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FRANCE and the REMILITARIZATION of the RHINELAND by GAYLE ANN BROWN, Bachelor of Arts Southeastern State College Durant1 Oklahom

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FRANCE and the REMILITARIZATION of the RHINELAND by GAYLE ANN BROWN, Bachelor of Arts Southeastern State College Durant1 Oklahom FRANCE AND THE REMILITARIZATION OF THE RHINELAND By GAYLE ANN BROWN, n Bachelor of Arts Southeastern State College Durant 1 Oklahoma 1967 Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College of the Oklahoma State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS July, 1971 FRANCE AND THE REMILITARIZATION "· OF THE RHINELAND ~ ..."'···-. Thesis Approved: ~~~TbeSAdviser ~ of the Graduate College 803826 ii PREFACE It is generally assumed that opposition to the German remilitari­ zation of the Rhineland in 1936 probably could have prevented World War II. Through an examination of the diplomatic documents published by the French government and the recollections of those who participated in the decisions that were made, this study attempts to determine why France failed to act. I acknowledge the attention of the members of my committee, Dr. Douglas Hale, Dr. George Jewsbury, and Dr. John Sylvester. To the en­ tire faculty of the Department of History at Oklahoma State University, I must express my deepest appreciation for the fairness, kindness, and confidence which I have recently been given. I am obligated to Dr. William Rock, of the Department of History at Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, for his suggestion of the topic and his guidance in the initial preparation of my work. I am also indebted to the staff of the Oklahoma State University Library for their assistance in obtaining many sources. I am very grateful to my typist, Mrs. Dixie Jennings, for the sympathy which she has shown me, as well as for her fine work. The unceasing reassurance and support given me by my parents has been the primary factor in my ability to continue working against con­ stant discouragement. For this and my other academic achievements, I must give them the credit. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I. FRANCE AT THE FRONTIER OF FREEDOM . 1 II. THE WAY OF A SOMNAMBULIST .. 28 III. ABOVE ALL, NOT WAR! .. 59 IV. THE MASK OF PEACE . If 0 •• • 0 0 ' 85 A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY .. 130 iv CHAPTER I FRANCE AT THE FRONTIER OF FREEDOM On March 7, 1936, German troops entered the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland, violating the Treaty of Versailles as well as the Treaty of Locarno, which Germany had freely accepted in 1925. 1 At the end of World War I, France had insisted upon the demilitarization of Germany's western border in order to prevent a sudden devastating attack and to allow France to attack swiftly into the industrial heart of Germany if Poland or Czechoslovakia were threatened. Yet, when challenged in the Rhineland, France failed to act in what was probably its best opportu- nity to check Adolf Hitler's aggression without war. A firm response from France in 1936 might have removed Hitler from power and averted World War II ~- or at least would have made the war easier when it came, For the French, the most crucial period was the first few days immedi- ately following the entry of German troops into the Rhineland, and it is the activities of the French government during these critical hours which will be explored. The Rhineland crisis provides a useful study of the decision-making process in a government faced with a coup and indicates the general pattern of appeasement that Britain and France would take toward Nazi aggression, 1The Rhineland is a rather imprecise term applied to the Rhine Valley. It generally refers to the Prussian province of Rheinland and those portions of Hesse-Nassau, Hesse, Baden, and the Bavarian Palatinate lying within the valley. 1 2 The most important question that can be asked is why those men in France who could have decided to act against Germany failed. In at- tempting an answer, it will be necessary to develop the diplomatic back- ground and then present an account of the actions of the French govern- ment. Fortunately, many of the participants wrote memoirs which elo- quently relate the concerns of each and present his version of the events. Although their writings could be considered exercises in placing the blame elsewhere, it is possible to develop a fairly lucid narrative from their recollections. General Maurice Gamelin, the Chief of the Army General Staff, kept a daily journal and wrote the most com- plete account. 2 The memoirs of Pierre-Etienne Flandin, the Foreign Minister, tend to be more emotional and slightly less reliable, and his ten d ency to omit. d ates contri"b utes to some con f usion.. 3 Joseph Paul- I Boncour, the Minister of the League .of Nations, wrote an account which dealt very explicitly with the meetings of the Council of Ministers in Paris, but he was unaccountably reticent about the League meetings. 