DOCSLIB.ORG

Public Opinion on the Religious Authority of the Moroccan King

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Public Opinion on the Religious Authority of the Moroccan King ISSUE BRIEF 05.14.19 Public Opinion on the Religious Authority of the Moroccan King Annelle Sheline, Ph.D., Zwan Postdoctoral Fellow, Rice University’s Baker Institute rationalism, and the Sufi tradition of Imam INTRODUCTION Junayd.1 According to the government Morocco has worked to establish itself as narrative, these constitute a specifically a bulwark against religious extremism Moroccan form of Islam that inoculates the in recent years: the government trains kingdom against extremism. One of the women to serve as religious guides, or most significant components of Moroccan “mourchidates,” to counteract violent Islam is the figure of the Commander of the messaging; since launching in 2015, the Faithful or “Amir al-Mu’mineen,” a status Imam Training Center has received hundreds held by the Moroccan king, who claims of imams from Europe and Africa to study descent from the Prophet Mohammad. The Moroccan Islam; in 2016, in response to figure of the Commander of the Faithful is ISIS atrocities against Yazidis, the king of unique to Morocco; no other contemporary 2 Morocco gathered esteemed Muslim leaders Muslim head of state holds a similar title. to release The Marrakesh Declaration on Morocco’s efforts to counteract the rights that Islam guarantees to non- extremist forms of Islam, and military Muslims. Such initiatives have contributed partnership with the U.S. and EU, have to Morocco’s international reputation as a cemented the kingdom’s reputation as a bastion of religious tolerance under state key ally in combatting terrorism. Yet while stewardship of religion. Mohammed VI’s role as a religious figure But to what extent do Moroccans view is frequently noted in media coverage, such state leadership in religion favorably, few studies have sought to evaluate or see head of state King Mohammed VI as whether Moroccan citizens trust their king To what extent do 3 a source of religious authority? According as an authority on religious matters. In Moroccans see head of general, the American policy establishment to a public opinion survey conducted by the state King Mohammed Baker Institute in December 2017, Moroccan lacks mechanisms to interrogate claims respondents view the king as a religious of religious leadership, although the VI as a source of leader. The findings corroborate the king’s U.S. government has engaged with religious authority? claim to the title of the “Commander of the religious figures as important community 4 Faithful,” and therefore appear to affirm stakeholders since the 1990s. his ability to use religious justifications to Observers of the Middle East and North combat religious violence. Africa tend to assume that state-led Islam King Mohammed VI and the state lacks credibility, due to its affiliation with, religious establishment assert that Morocco and support for, authoritarian regimes. In embraces a combination of three Islamic contrast, public support for independent traditions: the Maliki branch of Sunni religious actors is seen as reflected in the widespread appeal of Islamist movements. jurisprudence, the Ashʿari doctrine of RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.14.19 According to the assumption that state When asked to select which of the Islam lacks credibility, King Mohammed VI’s six Moroccan religious figures named in claim to religious authority would be viewed the survey they approved, 48 percent with skepticism. Questioning the religious of Moroccan respondents selected King leadership of the king is taboo in Morocco, Mohammed VI. The next most popular further complicating efforts to evaluate response was “I do not approve of religious whether his status as the Commander of the leaders,” at 25 percent. Approval of the other Faithful gives him the religious standing to five figures was significantly lower than challenge extremist interpretations of Islam. approval of the king, as the individual with Therefore, our public opinion survey provides the next highest approval was Prime Minister insights into the Moroccan case, and also Othmani, at only 8 percent. Less than 2 offers tools for how to evaluate the claims of percent or fewer respondents approved of the other religious leaders. other individuals. When respondents were asked to rate their level of trust in the religious authority SURVEY FINDINGS of the Moroccan religious figures, responses demonstrated that King Mohammed VI A team of researchers worked with YouGov represents the most trusted figure: 70 percent to implement an online public-opinion of respondents signaled that they “Trust” survey of respondents’ trust in and or “Completely trust” the king on religious approval of Moroccan and international matters. The individual that respondents Muslim religious figures in December 2017. trusted least was Prime Minister Othmani: 43 A survey experiment using endorsement percent of respondents selected “Do not trust” effects reinforced the validity of the survey when asked about the prime minister, while results by increasing the likelihood that 24 percent indicated that they did trust him. findings reflect respondents’ sincerely The most common response pertaining held positions. The results of this survey to the seven other religious figures named in of 2,990 Moroccans is described in detail the survey was “I do not know this person”: in a previous country report (https://bit. over half of respondents indicated that they ly/2UPep3i) published as part of a larger did not know Mohammed Abbadi of al-‘Adl study on religious authority in the Middle wa al-Ihsan, Sufi Sheikh Sidi Jamal, Salafi 70 percent East (https://bit.ly/2WfoqXT). preacher Umar al-Haddouchi, or