The Political Consequences of the Peace

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The Political Consequences of the Peace THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE by Jacques Bainville 1920 Translated by Philip Webb *** DRAFT : 2011-10-11 *** © Copyright Philip Webb 2011 All rights reserved *** You may make private copies for your own personal use *** *** Any other reproduction, distribution or publication *** *** of whatever kind, in whole or in part, is prohibited *** TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction Preface Chapter 1 The Shortcoming of Things & the Shortcoming of Men Chapter 2 Characteristics of the Peace Chapter 3 What Saved German Unity Chapter 4 60 M Germans in Debt to 40 M French Chapter 5 They Will Not Know Chapter 6 The Game of 32 Cards Chapter 7 The Crisis of 1920 & the Future of the Slavs Appx Germany & Poland Chapter 8 The Adriatic Imbroglio Chapter 9 Hypotheses & Probabilities Chapter 10 Position of France TRANSLATOR©S INTRODUCTION It was a comment by Prof Antony Lentin (Wolfson College, Cambridge), praising Bainville & regretting that his prophetic treatise had never been done into English, which first got me to take a look at it & then to set about translating it. He is also responsible for a number of corrections & improvements, which I have incorporated. I hope that no-one will try to use this work as a basis for attacking today©s European Union. While we can never know what Bainville would have said on the topic & while there is enormous room for debate on all aspects of Europe after World War I & today, there is nothing in his account which points to a belief in a Europe of isolated sovereign states. He clearly regretted the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire ± a proto-EU in the East ± & saw only future strife between an unreconciled France & Germany, but he was no jingoist: his attitude is sad acceptance of the facts & a hope that French democracy can defend itself. He also repeatedly stressed that the basis for peace in Europe was a federal Germany, much like the republic eventually created under Allied auspices after World War II. As for Britain & the USA, the EU©s biggest detractors, Bainville is contemptuously dismissive: the former was obsessed with its Empire, which it had expanded after the war ± one of Bainville©s astute prophecies was that it had fatally overextended itself thereby ± ; the latter©s movers & shakers had little interest in the continent & had already gone home. It took an even more terrible war, which left both France & Germany humiliated, to cause the two countries finally to come together & establish a peace which has now lasted 66 years . Anyone who wants to undermine that achievement & return Europe to the regime of factious & suspicious states & statelets which led directly to the World Wars is either utterly naïve or has some other more sinister agenda in mind. In making his book available to an English readership, I have not tried to turn Bainville into an Englishman. No Englishman ± or American or even a Canadian ± could have written it. Bainville was a French historian, writing in 1920 for his French fellow-citizens an analysis of the situation of his country & the likely dangers facing it in the coming years. While many words are shared between the two languages ± though a translator has to be careful about false or more often unsympathetic friends ± , the structure of French is basically that of Latin, which leads to a more rhetorical style of educated writing, & this in turn influences the very structure of French thought. Where English tends to fall away into fudge & dead clichés, French ± though very rarely that of Bainville ± can rise into clouds of oratory & abstraction. I have tried to keep his word-order, often somewhat inverted from the English habit, his repetitions ± a device French is fond of ± & even his subjunctives, wherever these can be retained without sounding artificial in English. I have been careful to take account of those tiny French particles, reminiscent of Ancient Greek, which English tends to forget. I have felt free to join up his too-short sentences, sometimes using colons & semi-colons, which seem to be in short supply in the French compositor©s type box, & have broken up some of his paragraphs, where this makes it easier for readers to follow. I have not been afraid to mark his frequent asides with a pair of dashes rather than commas. I have incorporated his few footnotes into the text for easier processing. The pages in the original French text are marked thus: [11]. # marks the end of a paragraph, if it occurs at the end of a page. Other priorities have not given me the time to give the translation a rigorous audit & no doubt there remain not a few errors, besides places where wording could be improved. I have left some coloring in this version, which is still basically a draft: red marks items I remain unsure of, yellow items which deserve a footnote of some kind, green text which was originally in another language & should be copied directed therefrom. If anyone cares to offer corrections, I will be happy to consider amending the text. I hope that readers will hear a very intelligent & literate Frenchman, as he might have made a series of lectures in a light French accent to a 21st Century English-speaking university. Philip Webb , Cities Centre , University of Toronto , 2011 [email protected] INTRODUCTION -- Pierre Gaxotte This is a book unique among the work of Mr Jacques Bainville. The natural bent of his mind leads Mr Bainville to understand & to explain rather than to forecast. Nonetheless in 1920, he forecasted; he wrote his book & was able without compunction to leave the calling of prophet to others, because he had announced everything, everything which has happened since 1920 & probably everything which will happen in future years. There is no reading-matter which leaves a more lively impression of an exceptional intelligence, at once lucid, firm, quick, vigorous, studious about reality, raising itself tirelessly from geographic detail to broader views & making use of historical experience with dazzling surety & a charming ease. The most striking feature of our time is undoubtedly the breakdown of political intelligence. The conduct of parliamentary government demands from leaders cleverness rather than strength, opportunism rather than tenacity, trickery rather than vision. Inexperienced men come to power who imagine they can make up for their lack of preparation by surrounding themselves with narrow fussy specialists. Thus the details of the Treaty of Versailles are the work of experts & technicians; the whole & the large outlines are the work of amateurs; reflection & competence find themselves as mere accessories. The general & essential arrangements on which depend the solidity & success of everything else were settled by men who were guided not by a knowledge of history but by the summary principles of an orator©s philosophy. That is the drama of Versailles, also the subject of this book. From underlying inconsistency there follow consequences. Jacques Bainville has the honor of having forecast them & of having defined the policies which, as far as was possible, would have been able to avert them. PREFACE ± Jacques Bainville , 1920 It is not because an English author has written The Economic Consequences of the Peace that we have put together this work. This book is not a reply to Keynes: one will see that immediately. We wish to note, in the introduction to these pages, only a singular contrast. After a war which has put into play the forces & the means of the principal nations of the World, the very idea of ©policy© has fallen into disrepute. Perhaps it was causing a headache ? It is true that such vast & confused material had never offered itself to popular leaders charged with establishing a major peace, all the more reason for reflection & much foresight. Calculation could prove tiring. In the absence of calculation, an enormous part of the future was left to the unknown & to chance, a part far in excess of the limits which the deepest minds encounter when they apply themselves to direct the course of great affairs. In an age in which people believed in the indefinite progress of the human mind, Fontenelle said: "It is certain -- and people will be more & more convinced of it ± that the political world, as well as the physical, is regulated by number, weight & measure". Poor peoples ! -- everything is done in their name & they have only to submit. At which moment did they see that the peace was violating the laws of physics ? But number, weight & measure are not neglected with impunity & the peoples will not even understand why they will have to pay yet again one day. CHAPTER 1 -- The Shortcoming of Things & the Shortcoming of Men It is not uncommon that after winning a war the victor -- or if there is an alliance, at least one of the victors -- is unhappy with the peace & believes he has been duped. In 1815 the Prussians complained that the Congress of Vienna had ended for them with "a farce". In earlier times, we ourselves had a treaty of which it was proverbial to say "stupid as the peace". Mr Raymond Poincaré, who has not been sparing with his criticisms of the actions of Versailles, St-Germain & other places near Paris, was correct to write that the deceived hopes which they caused were not new. People have said everything about the gaps in the Treaty of Versailles, what it didn©t give us, the lack of reward which it represents for us: lands, frontiers, money, what it delivers is inferior to what people had generally hoped for. People have commented everywhere that we didn©t even recover the boundaries of 1814, but those of 1815 -- of Waterloo -- , of which the French people had so long resented the humiliation.
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