently some of these changes were introduced in response to criticism of the fairly monolithic authority structure which had developed historically around the position of desa head (lurah) in Java. There, bengkok lands associated with village office formed the basis of deeply entrenched patronage arrangements GOVERNMENT policy statements on rural development in New Order and leadership perceived as unresponsive to government programmes Indonesia repeatedly mention the importance of engaging the participa­ (Zacharias, 1979; Breman, 1982; N. Schulte Nordholt, 1982; Tjondro­ tion of the rural population. The policy outlines for the fourth and fifth negoro, 1984). Unfortunately, most of the 1979 reforms, undermined development plans (Repelita) state that the greatest attention must be by elitist presuppositions and an overriding concern to draw local gov­ given to furthering rural development by increasing the participation ernment more firmly into the orbit of central control, have had the (partisipasi), preparedness (prakarsa), and self-reliance (swadaya) of reverse effect of reinforcing the powers of this position and, ironically, village society (GBHN, 1983: 56; 1988: 56-7). The Department of imposing a 'Javanized' village structure on the rest of the country (Kato, Home Affairs proclaims the desa the 'bulwark . . . for implementing 1989: 94). Pancasila', 'the site for guiding and increasing the spirit of gotong ro­ yong', and the 'pillar of public participation in all facets of government, development and society' (Depdagri 1986b: 2). To some extent this Bureaucratization of Local Officials rhetorical posturing reflects the central government's real dependence The Village Government Law and subsequent ministerial decrees and on local organization in the realization of its policy agenda. But the regional implementing legislation establish a multi-tiered administrative emphasis on popular participation and local self-reliance in economic hierarchy from neighbourhood through provincial level ( see Figure 9 .1). development does not extend to the political sphere. Under the 1979 law the village head, kepala desa, becomes the sole The rhetoric of participation is contradicted by ingrained assumptions popularly chosen leader in the local government hierarchy. The legisla­ in bureaucratic circles regarding the limited capacities of a 'traditionally tion and associated regulations specify in some detail the responsibilities oriented' rural populace to deal with modern social change and by the of this office, procedures for election and limits on tenure (UU 5/1979: higher priority given to social control over against genuine local partici­ §§4-10; Mendagri 6/81). The kepala desa is to hold office for an 8-year pation in the political process. These paternalistic perceptions and term and may be re-elected for only one additional term. Under normal instrumental priorities are manifest in central government efforts to circumstances at least two candidates must contest elections for village bureaucratize village-level government throughout Indonesia. With the head. In the event of a single nominee, regulations require the provision 1979 Village Government Law (Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia of an unmarked ballot box to permit voters to reject a sole candidate. No. 5 Tahun 1979 tentang Pemerintahan Desa, henceforth cited as The single candidate/blank ballot box (kotak kosong) alternative is widely 1 UU 5/1979) and subsequent ministerial regulations, the New Order has used in Bali because of a distaste for overt competition for local office. It undertaken a thoroughgoing reorganization and co-option of local gov­ is not unknown, however, for the anonymous ballot box to win.3 In that ernment in the name of more efficient development. case, or if less than two-thirds of the eligible voters cast their ballot, the election must be repeated. To win office a candidate must achieve a 'Reforming' Local Administration plurality of the votes cast. On the one hand, these provisions should work against the monopol­ The 1979 Village Government Law sets out to establish uniform local ization of local office. In a number of instances where individuals administrative structures across Indonesia with the stated objectives of had dominated local government for decades, regulations limiting office­ increasing the level of public participation in development and the holding provided the opportunity to replace them and in some com­ effectiveness of village administration, the weight of emphasis falling munities to alter· the local balance of power. On the other hand, 240 ADA T AND DINAS THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 241 FIGURE 9.1 feature of local politics, which provide that foundation. In the post­ Local Government Administrative Hierarchy under colonial framework, elected klian dinas represented banjar interests on Village Government Law 5/1979 village councils. This key representative link to the popularly based banjar units so critical to the effective functioning of the administrative desa is broken under the 1979 legislation. Heads of hamlets (dusun) are Province Propinsi henceforth to be appointed by the camat, a civil servant (and therefore a Gubernur government appointee of non-local origin) from nominees submitted by I the kepala desa (UU5/1979: §16). Region Kabupaten Bupati The transformation of local government into an arm of the central I bureaucracy is more thoroughgoing still among those villages which District have their status changed from desa to kelurahan. As defined in the legis­ lation, kelurahan, unlike desa, 'have no right to conduct their own affairs' (UU 5/1979: §1).7 In consequence, kelurahan lose control over their Village Desa/ =7.�Kelurahan leadership and over financial affairs. While at least the head of the Kepala Desa Kepala Kelurahan administrative desa (kepala desa) remains an elected official in the new I system, this does not apply to the kepala kelurahan (lurah) as head of an Hamlet Dusun/Banjar Lingkungan 'upgraded' village. In the latter structure, heads of both village (kelu­ Kepala Dusun/Klian Banjar Kepala Lingkungan 8 "'-.., / rahan) and hamlet (in the kelurahan structure, known as lingkungan) become appointed civil servants who have unlimited terms of office and Subhamlet � (Rukun Warga)" / whose obligations are entirely to the administrative hierarchy Neighbourhood Unit (Rukun Tetangga)" (UU 5/1979: §§24, 31). Although the practice initially was to appoint kelurahan officials from within the local community, there were from the outset instances where this did not occur and current indications are that Note: Light italics indicate the title of the government official responsible at each level. civil servants will be circulated among these positions taking no account "The sub-dusun units, rukun warga and rukun tetangga, were created by a subsequent of local origin. regulation of the Minister of the Home Affairs (Mendagri7/1983) and were mentioned in Criteria for designation as kelurahan are primarily the degree of relat­ the original law. ive modernization of a village and its centrality to the administrative hierarchy. For example, desa in urban areas and those which are the seat restrictive qualifications for candidates4 and supra-village scrutiny and of regional or district administration (kabupaten or kecamatan) have been approval of nominees severely limit local autonomy in choosing the vil­ the first to be reclassified. To the end of 1984, of 594 administrative lage head. 5 It is also the case that the powers vested in the position of desa in Bali, 79 had their status changed to kelurahan. Balinese regional kepala desa leave little scope for the expression of other political perspec­ and provincial officials responsible for implementing the legislation tives in the local decision-making process. All other village functionaries expressed the expectation that eventually kelurahan would become the are nominated or appointed directly by the village head. predominant form of village organization in Indonesia. This was Most critical for Balinese community organization, and particularly apparently the original intention behind the Village Government Law. the banjar, are those provisions of the 1979 law concerning the manner The Home Affairs Minister and the Commander of Security Operations of selection of hamlet leaders. No representative framework is provided (Kopkamtib) proposed the incorporation of all village heads within the under the legislation at hamlet level (the· banjar dinas in Bali, called civil service and elimination of elections (N. Schulte Nordholt, 1985: 15; dusun6 under the new law), which from the point of view of public Kato, 1989: 109). Financial considerations dictated otherwise, and in involvement is more important than the desa. Dinas heads of banjar, now the final form of the law these changes applied only to those centrally called kepala dusun, are to be appointed by superordinate authorities for located and administratively strategic villages to be designated kelurahan. indefinite terms of office, instead of elected by their banjar for 5-year terms as had been previous practice. Desa Councils Despite the policy focus on the desa as the smallest unit of local governmentsince colonial times, the administrative desa in Bali lacks any The structure and role of village councils under the 1979 Village real foundation in local social life. It is the banjar, where adat and dinas Government Law further reflects the contradictory objectives of central units more closely coincide and where direct popular participation i:t;i government policy towards popular participation. In place of previously decision-making through monthly meetings (sangkepan) is a customary existing village councils, which had been brought under the uniform 242 ADA T AND DINAS THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 243 label of Lembaga Sosial Desa (LSD: Village Social Council), by the FIGURE 9.2 Ministry of Home Affairs in 1972 (Mendagri 5/1972), two bodies have LKMD: Organizational Structure been created: the Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa (LKMD: Vil­ lage Public Security Council) and Lembaga Musyawarah Desa (LMD: Village Consultative Council) (UU 5/1979: §17; Mendagri 27 /1984; KETUAUMUM Depdagri 1986a; Depdagri 1986b). The LKMD, a predominantly elected council operating in both desa KETUAI and kelurahan, is intended to provide the main organ for public parti­ KETUAII cipation in development. In replacing the previously established Lem­ baga Sosial Desa, its allegedly expanded role is to 'activate public SECRETARY participation to carry out development in a coordinated way whether it originates from various government activities or through community TREASURER self-help initiatives (swadaya gotong royong masyarakat)' (Mendagri 27/1984: §§2-3). The kepala desa/kelurahan is ex officio head (ketua umum), assisted by a 'prominent villager' (pemuka) as First Chairperson (ketua I) and by the head of the women's organization, the PKK 0 QJ � � (specified as the wife of the kepala desa) as Second Chairperson (ketua II) (see Figure 9.2). Members of the LKMD are to be nominated CO-ORDINATION RE SPON SIBILITIES through public deliberations (musyawarah) in each dusun or lingkungan and elected at a public meeting of the desa/kelurahan. They are KETUAUMUM KETUAI confirmed for a period of service of 5 years by the bupati via the kepala KETUAII desa/kelurahan and camat and are responsible to the village head 1. Religion 5. Environment 10. PKK (Mendagri 27/1984: §§6-8). 2. P 4 6. Development, Economy, and The LMD, the Village Consultative Council, which does not exist in villages designated as kelurahan, is charged with 'realizing Pancasila 3. Security Co-operatives Democracy in local government' and 'conveying the aspirations of the 4. Education and 7. Healthand Family Planning village public' (UU 5/1979: §17, notes; Mendagri 2/1981; Depdagri 1986b: 29). It has the authority to constitute the Electoral Committee Information 8. Youth Sport and Art for nominating candidates and conducting the election of kepala desa, 9. Social Welfare and to advise the kepala desa concerning the nomination of candidates for desa secretary and kepala dusun (Mendagri 2/1981; Depdagri Source: Attachment to Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negeri, No. 27, 1984. 1986b: 10). The LMD is required to meet at least once a year to receive the report of the kepala desa, and to approve village decisions (keputusan desa), including the budget (APPKD). The head of the LMD (and of (kewibawaan) of Desa Government and in order that this body not be the LKMD) is the kepala desa and its membership is to comprise an used as a forum oposisi, the head of · the aforementioned Lembaga equal number of kepala dusun, leaders of important local social institu­ Musyawarah Desa will be the kepala desa ex officio.... ' (Biro Bina, tions and 'prominent' villagers (pemuka-pemuka desa) (UU 5/1979: §17). 1984/5: 13.) Furthermore, the LMD operates under the supervision of Given that the LMD is supposed to realize 'democracy'9 in local gov­ the camat who is to attend its deliberations as pengarah-literally, ernment, it is more than ironic that aside from the kepala desa, its mem­ 'director' (Depdagri 1986b: 41). bers are not elected and have indefinite terms of appointment. It is the Understandably, no little confusion e:xists at local level over the differ­ kepala desa who nominates the members of the LMD in consultation ences in functions of the two councils and the relation of the whole with unspecified 'prominent persons' in the village (UU 5/1979: § 17). apparatus to the wider public it is supposed to involve. 10 Theoretically, Since the kepala desa appoints the LMD and is in turn nominated by it engaging public participation is the purpose of the LKMD. It must be (Depdagri 1986a: 10), the two are clearly not intended to be independ­ consulted on the desa budget and on decisions related to development, ent representatives of the public interest. In one of its publications on . but it has no powers. The LMD has formal powers in village the new law, the provincial bureau responsible for local government government, but is not popularly constituted. The only mention of points out that the LMD is structured explicitly to prevent it from direct involvement of .the public in the form of village meetings (rapat becoming a forum of opposition: 'In order to protect the authority desa) occurs in vague references to a role in the election of members of 244 ADA T AND DINAS THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 245 the LIZMD (Mendagri 27/1984) and discussion of the proposed annual women's organization, the PKK (Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga: 12 budget (Depdagri 1986b: 39). 11 Family Welfare Association), in it. Here, once again, rhetoric and Neither the LKMD nor theLMD constitutes a check on the exercise practice are at odds. While the preamble to the ministerial decree on the of authority by thekepala desa. In contrast with the intent, structure, and PKK notes the need for participation of 'all the people' to ensure the functioning of villagecouncils which had been established spontaneously success of national development and points to the role of women in many communities after the Indonesian revolution, the role envisaged through the PKK as the 'motivating force' behind the development of in the legislation for the LMD and LKMD that replaces them can only society 'growing from below', the most striking feature of the decree is be regarded as regressive. The desa council established in Desa Tarian, the explicitly dependent and unrepresentative character of women's par­ was originally formed in the 1950s with the explicit objective of bal­ ticipation. At every level of the organization from national down to local ancing the administrative powers of the village head with those of a rep­ bodies, the head of the PKK is specified as the wife of the relevant gov­ resentative decision-making body. The klian banJar and additional ernment official (Mendagri 28/1984: §§9-13). The entire membership proportionally elected representatives from each banJar in Tarian formed of the village-level PKK Action Team (Tim Penggerak), which has at its the Dewan Desa. In the first years of its existence, meetings of the disposal a proportion of the budget for projects related to women, is Dewan Desa rotated among banJar in order to familiarize the population appointed by the village head, the kepala desa/kelurahan (Mendagri with its workings. Important proposals were forwarded to monthly 28/1984: §16). The explicit function of local PKK units, according to banJar meetings for discussion before action was taken at desa level, a the government's own official statements, remains a passive one of practice maintained to the present. When the Dewan Desa was renamed transmitting government directives and promoting state ideology to the the Lembaga Sosial Desa as a result of the government's earliest efforts mass of ordinary women (N. Sullivan, 1983: 160). to promote and systematize village councils (Keppres 81/1971; Men­ The vision of women's role in Indonesian development which has dagri 5/1972), its composition and operationsremained unchanged. The characterized the PKK from its inception exhibits the classic patterns of pivotal role of banJar assemblies in securing public involvement in village 'domestication' (Rogers, 1980) and 'housewifization' (Mies, 1986). It government and of banJar leaders as the key representatives on the desa assumes a dependent economic position in the household and promotes council prevails despite subsequent changes imposed on village adminis­ an ideology of the family and women's place in it which is more com­ tration. patible with the state's interest in social control than with its stated According to N. Schulte Nordholt (1985: 15), the Democratic Party economic objectives of expanded production and improved living of Indonesia (PDI) voted against the provisions of the 1979 legislation standards. 13 Women's participation in development projects as con­ related to village councils, foreseeing that the structure and division of ceived in policy-making circles is usually confined to those areas which functions between thetwo bodies would eliminate whatever independent revolve around housework and child-care-nutrition, health, family voice had been centredpreviously on the single village council, the LSD. planning, etc.-while ignoring women's economic needs and political N. Schulte Nordholt's study documents the changes in the role and pur­ potential. V. Hull (1976: 21-2) remarks that the order of the five major pose of the original LSD, initially promoted by the Department of 'duties' promulgated by the PKK tellingly places the Indonesian Social Affairs as a mechanism for encouraging autonomous local action woman's role as 'citizen' last, after those of 'producer' and 'socializer' of in community development. The conversion of village councils into the nation's next generation, 'husband's companion', and 'household instruments of 'top-down' administration began with the increasing manager'. involvement of the Department of Home Affairs in village administra­ Suryakusuma (1991) uses the term 'State Ibuism' to describe the New tion after 1965. Home Affairs was much more concerned with asserting Order's construction of womanhood as simultaneously instrumental and central control in line with internal security priorities than the Depart­ dependent. A woman's role is to serve her family, her community, and ment of Social Affairs had been. It increased its influence over local the state without recognition as an independent political and economic councils through the introduction of desa subsidies and competitions. actor. Like Djajadiningrat (1987), she argues that New Order gender The process was sealed with thefull transfer of control over desa admin­ ideology represents a fusion of traditional elite (priJaJz) values and those istration from the Department of Social Affairs to the Ministry of Home of the Western middle classes in which women's social identities Affairs (see Keppres 81/1971) which now has sole authority to imple­ are defined by husband and home. If the activities of the PKK serve ment the 1979 law. women's interests at all, it is only likely to be those of middle-class women who benefit from bureaucratic state policy through their husbands' positions (Y. Hull, 1976). The Participation of Women N. Sullivan (1983) observed very different patterns in PKK meetings The importance of women's participation in national development is at local and district levels which she suggests reflect the great distance specifically dealt with in recent Home Affairs Ministerial Decrees con­ between rural needs and the class interests that PKK ideology and prac­ cerning the new structure of the LKMD and the role of the official tice actually serve. Financial transactions, informal politicking, and ADA T DINAS 246 AND THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 247 socializing dominated the urban kampong gatherings she observed at the lack of a customary foundation for separate women's organizations in expense of the official part of the meetings which 'passed quickly' and Bali, and the general irrelevance and hierarchical structure of the 'largely unnoticed' (N. Sullivan, 1983: 162). At district level meetings, modern PKK organization which alleges to fill this vacuum. The form on the other hand, official PKK business was the focus of discussion. I of 'special emphasis' on women reflected in the present reorganization did not attend PKKmeetings in the kecamatan, but found N. Sullivan's of village government only exacerbates their political alienation. discussion of ward meetings in the Jogjakarta kampong she studied typical of banjar PKK activities in Tarian. On the whole they were not Budgetary Accountability and Data Collection well attended except when they were used to organize rotating credit funds (arisan). The legislation requires annual submission of a Village Income and Although Balinese women are very active in economic affairs outside Expenditure Plan-the APPKD (Anggaran Penerimaan dan Penge­ the home, their lack of direct inclusion in local political organization is luaran Keuangan Desa) (UU 5/1979: §21). It is to outline all income notable, and there is considerable scope for improving their participation and expenditure as either of two types: the Routine Budgetary Estimate at banjar and desa level. Patrilineal and patrilocal customary practice in includes costs of stationery, equipment, maintenance of buildings and Bali compounded by the central government's focus on the male head of roads, salaries, etc.; the Development Budgetary Estimate lists sources household (kepala keluarga: KK) in all official mattershave the practical of income and planned expenditure on infrastructure, communications, effect of excluding women from formal involvement in political affairs at marketing, and social and productive development. The APPKD is to hamlet and village level. 14 The fact that women do not normally attend be prepared by the kepala desa after consultation with one of the desa banjar assemblies should not be construed to mean that they have no councils (LKMD) and ratification by the other (LMD). It must then be influence on banjar practice, of course. As we have seen, informal rela­ forwarded to the bupati via the camat for approval (Depdagri tions are an extremely important part of local institutional practice. The 1986a: 25). successful organization of the family planning programme through 'Sis­ In conjunction with more rigorous accounting on fiscal matters, a tem Banjar' appears less of a paradox than at first sight when the im­ thoroughgoing expansion and regularization of village record-keeping portance of information networks centred on family, work-group (seka), has also been undertaken. Detailed inventories, cash-books, notes on and coffee-shops within the banjar are taken account of. Still, as the meetings and attendance records are required of village administrators. heavy stress on women's responsibilities for contraception would indi­ Procedures for recording and reporting statistics on agriculture, family cate, women's interests are likely to be served through these structures planning, health, as well as the economic and political activities of village only so long as they do not conflict with those of men. residents have been established and training programmes for record The lack of genuine representation within the new village government maintenance initiated. The collection of such information unquestion­ framework thwarts any likelihood that the PKK might become a forum ably expands the opportunities for state control. At the same time, up­ for expressing the particular concerns of village women in the public grading bookkeeping practices is a reform necessary to increase the sphere or for asserting women's claims with respect to local develop­ efficiency and public accountability of village administration. Training ment strategies. The wife of the desa head, as the one prescribed agent courses aimed at developing village officials' administrative skills were concerned with women's affairs on the village council, could not be generally considered worthwhile by local leaders. But they were discon­ expected to question the orientation of local programmes publicly. tented about the increasing amounts of time consumed by paperwork Informal pressures are even less likely to be forthcoming or effective if and the collection and reporting of data which was often trivial or the village is a kelurahan and the village head himself is not an elected, redundant. They recentlyregistered complaints to the Minister of Home and possibly not even a local, figure. Affairs, Rudini, regarding the burden and inefficiency involved in main­ The cumulative effect is to place women at the bottom of both a taining the 17 sets of books currently required (I Dasa, 1991). bureaucratic and a gender-based hierarchy. Their purported role as 'motor force' under the new legislation gives them no more opportunity for taking initiative than they had previously, and in some respects less. Implementation in Bali In Tarian, with the reorganization of the Desa Council that followed the The establishment of a separate bureau within the office of the 1984 Decree of the Home Affairs Minister, the two women who had Governor of Bali, the Biro Bina Pemerintahan Desa, specifically to been chosen to sit on the council because of their personal qualities and oversee the introduction of the Village Government Law, and the pro­ experience as a teacher and public health nurse were replaced in the new duction of a series of publications on its implementation in the province formal structure by the gentry wife of the village head who had no active (Biro Bina, 1984a, 1984b, 1984c, 1984d, 1984/5) are indications of the involvement in the PKK previously. The comparative weakness of PKK long-term significance attached to it. Nevertheless, a decade after its programmes noted in Chapters 7 and 8 can be attributed to both the introduction, the full impact of the 1979 Law has yet to be felt. 15 248 ADA T AND DINAS THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 249 Restructuring has been very slow and cushioned by informal conces­ Policy (GBHN), and the Work Programme of the Fourth Development sions to customary practice. In Desa Tarian klian banjar were installed Plan-his own selection criteria included factors such as whether the as kepala dusun only in 1984. candidate had a deformity or appeared nervous during the screening. One reason for the limited and gradual implementation of the provi­ Such personal characteristics would detract from the image of authority sions of the new law has been the cost of increasing the number of civil he thought appropriate to government office (I Kader, 1984). servants on the national payroll. A letter (11/1/84) from the Minister of The new legislation gives district and regional officials a degree of Home Affairs to provincial governors indicates that kepala lingkungan involvement in banjar affairs which had never existed before. Neither the have not yet been officially instated to the civil service because there has camat nor the perbekel previously had a role in the selection, approval, or been to date no budgetary increase to cover their salaries. For the same installation of banjar heads. The camat cited above complained that reason, despite expectations that bureaucratized kelurahan would before implementation of the new law, changes in banjar leadership were increasingly replace administrative desa, no further reclassifications have often not even reported to him. In the case of Tarian, all klian proposed taken place in Bali since 1984. Nor have adequate funds been provided by their respective banjar were in fact appointed kepala dusun. But the to subsidize kelurahan budgets, leaving them to cover their own costs mere knowledge that selection must be confirmed by higher authorities even though they technically have no authority to do so under the 1979 inevitably introduces new considerations into the process of choosing Law. local leaders. The provincial government is also treading softly because of the The regulations stipulate lower secondary education as a minimum recognized sensitivity of the law's provisions regarding village leader­ qualification for appointment to the position of kepala dusun (as well as ship. A district official charged with introducing the new system said he village-level officesof secretary and divison heads, kepala urusan). Since had avoided the disruptionexperienced elsewhere by experimenting first only 14 per cent of Indonesia's adult population have been educated to in villages that had been least politically active in the past and making this level (BPS, Statistik Indonesia, 1986), rigid educational requirements adjustments in methods as he moved to those more likely to put up would seriously limit the potential pool of local leaders, and certainly resistance. The first stages of restructuringwere introduced piecemeal in their class base. Most banjar heads have only primary schooling. This is one village after another, where possible using village competitions the case in Desa Tarian, where only two of the ten klian banjar have (Zomba desa) as the main vehicle for putting in place the new provisions secondary qualifications. It should be stressed that there was no correla­ on local government. tion between level of formal education and generally acknowledged The most radical changes have been muted by applying 'discretion' competence among the local leaders I studied. In fact some of the most (bijaksana) in implementation procedures. In most cases where desa active and efficient possessed no secondary qualifications. Among these have become kelurahan the status of lurah or kepala lingkungan was were Wayan Mandera, the klian of Banjar Madya in Tarian, who shared simply conferred upon incumbent elected officials. With respect to the responsibility for the village savings and loan co-operative and was appointment of administrative heads of dusun/banjar, kepala desa are highly regarded for his organizational abilities and meticulous record­ advised by provincial authorities in Bali to consult banjar before nom­ keeping and Ida Bagus Beratha, the village head so instrumental in inating the requisite minimum two candidates to the camat for 'screen­ Sanur's development programme. Although the clause 'or equivalent ing' and appointment (I Kader, 1984). Effectively, traditional election experience' in the legislation provides sufficient flexibility, the emphasis procedures continue, with the name of the banjar-chosen leader and one on formal qualifications provides a convenient rationale for the rejection of his assistants (petajuh/klian tempek) presented to the camat in ranked of some nominees when supra-village authorities are so inclined.16 order. The head of the Bureau (Biro Bina Pemerintahan Desa) estab­ Bijaksana ( discretion) was also applied to aspects of the restructuring lished to implement the new law in Bali explained that this informal of desa councils. Regulations regarding the composition and size of the modification was necessary since 'there is no doubt that a banjar official LMD (maximum of 15) would preclude the membership of all kepala appointed without the support of the membership would be completely dusun in large villages, leaving some banjar with no voice at all on this useless', an argument reiterated by numerous local leaders and civil ser­ council. Appointive procedures established by the law notwithstanding, vants I interviewed. kepala dusun continue to be elected in Bali and are expected by their But a number of officials admitted that there have been instances, constituencies to represent banjar interests. Given the extent of the nevertheless, where camat rejected banjar-elected candidates and insisted administrative desa's dependence on component banjar for its opera­ on appointments in accord with their personal criteria of suitability. One tions, the exclusion of banjar leaders from any formal decision-making camat I interviewed stated that he had several times failed the first-ranked body at desa level would undoubtedly cut off communication and abort banjar candidate, on one occasion turning back both nominees and the one working relationship which has proved capable of making village requesting a new slate. Above and beyond the officially prescribed test administration effective. Concern over this issue precipitated corres­ of the candidates' knowledge of national programmes and philosophy­ pondence between the Governor of Bali and the Department of Home Pancasila, Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, the Broad Outlines for State Affairs. In response to the Governor's letter indicating the problem 250 ADA T AND DINAS THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 251 posed by the exclusion of some banjar heads, the Minister of Home Discretion is of course an amorphous commodity in politics, and may Affairs simply reaffirmed the prescribed formula and obliquely advised be used to different ends depending on the balance of power in particu­ 'selectivity' in filling the positions (Biro Bina, 1984c: 68-79). lar situations. For some officials bijaksana justified informal modifica­ If the requirement to assure a balance among the three categories of tions important to ensuring the continuity of what they regarded as 'kepala dusun, leaders of local institutions, and other prominent figures' more appropriate and effective local practices. In other contexts bijak­ in the appointment of LMD membership had been rigidly applied in sana was simply a temporary instrumental strategy. The camat cited Tarian, only half of the ten heads of dusun!banjar could theoretically earlier, also remarked, 'At the moment, because of possible problems, have been included. This problem, compounded by another ministerial we are not concerned to push the letter of the law-this is a "transisz". directive (Mendagri 27/1984) restructuring the LKMD and reducing Later we can tighten up.' (I Kader, 1987.) the number of its members, only recently elected by their banjar, caused considerable difficulties. A 1984 council meeting, occasioned by this The Impact of Reorganization: Sanur newest ministerial directive, precipitated lengthy discussion in an effort to work out a compromise between local principle and official prescrip­ In many parts of Bali, discretionary practices have limited the impact of tion.17 It was decided that all banjar heads would remain on the LMD, reorganization on local government to date and muted the effects of taking up ten of its fifteen places. Because of overlapping adat and dinas bureaucratization policies. Accommodation proved short-lived, however, roles of klian banjar in Tarian, they could technically qualify as in villages such as Sanur which was more acutely affected because it appointees under either of the other two categories, thereby remaining experienced both subdivision and 'upgrading' to kelurahan status. within the letter, if not exactly the intent, of the law. Already elected Since the colonial period Desa Sanur had been a single administrative council members who were in excess of the now prescribed number unit superimposed on the two traditional desa adat of Sanur and Intaran. of positions on the councils would be co-opted to one of the subcom­ After the introduction of the Village Government Law in 1979 it mittees. became three separate administrative villages, one of which was officially The rapidity of changes to regulations regarding local government designated a kelurahan, while the other two became independent desa. structures has generally been disruptive and wasteful.A new apparatus The division into separate administrative units appears not to have has barely the opportunity to start functioning before it is reorganized or changed the practical functioning of Sanur's development programme in replaced. 'Everytime there is a new minister everything has to be the first years following promulgation of the new law. The status quo changed for no better reason than to show that he has authority prevailed largely because Ida Bagus Beratha, as the incumbent perbekel, (berwenang). When there's a new Education Minister, the children have became the first lurah in line with the provincial policy of discretionary to buy a new colour uniform.... When there's a new Home Affairs appointment of incumbents. Beratha was able to keep intact the organ­ Minister the village councils get reorganized. How are we supposed to izational structure Sanur had established for managing its affairs until be making progress when we are always having to revamp what was just his death in 1986. starting to work?' ( Cok Anom, 1984.) Widespread complaints in Tarian Several aspects of the restructuring and loss of control over its own about the debilitating effects of continual changes in government legisla­ affairs as a kelurahan posed serious problems for the village development tion and programming were echoed in Sanur. 'Before any new plan can programme which Sanur had built up over two decades. First of all, be put into action, it has already changed; just as a work plan is pre­ kelurahan as non-autonomous villages lose their fiscal independence. pared, it is cut off.' (Ida Bgs Beratha, 1984.) They are meant primarily to administer development projects as dir­ Modifications to comply with local representative practices are affec­ ected from higher levels of government. Opinions among departmental ted by the judicious application of bijaksana. In practice, the klian officials differed on whether the loss of rights to raise money would banjar remain the core representative group in Tarian, handling village entirely preclude non-autonomous kelurahan from 'owning' an enter­ affairs at weekly meetings with the kepala desa and village secretary. This prise in the name of its members. Beratha believed that under the pre­ inner executive typically initiates discussion on local matters. Their sent circumstances it would have been much more difficult for Sanur to proposals are then given consideration at banjar meetings and the desa get its development programme off the ground. The head of the Biro councils. There is little but formal distinction between LMD and Bina Pemerintahan Desa agreed that what Sanur had undertaken in the LKMD which usually meet together, although decisions are recorded as 1960s would theoreticallybe outside its jurisdiction as a kelurahan, since if separately concluded to comply with structural formalities. Discretion­ among other things, it no longer has the right to raise public funds.But ary adjustments to central government regulations were rationalized on because to date no subsidies for the administration of kelurahan have the very reasonable grounds that the local formula for village representa­ been forthcoming, the bureau necessarily turns a blind eye to fund­ tion is simpler and more democratic than the official one. How success­ raising activities. ful the strategy of modified compliance will be depends very much on Secondly, wh�n the core village of Sanur became a kelurahan under the sensitivity of intermediate levels of government. the new legislation, it lost the right to elect all dinas officials. Beratha, as 252 ADA T AND DINAS THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 253 previously elected head of the desa, was simply appointed kepala kelu­ smaller number of new geographically rationalized subvillage units rahan in 1980 when the law was put into effect there. What happened (dusun in the two desa, lingkungan in the kelurahan) were supposed to following his death in 1986, however, gives some indication that the replace the twenty-four banjar dinas which had corresponded to banjar bijaksana policy of discretionary concession to public opinion will give adat. This caused both confusion and resistance, 'because these ties are way over time to increasingly more direct exercise of control by upper so deeply connected to beliefs' (Ida Bgs Beratha, 1984). The loss of the banjar levels of the bureaucracy. During the following year Sanur proposed a base to Sanur's administrative structure would cripple it. Public con­ string of nominees who were one after another rejected by provincial fidence rested on its role as overseer, particularly with respect to the dis­ authorities without explanation. An adat leader who was also involved tribution of employment opportunities and budgetary allocations. 'We with Beratha in the village development programme from its inception had to register a protest, because with Keputusan [Mendagri] Number commented: 17, 1984 we saw that there was no klian dinas. Without the klian dinas there would be nobody to examine records, no advisory group.' According to the law the kepala kelurahan is appointed from above. But there (Ida Bgs Beratha, 1984.) Restructured lingkungan replacing banjar dinas existed should be discretion (kebijaksanaan) ... because a principle of development is only on paper until Beratha's death, when Sanur began to experience that it must be by and for the people (masyarakat) .... Don't go giving something to the people that they don't want. That isn't good and conflicts with greater pressure to put into effect a full reorganization. These pressures religious law. We made overtures both. formally and informally. We had to were not well received: provide reasons for every name we put up, but from the government we never The implementation of this regulation is not yet 100 per cent, not even 50 per received a reason for their rejection. (Ida Bgs Oka, 1987.) cent.... There has yet to be co-operation.Excuse me if I speak rather negatively, In April 1987 a relation of the deceased lurah, a naval officer who had I think there must be negotiation.. . . I was on one occasion interrogated by a spent the last 10 years away from his home village on assignment in government official, 'Why had we postponed establishing the lingkungan boundaries?' 'Yes, of course, I said, 'but how is it to be done? It s easy enough Java, was seconded from the armed forces and appointed to fill the ' ' to play at putting lines on a piece of paper!' (Ida Bgs Oka, 1987.) vacant position.18 Finally, restructuring threatens to undermine the successful working Local resistance appears to have had some influence on the recognition relationship between the banjar and village level administration in Sanur of pre-existing banjar boundaries in the restructuring which was origin­ which had been developed over two decades. Sanur had founded its ally to have been more drastic and was still in process in 1991. own Desa Council in 1963. The later introduction of Lembaga Sosial The future of the village industries and the direction of local develop­ Desa as village councils in 1973 (Mendagri 5/1972) throughout Indo­ ment in Sanur, matters of deep concern in that community, depend ulti­ nesia involved no serious adjustments, 'having no more effect than a mately on the character of local leadership and the level of public change of name' (Sanur, 1982: 2). But later changes were to alter involvement it is able to maintain. The effects of local government significantly the machinery Sanur had established for managing its 'reform' in a village regarded as a model of self-help development by industries and its capacity to maintain some degree of public control provincial authorities do not augur well for the direction in which over local development. Elected banjar and desa officials had played key bureaucratization policies will take other communities in Bali. roles in building public confidence and getting Sanur's village-owned industries off the ground. The desa councils (BPD, later LSD, then Misplaced Priorities LKMD), composed mainly of klian dinas representing each banjar, had served as guardians of the public interest. Despite lip-service to the principle of wider representation of the public Like Tarian, Sanur attempted to retain a more broadly based and in village administration, the new legislation actually formalizes the representative desa council. For several years after subdivision, a single centralization of authority in the hands of the kepala desa and supra­ LKMD continued to operate covering the three administrative desa and village officials-the camat and bupati-to whom he is in turn respons­ including all dinas heads of banjar. 19 In its report, published by the ible.20 Under the legislation the village secretary, administrative Directorate of Village Development for emulation by other commun­ assistants (kepala urusan), kepala dusun, and members of the LMD are ities, Sanur noted that it had not fully succeeded in accommodating all nominated or appointed directly by the kepala desa (UU 5/1979; ministerial directives with respect to the Desa Council. 