Pakistan's Security Dilemma and the War on Terrorism

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Pakistan's Security Dilemma and the War on Terrorism Pakistan’s Security Dilemma and the War on Terrorism Submitted by Muhammad Tariq Javed Ph.D. Scholar Department of International Relations University of Peshawar December 2016 APPROVAL CERTIFICATE Pakistan’s Security Dilemma and the War on Terrorism Dissertation Presented By Muhammad Tariq Javed To the Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Ph.D. in International Relations November, 2019 We, the undersigned have examined the thesis entitled ‘Pakistan’s Security Dilemma and the War on Terrorism’ written by Muhammad Tariq Javed, Ph.D. Scholar at the Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar, and do hereby approve it for the award of Ph.D. Degree. Approved By: Supervisor: ________________________________________ PROF. DR. IJAZ KHAN, Professor of International Relations, University of Peshawar External Examiner: ________________________________________ Chairman: _________________________________________ DR. Minhas Majeed Khan, Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar Dean: _________________________________________ PROF. DR. Johar Ali, Faculty of Social Sciences University of Peshawar Dedication I dedicate this study to my grandfather Mian Fazal Mahmood who instilled in me the fondness for learning. i Declaration I hereby declare that this dissertation is the outcome of my individual research and it has not been submitted to any other university for the grant of degree. Muhammad Tariq Javed ii Abstract Pakistan‘s security issues have been spiraled to a ‗Security Dilemma‘. Pakistan‘s core issue of Jammu and Kashmir is central to its security outlook. Pakistan was militarily weak at the onset that pushed it to international military alliances, primarily aimed to overcome its military and infrastructural deficiencies through aid from Western allies. Participation in alliances was primarily against Indian threat. As a member of international alliances it could not use that lever to resolve the Jammu and Kashmir issue with India and rather became part of international political and ideological controversies escalating to a ‗Security Dilemma‘. The study finds out that Western strategic cultures are one of the factors and causes of Pakistan‘s Security Dilemma besides Pakistan‘s chaotic political environment and inconsistent foreign policy. Pakistan is exposed to the global power players who exploit Pakistan‘s security fault lines to extract their interests. Pakistan is confronting the menace of terrorism from both NATO allies and Taliban. Pakistan is considered strategically facilitating the NATO alliance reinforcing NATO nations‘ strategies against Taliban insurgency. Pakistan is doubted at the same time by its allies in War on Terrorism of connivance with the anti-NATO Taliban. Pakistan has more strategic importance and significance than the abilities to handle it that put it in a state of Security Dilemma. The institutional imbalance and weaker political cadre is consequential to proactive institutional behavior that makes Pakistan politically incoherent. Nepotism, clanship, favoritism and authoritarian character of Pakistan‘s political culture has made it prone to foreign intrigues and ingress. Pakistan‘s borders with an irredentist Afghanistan on its West and India as rival involved in major issue of Jammu & Kashmir in the East. Iran is estranged on sectarian sensibilities and Russia (former USS.R) considers Pakistan as an ally of its rival capitalist camp. The Indian influence in Afghanistan quadrupled Pakistan‘s security problems. The Western concern for the terrorism and indifference to the sacrifices Pakistan has made in the ‗War on Terrorism‘ has created a ‘Security Dilemma‘. Pakistan‘s economy, society and geographical integrity are suffering due to international political intrigues. Pakistan‘s ‗Security Dilemma‘ has also been negatively influenced in the backdrop of its historical legacies and religious identity besides it‘s comparative potent military status among the Muslim fraternity and Islamic world vis-a- vis Western political dispositions and prejudice has compounded Pakistan‘s Security Dilemma with the advent of new security concepts. iii This work studies extended variants of Pakistan‘s internal and external factors, Vis a Vis her capabilities and response. The study focuses on Pakistan‘s inconsistent security policies and indirect strategies to seek solution for Pakistan‘s only issue of Jammu & Kashmir with India. The study suggests solution to overcome Pakistan‘s security dilemma internally by improving political leadership, civil military relations, consistent foreign policy measures, reformation and extended education system to regain the control from extremist sections. Externally to have a neutral and national-interest-based foreign policies and not to act as foreign proxy with zero sum gains of her own. Pakistan needs to improve infrastructure and industrial base to be self-reliant. Our national stance and character need special focus for a cohesive and coherent response to threats leading to Pakistan‘s security dilemma. Only a self-reliant Pakistan will ensure its integrity and security. iv Acknowledgements All the praise to ‗ALLAH‘, the Almighty, the most merciful and beneficent and salutations on the Holy Prophet ‗Hazrat Muhammad‘ (Peace Be upon Him), a blessing for humanity and both the worlds and complete source of knowledge. I am profoundly obliged for my academic achievements and endeavors to Pakistan Army and the University of Peshawar and above all; my parents, these institutions are major landmarks in my grooming and academic endeavors. I acknowledge the support and guidance of all of my teachers, colleagues and friends for the completion of this work. I am grateful to Professor Dr. Ijaz Khan Khattak, my Research Supervisor, who put me wise in so many ways, I learnt a lot from him. I am thankful to Professor Dr. Adnan Sarwar Khan, Professor Dr. Nasreen Ghufran, Professor Dr. Ghulam Mustafa and Professor Dr. Mansoor Khan, who all taught me different disciplines in International Relations which helped me understand concepts utilized in this study. I owe special thanks to Professor Dr. Taj Mehrum Khan for being kind enough to help me in reviewing some of my script. I also acknowledge Professor Dr. Touqeer Ahmad who was a great help and has gone through the fatigue of reviewing part of my study, he did it with utmost diligence. I thank Aysha Umair, Dr. Shumaila Farooq, Raza Rehman Qazi, Shakoor Safi, Saima Gul, Saira Bano Orakzai, Gul Marjan for their encouragement, understanding and cooperation. I thank Mr. Ishtiaq Ali for going through the draft. I owe special thanks to Amir Aleem, Muhammad Najam-Us-Saqib Mujahid, Anushka Amir, and Muhammad Ashar Amir who gave all their love and peace of mind which was most encouraging in the accomplishment of this work. I am grateful to the secretarial staff of IR department headed by Mr. Zahoor and Mr. Anees, who were always forthcoming and helping. The best in this study is due to all those I have mentioned in acknowledgements however, I own all the deficiencies in my work. v Contents Dedication............................................................................................................................................... i Declaration ............................................................................................................................................ ii Abstract ................................................................................................................................................ iii Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................... v List of Tables ....................................................................................................................................... xii List of Figures .................................................................................................................................... xiii Acronyms and Abbreviations ............................................................................................................ xv CHAPTER: 1 ........................................................................................................................................ 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 1 1.1: Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 1.2: What Distinguishes this Work? ............................................................................................ 12 1.3: Problem Statement ............................................................................................................... 13 1.4: Objectives ............................................................................................................................. 13 1.5: Research Questions .............................................................................................................. 14 1.6: Subsidiary Questions ............................................................................................................ 14 1.7: Hypothesis ............................................................................................................................ 14 1.8: Research Methodology........................................................................................................
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