Salafi cleric of respondents Briefly, the results overwhelmingly al-Maghraoui. The next most common indicate that King Mohammed VI enjoys the signaled that they response pertaining to these individuals, or highest religious authority of the Moroccan one out of five, was “Do not trust at all,” “Trust” or “Completely Islamic leaders named by the survey. The signaling that when respondents did know of trust” the king on results of the survey experiment, although these individuals, many mistrusted them. religious matters. not the direct survey questions, reveal Using endorsement effects, the survey that the figure with the second-highest experiment evaluated the extent to which approval among Moroccans is Abu Bakr a given individual’s name, when associated al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State. with a statement, led to greater or lesser The implications of Moroccans’ support for agreement with that statement. Moroccans al-Baghdadi are discussed below, but these were most likely to agree with a statement results strengthen the validity of the finding when it was affiliated with King Mohammed pertaining to King Mohammed VI’s religious VI’s name. The figure that generated the authority: if respondents felt concerned second highest agreement was that of IS about being penalized for their responses, leader Abu Baker al-Baghdadi. This finding they would not likely have expressed held true for all 14 questions asked for the support for al-Baghdadi. The results also survey experiment component. In both the reveal respondents’ lack of familiarity with, direct questions, and the survey experiment, or lack of trust in, the other Moroccan the clearest finding indicates that King religious figures they were asked to evaluate. Mohammed VI is viewed as a trusted source of religious authority in Morocco. 2 PUBLIC OPINION ON THE RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY OF THE MOROCCAN KING choices, many of which were made in the IMPLICATIONS modern era. Although these aspects of King Mohammed VI has sought to establish Moroccan Islam exist in the historical record, Moroccan Islam as an antidote to terrorism. they are also curated to project a specific However, for U.S. policymakers looking image, while other aspects of Moroccan for Muslim allies with sufficient religious religious tradition are not emphasized, such credibility to assist in delegitimizing as the acts of anti-colonial violence carried extremist interpretations of Islam, evaluating out by Sufi tariqas (brotherhoods). The the validity of claims made by figures government’s preferred version of Moroccan like the king of Morocco is imperative for Islam carries utility under contemporary cultivating an effective counter-extremism circumstances, when a tradition of religious strategy. Overall, while his status as both a tolerance constitutes a valuable commodity. religious and political leader is significant, King Mohammed VI’s legitimacy lies in the finding that King Mohammed VI enjoys his alleged authenticity, which would be high religious influence should be viewed as damaged by overt coordination with actors the result of state-led efforts to construct like the United States. an image of authority grounded in long- The finding from the survey experiment standing tradition. that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi represents Our findings challenge the assumption the figure with the second-highest that all state-affiliated religious figures religious authority after King Mohammed lack credibility. According to the survey VI is consistent with the high numbers results, King Mohammed VI possesses of Moroccan individuals who traveled to the necessary spiritual capital to credibly Syria to fight for the Islamic State. After promote Moroccan Islam, while discrediting Jordan and Tunisia, Morocco was the third- Our findings challenge interpretations of the religion that have been highest nationality represented among IS the assumption
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Question of 'Race' in the Pre-Colonial Southern Sahara
    The Question of ‘Race’ in the Pre-colonial Southern Sahara BRUCE S. HALL One of the principle issues that divide people in the southern margins of the Sahara Desert is the issue of ‘race.’ Each of the countries that share this region, from Mauritania to Sudan, has experienced civil violence with racial overtones since achieving independence from colonial rule in the 1950s and 1960s. Today’s crisis in Western Sudan is only the latest example. However, very little academic attention has been paid to the issue of ‘race’ in the region, in large part because southern Saharan racial discourses do not correspond directly to the idea of ‘race’ in the West. For the outsider, local racial distinctions are often difficult to discern because somatic difference is not the only, and certainly not the most important, basis for racial identities. In this article, I focus on the development of pre-colonial ideas about ‘race’ in the Hodh, Azawad, and Niger Bend, which today are in Northern Mali and Western Mauritania. The article examines the evolving relationship between North and West Africans along this Sahelian borderland using the writings of Arab travellers, local chroniclers, as well as several specific documents that address the issue of the legitimacy of enslavement of different West African groups. Using primarily the Arabic writings of the Kunta, a politically ascendant Arab group in the area, the paper explores the extent to which discourses of ‘race’ served growing nomadic power. My argument is that during the nineteenth century, honorable lineages and genealogies came to play an increasingly important role as ideological buttresses to struggles for power amongst nomadic groups and in legitimising domination over sedentary communities.