'The organ­ Mendagri 8/1981). Predictably these powers of appointment invite izational structure of theLKMD Sanur is not precisely the same as that abuse. A letter to provincial governors from the Department of Home stipulated in Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 225 Tahun 1980, Affairs indicates that the stipulation that appointees be 'able to co­ but differs somewhat according to the history of local institutions in operate with the kepala desa' was mistakenly being interpreted to encour­ Sanur' (Sanur, 1982: 13). age nepotism. A subsequent directive consequently prohibits the Complicating the restructuring which took place at village level, a appointment to these positions of any members of the immediate family 254 ADA T AND DINAS THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 255 of the kepala desa (Biro Bina, 1984d: 118 ff.). This, of course, does continue to prevail, banjar are inevitably constrained to take account of nothing to change the likelihood that vertical linkages of other sorts official policies regarding formal qualifications of age, education, and would enable the total domination of village government by this single political orientation at the expense of ideal notions of banjar leadership elected official. which place much greater emphasis on personal qualities of honesty and Not surprisingly, given their composition and marginality, the two disposition to public service. Furthermore, banjar are no longer at desa councils were not found to be taking the 'dynamic' role in rural liberty to replace unsatisfactory leaders at will. District and provincial development envisaged by central government. A manual on the LMD officials tended to see frequent changes in banjar leadership as petty and was issued in 1986 because it had become apparent that this council improvident. In the opinion of the head of the Biro Bina Pemerintahan 'was not yet functioning as intended ... to realize Pancasila Democracy'. Desa new provisions for indefinite terms of office still left room for It expresses particular concern that kepala desa were frequently enacting removal when a banjar head did not fulfil stipulated conditions, 'but the their own decisions without first consulting the LMD (Depdagri reason has to be investigated from the bupati's office to be certain it is 1986a: 4, 29). The unexamined assertion that the source of these not just a personal squabble. They can't just change klian whenever they 21 failures lay in the 'very limited capabilities' of local authorities, under­ feel like it anymore, or dump one because they simply don't like him. scores the patronizing paternalism at the heart of many aspects of the There has to be order in administration-and it is not very orderly if 23 legislation. The Manual notes the 'limited level of knowledge' and there is constant turnover in leadership.' In conventional practice, 'limited capability of members of the LMD to take in, understand and however, testing leadership qualities is necessarily a matter of trial and carry out decisions based on UU 5/1979' (Depdagri 1986a: 5). No cog­ error and the capacity to replace klian freely is a crucial part of the dif­ nisance is taken of the extent to which these problems arise from basic fuse forms of popular control which operate at hamlet level. contradictions in the legislation and ministerial directives themselves. An incident which occurred in Tarian not long after the official The lack of checks and balances within the local government system was installation of kepala dusun there illustrates the extent to which these new the subject of incisive comments by Ida Bagus Beratha: interventions have begun to influence local political process. On that occasion controversy erupted in one of the banjar when its kepala What is funny about the LMD as a deliberating body under Undang Undang dusun/klian banjar allocated a government granted pump to his son­ No. 5, I notice, is that its head is the kepala desa. So who is going to exercise in-law, the owner of a tourist home-stay, withoU:t consulting the banjar control? In my opinion it is clumsy. The secretary to the LMD is also the assembly. During the two weeks leading up to the monthly banjar kepala desa-so secretary to the he is going to oversee his ownwork! And LMD meeting there was intense criticism of his action in banjar and desa members aren't likely to take issue with anythingwhen the head of theLMD is circles. Tempek heads from that banjar came to the village office to regis­ the kepala desa himself. As village head, is it possible I will be able to criticize ter objections to the misuse of the klian's position. At its meeting, the myself?' (Ida Bgs Beratha, 1984.) banjar assembly debated for five hours whether they ought to dismiss The 1979 Village Government Law is predicated on the assumption him, and indeed the offending klian felt obliged to offer his resignation. that the desa is the basic unit of local government, whereas in Bali the But the members were persuaded, largely by the arguments of a civil only level of local organization which involves direct participation is the servant among the membership, that control over the position was no 22 banjar. Village government and development programmes in both longer technically in their hands and that a request for dismissal to Tarian and Sanur depended on component banjar for their effective­ district level was unlikely to be well received since his appointment had ness. The co-option of banjar leadership is in practical terms most been made official only a few months before. The offending klian was in serious because the banjar does approximate an organic community and the end only reprimanded publicly after making a formal apology to the because there is no established convention of choosing its leaders from banjar assembly. Interestingly, in his defence, he argued that as kepala the traditional elite as is frequently the case at desa level. Since inde­ dusun he was responsible only to the government department concerned in administering such grants and therefore believed he had not been pendence, Tarian has had four kepala desa, all of whom have been 24 descendants of the pre-colonial ruling family or its gentry retainers. In a obliged to consult the banjar. study of economic development in the rural Philippines, Anderson The case is an indication of the longer-term consequences of the (1982: 164) concludes that 'it was the overwhelming continuity of estab­ co-option of banjar leadership. Appointment by superordinate officials lished power and wealth that dictated most of the adverse consequences will subvert leaders' perceptions of their obligations towards their of rapid rural development there'. Negative outcomes have to some constituencies and erode popular involvement in decision-making. The extent been ameliorated in Balinese villages by the counterbalancing role conversion of desa to kelurahan, and therefore of both village and of banjar leaders who do not normally represent such established hamlet-level leaders to civil servant status, is all the more cause for con­ interests. cern. As well as �ubstituting appointment for election (which effectively Although informal discretionary concessions to customary practice returns desa administration to the colonial situation) and the security of 256 ADA T AND DINAS THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 257 tenure of civil service pos1t1ons, the option of installing non-local quasi-official recognition to local discretionary concessions in a circular officials as village or hamlet heads will eliminate even the indirect social to camat in his regency reiterating the need to continue 5-yearly elec­ 25 pressures which communities may exert over officials of local origin. tions for kepala dusunlklian banjar while retaining the outward form of Since the banjar is the only level of government in Bali which can be the appointment system stipulated by the Village Government Law. said to involve direct public participation, the consequences of eliminat­ ing popular control over its administrative leaders are self-evident. The Official Images and Local Competencies Dutch scholar-administrator, V. E. Korn's remarks on the effects of the installation of appointed functionaries as administrative heads of desa in While rhetorically reiteratingthe importance of decentralization and par­ the colonial reorganization of village government in Bali during theearly ticipation in official statements (GBHN, 1983, 1988), central govern­ part of this century have relevance to the extension of bureaucratization ment policies continue to reflect paternalistic and condescending policies to the banjar more than a half century later: attitudes towards village-level organization and leadership characteristic of urban elites. A Department of Home Affairs (1981: 65) paper on It is clear that the independence of the village and banjar administration initially rural development in Indonesia complains of 'the scarcity of dynamic, would have received a telling blow. Because, what remains after all of the right creative, and fair leadership, inefficient co-ordination of development, of the people to be under their own heads, when these are arbitrarily replaced by people with whom one does not know how to deal? ... Perbekel who replaced low level quality and quantity of village administrative machinery, lack bendesa were regarded in the villages as cronies of the government, who did not of capability to plan, weak implementation' which hinder its pro­ belong to the village institutions . . . and when one asks what happens at desa grammes. meetings one does not hear the village chief mentioned at all except where he The Village Government Law and subsequent regulations were was the klian desa of old. (Korn, 1924: 229-330.) framed with the intent of more efficient direction of local government from the centre. In so far as decentralization and regionalization of local The more recent addition by ministerial decree (Mendagri 7/1983) of development planning have occurred, they are aimed at levels of bureau­ sub-dusun units, rukun warga (RW) and rukun tetangga (RT), with cracy beyond the village, and within the purview of direct central locally elected leaders may have been intended to ameliorate the effects 26 control. The Department of Home Affairs' focus on a kecamatan-based of the original legislation on grass-roots organization. But it does so management system 'to maintain the concept of unity of command' only by further elongating and complicating the channels of commun­ (Mendagri 1/1981: 65) is indicative of the limits of decentralization and ication between village and state. There are now seven levels of adminis­ participation actually envisaged. tration below that of central government (see Figure 9.1). This Decentralization in Indonesia has not involved genuine devolution of adjustment leaves popular participation too far down the chain to enable authority which, as Uphoff, Cohen, and Goldsmith (1979) argue, must active involvement in the political process, with communication cut off be closely tied to an elective as opposed to a bureaucraticlocus of power by appointed intermediaries at dusun level. if it is to be effective and responsible. Provincial and regional officials delegated the task of implementing the Village Government Law generally considered it irrelevant or inap­ [F]or increasing popular participation, devolution of authority, giving lower propriate to the Balinese situation: 'Actually, Undang Undang Number echelon elected officials greater power, is more promising than administrative 5 is meant for areas that didn't have local government below desa level. deconcentration. Compared to bureaucrats, elected decision-makers at the Since Bali already has an effective system, it is foolish to tamper with it.' regional, district, or sub-district level are much more accessible and more easily held accountable for the choices that affect people's lives. (Uphoff, Cohen, and (rwecta, 1979.) Undoubtedly reflecting concern over the long-term implica­ Goldsmith, 1979: 69.) tions of the 1979 Law within his province, the Governor of Bali declared in 1983 that the name banjar should not after all be displaced What deconcentration has taken place in the form of regionalization by the new system and that 'dusun/banja'i would become the standard policies has been accompanied at the same time by a gradual transfer of designation of hamlet units in Bali (Letter from the Governor of Bali to Heads of power from desa to kecamatan. This has been government policy since Kabupaten, 5/9/83). This symbolic gesture did not touch upon the structural the establishment of the New Order (see Tjondronegoro, 1984: 89-90). consequences of the legislation, however. The Home Affairs Ministry favoured kecamatan-focused 'decentraliza­ Provincial and regional implementing legislation present verbatim tion' because of the convenience of larger, more uniform administrative restatements of the national law (Perda 7/1989-10/1981). When asked units and the advantages of dealing with camat, who by virtue of their why there were no amendments in the Balinese legislation, especially education and civil servant status were regarded as less inclined to 'cling concerning the election of banjar leaders, the heads of the regional and to tradition' th¥1 village headmen. Camat tend to be recruited from provincial Departments of Government and the Village Development urban areas and their authority is grounded in thebureaucracy. Officials Bureau replied that to do so would risk appearing to 'conflict with with a cultural background and structural position so firmly attached to national law' (1984). In 1989, however, the bupati of Gianyar did give the centre, as Tjondronegoro (1984: 132-3) has pointed out, could not 258 ADA T AND DINAS THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 259 be expected to represent or defend village interests within the adminis­ (Depdagri 1986b: 2). As Hendrata (1983: 32) remarks, 'We are always trative hierarchy. hearing the call to "participate", but what seems to be meant by "parti­ Contrary to bureaucratic perceptions of rural backwardness and lack cipation" here is loud support for the implementation of programs of organizational capability, in my observation, village-level implementa­ whose methods and contents have been determined at the top.' tion of government development projects was highly efficient with little of the 'leakage' that has become customary at upper levels of the Comparative Perspectives bureaucracy.27 DPIS studies of the administration of Inpres SD funding and my own evidence on use of these funds in Tarian discussed in Theories of collective action and findings based on studies of group Chapter 8 contradict the presuppositions behind much of government organization in a development context bear on a number of the argu­ policy. On the contrary, it appeared to be the case that the greater the ments presented here concerning local institutions and community distance from constraints of local knowledge, the more corrupt practices development in Bali. The substantial literature on the subject affirms tended to become a matter of unquestioned convention. An article in the general conclusions that the scale of local groups, the extent of estab­ Jakarta Post echoes complaints voiced by local leaders in Bali regarding lished mechanisms for mutual co-operation and participation, and misappropriation of development funds at intermediate levels of admin­ supportive, but restrained, state involvement with locally based organ­ istration: izations are pivotal factors in establishing conditions for successful col­ lective action. There has been, however, increasing criticism of the way lnpres projects are conceived, formulated and implemented.... The virtual absence of village-level The scale of local organization has some bearing upon potential levels authority to make decisions to fit lnpres projects to specific local conditions of participation and solidarity. Olson (1971: 53 ff.) argues that the dampens the sense of participation in, and of responsibility for, the projects on strength of social pressures and the effectiveness of social sanctions the part of the rural people themselves.... Businessmen and village administra­ varies greatly between small and large groups. His assertion, that only a tion officials associated with the projects complain that fund losses, through federated structure building on smaller units enables social incentives to malfeasance and inefficiency, have sharply reduced the real benefit of the pro­ be mobilized effectively on a larger scale, reflects the experience of jects to the rural community. Inpres-project funds seem to steadily decrease as administrative villages like Tarian, Sanur, and Blaju (C. Geertz, 1963: they pass by each stage of the bureaucratic channels-from the home office min­ 88-9) which depended on banjar agency for carrying out development istry, down to the provincial, regency and sub-district authorities before reaching projects.28 Small-scale facilitates the 'noticeability', 'publicness', and the village-level administration. (Jakarta Post, 11 January 1985, cited in perceived 'risk reduction' that Olson (1971: 45), Lipton (1985: 78, 97), Mccawley, 1985: 25.) and Wade (1987: 104; 1988: 210) consider essentialfor enforcing group McCawley proposed that the central government substantially increase rules necessary to sustainable co-operative outcomes. Informal informa­ funds being provided directly to villages. In urging more thoroughgoing tion networks and the power of reputation sanctions in tightly knit social decentralization of government development expenditure on rural infra­ situations increase negotiating options and provide important account­ structure, he preferred to bypass regional and district levels of bureau­ ability constraints on local leadership (Gow and VanSant, 1983: 432-9; cracy and disperse cash grants directly to villages whose 'leaders usually Wade, 1988: 185-93; Tjondronegoro, 1984: 225). have quite clear ideas about the needs of the local community' In one instance during my fieldwork, when Bandes government grant (McCawley, 1985: 22-5). funds for renovations had obviously been mismanaged by the village While the importance of communication and participation as prereq­ leader responsible, the level of rumour and innuendo in Tarian finally uisites for any kind of effective and equitable rural development policy led the inner executive of the desa, composed of klian banjar and the has become a truism of government and academic discourse (Hains­ kepala desa, to take action for fear that it would reflect upon their own worth, 1982; Gow and VanSant, 1983; Hendrata, 1983; Esman and competence. As one of the klian, a close friend of the individual Uphoff, 1984; Mubyarto, 1984; GBHN, 1988; Rondinelli, McCullough, involved, expressed his concerns in a later interview, 'The Bandes and Johnson, 1989), both political and economic strategies for problem had to be taken care of straight away .... This was our last Indonesian development remain highly centralized. From the central chance .... Because we were all together, like one egg, so we'd be ruined government's perspective, village autonomy and popular participation as one. Semua kena getah (We'd all get sticky from it).' (I Suta, 1985.) The are conceived in terms of economic self-support and local contribution Desa Council made enquiries and confronted the official concerned with to state programmes, not public inclusion in decision-making. The receipts for building materials 30 per cent short of reported expenditure. notion of village 'autonomy' inferred in the expression 'conduct its own Resolution of the issue was low-key. The desa co-operative loaned the affairs' in the Village GovernmentLaw is explicated in the Home Affairs money needed •to complete renovations and the malfeasant was to repay Department Manual on village government only as 'the ability to cover the debt in monthly instalments. Although there had been some public the costs of routine and development activities as well as public services' sympathy for the difficult personal circumstances which occasioned his 260 ADA T AND DINAS THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 261 illicit 'borrowing' of public money (he was a member of the landless for community action and were unable to organize to make claims for gentry and had been widely respected for his knowledge of religion and even these most basic needs.32 custom), the leader resigned from office soon afterward. He had 'lost The community development literature points to the advantage of face' (kehilangan muka) in a culture where public regard is paramount. building on effective pre-existing organizations (Uphoff, Cohen, and Interestingly, the kabupaten supervisor responsible for overseeing Goldsmith, 1979; Gow and VanSant, 1983; Wade, 1987).33 The poten­ expenditure of Bandes funds had earlier checked and certified the 'satis­ tial countervailing effect of internal class and social differences is of factory completion' of the project, although the renovations carried out course a significant issue in this regard, and sometimes an argument for were manifestly not commensurate with the money allocated. This bypassing established institutions (Reidy and Kitching, 1986). On the 'oversight' did not go unnoticed and provoked almost as much comment other hand, many collective action studies show that while relative among village officials as the initial improbity itself. It leaves open to homogeneity correlates positively with access for the poor, strong demo­ question any presumption that accountability to higher authorities is cratically organized institutions at local level can effectively place con­ likely to be a more effective constraint on corrupt practices than is straint on and/or co-opt the energies of local elites to wider purposes accountability to an informed and wary populace.29 In civil service (Gow and VanSant, 1983; Esman and Uphoff, 1984; Wade, 1988).34 circles, it is apparently expected that a substantial proportion of govern­ In lieu of a radical transformation in the national political structure, it is ment grant funds will be absorbed by such unaccounted for 'leakages' in any case unlikely that efforts to exclude these groups would be (see the Bali Post cartoon on Plate 21). At village level the prevalence successful. 35 of opportunities for personal aggrandizement at public expense is well While few banjar communities have ever been homogeneous in a recognized, but a pervasive 'culture of corruption', to use Hatta's term socio-economic sense, 36 cultural factors and institutional arrangements (Tarian leaders also used the phrase in their complaints about the do create a form of social and cultural commonality which have con­ bureaucracy), is not condoned where the effects are so immediately seen siderable modulating effects in other spheres. I have argued that the and felt. Reputation sanctions and local surveillance in this case were common dependence on collective ritual and mutual aid within the better guarantors of the public interest than anti-corruption agencies.30 banjar has important consequences in constraining the exercise of polit­ With respect to the appropriate size of units which will work to ical or economic power by elites and in placing redistributive pressures stimulate active public involvement in community development, some­ on wealthy members. 'Reputation sanctions' of course only operate on thing of a reverse economy of scale operates in thesocial arena. This is elites where a common institutional framework creates a situation in one reason for stressing the error of the premise in Indonesian govern­ which the poor are part of their significant reference group (cf. Wade, ment policy that the administrative desa is the basic unit of local organ­ 1988: 193). ization throughout the country, and for expressing particular concern In the Balinese case, established mechanisms already provided the with the co-option of klian banjar through appointment under the basis for information exchange, for pooling and managing common Village Government Law. But the effect of scale in linking these hamlet funds, and for high levels of routinized participation and accountability. units to grass-roots processes is not the sole reason for the primary These were institutionalized in the obligations and conventions of banjar importance of the banjar as 'community'. Equally significant is the coin­ adat membership (ayahan, sangkepan, iuran), its underlying sanctions cidence of the officially recognized banjar dinas with its adat counter­ (dosa, rampag, sepekan), and the values associated with local corporatism part. (seka, krama). To a remarkable degree they have been extended to The evidence from community studies shows that the existence of a incorporate new economic. and social initiatives beyond the traditional local group with collective needs is not sufficient in itself to ensure that a range of banjar activity. group will organize to achieve them (Olson, 1971: 35; Esman and More controversial is the question of the role of shared moral-cultural Uphoff, 1984: 9 ff.; Uphoff, 1987b; Wade, 1988: 201).31 Earlier re­ values in sustaining co-operative social relations in local communities search in a Bajau village in Malaysia convinced me of the great import­ (Scott, 1976; Popkin, 1979). Wade (1988: 196) found motives for co­ ance of both cultural and organizational aspects of community identity operation were rarely expressed in such terms in the Indian villages he and structure in establishing the conditions for collective action. That studied and notes the lack of symbolic representation which might have village was no larger than most banjar in Tarian. It was physically and been expected were this the case. Nevertheless, he argues that co­ culturally isolated from surrounding populations and was initially homo­ operativeaction cannot be explained solely in terms of individually cal­ geneous in socio-economic terms. For these reasons one might have culated interests and in.centives. A moral component existed in at least expected this apparently 'natural community' to form the basis for or­ the sense of a common recognition of the legitimacy of others' claims ganized economic and political action in circumstances where collective needed to make,any system of reciprocal obligation work (Wade, 1988: consumption needs for fresh water and a primary school, for instance, 196-9). were urgent. But theBajau lacked a culturally validated institutional base Uphoffobserves that the Sri Lankan farmers of Gal Oya in his study 262 ADA T AND DINAS THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 263 had no less of a material self-interest in the efficient distribution of water Reidy and Kitching, 1986; Dove, 1988). Villages are less and less able to from their irrigation system during the 30 years before they began to insulate themselves from the macro-economic policies and the institu­ organize so successfully.He argues forcefullyfor social scientists to take tional frameworks created by government. These have a direct impact more account of the power of symbols, concepts, and values alongside on material possibilities,38 but inevitably also affect the local structures structural variables for releasing 'social energies' in new and dynamic which make collective action possible. Comparative studies suggest that ways (Uphoff, 1987b: 23 ff.; see also Gow and VanSant, 1983: 441). the imposition of externally created structures has been a common These less measurable factors, built from increments of trial and error factor in the failure of rural development initiatives (Anderson, 1982; co-operative behaviour, created a positive sum climate of opinion in the Gow and VanSant, 1983: 428; Esman and Uphoff, 1984; Gondolf, Gal Oya case. A synergistic reaction developed between increasingly 1988). positive intra- and inter-community relations and improved organization Historically, state and market penetration have operated to undermine of the water distribution system which Uphoff considered could not be local organizational structures which make co-operative action viable, accounted for in simple mechanistic or individual-interest terms. The more often than not without establishing workable alternatives. 'Indeed, construction of a communityof interest in that case entailed both prac­ some of the large-scale and long term changes occurring in rural areas of tical and social satisfactions. Moral-social and structural dimensions of developing countries may be lowering the average probability of co­ group activity typically reinforce one another in a manner Durkheim's operative solutions' (Wade, 1988: 216; see also Lipton, 1985; Uphoff, sociology rightly acknowledged. Community organizational forms create 1987a: 218; 1987b: 42; Dove, 1988: 22 ff.). According to Kato (1989: public space in which there is the potential to transform individual issues 105), this has been precisely the outcome of village reorganization in into collective ones. As one of the community organizers involved in Riau province since 1979. In the village he studied, co-operative main­ Uphoffs study (1987b: 35) put it: 'It is much more difficultto be selfish tenance of local infrastructure and communal regulation of planting sea­ in public than in private.'37 sons disintegrated when the adat-based village structure, the negeri, was Olson's model, which stresses the importance of involuntary sanctions broken up under the new administrative arrangements.39 and selective incentives, does not dismiss the importance of a moral­ A corroborative indication of the deleterious effects of the centraliza­ social dimension either. He sees such values as providing potent incent­ tion process on local institutions in Bali comes from an intensive study ives to co-operative action, although only to the extent that they serve of two subak sponsored by the Ford Foundation and conducted by staff more fundamental individually interested objectives and group disciplin­ at Udayana University (Sutawan et al., 1984). One of the subak had ary functions. He looks on the affective rewards of public regard and experienced a very long period of government involvement which ori­ self-esteem as one explanation for the willingness of some individuals to ginated with the construction of permanent irrigation canals in 1941 incur disproportionate costs of organization (Olson, 1971: 62, 176-8). under the Dutch and its subsequent integration into the irrigation The adat foundations of local organization in the Balinese case programme of the Public Works Department (PU). The other subak has unquestionably provide both an institutional framework and a moral operated entirely independently of government involvement. In contrast orientation incomparable to anything the state could construct. The to the non-government subak, the study found a poor level of main­ large civic space afforded by adat institutions in Bali became the base on tenance and repair in the PU subak which was supposed to keep up to which national ideology and state development policy have been con­ secondary irrigation channels while the Public Works Department had veniently grafted. Put in the economically 'rational' terms Olson would responsibility for the primary system. Sutawan et al. (1984: 257-8) applaud, the social and religious basis of adat institutions has effectively attribute the degree of apathy in the subak which is partially managed by subsidized the costs of organization for local collective consumption the Public Works Department to the low level of members' involvement purposes as well as for those of the state. For this pragmatic reason, at in planning the government's part of the programme which resulted in least, the state ought to take local institutions for co-operative action technical changes incompatible with the system of water division pre­ seriously (Wade, 1988: 217; Rondinelli, McCullough, and Johnson, ferred by most subak members, and to related authoritarian and nepot­ 1989: 69 ff.)'. Indeed, cost-saving is the one sense in which the rhetoric istic leadership arrangements in the PU subak. 40 of public participation has real meaning in Indonesian government One good reason for the state to tal<:e existing local institutions for circles (Depdagri 1986b: 2). But here New Order policy is at odds with co-operative action seriously, says Wade, is that they are likely to place itself, for the organizational energies of local systems cannot be less of a drain on state resources than alternatives. 'A malfunctioning harnessed positively without a political stake in the process. approximation to a formalized system of state control or private pro­ In this regard, the relationship of the state to what it regards as local perty rights, based on a distant authority only dimly aware of local con­ instrumentalities is a crucial issue. It commands resources beyond the ditions, may b€ worse in terms of resource management than a strategy reach of rural villages, and neither its constructive nor destructive which aims to improve, or at least not impair local systems of rules.' influences can be ignored (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, 1985; (Wade, 1988: 217.) Lipton (1985: 101) makes a similar case for the 264 ADA T AND DINAS THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 265 strengths of localized decision-making. And Rondinelli, McCullough, the tension between leaders' representative and administrative roles and Johnson (1989: 73) assert that 'local services can be performed by (Zacharias, 1979; N. Schulte Nordholt, 1982; Tjondronegoro, 1984; community associations more efficiently than by an overburdened cen­ Keeler, 1985: 127). These tensions also press heavily on village officials tral government'. in Bali, but close social interaction, elective practices, and the power of But there is little evidence of the respect for local competencies in formal and informal sanctions traditionally maintained a considerable government circles that a genuinely collaborative approach to commun­ degree of power over local leadership. While popular control applied ity development would require. This is not only because of political more directly at banjar than at desa level, the fact that desa were for expediency, but also because of the great cultural disjunction between practical purposes dependent on constituent banjar meant that village the paternalist values of urban elites and the practical concerns and local government on the whole could not afford to ignore popular senti­ knowledge of rural people (Dove, 1985, 1988). An instructive example ments. It is inevitable that the co-option of these leaders to positions of the consequences of restructuring local organizations to centrally now clearly conceived as administrative rather than representative, will determined ends comes from the Philippines where state intervention inhibit the two-way process of communication necessary for effective reshaped barangay communities, turning them into instruments of fed­ rural development. eral government 'fully subservient to policy from above and supportive A telling paradox is apparent in contradictions between the rhetoric of of centralization nationally' (Paget, 1983: 126). As in Indonesia, the participation and the rationale behind the kelurahan model of local government of the Philippines appealed to a selective version of tradi­ government under the new legislation. The kelurahan structure pre­ tional ideologies to 'revitalize the co-operative spirit', while at the same sumes the disappearance of the co-operative gotong royong traditions still time pre-empting opportunities for the exercise of local decision-malting officially touted as the common basis of Indonesian nationalidentity and power. In the process of restructuring existing institutions to conform to philosophy (GBHN, 1983, 1988; Depdagri 1986b: 2). Indonesian de­ its master blueprint, thePhilippine government debilitated the barangay velopment policy is predicated on the assumption, even promotion, of a and induced a state of pervasive cynicism in the rural populace decline in the political and economic autonomy of communities as they (J. Anderson, 1982: 122-71). move through specified stages of development from traditional swadaya The degradation of local organizational capacity in the Philippines (self-help) through transitional swakarya (self-activating) to modern was, in J. Anderson's (1982: 151-2) view, 'perhaps mostly an unin­ swasembada (self-sustaining) villages. The disjuncture between appeals tended consequence of the assumptions that no institutions and organ­ to the involvement of collective subjects implicit in the language of the izations worthy of the name exist or could develop indigenously in swadaya-swakarya-swasembada classifications and the actual loss of local villages'. Similar attitudes and objectives are at the heart of the 1979 ,power to central authority as villages are guided through each of these Village Government Law in Indonesia. If, as analysts of collective action 'progressive' stages could not be more stark. conclude, the possibility of genuine community development rests Tjondronegoro (1984) cites a Home Affairs Ministry paper which heavily on an appropriate mix of local initiative and government support defines these three developmental stages in revealing terms. In govern­ (Gow and VanSant, 1983: 430; Esman and Uphoff, 1984; Gondolf, ment planning traditional swadaya desa with strong primary group 1988: 156), radically different attitudes and approaches from the Indo­ relationships and self-sustaining orientations are to give way to swakarya nesian state will be needed. desa where 'customary and traditional law is in transition and external influences have penetrated, making for changes in the way of think­ ing ... and gotong royong [is] decreasing'. In the final stage, swasembada Conclusion villages are described as 'free from stringent, limitative, traditional laws; The Village Government Law and subsequent ministerial decrees there are rational relationships between villagers ... and a clear institu­ address important issues of village government and administrative tional framework' (Tjondronegoro, 1984: 90-1). The aspiration of the procedure. But the hierarchic orientation and generally undemocratic Home AffairsMinistry is to have all 60,000 villages in Indonesia achieve character of the new apparatus will inevitably stifle the popular parti­ swasembada status by the first decade of the twenty-first century cipation it purports to facilitate.Where the primary orientation of village (Department of Home Affairs and National Institute of Administration, leaders is to supra-village authorities, the level of popular participation in 1981: 64). A decline in the spirit of go tong royong is one ground for con­ local decision-making will necessarily be diminished. Not surprisingly, verting desa to kelurahan and for the thoroughgoing transfer of local Prijono and Prijono (1983: 46-53) found on Java that the more closely authority to central bureaucratic management, presumably the ideal the lurah was tied to outside administrative authorities, the more he was form that 'a clear institutional framework' would take (see Mendagri inclined to ignore public opinion and avoid taking matters of importance 2/1980). to village meetings for deliberation. Bureaucratization policies involve more than the rationalization of Numerous observers of local government in Java have commented on local government. They will freeze in place a top-down administrative 266 ADA T AND DINAS THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 267 structure which, contrary to its proclaimed objective of increased 8. Lingkungan parallel dusun as subunits of kelurahan and desa respectively in the new structure. Both replace the in Bali, but while within continue to participation, will exacerbate the lack of communication between the banjar dinas dusun desa coincide with the old banjar dinas, and therefore in most cases also with the banjar adat, central government and the Indonesian population. In the process they this is not so with lingkungan under the kelurahan. Lingkungan have become the first threaten to undercut long-evolved and highly effective mechanisms for targets of hamlet rationalizationalong the lines of population size and geographic location. community co-operation which exist in Bali and in other forms else­ See below for a discussion of the difficulties which Sanur has experienced as a con­ where in Indonesia. sequence of these changes. 9. ' ... mewadahi perwujudan pelaksanaan Demokrasi Pancasila dalam pemerintahan Desa' (literally, to embody the realization and implementation of Pancasila Democracy in Village government) (Depdagri 1986a: 7). 10. This is acknowledged in a letter from the Minister of Home Affairs to Provincial 1. The following short forms will be used to refer to the sources of related regulations Governors (5/11/81) and in the subsequently published manuals regarding the functioning and documents: Keppres-Keputusan Presiden; Mendagri-Instruksi/K.eputusan Menteri of the LMD (Depdagri 1986a; Depdagri 1986b). Dalam Negeri; Depdagri-Departemen Dalam Negeri; Biro Bina-Biro Bina Pemerin­ 11. Plenary meetings of the full desa membership are unrealistic in Bali because of the tahan Desa. For complete references, see the Government Documents section of the size of administrative villages which typically include over a thousand households. The Bibliography. Between 1979 and 1986 at least thirty-fiveregulations, decrees, and instruc­ business of soliciting popular opinion on village administrative matters has since inde­ tions were issued by the Home Affairs Ministryconcerned with implementingthe Village pendence been handled at the monthly meetings of component banjar. Government Law. Only the most important are listed here. 12. See Keppres 28/1980; Mendagri 27/1984; Mendagri 28/1984. Figure 9.2 shows the 2. A more recent statement from a Department of Home Affairs Manual on village relationship of the PKK to the overall organizational structure of the LKMD. government reiterates the point. ' ... [T]he consequence of various forms and styles of 13. See Staudt (1986) for a theoretical discussion of the role of the state and bureau­ desa government, each possessing its own unique characteristics, is a frequent hindrance, cracy in institutionalizing and reinforcing male privilege. She argues that there is an. within the framework of intensive guidance and control, of efforts to increase the standard entrenched bureaucratic resistance to women's participation because of the redistributive of living and effective conduct of government.' (Depdagri 1986b: 2-3.) threats that comprehensive development programmes would pose (1986: 329; cf. Stivens, 3. See Letter to the Editor, 'Keluhan Terhadap Nasib Desa Kami' (Bali Post, 3 De­ 1990). On gender in Indonesian bureaucratic ideology, see Suryakusuma (1991). cember 1984) and Wilkinson (1991) for instances. 14. Membership in the banjar council is customarily as a pair (banjar luh/banjar muani 4. Aside from a range of criteria of age (25-60 years), education (SLP/SMP), res­ or istrillanang); but the male partner as lineal descendant through the patri-line, inheriting idence (minimum of 2 years), good behaviour, devotion to God, and obedience to the rights in the residential compound (karang ayahan) and associated civic responsibilities, is principles of Pancasila and the Indonesian Constitution, candidates must not ever have the usual public representative of the married couple. Technically under Balinese adat, a been directly or indirectly implicated in any prohibited organization such as the PKI woman becomes the recognized head of household if, for lack of a male descendant, she (UU 5/1979: §4). In the event that no candidate can be found who satisfies these stipula­ becomes the 'substitute heir' or sentana (Geertz and Geertz, 1975: 54). The in-marrying tions, 'as a last resort' the camat may advise nomination of someone from the civil service husband is then considered the juridical female. In this case, a woman theoretically should (Letter from Mendagri to Governors, 11/11/83 in Biro Bina, 1984c: 75). represent the household at banjar assemblies and in ayahan service. I am told that in Desa 5. The camat along with representatives of police and military comprise the official Pejeng this is customary practice and Hobart reports that women sometimes do so in the Supervisory Committee for the election of the kepala desa. They co-ordinate and give village of his study. Among these had been at least one woman with a reputation as an advice to the village Electoral Committee and scrutinize nominees (Mendagri 6/1981: §5). orator (Hobart, 1979: 579). Generally, however, women claim they are embarrassed and On advice from the camat, the bupati must approve all nominations to the office of kepala prefer to send a male representative in their place (Ni Nyantet, 1983; Dayu Putu, 1984). In the desa. Keeler (1985: 118) mentions complaints in CentralJavanese villages of manipulation case of widows who have no adult sons to perform these services, awig-awig usually pro­ of the screening tests to eliminate significant competition in elections. See also N. Schulte­ vide special dispensation (tapakan) from banjar-desa service. Nordholt (1982: 123) concerning the influence of external authorities on the village 15. A 1983-4 study commissioned by the Department of Education and Culture to election process via thesupervisory committees. In Desa Tarian, the long-overdue election document leadership systems in village Bali makes no reference to the 1979 law in its dis­ of a new kepala desa was held up by kabupaten officials for 18 months. Rumour had it cussion of dinas officials, nor does it use the term dusun in place of banjar (Swarsi et al., that authorities would not permit the election to proceed if there were any possibility that 1986). the retired army candidate might lose. There was resistance to his candidature in some 16. Such incidents are apparently still unusual or unpopular enough to warrant report­ quarters of the village, and he eventually withdrew. At the suggestion of the camat, the desa ing in the Bali Post. See 'Camat Tegallalang tidak akui Darsana Kepala Dusun Pakudui' secretary was put up as a notional second candidate in his place. (27 April 1989) which covers a recent instance in which an elected kepala dusun/banjar, 6. Indicatively, the Indonesian word dusun has pejorative connotations of backward who had already been carrying out the duties of office for 2 months, was rejected by the rusticity. Undoubtedly reflecting more serious concern over the political effects of the camat on grounds that he lacked a primary school certificate. I concur with Dove's (1988: 1979 law on local institutions, theGovernor of Bali declared in 1983 that the name banjar 7 ff.) expression of concern at the overvaluation of formal education in both Indonesian should not after all be displaced under the new system and that 'dusun/banjar' would and international development policy circles. As formal education conventionally operates, henceforth become the standard designation of hamlet units in his province (Letter from it has the effect of cutting short children's informal schooling in the local knowledge sys­ the Governor of Bali to Heads of Kabupaten, 5/9/83). This symbolic gesture did not touch tem and devaluing the place of that lmowledge in the global one. the structural consequences of thelegislation, however. Provincial implementing legislation 17. Among the comments I recorded at that meeting (15 November 1984): 'We only present verbatim restatements of the national law (see Perda 7/1981-10/1981) and there just reorganized the Desa Council a few months ago after one ministerial directive was a decided anxiety among intermediate officials in Bali to avoid overt conflict with [Mendagri 2/1981]. Now we have to start all over again.' (I Kader, 1984.) 'Many that have central government. been chosen by th,eir banjar can't be included now. We'll have to find a way to involve 7. 'Kelurahan adalah suatu wilayah . . . yang tidak berhak menyelenggarakan rumah them informally.' (I Wy Artha, 1984.) 'Too many of theappointees are coming from Banjar tangganya sendiri.' (UU 5/1979: §1.) Madya. More have to be chosen from other banjar to be fair.' (I Mandera, 1984.) ADA T DINAS 268 AND THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 269 18. Retired or seconded ABRI members appear to be heavily favoured forappointment in the area of 'externally oriented tasks where the clout of greater size probably makes to kelurahan positions reflecting their increasing involvement in local affairs over the New some difference' (Esman and Uphoff, 1984: 149). Order period. Members of the armed forces are now routinely appointed to district-level 29. Gow and VanSant (1983: 440) describe an instance of the exposure and removal of bureaucracies across the country. Every kecamatan has a 'trouble-shooting' task force a corrupt officialby local participants in an NGO-sponsored rural development project in (TRIPIDA) composed of the camat and representatives of the armed forces and police. Indonesia, where the practice of maintaining open records, combined withbasic trainingin See Chapter 2 for an example of the extension of its activities to adat disputes. bookkeeping and management, enabled clear identification of malfeasance. 19. In some banjar in Sanur the klian adat and dinas positionswere separate. In others, 30. External accountability mechanisms are of course also important counterweights to as in Tarian, one person acted as bothcustomary and official banjar head. established local power structures which might otherwise inhibit the free flow of informa­ 20. Desa 'autonomy' and 'control over its own affairs' is actually strictly limited under tion or the exercise of sanctions. Ideally, a combination of the two would provide the the 1979 law. As we have seen, district and regional authorities vet the selection of kepala necessary checks and balances to ensure accountability in both directions. desa. Desa ordinances may not be implemented without formal approval of the bupati, who 31. Reidy and Kitching (1986) take to task the unexamined assumptions of a great deal may reject any village decision which he regards as 'conflicting with higher regulations or of the community development literature. They challenge tendencies to reify the highly with public interest'. The camat attends LMD meetings as pengarah (director) to ensure ambiguous concept of 'community' and to presume that participation rather than direct thatdecisions at village level are in accord withhigher authority. He also has the obligation provision of services is more vital for the rural poor. Most importantly, they criticize the to 'give direction' when the LMD has difficulty achieving consensus (mufakat) (Depdagri failure of some of these studies to take account of limitations posed by the entrenched 1986a: 17). Under specified conditions the camat may recommend the dismissal of the position of rural elites. While accepting their point that the 'community' concept suffers village head (Mendagri 6/1981: §28); and when he considers public order to be at stake, he from the myth of assumed concreteness, the fact remains that those not organized enough may appoint an acting village head for up to one year. In Gianyar, for example, in 1987, even to make their needs heard politically, will almost certainly be ignored. Some level of two village heads were replaced by interim appointees because they had 'lost public organization and participation is necessary to acquire at least political visibility, not to support' in the view of district officials. mention to ensure that those resources which are provided are distributedeffectively. 21. For example, the Home Affairs Ministerial Instruction on the role of the LMD 32. This is not to argue that it is impossible to construct conditions which make co­ begins, '.. . keeping in mind the very limited capabilities of those who carry out village operation feasible. Uphoff's research indicates that even less promising situations are government ...' (Mendagri 140-100/1986 in Depdagri 1986b). amenable to the development of sophisticated levels of organization with flexible, 22. Prijono and Prijono (1983) and Tjondronegoro (1984) make the point that sub­ experience-generating approaches to community development and a balanced combina­ desa units are the primary locus of strong community ties and collective action in con­ tion of local initiative and government support (Uphoff, 1987a, 1987b; see also Gow and temporary Java as well. ' ... [Alt this level, elements of "primitive democracy" and VanSant, 1983: 430; Gondolf, 1988: 156). mutual-help practices are still functioning effectively.' (Tjondronegoro, 1984: 236.) See 33. Wade (1988: 213-14) found that the organization of irrigation in his sample Indian also J, Sullivan (1992) on neighbourhood organization in Yogyakarta. villages was more effective where structured around established community ties than 23. There is no little inconsistency in the view held by bureaucrats in regional and where new units were created by government on the apparently more rational basis of eco­ provincial government. The contradictions between these statements and the positive logically defined irrigation outlet users. convictions expressed in the same interviews about the power of the banjar relative to 34. Esman and Uphoff (1984: 161) found that economic homogeneity in the local central government (see Chapter 4) and the importance of acceding to popular electoral organizations they studied correlated significantly with income and service access for the conventions undoubtedly reflect their own ambivalent positions as agents of the state but poor, but that economic heterogeneity correlated equally stronglywith other positive gains banjar members too with strong ties to their own communities. in healthand in local participation in government decision-making. 24. Although not immediately removed from office, disaffection within the banjar per­ 35. With respect to Reidy and Kitching's argument that direct governmentintervention sisted and the kepala dusunlklian concerned did eventually resign. might override the dominance of local elites, Esman and Uphoff's conclusions are salutary. 25. The objective of assuring that primary loyalty be directed to superiors will result in Referring to the results of a comparative study of the effectiveness of land reform in a an increasing number of appointments circulating from within the bureaucracy at number of countries, they argue the key issue was the degree of direct involvement of local kecamatan level. This occurred in Ubud, for example, in 1990, when the earlier appointed organizations in the implementation process. This was more important than either the lurah of local origin was transferred and replaced by a civil servant from another village. internalstructure of these organizations or the political ideologyof the government. 'Even 26. See §1 of the regulation defining the structure and purpose of these two levels: 'RT a "progressive" bureaucracy acting in a centralizedmanner is likely to be more subject to and RW are social organizations recognized and promoted by government to protect and the blandishments and influence_ of the rural elite than to pressures from illiterate, poor preserve Indonesian social values based on gotong royong. ...' (Mendagri 7 /1983.) RT were peasants who make claims or pleas on an individual basis. They-lack the money and time, originally created in Java during the Japanese occupation and remain as local units of the knowledge and manners to be able to meet with distant officials, and to understand village organization there (Tjondronegoro, 1984; J, Sullivan, 1992). I was told by the head how paper can be manipulated to their benefit, to turnlegal loopholes to their advantage, of theregional Department of Government thatit was unlikely thatRT and RW would be and (perhaps most important) to gain a continuingfoothold in the politicalsystem-unless established in Bali because tempek, as formal subdivisions of the banjar, already fulfilled theyare involved in an organized way.' (Esman and Uphoff, 1984: 209.) this function. 36. Considerable variation exists among banjar even in the same village. The southern 27. On the problem of corruption in the Indonesian bureaucracy, see Arndt and banjar in Tarian, for example, with few or no members from triwangsa title-groups and Sundrum (1979), Gray (1979), and Mubyarto (1984). fairly even landowning patterns, had been more homogeneous than banjar of mixed status 28. Esman and Uphoff (1984) question the categorical assertion that small group base membership in the centre and north of the desa-thai is, before the development of (in their survey, those with under 100 members) is a determining factor in the success of tourism and handicraft exports created socio-economic differences of another sort in the rural development programmes. Among the 140 local organizations they surveyed there last decade. was in fact a small positive correlation between size and performance. This was partly 37. It is of interest that analogous principles to those elaborated by community develop­ attributable to the fact that successful small groups would tend to grow in size while ment and collective action theorists have been found operative in the very different unsuccessful large groups would be less likely to survive. Their conclusions therefore are corporate world of private enterprise. A study by Peters and Waterman (cited in Uphoff, not necessarily inconsistent with Olson's proposition.One advantage of large groups was 1987a: 216) of the most successful American corporations revealed the importance of 270 ADA T AND DINAS values and interpersonal relations in accounting for high performance. 