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Modal Empiricism Made Difficult Modal Empiricism Made Difficult Modal Empiricism Made Difficult An essay in the meta-epistemology of modality Ylwa Sjölin Wirling © YLWA SJÖLIN WIRLING, 2019 ISBN 978-91-7346-983-8 (printed) ISBN 978-91-7346-984-5 (pdf) ISSN 0283-2380 The publication is also available in full text at: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/57967 Academic thesis in Theoretical Philosophy, at the Department of Philosophy, Linguistics, and Theory of Science. Distribution: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis PO Box 222, SE-405 30 Göteborg, Sweden [email protected] Cover: Detail from Portrait of Elizabeth I (c.1563), the so-called Hampden Portrait, by Steven van der Meulen, or possibly by Steven van Herwijck (scholars disagree). Print: Brand Factory, Gothenburg, 2019 Abstract Title: Modal Empiricism Made Difficult Author: Ylwa Sjölin Wirling Language: English ISBN: 978-91-7346-983-8 (printed) ISBN: 978-91-7346-984-5 (pdf) ISSN: 0283-2380 Keywords: epistemology of modality, modal epistemology, integration challenge, non-uniformism, modal empiricism, metaphysics of modality, epistemic value Philosophers have always taken an interest not only in what is actually the case, but in what is necessarily the case and what could possibly be the case. These are questions of modality. Epistemologists of modality enquire into how we can know what is necessary and what is possible. This dissertation concerns the meta- epistemology of modality. It engages with the rules that govern construction and evaluation of theories in the epistemology of modality, by using modal empiricism – a form of modal epistemology – as a running example. In particular, I investigate the assumption that it is important to be able to meet the integration challenge. Meeting the integration challenge is a source of serious difficulty for many approaches, but modal empiricism is supposed to do well in this respect. But I argue that once we have a better grasp of what the integration challenge is, it is not obvious that it presents no problem for modal empiricism. Moreover, even if modal empiricism could be said to be in a relatively good position with respect to integration, it comes at the cost of a forced choice between far-reaching partial modal scepticism and non-uniformism about the epistemology of modality. Non-uniformism is the view that more than one modal epistemology will be correct. While non-uniformism might not in itself be unpalatable, it must be defined and defended in a way which squares with the modal empiricist’s other commitment. I explore two ways of doing so, both involving a revised idea of the integration challenge and its role for the epistemology of modality. One involves a bifurcation of the integration challenge, and the other a restriction of the integration challenge’s relevance. Both ways are interesting, but neither is, as it turns out, a walk in the park. Acknowledgements To begin with, I have been immensely lucky with my supervisors – this book would not have come about without them patiently sharing their valuable time, expertise, views and experience, with me. The many shortcomings of this dissertation are despite their efforts, and all due to me. Anna-Sofia Maurin has been my main supervisor and I absolutely could not have wished for a better one. She has given generously of her time – far, far beyond what duty demands and what she gets paid for – and always with the greatest effort and commitment. Her ability to see through a wall of confused text or a messy presentation, and tell you what it is that you wanted to say all along has helped me out of many seeming dead-ends, and continues to be a great inspiration to me whenever I am asked comment on the work of others. Also, she has never once expressed a doubt that I could write this dissertation, and do it well. That encouragement has been really important to me. So, Anna-Sofia – thank you, thank you, thank you. My assistant supervisors Sören Häggqvist and Daniel Giberman have also helped me a lot, at various times during my project. Sören, thank you for providing knowledgeable comments and conversation on the texts I have been throwing your way. Your input was very important in the process that shaped the final argumentative outline of my dissertation. In fact, any reader of this book should also send Sören a grateful thought, in light of all the grammatical errors and language-related mistakes that his careful eye has saved me from making. And thank you, Dan, for extensive comments on all sorts of texts that sometimes did and sometimes did not end up being part of this book, and for your support during my first confused year at FLoV. Other people have also kindly given my work careful considera- tion, for which I am very grateful. First, I am so glad that Tuomas Tahko agreed to comment on the first full draft