    [Show full text]
  • Universita' Degli Studi Di Padova the Creation of the Marrakesh
    Universita’ degli Studi di Padova Dipartimento di Studi Linguistici e Letterari Laurea Magistrale in Lingue moderne per la Comunicazione e la Cooperazione internazionale Classe LM38 The Creation of the Marrakesh Declaration and the Portrayal of Religious Minorities in the International Press Cunico Valeria mtr: 1159381 Relatrice: Prof.ssa Martini Cecilia - DiSSGeA Abstract In recent times religion minorities all over the world have been facing existential threats, which seriously compromise their social inclusion and the survival of their cultural heritage. In 2016, hundreds of Muslim and non-Muslim scholars and intellectuals met in Marrakesh to discuss about religion tolerance, interfaith dialogue and the treatment of religious minorities in predominantly Muslim countries. The gathering ended with the drafting of a new Declaration, which aims to restore the principles of the ancient Charter of Medina, to the benefit of all religious groups in the Middle East. This dissertation analyses the declaration of Marrakesh on both a linguistic and a legal level, providing information on why it was considered as an urgent necessity and defining possible predictions regarding its future implementations and its legal value in modern Arab societies. Finally, this thesis will analyse the relationship between religious minorities and the media, focusing on how smaller religious groups are perceived from the general public and how British and American newspapers deal with minorities representations and challenges. Contents Introduction 1 1 The Marrakesh Declaration of 2016 5 1.1 The inspiration behind the Declaration of Marrakesh . 12 1.1.1 Ancient documents on Religious Minorities . 12 1.1.2 Modern documents on Religious Minorities . 16 1.2 The Future of the Declaration .
    [Show full text]
  • Country Report MOROCCO
    Country report MOROCCO Summary Morocco’s stable growth and banking sector, despite the global crisis, mark the county’s present relatively sound economic state. Although Morocco suffered from lower inflows of remittances, less tourism and reduced textile exports related to contracting European markets, expansionary economic policies were feeding domestic demand and almost fully compensated for these external demand reductions. Growth reached over 5% in 2009. Unemployment, already high among younger Moroccans, remains an urgent issue as failure to reduce it may lead to social unrest. Morocco’s governance indicators are in line with most of its neighbouring countries, but clearly below the lowest west-European levels of Greece. Compared with its immediate peers, Morocco’s declining public debt at still 54% of GDP may be somewhat on the high side, but foreign debt is rather low at 20% of GDP. Foreign reserves are sufficient at 7 months of import value, indicating a favourable short term ability to pay. Economic policies and performance plus adequate political stability promise also favourable payment behaviour in the medium to longer term. Things to watch: • Growth in the European export markets • Prominence of currently minor militant Islamist groups Author: Leendert Colijn Country Risk Research Economic Research Department Rabobank Nederland Contact details: P.O.Box 17100, 3500 HG Utrecht, The Netherlands +31-(0)30-21-67063 [email protected] June 2010 Rabobank Economic Research Department Page: 1/7 Country report MOROCCO Morocco
    [Show full text]
  • Dialogue the Only Way to Solve Region's Crises: Amir
    BUSINESS | Page 1 Salem Khalaf al-Mannai appointed group CEO of Qatar Insurance Group published in QATAR since 1978 MONDAY Vol. XXXX No. 11426 January 13, 2020 Jumada I 18, 1441 AH GULF TIMES www. gulf-times.com 2 Riyals Dialogue the only way to Amir off ers condolences solve region’s crises: Amir to Sultan Haitham on the death of Sultan Qaboos zAmir holds talks with senior Iranian leaders including Khamenei and Rouhani zQatar, Iran agree to enhance trade and tourism exchange His Highness the Amir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani meeting the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, in Tehran yesterday. is Highness the Amir Sheikh Tamim bin Earlier in the day, His Highness the Amir arrived Hamad al-Thani off ered condolences in Muscat, accompanied by an offi cial delegation. QNA ciating Iran’s position after the between the two countries. ther escalation and peacefully Hto Sultan Haitham bin Tariq al-Said of He was welcomed at the Private Sultani Airport by Tehran blockade of Qatar and thanked The Iranian president empha- settling differences in a way Oman on the death of Sultan Qaboos bin Said bin Minister of State Sayyid Fatik bin Fahar al-Said, Iran for providing all the facilities sised the importance of the secu- that contributes to achieving Taimur, at Al Alam Palace in Muscat yesterday Governor of Muscat Sayyid Saud bin Hilal al-Bu- to Qatar and the Qatari people by rity of the region, especially the security, peace and stability in morning. saidi, Qatar’s ambassador to Oman Sheikh Jassim ialogue is the only way to immediately opening its airspace security of waterways in the Gulf, the region and the world.
