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THE REBIRTH OF CHINA’S INTRA-ASIAN MARITIME

TRADE, 1670 - 1740

A Dissertation in History and Asian Studies by Ryan Holroyd

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

August 2018

The dissertation of Ryan Holroyd was reviewed and approved* by the following:

Ronnie Po-chia Hsia Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of History Dissertation Co-Advisor Chair of Committee

Kathlene Baldanza Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies Dissertation Co-Advisor

Jyoti Gulati Balachandran Assistant Professor of History

Carol Reardon George Winfree Professor Emerita of American History

Shuang Shen Associate Professor of Comparative Literature and Chinese

Gregory J. Smits Director of Graduate Studies Professor of History and Asian Studies

*Signatures are on file in the Graduate School.

Abstract

This dissertation is a study of the development of China’s overseas trade during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. It argues that beginning in the 1670s, the formerly profitable trading links that connected China to Japan and Luzon were compromised by political changes in the three regions, and particularly by a civil war in China. The result was a turn towards Southeast Asia that began in 1674 when the Taiwan- based Zheng family, who then dominated maritime trade in East Asia, were forced to find alternative sources of goods to replace Chinese ones that had become inaccessible during the war. After the Qing empire’s conquest of Taiwan in 1683, its government legalised maritime trade from Chinese ports, creating a surge in the volume of China’s overseas trade. The markets of Japan and Luzon were not elastic enough to allow all of the new China-based merchants to participate profitably there, so they once again turned towards Southeast Asia. However, unlike the Zheng family in the 1670s, the goal of these new merchants was to find alternative markets to Japan and Luzon for their Chinese goods, and new imports for their home market.

This trading network that emerged in the 1680s is examined in depth. Its structure developed as a ‘hub-and-spoke’ system; China-based merchants concentrated their activity in a few major commercial hubs that were already connected to many smaller centres by the spokes of sub-regional trading networks, and in some cases to the Indian Ocean as well. This gave the China-based merchants indirect access to a larger number of markets than would have been possible otherwise. The major impact of the expansion of Chinese trade in Southeast Asia was a re-orientation of the region’s economies towards China, and away from other trading systems, including the Dutch Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie’s commercial empire. This network in Southeast Asia was also easily the most important maritime link between China and the global economy until about 1720, when a combination of factors helped prompt the growth of direct trade between China, Europe, and South Asia.

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Table of Contents

List of Tables ...... vi

List of Figures ...... vii

List of Maps ...... viii

Acknowledgements ...... ix

Introduction ...... 1

Chapter 1: Cut Adrift ...... 20 The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories and Maritime Trade ...... 21 A Period of Relative Stability, 1664 – 1673 ...... 23 Mountain and Sea Routes ...... 29 The South Seas Connection ...... 33 The Final Years of the Zheng Trading System, 1680 – 1683 ...... 40 Conclusions ...... 42

Chapter 2: Flood Gates & Bottlenecks ...... 44 Qing Economic Recovery ...... 45 Disapointment in Nagasaki ...... 50 The Manila Galleon Bottleneck ...... 57 Conclusions ...... 66

Chapter 3: A Borean Tailwind ...... 69 Chen Lunjiong and the New Structure of Trade ...... 73 The Five Great Emporia of Southeast Asia ...... 80 The Dominance of China-based Merchants within the New System ...... 90 Conclusions ...... 96

Chapter 4: The Swell ...... 98 The Triangular Trades between Southeast Asia, China, and Japan ...... 101 The Qing Commodity Conquest of Southeast Asia ...... 103 The Trinh and Nguyen Domains ...... 105 Siam ...... 110 Johor and the Malay World ...... 119 Banjarmasin ...... 126 The Philippines, Northern Borneo, and the Maluku Islands ...... 129 Java and the Core of the VOC’s Empire ...... 135 Conclusions ...... 139

Chapter 5: More Distant Shores ...... 142 The Flow of Chinese Goods into the Indian Ocean before c. 1715 ...... 144 The Inadequacy of the Old Routes through Southeast Asia ...... 154 Surat’s Ships at Guangzhou ...... 162 The Macanese ...... 168 Private British and French Trade from c. 1720 to 1740 ...... 173 Conclusions ...... 179

Conclusions ...... 181

Appendix A. Notes on masses, currencies, and dates ...... 186

Appendix B. Non-Spanish ships arriving in Luzon, 1680-1701 ...... 188

Appendix C. Ships arriving in Nagasaki from Southeast Asia in the Kai Hentai, 1684 - 1724 ...... 200

Appendix D. British company and private ships sailing between South Asia and China, 1720 – 1740 ...... 221

Bibliography ...... 224

List of Tables

Table 1.1. Raw silk imported to Nagasaki on Chinese Ships, 1654 – 1683 ...... 28 Table 2.1. Asian Ships arriving in Nagasaki, 1674 – 1715 ...... 50 Table 2.2. Value of imports on Asian ships in kanme of silver, 1674 – 1713 ...... 53 Table 2.3. Numbers of ships arriving in Luzon, 1657 – 1710 ...... 59 Table 2.4. Chaunu's five-year averages for almojarifazgo collection from arriving ships in pesos, 1671 – 1715 ...... 62 Table 2.5. Almojarifazgo collection amounts for available years in pesos , 1680 – 1701 ...... 62 Table 4.1. China-based Trade Ships Sailing to Siam According to Scattered Mentions in the Kai Hentai, 1684 – 1710 ...... 114 Table 4.2. China-based trade ships sailing to Banjarmasin, 1692 – 1719 ...... 127 Table 4.3. Five year averages for the numbers of Chinese ships arriving in Batavia, 1621 – 1685 ...... 136 Table 4.4. Arrivals of Chinese ships in Batavia, 1684 – 1717 ...... 137 Table 5.1. Yearly Arrivals of English Ships at Xiamen, 1684 - 1700 ...... 146 Table 5.2. Ships departing from and arriving at Madras to and from China, 1700 - 1719 ...... 150 Table 5.3. Annual arrivals of foreign ships in Guangzhou according to Yang Lin's memorials, 1715 – 1722 ...... 151 Table 5.4. Ships sailing between Madras and Siam, Mergui/Tenasserim, and Johor, 1700 – 1728 ...... 156 Table 5.5. South Asian Ships in Guangzhou and Macau according to British records, 1699 – 1709 ...... 166 Table 5.6. Intended Destinations of Ships Sailing from Macau for 1732, 1733, and 1740 ...... 169 Table 5.7. Ships and their tonnages sailing from Macau in 1740 ...... 170 Table 5.8. Ships Sailing to and from Macau in Different Asian Ports ...... 172 Table 5.9. French intra-Asian trading voyages to China, 1723 - 1740 ...... 178

List of Figures

Figure 2.1. Asian ships arriving in Nagasaki, 1674 – 1715 ...... 52 Figure 2.2. Ships arriving in Luzon, 1657 - 1710 ...... 61 Figure 5.1. British companies’ investment in Asia, 1700 - 1740 ...... 175

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List of Maps

Map 1. China’s Coast and the surrounding seas, c. 1670...... 19 Map 2. The Western Pacific, c. 1700 ...... 68 Map 3. The sailing routes of China-based ships in Southeast Asia according to Chen Lunjiong ...... 72 Map 4. The hub-and-spoke structure of China-based trade in Southeast Asia, c. 1700 ...... 79 Map 5. The eastern Indian and western Pacific oceans, c. 1720 ...... 141

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Acknowledgements

It seems that doctoral programs are above all else exercises in the accumulation of debts, and mine has been no exception. Most of my debts will never be adequately repaid, but I am grateful I have this customary opportunity to acknowledge them at least. First and foremost, whatever clarity and consistency my dissertation has I owe to my supervisors Ronnie Hsia and Kathlene Baldanza, who spent many hours reading the drafts of my chapters, and gave me invaluable advice on how to improve them. Throughout my program I also received as much support and guidance as any graduate student could hope for from both the departments of history and Asian studies at Penn State. Drs. David Atwill, Erica Brindley, On-cho Ng, Carol Reardon, Sophie De Schaepdrijver, Tatiana Seijas, and Gregory Smits in particular helped me in more ways than can be listed here. I will be forever grateful to all of them.

I also owe debts to a number of institutions that supported my research financially and made this dissertation possible. Most important was Penn State itself, which treated me generously at every turn. Several institutions within the university aided my work and travels with grants and scholarships, including the Institute for the Arts and Humanities, the Research and Graduate Student Office, and the Center for Global Studies. Penn State’s Alumni Association aided my work through its dissertation award as well. Outside the university, there are several other organisations whose assistance I am happy for this opportunity to acknowledge. Stanford University, the University of Michigan, and the University of Chicago all helped me use their excellent libraries with generous grants. The China and Inner Asia Council of the Association for Asian Studies assisted in making my research in London and Antwerp possible too. Finally the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation supported my final year of research and writing, which made it possible to finish as early as I did.

I think I was luckier than most in regard to the classmates fate threw me in with when I entered Penn State’s Department of History. Kwok-leong Tang and I were bound together by the structure of the program, and consequently moved through it in lock-step, sharing each triumph and defeat together in our long campaigns. Chen Bin managed to brighten the gloomiest moments with a sense of humour that was utterly unfailing. Courtney Fu was frequently an inspiration through her knack for meeting every challenge with a peculiar grace. Joohyun Sheen was a completely dependable comrade who had the incredibly rare ability in our age to defend what he believed with complete conviction, but at the same time to never let it compromise a friendship. Laurent Cases had incredible patience and good humour in the face of my frequent stubborn attempts to prove whatever trivial point I wanted to make during the many late night discussions we had. Xiang Hongyan, who was the first among us, set the best example for the rest to follow, and helped me in particular through her willingness to share everything she had learned. Finally Wu ix

Hsin-fang’s friendship became crucial to my journey in many different ways, but most important was that at the end of the night she never refused just one more parting glass. 會須一飲三百杯 !

My last set of debts are those to my family. My father gave me a quiet place on our family farm in Alberta to write my fourth chapter and prepare the fifth, while my uncles, grandmothers, grandfather, and brother all offered support in various ways, in spite of whatever bemusement they must have felt when I announced to them that I was going to pursue a doctorate in history. To Su Shu-Wei, I probably owe my single biggest debt, both for her patience with my absences during frequent research trips abroad, and for her help formatting, support, and love while I was writing the dissertation. In Taiwan, her family gave me a second home and introduced me to many curious corners of Chiayi and Tainan that I would have missed on my own. Shu-Wei’s aunt and uncle, Su Hsiu-o 蘇秀娥 and Lin Hsing-hsiung 林興雄 , also gave me a place to stay while I was doing research in Taipei, and her cousin Su Chia-hsuan 蘇家萱 , a talented graphic designer, helped me make the maps within this dissertation. My final debt is to the memory of my mother who encouraged me more than anyone else, and should have seen this day that my work was done.

Introduction

This dissertation investigates the development of Chinese overseas maritime trade in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. It examines the structure of the trading network operated by Chinese merchants, and attempts to assess its impact on the markets of China’s maritime neighbours in East and Southeast Asia. The essential argument that it makes is that a new system of commerce emerged in the 1670s and 1680s, replacing the one that had existed in the mid seventeenth century. This newly established system had a considerably larger scope than its predecessor, and facilitated far stronger flows of goods between China and the region’s other states. As a result China became connected to a greater number of foreign economies than it had been earlier in the century, and this caused a rapid rise in China’s economic influence across maritime Asia, and particularly in Southeast Asia.

Within China, the context for the emergence of this new trading network was the consolidation of the Qing empire. In 1644 the armies of the Manchu Qing dynasty took Beijing, the capital of the old Ming state, and then spent the next twenty years gradually conquering all of China. One of the last Ming loyalist holdouts was the Xiamen-based military and commercial organisation controlled by the southern Fujianese warlord Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功 . Zheng’s merchant fleet was the dominant force in trade between China and foreign markets overseas by the 1640s, and the family’s grip on the region’s trade only increased as the invading Qing armies conquered southern China’s coastal regions where other merchant groups had been-based, thereby inhibiting or eliminating most of the potential rivals to Zheng’s organisation. In 1661, when Qing armies were closing in on his headquarters in Xiamen, he invaded the colony of the Dutch Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) on Taiwan in order to establish a new safer base for his family’s commercial ventures. The invasion succeeded, and the Zheng family was able to maintain their trading system for the next twenty years despite the Qing empire’s control of China.