38. Gondolf (1988: 152) in comparing the success of sugar co-operatives in Central India with the failure of native village corporations in Alaska argues that 'the accommoda­ tion of grassroots initiative' and supportive state regulation 'can mediate the impact of the global economy and extend national development to exploited sectors' (see also Wade, 1988: 212). 39. J. Anderson's (1982: 150-1) study of similar processes in the Philippines is of com­ parative import 'In the Philippines, the increasingly unequal power of national and local­ 10 level institutionsin theprosecution of development and modernizationhas swamped most local institutions.... The survival of many meaningful local institutions is seriously in Popular Political Culture and the doubt.... When local organizations are replaced by government promises and projects ... local responsibility, informal leadership, mobilization, proficiency and confidence are Rhetoric of National Development undermined. The local organizations have not regained their previous capability or vitality even when the promised government services are undelivered or insufficient to the task.' Similarly pessimistic conclusions can be drawn from the cases presented in Dove's (1988) edited collection on government interventions in the economic and religious practices of a number of culture groups in Indonesia and from Kato's (1989) study. 40. In the independent (non-PU) subak thepekasih and his assistants were elected every 5 years, whereas the PU counterpart had been in office for 40 years without re-election, A perspective 'from below' on therelationship between village and state virtually since the permanent irrigation project had been initiated. Meetings in the PU in contemporary Bali requires a consideration of the sources of popular subak attractedonly a 35 per cent rate of attendance on the rare occasions when theywere political culture. In particular, it is important to recognize the impact of held. By comparison, the non-government subak held regular monthly meetings with nationalist, populist, and socialist ideas of the 1945-65 period, their attendances averaging 90 per cent. Members' participation in discussion was also more fusion with aspects of local customary practice and values, and their outspoken and critical (Sutawan et al., 1984: 238). Mobilization for collectivework (gotong royong) in the non-PU subak was regular for both religious and irrigation purposes. On the influence on villagers' interpretations of state ideology in the present. other hand, in the PU subak, collective work was only rarely conducted for any purpose The re-presentation of national rhetoric in these culturally and historic­ other than ritual obligations (Sutawan et al., 1984: 247). Arguably the PU subak has expe­ ally weighted terms has become one of the strategies villagers employ to rienced more rapid social change, being located nearer Denpasar and along a major tourist deal with bureaucratic power, and a standard by which they measure route. But there appears to be no comparable decline in participation in subak ritual, sug­ gesting that poor commitment to other subak activities should not be attributed primarily state practice. to this factor (Sutawan et al., 1984). Political Legacies Social historians and cultural theorists influenced by Gramsci ( 1971, 1985) and Bakhtin (1968, 1981) have argued that the construction of ideology is a multi-sided process. Popular cultureis not merely a passive recipient of introduced concepts, but actively contributes to and select­ ively moulds them in the light of ordinary people's experience. Testifying to the constructive role of popular culture in the appro­ priation of infused idea systems are the modifications these undergo in popular usage and their -resilience in the face of suppression (Rude, 1980: 35). In the case of Indonesia, Lane (1982) has argued that the decimation of radical political parties and organizations after 1965 should not be allowed to obscure the considerable influence of populist, democratic, and socialist ideas generated in the pre-coup period on contemporary political culture and popular consciousness. During the course of my fieldwork in rural Bali, vocabularies of modern critical discourse emerged with striking frequency in formal interviews and informal conversations, in shadow puppet performances, as well as in confronta­ tions over loc� political issues. Words like 'piodaI' (feudal), 'kesadaran' (consciousness-usually of public responsibility), 'sosiaI' (socially com­ mitted, as opposed to self-interested or 'bisnis'-oriented), and 'pemera­ taan' ( equalization) hint at the profound cultural influence of the 272 ADA T AND DINAS POPULAR POLITICAL CULTURE 273 political thinking of the revolution and the subsequent era of political as economic development and a high priority everywhere on the island contest which have not been entirely obliterated by the cataclysm of was given to the extension of educational ,facilities previously available 1965 or by the pragmatic and repressive policies of the New Order. only to the elite. Benedict Anderson (1966: 102) traces the source of these concepts in In the wake of the revolution in Tarian, where the declining local Dutch radical writing of the 1920s and 1930s, at which time he says 'a aristocracy had supported the Republican cause (in opposition to its old socialist-communist vocabulary became the common property of the political rivals in Gianyar), members of activist youth groups pushed for entire [Indonesian] nationalist elite ...'. Translated into what he calls the establishment of a representative council. The Dewan Desa, as it 'revolutionary Malay' these concepts came to form an important part of was called, comprised elected representativesfrom each of the ten ban:jar popular discourse.1 So much so, that the New Order itself has had to constituting the administrative desa. The ban:jar was regarded as a fitting pose its political agenda in compatible terms in order to make claims to base for the democratic restructuring of des a administration ( Cok Anom, legitimacy. 'The Left before-1965 had made considerable headway in· 1984; I Kt Mica, 1984; I Wy Arta, 1984). The election of representatives to the popularising notions of socialism, so that even the Suharto regime village council on a ban:jar basis and rotation of venue for its monthly avoids wherever possible calling itself capitalist or even free enter­ meetings among the balai ban:jar in Tarian was intended to introduce a prise.. ..' (Lane, 1982: 123.)2 Government rhetoric in the 1980s still genuine sense of public involvement in desa affairs. The Dewan Desa set described its strategy of economic development as treading a path half­ itself the task of building schools and popularizing the reforms initiated way between socialism and capitalism (Bahan Penataran P4, cited in by the Provincial Assembly (DPRD) which, among other things, was Morfit, 1986: 4 7), and its defensive rhetorical devices require lip-service attempting to reformulate the position of the aristocracy. Members of at least to democratic and egalitarian commitments.3 the old ruling and allied gentry families, who had under the Dutch Bali had not been highly politicized by the parties and ideologies that remained at a remove from village responsibilities, were pressured to emerged inJava before theJapanese occupation. But nationalist, social­ join ban:jar and take on the same labour-service as commoners for public ist, and populist concepts became widely articulated themes during the and ritual purposes. revolution and subsequent period of political ferment. After independ­ The changing politics of the 'caste' order4 in Bali was of considerable ence, reaction to the established political and social hierarchy manifested . significance. Legal changes to some extent introduced a levelling of itself in legal acts which abolished 'feudal' prerogatives thought inappro­ social differences, but did not erase hierarchic values revolving around priate to ':iaman merdeka'. These included prohibitions on 'mis-caste' concepts of authority and prestige-values which retain ambivalent marriages and other customary practices ( such as the temporary segre­ adherence to the present. Appointments to the highest administrative gation of commoner couples who gave birth to male-female twins, positions of Governor and Bupati, and candidates for regional and manak salah) which discriminated along status lines. The Great Council provincial assemblies (DPR and DPRD), are, four decades later, dispro­ of Rajas was abolished and replaced by a provisional parliament in 1950 portionately drawn from the traditional elite. In fact, pressures to (Pendit, 1979; Bagus, 1991). After considerable debate, the Balinese demonstrate egalitarian commitments offered new opportunities to the Provincial Assembly (DPRD) rejected 'Daerah Istimewa' status within aristocracy to exert greater influence in the local sphere. In some areas the new Indonesian state, which would have instated traditional rulers as for the first time individuals from gentry families could be found filling regional and provincial heads of government. This was a victory for the adat and administrative positions at the local level, 5 in many cases with a Nationalist Party oflndonesia (PNI) in Bali which had opposed the per­ revised sense of social obligation which kept them in tune and some­ petuation of 'feudalism' through such 'Special Region' designations times in the forefront of progressive political and economic develop­ (Lane, 1972: 33 ff.; Robinson, 1988b: 32). ments. Many communities began to democratize local administration with Revolutionary ideas overtly challenged ascriptive notions of power, the establishment of village councils in the years following the revolu­ wealth, and privilege as natural or inviolable prerogatives, tapping latent tion. Pressure particularly from highly mobilized youth group activists hostilities over the distribution of social and economic goods. Status brought about considerable changes in leadership at desa and district . was, as often as not, the metaphoric ground on which general issues of levels, replacing perbekel and punggawa who had been appointed under inequality in Bali were contested. In extracts from a lengthy interview theDutch with individuals holding more acceptable Republican creden-. conducted by H. Geertz, a former bendesa adat described his views on tials (Robinson, 1988b: 23-4). Those I spoke with who had been status hierarchy in Bali, formulated out of his political experiences in the ' actively involved in the movement to broaden the base for popular 1960s: participation in local administration, pointed to the impact of the 'new ... In Hinduism there is no kasta [caste]. Caste comes from the the Dutch lan­ thinking' that had come with 'progressive times' ( Cok Anom, 1984; I Wy Arta, guage.. . . According to caste, if a Brahmana has children and grandchildren, 1984). There was general recognition of an urgent need for social as well they too are Brahmana, even though they don't know anything.... Now the 274 ADA T AND DINAS POPULAR POLITICAL CULTURE 275 world is different.They carry caste which was given them by the powerful in the comments on its policies in Java apply equally to Bali. '[T]he PK.I found past. But this is not correct anymore.... They should be united in the commun­ it difficult to find issues which would develop class divisions within the ity and not differentiate by caste, and not let the Brahmana have prioritas.... villages, and it tended instead to promote welfare and social reforms The results have not been a hundred per cent.... I must carry it [the struggle which benefited richer and poorer villagers alike.' (Mortimer, against gentry privilege] on, until their position is the same as mine. So that we 1980: 628.) The PK.I did draw considerable support from poor farmers all sit at the same low place.... I think it came to me after I came out of school, because of its more radical stance on land reform (Robinson, masyarakat masyarakat when I first had connections with [society] and I saw that 1988b: 30-1; Cribb, 1990: 244) which its cautious leadership had only was crippled .... I didn't belong to a party in school, but as soon as I entered the adopted under intense 'pressure from below' (Wertheim, 1969: 13). masyarakat, I was a supporter of Bung Karno, PNI. I got a lot from theparties, about how to reform society. (H. Geertz, interview withI Jarod, 1986.) 6 Otherwise the differences between PNI and PK.I policies with respect to the social transformation of rural Indonesia were difficult to distinguish. He expressed the view that ritual or political duties as priest or in For the mass of the population, the socio-economic heterogeneity of government should be achieved, not inherited, as should be the four party membership, and the eclectic fusion of populist and socialist warnatitles. The same point was made by one of the klian in Tarian: idioms in Sukarno's Marhaen philosophy and Nasakom (Nationalist, Religious, and Communist) alliance strategy obscured philosophical dif­ My wife and I have studied a great deal so there are a lot of things we lmow ferences between the socialist and populist premises of the two parties about and do that people normally go to Brahmana for. When someone says, (McVey, 1965; Wertheim, 1969; Mortimer, 1980; Cribb, 1990). 'Shouldn't a Brahmana be doing that?' I say, 'Who's a Brahmana? An Ida Bagus Political conflict in Bali was not then an essentially ideological conflict lontar, that sells ice cream?' No! If you really read the it's someone who lmows between the PNI's Marhaenism and the PK.I's communism (H. Geertz, truly what is correct from study and who dedicates himself to God as his goal 1959: 25; Lane, 1972: 132). It was a conflict over access to power in a above all things.No Ida Bagus is automatically a Brahmana and a Sudra can just as well be a Brahmana. (I Dasa, 1985.) new and fluid political situation. It reached such intensity because party loyalties tended to run along and reinforce other lines of division and Dewa Dani, an elderly representative of the conservative gentry in potential conflict between kin-groups, hamlets, and patron-client net­ Tarian, remarked that on the question of caste privilege there had been works. Both the PK.I and the left-wing of the PNI adopted vertical little difference in the goals of the nationalist and communist parties. alliance strategies in their efforts to build broad bases of popular Both were in his opinion out to hancurkan puri (destroy the palace) support, which inevitably compromised their radicalism. Lane refers to (Dw Dani, 1984). priestly and royal families in Klungkung supporting the theoretically While language levels in Balinese continue to reproduce an automatic atheist PK.I and populist PNI respectively. This is but one example of discourse of status differentiation, the transgression of rules of speech party affiliations defying ideological rationale which occurred through­ etiquette and the strategic resort to Indonesian as a socially neutral out Bali. While this accommodative strategy created a costly constraint language7 are increasingly in evidence. The testing of traditional prerog­ on the transformative thrust of the PK.Is programme,9 it undoubtedly atives is very much a part of the cultural politics of contemporary village also had the effect of making socialist discursive themes palatable to a Bali. Over the decades since the revolution, conflicts related to status wider audience. In their attempts to gain popular support across rural and wealth have been expressed in disputes over temple worship and Bali, both parties tended to play on these same themes and in the death ceremonial obligations in villages across the island. process contributed to making a common set of socialist and populist In the new and amorphous political situation which developed be­ idioms important in modern political culture. tween 1950 and 1965, allegiances to the political parties vying for power Throughout this period of political contest, party factionalism posed a were established along lines not clearly related to social or economic serious problem for Balinese communities ideally premised on principles divisions of 'caste' or 'class'. Often whole villages or hamlets allied them­ of consensus and solidarity. Local institutions could not easily tolerate selves with particular parties, and gentry groups were visibly represented the overt expression of fundamental divisions among members. Even among political parties of all persuasions (H. Geertz, 1959: 29-30; musical groups broke up over political issues. Orenstein (1971: 30) C. Geertz, 1963: 88; Lane, 1972: 80). The PNI managed to build an reports that the gamelan orchestra in one village disbanded when some extensive organizational base in rural villages across Bali, promoting the of its PK.I members refused to play with 'feudal' musicians. Although populist Marhaen (common man) ethic promulgated by Sukarno.8 the Tarian gamelan troupe avoided division over political issues, there Marhaenism was a philosophy advocating the economic and social well­ were nevertheless periods when the orchestra became inactive as a result being of 'everyman'. It stressed the ability of all social groups to work of tensions which arose because of the behaviour of one of its founders, together and consequently downplayed fundamental economic divisions. head of a powerful gentry family, who frequently exceeded his rights as Working to fill the vacuum in Balinese politics left by the banning of an ordinary member of the seka. the Socialist Party in 1960, the Communist Party of Indonesia (PK.I) But there were a limited number of options for dealing with these initially adopted a strategy of co-operation and co-option. Mortimer's conflicts in the framework of Balinese village structures which, unlike 276 ADA T AND DINAS POPULAR POLITICAL CULTURE 277 voluntary seka, could not dissolve themselves. In response to the in­ killings among their membership, but three villagers from Banjar Besaya, tense competition for popular support between the PKI and PNI from including a PK.I leader who was an active and by all accounts well­ 1960 to 1965, whole banjar typically responded by supporting a single respected member of the Dewan Desa, were 'given up' to be killed by party (H. Geertz, 1959: 30; C. Geertz, 1963: 88; Cribb, 1990: 245). military squads. In Sanur large numbers died. 11 Others attempted to defuse factionalism, with varying degrees of suc­ Whether villages managed to subsume party divisions or split into cess, by prohibiting the use of public buildings for party political pur­ open conflict, the intense PNI and PKI competition to mobilize village poses or co-opting members of both parties to village councils in an Bali had the effect of making new concepts for analysing and evaluating attempt to get them to bury their differences, at least with respect to social action a part of popular language. It created a legacy of internal village matters. This was the case in Tarian where party sym­ populist-socialist rhetoric12 which continues to have potent appeal and pathies were predominantly in the PNI camp. Cokorda Anom, a mem­ is widely accorded referential respectability across the spectrum of eco­ ber of the PNI youth group who subsequently became klian of Banjar nomic and social groups. 13 Members of gentry families, such as Anom Madya and later bendesa adat of Tarian, commented, and Beratha who played leading roles in the changes which took place in their villages, were strongly influenced by a combination of traditional We had hardly any problems between the parties here like those experienced in and revolutionary ideas. Unquestionably, the concern for social welfare, other villages. On the contrary, other parties were invited to sit as well on the development, and democratization on the part of individuals of privi­ Dewan Desa and they faithfully contributedtheir talents to thedevelopment of 14 the village. The primary school [built in 1964] was the fruit of co-ope,ration leged social backgrounds has to be attributed to the ideologies and between members of different parties joined together in the Dewan Desa. political tensions of the period leading up to 1965, as much as it has to (Cok Anom, 1983.) traditionalsocial rivalries and notions of noblesse oblige. Overcoming party factionalism was also a factor in the establishment of a village council (Badan Pembina Desa) in Desa Sanur in 1963. Corporatism: Village and State Constructions According to the perbekel, the council's formation was aimed at over­ Broadly held concerns with issues of social change and economic coming the 'smell of feudalism' in village administration as well as the welfare could only have taken hold so rapidly because they resonated divisive effects of party rivalry. with important elements of Balinese social structure and value. Demo­ At that time there were so many political parties, it was becoming a serious cratic and egalitarian ideas were not as alien to Balinese culture and problem. It was as though people were being put into boxes, leaving no way to practice as the ethnographic emphasis on hierarchy in Balinese society reach the goal of developing Indonesia. So we tried bringing the leaders to­ or critical deconstructions of the dorpsrepubliek myth might suggest (see gether, not as party representatives, but as fellow members of Sanur village .... Chapter 3). While revisions of the stereotyped 'village republic' have Better that we plant first the understanding that they were all people of Sanur contributed to a more sophisticated understanding of the cross-cutting and should devote their energies to building it, rather than to defending parties. interests which influence local social life, they should not be allowed to (Ida Bgs Beratha, 1984.) obscure the fact that concepts of consensus, reciprocity, and collective It is interesting that in both Tarian and Sanur the response to the prob­ decision-making do have authentic referents in the local customary lem of overcoming political divisiveness was to turn to some shared pub­ (adat) sphere in which community relations operate. lic good as the focus of local action. 'Development', in the broad sense The formal grounding for Balinese cultural analogues to these con­ of increasing public welfare, was before 1965 already an idiom of local cepts lie in the seka principles upon which hamlets, irrigation associ­ discourse which could be used to transcend, or at least paper over, ations, temple worship groups, and voluntary associations are organized. increasing conflict. As we have seen, in Sanur these goals were even­ Seka ideology embodies a powerful corporate-egalitarian ethos which tually translated into a local development programme of impressive pro­ contrasts with the paternalist and hierarchic model of corporatism of the portions. state. In practice, accommodation to the real inequalities that character­ In the aftermath of 1965-6, it is of course extremely difficult to ize social life in Bali informally compromise these principles in various assess post hoc reflections on the preceding period. In both Sanur and ways. But the classic peasant values of reciprocity and levelling, Tarian, although tensions existed among party-sponsored youth groups, inscribed in customary codes and expressed in the aphorisms of daily people involved in village councils at the time insist that members of the life, found a meeting-point with similarly framed idioms of the revolu­ nationalist and communist parties were able to work together effect­ tionary movement and of subsequent party politics: 'the banjar knows ively. 10 This may have been an exception to the general picture in Bali, no caste', 'same level, same feeling', 'all for all', 'work heavy or light, or it may represent a paradoxic reworking of the recent past in terms of equally shouldered'. 15 In the post-revolutionary period Balinese have the ideal unity of cultural preference. Whatever level of co-operation invested these sentiments to a remarkable degree in broader conceptions was achieved, it did not in the event, prevent subsequent bloodshed in of the 'public' and 'national'. 16 either village. Most banjar in Tarian successfully acted to avoid any At the same time, aspects of local corporatism became part of the 278 ADA T AND DINAS POPULAR POLITICAL CULTURE 279 imagery taken up and generalized by the state in the nationalist rhetoric concepts 'development' and 'stability' it has acquired virtual 'mantra' through which an Indonesian identity was forged and on which the status in official discourse (Van Langenberg, 1986: 20). Indonesian state has subsequently been sustained. Sukarno's syncretic In New Order rhetoric Pancasila has undergone a transformation style, expressed in the slogans of Pancasila and Nasakom, appealed to associating the mutual co-operation, gotong royong (another of those the corporatist and collectivist aspects of Balinese culture, as have many mantra-like terms of national discourse), which Sukarno had asserted of those elements of New Order rhetoric co-opted from the language of was its foundation, with the current government's growth strategies of revolution and social transformation of the previous era. The outcome development. The new authoritative interpretation attempts to subsume of the counter-coup in 1965 shifted the balance of interpretation of all principles under the primary goal of assuring the national security revolutionary concepts so that their populist elements and roots in tradi­ claimed necessary for development. The effect of the government's tion received even greater stress. Headlines in theBalinese edition of the ideological tactic, in seeking to appropriate the historical experience of PNI-affiliated newspaper Suluh Indonesia in the first month of 1966 the Indonesian revolution through legitimating references to the past reiterated the PNI's populist version of socialism, while urging a return while sidelining the expectations which that historical experience gener­ to its proclaimed foundations in traditional social values: Sosialisme ated, has been to exacerbate the contradictions already inherent in Indonesia Bersumber si Marhaen, Bukan Prokt;ar (Indonesian Socialism is Pancasila rhetoric. Based on Marhaen, not the Proletarian), 5 January 1966; Marhaenisme Despite the enormous investment in its promotion and the intense Berdjiwakan Gotong Royong (Marhaenism Gives Spirit to Mutual h.i_d), debates it has provoked in Indonesia, Western academics have devoted 3 January 1961; Kembalikan Dasar Musjawarah dan Gotong Royong little attention to the practical impact of Pancasila ideology, which they (Bring Back the Foundations of Consensus and Mutual Aid), 29 Janu­ are inclined to dismiss as an ambiguous substitution of romantic ary 1966. imagery for policy. It is precisely the ambiguity of the Pancasila idiom that allows it to be made an instrument for the critical re-evaluation of current policy and for the assertion of competing values. Under the Pancasila: Competing Discourses aegis of what Mubyarto (1984) termed 'Pancasila Economics', Indo­ The manner in which received and reinterpreted 'tradition' moulded by nesian critics of the direction of development policy reiterated the earlier recent historical experience and modern ideologies has fed into popular emphasis on equity and co-operation in national ideology, while consciousness and political culture in contemporary Bali is best illus­ Budiman (1982) from a more radical position could argue Marxist trated by the competing discourses surrounding the national ideology, socialism was the only economic and social system consistent with the Pancasila. In both Old and New Order Indonesia the 'Five Principles' of Pancasila principle of social justice. Similarly, outspoken opposition to Pancasila-belief in one God, humanitarianism, nationalism, consensus Suharto's government from the Petisi 50 group and its sympathizers democracy, and social justice-are presented as a modern formulation, draws on counter-hegemonic interpretations of Pancasila, criticizing rooted in ancient Indonesian philosophy (B. Anderson, 1966: 111). Set growing socio-economic inequalities and the lack of genuine represent­ out by Sukarno in 1945, Pancasila was conceived as the key to national ative democracy in contemporary Indonesia.18 'Because the govern­ integrity in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious polity, and became enshrined ment's articulation of Pancasila is vague,' says Morfit (1986: 46), 'there in the constitution as the philosophical foundation of the Indonesian is opportunityto criticize government policies and stillremain within the State (Feith and Castles, 1970: 40-50). sphere of legitimate debate.' It was precisely the populist elements and rhetorical character of Attempts to call national.rhetoric to account are not confined to the Pancasila imagery which Sukarno used to forge a symbol that would ranks of urban middle-class intellectuals and political opponents of the transcend the socio-economic, ethnic, and religious divisions widely current government. With the same emphasis on distributive justice, perceived as threats to Indonesian nationalism (Feith, 1962). But sharp popular participation, and political tolerance grounded in the revolution­ social and economic differences have always existed in Indonesia; and ary movement, Pancasila ideology is taken at local level and made a the principle of corporate unity underlying nationalism, paternalist standard against which state practice can be measured. With striking rather than egalitarian in elite interpretation, too readily lent itself to competence, villagers turn government rhetoric to their own purposes, discounting social differences and displacing participation and equity sometimes successfully, sometimes not, but with the common conviction from the official reading of the national ideology. The privileging of this that it can be made to speak for their interests. one principle, initially in the Guided Democracy phase of the Sukarno 17 era, intensified as the Pancasila idiom was taken up and aggressively State Rhetoric and Local Response promoted under the New Order as the only legitimate national ideology. Van Langenberg describes Pancasila as the all-encompassing 'keyword' In a critical analysis of the motivated 'misrecognition' of indigenous of legitimacy in Indonesian political language. Along with the corollary conceptions of shared obligation and reciprocity in New Order cultural 280 ADA T AND DINAS POPULAR POLITICAL CULTURE 281 ideology, Bowen (1986) describes how local reciprocal traditions have Pak Sukarya's son is intelligent and hard-working, but he can't afford to send his child to school. His son is embarrassed to be sponsored by someone else under been reworked by the state in the Pancasila rhetoric of gotong royong the orang tua asuh (surrogate parent) programme. What would you do? (mutual aid) to become instruments for political control and for the mobilization of village labour. Drawing on the conceptual schemes of lbu Kartini is having difficulty with her IUD and comes to you, her neighbour, Williams (1977) and Bourdieu (1977), he argues that this 'selective for advice. What would you tell her? tradition' has been appropriated as 'symbolic capital' and welded into an Responses are supposed to be in accord with the Five Principles. But ideological tool, 'lending cultural continuity to state control' (Bowen, the performative context and the competitive team structure of the 1986: 558). But the process is not one-directional or monolithic in its games built in a dialogic element with occasionally unexpected out­ political effects. '[S]tate and local actors are both continually engaged in comes. During a public exhibition of the game in Tarian, one of the the construction of "tradition", in a dialogue consisting of representa­ participants brought the house down with her reply to the contraceptive tions and misrepresentations in which the outcome is by no means question. The opposed team member had advised her fictitious friend to predetermined by the state.' (Bowen, 1986: 546.) go to the government health clinic (puskesmas) to be checked by the My interest here is in exploring that other side of the negotiation doctor-a model reply, among other reasons for deferring to the appro­ process in which witting misrepresentations by the state may become priate authority figure. When it was her turn, Ni Yanthi came up with instruments in the defence of local interests. As suggested above, the one better: 'Maybe the problem lies with si Zaki (the man)!' she said, collective images evoked in Pancasila rhetoric touch on cultural cat­ ambiguously implying that he was perhaps too ardent a lover, causing egories which have genuine referents in Balinese local practice and his­ her IUD to dislodge, and that he was the one who ought to be thinking torical experience. It must also be noted that Bali's minority religious about contraception! Her interjection had something of the effect of the status undoubtedly accounts for a more positive response to state popular clown interludes in the shadow puppet plays and was the rhetoric than might otherwise be the case. The pragmatic promotion of subject of rave reviews in the village for some days after. Pancasila from the early days of independence as an alternative political The game at first met with considerable enthusiasm in Tarian, where philosophy to that posed by forces aspiring to an Islamic state (Feith, it appealed to the Balinese penchant for theatre and collective competi­ 1962) gives it an automatic appeal to Hindu Balinese. In addition, tion. In fact it offered some potential as a consciousness raising exercise Balinese share with Javanese culture the underlying Hindu-Buddhist in which different perspectives on issues could be debated. But with the syncretism projected in the Five Principles. 19 district officer orchestrating the games in an effort to fix an authorized The New Order government has gone to great lengths to promulgate version of Pancasila, spontaneity dissipated and so did public interest. the national ethic and extend its hegemonic sphere to every level of The game was introduced and disappeared in Tarian during a 2-month society. In the 1980s it required local officials to undergo training period in 1985. courses on the 'Foundation, Vitalization, and Practice of Pancasila', While the systematic ideological and institutional penetration of civil known as P4 (Pedoman, Penghayatan, dan Pengamalan Pancasila); and society is part of a process of co-option in the extension of New Order Pancasila studies (Pendidikan Moral Pancasila) were introduced into the hegemony, its audience is by no means a passive one. Rarely did vil­ school curriculum. The most extraordinary example I observed of the lagers lose an opportunity to turn official exercises to local purpose. ingenuity mustered to popularize the national ethic and the state's polit­ When Golkar adopted a new membership policy, reorganizing itself on ical and developmentalist agenda in the process was the introduction of the basis of individual rather than occupational group affiliation, it used 'simulation games' (Permainan Simulasi Pancasila) in villages across channels of local administration to promote its new look image and Indonesia. In these games, two teams whose members role-play local recruit members. The use of local government for party political pur­ officials and members of the public compete in responding to a series of poses was understood to be unofficial (political activity at village level is hypotheticalsituational problems provided on a deck of cards: banned), but mandatory none the less. Each banjar head was directed to Pak Dabdab lets his cows graze untethered on the school playing field. What round up recruits representing one-third of the households in his hamlet should the school principal do? to participate in a series of seminars and discussions. At the planning klian Pak Putu refuses to join in gotong royong for road repair because he says only a meeting, expressed discomfort at being expected to pressure few people in the village benefit from the road concerned. As village head, how people to attend. Public servants could be leaned on to come along as an would you deal with it? official duty, but after that they did not know how to go about filling their quotas. Another issue was how to cover the cost of refreshments Thu Dharmi owns an automobile and is requested by a neighbour to bring home which Golkar was not providing. These had to be offered if they expect­ the body of a friend who has died in hospital. Because of taboos associated with death in Balinese religion, she feels that to comply may be dangerous. How ed villagers to sit through the long drawn out sessions. It was all rather would you advise her? ironic trying to persuade people to join Golkar, quipped the village head, ADA T DINAS 282 AND POPULAR POLITICAL CULTURE 283 when everyone knew he had been an enthusiastic PNI supporter.20 for equity (pemerataan), consultation (musyawarah), and justice (keadil­ Tarian leaders did manage to get a reasonable, if begrudging, attend­ an) in their demands for access to the fresh-water programme. Villagers' ance and to turn the orchestrated attempts at recruitment to some ac­ attitudes reflected in the water project dispute present an interesting count in discussions of local issues. A young schoolteacher told me that complement to the two divergent examples of local reconstructions of she was astonished to find out from her group's session that some national political ideology discussed by Bowen ( 1986). He argues that Brahmana in Tarian had never joined in ritual offerings (maturan) at vil­ state demands for unpaid gotong royong labour services in the name of lage temples. This precipitated intense discussions centred on the relev­ development meet very different responses-in Java and Aceh, for ex­ ance of Pancasila to the issue of status difference and responsibilities in ample, ranging from grudging compliance to pragmatic reformulation­ community civic and religious affairs. 'The Kahyangan Tiga are com­ depending on the differing degrees of cultural and political legitimacy munity temples and all should have equal obligations there. The two central authority is accorded. In this dispute, the practical currency of Brahmana in my group became "conscious" (sadar) and said they state constructions of Pancasila, gotong royong (mutual aid) and pem­ would be worshipping with everyone in future.' (Ni Ratih, 1984.) bangunan (development) depended on perceived reciprocity between When another group turned to thefifth 'Sila', social justice, one of the state and village. One member of the banjar involved in the water dis­ klian managed to connect it to desa plans for constructing the co­ pute made this point explicitly in the heated public discussion of the operative centre, which among other things was intended to become an issue: 'What use is there in carrying out gotong royong with ABRI [the outlet for local art and handicrafts. One participant asked whether, this military], if we get no attention from the government?' (r Danu, 1983.) would not be seen as threatening the established art shops in Tarian. Willingness to comply with state demands depended on the extent to According to Gusti Kanti (1984) the conclusion of that group, no doubt which the overt claims of Pancasila rhetoric-development, equity, influenced by his strong feelings on the subject, 21 was that 'according to democracy, participation-were met in concrete ways. Villagers under­ Pancasila principles, the general good must come before the interests of stood perfectly well the state's interest in 'order' (keamanan), and they individuals'. insisted that greater consultation (musyawarah) and equity (pemerataan) The thoroughgoing promulgation of the national ideology at all levels in development programming had to be a condition of it. Through of Indonesian society has in many respects proved a double-edged dramatic action and skilful negotiation the banjar got its water facility. In sword. Villagers are quite capable of adopting state rhetoric against it this instance, national ideology proved a double-edged sword in the when their individual or collective interests do not coincide with central 'everyday' versus 'official' negotiation of cultural politics. government policy. In dealings with authorities it has become a useful The strategic resort to state ideological principles in defence of weapon, the historical touchstones and necessary ambiguities in its for­ demands for equitable distribution of development project resources in mulation leaving it vulnerable to alternative construction. On numerous this example demonstrates that it is possible to turn supra-local ideo­ occasions, popular understandings of Pancasila principles were deployed logies into effective political tools in the service of local ends, at least in an effort to resist what was perceived as improperly constituted or when they can be focused on particular issues by well-organized groups. executed authority. I must stress, however, that the effective assertionof alternativeformula­ Often in very small ways local interests were defended in its terms. tions of national ideological instruments in this case cannot be under­ Pressed by family planning officials to do something about a particular stood without reference to the high degree of local organization in Bali. couple within his hamlet who had failed to join the contraceptive pro­ Skilful play on the ambiguities inherent in national rhetoric was not gramme, the klian of Banjar Lagas proceeded to lecture the intruding alone sufficient for successful resistance to state authority. The defence official on the 'true' meaning of Pancasila. Forced compliance con­ of local interests in the water project dispute depended critically on the travened the basic principles of tolerance and consultation, he claimed: corporate organizational power of village institutions and on popular 'Berbicara masalah Pancasila, sedikit pun tidak ada paksaan' (Speaking control over local leaders who articulate the two spheres of village and in terms of Pancasila, there can't be even the slightest force). According state. The strike and rumoured threats to sabotage the pipe gave clout to to the klian's version of the 'debate', in which he cited his P4 train­ the banjafs appeals to equity. The healthy respect with which banjar are ing manual chapter and verse, the family planning official became 'con­ regarded in Bali, and the fact that once a decision had been made scious' (sadar), left the matter to local discretion (kebijaksanaan), and regarding collective action, no hamlet member would break rank, had a did not cause any trouble after that (I Dasa, 1984) . decisive effect on the outcome of their local resistance. At the same time, In the more serious confrontation described in Chapter 8, when the I am also persuaded that this community would have found it much entire hamlet of Banjar Sangan protested their exclusion from a govern­ more difficult to stand its ground in the face of the superior power of the ment development project, disgruntled villagerssucceeded in turning the state without a common discursive framework within which to make its government's own rhetorical devices back upon it. In that instance, state claims. ideology became the legitimating ground for the assertion of local claims A final example of local appeal to idioms of national ideology 284 ADA T AND DINAS POPULAR POLITICAL CULTURE 285 occurred in the context of the adat dispute in Desa Siang discussed in rhetorically references what is clearly taken to be a common ground of Chapter 2. The correspondence connected with the case is revealing of philosophy and institutional process, and hints at the fusion of concep­ popular conceptions of consensus democracy and the responsibility of tualization that has taken place in the decades since independence. It is local leadership. A particularly pointed formulation of leadership prin­ therefore possible to refer to concepts of democracy and equality in ciples and collective authority, which self-consciously articulates cus­ contemporary Balinese political culture, which, importantly qualifiedby tomary and modern frames of reference is expressed in a letter to the a strongly corporatist sense, are regarded as sharing common ground 22 klian of Banjar Satria. Written by two obviously well-educated members with Western political ideals. of the dissident faction, the letter objects to the refusal of their klian to Other letters from the dissident faction accused the banjar leadership call an extraordinary banjar meeting at their request. Unusual in its writ­ of having 'created a mechanism of leadership, feudal and authoritarian ten form and use of the Indonesian language peppered with Balinese in character' ( 12 June 1977); and of 'completely failing to put into prac­ and Western borrowings, it clearly reflects the extent to which contem­ tice Pancasila Democracy' (4 August 1977). Several of the letters were porary political values have been influenced by both customary practice introduced with the salutation, 'Merdeka' (Liberation) marking the and revolutionary national ideology: incontrovertible revolutionary and progressive frame of reference within which the litigants intended their claims to be understood. So what is the relationship of yourself as leader, as klian, towards the banjar membership, whether as individuals or as a collectivity (kolektip)? ... The Resort to Pancasila rhetoric in this instance did not guarantee a favourable result either for the minority claimants or for government answer to this question is that this is a relation characterized by co-ordination, 23 not subordination.As klian, brother, your position is not to be equated with a intermediaries for that matter. In the end, the customary power of the military officer's relation to his soldiers. A banjar leader (klian/pengurus) is only a village over death rites and corpse disposal prevailed and determined the conduit (sekedar alat), a medium of co-ordination and ... conciliation. outcome against the dissidents' claims. But Pancasila ideology did provide legitimate ground for contest, a contest that remained tense and The letter asserts theintrinsic superiority of collective authorityover that unresolved for 4 years despite persistent attempts at intervention by vested in the position of individual leaders: regional authorities on behalf of the dissident group. Are you acting as klian or executive (pengurus) because you possess high educa­ Although the litigants eventually lost the dispute, it was not because tional qualifications or because you have been appointed by the government? their deployment of democratic interpretations of Pancasila and its iden­ Isn't it rather the case that the source of your leadership is the decision of the tification with local adat institutions was taken lightly. On the contrary, banjar assembly (pesangkepan banjar)? That means the ultimate authority lies not criticisms were met point by point by the accused banjar officials who with the position of klian, but rather with the collective decision of the banjar clearly accepted the underlying premises of the dissidents' objections, klian assembly itself. The position of holds no authority to accept or reject out of but not the assertion that their own behaviour had deviated from these hand any proposal from the banjar membership, be it put forward from an indi­ the letter of complaint quoted above vidual or all the more from a group, because the right to receive or refuse the principles. Their response to klian, klian tempek proposal of a banjar member lies only with the institution of the banjar assembly (signed by the secretary, treasurer, and and copied to itself. The proper modus operandi on a request from a member is to call a meet­ the bendesa, kepala desa, camat, and bupati) presents a defensive and ing and turn it over to those with a proposal to submit. Then it is up to the derisory retort in terms consistent with the underlying collectivist and krama banjar to decide whether to accept or refuse the proposal. ... anti-elitist propositions put forward by the dissidents. Have you left behind the fundamental principles contained in Pancasila that decisions are based on collective deliberation (musyawarah) and consensus Before deciding on the necessity of calling a special meeting, our responsibility is (mufakat)? Perhaps there are certain political tendencies [feudal/anti-democratic] to assess the problem. There has never been any question concerning pro­ lying behind this way of thinking? Perhaps this klian banjar, born of a banjar cedures with respect to the organization of Banjar Satria at past banjar meetings. decision (keputusan rapat!sangkep anggota banjar), has forgotten himself lil(e a It is strange that you should find it unnecessary that the klian banjar be informed peanut on a hot day forgets its shell? Have you lost your point of contact, of the purpose for which a [special] meeting is requested. For one thing there is brother, like a kite that has broken from its string? ... responsibility to make an issue intelligible to members, not all of whom have We know you are young and quick to become emotional, quick to become command of the national language, no less foreign ones. Proposals are usually hot-headed, but as klian you cannot behave as a youth.The term klian means made orally and in the spirit of a family, though we don't find fault with the fact eldest brother, old in thinking, wise in carrying out. ... This is a matter concern­ that this is by letter.... ing people, not ducks.... Don't thinl( you can treat the members of Banjar Satria Regarding the accusation that there may have been political tendencies lil(e cattle to be pulled by the nose.. .. (RegionalDepartment of Government files, 5 June involved, we answer with insistence that the banjar is not a political organization. 1977.) The banjar is an organization of adat and mutual help [adat suka-duka]. We agree that there has to be a meeting to clear up these matters. A date has The parallel iteration of Balinese phrasing and foreign borrowings in the not yet been set only because of the need for preparation.There is after all the predominantly Indonesian text emphasizing collective and consensual routine banjar meeting that is held each month, whose time is fixed and already decision-making (mufakat, musyawarah; sangkepan, krama; kolektip) approaching. And we will ensure that you are all in a position to attend, because 286 ADA T AND DINAS POPULAR POLITICAL CULTURE 287 we know that you, brothers, are office workers (para pegawai) who very rarely and democratic-egalitarian themes generated in the revolution and indeed come down to the people (tery·un ke masyarakat).... (Regional Department of subsequent period of intense political contest may sometimes prove Governmentfiles, 10June 1977.) particularist and parochial in application, but they are none the less Despite the intensity of the conflict and level of invective, bothparties to important contributors to an ongoing critical discourse which forms a the dispute were operating within a shared discourse, a common ground vital part of popular political culture in Bali. of local customary practice and modern political concepts, held to be fundamentally compatible.