    [Show full text]
  • Plan of Action to Safeguard Religious Sites: in Unity and Solidarity for Safe and Peaceful Worship
    Plan of Action to Safeguard Religious Sites: In Unity and Solidarity for Safe and Peaceful Worship 1 Plan of Action to Safeguard Religious Sites: In Unity and Solidarity for Safe and Peaceful Worship The United Nations Plan of Action to Safeguard Religious Sites: In Unity and Solidarity for Safe and Peaceful Worship “Rings of Peace” 2 Plan of Action to Safeguard Religious Sites: In Unity and Solidarity for Safe and Peaceful Worship FOREWORD Our world has witnessed a tragic surge in anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim hatred, attacks on Christians and violence targeting members of other faiths and traditions. In recent months alone, we have seen Jews murdered in synagogues, their gravestones defaced with swastikas; Muslims gunned down in mosques, their religious sites vandalized; Christians killed at prayer, their churches torched. In the face of these unspeakable tragedies, we have also been deeply moved by extraordinary displays of support, love and solidarity from religious communities across the globe for the victims of such attacks. People everywhere must be allowed to observe and practice their faith in peace, as affirmed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Religious sites and all places of worship and contemplation should be safe havens, not sites of terror or bloodshed. For all these reasons, I asked the High Representative for the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations to develop a Plan of Action for the organization to be fully engaged in support of safeguarding religious sites. The Plan was informed by significant outreach with a wide variety of actors -- including governments, religious leaders, faith-based organizations, civil society, young women and men, local communities, traditional and social media, and the private sector.
    [Show full text]
  • The Prospects of Political Islam in a Troubled Region Islamists and Post-Arab Spring Challenges
    The Prospects of Political Islam in a Troubled Region Islamists and Post-Arab Spring Challenges Editor Dr. Mohammed Abu Rumman The Prospects of Political Islam in a Troubled Region Islamists and Post-Arab Spring Challenges Editor Dr. Mohammed Abu Rumman 1 The Hashemite Kingdom Of Jordan The Deposit Number at The National Library (2018/2/529) 277 AbuRumman, Mohammad Suliman The Prospects Of Political Islam In A Troubled Region / Moham- mad Suliman Abu Rumman; Translated by William Joseph Ward. – Am- man: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2018 (178) p. Deposit No.: 2018/2/529 Descriptors: /Politics//Islam/ يتحمل المؤلف كامل المسؤولية القانونية عن محتوى مصنفه وﻻ ّيعبر هذا المصنف عن رأي دائرة المكتبة الوطنية أو أي جهة حكومية أخرى. Published in 2018 by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Jordan & Iraq FES Jordan & Iraq P.O. Box 941876 Amman 11194 Jordan Email: [email protected] Website:www.fes-jordan.org Not for sale © FES Jordan & Iraq All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted, reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means without prior written permission from the publishers. The views and opinions expressed in this publication are solely those of the original author. They do not necessarily represent those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or the editor. Translation: William Joseph Ward Cover and Lay-out: Mua’th Al Saied Printing: Economic Press ISBN: 978-9957-484-80-4 2 The Prospects of Political Islam in a Troubled Region Islamists and Post-Arab Spring Challenges Contributed Authors Dr. Mohammed Abu Rumman Dr. Khalil Anani Dr. Neven Bondokji Hassan Abu Hanieh Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • MOROCCO © 2019 African Development Bank Group All Rights Reserved