Even after 1664 when the Zheng family lost Xiamen, their last toehold on the mainland, and were confined to Taiwan, their trading system was organised in essentially the same way it had been since the 1640s. They relied on the exchange of Chinese goods, especially silk, for American silver in the Spanish colonial port of Manila on Luzon, and for Japanese silver and copper in Nagasaki on Kyushu. After its invasion of southern China the Qing government prohibited maritime activity in its newly acquired coastal territories in an effort to limit the Zheng family’s access to China, but this ban proved to be practically unenforceable. In fact, it had the unintended consequence of eliminating most of the family’s potential rivals, which gave the Zheng a near monopoly on China’s foreign maritime commerce. As a result, their exchange of Chinese silk for American and Japanese silver and copper continued to be the largest part of China’s overseas trade until the 1670s. Southeast

Asia, which had been important to Chinese maritime merchants in the late Ming period, played a very small role by comparison in the Zheng family’s mid seventeenth-century system.

In the following chapters, this dissertation seeks to show how this situation changed. It will argue that in the 1670s the Chinese civil war known as the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories (San Fan Zhi Luan 三藩之亂 ) forced the Zheng family to turn towards Southeast Asia in order to sustain their maritime commerce. This incorporation of Southeast Asia into the trading system of China’s maritime merchants outlasted the family, though the role the region played in their network changed significantly. In 1684, a year after the family’s surrender to the Qing empire, the Qing government legalised maritime activity and this prompted a sudden expansion in China’s foreign trade. Because of limits on the volumes of Chinese goods that the markets of Japan and Luzon could absorb, the maritime merchants operating out of the Qing empire needed to seek new destinations for their ships and their loads of cargo. So, like the Zheng family in the 1670s, these Qing merchants turned towards Southeast Asia. Beginning in the 1680s, they established a new trading network that linked China to economies throughout the region, and through some parts of it to the Indian Ocean as well.

This dissertation is above all an attempt to describe this commercial system as an integrated whole. It will not of course try to touch on every aspect of maritime interaction. There is not enough space to include, for example, lengthy discussions on the infrastructure of the trade; the chapters that follow mostly leave aside the construction of ships, the establishment of merchant organisations, and the administration of ports. 1 The dissertation also does not attempt to describe in detail what trade meant for social and cultural developments in the region. 2 Instead, it will offer a sketch of the geographic extent of the overall network by tracing the trade routes that bound maritime Asia’s disparate sub-regions to China in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, and describe the commercial impact it had on the regions it connected.

1 For good introductions to these topics, see Chen Xiyu 陳希育 , Zhongguo fan chuan you hai wai mao yi 中國帆船與海外貿易 (Xiamen: Xiamen da xue chu ban she, 1991); Angela Schottenhammer, “Brokers and ‘Guild’ (huiguan 會館 ) Organizations in China’s Maritime Trade with her Eastern Neighbours during the Ming and Qing Dynasties,” Crossroads 1 (2010): 99 – 150; and Chen Guodong 陳國棟 , “Qing Dai Zhong Ye Xiamen De Haishang Maoyi (1727 - 1833) 清代中葉廈門的貿易 (1727 - 1833),” in Zhongguo Haiyang Fazhan Shi Lunwen Ji 中國海洋發展史論文集 , vol. 4, ed. Wu Jianxiong 吳劍雄 (Taibei: Zhongyang Yanjiu Yuan, 1991). 2 For good examples of works that tackle these types of issues see Angela Schottenhammer, “The ‘Liuqiu baiwen 琉球百問 ’ (A Hundred Questions from the Liuqius ; 1859): an example of an intercultural encounter in the field of medicine,” in Trade and Transfer Across the East Asian “Mediterranean ,” ed. Angela Schottenhammer (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 2005); Ng Chin-keong, “Information and knowledge: Qing China's perceptions of the maritime world in the eighteenth century,” in The East Asian Maritime World 1400 – 1800: Its Fabrics of Power and Dynamics of Exchange , ed. Angela Schottenhammer (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 2007); Claudine Salmon, “Coastal Maps from the Beginning of the Qing Dynasty, With Special Reference to the Qingchu haijiang tushuo,” in The Perception of Maritime Space in Traditional Chinese Sources , eds. Angela Schottenhammer and Roderich Ptak (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006); and Zheng Yangwen, China on the Sea: How the Maritime World Shaped Modern China (Leiden: Brill, 2012). 2

The setting for the first four chapters is the maritime region encompassing the areas that are customarily known as the ‘East China Sea’ and ‘South China Sea.’ Following Leonard Blussé, who thinks it is more useful to understand them as one unified ‘China Sea,’ 3 this dissertation refers to them together as a single maritime region and generally refers to it as the ‘western Pacific’ throughout, though it often distinguishes between the region’s two major terrestrial subdivisions conventionally as East and Southeast Asia. The western Pacific is, as Blussé describes it, an hourglass-shaped region with the Strait of Taiwan as the narrow throat dividing its northern and southern parts. Kyushu and Korea form the furthest edge of its northern half, while past Taiwan the southern one follows the contours of the Philippine islands, the Malukus, and the Bird’s Head Peninsula of Papua New Guinea. The northern shores of the Indonesian archipelago from Timor to the Straits of Sunda serve as the base of the hourglass, while the coastlines of the Malay peninsula and Indochina north to Guangdong define its western edge. In the final chapter the dissertation also attempts to show the linkages between this sea region and the shores of the Indian Ocean, from the eastern edge of the Bay of Bengal to Gujarat in the west. Throughout, the dissertation uses the term ‘region’ to refer to these larger global maritime or terrestrial divisions, including the western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, South Asia, East Asia, and Southeast Asia. ‘Sub-region’ refers to smaller and usually conventionally understood divisions of the regions, including such areas as the Melaka straits, the Philippine islands, the Malukus, Indochina, and so on, though very fuzzy boundaries are assumed in every case.

Naturally, this study has been made possible by a large body of earlier scholarship on the relationships between China and its neighbours in this western Pacific region during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Since the 1950s there has been a gradual growth in our understanding of how trade and navigation functioned in Asia’s seas, as scholars have added bit by bit to what is now an impressive corpus of work on the subject. Our overall picture is not yet completely seamless however. There has been a disproportionate focus on trade during the latter part of the Qing period, and much of this has been dedicated to only a few specific questions, especially when and why the Chinese merchants’ trading system began to decline. In the meantime, the system’s earlier stages have received relatively little attention, particularly the first three or four decades following the Qing government’s decision to legalise maritime trade (1684 to about 1720). In addition to this chronological unevenness, most of the scholarship produced so far has focussed on discrete categories of maritime interaction or on maritime activity between only two particular regions, while the evolution of the system of economic interlinkages that was created by trade across the broader region is generally acknowledged but left unexplored. Consequently, our view of the forest is still largely obscured by a multitude of carefully rendered trees. The earliest studies of Qing-era maritime trade driven by Chinese merchants were primarily interested in either locating the moment of the trading system’s demise, or

3 Leonard Blussé, “No Boats to China. The Dutch East India Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635 – 1690,” Modern Asian Studies 30, no. 1 (February 1996): 55. 3 explaining how it was affected by government policy, with little attention to the actual operation of trade. In the 1950s the Chinese historian Tian Rukang wrote a ground breaking article concerning Qing overseas trade, though he did not elaborate significantly on its structure or operation. His conclusion was that in spite of intermittent government restrictions on trade, overseas commerce flourished until about the 1750s when it declined because of competition from European merchants, Qing government regulations on ship building, and unrest in southern China. 4 Writing at about the same time, John King Fairbank introduced Chinese overseas trade during the Qing period to Anglophone readers in his Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast . The primary goal of the book was to explain why the Qing court was so ill-prepared for the British assault during the first Opium War in the 1840s. Contrary to what a recent ungenerous evaluation of Fairbank’s work claims, he actually had rather a lot to say about private trade,5 but unfortunately his description of it ends up being confused because he attempts to link its development to the Qing dynasty’s diplomatic ‘tributary’ system. Essentially he argues that the Qing empire’s government (like those of previous dynasties) saw all foreign trade as an aspect of diplomacy. Private China- based overseas trade did not fit nicely into the imperial government’s vision, and its expansion, which happened throughout the dynasty in concert with both European private trade and trade carried on by other Asian governments in the guise of tribute embassies, entangled the empire in a global trading network that was beyond its ability to manage or understand. 6 Consequently the Qing government’s misconceptions about trade eventually caused the first opium war in the 1840s, and this ushered in a period of European dominance. In the cases of both Tian and Fairbank’s work, there is little discussion of the specific routes that merchants sailed, or what they traded with whom. Though they disagree on some points, their shared interest is in when and why Chinese trade lost its predominance in the western Pacific during the latter half of the Qing dynasty.

In the 1970s a second generation of scholars after Tian and Fairbank began to explore other aspects and stages of Qing maritime trade beyond the periods in which it supposedly collapsed. Initially, the most important of these new works focussed on discrete bilateral trading connections between China and other polities or regions in Asia. Among the most important of these studies were dissertations written by Sarasin Viraphol and Jennifer Cushman on Sino-Siamese trade during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, both of which were later published. Sarasin Viraphol’s study explored the tributary trading missions sent to China by Siam’s kings, while Cushman wrote primarily about the private

4 Tian Rukang 田汝康 , “Shi Ji Shi Ji Zhi Shi Jiu Shi Ji Zhong Ye Zhongguo Fan Chuan Zai Dong Nan Yazhou Hang Yun He Shang Ye Shang De Di Wei 十七世紀至十九世紀中葉中國帆船在東南亞洲航運和商業上的地位 ,” Li Shi Yan Jiu 歷史研究 8 (1956): 1 – 21. 5 Gang Zhao, The Qing Opening to the Ocean: Chinese Maritime Policies, 1684 – 1757 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2013), p. 11. 6 John King Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842 - 1854 , (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), vol. 1, pp. 33 – 38. 4

Chinese merchants based out of the Qing empire’s ports who sailed to and from Siam. 7 Both of these works demonstrated the importance of Chinese merchants as the agents that maintained the link between the Qing economy and Siam, whether in the service of the Siamese throne or as independent operators. Cushman’s contribution also explicitly rejects Tian and Fairbank’s visions of the dismal administration of trade during the late Qing era by demonstrating that the imperial state usually did not obstruct the business of Chinese maritime merchants from 1684 onwards. According to her, the state in fact helped China- based merchants to maintain their position as China’s pre-eminent importers and exporters by placing relatively more onerous restrictions on their European competitors. 8 Soon after, Leonard Blussé followed Sarasin Viraphol and Cushman’s examples, and investigated the bilateral trading relationship between the Qing empire and Batavia, the Dutch VOC’s headquarters in Asia, using the company’s extensive surviving records. Among the relatively early writers on Qing-era trade by China-based merchants, Blussé provides one of the best periodisations of its development, though of course his scheme is only directly applicable to the Batavian trade. He divides it into three phases. From 1619 to 1680 there was a formative period in which Chinese trade to the VOC’s capital became regular, but did not expand because of the turmoil in China caused by the Ming-Qing transition, and also because Batavia still lacked control of any large markets in Java. From 1680 to 1740 the trade expanded thanks to the consolidation of Qing power in China and its legalisation by the Qing court. Finally, Blussé sees 1740 as the turning point when trade began to stagnate and decline, mainly because of the VOC’s ham-fisted attempts to impose tighter control over the Chinese merchants (including both those based in China and in Batavia). These policies had the unintentional effect of encouraging Chinese merchants to take their business to other ports outside of the company’s control. 9 As Blussé, Cushman, and Sarasin Viraphol were investigating Chinese commerce in different parts of Southeast Asia, other scholars began to examine factors within China itself that influenced the development of maritime trade during the Qing period. One of the earliest and most important contributions was Ng Chin-keong’s study of the evolution of Xiamen as a coastal trading hub. In it he argues that a combination of ‘push and pull’ factors encouraged the southern Fujianese to begin participating in coastal and overseas trade in large numbers. The push factors were mainly the scarcity of arable land in Fujian that could support the province’s growing population in the late seventeenth century, while the pull factor was the economic opportunities that were suddenly available to the Fujianese after 1684, the year that the Qing empire legalised overseas trade. Ng, like Blussé, identifies