1. As B. Anderson (1966: 102) points out, these concepts have played a more critical Conclusion thanprogrammatic role in Indonesian usage. 2. A similar point is made by Liddle (1982) in discussing the roots of the notion of The language of Pancasila, appealing to tolerance, public responsibility, 'Ekonomi Pancasila' in the anti-capitalist traditions of Indonesian nationalism. and distributive justice in popular usage, did not in itself determine the 3. See, for example, GBHN, 1983; Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1985. outcome of any of the issues described in this chapter. But it did grant 4. The fluidityof what Geertz and Geertz (197 5) consider more appropriately termed space for the alignment of local forces and legitimacy for their deploy­ a title system was rigidified under Dutch administration to fit their image of a caste struc­ ture. Those defined as having triwangsa (Brahrnana, Satria, Wesia) titles were exempted ment. The ambiguity of the Pancasila idiom itself provided the ground from the heavy labour service (kerja rodz) that was required of commoners (H. Schulte­ for dialogue and debate. Bakhtin (1968, 1981) and Gramsci (1985) Nordholt, 1986: 30-1). Robinson (1988a: 20 ff.) discusses the early resistance to caste draw attention to the importance of cultural processes of reception and distinction and privilege which emerged openly in Singaraja in the 1920s and gained mo­ response in mediating all discursive practices. One of Bakhtin's import­ mentum throughout Bali during the revolution. See Wirjasutha (1939) for an interesting ant contributions is to attune us to the fact that no form of discourse is example of challenges to the system by a writer who was triwangsa himself. That the sub­ ject remains an emotive one is indicated by the series of headline articles and letters to the closed to alternative construction. There is, in the final analysis, always editor in the Bali Post during May 1989 debating the meaning and relevance of 'caste' the 'internal dialogism of the word' (Bakhtin, 1981: 279 ff.). The heav­ (catur wama) for Balinese Hindus. ily symbolic loading of rhetorical genres and their appeal to consensual 5. Displaced gentry were often appointed as heads of administrative desa (perbekd) response makes them particularly susceptible to subaltern reconstruc­ following the reorganization of local government under the Dutch (H. Schulte Nordholt, tion. 1986: 34), but were rarely to be found filling positions as bendesa adat or klian banjar. 6. This desa adat had been shaken by a dispute over caste prerogatives and access to To claim generalized validity, hegemonic discourses must necessarily the Pura Desa some years before. I am grateful to Hildred Geertz for providing me with be extended beyond instrumental intent. In the Indonesian case, the her transcript. Except for a few Balinese and Indonesian phrases which remained in the Pancasila cultural-ideological idiom appeals to its audience by tapping a transcribedtext of her recorded interview, and which I have translated here, the translation set of shared experiences-both customary and revolutionary. In con­ is that of Professor Geertz. sequence it carries embedded within it a heavy burden of historically 7. What B. Anderson termed 'revolutionary Malay', created from the trade language of the archipelago, was not in the early nationalist period associated with particular re­ generated expectations. Because reference to the past is a necessary gional or status-groups, making it a natural political language for communicating demo­ means of deflecting from the interested character of Pancasila as an cratic and egalitarian ideas. 'The very awkwardness and unfamiliarity of the new language ideological device, other subordinated interpretations cannot readily be reflected the sense of creativity and exploration of a "socialist" and would-be egalitarian divorced from the official one. The examples of grass-roots conflict and experience.' (B. Anderson, 1966: 104.) Having subsequently become tied to a new dissent described above indicate that hierarchic, paternalist, and repress­ bureaucratic social group, however, Indonesian now introduces new hierarchies at the same time as it displaces old ones. The Indonesian poet W. S. Rendra made the. same ive readings of national ideology have not succeeded in displacing the point during a seminar at Murdoch University in 1988. social ideas and energies which the Indonesian revolution and sub­ 8. See Lane's study (1972) of the personality, political philosophy, and organizational sequent political foment activated, ideas to which the accumulated ex­ acumen of Wedastera Suyasa, the leading spokesman and organizer of the PNI in Bali perience of local customary practices in Bali also contributed. from 1962 to 1965. He was an exponent of face-to-face politics and devoted himself to Counterposed to the centralizing intent of the state's version of expanding the position of the PNI in village Bali through regular forays into the country­ side. national philosophy, are decentred, participatory, and often politically 9. A post-coup 'PK! Self-Criticism', originally published in 1967 outside Indonesia, progressive strands of local interpretation which belie the official image blames the failure of the Indonesian Communist Party on its reformist alliance strategy of an unenlightened 'floating mass' incapable of constructing a future and on the non-proletarian class origins of the party leadership (Feith and Castles, 1970: without strong central leadership and direction, an image carefully 270-81). designed to justify the extension of state control.24 The re-presentation 10. This is consistent with Soe Hok Gie's account in Cribb (1990: 254). He states that co-operative relations between the PNI and PKI in Bali were maintained by dint of of Pancasila rhetoric in the examples described here testifies to the de­ Sukarno'swill and theintervention of centralparty and ABRI leadership whenever conflict constructive and reconstructive capacities of popular culture in the erupted. small skirmishes of accommodation and resistance to the centre. Local 11. The extent of the massacre which took place in Bali, and who held responsibility for interpretations of national ideology in terms of populist-socialist it, remain shrouded in uncertainty. The toll in lives was alleged to be as high as 100,000. ADA T DINAS POPULAR POLITICAL CULTURE 288 AND 289 But Cribb's (1990: 246-8) analysis is more tempered. The late initiation of the purge and aspects of the village community myth in order to explain the appropriateness of sup­ (2 months after it began to sweep Java) and evidence that the arrival of army units with pressing political parties under Guided Democracy. death lists triggered much of the killing suggest that the army and some foreign observer's 18. See Inside Indonesia (October 1990) for a translation of a recent public letter signed reports exaggerated the spontaneity and ferocity of local violence. The doleful recollections by many of the original Petisi 50 group as well as others. It calls on the government to of Tjokorda Gde Agung Sukawati of Ubud give this impression (Hilbery, 1979: 79-80, 'return' to a path consistent with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, by rescinding the 91), as do most of the accounts I was given. use of emergency extra-constitutional powers, electing all members of deliberative bodies 12. Rural villagers' versions of these concepts naturally retain a local and particularist (20 per cent of the Lower House and 60 per cent of the Upper House are appointees) and character, as pointed out by O'Malley (1980) with reference to pre-independence nation­ reviewing all laws, regulations and procedures 'that do not accord with the essence and alism and its limits. spirit of the people's sovereignty .. .' (Inside Indonesia, October 1990: 6). 13. A triwangsa university lecturer defended the aristocracy itself in these terms: 'The 19. On the other hand, many Balinese are concerned about the encroaching Java­ Hindu religion leans towards egalitarianism and has a sosial character. Frequently the Puri nization of national institutions for which Pancasila is one more vehicle. See Van Langen­ [palace] was said to be piodal [feudal] by the PKI, but the Puri was not feudal; on the berg's (1990: 132-4) discussion of this subject. contrary it was sosial [referring here to its redistributive role, in the same sense as Sangut's 20. Tarian had been predominantlyPNI in its sympathies.When the PNI was absorbed model perbekel was sosia�. It was the PKI that was a modem form of feudalism.' into the PDI under the New Order many party activists, under pressure that reached a (Cok Ananda, 1982.) violent peak in the 1971 election, switched allegiance to Golkar. One banjar continued to 14. Ida Bagus Beratha came from a wealthy Brahmana family. Although he did not give a majority of votes to the PDI in subsequent elections to the embarrassment of its pursue his formal education beyond primary school, he was well versed in traditional klian and other desa leaders. In 1992 there was a significant swing away from Golkar in religious manuscripts. His father had been a member of the Raad Kerta, the customary Tarian with the percentage voting PDI increasing from 22 per cent in 1987 to 41 per cent, law court established in Denpasar under the Dutch. Cokorda Anom, who was for 10 years reflecting a similar trend across Bali. klian banjar and later bendesa adat of Tarian, was the descendant of a disenfranchised 21. Gusti Kanti was a painter of no small reputation. He had inherited from his father's branch of the local ruling aristocracy. He was active in the PNI youth group and a student experience with the pioneer art dealer in the area a disgust for the extortionate practices of of religious and customary law. He became a strong advocate of the reforms promoted by some of these entrepreneurs.Kanti was among the very few who had been able to make a the Parisada Hindu Dharma and contributes to its deliberations on adat and religious reasonable living without selling his work through the art-shop networks, though at the issues. cost of a very irregular income. He might sell only a single painting in a year, but for as 15. Among the common Balinese sayings which closely equate to 'Revolutionary Malay' much as US$1,000. He was questioned in the discussion regarding his personal interest in slogans and concepts are: Jelek, melah bareng-bareng (Good, bad shared together); Paras, the issue. This he admitted, while arguing his independence from the art dealers left him paros (Give, receive) from the Kawi, Paras paros sarpanaya, salunglung, sabayantaka (Each more free to speak on the problems others experienced. helping the other on the same road, one in fortune, one in misfortune). The former is low 22. See also 'Demokrasi Terletak di Banjar' (Pendit, 1978: 29-34). Animated discus­ Balinese. The latter, of Sanskrit origin, is equated in Ketut Soebandi's interpretation to the sions in the desa office concerning the unilateral allocation of the government pump by the Indonesian gotong royong, recognizing the fundamental equality of all and the importance klian of Banjar Kalih to a relative, brought criticism of his failure to act 'democratically' of tolerance and mutual help (cited in Suasthawa, 1987: 34-40). Briuk sepanggul (strike (I Sutoya, I Sapra, and ISuta, 1984). together as one [panggul is the mallet used for striking gamelan instruments]) and the 23. Regional government officials also appealed to principles of tolerance and social Balinese words for meeting, paum and sangkep (from pahem meaning to boil; se-angkep, justice in their efforts to prevent withdrawal of dissidents' access to burial grounds in Desa one word), were suggested by Cokorda Anom (1989) as Balinese equivalents of Siang under customary law. Similar use of the Pancasila ethic was made by state func­ musyawarah and mufakat. Pedum karang sikut satak (equal house-yard shares) he con­ tionaries in the Regreg (C. Geertz, 1983) and Kerta (Bali Post, 14 January 1983) cases, sidered a traditional precedent for modem concepts of equality, pemerataan. A similar unsuccessfully also in the first instance, but apparently not in the latter (see Chapter 2). inference is drawn in Kom's discussion of the term tegakan, which refers to a desa 24. The potential for effective counter-hegemonic response to state ideology and prac­ member's dues, place in the Bale Agung, piece of land associated with services, and in tice depends on the existence of strong organizational mechanisms at the local end of the general his 'equal say .. . equal obligations' (Korn, 1924: 100). state-village axis. The New Order's paternal-corporatist version of the 'national unity' 16. For many individuals those revolutionary values are intensely personal and con­ principle is currently being used to rationalize policies for undermining those sites of pop­ crete. The 60-year-old gentry principal of the primary school near. my home spent his ular involvement which make effective alternativeconstructions possible.The co-option of evenings and weekends gardening and tidying the school grounds. He was regarded with local leadership under the Village Government Law of 1979 and constraints governing admiration and respect in Tarian, tinged though with mild disdain at his obsessiveness. mass organizations in 1985 are designed to circumscribe further the expression of other When I passed him late one afternoon filling a hole in the centre of theroad in frontof the readings of national ideology. It is worth emphasizing that the Siang dissidents' letter, school, I asked why he did not leave that to the Public Works Department? He replied, written 2 years before the promulgation of the Village Government Law, explicitly con­ 'This is what the revolution was about-everyone taking responsibility for the common trasts the implications of popular selection and responsibility of local leadership with the good. What would Indonesia come to if everyone always passed the buck? This generation very different sources of authority grounded in a hierarchical administrative order. does not really understand what it was about. Even many of my friends think I am a bit crazy to spend my time doing more work, but we live in society and die in society, don't we?' (A A Dunia, 1985.) 17. Many of the institutions associatedwith political repressionand control in the New Order regime had their origins under the more ambivalent and less systematic policies of its predecessor. The functional groups which formed the basis of Golkar, the political role of the army and paternal corporatist politics all have roots in the earlier period (Reeve, 1985). On the last of these, see Selosoemardjan, 'Guided Democracy and our Cultural Traditions' (in Feith and Castles, 1970: 127-30), who refers both to paternalist traditions CONCLUSION: ADAT AND DINAS 291