    COUNTRY RESULTS BRIEF 2019 MOROCCO © 2019 African Development Bank Group All rights reserved. Published November 2018 African Development Bank Group COUNTRY RESULTS BRIEF 2019 – Morocco The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the African Development Bank (the Bank), its Board of Governors, its Board of Directors or the governments they represent. The Bank and its Board of Directors do not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accept no responsibility for any consequence of their use. By making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area, or by using the term “country” in this document, The Bank does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area. The Bank encourages printing or copying information exclusively for personal and non-commercial use with proper acknowledgment of AfDB. Users are restricted from reselling, redistributing, or creating derivative works for commercial purposes without the express, written consent of the Bank. Note: In this report, “$” refers to US dollars. African Development Bank Group Avenue Jean-Paul II 01 BP 1387 Abidjan 01, Côte d’Ivoire CONTENTS THE FIRST CLIENT OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 1 CROSS-CUTTING AND STRATEGIC AREAS 4 LIGHT UP AND POWER MORROCO 9 Coming out of energy dependence 9 Executive summary 1 Becoming a pioneer in the development of clean energies 10 Partnering to reach middle-income status by 2025 3 An innovative
    [Show full text]
  • Amazight Identity in the Post Colonial Moroccan State
    Oberlin College Amazight Identity in The Post Colonial Moroccan State: A Case Study in Ethnicity An Honors Thesis submitted to the Department of Anthropology by Morag E. Boyd Oberlin, Ohio April, 1997 Acknowledgments I would like to thank my advisers in Morocco, Abdelhay Moudden and Susan Schaefer Davis for the direction they gave me, but also for the direction that they did not. My honors adviser, Jack Glazier, was vital in the development of this thesis from the product of a short period of research to the form it is in now; I am grateful for his guidance. I would also like to thank the entire Oberlin College Department of Anthropology for guiding and supporting me during my discovery of anthropology. Finally, I must thank my family and friends for their support, especially Josh. Table of Contents Chapter one: Introduction . 1 I: Introduction . 1 II: Fieldwork and Methodology .3 Chapter two: Theoretical Foundations .7 I: Ethnicity ..... 7 II: Political Symbolism .15 Chapter three: History, Organization, and Politics . 19 I: Historical Background .. ........... .. ... 19 II: Ramifications of Segmentary Lineage and Tribal Heritage . 22 Segmentary Lineage and Tribes Tribes, Power, and Politics Political Heritage and Amazight Ethnicity III: Arabization and Colonization . .. .. .. .. .. .. 33 Contemporary ramification IV: Amazight identity and government today .... .. .. 39 Chapter four: Finding Amazight Ethnicity . 44 I: Perceptions of Amazight Identity . 44 Markers of Ethnicity Ethnic Boundaries and Maintenance of ethnic Identity Basic Value Orientation Significance of Amazight Ethnicity Common History as a Source of Group Cohesion Urban and Rural Divide II: Language.... ...... ... .... .. ...... 54 Language and Education Daily Language III: Religion ' .60 IV: Conclusions .63 Chapter Five: Conclusions .
    [Show full text]
  • Uhm Phd 4580 R.Pdf
    4550 UNIVERSiTY OF Hj~W/\n LIBRARY DIALECT LEVELING, MAINTENANCE AND URBAN IDENTITY IN MOROCCO FESSI IMMIGRANTS IN CASABLANCA A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI'I IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN LINGUISTICS MAY 2005 By Atiqa Hachimi Dissertation Committee: Michael L. Fonnan, Co-Chairperson Miriam Meyerhoff, Co-Chairperson Patricia J. Donegan Ibrahim G. Aoude Robert J. Littman ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to extend my deepest and sincere thanks to both my supervisors: Professors Michael L. Forman and Miriam Meyerhoff. Professor Michael L. Forman has been there from the very beginning and has supported me in all my endeavors. His guidance and intellectual stimulation have been instrumental in developing my understanding of sociolinguistics. I am grateful to him for introducing me to linguistic anthropology and to advising me to explore the richness of language. His kindness and sense of humor have kept me going for all these years. I am particularly indebted to my advisor and chair, Professor Miriam Meyerhoff, who has constantly been pushing me to go beyond my limits. She has always had faith in me when I believed I had already given my best. I am grateful to her for introducing me to variationist linguistics and for her brilliant insights. She gave me invaluable advice, guidance and critiqued my work, and materially improved my understanding of my own work. I am deeply humbled by her generosity and big heart. She invited me to Edinburgh to help me with my work and she was a gracious host.