7 Sarasin Viraphol, Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652 - 1853 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); and Jennifer Wayne Cushman, Fields from the Sea: Chinese Junk Trade with Siam during the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, 1993). 8 Cushman, Fields from the Sea , p. 135. 9 The original version of Blussé’s study was a short article, Leonard Blussé, “Chinese Trade to Batavia during the days of the V. O. C.,” Archipel 18 (1979): 195 – 213. It was a later expanded into a much longer book chapter in Leonard Blussé, Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women, and the Dutch in VOC Batavia (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1988), chap. 7. See page 115 for an overview of his periodisation. 5 the legalisation of overseas trade as the major turning point in the history of Qing era Chinese maritime activity, 10 and most writers who followed them agree on the importance of this event. Robert Marks in his study of the connections between the economic and environmental histories of the Lingnan region, for example, also claims that in the late seventeenth century the agricultural economy of the Pearl River delta in Guangdong was transformed by a commercialisation prompted by the growth of maritime trade after 1684. 11 In the past two decades or so, there have been a number of newer works that use Qing government materials to explore different aspects of the administration of trade by the Qing state following the 1684 legalisation. The thesis that most of these studies share is that after 1684, the Qing state’s stance on private China-based maritime trade was generally intelligent and flexible, and it thus helped merchants based in China to flourish. Huang Guosheng has given scholars an invaluable guide to the Qing government’s establishment of maritime customs, while Chung-yam Po has written a dissertation that argues it was the Qing government’s able management of both customs and its coastal defences that allowed maritime commerce to thrive across the region. 12 The most recent (and most polemical) contribution to this genre has been Gang Zhao’s The Qing Opening to the Ocean . In it he condemns the alleged ‘Eurocentrism’ of John King Fairbank, claiming that beginning with Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast , there has been an unfortunate tendency to see the Qing state as anti-maritime, when in reality after 1684 the Kangxi emperor and his successor, the Yongzheng emperor, were both aware of the benefits of maritime trade, and took steps to promote it. 13 One of the more recent major trends in Asian maritime history has been a debate over the applicability of the approach used by Fernand Braudel in his La Méditerranée to the study of the western Pacific. 14 The basic idea of this ‘Eastern Mediterranean’ approach is that the East or South China seas (or both) could be studied as maritime zones that connected and subsequently shaped the societies around them together, just as Braudel studied the Mediterranean’s relationship to northern Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. Critics of this approach have generally cautioned against taking for granted the commensurability between the western Mediterranean and the proposed East Asian one.

10 See Ng Chin-keong, Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast, 1683 – 1735 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983). 11 Robert B. Marks, Tigers, Rice, Silk, and Silt: Environment and Economy in Late Imperial South China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 12 Huang Guosheng 黃國盛 , Ya pian zhan zheng qian de dong nan si sheng hai guan 鴉片戰爭前的東南四省海關 (Fuzhou: Fujian ren min chu ban she, 2000); and Chung-yam Po, “Conceptualizing the Blue Frontier: The Great Qing and the Maritime World in the Long Eighteenth Century,” (PhD diss., Universität Heidelberg, 2013). 13 Gang Zhao, The Qing Opening to the Ocean: Chinese Maritime Policies, 1684 – 1757 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2013). 14 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II , trans. Siân Reynolds, 2 vols. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972-1973). For the best overview of the eastern Mediterranean debate in regards to Southeast Asia specifically, see Heather Sutherland, “Southeast Asian History and the Mediterranean Analogy,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 34, no. 1 (February 2003): 1 -20. 6

Chung-yam Po, for example, makes the point that unlike the post-Roman Mediterranean, the western Pacific had an overwhelmingly dominant economic core in China, which exerted an influence on the region many times greater than any other polity.15 John Wills has also pointed out that because of Asia’s monsoon cycles, the interconnections across the western Pacific were organised in a fundamentally different way than they were in the Mediterranean. Where the Mediterranean sea could be crossed in any direction at any time of year, in the western Pacific sailing ships were usually forced by the prevailing winds to sail northeast in the spring and summer, and southwest in the fall and winter. 16 The most potent arguments made by proponents of the approach tend to be that regardless of the specific differences between the two oceans, understanding Asia’s seas as an Eastern Mediterranean liberates our studies of the region from the shackles of nation-state histories that ignore the influences of interactivity between multiple societies. 17 In this respect, most historians, even those such as Sanjay Subrahmanyam who have expressed misgivings about a more rigorous application of the analogy, have come around to the possibility that the Braudelian approach has some utility. 18 The conclusion that Heather Sutherland arrives at in her review of the literature surrounding the question of a possible Southeast Asian Mediterranean is that attempting to exactly define the region geographically as Braudel did is neither a particularly interesting nor fruitful strategy. But if the ambition of using the sea to define and delimit a region is eschewed, applying some aspects of Braudel’s approach, especially investigating persistent patterns of maritime interaction, still allows us to explore processes that spanned political boundaries and to re-map the region according to specific historical questions without the need to rely on conventional geographic frameworks.19 So in sum, at least three major consensuses have been reached in the field of East Asian maritime history. There is a general agreement amongst scholars that the 1684 Qing legalisation of maritime trade was a turning point for the western Pacific’s commercial world.

15 Po, “Conceptualizing the Blue Frontier,” p. 30. 16 John E. Wills, Jr.., “The South China Sea Is Not a Mediterranean: Implications for the History of Chinese Foreign Relations,” in Zhongguo Hai Yang Fa Zhan Shi Lun Wen Ji 中國海洋發展史論文集 , vol. 10, ed. Tang Xiyong 湯熙勇 (Taibei: Zhong Yang Yan Jiu Yuan Ren Wen She Hui Ke Xue Yan Jiu Zhong Xin, 2008), pp. 13 – 14. 17 Angela Schottenhammer, ‘The East Asian “Mediterranean”: A Medium of Flourishing Exchange Relations and Interaction in the East Asian World,” in The Sea: Thalassography and Historiography , ed. Peter N. Miller (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013), especially pp. 133 – 134; Angela Schottenhammer, “Introduction,” in Trade and Transfer Across the East Asian “Mediterranean” , ed. Angela Schottenhammer (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2005); Angela Schottenhammer, “The ‘China Seas’ in world history: A general outline of the role of Chinese and East Asian maritime space from its origins to c. 1800,” Journal of Marine and Island Cultures 1 (2012): 63 – 86; Craig A. Lockard, “‘The Sea Common to All’: Maritime Frontiers, Port Cities, and Chinese Traders in the Southeast Asian Age of Commerce, ca. 1400 – 1750,” Journal of World History 21, no. 2 (June 2010): 220 – 221; and Denys Lombard, “Une autre “Méditerranée” dans le Sud-Est asiatique,” Hérodote 88 (1998): 184 – 193. François Gipouloux’s study of the “Asian Mediterranean” is probably the most recent major work to make this argument. François Gipouloux, The Asian Mediterranean: Port Cities and Trading Networks in China, Japan and South Asia, 13th-21st Century (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), p. 11. 18 Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Notes on Circulation and Asymmetry in Two Mediterraneans, c. 1400 – 1800,” in From the Mediterranean to the China Sea: Miscellaneous Notes , ed. Claude Guillot, Denys Lombard, and Roderich Ptak (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1998), pp. 42 – 43. 19 Sutherland, “Southeast Asian History”: 19. 7

It resulted in an expansion of Chinese maritime activity that was sustained at least until the middle of the eighteenth century. As well, there is now also an agreement that after 1684 the Qing state’s policies usually benefited the business of China’s maritime merchants. Finally, though the Braudelian Eastern Mediterranean analogy is still divisive, most writers who have struggled with questions relating to the influences on and of Asian maritime activity are willing to admit at least that treating these seas as interactive zones connecting terrestrial societies in extra-political ways can be a useful approach. But what has been said of the new post-1684 trading system’s structure and its impact on other economies beyond China’s shores specifically? The literature on these questions is much sparser, but they are the ones that this dissertation is primarily concerned with so it is necessary to review what studies there are here. One major strategy that the present dissertation employs is the identification of the major overseas destinations for Chinese ships and the investigation of the particular roles they played in the China-based trading network before and after 1684. This approach was partly inspired by a short article written by John Wills in the early 1990s. In it he sketches out the commercial activities of China-based merchants in six port cities across the western Pacific in the immediate wake of the Qing emperor’s 1684 decision to legalise maritime trade. 20 The ports he chooses are Ayutthaya, Melaka, Banten, Batavia, Manila, and Nagasaki. The article breezes through them in a counter-clockwise port-to-port voyage lasting twenty- four pages, and thus provides no more than a snapshot of China-based merchant activity in the early 1680s. The only firm unifying conclusions it offers are that in each of the ports there is strong evidence of a rapid expansion of Qing commercial activity, and that this had consequences for the political economies of the region. 21 On these two points, the results of the present research are in perfect agreement. However Wills’ list of important emporia was not intended as more than an introduction to some of the places that were important to the story of Chinese maritime trade at the moment of transition in the early 1680s, so it does not convey anything about the operation of the system over time. Like Wills, James Chin also attempts to establish the geographic centres of Chinese merchant activity across the western Pacific in his studies of Hokkien (southern Fujianese) networks beyond China. Chin goes further in his claims than Wills though, proposing a complete map of the Hokkien merchants’ activities in the region. In it, he identifies seven major spheres across the western Pacific into which the overall network can be divided, ranging from Kyushu to Java, most with particular centres in port cities or small kingdoms where Chinese business activity was the most intense. 22 The result of his work is a more

20 John E. Wills, Jr., “China’s Farther Shores: Continuities and Changes in the Destination Ports of China’s Maritime Trade, 1680 – 1690,” in Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, c. 1400 – 1750 , ed. Roderich Ptak and Dietmar Rothermund (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991). 21 Wills, “China’s Farther Shores,” p. 77. 22 James K. Chin, “Junk Trade, Business Networks, and Sojourning Communities: Hokkien Merchants in Early Maritime Asia,” Journal of Chinese Overseas 6 (2010): 193; and James Kong Chin, “Merchants and other Sojourners: The Hokkien Overseas, 1570 – 17 60 (PhD diss., University of Hong Kong, 1998), pp. 337 – 338. Hokkien merchants were likely both the most numerous and best capitalised Chinese in Southeast Asia, but 8 complete picture of the geographic extent of Chinese overseas activity than any other that has previously been offered. However, Chin’s description has one critical shortcoming, and that is that it lacks any serious attempt to examine the networks he studies chronologically. His works’ primary concern is not the structure or evolution of the Hokkien networks, but rather the characteristics of the relationships between different groups within them. Consequently, most of his evidence aims to demonstrate the essential qualities of relationships that were constant over time, and thus his examples are mostly drawn with little regard for their individual historical moments. According to him, the map of the seven spheres of business activity is valid before 1760 or 1800 (depending on which of his works is referred to) and he cites sources in his descriptions of it from as early as the late sixteenth century. The implication of this is that he seems to assume the network was more or less stable for at least the whole period between about 1600 and 1800.

This dissertation follows Chin’s example and maps the structure of Chinese commercial activity across East and Southeast Asia. It departs from his reconstructions in both its details and its dynamism however. Essentially, the main conceptual revision to Chin’s model that is proposed here is that the Chinese trading networks (Hokkien and otherwise) were actually not stable over time either in their geographic scope or in their commercial organisation. Variable regulation of markets and changes in regional economies caused major structural shifts in the way trade functioned. For example, the second chapter of this dissertation attempts to show that though Nagasaki and Manila were supremely important before trade was legalised in 1684, during the later periods they lost much of their predominance to other ports.