1987: 63-4). As Dewa Dani put it, 'Dinas piggy-backs on adat.' (Dw Dani, 1984.)

Dinas Adat and 11 Officially, Indonesian law only applies to local affairs in administrative matters and formally acknowledges the independent existence of Conclusion: Adat and Dinas customary systems (UU Dasar/1945: §18), but with powerful qualifiers that make clear their intended subordination to the interests of central government. National law continues to recognize the authority of adat '... so long as it promotes the continuance of development and national security' (UU 5/1979: Penjelasan; Mendagri 11/84) and 'does not Local Knowledge/Local Power conflict with higher laws and regulations' (UU 5/1960: §I/3). Not incidentally, the Department of Home Affairs uses the acknow­ THE local institutions and customary practices to which the concept of ledged contribution of adat to the 'continuity of social life, theindepend­ adat refers form focal referents of the Balinese 'habitus'. The diffuse ence struggle and national development' to justify its own involvement conceptions gathered up in the term adat-dresta reflecting the handed in the promotion and 'development' of adat institutions under state down experience of past generations and ongoing ancestral guardianship tutelage (Preamble to Mendagri 11/84). But long before the Indonesian of community life; sima, tata krama embodying community practice, state formally laid claim to establish a role for itself as patron and tutor past and present-refer to a common moral, social, and communicative in adat matters through the Home Affairs Ministry, the provincial matrix grounded in local knowledge. As expressions of customary law, government of Bali had begun to do so, as much to stave off the per­ collective experience, religious value, and local knowledge, adat institu­ ceived threat of central government power to Balinese cultural auto­ tions are negotiating grounds of public interest. The practices of village nomy, 1 as to enhance its own authority over local institutions. The customary organizations such as banjar and subak involve a sensitivity to Parisada Hindu Dharma, recognized as the official council of the Hindu consensus, balance, and in their circumscribed contexts to a radical religion in 1959 (Stuart-Fox, 1987: 364), and the Majelis Pembina equivalence based on incorporation under seka principles. The evidence Lembaga Adat (Forum for the Development of Adat Institutions), presented in this study demonstrates that adat continues to have great established under the Governor's office in 1979, have been the prime importance in defining and satisfying community needs (religious, movers in efforts to reinforce the role of adat institutions and at the social, and economic) and in the articulation of local affairs with the same time to systematize and reform local practice. wider society. The ambiguous status of Balinese customary law within the wider Adat institutions and the social relations upon which they are predic­ Indonesian legal system, and of desa land under Indonesian property law ated inform Balinese notions of the public and consequently the reson­ are issues which arise repeatedly at provincial seminars, and indeed at ances attached to national ideology. The infusion of local customary one time or another in every desa and police station across the island in practice and legal sensibilities with modern conceptions of democracy the course of dealing with local disputes. Provincial officials stress the was vividly expressed in the correspondence of the dissidents in Desa need for a Hindu/ adat law court equivalent to the syariat judicial system Siang concerning popular control over banjar leadership, as it was in which exists for Muslim Indonesians to deal with cases concerning debates on that same issue and the distribution of government project religion and customary law in Bali. They commonly refer to the resources in Tarian. Very clearly in the case of Sanur's public industries, rejection of the special 'Daerah Istimewa' status which Bali held under and on a smaller scale in other communities, the fusion of local and the Dutch as the source of the present problem (see Majelis, 1980: 48; national ideologies became the catalyst for ambitious development Majelis, 1985: 77, 91). As a consequence of its association with 'feudal' efforts. authority structures, the Raad Kertha law court which operated in the While national programmes have provided important resources for colonial period was abolished after Indonesian independence and adat community development activity, the extent to which the implementa­ legal cases were turned over to the civil judicial system. The Majelis tion of state policy in Bali hinges on adat institutions is evident. Their Commission on Adat Institutions complains that judges of the national role in bringing about the success of family planning, developing local court system frequently have no familiarity with Balinese culture or cus­ infrastructure, maintaining 'law and order', and promoting tourism is tomary law and that consequently many decisions are not in accord with widely acclaimed (Dherana, 1984; Majelis, 1980: 44-55; Majelis, 1982: adat principles (Majelis, 1980: 48). Reports are common of court deci­ 3 ff.; Majelis, 1984: 94; Biro Bina, 1984c; Surpha, 1986: 5; Suasthawa, sions exacerbating conflict and being disregarded by the local populace 292 ADAT AND DINAS CONCLUSION: AND ADAT DINAS 293 when they are seen to contravene customary practice or trespass on the made between a desa adat and its land'. 3 In its opinion, the con­ authority of the krama (Majelis, 1980: 48; Majelis, 1985: 60). In defer­ sequences of permitting the certification of adat land under national law ence to the limits of their powers in these matters, civil courts do occa­ (and therefore of its conversion to private property) would be to erode sionally refuse to hear cases where they can be unambiguously defined the strength of adat by making desa land subject to central government as matters of adat. rather than local authority, to change land-use patterns and distribution In 1981 and again in 1983 the Majelis (1983: 82-3) called for the and eventually to break the relationship between rights and responsibil­ establishment of a separate court system to hear adat cases. It could be ities to the community associated with land rights. argued, however, that any centralized system would hold a problematic The categories of property established under the Basic Agrarian Law relation to an understanding of adat grounded in local knowledge and (UU 5/1960) and reinforced under recent tax legislation (UU 12/1985) power, as did the Raad Kertha, established by the Dutch and dominated are basically Western, and have the potential to alter fundamentally the by the traditional elite. In this regard, the officially constructed concept basis of adat institutions. In particular, the Basic Agrarian Law estab­ of adat extends beyond the popular meaning of dresta, sima, and tata lishes conditions for conversion of various types of qualified traditional krama (see Majelis, 1984: 52), for the latter are so fundamentally rights of possession and use (hak ulayat and hak druwe desa, that is, grounded in place and procedure as to be unrepresentable by some cen­ residual rights and communal rights of possession) to private property trally defined legal structure or religious code. rights (hak milik) (UU 5/1960: II, §2/1). In K. von Benda-Beckmann's Connected with its campaign to formalize the status of adat law, the words (1984: 175), the law constitutes 'a new conceptual frame in Majelis is also actively promoting the written codification of awig-awig in which to talk and think about property relationships' (see also F. von banjar, desa, and subak throughout Bali (Majelis, 1981; Majelis, 1984). Benda-Beckmann, 1979: 281). Within each kabupaten a team of religious and adat law specialists give The various types of corporate ownership or residual rights to village lectures and assist villages in systematizing their awig-awig according to temple (laba pura), residential (karang ayahan) or agricultural (tanah a formula set out in its published manual (Agung, 1986). Often this is ayahan) lands under customary law are not accommodated by the forms done in conjunction with village adat competitions. While aiming to of property recognized under the Basic Agrarian Law. The ambiguous strengthen the legal standing of adat law in the judicial system, this legal status of adat land precipitated proposals for an inventory project process concomitantly facilitates the Parisada's reform programme to to document village lands in each kabupaten in Bali and to press the rationalize and modernize local practice. The Janus-headed framework central government for official listing of desa adat as legal owners (hak within which provincial bodies operate is evident in the Report of the milik) of village lands (Recommendations of the Commission on Adat 1980 Adat Commission which concludes with the vehement statement Lands, Majelis, 1982).4 that the relationship between government and adat institutions would Historically there is a close connection between theintervention of the not be a harmonious one if the autonomy of the desa adat were ignored, state through the impositionof tax and the conversion of common lands but at the same time includes among its recommendations the submis­ to private, alienable property. 5 The Land and Building Tax Law of sion of all awig-awig before ratification to the regional government 1985 (PBB) requires the measurement and official certification of all (kabupaten) 'in order to be controlled/perfected [dikontrol/disempurna­ agricultural and residential lands for tax purposes, extending and accel­ kan] in accordance withprevailing laws and regulations' (Majelis, 1980: erating the privatization of property rights. Residential karang ayahan 46-7). This requirement was made law in 1986 (Perda 6/86). desa (PKD) in Bali had previously been exempt from tax because of its Because ancestral religion and local corporate relations are grounded socio-religious status as adat land, and because as such it was not subject in place, the legal status of village land is of great import. The tight rela­ to purchase or sale. Henceforth only the household temple complex tionship between village land and collective religious-social life is a fun­ (sanggah) and ritual pavilion (bale dangin) will be so exempted. damental construct of local knowledge and power (see Chapter 2). The For religious reasons it is unlikely that these formal changes will have implications of the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law for the various types of an impact in the short term on occupation of karang ayahan or the desa land is another matter raised repeatedly in the reports of regional service obligations that go with it. However, the new mandatory adat commissions and in the deliberations of the Majelis (1980: 55; certification process legally severs the connection between access to 1982: 22-51; 1985: 53, 77). Balinese authorities and legal writers stress residential land and corporate membership in banjar/des a. In Suas­ the importance of protecting the integrity of adat land as the basis of the 2 thawa's (1987: 50 ff.) view this separation undercuts one of the tradi­ desa adat and of collective interest (Wiweka, 1971: 83; Majelis, 1982: tional bases of ritual service obligation (ayahan) and of the desa adat 27, 48; Suasthawa, 1987). The Report of the Commission on Adat itself. Certification and tax liability could also undermine the residential Lands (Majelis, 1982: 24) states that 'from the point of view of rights security which desa members currently have. Private property may be and responsibilities associated with adat lands ... no separation can be resumed, transferred, accumulated and its occupants evicted on grounds ADAT DINAS 294 ADAT AND DINAS CONCLUSION: AND 295 warisan putung, turunan not possible in the past. Over time it means that the current situation, in [inheritance].For instance in a case of there is no [direct krama which any Balinese holds use-rights to a place in the village house yard descendant], and there are several contenders for the estate. So then the banjar would decide it. (HG: That's as if the krama banjar was the hakim of origin, so long as he or she retains membership and fulfils associated [judge].) Yes that's what they thought. But I thought that waris is a matter of obligations, would disappear. 'individu'. It is going to go on down to their children and grandchildren. So the As has been the case with the election of banjar dinas leaders, the banjar should not decide that. (HG: Do you think that during the Dutch time, combination of legal ambiguities, funding limitations, and the local the banjar made such decisions?) Perhaps they did. (HG: Today in my experi­ application of 'discretion' have to date limited the ramifications of ence the kehakiman [judiciary] doesn't mengakui [recognize] the power of the national property and tax legislation.6 In practice, the agreement of the banjar to make those decisions.) No, they don't, but the people in the banjar krama desa adat through the bendesa has been required for residential or don't know that. agricultural lands held by the desa-classified respectively as PKD They want to make it part of theawig-awig that the banjar has the right to decide (karang ayahan desa) and AyDs (tanah ayahan desa)-to be 'certified' such waris decisions. The debat was luarbiasa [extraordinary].So when the argu­ and thereby become alienable private property with unqualified rights to ment got too panas [hot], I closed the meeting. Met again the next day, and sale and purchase. This convention is now a formal requirement of asked them to think whether it was right that orang lain [other people] could provincial legislation under Perda 6/86. decide a waris matter. I told them to go back and ask 'sane wikan-wikan' the As the evidence of this study demonstrates, adat has proved itself smart ones, for instance a hakim [judge], or a sarjana bidang adat [adat law remarkably resilient in the face of overarching legal systems ( cf. K. von scholar], about it. This took two weeks. And after that we discussed it further. Benda-Beckmann, 1984: 153). C. Geertz (1983: 214) puts the point (HG: Do you think that those who felt strongest were people who had a perkara with his usual flair: [dispute] going of their own?) No. (HG: So the difference between the positions was those who support adat kuna .[the old ways], versus those of today's Centered so firmly in the mechanics of procedure, the adat sort of legal sens­ keadaan sekarang?) ibility is perhaps even more vulnerable to external disruption than either the situation, Yes. That's why it was so hard to settle it. In the banjar hak waris haqq or the dharma, where at least partial accommodations between local sub­ end we decided that the would not mix in problems of [inherit­ banjar stance and foreign machinery are somewhat easier to effect.But for the mean­ ance rights]. Some wanted to allow the to decide those matters. But I 'stopped' that. time, anchored in local social organization, watched over by local guardians, adapted to local circumstances, and cast in local symbols, it maintains itself Another kind of problem was the karang desa. It may be that in the past the desa about as well as they. gave land to people for homes. Now, because the desa can no longer give land to the people ... some say it is no longer involved, while others say it is still strong, More serious than the immediate effects of impinging national laws are desa adat and want to defend the right of the over that land. Meanwhile people have the shifting frames of reference within which public discourse on is transformed that desa land .... taking place. The real battleground has become the balance of power between adat and dinas in the construction of meaning and ordering of ... We had a big debate about it. Part of thegroup wanted to keep things as they were, kuna, but the others said that the present day situation won't allow that value. anymore.8 We settled it by saying in the awig-awig: 'Tanah which is karang desa, or PKD [desa residential land], may not be sold, period.' (HG: No details?) No. Ambiguity and Ambivalence (HG: So it has to be passed down through waris?) Yes. And if there are no heirs, it goes back to the desa. And the desa can give it to someone who doesn't have The conflicting interests and ambiguous ramifications for local as land. But the effect is that the desa retains only a small right in the land. opposed to state, and collective as opposed to individual rights in the ... 'Tanah karang tidak boleh dijual'-but that means that the owner can do any­ official reformulation of adat are brought out well in debates which arose thing else he wants with it, except sell it. (H. Geertz, transcript of interview withI Jarod, in Desa 'Sangging' during the process of committing its awig-awig to 1986.) writing. In the same interview with Hildred Geertz quoted in Chapter 10, the chair of the awig-awig committee and former bendesa The pos1t1ons described by the chair of the awig-awig committee adat recounted agitated public discussions concerning desa regulations reflected differing weightings of corporate versus individual rights and on the disposition of village residential land to be included in the written community versus family principles associated with the occupation of codification of its awig-awig: 7 adat land, as well as changing orientations toward authority vested in local customary institutions as opposed to those of the state. Although Some of the people were entirely too 'emosi' .... For instance, the waris [the the wording of the awig-awig finally produced did not depart radically matter of the heir]. According to my opinion, 'yang dominan, itu orang tua'­ meaning that the decision-maker is the older person. But according to those from practice that had developed over time in most parts of Bali, the others, the decision about waris should be made by the 'masyarakaf [the frame of reference within which it was considered has. What is most people]. So the masyarakat can decide whether si A or si B should get the striking about the process of conflict resolution in this account is the 296 ADA T AND DIN AS CONCLUSION: ADAT AND DINAS 297 subtle shift in the appeal to new sources of authority in the judicial and tional base with the formation of the Parisada Hindu Dharma. The academic system, overshadowing the locally and ancestrally founded Parisada, along with the Majelis and other provincial bodies ambival­ authority of the krama itself. ently located between village and state, as readily play the role of vehicle A trend towards the codification and bureaucratization of adat has for, as bastion against, the imposition of central government policy.12 been the primary strategy adopted for dealing with the impinging power The institutionalization of the distinction between dinas, agama, and of central government. This policy has been actively promoted by adat in government policy threatens increasingly to marginalize the provincial authorities, and many desa leaders concede it offers their. one latter, and in the process to displace the power base it offered at local recourse within the centralized legal system. The awig-awig of Desa level. As Acciaioli (1985: 151-3) points out, the central government's Siang was put to writing in the midst of the dispute there with a view to 'principle of respect for adat has concealed what is perhaps a more strengthening the position of local authority vis-a-vis the state. The risk cunning strategy' to erode its practical force by compartmentalizing and with this strategy, however, may be a fixing of meaning, accompanied aestheticizing what was once perceived as an 'encompassing moral by a de-emphasis on process, and the displacement of provenance from order'. If adat was reified and artificially systematized by the Dutch local sources of adat to other centres of knowledge and power. Cus­ adatrecht school, New Order policy would render it vestigial.13 The tomary law and its religious underpinnings have always been embodied artificial distinction of civic life and religion from customary practice is in what is essentially community praxis, a practice and procedure whose an outcome which will likely impoverish the dynamics of all. authority rests on relations between the living and the dead, in which codified forms could only be partial expressions.9 Increasing focus on the written text and on external sources of authority for its legitimation Contest and Accommodation portend a shifting balance of power between adat and dinas. The colonial state had attempted to establish administrative control over In tandem with the growing accumulation of power by the state, the Bali by creating a dual structure of government at local level. Adat and language of dinas is increasingly able to position itself as the dominant dinas were theoretically to be kept distinct. But as K. von Benda­ discourse. Surpha (1986: 3-4) speaks of a contest for domination Beckmann remarks with respect to Minangkabau, the Dutch system was between adat and dinas leading to the waning existence of the desa adat at one and the same time administratively ineffective while truncating within the sphere of government. A university lecturer in adat law said, and undermining local authority as certain aspects of decision-making 'The problem that is disturbing is the eclipsing of adat by dinas. The processes were assumed by new institutions. 'Although the offices intro­ desa adat is being weakened. The cause is that power resides with dinas duced by the Dutch were quickly "domesticated" (Graves, 1981) by the authorities and the desa adat becomes invisible.' (r Tirtha, 1984.) Similarly, Minangkabau, they could never actually replace the system of authority reports to the Adat Commission complain that 'the desa adat itself has based upon adat' (K. von Benda-Beckmann, 1984: 162). The same no meaning whenever it does not receive help from the desa dinas' and criticism of the restructuring of desa in Bali was made by Korn (1924: that 'it often happens that the Kepala Desa Dinas immediately takes a 229-30). hand in adat issues, leaving the appearance that the Bendesa Adat is In several important respects the Indonesian state has gone beyond its unable to carry out his duties' (Majelis, 1980: 45; Majelis, 1983). While colonial predecessor in penetrating the lowest levels of socio-political the strength of customary institutions in Bali has enabled them to organization which had remained fundamentally adat-based. The become the bulwark in the implementation of national development bureaucratization of banjar dinas by central government, the imposition policy, it is conversely dinas functions that are used to justify the con­ of national property law on_ corporately held village land, the rationaliza­ temporary legitimacy of adat units, 10 and to dinas officialdom that tion of adat law and intervention in the exercise of village sanctions appeals are made to prop up the alleged decline in authority of the desa strike directly at the foundations of local socio-political organization. It is adat. The Governor's belated efforts to protect at least the name of the precisely because adat and dinas structures continued to coincide at banjar in the wake of the 1979 Village Government Law was explicitly banjar level, in a way that they did not at the level of the desa, that makes justified by the international reputation it had acquired in bringing about the impact of restructuring under the Village Government Law poten­ the success of the family planning programme. tially so damaging. In Ida Bagus Beratha's words (1984): A three-way distinction between civic, religious, and customary The role of the banjar is decisive. Because of the rules, called awig-awig banjar, it spheres-dinas, agama, and adat-is in the process of becoming institu­ is extremely strong. You could say it gives roots to every person. He or she is tionalized. Among the three it is adat-local and changeable according very much afraid of being excluded from the banjar. From that comes its power to the meaning of Desa, Kala, Patra-which is under increasing pressure to activate development. The effectiveness of family planning and other social to give up its authority to the other domains.11 Agama, represented as welfare activities, concerning death and other matters, all depend on the banjar unchangeable truth in this constellation, acquired a centralized institu- system. ADA T DINAS ADAT DINAS 298 AND CONCLUSION: AND 299 The lamented invisibility of the des a adat must be understood in the con­ Conclusion text of the parallel weakness of the administrative des a and its dependence on banjar for the conduct of dinas affairs. The practicalimportance of the Adat institutions in Bali offer a legitimate frame of discourse and an banjar in local administration is a reflection of the continuity of banjar organizationalbase throughwhich power can be asserted at local level in dinas withthe primary social and ritual relationsof its adat counterpart. 14 the ongoing negotiation of relations between village and state. The con­ Underlying the in many respects successful accommodation of dinas test between local knowledge and power and that of the state is not to adat at banjar level is the seka principle which presupposes members' unconnected with the struggle to maintain a balance between collective direct participation in corporate decision-making and the diffusion of and individual interests, 17 and between sosial and materi orientations, as authority within the krama. In Tarian and most of Gianyar the coincid­ Balinese often put it. The debates in Sanur over the future of village­ ence between adat and dinas at banjar level is such that corporate mem­ owned industries, in Sangging over the disposition of village land, in bership, leadership, and decision-making processes in the two spheres Tarian concerning collective cremation, equity in development projects, are virtually indistinguishable. Even where radical reorganization of and the accountability of klian banjar indicate a sharp consciousness of administrative units is taking place, such as in the new kelurahan of the issues at stake and the contradictions and ambiguities of a process Sanur, the underlying draw of the adat unit continues to supersede the that is not a predetermined or single-directional one. Whether the new structure which otherwise lacks foundation in social or ritual rela­ Indonesian state will become a willing party to a mutual accommodation tionships.15 process depends on a more than rhetorical realization of the intrinsic In the Balinese case, government programmes have often provided significance of adat frameworks of meaning and practice in the contribu­ important resources for community development activity. Very clearly tion of local institutions to national purpose and of both to the common too, supra-local ideologies have fused with those of local institutions to good. provide the rationale for progressive developments in both adat and Provincial government recommendations to central authorities regard­ dinas spheres. The adoption of collective cremations by most banjar in ing the institutional establishment of a Hindu judicial system and the Tarian, Banjar Sangan's assertive action in the piped water dispute, the recognition of customary forms of desa land tenure have to date not establishment and revival of Banjar Madya's kecak performing troupe, been accommodated by the Indonesian state. 18 But then its attempts in and the role of banjar agency in Sanur's development programme are the local domain to loosen the grip of the banjar/ desa adat on the some examples of the manner in which adat institutions and modern definition of local citizenship or on rights of access to temple and ceme­ ideologies have interacted synergistically to the benefit of Balinese tery have been little more successful.19 Similarly, notwithstanding communities. appointment provisions in national law, local election of dinas heads of At the same time the ambiguities and interdependencies of adat and dusun/banjar prevails with rare exception.20 dinas fortify, however, they simultaneously make vulnerable. The argu­ Nor is the argument for local power and collective interest merely ment here closely parallels that of Picard on the processes of cultural resigned to a defensive rear-guard response. In several instances com­ transformation accompanying the promotion of tourism. He observes munities have actively attempted to press for the expansion of their that the symbols which Balinese authorities 'flourish as markers of their authority and jurisdiction. The widespread refusal of identity cards and identity are actually cultural expressions designed according to the logic other official services as sanction is one example of adat institutional of a foreign model' (Picard, 1986: 15). The habitus of local adat will claims on the exercise of state functions (Chapter 2). Banjar Kerta's inevitably be transformed as members of local communities increasingly decision to appropriate the government granted honorarium of its klian come to identify themselves in terms constructed through other dinas to banjar cash (Chapter 4) was another assertive attempt to extend frameworks-the national media, education, legal, and bureaucratic sys­ the principle of corporate priority well beyond the adat sphere. In the tems. These changing frames of reference would position adat on the Sangging discussions of their awig-awig cited above, some of the krama margins, shifting the balance from local to national and from popular to were proposing a return to older conventions in claiming the banjar's official premises of legitimation. right to intervene actively in the determination of heirs. But the history of local institutions in Bali is a history of contest and Adat continues to have profound symbolic significance in the con­ accommodation, and equivocality is not new to the Balinese cultural struction of popular visions of collective good, and adat institutions pro­ arrangement.16 In pre-colonial Bali, adat mediated variably tenuous and vide an important base for organizing collective action. At this time the imposing relations with hierarchic structures and values. In this process, core social relations defined by krama membership-obligations asso"' the principles of seka unity as well as the claims to desa autonomy ciated with ancestral deities and death rites, temple and cemetery in offered a language and institutional base for asserting local collective Balinese religious belief-remain intact. The extent to which these interests. In a similar manner, Balinese communities in post-colonial relations will continue to vitalize wider social, economic, and political Indonesia have succeeded in accommodating dinas to adat as often as spheres depends ultimately upon the continued capacity of adat institu­ they find themselves in the reverse process of engagement. tions to bind local knowledge to local power. 300 ADAT AND DIN AS CONCLUSION: ADAT AND DINAS 301 1. The strugglein theearly years after the revolution to gain official recognitionfor the decided orally by the village assembly (pasuaran).' Such sanctions had lesser force than Bali-Hindu religion impressed upon Balinese a strong sense of the political difficulties of officially approved written codes in his view, but apparently not in the estimation of the their status as a cultural minority. villagers concerned. 2. The Commission on Adat Lands interestingly frames adat law and civil law as the 10. The practical functions of adat have always been implicit in theemphasis on mutual guardians of the interests of thecollective and the individual respectively, and stresses the help and the direction of ritual towards community well-being. I have argued throughout importance of 'protecting the balance and harmony between these important principles' that there is a demonstrable defence of local adat-based institutions on pragmatic grounds, (Majelis, 1982: 27). without I hope appearing to adopt an instrumentalist interpretation which would reduce or 3. Suasthawa (1987: 33-4) argues that oral traditions and lontar accounts of the ori­ devalue their intrinsic cultural significance. gins of the desa and temple-system support the principle thatprivate property rights in vil­ 11. The axiomatic defence of local claims to authority, Desa, Kala, Patra (according to lage land are not permissible. Village, Era, and Circumstance), paradoxically in thiscontext provides justificationfor the 4. A subsequent government regulation provides that banks, registered co-operatives, transcending claims of 'modernity'. and certain religious and social bodies specified by theMinister for Agriculture may obtain 12. There is considerable ambiguity in the rationalizing thrust evident in virtually every hak milik ownership of land in their own right (PerPem 38/1963: §1). Desa adat had not to document produced by provincial bodies. This arises from .a pervasive ambivalence 1990 been listed among the recognized social or religious bodies which may apply for land among Balinese religious scholars, as well as bureaucrats and university academics, toward title.Although some accommodationto permit this has been negotiated at provincial level, the significance of the ancestral and local in Balinese religious ontology (see also Stuart­ it does not solve the problem of ayahan lands to which the concept of private property is Fox, 1987: 364). While deferring to state authority and national ideology, the provincial entirely inappropriate. government nevertheless maintains a serious commitment to local adat institutions which 5. According to the accounts of three elderly members of Desa Kajang (Bangli) places it at odds with the centralizing thrustof national government policy. Recent legisla­ recorded in the Adatrechtbundels (1924: 459), each time someone married and became a tion on adat institutions, for example, asserts the equivalent status of the desa adat to the member of the krama desa, all village dry lands were recalled and redivided equally. administrative desa, the paramount authority of the krama within the desa adat and the Reallocation no longer took place after land was measured into fixed parcels for oepeti tax. necessity of its agreement to any change in the status of village land (Perda 6/86: §1, §14). The tax system instituted in the colonial period created distinctions within the karang aya­ 13. Hobsbawm, in his discussion of 'invented traditions' in the modern age, makes two han desa which had not existed before. The Dutch established separate classifications for important points. Firstly, we should not assume that 'older forms of community and the residential part of the compound on which the bale and household shrine stood and for authority ... were unadaptable' or that 'new' traditions simply resulted from the unviability the surrounding house-yard area (teba). The latter, classified as Tanah D, was taxable; the of old ones. He observes that newly constructedalternatives, despite all the inventive powers former, classified as PKD, was not. In consequence, in many desa Tanah D became of modernizers, 'have not filled more than a small part of the space left by the secular saleable (IBedeg, 1984: 41; Suasthawa, 1987: 61; CokAnom, 1990). decline of both old tradition and custom .. .' (in Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983: 5, 11). A 6. The klian banjar of Tarian were the first to have their karang subjected to the tax in group of young urban Balinese intellectuals, concerned about the future of their culture in an experiment to establish procedures for the new system in 1986. The tax department in the face of accelerating tourism 'development' and Jakarta-based investment, express the the 3 years since has not gone beyond the experimental stage and to date still operates point, in a slogan of their own: 'Modernizasi tidak berarti kemajuan. Tradisi tidak berarti under the old procedures, although the tax is now called PBB instead of Ipeda. The klian keterbelakangan.' (Modernization is not necessarily advancement. Nor is tradition back­ found themselves caught in the middle of the two systems, double taxed for their efforts, wardness.) (A A Alit, I B Gunadi, IKodek, I Surya, 1992.) and in protest refused to pay under the new system since 1988. 14. Parker's study (1989) of the impact of New Order policy in a Klungkung village 7. I wish again to express my gratitude to H. Geertz for generously maloog available focuses on the administrative desa and the role of the puri in the social and economic the documents on these awig-awig deliberations, and particularly this interview. Except transformation of this village, especially in the areas of education and agricultural policy. where brackets indicate my translation of original Balinese and Indonesian vocabulary in She says: 'One perspicacious informant ... suggested that a theme of my thesis could be the typescript text of the recorded interview, the translation is that of Professor Geertz. the conflict between adat and pemerintah (government). He suggested that adat could be 8. The speaker said he himself had been involved in a suit over the right to sell desa equated with the banjar and pemerintah with the desa.' (Parker, 1989: 447.) land, which had gone to the civil court, and which he won. It is possible that this past 15. The development projects adopted over recent years in Banjar Semawang, for personal interest may explain the position he took in the debate over private rights to example, belong to the krama banjar adat, which remains the only 'real' unit of local social disposal. organization in Balinese practice.This does not mean that no shifts in the identity of these 9. Codified forms never purported to incorporate the whole of customary law. For a units have taken place. In many. banjar the official terms dusun or lingkungan have been contemporary example of the primacy of the unwritten code, see Schaareman (1986: added to bale banjar insignia and local vocabulary. And in at least one instance, members 212). One member of the government-sponsored advisory team commented thatthe draft debated redefining their banjar adat to fit the dinas unit. But even this shift arises from the of the new awig-awig in a village they were currently assisting had to be corrected to sense that the social and ritual aspects of banjar membership are inextricably tied. exclude reference to expulsion from the krama. This would have to be left as part of the 16. Indeed thehistory of the Indonesian state itself is one full of contradictoryefforts to unwritten adat, he insisted. Similar suggestionof thecontinuity of oral precedence in pop­ 'accommodate' the separate interests of its varied constituents to an identity built on cor­ ular practice is evident in a Bali Post report (19 May 1992) entitled 'Left Behind by the poratist and collectivist imagery (Feith and Castles, 1970; B. Anderson, 1983; Liddle, Times, Awig-awig that Expel Village Members'. It quotes a regional Adat Forum official 1989). who states categorically that none of the awig-awig of the desa adat in the district con­ 1 7. The modulating effect that national ideology and state policy have had on the cerned have provisions in writing concerning expulsion. Questioned about the evidence exclusionary and parochial side of local corporatism has also to be recognized. State that such sanctions were still prevalent, as in a recent Klungkung case where a person was officials made use of Pancasila principles of humanitarianism and tolerance to curtail expelled for poisoning through black magic, the official said, 'In the sections and sub­ the exercise of customary sanctions of expulsion and the practice of ngarapan which they sections of awig-awig, there is no chance of finding such sanctions because the process of argued infringed individual rights, while ironically at national level the ideology of corpor­ composing and validatingthem is tightlyfiltered by the government. Where incidents like atism often works in the opposite direction, to constrict individual rights and those of this have occurred, it could only be on the basis of some unwritten part of the code minorities. 302 ADA T AND DINAS 18. In 1992 the Parisada Hindu Dharma set up a team to consider the form that the proposed Hindu religious court would take, acknowledging the difficulties of accommod­ ating the legitimacy of local variation recognized in Hindu teaching itself and a court sys­ tem that would have 'universal' coverage for all Hindus in Indonesia. Centralization and rationalization are pivotal issues in the ongoing 'struggle' to gain official acceptance (see Bali Post, 4 May 1992). 19. Most recently, the Bali Post (5 December 1991) reports on a case of expulsion and refusal of temple worship rights arising from two members' resistance by court action to Appendices banjar resumption of tanah ayahan. Parisada and the regional government Adat Forum (BPLA) representativeswere sent to give 'guidance' to the desa concerned. 'But, according to a close source who did not wish to be named the arrival of the contingent from BPLA and Parisada was received coldly by the people there. The local citizenry who were to receive this instruction did not attend. And the officials returned without the opportunity to perform their duty.' APPENDIX 1 20. See 'Soal Puikan Banjar' (Bali Post, 20 September 1989) for an example of one banjai's resistance to the appointmentof its dinas head. The banjar refusedto hand over its Desa Tarian: Biographical Sketches of Primary Informants books to the new kepala dusun because 'he was not chosen by the banjar and did not have its support'. A Note on Balinese Names and Titles*