of the dissertation manuscript for my final seminar. He did a great job and provided encouragement, interesting discussion and insightful input that has been important to me during the completion of this book. A recurring arena for presenting my work has been provided by the Gothenburg Research Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy. Thanks to Susanna Andersson, Andrew Brenner, John Eriksson, Gustavo Fernandez Walker, Ragnar Francén, Paul Gorbow, Martin Kaså, Felix Larsson, Helge Malmgren, Ana Maria Mora Marquez, Kristin Mickelson, Seyed Mousavian, Stellan Pettersson, Susanna Salmijärvi, Alexander Skiles, Alva Stråge, Naomi Thompson, Marco Tiozzo, Anders Tolland, Kelly Trogdon, Maximilian Zachrau, and everyone else who has participated throughout my years in Gothenburg. Thanks to all my colleagues at FLoV who helped by making the day-to-day struggle of being a doctoral student into so much more of a pleasure; to Anton Broberg and Johan Gross for peaceful times of office co-habitation; to Moa Ekbom for listening to my complaining and contributing some in return. Also, thanks to all those who have helped me with the administrative side of my doctoral studies. Finally, Susanna Radovic once told me about her horseback riding metaphor for writing good philosophical text: think about it as making the horse strike off into nice, collected canter (much, much harder than it seems!). I found that picture enormously useful in writing this book – even though it might not always show through. During my time as a PhD student I also had the opportunity to present thesis-related work at some workshops and conferences: at the Directions in the Epistemology of Modality Workshop in Stirling, October 2015, where I also received generous feedback from my commentator Bob Hale; at the Stockholm Graduate Conference in April 2017, where I especially want to thank my commentator Peter Pagin for his encouragement and feedback; at the Epistemology of Metaphysics Workshop III in Helsinki in August 2017; at Filosofi- dagarna 2015 in Linköping; and Filosofidagarna 2017 in Uppsala. I want to thank the organisers and audiences at all of these events. I originally hail from the Department of Philosophy at Lund University, where I have had something of a second home during my time as a PhD student. There are many people there to which I owe thanks. First, to the organisers of and participants in the PhD Seminar in Philosophy at Lund University for letting me present there multiple times, generously commenting on my texts, and to all my other friends at the department for letting me hang out there with you, discuss things philosophical and non-philosophical, and borrow desks in your offices. Second, thanks to all the people that sat with me on the Board of the Philosophical Society of Lund between 2013 and 2018, I really enjoyed all the fun times we had in between the sometimes-frustrating ones. Finally, two Lund-related people deserve special mention. Jeroen Smid – for all stimulating conversation, helpful advice and most importantly for giving me the first experience of actually having fun, rather than being scared and intimidated, while discussing philosophy with a peer. Frits Gåvertsson – who has time and again, ever since I was a philosophy undergraduate, encouraged and convinced me to do various things I would otherwise have shied away from. Throughout the years, in addition to those already thanked above, my thesis work has benefited from rewarding conversation with Albert Casullo, Phil Corkum, Bob Fischer, Rebecca Hanrahan, Felipe Leon, Sanna Mattilla, Sónia Roca-Royes, Andreas Stephens, Margot Strohminger, Anand Vaidya, Tobias Wilsch, and several others who I forget to mention but who I am nonetheless indebted to. I also want to extend a thanks to Arianna Betti for giving a very inspiring course some years ago, where I managed to get a grasp on what I take to be a really nice way of doing philosophy, and for encouraging me to pursue the subject further. And of course, thanks to all my friends and family for keeping me sane. Some of you through being supportive, others by not giving a damn about theoretical philosophy in general or my thesis in particular but just wanting to go for a walk, hang out, or get drunk. Thanks to Johanna for sharing her horse Pelle with me. My parents, of course, who always believe in me, help me out, and never ques- tioned the ridiculous choice to pursue a PhD in philosophy of all things – thank you. Finally, I want to thank Eric Brandstedt for end- less support, encouragement and patience. Apart from being a wonderful partner he has also been a useful and inspiring commentator and sounding board for ideas big and small that have found their way into this book. Few things infuriate me more than his comments on my texts but once the dust settles, I usually realise he has a point.
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