The question of the China-based trading system’s impact on the economies of Southeast Asia has been left even more unexamined than the question of its structure. The reason for this is a consistent tendency in past scholarship to focus on the impact of the Chinese immigration to Southeast Asia that was facilitated by the trading patterns of Chinese merchants, rather than on those trading patterns themselves. Carl Trocki, for example, sees the years from 1630 to 1700 as the period in which the China-based trading network expanded throughout maritime Asia, and paved the way for the large-scale immigration of Chinese labourers in the eighteenth century. 23 Likewise, Denys Lombard devotes a full chapter of his celebrated Le Carrefour Javanais to the activities of Chinese immigrants in the Indonesian archipelago, discussing in detail their role in developing industries, their business strategies, their introduction of new cultural practices, and so on, while saying relatively little there were other groups, such as merchants from Chaozhou who were known to trade in Siam, so this dissertation does not followed Chin by restricting the analysis in the following discussion to any one regional or sub-ethnic Chinese group. 23 Carl A. Trocki, Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore, 1800 – 1910 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 30 – 31. See also Carl A. Trocki, “Chinese Pioneering in Eighteenth-Century Southeast Asia,” in The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750 – 1900 , ed. Anthony Reid (Houndmills: MacMillan Press, 1997). For a good and concise introduction to Chinese immigration into Southeast Asia, see Craig A. Lockard, “Chinese Migration and Settlement in Southeast Asia Before 1850: Making Fields from the Sea,” History Compass 11, no. 9 (2013): 765 – 781. 9 about the trading patterns that brought Chinese goods to the sub-region. 24 Even Leonard Blussé, who wrote the definitive study of trade between China and Batavia, penned a later article on the impact of Chinese commercial expansion throughout the wider region during the eighteenth century that suggests that its most important economic effect in Southeast Asia was the establishment of overseas Chinese settlements and businesses. 25 This dissertation does not deny the importance of Chinese immigration into Southeast Asia or its connection to the China-based trading network, but it does treat them as separate phenomena that each had their own impacts on Southeast Asia’s economies. The regular arrivals of China-based trade ships in various Southeast Asian ports facilitated the entry of Chinese migrants and sojourners into the region, but the ships were not intended primarily as passenger vessels. Their owners rented cargo space on them every time they set out for foreign ports, and this was how their voyages produced most of their profits. After settlements of overseas Chinese were established in Southeast Asia, China- based crews did do business with these new migrant communities of course, but the seaborne merchants were willing and able to cooperate with other groups as well. Similarly, the overseas Chinese farmers and workshop owners produced goods that they sold to traders coming from China, but they also made deals with Dutch, English, Malay, and South Asian traders just as readily. The importation of Chinese goods into Southeast Asia and the export of goods from it to China had an impact on the region’s economies that was independent of Chinese immigration into specific sub-regions. Consequently, the discussion in the following chapters makes an effort to distinguish between the activities of merchants based out of the Qing empire, usually referring to them as ‘China-based’ or ‘Qing’ merchants, and ‘overseas Chinese’ groups based in Southeast Asia, and avoids referring to either category of merchants as simply ‘Chinese’ because of the obvious ambiguity. Excluding those studies, such as Trocki’s, that are primarily interested in the delivery of immigrants from China to Southeast Asia, there are very few that seek to describe the economic effects of the expansion of Qing trade across the whole region. The only major attempt to present a synthetic vision of how the influence of maritime trade between the Qing empire and the rest of East and Southeast Asia evolved that this author knows of is Anthony Reid’s. In various publications, Reid has created a periodisation of Southeast Asian history in which he posits that there was an ‘age of commerce’ lasting from the fifteenth to late seventeenth century. During this phase, the region saw economic and demographic growth, and a steady expansion of its internal and external maritime trade, especially with China. For two major reasons, the seventeenth century’s ‘little ice age’ and a global decline in long distance trade, this age of commerce came to an end around 1680, according to him. He goes on to describe a ‘Chinese century’ beginning around 1740. From that year until

24 Denys Lombard, Le Carrefour Javanais: Essai d’histoire globale. II: Les réseaux asiatiques (Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1990), chap. 4. In a separate chapter, he does briefly discuss China-based trade to Java in relation to the archipelago’s other trading networks. See Ibid., pp. 61 – 62. 25 Leonard Blussé, “Chinese Century. The Eighteenth Century in the China Sea Region,” Archipel 58 (1999): 121 – 128. 10 about 1840 ethnic Chinese commercial activity in non-European controlled Southeast Asian centres increased and commonly led to an emergence of Chinese political and economic power within the host societies. He describes the intervening years, roughly 1680 to 1740, as something of a dark age in Sino-Southeast Asian trade. During this period the levels of Chinese commercial activity in Southeast Asia sunk to well below what they had been in the happy days of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and Southeast Asia’s connections to global trade networks atrophied.26

Reid’s conclusions are almost directly opposed to the reconstructions and periodisations that this dissertation proposes in the pages that follow. In contrast to his vision of the decades between 1680 and 1740, this study argues that during these years Chinese commercial activity in Southeast Asia expanded dramatically. China-based merchants found new markets and new sources of import goods in the region that replaced some of their declining or stagnant ventures in Japan and Luzon that had been dominant earlier in the seventeenth century. And the economies in Southeast Asia on the rim of the western Pacific, rather than withdrawing from world trade, re-oriented themselves towards the Qing empire.

Essentially the new reconstruction that this dissertation offers is this. In Chapter One, it begins its story about a decade before 1684, the year in which the Kangxi emperor decided to legalise maritime trade to and from China. It was then, in late 1673, that the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories broke out in the Qing empire. This war initiated a strengthening of the commercial ties between Southeast Asia and the major Chinese trading system of the time. During the seventeenth century prior to 1673, China’s overseas trade had become dominated by an exchange of Chinese silk and cotton for silver with Japan and the Spanish-ruled island of Luzon, while its trade links with Southeast Asia declined in importance. The apogee of this imbalance came in the 1660s, after Zheng Chenggong conquered the VOC’s colony on Taiwan. The Zheng family by then held a commanding position in China’s maritime trade, while the VOC was the predominant naval power around the Indonesian archipelago and the Malay peninsula. The consequence of this conflict was that the Zheng family and their subordinates in Taiwan focussed their efforts on the trade between China, Japan, and Luzon, and left Southeast Asia for the most part to the Dutch company and independent traders.

The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories disrupted this arrangement. Until the 1670s, the Zheng family had successfully relied on a smuggling system to carry silk and other Chinese goods out of Qing territory for their Japan and Luzon-bound cargoes, despite the Qing empire’s best efforts to block their commercial access to China’s coast. But the war obstructed the most important smuggling routes out of China more thoroughly than the

26 Anthony Reid, “Flows and Seepages in the Long-term Chinese Interaction with Southeast Asia,” in Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese in Honour of Jennifer Cushman , ed. Anthony Reid (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1996), pp. 41 – 45. 11

Qing military had managed, and so the Zheng family and their merchant followers had an increasingly difficult time securing the silk and other goods they needed to trade for silver in Japan and Luzon beginning in 1674. They eventually found two related solutions to this problem. The first was to make use of the English East India company’s factory on Taiwan, which provided limited quantities of South Asian cotton cloth for re-export. The second was a turn southward to mainland Southeast Asia, the Trinh and Nguyen lords’ Vietnamese domains and Siam primarily, where cotton cloth and silk were also available. Because of the VOC’s hostility, the Zheng continued to mostly avoid insular Southeast Asia, but their efforts to re-develop trading ties in the more northerly ports succeeded. Until their final defeat in 1683, the family and their followers were able to supplement their cargoes with silk and cotton cloth procured from the English and from Southeast Asia.

A year after the Zheng family’s defeat and the beginning of the Qing occupation of Taiwan, the Kangxi emperor made the momentous decision to lift the ban on overseas maritime trade that had been in place since 1661. The second chapter of this dissertation attempts to show how the economic and political situations that prevailed in the domains of the empire’s trading partners affected and were affected by Chinese trade after the ban was removed. Its conclusion is that because the opening of the oceans came only a few years after the end of the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories, the Qing domain was then in a period of buoyant economic recovery and expansion. This circumstance allowed luxury commodity industries to grow, and this consequently meant that cargoes of goods were readily available to potential exporters in increasing quantities. In the first few years following the legalisation, there was rapid growth in the numbers of Qing participants in overseas trade, including both ship owners and small time merchants who usually contracted for a set amount of cargo space aboard trading vessels.

Until about 1688, the assumption shared by most China-based ship owners and merchants seems to have been that their primary trade circuit would be between the Qing empire and Japan, while the circuit between the Qing empire and Luzon would play a secondary role. Southeast Asia would once again be mostly unnecessary in their commercial strategies. This arrangement would have been more or less identical to the dominant structure that existed in the seventeenth century before the 1670s, and we can reasonably assume this new generation of maritime merchants generally imagined themselves participating in a reproduction of the Zheng family’s pre-rebellion system and growing rich by it. For many, if not most of them, this dream was not to be however. The problem was that for different reasons, neither the Japanese nor the Luzon markets were capable of absorbing the volumes of Chinese goods the vastly expanded Chinese trading fleets brought them. In Japan, silver production had fallen and the Tokugawa government, fearful of losing too much bullion to foreign trade, began to put strict limitations on the numbers of trading vessels that could do business in Nagasaki each year. The Spanish authorities in Luzon’s port of Manila meanwhile continued to allow unrestricted numbers of ships to arrive, but the volume of imports that could be exchanged for American silver was

12 effectively capped by the capacity of the galleons that connected the outpost of Luzon to the true market for Chinese goods within the Spanish empire, New Spain. Each year usually no more than two galleons sailed in each direction between Manila and Acapulco, and they could only carry so much Asian cargo on the voyage outbound from Luzon, meaning that there was only so much Asian cargo Spanish investors were willing to trade their silver for annually. Making that market even more difficult for the China-based merchants was growing competition in the 1680s and 1690s from South Asian-based traders who were also seeking American silver.

Nagasaki and Manila continued to attract Chinese ships, but the different restrictions on their markets prevented them from meeting the expectations of all the China-based merchants who hoped to make their fortunes in overseas trade. Though we lack detailed statistics for the Qing shipbuilding industry in the 1680s, we can surmise from the total numbers of ships sailing to Nagasaki and Manila in the first few heady years following the legalisation that there had been large capital expenditures made by the merchant communities in Guangzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo, and elsewhere for the acquisition or construction of large ocean-going trading vessels. Because there was simply not enough of a market in either Japan or Luzon to accommodate all of the new merchant ships every year, new destinations needed to be found to prevent the investments in the ships from being wasted. The obvious and only practical solution was a turn once again to Southeast Asia.

The third chapter of this dissertation is an investigation of how the new circuits of exchange between the Qing empire and specific ports in Southeast Asia functioned. It proposes that unlike trade during the late Ming period, in which ships from China sailed to many different relatively small Southeast Asian ports, the early Qing-era traders focussed most of their activity on five major emporia throughout the region that were connected to smaller centres through the trade of sub-regionally based merchants in a hub-and-spoke system. These five emporia were Ayutthaya, Johor, Banjarmasin, Manila, and Batavia. The chapter leaves aside the Trinh and Nguyen ports of Pho Hien and Hoi An because although both of these cities were important destinations for ships from China, neither seems to have served as a hub in the way that the other five did. They primarily connected the Qing trading system to the interior hinterlands of the Trinh and Nguyen territories within Indochina.

This chapter also presents an argument for how merchants based in China came to be predominant in the trade between China and Southeast Asia. In the formative period during the late 1680s and early 1690s, merchants from the Qing empire were not the only group vying for a share of this trade. Overseas Chinese, the communities in Batavia and Ayutthaya in particular, also began participating in commerce between their home ports and China. However a decision made by the Qing court in 1694 to ban foreign-built ships in Chinese ports upset the operations of the Southeast Asians. The court’s narrow intention for the legislation was to make monitoring the operations of China-based merchants easier.

However, local officials in the empire’s port cities interpreted the regulation more broadly. They used it to ban not only foreign-built ships, but also overseas Chinese crews who had been coming to the Qing empire regularly to trade up to that point. The way in which local officials implemented this legislation naturally gave China-based merchants an advantage over their Southeast Asian competitors. Based on the available data, it appears that from 1694 until at least about 1720 trade between Southeast Asia and the Qing empire was dominated by merchants who operated out of Chinese port cities, rather than out of Southeast Asian ones.