ABBREVIATIONS have been used throughout the text to indicate gender and social status according to the following conventional designations:

I ff:Ni] I/Ni, with or without birth-order names Wayan, Made, Nyoman, and Ketut, refer to commoners of non-triwangsa status. In Indic caste terminology, this group is sometimes referred to as Sudra, more often in Bali as Jaba, 'outside' the ranked title-groups.

I Gusti (Gst) ff: I Gusti Ayu] In Tarian, Gusti were retainers of thelocal rulers but in some parts of Bali gov­ erned in their own right. This title is conventionally associated with the third of the triwangsa status-groups, theW esia.

Cokorda (Cok), Anak Agung (AA), Dewa (Dw) ff: Cokorda Istri, Agung Istri, and Desak] Those bearing the title Cokorda are descendants of the pre-colonial ruling house of Tarian. The titles Anak Agung and Dewa are used by families of ancillary puri who formed part of the traditional administration as jaksa and sedahan, the legal and financial administrators of the realm. These titles are conventionally associated with the second of the triwangsa status-groups, the Satria.

Ida Bagus (Ida Bgs) ff: Ida Ayu] This title, held by descendants of priestly families, is associated with the highest status in the Indic caste hierarchy, theBrahmana.

*For a more detailed treatment of the title-system in Bali and its relation to the Hindu caste!varnasystem, see Geertz and Geertz, 1975: 20-3. 304 APPENDICES APPENDICES 305 PrimaryInformants grant of machinery from the Department of Small Industry enabled them to establish a cottage industry of their own, making toys for export. Cokorda Anom I Made Lebah Born 1936. Secondary education. The descendant of a disenfranchised branch of the Tarian ruling family. In the 1950s a member of the PNI youth group, he Born 1905? No formal education but completed a banjar-based adult literacy later filled positions as klian of Banjar Madya Dangin and bendesa adat of course in the post-war years. Raised as a servant (parakan) in Puri Tarian in Tarian. Knowledgeable on traditional lontar texts, he is occasionally involved in what he called jaman setengah Bali, before Dutch colonial rule had made a Parisada Hindu Dharma activities, often as a member of regional commissions significant impact in the Gianyar region. He was sent to study gamelan music at on adat affairs. Ketewel and later became one of the founders of the village gamelan orchestra. He also worked in the Bali Hotel and as chauffeur and music teacher to Colin Desak Ketut Dewati McPhee. Into his eighties he was still performing and teaching. His views on local social history and change provided a counter-perspective to that of Dewa Born 1942. Primary education. She works as a cloth and souvenir pedlar. We Putu Dani. met frequently on the street, exchanging small talk about local affairs. A ritual offering specialist (tukang banten) in Banjar Madya, she also provided valuable I Made Toya background understanding on local religious practices. Born 1920? Primary education. The oldest of the klian in Tarian, he had served Dewa Putu Dani Banjar Besaya in this position from 1942 to 1961 and again from 1979 to the present. He spent his mornings in the desa office and had the responsibility of Born 1906? Sent to Denpasar for primary education. Grandson of the fiscal supervising and collecting daily rental fromthe desa-owned market stalls. In the administrator (sedahan gede') to Puri Tarian, he spent his early years in the afternoons he peddled food from a mobile cart in the neighbouring town. (See Tarian court. He worked for several years in the Bali Hotel before returning to Table 4.1.) Tarian to marry. He was an avid oral historian and offered a predominately court-centric perspective on life and social change in Bali. I Nyoman Dharma

I Gusti Wayan Kanti Born 1949. Primary education. ]Qian of Banjar Sangan since 1981. He de­ pended on farming and occasional day labour for his livelihood. His wife's Born 1939. Primary education. An established painter of the old school, he income from their coffee-stall was also a mainstay of the family budget. He was refused to sell his work through art shops. Klian of Banjar Pekandelan since acutely aware of the economic problems of poor villagers from personal experi­ 1972, he is the descendant of a line of banjar heads who were also retainers of ence. (See Table 4.1.) Puri Tarian. He is very knowledgeable on the oral history of the area. (See Table 4.1.) I Wayan Bamia Born 1938. Secondary education. Retired army administrative officer. He I Ketut Suta became head of Banjar Kalih in 1989, having served as petajuh in the 1970s and Born 1942. Secondary education. Descendant of a line of clients (pamekel) of early 1980s. (See Table 4.1.) Puri Tarian. He had relatively large landholdings by local standards. He suc­ ceeded his father as klian of Banjar Tegeh and served as manager ·of the desa I Wayan Mandera savings and loan co-operative with Wayan Mandera and was influential in desa Born 1945. Primary education. Klian of Banjar Madya Dangin since 1978. His administration. (See Table 4.1.) records on banjar affairs, along with the cash-books of the treasurer, are the most detailed in Tarian. His large extended household is supported by his paint­ I Made Dasa ing and his wife's marketing. His perspective on social life and change in Bali is Born 1942. Primary education. Although he lists his main occupation as farm­ influenced by the Javanese-based kebatinan (mystical) group of which he is a ing, his time was devoted almost entirely to the social and adat affairs of Banjar member. (See Table 4.1.) Lagas as klian. These interests and activities were shared by his wife, Ketut Ida Bagus Rai Buda Yanthi. Their efforts in promoting the family planning programme were recog­ nized in a provincial award to Banjar Lagas. (See Table 4.1.) Born 1925? in Karangasem. Married into a Tarian griya. Learned in lontar texts. Although not a pedanda, he often assisted with the life-cycle rituals of local I Made Gatra followers of the griya. A one-time employee of the Dutch scholar C. Hooykaas.