4 Andre Franrois~Poncet, the French ambassador in Berlin, left a thoughtc ful memoir which is remarkably free of faultfinding. 5 In regard to documentary sources, the French government has published Documents 2General Maurice Gamelin, Servir, vol. II, Le prologue du drame, 1930-aout 1939 (Paris, 1946). 3Pierre-Etienne Flandin, Politique francaise, 1919-1940 (Paris, 194 7) . 4 Joseph Paul-Boncour, Entre ~ guerres (New York, 1946). 5Andre Franrois-Poncet, The Faithful Years: Memoirs of a French Ambassador in Berlin, 1931-1938 (New York, 1949). 3 Diplomatiques Frantais. 6 Regrettably, the documents for 1935 have not yet been published. For the French, the problem of the Rhine as a frontier was at least two thousand years old. Roman legions established the Rhine as their border with the Germans, and with the end of the Pax Romana, there came three centuries of invasions across the Rhine. The history of the Rhine Valley as a formal buffer zone between the regions that became modern France and Germany began in 843 with the Treaty of Verdun, which divided Charlemagne's Empire among his grandsons. The unfortunate Lothar, who received the middle kingdom which ran along the Rhine, was the victim of continual war between his brothers. The Thirty Years' War brought indescribable destruction which was repeated when Louis XIV devastated the Palatinate in 1688, Although German in race and language, Rhinelanders developed a feeling of being different from their Prussian neighbors who provided the impetus for the formation of modern Germany. Rhinelanders have sometimes exhibited a capricious nature which favored first the French and then the Germans. For example, they welcomed the armies of revolu- tionary France and then turned to Prussia when it became evident that France intended annexation. In fact, it was during the French Revolu- tion that the concept of natural frontiers was first realized for France. Georges Danton, a leader of the Jacobins, formulated the doc- trine quite concisely: "The limits of France are marked by nature. We shall reach them in the four corners of the horizon, to the Ocean, to 6oocuments Diplomatiques Francais, 1932-1939, 2nd Series, 1936- 1939 (Paris, 1963), (hereafter cited as DDF). 4 the Rhine, to the Alps, to the Pyrenees." 7 Hence, the tradition of French concern for a natural frontier on the Rhine was conceived during the .Revolution and realized by Napoleon. In 1815, the Congress of Vienna, which attempted to restore the balance that Napoleon had destroyed, gave most of the Rhineland to Prussia and Bavaria. After the Congress of Vienna, both France and Prussia appeared to accept the status quo, but French fears for their security were proved correct when Germany was able to deliver a crushing blow through the Rhineland in 1870. Then Germany completed its victory by annexing Alsace-Lorraine. Consequently, from 1870 to 1918, France's position on the Rhine was exactly what it feared most. The military advantage which Germany held on the left bank of the Rhine seemed almost insurmountable. 8 Again in 1914, Germany was able to advance rapidly into Flanders and northern France due to the advantage of controlling the bridgeheads of the Rhine. World War I was the greatest test and the greatest vie- tory of the .Third French Republic, which had been born in the defeat of 1870, but the price of victory was indeed high. France had lost one hundred thirty-four billion francs in goods and property and, more im- portant, one and one-half million Frenchmen had been killed. One out of ten Frenchmen h~d been killed at the front, and the youth had been decimated most. Population losses during the war further lowered the French birthrate, which had already been declining for several years. When World War II started in 1939, France had less than half as many 7Georges Danton, Les plus beaux discours .de Danton, ed. by Paul Lorquet (Paris, n.d.), p. 52. 8 Goronwy Rees,~ Rhine (New York, 1967), pp. 158-167. 5 men as Germany between the ages of twenty and thirty-four. The cele- bration of victory.in 1918 was necessarily short lived, for Frenchmen sensed that they could not stand against the greater population and superior industrial base of even a defeated Germany without the help of the United States and Britain.9 Thus the Rhineland, through which Germany had launched invasions in 1814, 1815, 1870, and 1914, was logically the first French concern in establishing security after the war. Although the French Parliament remained mostly silent on the Rhineland issue during World War I, a great many private citizens had advanced various theories concerning France's role in the Rhineland and its implications for the future. Their main theme was that the Rhinelanders.were Gallo-Roman, not truly German in origin, and that they would recognize the advantages of being associated with France when the war was over. 10 The plans of the French government were formulated in two documents written early in 1917.
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