What did these new trading patterns mean for Southeast Asia? In the penultimate chapter, the argument is that there was no economic decline and deterioration of Southeast Asia’s integration into global trade, as Anthony Reid claims. Reid’s main pieces of evidence for the close of his age of commerce are a fall in the numbers of Asian ships identified as Southeast Asian in lists of arrivals in Nagasaki, and the weakening of the business system the VOC had constructed in Southeast Asia, especially the failure of much of its intra-Asian commerce. This dissertation shows that a closer examination of the Japanese records strongly suggests that trade between Southeast Asian polities and Japan was not actually declining. Instead the ascendant Qing-based trading network in Southeast Asia began channelling most Southeast Asian goods destined for the Japanese market through Chinese ports, and the trade therefore merely became less visible as increasing volumes of Southeast Asian products arrived at Nagasaki in ships identified as coming from the Qing empire rather than Southeast Asia.

The second and more important claim is that the erosion of the VOC’s fortunes in Southeast Asia was offset, and at least partially caused by the expansion of the Qing empire’s trade in the region. The specific ways in which the operations of the China-based merchants and the VOC interacted varied, but in almost every sub-region there was a rising consumption of Chinese goods that affected the company’s established relationships with their markets. Other European groups, especially the English companies, who attempted to gain a foothold in the region during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, also found themselves in similar positions vis-à-vis the China-based traders. In some cases this meant simply that the Europeans were outbid by China-based merchants for Southeast Asian products, as the VOC and the English East India companies were for pepper in Banjarmasin. In other instances though, the demand for Chinese products within a specific market increased the demand for European silver imports because that metal was useful for Southeast Asians in their trade with the China-based merchants, as was the case in north- eastern Java. As well, the availability of Chinese goods in certain sub-regions encouraged the development of new trading networks outside of the VOC’s control, as happened between Sulawesi and the Maluku islands. In almost every instance, the common pattern was European trade adjusting itself to accommodate the abrupt influx of Chinese goods.

The last chapter proposes a basic outline for the evolution of commercial links between the Qing empire and South Asia. In its reconstruction, from 1684 to about 1715 there was a limited outflow of Chinese goods towards South Asia shared between two types of routes. First there were English ships and a very small number sent by other groups that sailed directly from South Asian ports to Xiamen and Guangzhou to acquire Chinese goods. Second, and at least as important, were the flows of Chinese goods redirected towards the Indian Ocean through the China-based merchants’ two most western Southeast Asian emporia, Johor and Ayutthaya. This balance shifted in favour of the direct route around 1715 because of the confluence of a number of factors. These included the Kangxi emperor’s ban on China-based merchants sailing to Southeast Asia that was enforced from 1717 to 1722, the ascendancy of a powerful and venal phrakhlang or treasury minister in Siam, warfare in the Straits of Melaka, and the increasing volumes of American silver available to merchants in South Asia after the end of the War of Spanish Succession. The combined effect was to prompt a number of different merchant groups to increase their participation in direct trade between South Asia and the Qing empire beginning in the late 1710s and early 1720s. Together, their efforts outperformed the indirect routes through Southeast Asia, which were by then languishing.

This introduction will end with a few brief points on the sources and methodologies employed throughout the dissertation. Because it attempts to show the structure of trade between the Qing empire and a large part of the rest of maritime Asia, it has needed to cast a wide net in its search for evidence. It uses Qing, Japanese, Spanish, Dutch, and British sources, as well as a smattering of documents produced by writers from other parts of Asia and Europe. The present author may reasonably be accused of trading depth for breadth in the discussions that follow, as the dissertation spends comparatively little time on textual analysis throughout. This is a necessary sacrifice though, because only a few primary sources used here contain more than a handful of scraps of information relating to the questions it pursues, and attempting to interrogate all of them at length would have made this study even more unwieldy than it already is. But there are two sets of sources at least are important enough to deserve some extra attention.

Easily the most useful sources of information for this study are the Tosen fusetsu gaki 唐船風說書 (‘Chinese ship rumour books’) contained in the Kai Hentai 華夷變態 . These were reports created by the Chinese interpreters in Nagasaki who began interviewing the arriving crews and captains of Chinese ships in 1674 after the Tokugawa government ordered them to collect intelligence on overseas countries. Around 1720, the Confucian scholar and Tokugawa official Hayashi Hoko 林鳳岡 compiled the Kai Hentai from the rumour books and other materials.27 The modern publication of the Kai Hentai used here

27 For background of the Kai Hentai , see Matsukata Fuyuko 松方冬子 , “Tang, Lan Feng Shu Zhong You Guan Zheng Shi Zheng Quan Wa Jie De Xun Xi Ji Zhuan Ri Jing Guo 唐、蘭風書中有關鄭氏政權瓦解的訊息及其傳日經過 ,” Taiwan Shi Yan Jiu 臺灣史研究 19, no. 1 (March 2012): 174 – 176; and Yoneo Ishii, ed., The 15 also incorporates several other manuscript copies of Tosen fusetsu gaki , which together with Hayashi’s original collection provide interviews from 1674 to 1724. 28

The Chinese interpreters in Nagasaki gradually became more formulaic and rigorous in their interviews as the years passed. In the interviews from the period of the Zheng family’s rule in Taiwan (1674 to 1683) the entries often amount to long-winded stories in which crews recounted the rumours they had heard about the civil war on the mainland. By the 1690s though, the interviews almost always include statements giving the captain’s name, the crew’s size, the ship’s origin and sailing route, its previous voyages to Nagasaki, other ships encountered along the way, and miscellaneous news about developments in China, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. Though collecting it is time consuming, there is a great deal of information that can be gleaned from these thousands of interviews. The crews reported on fires in Suzhou, crop failures in northern Vietnam, and the births of mythical creatures in Zhejiang, among many other things. The Kai Hentai ’s records are also the only source that the present author knows of where descriptions of the Chinese overseas trade are preserved in the words of the Chinese merchants themselves, save for the occasional interrogation transcript in the Qing archives.

The second most important source for this study has been the VOC’s records. The vast majority of the references to company’s material in this dissertation are to the published generale missiven of the governor generals and their councils in Batavia. These were letters to the directors of the company, the Heeren XVII in Amsterdam, which the Batavian councils composed to summarise the VOC’s activities and the important developments in Asia that affected its business. As the Qing-based trading fleets were both a boon to the company in Batavia through their regular deliveries of Chinese goods, and dangerous competitors almost everywhere else, the company’s agents across the region paid especially close attention to them. They gathered commercial intelligence related to the merchants from the Qing empire and then transmitted it to Batavia, where the councils summarised it within their generale missiven in a form easily accessible to the Heeren XVII, and incidentally to modern researchers as well. 29 Any follow up studies will ideally make use of the VOC’s archives held by the Netherlands Nationaal Archief in Den Haag and by the Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia in Jakarta, neither of which this author was able to consult for the present study. As many historians have demonstrated, the company’s vast records provide a wealth of detail that is unparalleled in value for the reconstruction of Southeast Asian history. As the conclusion to this dissertation suggests, one avenue for further research might be to use the

Junk Trade from Southeast Asia: Translations from the Tôsen Fusetsu-gaki, 1674 - 1723 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), pp. 6 – 7. 28 Hayashi Shunsai 林春齋 , Hayashi Hoko 林鳳岡 , and Ren'ichi Ura 浦廉一 , ed., Kai Hentai 華夷變態 , 3 vols. (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1958 – 1959). 29 W. Ph. Coolhaas, Jurrien van Goor, Judith Schooneveld-Oosterling, and H. K. 's Jacob, Generale missiven van gouverneurs-generaal en raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie , 13 vols. ('s-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1960 – 2007). 16

VOC’s archives to attempt to quantify the impact of Chinese trade goods within specific parts of Southeast Asia.

Finally, a word on methodology is needed. In all of the five chapters that follow the reader will encounter many ships, most in the act of dropping anchor in the harbours of the various ports across the western Pacific where Chinese merchants did business. In most instances, these ships are the only units that the volume of trade can be measured by because the observers of Asian commercial activity whose records have been left to us did not typically record anything more detailed than ship numbers. In instances where the observers did estimate cargo values or ship tonnages, these values are noted, but most often this dissertation has been forced to rely on comparisons between the amount of trade being conducted in different places or in different years based solely on ship numbers without any information on their sizes or cargo values. Similarly, in attempting to determine the types of Chinese goods imported into other parts of Asia, this dissertation has generally needed to rely on scattered observations made by European and Chinese travellers. This method lacks even the bare statistical basis of counting unmeasured ships, but in most cases there is no evidence more direct on the economic impact of China-based trade than simple acknowledgements that Chinese goods were present in a particular market, that they were valued by the market’s consumers, or occasionally that they were outcompeting alternative goods brought by other merchant groups. The problem is compounded by our lack of statistical figures for the regional or sub-regional economies of early modern Asia; we generally do not have detailed information on the populations, production levels, or current prices of particular goods anywhere in the region. Though this dissertation disagrees with Anthony Reid’s work on several major points, it has tried to follow Reid’s admirable example in attempting to glean as much information as possible about Asia’s economies from seventeenth and eighteenth-century travelogues and cultural studies in order to understand the influences of Chinese trade within them. It needs to be acknowledged that these are incredibly imperfect methods of evaluating trade, but there are no good alternatives. If we are unwilling to use ship numbers or the scattered observations of travellers, we would be confined to discussing only the isolated cases where more complete statistical information was regularly recorded, and this would preclude the possibility of being able to say anything useful about the western Pacific’s trading system from a wider perspective. Worse, it might tempt us to falsely assume that the instances where our statistical data is relatively complete are also the most important. This trap is exactly what Immanuel Wallerstein warned against in his reference to the joke about the drunk who dropped his key on a dark street while walking home, and then searched for it only within the small pools of light beneath street lamps. 30 The key to understanding the western Pacific’s trading system during the seventeenth and eighteenth

30 Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), p. 19. 17 centuries probably does not lie directly in the narrow bands of light shed by the statistical data preserved in European and Japanese records, so if we are truly interested in finding it, we must use what little we have to explore the darker channels of maritime Asia’s commercial worlds.

Map 1. China’s Coast and the surrounding seas, c. 1670

Beijing

Edo

Nagasaki Nanjing Suzhou Shanghai Ningbo Putuoshan

Fuzhou Quanzhou Zhangzhou Chaozhou Xiamen Guangzhou Dongning Macau Pho Hien

Hoi An Ayutthaya Manila

Chapter 1: Cut Adrift

The Zheng Family and the Southward Shift in Their Trade during the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories, 1662 – 1683

This first chapter examines the last period in which the family of the Ming loyalist warlord Zheng Chenggong was the dominant force in East Asia’s maritime trade. Under Zheng in the 1640s, the family became an enemy of the Manchu Qing dynasty, which had then begun its conquest of the former Ming empire. Though Zheng eventually lost most of his holdings on the mainland during the ensuing war with the Qing, he was able to conquer the Dutch VOC’s colony on Taiwan in 1662. This gave his family a secure base from which to continue operating their maritime trading organisation after his death the same year. The discussion below considers how the family’s trading system evolved from 1662 until its final defeat in 1683, and especially the period in the 1670s when a civil war known as the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories (San Fan Zhi Luan) broke out in the Qing empire. The chapter follows two recent studies of the Zheng family, Hang Xing’s Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia and Cheng Wei-chung’s War, Trade and Piracy in the China Seas . Hang’s work is primarily an investigation of the methods used by the family to adapt existing ‘modes of legitimacy’ to validate their maritime-oriented state. Cheng’s study is a more straightforward military and political history of the Zhengs, with admirably close attention to the ways in which the family used trade to sustain its operations in their different stages. This chapter builds on both works by offering a more detailed look at out the Zheng family changed its trading strategies in response to economic and military developments across the western Pacific, and particularly within China itself. 1 Essentially the argument here is that prior to the 1670s, the majority of the Zheng family’s trade had been an exchange of Chinese silk and cotton for Japanese silver and copper and American silver that were acquired in Nagasaki and Manila. These trades had been profitable enough that the family did not require any other types of goods in significant quantities, and therefore the majority of their shipping had been dedicated to the trade routes between China, Japan, and Luzon, while Zheng ships only occasionally sailed to

1 Xing Hang, Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, c. 1620 – 1720 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); and Cheng Wei-chung, War, Trade and Piracy in the China Seas, 1622 – 1683 (Leiden: Brill, 2013). There are also a number of older but still valuable studies of the Zheng family. See Patrizia Carioti, “The Zhengs’ Maritime Power in the International Context of the 17th Century Far East Seas: The Rise of a ‘Centralised Piratical Organisation’ and Its Gradual Development into an Informal ‘State’,” Ming Qing Yanjiu (1996): 29 – 67; Hung Chien-chao, “Taiwan Under the Cheng Family, 1662 – 1683: Sinicization After Dutch Rule” (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 1981); John E. Wills, Jr., “Maritime China from Wang Chih to Shih Lang: Themes in Peripheral History,” in From Ming to Ch’ing: Conquest, Region, and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century China , ed. Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills, Jr. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979); and Tonio Andrade, “The Company’s Chinese Pirates: How the Dutch East India Company Tried to Lead a Coalition of Pirates to War against China, 1621–1662,” Journal of World History 15, no. 4 (December 2004): 415 – 444. 20

Southeast Asian ports to supplement their cargoes with tropical goods. But change was forced on the structure of the family’s trading system by the outbreak of the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories.