Born 1950. Secondary education. He worked in the early 1970s as an itinerant Ni Ketut Ratih souvenir pedlar, eventually going into partnership in a shop in Kuta. When competition forced him out of business, he and his wife, Ni Luh Sari, survived Born 1961. Secondary education. Primary schoolteacher. A member of the by painting for local handicraft exporters on a piece-work basis. In 1985 the household in which I lived until her marriage into a neighbouring family. My 306 APPENDICES APPENDICES 307 impressions of matters of importance to young women are very much shaped APPENDIX 2 through her experiences. Desa Tarian: Awig-awig Banjar Pantle

Ni Ketut Yanthi §1. Banjar Pantle [hereby] establishes its standards. Assemblies take place on Wraspati Umanisyinta [every 35 days on the uku calendar]. Born 1940. No formal education during the war years; later completed an adult §2. Banjar Pantle may carry out the ngaben or lebon [low and high Balinese for literacy course. A popular joged dancer in her youth and recognized specialist on cremation ceremony] each year when the banjar must offer patus [contri­ ritual offerings, she is very active in civic and ceremonial affairs. She organized butions]. thewomen's rotating credit club and pioneered contraceptive use in her banjar. §3. It is not permitted to cremate before 42 days have passed since the previ­ She is married to the klian of Banjar Lagas, I Made Dasa. ous one. §4. If 42 days have passed during the same year it is possible to carry out a Ni Luh Sari cremation, but without receiving patus. Labour assistance can be drawn as Born 1957. Secondary education in economics. An accomplished dancer in the usual. Tarian performing group from her youth, she now teaches dance to the newly §5. If there is a corpse [layonlsawa] of a recently deceased to be cremated formed troupe in Banjar Lagas. Her considerable artistic talents helped to sup­ immediately, patus is to be contributed as usual. port the household in lean periods and in thelast five years to develop a success­ §6. The patus contribution in Banjar Pantle is rice apunjung [a bamboo cylin­ ful cottage industry with her husband, Made Gatra. der holding enough rice to serve four people on a raised platter (wanci)]; one bamboo, a hand-span and three fingers in circumference; a coconut, Ni Made Sani two hand-spans and four fingers in circumference; and if the ceremony is conducted at the cemetery, a woven piece of coconut frond is to be added Born 1948. Primary education. Runs a coffee-stall next to the balai banjar in for roofing. Banjar Madya. She and her husband supported their three children with the §7. The banjar may be called on for labour four times in total, including an income from this stall and her husband's work as a tenant farmer. extratime on request [i.e. 3 times as the standard labour contribution, and a fourth if needed]. §8. Members will bring their own machete (timpas) and chopping knife (bela­ kas) to work three times, and once more. If not brought, the fine (dosa) is one Dutch rupiah. §9. Banjar members when called upon to work may request exemption when sick, planting, ploughing, transplanting, harvesting, when working in their own fields, or if away travelling. §10. If the patus rice is not prepared and presented properly on a wanci, the person responsible for the rice will be fined one rupiah. §11. Anyone bringing rice that is dirty or has even the smallest pebble or husk will be fined 125 kepeng. §12. Banjar members may be called upon three times to keep watch [at the household conducting ngaben], but must be offered food. If they are not given food, the person requesting the watch will be finedaccordingly. §13. And if there are those cremating with a corpse [i.e. recently deceased] and those without, those witli the corpse will have a double division of banjar labour [for added preparation assistance]. §14. And when members conduct a cremation, grouping together as one, they may call on the banjar for help four full times. §15. And the banjar may be divided [to assist those holding the ceremony] at nguangun after the corpse has been bathed. §16. And those that cremate collectively receive [for assistance] one share of the banjar men and women. § 17. And if the cremation is carried out as a group, assistance with rice pounding may be requested by the main organizer once only. §18. And those that help with pounding rice will be reciprocated once with a share of ritual food (pangetut) by the person responsible for the ceremony. If those who should receive pangetut do not, the one who requested assist­ ance with pounding will be fined. APPENDICES 308 309 §19. Banjar men (banjar lanang) receive a portion of ritual food five times. � Once two days before cremation, two times the day before cremation, "',� .sbO once at the final sending (pangiriman). � ..o � "' JI & Os �� §21. The banjar ritual patus meal [ajengan patus] may not be divided, except "'

(lawar), sate (perangkat), n meat and a certain number and type of according to the level of

Project Location Desa Tarian Government Total Explanation

UJ Construction and repair of temple Market 1,000,000 1,200,000* 2,200,000 *Bandes .....

1985/6 Construction of classrooms and principal's residence SD#3 Renovation of classrooms SD#4 13,910,000* 13,910,000 *Inpres Repairs to PKK office Desa Tarian 1,350,000* 1,350,000 *Bandes

1986/7 Repairs to classrooms, temple, and subak SD#6; Pura Ulun Suni; Subak Gandalang 3,030,000* 3,030,000 *Inpres Construction of kindergarten Desa Office Complex 900,000 1,350,000* 2,250,000 *Bandes

1987/8 Renovation of desa office Desa Office Complex 1,000,000 1,350,000* 2,350,000 *Bandes

1987/8/9 2 Co-operative arts centre Desa Complex 60,000,000* *Project /3 completed-1989 funds raised by lottery, 1988/9 savings, and contributions Repairs to classrooms SD #1 & 6 1,800,000* 1,800,000 *Inpres

1989/90 Renovation of classrooms SD #5 10,500,000* 10,500,000 *Inpres (kabupaten- manag<;d)

Sources: Desa Tarian, 'Monografi Desa, 1988'; Desa Inpres/Bandes records; Note: Desa Tarian contribution to Bandes projects refers to (sometimes notional) APPKD, 1985/6, 1986/7, 1987/8, 1988/9. gotong royong value; in other cases the amount refers to real cash value. •sources of funds in rupiah, rounded to nearest '000.

APPENDIX 4 Desa Tarian: Major Banjar Projects, 1978-1991"

Project Location Banjar Funds Others Total Explanation

1978/9 Bale kulkul Br. Madya 2,480,000* 2,480,000 *Banjar kecak performances Television Br. Lagas 275,000* 275,000 *Banjar 'bar' fund-raising

1979/80 Bale banjar Br. Sangan 6,000,000* 6,000,000 *Levies, loans, and fund-raising Banjar shrine Br. Madya 1,700,000* 1,700,000 *Kecak performances and levies

1980/1 Construction of side-roads Br. Madya 1,438,000* 1,438,000 *Levies

1981/2 Construction of bale tempek Br. Madya 1,000,000* 1,000,000 *Kecak performances and levies

1982/3 Banjar storage complex Br. Pande 1,000,000* 1,000,000 *Levies and fund-raising 'bar' 1983/4 Gamelan instruments Br. Lagas 5,000,000* 5,000,000 *Levies, fund-raising, and loans Construction of banjar shrine Br. Kalih 3,000,000* 3,000,000 *Levies and fund-raising 'bar' Public water utilities Br. Besaya, Sangan, 1,200,000* 300,000** 1,500,000 *Levies Pekandelan, Madya *** **ABRI: part costs and labour ***Pipes from public works .....

(continued) APPENDIX 4 (continued) (JJ

Project Location Banjar Funds Others Total Explanation

1984/5 Water-pipe extension Br. Besaya 1,475,000* 1,475,000 *Levies Construction of banjar shrine Br. Lagas 1,500,000* 1,500,000 *Levies and fund-raising 'bar' Extension of bale banjar Br. Lagas 1,200,000* 1,200,000 *Levies

1985/6 Gamelan instruments Br.Madya 7,500,000* 7,500,000 *Levies Bale banjar extension Br. Pekandelan 4,500,000* 500,000** 5,000,000 *Levies and **government contribution Temple repairs Br. Besaya 3,000,000* 3,000,000 *Levies

1986/7 Kiosk and performance stage Br. Lagas 4,100,000* 4,100,000 *Levies and performance proceeds Construction of side-road and Br. Besaya 1,000,000* 1,000,000 *Levies and contributions volleyball court

1987/8 Construction of drainage ditches Br. Tegeh-4 tempek 1,150,000* 1,150,000 *Levies Construction of bale tempek Br. Besaya 2,000,000* 2,000,000 *Levies and contributions Construction of concrete- paths Br. Madya 2,300,000* 2,300,000 *Levies Repairs to banjar shrine Br. Kalih 1,500,000* 1,500,000 *Levies Sports complex Br. Madya 2,500,000* 2,500,000 *Levies and contributions

1988/9 Repairs to bale tempek Br. Besaya 5,000,000* 5,000,000 *Levies

1989/90 Renovation of bale banjar Br. Pekandelan 24,000,000* 500,000** 24,500,000 *Levies (Rp 8 million); contributions and fund-raising (Rp 16 million) **Contributions from kabupaten Renovation of bale banjar Br. Lagas 9,000,000* 500,000** 9,500,000 *Levies and performance proceeds **Contributions from provincial government Renovation of bale kulkul Br. Kalih 5,000,000* 5,000,000 *Levies and film proceeds

1990/1 Repairs to banjar shrine Br. Madya 5,000,000* 5,000,000 *Levies Construction of new bale banjar Br. Tegeh 27,000,000* 27,000,000 *Banjar cash, contributions, and overseas performance proceeds

Sources: Desa Tarian, 'Monografi Desa, 1988'; banjar notebooks; and oral Note: All calculations refer to cash expenditures and do not include the value of sources. banjarlabour. •Sources of funds in rupiah, rounded to nearest '000.

(JJ...... (JJ 314 APPENDICES APPENDICES 315 APPENDIX 5 Desa Sanur: Development Projects, 1969-1984a APPENDIX 5 (continuea)

Regional Provincial Central Annual Projects Location Desa Sanur Government Government Government Subtotal Total Explanation -- 1969/70 Construction of showers and toilets Sanur Beach 455,175 455,175 Construction of kiosk- sale of carvings Beach Market 19,111 100,000* 119,111 *Bandes Construction of desa offices Br. Taman 398,941 398,941 Construction of Bank Desa Sanur offices Br. Taman 761,981 761,981 Repairs Br. Danginpekan 31,150 31,150 1,766,358

1970/1 Construction of empelan Br. Pekandelan/Intaran 20,000 25,000 45,000 Construction of 3 kiosks for sale of carvings Beach Market 60,000 75,000 135,000 Repairs to foundation offices Br. Taman 21,398 21,398 Repairs Br. Danginpekan 12,000 12,000 Repairs to Bank Desa Sanur offices Br. Taman 39,747 39,747 253,145

1971/2 Extension of foundation offices Br. Taman 210,325 210,325 Road widening Sindu to Danginpekan 70,000 100,000* 170,000 380,325 *Bandes

1972/3 Construction of co-operative laundry Br. Taman 3,014,415 3,014,415 Construction of public market stalls Sindu Market 1,320,000 1,320,00 Construction of kiosk stalls Beach Market 531,332 531,332 Construction of restaurant I Beach Market 606,866 606,866 Construction of wire fence Sindu Market 262,485 100,000* . 362,485 5,835,098 *Bandes

1973/4 Construction of market temple (melanting) and consecration costs Sindu Market 115,095 115,095 Construction of garage Br. Gulingan 255,295 255,295 Repairs to perbekel's office Br. Taman 42,145 42,145 Repairs to irrigation channel Subak Intaran 50,000 100,000* 150,000 *Bandes Repairs to beach market Beach Market 80,000 80,000 642,535

(continued) 316 APPENDICES APPENDICES 317 APPENDIX 5 (continued) APPENDIX 5 (continued)

Regional Provincial Central Annual Projects Location Desa Sanur Government Government Government Subtotal Total Explanation -- 1974/5 Construction of art shop, Cemara Beach Br. Semawang 1,265,145 1,265,145 Construction of high school (SMP) Br. Taman 3,044,463 3,044,463 Installation of electricity Sindu Market 661,902 661,902 Construction of toilets at SMP Br. Taman 59,510 59,510 Construction of kiosk and fence Beach Market 137,485 137,485 3 classrooms and office (SD #3) Br. Betongandang 1,400,000 100,000 1,500,000 School extensions (SD #1) Br. Pekandelan Sanur 675,000 75,000 750,000 School extensions (SD #2 & 3) Intaran and Sanur 2,600,000 2,600,000 Restaurant II, Cemara Beach Br. Semawang 978,640 978,640 Road repairs Br. Puseh Kauh 36,000 162,500* 198,500 *Bandes Construction of bar and restaurant ill Beach Market 890,810 890,810 Construction of bar and toilets in restaurant I Beach Market 812,317 812,317 Repairs to road Br. Puseh Kauh 20,000 28,100 48,100 Cons.truction of road drainage ditches Br. Taman-Gulingan 660,017 100,000 760,017 Construction of public health clinic Br. Gulingan 6,155,525 6,155,525 19,862,414 1975/6 Repairs to beach market I Beach Market 76,775 76,775 Construction of drainage ditches Br. Gulingan-Taman 242,375 200,000 442,375 Construction of garage Br. Sindu 272,470 272,470 Construction of perbekel's office Br. Taman 2,650,000 2,650,000 Construction of 3 security posts Belong, Tanjung and Padanggalak 270,000 270,000 Construction subak, Sanur Br. Panti 50,000 300,000* 350,000 *Bandes Construction of water drain Beach Market 55,425 55,425 Repairs to co-operative building Br. Taman 1,657,525 1,657,525 Construction of bicycle stand Br. Taman 75,250 75,250 Construction of wall, bank office Br. Taman 63,6200 63,620 5,913,44 (continued) 318 APPENDICES APPENDICES 319 (continued) APPENDIX 5 APPENDIX 5 (continued)

Regional Provincial Central Annual Projects Location Desa Sanur Government Government Government Subtotal Total Explanation

1976/7 Construction of primary school Br. Gulingan 4,500,000* 4,500,000 *Inpres-work done by Pemborong Sandhi Construction of pre-school- 2 classrooms Br. Pusek Kuta 172,100 172,100 Karya Denpasar Construction of sports field Br. Taman 478,575 478,575 Road widening Br. Taman-Buruan 35,000 35,000 Construction of toilets and fence Perbekel' s Office 200,540 200,540 Construction of road Pekandelan Sanur and drainage ditches Buruan 148,500 325,000* 473,500 Department of Tourism grant (Rp 150,000) *Grant from Sandhi Karya (Rp 175,000) Construction of restaurant and homestay Desa Kuta 7,531,801* 7,531,801 *Includes land purchase cost Constructionof road drainage Pekandelan Sanur and (Rp 2,100,000) ditches Br. Anggarkasih 660,900 660,900 Repairs to kiosk Beach Market 117,790 117,790 Repairs to road and ditches Br. Gulingan 1,500,000* 1,500,000 *Work by Pemborong CV SaduK arya Widening and surfacing Pekandelan Intaran 1,290,000** 200,000 300,000* 1,790,000 *Bandes, **including land of road network cost and gotong royong Construction of temporary drain at temple Pekandelan Intaran 30,000* 30,000 Swadaya gotong royong- Construction of temporary 4 banjar ditches and road grading Br. Danginpekan 15,000* 15,000 *Gotong royong Br. Penopengan Repairs to kiosk at beach market Beach Market 71,725 71,725 17,576,931 1977/8 Construction of shrine at SMP Br. Taman 20,000 20,000 Construction of primary school Br. Gulingan 1,239,260 4,500,000* 5,739,260 *Inpres Repairs to beach market at restaurants I and II Beach Market 58,100 58,100 Construction of primary school Sanur 491,312 4,163,354* 4,654,666 *Inpress (after tax -10%)

Construction of pre-school PusekKuta 3,315,630 200,000 350,000* 3,865,630 *Bandes Construction of bridge Tanjung 700,000 700,000 Construction of restaurant, Sanur village Sanur 6,846,038 6,846,038 21,883,694

( continuea) 320 APPENDICES APPENDICES 321 APPENDIX 5 (continued) APPENDIX 5 (continued)

Regional Provincial Central Annual Projects Location Desa Sanur Government Government Government Subtotal Total Explanation

1978/9 Construction of drainage ditches Br. Danginpaken 350,000 350,000 Construction of carwash Br. Taman 4,815,420 4,815,420 Construction of wall- bale agung Br. Tulingan 425,000 425,000 Construction of shrine at subak, Sanur Br. Belong 25,000 25,000 Construction of fish pond Br. Tanjung 1,500,000 1,500,000 Construction of water-tower and carwash Br. Taman 1,000,000 1,000,000 Renovation of bale desa Desa Adat Intaran 5,000,000 5,000,000 Repairs to Pura Pengulun Setra Desa Adat Sanur 150,000 150,000 Construction of refuse containers Sanur Market 150,000 150,000 Construction of road drainage ditches Br. Danginpekan 926,625 926,625 Construction of gorong Br. Danginpekan 616,000 200,000 350,000* 1,166,000 *Bandes Construction of irrigation channel Subak Intaran Barat 60,000 60,000 Construction of drainage at pre-school Pasek Kuta 90,000 90,000 Installation of 8 electric cables Br. Danginpekan 24,000 24,000 15,682,045

1979/80 Road surfacing Br. Sindu-Danginpekan 361,391 200,000 450,000* 1,011,391 *Bandes Construction of reading room HMS Br. Taman 172,177 172,177 Yard works, co-operative building Br. Taman 64,000 64,000 Construction of restaurant III Cemara Beach 4,495,915 4,495,915 Construction of parking lot Pekandelan Sanur 331,904 331,904 Construction of primary school (SD # 7) Pasek Kuta 2,599,421 2,599,421 Bamboo tambak-PKK Mel Tanjung 856,416 856,416 Repair of irrigation channels Subak Taman 70,430 70,430 Reconstruction of restaurant II Beach Market 8,975,140 8,975,140 Construction of Secondary School Building (SMP) Br. Taman 2,279,408 2,279,408 Demolition of old office complex Br. Taman 67,250 67,250 Additional calssroom (SD #2) Pekandelan Sanur 469,900 1,500,000* 1,969,900 *Inpres (after tax deducted) Construction of primary school (SD #6) Br. Buruan 529,942 4,181,058* 4,711,000 *Inpres (after tax deducted) PKK Demonstration Project Mel Tanjung 5,098,741 5,098,741 Construction of gorong 2 Br. Taman 228,575* 228,575 32,931,668 *Labour by members-Subak Intaran Timur

(continued) APPENDICES APPENDICES 322 323 APPENDIX 5 (continued') APPENDIX 5 (continued') --- Regional Provincial Central Annual Location Desa Sanur Government Government Projects Government Subtotal Total Explanation

1980/1 Construction of new desa and bank offices Br. Taman 52,111,093 52,111,093 Construction of pig pens Br. Sindu 368,804 368,804 Construction of toilets and sheds in restaurant ill Cemara Beach 415,260 415,260 Construction of temple shrine Desa Office 471,070 471,070 Water facilities and furniture Desa Office 524,900 524,900 Installation of 8 electric cables Br. Danginpekan 34,000 34,000 Installation of 4 electric cables Br. Puseh Kauh 12,000 12,000 Construction of 3 primary school classrooms Pasek Kuta 7,045,000* 7,045,000 *Inpres Construction of 3 primary school classrooms PuraAgung 5,000,000* 5,000,000 *Inpres Signs at Intaran market Br. Danginpekan 116,350 116,350 Relocation of walk- restaurant III Cemara Beach 127,825 127,825 Construction of well at Intaran market Br. Danginpekan 14,500 14,500 Extension of desa offices Desa Office 9,210,905 9,210,905 Br. Singgi-Buruan 112,500 250,000 Sidewalk repairs 750,000* 1,112,500 *Bandes, incl. Rp 100,000 forPKK project Repairs to beach market restaurant Beach Market 6,702,735 6,702,735 83,266,942

1981/2 Repairs to kitchen- restaurant ill Cemara Beach 8,820,949 8,820,849 Construction of wall Kantor Desa 256,780 256,780 Construction of classrooms (SD) Br. Balanjong 1,400,000 7,425,000* 8,825,000 *Inpres Construction of classrooms (SD) Pasek Kuta 1,400,000 7,425,000* 8,825,000 *Inpres Construction of classrooms (SD #12) Selang 1,575,000 7,425,000* 9,000,000 *Inpres Construction of classrooms (SD #2) Selang 1,575,000 7,425,000* 9,000,000 *fupres Construction of classrooms (SD #3) Betongandang 1,400,000 7,425,000* 8,825,000 *Inpres Construction of classrooms (SD #4) Pasek Kuta 1,400,000 7,425,000* 8,825,000 *fupres Construction of classrooms (SD #5) PuraAgung 1,400,000 7,425,000* 8,825,000 *Inpres Construction of classrooms (SD #6) Br. Betongandang 1,400,000 7,425,000* 8,825,000 *Inpres 1,768,069 1,500,000 Repairs (SD #1) Br. Pekandelan Sanur 1,980,000* 5,248,069 *Inpres-earthquake relief

(continued') 324 APPENDICES APPENDICES 325 (continued) APPENDIX 5 APPENDIX 5 (continued) Regional Provincz"al Central Annual Projects Location Desa Sanur Government Government Government Subtotal Total Explanation Construction of caretaker's residence (SD #12) Br. Selang 820,038 1,237,500* 2,057,538 *Inpres Construction of caretaker's residence (SD #3) Br. Betongandang 820,038 1,237,500* 2,057,538 *Inpres Sidewalk repair Br. Buruan-Singgi 59,160 300,000 1,000,000* 1,359,160 *Bandes, incl. Rp 200,000 forPKK project Repairs (SD #3) Br. Betongandang 940,110 500,000 1,980,000* 3,420,110 Repairs (SD #2) Br. Danginpekan 1,200,000 800,000 2,000,000 Repairs to pre-school Br. Pasek Kuta 473,610 473,610 Desa Temple extensions Office 600,400 600,400 Repairs to restaurant I Beach Market 757,675 757,675 Jempang well Intaran Market 39,150 39,150 Desa Extension-bank offices Office 3,800,000 3,800,000 Construction of kitchen- desa Desa offices Office 1,025,000 1,025,000 Repairs to healthclinic Br. Gulingan 499,425 499,425 Major repairs (SD #3) Br. Betongandang 7,536,000* 7,536,000 110,901,304 *Inpres 1982/3 Construction of fences (SD #6) Br. Bu.roan 1,220,750 1,220,750 Repairs to co-operative building Br. Gulingan 1,555,233 1,555,233 Construction of water tank- restaurant III Cemara Beach 328,800 328,800 Construction of art market Br. Sindu 953,363 14,250,000 15,203,363 Repairs to primary school (SD #3) Br. Betongandang 810,987 14,647,080* 15,458,067 *Inpres Extension of secondary school (SMP) building Br. Taman 2,023,596 2,023,596 Construction of art shop Cemara Beach* 6,200,000 6,200,000 Gotong-royong Small repairs (SD # 1) Br. Puseh Kauh 121,366 2,168,009* 2,289,375 *Inpres Repairs to restaurants I, II, and III Beach Market 9,758,015 9,758,015 Construction of concrete tables Sindu Market 105,500 105,500 Construction of change rooms Segara Beach 9,000,000 9,000,000 *Work by Pemborong PT Tunas Jaya Sanur Construction of drainage ditches Br. Danginpekan 552,640 1,000,000* 1,552,640 *Bandes Extension of sidewalks Br. Singi-Panti 200,000 300,000 1,250,000* 1,750,000 *Bandes Extension of sidewalks Br. Buruan 520,175 1,000,000* 1,520;175 67,965,514 *Bandes 1983/4 Construction of government health clinic Desa Office 737,620 19,475,000 20,212,620 *Work by Pemborong PT Karirnin Adhi Denpasar Repairs to co-operative building Br. Taman 31,650 31,650 Repairs to restaurant at Cemara Beach Br. Semawang 10,000* 10,000 *Cost of tree felling

( continued') 326 APPENDICES APPENDICES 327 APPENDIX 5 (continued) APPENDIX 5 (continued)

Regional Provincial Central Annual Projects Lo.cation Desa Sanur Government Government Government Subtotal Total Explanation

Construction of classrooms (SD #4) Br. Pasek Kuta 16,441,000* 16,441,000 *Inpres Major repairs (SD #3) Br. Danginpekan 8,470,000* 8,470,000 *Inpres Construction of classrooms (SD #13) Br. Betongandang 9,488,000* 9,488,000 *Inpres Repairs (SD #5) Br. Gulingan 181,885 3,530,000* 3,711,885 *Inpres Repairs (SD #6) Br. Buruan 90,485 3,530,000* 3,620,485 *Inpres Construction of residence of principal (SD #1) Br. Puseh Kauh 3,386,000* 3,386,000 *Inpres Construction of residence principal (SD #12) Br. Selang 3,386,000* 3,386,000 *Inpres Construction of 3 classrooms (SD #3) Br. Danginpekan 60,672 9,489,000* 9,549,672 *Inpres Extensions-2 classrooms (SMP) Br. Taman 7,370,450 7,370,450 Construction of sports fields Br. Belong 1,613,775 1,885,000 3,000,000 6,498,775 Five waste disposal units Br. Batanpoh, Buruan, 256,475 256,475 SD#2, Intaran, Market Road construction Br. Gulingan 123,000 123,000 Road drainage construction Br. Taman 130,000 305,000 1,250,000* 1,685,000 *Bandes Road drainage construction Br. Puseh Kangin 300,000 305,000 1,250,000* 1,855,000 *Bandes Sidewalk construction Crossroads Sanur and 100,000 305,000 1,250,000* 1,655,000 97,751,012 *Bandes Br. Anggarkash

Totals 237,351,324 52,303,100 3,000,000 189,958,001 482,612,425

Sources and Notes: Desa Sanur, Daftar Proyek Desa yang Dibiayai dari Swadaya Desa, Bantuan Tingkat I, Tingkat II, dan Bantuan Pusat di Desa Kelurahan Sanur Pelita I s/d III, 1969-84. Figures listed here are as presented in the original, except that several small items have been combined under general headings in some cases to condense and simplify theAppendix. "Sources of funds in rupiah. APPENDIX 6 00 Market Values and Exchange Rates, 1938-1990

Per Capita Income (GDP) Day-wage Price of Price of Indonesia!Bali Unskilled Rice per Kg Sawah per Are Year Rp!US$ (Rp) (Rp) (Rp) (Rp)

1938 1.87a 1951 3.81" 1.7" 1952 11.43" 1.5oe 2.2• 1958 11.47" 5.o• 1960 45.28" 5.6• 1962 3_5f 1964 115h 1965 235b 200-1,150d

December 1965 currency conversion (1,000 old Rp = 1 new Rp)

d 1966 235b 3 1 1967 235b 5* 1 1968 326b 14* 1 1969 11* b 1 1970 378 150* 13* ° d 1 1971 415b 37,350g 120 40 7,700* 1972 415b 162e 1973 415b 79d

1974 70,550g 1975 415b 67,900m 1976 b 415 140d 1977 132,819° 1978 625b 154,73(11 1979 211,089° 200- 500i 147,ooom 1980 293,40(11 d 238 200,000*i 198,ooom c 1981 344,33(11 d 643 500* 255 300,000- 500,000*k 230,ooom n 1982 c ° 692 372,911 753 270d 1983 c n 994 470,613 800* 382P 350,913m 1984 c 1,076 530,404° 1,200* 395P 419,215m 1985 c n 1,118 565,243 41QP 545,509m 1986 c ° 1,134 585,03T 1,200-1,500 472P 300,000-700,000*k 632,570m 1987 c n 1;644 690,628 1,500* 531P 735,600m 1988 c n 1,659 769,398 650P 1989 c 1, 770 882,94sn 700P 1990 c 1,843 1,500-3,000* 4,000,000-15,000,000*k