    [Show full text]
  • G20 Investment Summit – German Business and the Cwa Countries
    G20 Investment Summit – German Business and the CwA Countries Under the Patronage of Dr Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Tuesday, November 19th, 2019 Haus der Deutschen Wirtschaft Breite Straße 29 · 10178 Berlin Conference languages are German, English, French and Arabic. Simultaneous trans lation will be provided. Programme alterations to be reserved. Hosted by With support of We would like to thank the following companies and institutions for their generous support of the G20 Investment Summit – German Business and the CwA Countries: Strategic Partner Silver Sponsors Bronze Sponsors Conference Program Tuesday, November 19th 08.00 – 09.45 a.m. Registration 08.00 – 10.00 a.m. Welcome Coffee 10.30 – 11.00 a.m. Welcome Prof. Dr Heinz-Walter Große Chairman Subsahara-Afrika Initiative der Deutschen Wirtschaft (SAFRI) / Sub-Saharan Africa Initiative of German Business Opening Keynote H.E. Dr Angela Merkel Federal Chancellor Federal Republic of Germany Keynote H.E. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi Chairperson of the African Union President of the Arab Republic of Egypt 11.00 – 12.30 p.m. German Direct Investment in Africa – The Rise of the Compact with Africa Introduction Prof. Dr Stefan Liebing Chairman Afrika-Verein der deutschen Wirtschaft (AV) / German-African Business Association Presentation of German Lighthouse Projects in the Presence of the African Heads of States Projects in the Renewable Energy Sector Ethiopia Joe Kaeser, CEO, Siemens AG in cooperation with FruitBox Africa GmbH & Member of the Government, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Benin Heike Bergmann, Senior Vice President Sales Africa, Voith Hydro Holding GmbH & Co. KG & Hon.
    [Show full text]
  • Language Situation and Conflict in Morocco
    Language Situation and Conflict in Morocco Abderrahman Zouhir Wayne State University 1. Introduction Most language conflicts are the result of differing social status and preferential treatment of the dominant language. The disadvantaged language either dies out or its space is significantly reduced. Language conflict occurs mostly in multilingual societies such as Morocco. Moroccan society is linguistically diverse and complex although the range of its linguistic complexity and diversity is slighter than the sociolinguistic situation in most African countries. Its strategic location at the crossroads of Africa, Europe and the Middle East has made Morocco open to a variety of linguistic influences by those of Phoneticians, the Greeks, the Arabs, the Spaniards, Portuguese, and the French. Given this complex multilingual situation in which languages compete and overlap for social, economic and political capital, Morocco provides a rich setting for studying the conflict and tensions between languages in Morocco. The cultural and linguistic context of Morocco has been characterized by the significance use of Classical Arabic/Standard Arabic as well as by the presence of Berber, Moroccan Arabic, French, Spanish and English, which has been seen as a proof of the country existing multilingualism. The Moroccan language market splits into two categories. The first includes Moroccan Arabic and Berber, which constitute a weak social and symbolic capital. The second category involves French, Standard Arabic, and English which are the institutional languages and have a strong social capital. Therefore, there exists a competition and power struggle between languages within the same category as between the two separate categories (Boukous 2009). 2. Berber Berber is considered the indigenous language spoken by the inhabitants of Morocco because its arrival predates all other known languages spoken in Morocco.
    [Show full text]
  • Islam As Statecraft: How Governments Use Religion in Foreign Policy
    THE NEW GEOPOLITICS NOVEMBER 2018 MIDDLE EAST ISLAM AS STATECRAFT: HOW GOVERNMENTS USE RELIGION IN FOREIGN POLICY PETER MANDAVILLE SHADI HAMID ISLAM AS STATECRAFT: HOW GOVERNEMENTS USE RELIGION IN FOREIGN POLICY PETER MANDAVILLE AND SHADI HAMID EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The discussion of Islam in world politics in recent years has tended to focus on how religion inspires or is used by a wide range of social movements, political parties, and militant groups. Less attention has been paid, however, to the question of how governments—particularly those in the Middle East—have incorporated Islam into their broader foreign policy conduct. Whether it is state support for transnational religious propagation, the promotion of religious interpretations that ensure regime survival, or competing visions of global religious leadership; these all embody what we term in this new report the “geopolitics of religious soft power.” The paper explores the religious dimensions of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, looking at how the Islamic outreach strategies of the two governments have evolved in response to changing regional and global environments. We assess the much-discussed phenomenon of Saudi Arabia’s export of Wahhabism, arguing that the nature and effects of Saudi religious influence around the world are more complicated than we ordinarily think. Meanwhile, since 9/11 and the rise of ISIS, the governments of several prominent Muslim-majority countries, among them Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt, have positioned themselves as the purveyors of a “moderate Islam” capable of blunting the narrative of extremist groups. We also look at Turkey and Indonesia as examples of emerging powers that, with somewhat less fanfare, have integrated elements of religious outreach into their broader soft power strategies across Asia and Africa.
    [Show full text]