The civil war in China, which lasted from late 1673 to 1681, effectively severed the Zheng family’s access to most of the Chinese products they had formerly relied upon to make up their export cargoes to Japan and Luzon. In 1664 the family had lost the last of its territory on the mainland, and had been based solely in Taiwan at a remove from China’s main production centres and markets, but they had still been able to rely on smugglers in the mainland to keep Chinese silk, cotton, and other goods flowing towards Taiwan. However, with the outbreak of the civil war, these smuggling routes along China’s coasts and through its mountain passes were cut off by naval blockades and marching armies. Zheng Jing 鄭經 , Zheng Chenggong’s son and the family’s patriarch between 1662 and 1681, therefore faced a dilemma. In order to keep his trading system operational and his military machine funded he needed to find new sources of goods to fill the holds of the ships he and his subordinates sent to Nagasaki and Manila each year. His solution was a turn towards Southeast Asia where cotton cloth and silk were available, along with various Southeast Asian tropical goods. The Zheng family and its followers acquired South Asian cloth in Siam and the Vietnamese port of Hoi An, and from the English East India company which carried it directly to Taiwan. The family also replaced Chinese silk with silk produced in northern Vietnam and acquired in Pho Hien. These new sources of goods allowed the Zheng family to maintain an altered version of their trading system that was ultimately more expansive than the original one that had existed earlier in the seventeenth century. It also initiated the beginning of an incorporation of Southeast Asia into the late seventeenth-century Chinese maritime merchants’ trading system that would survive the Zheng family’s rule of Taiwan and become paramount in their network by the late 1680s.

The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories and Maritime Trade For its scale, the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories is a surprisingly understudied episode in Chinese and Qing history. The rebellion was initiated in late 1673 by Wu Sangui 吳三桂 , the powerful and semi-independent ruler of Yunnan province in the southwest of China. He was joined temporarily by southern China’s other two feudatory rulers, Geng Jingzhong 耿精忠 of Fujian, who rebelled in April 1674 and surrendered in November 1676, and Shang Zhixin 尙之信 of Guangdong, who was in rebellion from March 1676 to January 1677. The suppression of the rebellion required the mobilization of nearly all of the Qing government’s resources, and for at least its first two years, it seemed likely that the forces of Wu and his allies would be able to topple the dynasty. Chinese and Manchu accounts suggest that the war wrought widespread devastation in the regions where fighting took place, and it almost certainly disrupted internal trading networks within China while the

21 division of the empire into warring blocs lasted. 2 However, few works in either Chinese or English have dealt primarily with this civil war, and those few that have, such as Tsao Kai-fu and Liu Fengyun’s studies, have focussed on its military and political aspects, with less attention to its economic impact beyond the finances of the Qing and feudatory governments. 3 Economic historians have occasionally mentioned the rebellion in the context of the ‘crisis of the seventeenth century’ and the ‘Kangxi depression,’ though usually only in passing. An unresolved and perhaps unresolvable debate continues over how fluctuations in the availability of silver affected the Chinese economy during the upheavals of the seventeenth century based on the piece-meal data that has been left to us. 4 But even within this debate, the war often gets only passing mention. Mio Kishimoto-Nakayama, for example, has argued that the Kangix depression (which she describes as lasting from 1656 to the 1680s) was a slump in prices caused by the falling circulation of silver, which in turn was caused by a combination of the Qing government’s coastal blockade against the Zheng family, and the government’s accumulation of silver reserves. She mentions the three feudatories war only as a period of brief reversal in the government’s attempts to amass silver.5 In a more recent article, Richard von Glahn notes a decline in the volume of silver exported from Japan by Chinese ships between 1672 and 1683, but disagrees with Kishimoto-Nakayama, arguing that this had little to do with the Qing attempt to block the Zheng family’s access to the coast, or apparently the civil war. According to him, it was instead the residual effect of a one-trading season ban on silver bullion exports from Nagasaki in 1668, and that it likely had little impact on China’s economy anyway.6 It seems strange to this author that an eight-year civil war that temporarily ripped China apart would warrant so little attention from these past scholars interested in explaining economic decline in China or falling volumes of overseas trade during the same period. I will argue that the impact of this war did inhibit China’s overseas trade, especially in its later years. Qing government documents written during the war hint at this when they describe how warships were stationed in river mouths and bays, but it is even more evident in the available statistics of Japanese imports and exports, and in the observations made by Chinese merchants sailing from China and Taiwan compiled in the Kai Hentai 華夷變態 by

2 For example, see the Manchu soldier and diarist Dzengšeo’s account of the brutal final battle for Yunnan’s capital. Dzengšeo, The Diary of a Manchu Soldier in Seventeenth-Century China “My Service in the army,” by Dzengšeo , trans. Nicola Di Cosmo (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 71 – 72. 3 Kai-fu Tsao, “The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories Against the Manchu Throne in China, 1673 – 1681: Its Setting and Significance” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1965); and Liu Fengyun 劉風雲 , Qing dai san fan yan jiu 清代三藩硏究 (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue, 1994). 4 See William S. Atwell, “Some Observations on the “Seventeenth-Century Crisis” in China and Japan,” The Journal of Asian Studies 45, no. 2 (February 1986): 223 – 244; Mio Kishimoto-Nakayama, “The Kangxi Depression and Early Qing Local Markets,” Modern China 10, no. 2 (April 1984): 227 – 256; Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, “Cycles of silver: Global economic unity through the mid-eighteenth century,” Journal of World History 13, no, 2 (Fall 2002): 391 – 427; and Richard von Glahn, “Cycles of Silver in Chinese monetary history,” in The Economy of Lower Yangzi Delta in Late Imperial China: Connecting Money, Markets, and Institutions , ed. Billy K. L. So (London: Routledge, 2013). 5 Kishimoto-Nakayama, “The Kangxi Depression”: 233. 6 Richard von Glahn, “Myth and Reality of China's Seventeenth-Century Monetary Crisis” Journal of Economic History 56, no. 2 (June 1996): 441 – 443. 22

Japanese officials in Nagasaki. 7 From these reports, what is clear is that obtaining silk and other goods from Jiangsu and Zhejiang became more difficult over the course of the three feudatories rebellion, as warships were sent to the mouth of the Yangzi river and the islands near Hangzhou Bay, and armies blocked the important overland routes smugglers had once used. One of the few historians to take the rebellion seriously as a factor affecting trade is Zhu Delan. In several important articles, Zhu uses the Kai Hentai to describe how the Zheng family and other Chinese merchants managed trade during the coastal removal period, which she defines as 1661 to 1683. This period includes both the period of maritime closure beginning in the early 1660s when the Qing government enforced the boundary removal order ( qian jie ling 遷界令 ), compelling China’s entire coastal population to move inland, and also the years of the rebellion and its aftermath in the 1670s and 1680s. Zhu’s meticulous studies describe how the Zheng family controlled its merchants, how they used bribery to gain access to the mainland, and the crucial places where they smuggled goods out to sea. The one disagreement with her analysis that this dissertation proposes is that she does not pay enough attention to how conditions changed for the Zheng family between the 1660s and 1680s.8 Zhu treats the war and the few years the Zheng regime survived afterwards as a continuation of the trouble that began with the implementation of the coastal removal policy in 1661. In contrast to Zhu’s conclusion, this chapter will argue that when the war began, it in fact caused a shift in the balance of the region’s maritime trade, forcing the Zheng family to change the way they managed their network. This shift is not immediately obvious in the statistics from the Nagasaki and Manila customs records on the numbers of Chinese merchant ships arriving annually or the value of their trade each year, but this chapter will argue that these indicators of the overall volume of the region’s trade remained relatively stable for two reasons. First, the fall in the value of the Zheng family’s business was partly compensated for by a rising number of competitors sailing primarily from Southeast Asia. Second, and more importantly, the Zheng family managed to maintain their trade with Japan and Luzon by turning towards Southeast Asia to replace the Chinese goods that they no longer had reliable access to. To some extent the resulting structural transformation can be seen in the fragmentary data on the types of goods traded in East Asia’s ports, but even stronger evidence can be found in many of the descriptive accounts left by the Zheng family’s enemies, allies, and its own men.

A Period of Relative Stability, 1664 – 1673 In 1664, the Zheng family was recovering from a series of setbacks that had undermined their position as the predominate military and mercantile power on the coast of China. In the summer of 1662, their patriarch, Zheng Chengggong, had died leaving the leadership of his organisation in turmoil. His son, Zheng Jing, managed to exert control

7 Hayashi Shunsai 林春齋 , Hayashi Hoko 林鳳岡 , and Ren'ichi Ura 浦廉一 , ed., Kai Hentai 華夷變態 , 3 vols. (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1958 – 1959). 8 Zhu Delan 朱德蘭 , “Qing chu qian jie ling shi Zhongguo chuan hai shang mao yi zhi yan jiu 清初遷界令時中國船海上貿易之研究 ,” in Zhongguo hai yang fa zhan shi lun wen ji 中國海洋發展史論文集, vol. 2 (Taibei: Zhong Yang Yan Jiu Yuan, 1986). 23 over the family’s territorial possessions in Xiamen, Jinmen, and southwest Taiwan, but the intra-family struggle did not end there. Jing eliminated the greatest potential rival to his rule in Xiamen, his father’s cousin Zheng Tai 鄭泰 , but Tai’s younger brother Zheng Mingjun 鄭鳴駿 managed to flee to Qing controlled territory with the part of the family’s fleet that had been stationed in Jinmen, and with its treasury. Mingjun surrendered to the civil and military officials in Fujian appointed by the Qing court in Beijing, and presented them with a readymade package of equipment, capital, and manpower to challenge Zheng Jing with, both in war and trade. 9 The Fujian officials did not lose much time putting this to use; in November 1663 they attacked Xiamen and Jinmen with their new fleet and the help of the Dutch VOC, which still held a grudge against the Zheng family for invading its colony in Taiwan in 1661. Zheng Jing’s forces were defeated and forced to retreat, leaving only the Penghu Islands and southwest Taiwan under his control. 10

These setbacks did not cripple the family’s business however. According to the lists of ships coming to Nagasaki each year from China and other parts of Asia compiled by Iwao Seiichi, from 1664 to 1673 more ships sailed from Taiwan (108) than any other place in East Asia. 11 The four places in mainland China that Iwao lists as sending ships during this period are Nanjing, meaning Jiangsu (12), Putuoshan (6), Fuzhou (15), and Guangdong, meaning Guangzhou and the Pearl River delta region (29). Of the port cities in Southeast Asia during the same period, the three most common places of departure for ships sailing to Nagasaki were the domains of the Nguyen lords in what is now central Vietnam (46), Batavia (31), and Siam (23). The sizes of the ships and values of cargoes varied, so this is not a perfect indicator of the Zheng family’s market share, but it does strongly suggest that they were the dominant commercial force in East Asia’s maritime trading world. And in fact, their dominance along the coast of China was likely even greater than these numbers indicate before 1673.