(continuea) APPENDIX 6 (continued') UJ UJ 0

Sources and Notes: Yanthi, 1982). gSuluh Marhaen, Figures for wages and prices marked with an asterisk are based on informants' 20 September 1971 (national per capita); Eldridge (1980: 12). hSuara Indonesia, reports and local records in the Tarian area. Cross-checking oral and written 10 September 1964 (Bali price). Bali Post, sources where possible showed considerable consistency. However, the limited ipoffenberger and Zurbuchen (1980); 17 January 1981. iBali Post are sampling basis for these calculations necessitates that they be taken as rough but (24 December 1980) gives Rp 4 million per of land in the Renon reasonable indications of the relativities of local income and cost of living. district of Denpasar for the same period. Italic indicates Indonesia-wide figures. kThe higher figure reflects land prices along the main road in the Tarian area Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia, 1961. "BPS, Rice prices are given at average where alternative commercial use for tourist shops increases its value. retail price forhusked rice measured in litres in the Denpasar market, converted 1Rice prices for 1966-70 are wholesale prices received at harvest for unmilled rice (gabah) at 1 litre to 0.8 kilogram. sold in bulk to middlemen and hence would be lower (by about half) Industrialization in Indonesia; hp_ Mccawley, MacAndrews (1986 : xii). than retail urban market selling prices. These figures are based on sale prices list­ Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic banjar "BPS, 1984, 1986; ed in cash-books in Tarian; all subsequent figures are retail market prices Studies sawah (April 1987), 23(1): 5; InternationalMarketing Data and Statistics, 1992, in Denpasar for milled rice. Prices for are for good quality rice land pur­ for 1987-90. chased in Tarian. Hobart (1979: 269, 640) gives 1971 figures comparable to dSuara Indonesia, gu sawah 24 February 1965, 31 Au st 1965, and 1 November 1965. these for rice and in nearby 'Tengahpadang', at Rp 15 per kg and are Bali prices in the Denpasar market. The price of rice rose from Rp 200 per kg to Rp 6,000 per respectively. Statistik Bali, 1987, Bali Post, Rp 1,050 per kg between February and October 1965. In December the govern­ mKantor Statistik Propinsi Bali, Denpasar; 2 March gu Bali Post gu ment declared 1,000 old rupiah to be worth 1 new rupiah. See 'Pemerintah 1981, 13 Au st 1984, 13 December 1984, and 14 July 1988. fi res Suluh Indonesia, Keluarkan Uang Rupiah Baru', 15 December 1965; 'Bahaja are given as annual income per capita, based on Gross Regional Domestic Suluh Marhaen, "1000 jadi 1" Semakin Terasa', 26 June 1966. Prices after 1971 Product statistics provided by the Kantor Statistik. Bali Post Key Indicators of Developing are from the for Beras Bali, Class II before 1981 and Beras C4 after nEconomics and Development Resource Centre, Asian and Pacific Countries, that year. Where possible the average of the published market price fortwo dates Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1987. at six-month intervals during the same year has been given to provide some °Jayasuriya and Nehen (1988: 450). Figures reported here are casual daily wages (Bali Post, adjustment for market fluctuation. 20 October 1971, 2 October 1973, formen. Women's wages were reported at approximately two-thirds of the male 1 December 1973, 13 March 1976, 11 September 1976, 9 September 1980, 17 wage. Statistik Bali, 0January 1981, 13 June 1981, 6)anuary 1982, and 29 May 1982.) PKantor Statistik Propinsi Bali, 1987 and 1990, Denpasar. Robinson (1988b: 56). runskilled day-labour working on construction of Hotel Bali Beach (Ni Ketut

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" • p..--....,v 1 ,_'j ;:;. -' ""O � � ;,l C, :::i 'O Z :,,3 ;p ;::i '1:1 R p.;· P. � p, g o ...p, "' " - · -g; � es it � � � � ;::i gi " 8 �- � �- � Z ·v ""O � t:! 0 ft t:,

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Awig-awig Desa Bebandem, Korn Collection, No. 162: n.d. Mendagri 9/1980, Instruksi Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 9 Tahun 1980 tentang Awig-awig Desa Dauh Tukad, Karangasem, Korn Collection, No. 161. Pelaksanaan Undang-Undang No. 5 Tahun 1979. Awig-awig Desa Intaran (mimeo), Badung, 1984. Mendagri 40/1980, Peraturan Menteri dalam Negri No. 44 Tahun 1980 tentang Awig-awig Desa Mas (mimeo) Gianyar, 1980 . Pedoman Susunan Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Pemerintah Kelurahan. Awig-awig Desa Peliatan (mimeo), Gianyar, 1980, 1988. Mendagri 225/1980, Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 225 Tahun 1980 Awig-awig Desa Sebatu (mimeo), Gianyar, 1968? tentang Susunan Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Awig-awig Desa Tihingtali, Karangasem, Korn Collection, No. 160: n.d. Desa. Sima Desa Sarniadji, Beratan, Buleleng, Korn Collection, No. 150: n.d. Mendagri 1/1981, Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 1 Tahun 1981 tentang Babad Dalem Sukawati (mimeo), n.d. Susunan Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Pemerintah Desa. Bhama Kretih, Tabanan (mimeo), Badan Pelaksana Pembinaan Lembaga Adat, Mendagri 2/1981, Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 2 Tahun 1981 tentang Gianyar, n.d. Pembentukan Lembaga Musyawarah Desa. Yamapurwa Tatwa, 'Widi Sastra Tetep' (mimeo), Transcription No. 223, Mendagri 5/1981, Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 5 Tahun 1981 tentang Gedong Kirtya, n.d. Pembentukan Dusun dalam Desa dan Lingkungan dalam Kelurahan. Mendagri 6/1981, Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 6 Tahun 1981 tentang GovernmentDocuments Tatacara Pernilihan Pengesahan, Pengangkatan, Pemberhentian Sementara dan Pemberhentian Kepala Desa. Republic of Indonesia: Legislation Mendagri 8/1981, Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 8 Tahun 1981 tentang Persyaratan, Tata Cara Pengangkatan dan Pemberhentian Sekretaris Desa, UU Dasar/1945, Undang-Undang Dasar 1945. Kepala Urusan serta Kepala Dusun. UUPA 5/1960, Undang-Undang No. 5 Tahun 1960 tentang Peraturan Dasar Mendagri 6/1982, Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No.· 6 Tahun 1982 tentang Pokok-pokok Agraria. Pelaksanaan Administrasi Umum di Desa/Kelurahan. UU 18/65, Undang-Undang No. 18 Tahun 1965 tentang Pokok-pokok Peme­ Mendagri 7/1982, Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 7 Tahun 1982 tentang rintahan Daerah. Pelaksanaan Administrasi Penduduk di Desa dan Kelurahan. UU 19/65, Undang-Undang No. 19 Tahun 1965 tentang Desapradja. Mendagri 8/1982, Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 8 Tahun 1982 tentang UU 5/1974, Undang-Undang No. 5 Tahun 1974 tentang Pokok-pokok Peme­ Pelaksanaan Administrasi Keuangan Desa. rintahan di Daerah. Mendagri 6/1983, Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 6 Tahun 1983 tentang UU 5/1979, Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No. 5 Tahun 1979 tentang Pengawasan atas Jalannya Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan Desa/Pemerintahan Pemerintahan Desa. Kelurahan. Per RI. 55/1980, Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia No. 55 Tahun Mendagri 7/1983, Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 7 Tahun 1983 tentang 1980 tentang Pengangkatan Kepala Kelurahan dan Perangkat Kelurahan Pembentukan Rukun Tetangga dan Rukun Warga. menjadi Pegawai Negeri Sipil. Mendagri 7/1984, Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 7 Tahun 1984 tentang GBHN 1983, Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Pembinaan dalam Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan Desa dan Pemerintahan No.II/MPR/1983 tentang Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara. Kelurahan. 348 BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIO GRAP HY 349 Mendagri 27/1984, Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 27 Tahun 1984 ten­ Agama; IV ttg. Peranan Adat dalam Pembangunan; V ttg. Bubungan antara tang Susunan Organisasi dan Tata Kerja LKMD. Tingkah Laku Manusia dan Kelestarian Lingkungan. Mendagri 11/1984, Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 11 Tahun 1984 ten­ __ (1981), Basil Pesamuhan Majelis Pembina Lembaga Adat Tingkat I Bali; tang Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Adat Istiadat di Tingkat Desa/Ke­ Laporan Badan Pelaksana Bina Lembaga Adat Klungkung, Gianyar, Badung, lurahan. Tabanan, Buleleng, Karangasem, Bangli, Jembrana. Mendagri 27/1984, Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 27 Tahun 1984 ten­ __(1982), Basil Pesamuhan Majelis Pembina Lembaga Adat: Kornisi I ttg. tang Susunan Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Tanah-tanah Adat; Kornisi II ttg Adat dlm Bubungan dengan Pitra Yadnya; Desa (LKMD). Kornisi III ttg Penyelesaian Sengketa Adat; Kornisi IV ttg Pelaksanaan Mendagri 28/1984, Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 28 Tahun 1984 ten­ Undang-undang Perkawinan. tang Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (PKK). __ (1983), Basil-hasil Pesamuhan Majelis Pembina Lembaga Adat Daerah Mendagri 140-100/1986, InstruksiMenteri Dalam Negeri No. 140-100 tentang Tingkat I Bali dan Badan Pelaksana Pembina Lembaga Adat Kabupaten dan Latihan Operasional bagi Para Penyelenggara Pemerintahan Desa. Kecamatan se Bali, 30-31 Mei 1983. Depdagri 1986a, Manual Peranan LMD dalam Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan __ (1984), Basil-hasil Pesamuhan Majelis Pembina Lembaga Adat Daerah Desa. Tingkat I Bali dan Badan Pelaksana Pembina Lembaga Adat Kabupaten dan Depdagri 1986b, Himpunan Materi Peraturan Pelaksanaan Undang-Undang Kecamatan, 5-6 November 1984. No. 5 Tahun 1979 tentang Pemerintahan Desa. __ (1985) Basil-hasil Pesamuhan Majelis Pembina Lembaga Adat Daerah Tingkat I Bali dan Badan Pelaksana Pembina Lembaga Adat Kabupaten dan Bali, Provincial Legislation Kecamatan, 23-24 October 1985. Perda 7/1981, Peraturan Daerah No. 7 tentang Pembentukan, Pemecahan, Penyatuan and Penghapusan Desa. Perda 8/1981, Peraturan Daerah No. 8 tentang Pemilihan, Pengesahan, Peng­ angkatan, Pemberhentian Sementara dan Pemberhentian Kepala Desa. Perda 9/1981, Peraturan Daerah No. 9 tentang Pembentukan Lembaga Musya­ warah Desa. Perda 10/1981, Peraturan Daerah No. 10 tentang Keputusan Desa. Perda 1/1982, Peraturan Daerah No. 1 tentang Pedoman Pembentukan, Peme­ cahan, Penyatuan dan Penghapusan Kelurahan. Perda 6/1986, Peraturan Daerah No. 6 tentang Kedudukan, Fungsi dan Peranan Desa Adat sebagai Kesatuan Masyarakat BukumAdat dalam Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I Bali.

Bali, Biro Bina Pemerintahan Desa, Kantor Gubemur, Bali Biro Bina (1983), Langkah-langkah dan Kebijaksanaan Gubernur Kepala Daerah Tingkat I Bali dalam Pelaksanaan Undang-Undang No. 5/1979 ten­ tang Pemerintahan Desa. __(1984a), Undang-Undang No. 5 Tahun 1979 tentang Pemerintahan Desa Beserta Aturan Pelaksanaannya. Buku I. __(1984b), Bimpunan Surat2 Edaran, Instruksi, Petunjuk dalam Penye­ lenggaraan Pemerintahan Desa. BukuII, Jilid I. __ (1984c), Himpunan Peraturan dan Surat2 Edaran, Instruksi, Petunjuk dalam Penyelenggaran Pemerintahan Desa. Buku II, Jilid IIA. __ (1984d), Himpunan Surat2 Edaran, Instruksi, Petunjuk dalam Penye­ lenggaran Pemerintahan Desa. Buku II,Jilid IIB. __(1984/5), Penjelasan Umum dan Petunjuk Tekhnis Pelaksanaan Undang­ Undang No. 5 Tahun 1979 tentang Pemerintahan Desa.

Bali, Majelis Pembina Lembaga Adat Majelis (1980), Basil Penataran Badan Pelaksana Pembina Lembaga Adat: Laporan Kornisi I tentang Masalah Tata Organisasi Majelis; Kornisi II ttg. Bubangan Adat dan Pemerintahan; Kornisi III ttg. Bubungan Adat dan INDEX 351 gamelan, 177, 181; kecak group, 150, CAMAT,241, 247-9, 253, 257, 266, 268 172-7, 185; loan fund,178; odalan, Canang lekesan, see cane 150; ritual expenditure,151-3; selection Canang pengeraos, see cane · of leaders,92, 119-20; water supply, Candradewi, N. A., 34, 104 228, 236 Cane, 14-15 Banjar Pacung,67 Canetti,E., 83, 86, 96 Banjar Pande, 25-7,149-150, 225, 228, Caru, 144 Index 237; awig-awig, 307-8 Casparis,J. G.,97, 127, 129 Banjar Pekandelan, 24,27, 67, 76, 124-5, Caste,97, 159-60, 273-4, 287-8; see also 182, 225, 228 Hierarchy Banjar Petulu, see Desa Petulu Castells,Manuel, 137-8 Banjar Pisangkaja,72, 92 Castles,L., 278, 287, 301 Banjar Sangan, 25-7, 76,125, 157, 159, Cemetery: access to, 47, 299; importance 178-9, 220; water supply, 224-30, 236 of, 46,54; see also Siang case ABERCROMBIE, N.,83-4 Balinese Provincial Assembly (DPRD), Banjar Satria,18, 49-50, 64, 284 Citizenship: local, 42,58-61; national, ABRI, 225-8, 252, 266, 268, 287 272-3 Banjar Semawang, 182-3, 301 271-89 Acciaioli,G., 297 Balinese religion, 55-7,60, 65, 83, Banjar Tegeh, 24, 27, 113, 118, 142, 159, Civil service appointments to villages, Adat, 3-5, 30, 51-3, 290-302; and dinas, 139-41, 143-6, 300 170-1,181, 186-7, 225 255-6, 268 290-302, see alsoBanjar; Desa; Land; Bali Post, 46,121, 124-5, 168, 216, 224, Banjar Titih,167-8 Cock-fights,93, 130,144, 187 Leaders 233, 237, 266-7, 260, 287,302 Bank Negara Indonesia, 180, 216 Cohen,J. M., 257, 261 Adat Commissions, see Adat Forum Bamia,I Wayan, 112, 118, 305 Barong Ratu Gede, 143, 164 Cole,W. S.,92, 150, 165 Adat Forum (Majelis),53, 290-3, 296 Bandes, 190, 198, 214, 259-60 Barwa,Anak Agung, 52,54-5 Collective: action, 259-64, 269-70; Adi Agama, 13 Bangli, 33,107 Basic Agrarian Law 1960, 292-3 consumption,137-8, 147-58, 162-3; Agricultural associations,see subak Banjar: adat and dinas, 4,7-8, 10-15, Basic needs, 211-39 cremation, 158-62,166; harvesting, Agriculture, 35, 36; land,41-2; 29-34, 36, 189, 253-4, 261, 269, 283; Bateson, Gregory, 7, 59, 66-7, 79, 82-3, 169-71 organization,28, 36; see also Basic 297-8; death rituals and,16, 40, 42, 94, 143 Collier,W., 211 Agrarian Law 46-9, 58, 66, 84, 89,146-50, 157; Becker,A. L., 128 Colonial government: and local system, Agung,A. A. N. G., 11, 292 demands of membership, 16; -desa Bedeg, I Wayan, 112, 129, 300 22-6, 35, 101, 112, 297; see also Dutch Alexander,J., 95 relation,21-3, 28,33, 48-54, 190-1, Bekasih,32-3, 66 scholarship Ancestors, 20, 30,39, 40-2, 54-8,89-90, 205; economic activities,167-83; Belo,Jane, 146, 156 Commission on Adat Lands, 292-3, 300 141-3,163, 292, 299 educational programmes,169; expulsion Benda-Beckmann,F. von, 293 Communist Party of Indonesia,80, Anderson, Benedict,272, 278, 287,301 rights, 42-54; family planning, 217-24, Benda-Beckmann, K. von, 3, 293-4, 110-11, 130, 274-7, 287-8 Anderson,J., 254,263-4 232; gentry and, 17,31, 69, 273; 297 Community, 3, 140-1; development Anom, Cokorda,131, 276-7, 288,304; importance of,89, 205, 229, 259,297; Bendesa, 119-20,129, 287 programmes,4, 196-8, 259-64; see also government,250; land,40, 63, 300; loan funds, 177-80; obligations to, 39; Beratha,Ida Bagus,110, 120,189-93, Self-help; Swadaya leadership,69, 91, 119, 272; performing patus, 11, 47, 148; rulers and, 19; self­ 199,202-6,249-54,276-7, 288,297 Connor,L., 56, 59-60, 67, 79,158 troupe,172; rituals, 30, 38, 58, 64-6, help,167-85; and state, 231-3; suka­ Bimas,234 Co-operatives,182, 187-8 160,166 duka, 11,47, 49, 148; water supply, Bimaswarga, 94 Corporate groups, 10, 29, 85; see also Seka Appell, G.,65 224-30 Birkelbach,A. W., 104-5, 122, 125 Corporate egalitarianism, 87-8 Arndt,H. W., 268 Banjar Belong Gede, 11,30-1, 122 Biro Bina Pemerintahan Desa, 247,250-1, Corporatism,9, 18, 31,85, 99, 127,138, Artha,I Ketut, 104, 267 Banjar Besaya, 24,27, 91,159, 228, 231, 254-5, 290 166, 167, 277-8, 301 AsiaticMode of Production, 97 236,277 BKKBN, 217-18, 221, 224, 230; see also Corruption,113-16, 131, 255-60, 268-9 Astika,K. S., 33,63, 104,211 Banjar Gede, 168 Family planning Covarrubias,M., 93-4, 128, 145, 156, Awig-awig, 5,11-14, 30, 33, 47, 149-50, Banjar Kalih, 24,26-7, 46-7, 76, 116, Bloch,Maurice, 72-4, 82,86, 89 187 292-302 124-6, 132, 159, 179, 181-2 Boon,James, 31,62, 71,82-5, 88, 90, Credit, local, 1 77-80; and government Ayahan,40,63, 86, 173,293-5 Banjar Kasimpar, 67 128, 141 projects, 231, 236-7; see also KIK, Banjar Kerta, 124-5 Bourdieu,P., 78, 85, 128, 280 KMKP,KUK BABAD DALEMSUKAWATI, 143 Banjar Kertha Bhuwana Kaja, 168 Bourdillon,M., 91 Cremation,31, 47, 56-8, 66, 81-3, 93-4, Babcock, B., 82 Banjar Kestala,43 Bowen,John R., 232, 280, 283 147, 153-8; collective,158-62, 166; Bagus, I. G. N., 272 Banjar Lagas, 24-7, 43,95, 113; collective Breman,J., 3-5, 34-5,68, 70, 91, 239 expenditure, 156-7 Bailey,F. G., 80, 93, 126,235 cremation,75-6, 159-61; development, Budiarta,Dr, 222 Cribb, R., 275-6, 287-8 Bajau, 229-30, 260-1 184; family planning, 220, 223; gamelan Budiman,A., 279 Crucq, K. C., 55, 57, 66 Bakhtin,M. M., 82-3, 128,271, 286 orchestra,180-1; politics, 112,130; roll­ Bupati, 247, 253, 268,273 Culture,36-8, 61-2, 79-90, 93-6, 162, Bale Agung, 15, 17, 20, 32, 141-2 books, 14 Bureaucratization policy, 238-41, 255-6, 271; see also Hierarchy; Popular culture Bale banjar, 145-6, 167-9,176-7 Banjar Madya, 25-7; bale banjar and bale 265-8; see also Village GovernmentLaw Customary law, see Adat Bale kulkul, 167-8, 176-7 kulkul, 17 6-7; banjar obligations,4 7, Burial, 17-20,48-61 Bali Aga, 20, 31; see alsoDutch 76-7; Barong, 143, 150, 164; collective Burns,P., 3, 5, 63 DADIA,7-8, 15; see also Kinship-groups scholarship cremation, 75-6,159-61, 165; Buta-kala, 37-8, 140, 143-5, 164 Dahl,R. A.,86- 7 352 INDEX INDEX 353 Danandjaja,J., 9, 165 Desa Petulu,63, 237 Dutch scholarship, 19-21, 28,31-2, 64, Gianyar, 107,218, 298 Dani, Dewa Putu,56, 91, 304; adat and Desa Pujung,31, 48, 62, 66,129 71; see also Dorpsrepubliek Godelier,M., 137 dinas, 291; banjar and desa, 33; gentry, Desa Samiadji,63 Goldsmith,A. A., 257, 261 31, 84, 88,129, 274; leaders, 91, 124; Desa Sanur: bank,53, 86, 191-2, 200-4, EARTH: religious conceptions,36-8, Golkar,92, 111-12, 130, 281-2, 288 neighbours, 16; patus, 47, 150; rituals, 299; council,252, 276; development 54-62 Gondolf,Edward W.,194, 263-4, 269-70 56, 66-7,97 programme,110, 126-7, 189-205, Egalitarian values,5, 31, 71, 79-98, Goris,R., 15, 18, 26,56, 139, 141-2, Dasa, I Made,104, 130, 154-5, 304; 314-27; employment,193-7, 206; 271-4,287 156 family planning, 220-1, 224; gentry, industries,192-3, 196,198-204; Eka Dasa Rudra, 56,166 Gotong royong, 168, 214, 226, 265, 274; as klian banjar, 108,113,119,124, officials,116, 120, 203-4; salaries, Eldridge, P.J., 213-14 279-80,283 127,184, 214,247; leadership,121-2, 195-6, 200, 206; schools, 197-9,215; Elections: local, 116-22,132; national, Government: and community rights,52; 132; loan,114, 236-7; rituals,157-8, and Village Government Law, 251-3 130, 239-40 decentralization,214, 233, 257-9; 160 Desa Sangging, 294-5, 299 Employment,in village-ownedindustries, development policy and banjar, 211-33, Deathbeliefs, 54-8 Desa Selat,117, 164 182-3, 186,193-6, 199-200, 206 256 Desa Siang,10, 49-54, 215, 296 Death rituals,47, 56, 149; and banjar, 16, Endicott,K. L., 62 Governor of Bali, 247, 249-50, 273, 21, 40,42, 46-9,58, 66, 84,146-50, Desa Tangkup,33, 117 Equivalence principle, 10, 17-18, 29 296 157,299; disruption of, 58-62,67, Desa Tarian, 23-8, 31; banjar, 33,298; Errington,S., 95, 99 Gow, D.,233, 258-9, 261-4, 269 79-86,147; non-Hindu origins,34, banjar development projects,311-13; Esman, M., 235, 258, 260, 263-4, 268-9 Grader, C.J., 12-13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 30, 55-7; in old-style villages, 18,31; see basic needs programmes, 230, 236; Evans, P., 262 142-4, 146,169, 187 also Cremation deathrituals, 47, 95, 161, 166; desa Expulsion cases,42-6, 48-54, 64-5 Gramsci,A., 271, 286 Demonic,significance of 61-2; see also development projects,309-10; Dewan Gray, C., 268 Buta-kala Desa,130, 244, 273, 276; economic FACTIONS, in local politics,72-9, 91-2 Great Council of Rajas, 272 Democratic Partyof Indonesia (PDI),112, activities,183-5, 187-8; elections,112, Family planning, 217-24, 232, 234-5 Griyadi, S. H., 62 244 130; expulsions,43; klian banjar, Family WelfareAssociation, see Pembinaan Grossberg,L. , 138 Department of Education and Culture, 101-12,118, 129, 244, 249-50,300; Kesejahteraan Keluarga Guermonprez,Jean-Francois, 19-22, 32, 267 krama banjar, 23; krama desa, 23,343; Feith,H., 278, 280,287, 301 46, 56,71, 139 Department of HomeAffairs, 238, 242-3, land,63; leaders,91, 101-12, 129; Fines, 13-14, 30, 42,65, 92, 113 Guha,R., 132 247,253, 257,266-7, 291; see also members,90; ngarap-ngarapan, 79-80; Five-Year Plans, see Repelita Gunung Agung, 38, 62 Village Government Law occupations,104, 129; politics,75-6; Forge,A., 55, 142 schools,169, 215-16; temples,142 Departmentof SocialAffairs, 244 Foster,M. L., 62,164 HAINSWORTH, G., 258 Desa, 4, 7, 19-20,30, 71; adat-banjar Desa Tenaon,63 Fox,J., 38, 66, 95, 97, 128, 214, 233 Hansen, Gary E., 211, 234 relations,21-3, 28, 33, 51-2; councils, Desa Tihingtali,63 Frank,A. G.,138 Harrison, P., 217 241-4; desa adat, 3, 7, 17, 20-2,28, Desa Trunyan,9 Franken,H.J., 56,143 Harvard Institutefor International 38-46,51-3, 70-1; 142,292-3, 300; Descent and inheritance,7, 29 Fuentes,M., 138 Development,215 desa dinas, 22,28; dinas, economic Devas,N., 233 Frye,Northrop, 85 Health centres,221-3 activities,183-5; government grants to, Development Programme Implementation Hendrata,L. , 258-9 214; kepala, 239,241-2, 244-5, 247, Studies (DPIS), 215-16 GALUNGANF'ESTNAL, 9,113 Hertz,R., 56 253-4, 266,268; and negara, 70, Dewey,A., 30 Gandera,I, 12, 132, 186 Hicks,D., 38, 66 87-90, see also Colonial government; Dharma,I Nyoman,104, 129,305; on Gede, Cokorda, 106, 110, 120 Hierarchy, 21,68-98, 205; and local Village; Village GovernmentLaw familyplanning, 221; as klian banjar, Geertz, Clifford: on adat, 3, 294; culture, sanctions,44-5, 79-89 DesaAan, 13 108,113-15, 219, 226-31, 236; on 15,80-4, 86, 88, 93, 95-6, 185,227; Hilbery,R., 66, 288 Desa Bangkah,43 leadership,121, 124; on rituals,34, 56, hierarchy,163, 188, 287; inheritance, Hill,S., 83-4 Desa Batubulan, 185 156-7 29,267; Klungkung,44-5; land,63; Hinduism,32, 37,55-7, 83, 88, 96-7, Desa Bebandam,12, 17, 164 Dherana,Tjokorda Raka, 290 leadership,99, 123,127, 132; politics, 273-4,302; see also Parisada Hindu Desa Blaju, 31 Dinas, seeAdat: and dinas; State 274-6; ritual,58, 61,81-3, 162; seka, Dharma Desa Boengan,143 Disruption,see Death rituals; Ngarap: 8-10,15-17; Tabanan,169, 186, 205, Hobart, M.,29, 56,69, 71-5, 78, 88-9, Desa Bukti,12 -ngarapan 207; temples,142; village,8, 18-20,30, 91-2,95, 99, 105, 119,171, 267 Desa Buungan,4 7 Djajadiningrat,M., 245 33, 36,39, 68,70, 77,89-90, 93, 259 Hobsbawm,E., 5, 301 Desa Dauh Tukad,13 Dorpsrepubliek, 3, 5,7, 18-20, 68-71 Geertz, Hildred: on culture, 15, 88, 93,96, Holleman,J. F.,3 Desa Gwang,33, 41, 51 Douglas,M., 57,62 227; hierarchy, 273-4, 287; inheritance, Hooykaas,J. H.,29, 66 DesaJulah, 33, 117 Dove,M. R.,263-4, 267 29,267, 294-5; leadership,127, 129, Howe, L.: on culture, 36-8,61-2, 162; Desa Kajang,41, 300 Dresta, 4-5, 61,290; see alsoAdat; 132; politics,274-6; seka, 8-10,15-17; hierarchy, 71, 95, 140-1, 163-4; Desa, Kala, Patra, 68, 301 Ancestors temples, 142; village, 8, 30, 274 leaders, 99, 119, 123,129; religion, 142; Desak Ketut,94 Dukuh, 128 Gennep,A. van, 56 ritual, 56, 66,165; village, 21, 31-2 Desa Kubutambahan, 31 Dumont,L. , 21, 71,83, 88, 96-7 Gentry,31, 56-60, 84,88, 129, 274; see Hull,T., 217-18, 223-4 Desa Patjoeng,43 Dunia,Anak Agung, 108, 288 also Caste; Hierarchy Hull,V., 217-18, 223-4, 245 Desa Pau, 16 Durkheim, 262 Geriya, I Made, 125,156, 172, 182, 189 Hunger,F. W.,35 Dusun, 240, 249, 266 Desa Pejeng, 267 Gesick,L. , 99 Huntington,R., 55-6, 66 354 INDEX INDEX 355 lKET,8-9 KMKP (Kredit Modal Kerja Permanen), Lisk, F., 211 Mutual aid, see Gotong royong ILO,211 180, 187,216, 233-4 LKMD/LMD,see Village: councils Myers, D.,67 Indonesian language,274, 287 Koentjaraningrat,37 Loan funds, see Credit Inheritance, 29, 41-2, 267, 294-5 Korn,V. E.: on land, 63; leaders, 99,101, Local: administrativereform, 238-47; NAKAMURA,K., 164 Inpres, 115,131, 169, 190, 197-8, 112,114-17, 123, 131-2, 256; religion, politics,72-9 Nasakom, 275, 278 214-16,230-3, 258 139; ritual,46-8, 164; Teganan,43; Lombok, 12 National Family Planning Co-ordinating Inside Indonesia, 289 village, 18-19, 21,31-3, 35, 46, 51, 297 Lovric,B. J., 37, 56,61, 140, 206 Board (BKKBN), see BI