The conventional view is that the Zheng family’s greatest competitors were the merchants backed by the rulers of the Guangdong feudatory, the Shang family. Gu Pan, for example, has argued that the profits from maritime trade were a major part of the Shang family’s revenue, based on the relatively large number of ships identified in the Nagasaki records as ‘Guangdong ships’ and on a 1682 report by Li Shizhen 李士楨 , the governor of Guangdong, which states that the Shang family’s ‘goon’ (gun 棍) Shen Shangda 沈上達 had been in charge of a group of merchants that had been sending a thousand ships abroad since 1662 and were making 400 000 to 500 000 taels of silver a year. 12 Besides the improbable

9 John E. Wills, Jr., Pepper, Guns and Parleys: The Dutch East India Company and China 1622-1681 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 52. 10 Cheng Wei-chung, War, Trade and Piracy , p. 206; and Wills, Pepper , p. 71 – 74. 11 Iwao Seiichi 岩生成一 , “Kinsei Nisshi boeki ni kansuru suryo teki kosatsu 近世日支貿易に關すゐ数量的考察 ,” Shigaku Zasshi 史學雜誌 62, no. 11 (1953): 12 – 13. 12 Gu Pan 顧盼 , “Chu hai jin zheng ci yu Pingnan Wang cai zheng ji chu zhi guan xi 清初海禁政策與平南王財政基礎之關係 ,” in Qing shi lun ji 清史論集, vol. 2, ed. Chen Jiexian 陳捷先 , Cheng Chongde 成崇德 , and 24 size of Li’s figures, there are some reasons to doubt that the Shang family and their merchants were really this active in maritime trade, at least before the outbreak of the rebellion in late 1673. First, the origins of the ships recorded by Iwao from the Nagasaki records are not consistently reliable indicators of their political affiliation or even their home port. The systematic interviews recorded in the Kai Hentai only begin in 1674, but from them we can see that many of the ships labelled as ‘Guangdong’ were in fact affiliates of the Zheng family whose last port of call on a multi-stop journey had been Shizimen 十字門 (meaning Macau) or somewhere else in the Pearl River delta. 13 In addition to this, the recent and very detailed chronicle of the Zheng family’s fortunes by Cheng Wei-chung uses records from the VOC’s factory in Nagasaki to show that though Shang Kexi 尚可喜, the Shang patriarch before the rebellion, had tried to send two ships to Japan in 1661, these had been arrested by officials in Guangzhou apparently more loyal to Beijing than to him. From that time until the outbreak of the war, the Shang family sent no ships overseas themselves. Instead, the vessels sailing from Guangdong belonged to Su Li 蘇利 or his subordinate and successor Xu Long 許龍 , former Qing naval commanders who changed their allegiance to the Zheng family in late 1663.14

As for Jiangsu and Putuoshan, neither of these places was controlled by semi- independent feudatory governors like the ones in Fujian and Guangdong. The Jiangsu and Putuoshan ships in the Nagasaki records were therefore affiliated with the Fujian feudatory government, the Zheng family, or were independent operators. In the case of Putuoshan, an island filled with Buddhist monasteries off the coast of Zhejiang, the records from the Kai Hentai make it clear that this was a favoured rendezvous spot for Zheng ships throughout the rebellion,15 and a report written in 1670 by Ellis Crisp, the first English East India company servant to land in Taiwan, confirms that it had been before as well. 16 This leaves only the Fuzhou ships, and from the Dutch records Cheng uses it is clear that these ships were given approval by Geng Jimao 耿繼茂 (Geng Jingzhong’s father and predecessor), and therefore were real competitors of the Zheng family.17 But according to Iwao’s numbers, there were only fifteen ships that sailed from Fuzhou to Nagasaki between 1664 and 1673, compared to one hundred eight from Taiwan, so even if all of the Jiangsu and Putuoshan

Li Jixiang 李紀祥 (Beijing: Ren min chu ban she, 2006), pp. 670 – 671. For Li Shizhen’s original report, see Li Shizhen 李士楨 , Fu Yu zheng lue 撫粵政略 (Taibei: Wen hai chu ban she, 1988), pp. 813 – 814. 13 For example, see Ship #22 from Siam, September 16, 1683 in Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 403 – 405. On the importance of Shizimen, see Zhu, “Qing chu qian jie ling,” pp. 140 – 141. 14 Cheng Wei-chung, War, Trade and Piracy , p. 210 – 211. For some background on the Shang family’s interest in trade, and especially their relationship with Macau, see Ronnie Po-chia Hsia, “A Tale of Two Ports: Macau and Guangzhou in the Ming and Qing Dynasties,” in Port Cities and Intercultural Relations, 15 th – 18 th Centuries , ed. Luís Filipe Barreto and Wu Zhiliang (Lisbon: Centro Científico e Cultural de Macau, I. P., 2012), pp. 20 – 21. 15 For example, Ship #29 from Putuoshan, December 26, 1677 in Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 193 – 194. 16 Ellis Crisp at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, October 22, 1670, in The English Factory in Taiwan 1670 – 1685 , ed. Chang Hsiu-jung, Anthony Farrington, Huang Fu-san, Ts’ao Yung-ho, Wu Mi-tsa, Cheng Hsi-fu, and Ang Ka-in (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1995), p. 69. 17 Cheng, War, Trade and Piracy , p. 209. 25 ships were affiliated with Geng, which is highly unlikely, the Zheng family and their affiliates would still have dominated the Chinese-Japanese trade route.

Establishing how great the overall impact the coastal removal order was on the Zheng family and the Fuzhou merchants is harder. By the late-Ming period Chinese production of raw silk (sheng si 生絲 , unprocessed silk fibres reeled off the silkworms’ cocoons 18 ) was concentrated around the shores of Lake Tai 太湖 in Jiangsu and Zhejiang,19 and most of the raw cotton that Fujianese weavers turned into cloth and then sold for re- export originated in the Jiangnan region as well. 20 Even prior to the order in the 1650s while Zheng Chenggong was the family patriarch, gaining access to these regions in Jiangnan to obtain the raw silk and cotton they needed for trade with Japan and Luzon was not a straightforward matter. Aside from a brief period in 1659 when Chenggong launched an expedition up the Yangzi River in a failed bid to capture Nanjing, his family did not control any territory in Jiangnan. His merchants apparently used a complex smuggling network to bring the silk to the areas his forces controlled in southern Fujian. According to an investigation carried out by the Ministry of Punishment (Xingbu 刑部 ) in 1662, which cited an earlier memorial, there were two groups of firms known as the ‘Five Merchants’ (Wu Shang 五商 ) that operated two parallel silk smuggling routes between Suzhou and Hangzhou in Qing territory and Quanzhou in southern Fujian, then under Zheng control in the early 1650s.21 Yang Ying 楊英 , a Zheng family officer who kept a record of the family’s military and political fortunes during Zheng Chenggong’s rule, also mentions an inspection of the account books of ten merchant firms ( hang 行) in 1657, so the Zheng family’s smuggling ring seems to have been still operational then.22 After the family’s withdrawal to Taiwan in the 1660s, direct evidence for the continuation of their smuggling system is harder to find. The consensus among historians is that the Five Merchants or ten firms likely did survive in one form or another, and there is some evidence that supports this in the Qing government’s records, near contemporary histories of the family, and in the available statistics from Nagasaki’s silk trade.23

Some unofficial histories written after the fall of the Zheng regime describe an efficient smuggling system based out of a covertly re-established outpost in Xiamen after

18 Chor Yee Wong, “Proto-Industrialization and the Silk Industry of the Canton Delta, 1662 – 1934” (PhD. diss., University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1995), pp. 7 – 8. 19 Fan Jinmin 范金民 , Jiang nan si chou shi yan jiu 江南絲綢史研究 (Beijing: Nong ye chu ban she, 1993), p. 80. 20 Fan Jinmin 范金民 , "Qing dai zhong qi Shanghai cheng wei hang yun ye zhong xin zhi yuan yin tan tao 清代中期上海成爲航運業中心之原因探討 ," Anhui shi xue 安徽史學 (2016 (1)): 34 – 35. 21 Zheng shi shi liao san bian 鄭氏史料三編 (Taibei: Taiwan yin hang, 1963), pp. 3 – 4. 22 Yang Ying 楊英 , Xian wang shi lu 先王實錄 (Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin Chuban She, 1981), pp. 150 – 151. 23 Zhu Delan, “Qing chu qian jie,” p. 142; Nan Qi 南棲 , “Taiwan Zheng shi shang zhi yan jiu 臺灣鄭氏五商之研究 ,” Taiwan Yin hang ji kan 臺灣銀行季刊 16, no. 2 (June 1965): 263; and Lai Yongxiang 賴永祥 , “Taiwan Zheng shi yu Yingguo de tong shang guan xi shi 臺灣鄭氏與英國的通商關係史 ,” Taiwan wen xian 臺灣文獻 16, no. 2 (June 1965): 18. 26

1663. The most detailed of these is probably Jiang Risheng’s 江日升 . In the first decade of the eighteenth century, Jiang wrote the Taiwan Waiji 臺灣外記 , a sensationalised history of the Zheng family, and in it he claims that in 1666 Zheng Jing sent a general named Jiang Sheng 江勝 to re-occupy Xiamen, which had been cleared of people and structures, and then abandoned by the Qing military as part of the zone outside of the coastal removal boundary. Jiang Sheng established an orderly trading post on Xiamen, and the former coastal inhabitants began to secretly bring goods across the boundary to sell to the Zheng family’s men on the island. 24 This account is supported by a report sent to Beijing by Geng Jimao in 1671, which warned that pirate ships were sailing to and from Xiamen and the neighbouring islands of Jinmen and Tongshan, and that some of the pirates had begun squatting there and had even begun constructing fortifications.25

Corroborating evidence for a revived smuggling network based out of outposts on Xiamen and some neighbouring islands can also be found in the statistics compiled for the volumes and values of trade goods entering Nagasaki by Iwao Seiichi from Japanese customs documents and the VOC’s records. Of particular interest is the data he has collected on the volumes and types of raw silk that were imported by Chinese ships, frustratingly fragmentary though it is. The most esteemed type of silk on the Japanese market was the white variety primarily produced in Jiangsu and Zhejiang. In the latter half of the seventeenth century, the Dutch company and overseas Chinese merchants were selling other types of silk produced in Persia, Bengal, and northern Vietnam. But these varieties, though marketable in Japan, were generally considered by Japanese consumers to be of inferior quality compared to the Chinese varieties, and therefore carrying them would have been a less profitable use of cargo space if Chinese silk was available cheaply.26 Thanks to the data Iwao has collected, we know the quantities of white and non-white silk that were imported by the Japanese market for the decade before Zheng Jing’s retreat from Xiamen, the pre-war years 1664, 1665, and 1671, and for the years 1680, 1682, and 1683 during and after the war. From this data, we can see that non-white silk constituted over 40% of Chinese raw silk imports every year to 1658, except 1655. After that, it was never more than 6% for any year we have data for until 1680s when it was 67.35%. The implication is that the Zheng merchants and their competitors in Fuzhou and elsewhere actually had better access to white silk in the 1660s than they did in the 1650s, including the years 1664 and 1665 after the Zheng family had withdrawn their operations to Taiwan. Complete data is missing for all of the crucial period

24 Jiang Risheng 江日升 , Taiwan Waiji 臺灣外記 (Taibei: Taiwan da tong, 1987), p. 239. See also Zhou Kai 周凱, Xiamen Zhi 廈門志 , vol. 5 (Taibei: Taiwan Yin hang, 1961), p. 671; and Yu Yonghe 郁永河 , Pi hai jiyou 裨海紀遊 (Taipei: Taiwan yin hang, 1959), p. 48. 25 Qing chu Zheng Chenggong jia zu Man wen dang an yi bian: Shunzhi san nian zhi Kangxi er shi wu nian 清初鄭成功家族滿文檔案譯編 : 順治三年至康熙二十五年 (Beijing: Jiu zhou chu ban she, 2004), vol. 3, pp. 347 – 348. 26 For a discussion on how the types of silk were categorised, see Nara Shuichi, “Silk Trade Between Vietnam and Japan in the Seventeenth Century,” in Pho Hien The Centre of International Commerce in the XVII Th - XVIII Th Centuries (Hanoi: The Gio Publishers, 1994); and Robert LeRoy Innes, “The Door Ajar: Japan’s Foreign Trade in the Seventeenth Century” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 1980), p. 311. 27 of the three feudatories’ rebellion except for 1680, the year Zheng Jing retreated to Taiwan for the second time. For that year and 1682, non-white silk was 67.35 and 20.34% respectively. For 1683, non-white silk was 13.66%, though this year is anomalous because the Zheng statelet only survived until the October of that year, and the quantity of silk carried to Japan was miniscule compared to all past years.

This data is too fragmentary to allow definitive conclusions about the evolution of the structure of the Zheng family’s trade. But combined with the claims that commerce continued between the family’s maritime trading system and China through Xiamen, the persistence of raw white silk as the dominant import to Japan during the few years in the 1660s and 1670s we have data for until the outbreak of the rebellion suggests that though the coastal removal order may have inhibited the trade, the Zheng family’s smuggling system was still reliably exchanging silver for silk from China’s interior. The appearance of greater quantities of other types of silk in the 1680s implies that the reliability of the smuggling network had fallen by then. An examination of the testimony of Chinese sailors arriving in Nagasaki and the English East India company’s servants in Taiwan strongly suggests that the reason for this was the outbreak of the rebellion.

Table 1.1. Raw silk imported to Nagasaki on Chinese Ships in jin 斤斤斤 (1 jin = 1.25 lbs), 1654 – 1683 Year White Silk Non-White Silk Total Percentage of Non-White 1654 71900 57731 129631 44.53 1655 140137 37644 177781 21.17 1656 92770 95881 188651 50.82 1657 61818 50566 112384 44.99 1658 79530 56190 135720 41.40 1659 224718 5173 229891 2.25 1660 198780 2603 201383 1.29 1661 198924 12547 211471 5.93 1662 357990 1781 359771 0.50 1663 46623 991 47614 2.08 1664 112598 6610 119208 5.54 1665 162236 806 163042 0.49 1671 50000 0 50000 0.00 1674 NA NA 220000 NA 1676 NA NA 133282 NA 1680 50000 103116 153116 67.35 1682 58407 14916 73323 20.34 1683 9749 1542 11291 13.66 Adapted from Iwao Seiichi 岩生成一 , “Kinsei Nisshi boeki ni kansuru suryo teki kosatsu 近世日支貿易に關すゐ数量的考察 ,” Shigaku Zasshi 史學雜誌 62, no. 11 (1953): 28.

Mountain and Sea Routes In the report sent to Beijing in 1662 concerning the Zheng family’s Five Merchants smuggling ring, the governor of Fujian claimed that one of the two sets of Zheng Chenggong’s five merchant firms operated along ‘mountain routes,’ and that the other operated on ‘sea routes’ (shan hai liang lu 山海兩路).27 The report identifies Hangzhou in Zhejiang and Suzhou in Jiangsu as the two cities where the Five Merchants bought silk and other goods with the Zheng family’s silver, so the sea route would have been the coastal route that small boats travelled from Quanzhou or Xiamen north into Hangzhou Bay or the mouth of the Yangzi River. Which mountain routes the merchants would have carried their goods over is less certain, but because the border between Fujian and Zhejiang was hilly, difficult terrain, we can guess that if the merchants were transporting any significant volumes of silk southward, especially raw silk, they would have needed to take one of the roads that led through the few main mountain passes between the two provinces, probably the Fenshui Pass (Fenshui Guan 分水關 ) near the coast, or the Xianxia Pass (Xianxia Guan 仙霞關 ) whose road entered Fujian from Zhejiang’s southwest corner. 28 Xianxia seems to have been especially important; in 1666 a Fujian official reported to the Ministry of Troops (Bingbu 兵部) that woven silk was being moved into his province from that pass, presumably to be shipped out to sea. 29

Of these two types routes for importing and exporting goods, the coast was certainly the most important before the loss of Xiamen and probably afterwards as well. It seems many of the smuggling vessels carrying silk out of Jiangsu and Zhejiang began meeting the Zheng trade ships in Chongming 崇明 , an island at the mouth of the Yangzi River, and at Putuoshan 普陀山 , which was just to the east of the larger Zhoushan 舟山 island on the southwestern edge of Hangzhou Bay.30 In the 1660s, the Qing military’s ships and troops had been spread too thinly along the coast to effectively counter penetration by the swift moving Zheng fleets anywhere, but in the early 1670s, the court in Beijing, acting on recommendations from its officials, altered its strategy. 31 Because they had learned that ‘crafty villains’ (jiantu 奸徒 ) were sneaking into the islands around the Yangzi river’s mouth,

27 Zheng shi shi liao san bian , p. 3. 28 Li Wei 李衛 , Ji Zengyun 嵇曾筠 , and Shen Yiji 沈翼機 , ed., Zhejiang tong zhi 浙江通志 [1736], juan 37, 38. For a reprint of a late Ming-era merchant manual describing the route from Hangzhou into Fujian through the Xianxia Pass, see Huang Bian 黃汴 , Dan Yizi 憺漪子 , and Li Jinde 李晉德 , ed., Tian xia shui lu lu cheng 天下水陸路程 (Taiyuan: Shanxi ren min chu ban she, 1992), p. 376. 29 Qing chu Zheng Chenggong jia zu Man wen dang an , vol. 3, p. 247. 30 For an often cited reference to the importance of Putuoshan to the Zheng trading system from 1670 by a servant of the English East India Company, see Ellis Crisp at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, October 22, 1670, in Chang, The English Factory in Taiwan , p. 69. 31 For a few examples of this, see Zheng shi shi liao san bian , pp. 62 – 63, 66 – 67; and Cheng, War, Trade and Piracy , p. 231. 29 particularly Chongming, in 1671 the court ordered that patrols around the area be resumed and fortifications on Chongming be established and then reinforced.32

There is no evidence that this initial attempt to fortify Chongming was effective in blocking trading ships from slipping in and out of the river’s mouth, but after the outbreak of the civil war Qing attempts to take control of traffic through the Yangzi River became more serious and more effective. The new motivation was not to block the smuggling activities of crafty villains, but to protect Jiangsu from a possible amphibious assault on the river. However, this additional strengthening of the empire’s defences around the river mouth also did finally block the flow of smuggled goods through it. In 1674, Zheng Jing dispatched a fleet of warships to the coast of Zhejiang and the Yangzi River delta, prompting the Qing military to begin moving more ships and men to the region. 33 They sent thirty new coastal ‘sand ships’ (shachuan 沙船 ) to patrol around Chongming island and put an additional seventy at the mouth of the Huangpu River 黃埔江 to wait in reserve there.34 The value of these measures was soon apparent. Zheng Jing did not attempt an invasion from the river, and the Qing officials also began happily reporting the capture of smuggling vessels around Chongming. They even took one ocean going vessel returning from Japan that was allegedly blown to Chongming by a storm. 35

The reports of these successful captures imply that the military blockade around the Yangzi’s mouth during the rebellion did severely inhibit smuggling traffic on the river, and this is corroborated by the reports of merchants themselves in the interviews they gave to the Nagasaki customs officials. The sand ships guarding Chongming and the entrance to the Yangzi River were not so effective that they managed to block every ship that attempted to enter or leave the river, so we do have reports from ships that identified themselves as coming from ‘Nanjing’ (meaning Jiangsu) arriving in Japan. However, these ships’ crews almost always stressed the difficulty and danger they had running the blockade or sneaking past it. In 1675, the crew of the first Nanjing ship to leave an interview that year told the Japanese officials that during the coastal removal period those merchants from Jiangsu wishing to trade had met with the Zheng merchants in the delta region, but now it was very difficult to do this safely. The ship’s crew, apparently based in Jiangsu somewhere upriver from Chongming, had attempted to run the blockade in order to sail to Japan themselves, but had been sighted at the river mouth by Qing patrol boats, which had chased them for a day. 36 The increased vigilance of the Qing also cut into the volume of goods coming from Jiangsu, especially silk. One of the crews in 1677 told their interviewers that there was very little cargo that could be acquired without great difficulty in the province.37 Similarly, in

32 Zheng shi shi liao san bian , pp. 144 – 150. 33 Zheng shi shi liao san bian , pp. 156 – 157. 34 Kangxi yi tong Taiwan dang an shi liao xuan ji 康熙一統臺灣檔案史料選輯 (Fuzhou: Fujian ren min chu ban she, 1983), pp. 89 – 90; and Zheng shi shi liao san bian , pp. 158 – 159. 35 Zheng shi shi liao san bian , pp. 160 – 166. 36 Ship #20 from Nanjing, August 23, 1675, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 121. 37 Ship #1 from Nanjing, February 14, 1677, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 174. 30

1678 the crew of a ship from Putuoshan explained that they had attempted to acquire a cargo in Jiangsu, but the ‘Tartar’ (meaning Qing) ships that had been patrolling had chased them off before they could collect it. 38 Also in 1678, yet another crew from Jiangsu told the officials at Nagasaki that they had been attempting to get a load of goods as well as firewood and provisions at Chongming when they were surprised by a Qing patrol boat and forced to flee out to sea with only a very small cargo. 39 The Qing patrols do not seem to have been able to shut the door completely on this coastal route, but they did great damage to the business of the Zheng family and all other merchants who had a stake in the Jiangnan- Nagasaki silk trade.

The war also blocked the sea route from Zhejiang, where silk and other goods had previously been carried from the interior to Zhoushan or Putuoshan. In April 1674, Geng Jingzhong, the rebel ruler of Fujian, launched an invasion of Zhejiang, and by the end of the year had occupied the southern part of the province.40 In 1675, the crew of a ship arriving in Nagasaki from Fuzhou told their interviewers that Geng’s invasion had cut off the flow of silk from Zhejiang to Fujian, and silk had become scarce both in Fuzhou and in Quanzhou, the latter of which Zheng Jing had recently occupied. If Zhejiang could be fully controlled by Geng, the crew claimed, then silk would be able to flow freely, but because the war in the province continued to rage, few ships were sailing from there.41 The crew of another ship from Nanjing that arrived in Nagasaki in early 1676 reported that they had stopped at Putuoshan the previous summer, and had found that there were goods from the interior of Zhejiang secretly being brought to the island. 42 But a ship from Putuoshan in the spring of 1676 told the Nagasaki officials that because most of Zhejiang was by then back in Qing hands, very few goods from the interior were available. 43

Whatever small smuggling operation survived in Zhejiang suffered another blow in 1677. Probably in 1674 or 1675, the Zheng family’s men had occupied a number of small islands around Zhoushan and Putuoshan with the intention of facilitating smuggling. For a very short period of time, this move may have helped them access Zhejiangese silk and other goods, but its utility did not survive Geng Jingzhong’s rebellion. After two and a half years of valiantly struggling against the Qing empire’s forces, Geng surrendered in late 1676. Thereafter, mainland Zhejiang and most of Fujian were back under Qing control, and the Zheng family’s recently acquired toeholds in China were the empire’s new target. The Qing military assaulted the Zheng outposts on the islands around Zhoushan and Putuoshan in March and April of 1677, and easily destroyed them.44

38 Ship #2 from Putuoshan, April 11, 1678, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 196. 39 Ship #3 from Nanjing, May 29, 1678, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 198. 40 Kai-fu Tsao, “The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories Against the Manchu Throne in China, 1673 – 1681: Its Setting and Significance” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1965), p. 109. 41 Ship #1 from Fuzhou, April 24, 1675, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 106. 42 Ship #29 from Nanjing, February 5, 1676, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 140. 43 Ship #3 from Putuoshan, April 26, 1676, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 147. 44 Qing chu Zheng Chenggong jia zu Man wen dang an , vol. 3, pp. 355 – 367. 31

The war also disrupted the production and transport of goods within the interior of Zhejiang province. By 1679, the year before Zheng Jing was forced to retreat from the mainland for the last time, there were almost no goods making it to Putuoshan. According to a morose crew from that island, the interior of Zhejiang province was infested with bandits who were peeling most of the goods away from the merchants, and the small amount of goods that the merchants did manage to carry to the coast was then typically seized by independent pirates before the Zheng family’s agents to acquire them. So instead of saleable merchandise, most of their ship’s load was passengers who were probably refugees fleeing the disorder in Zhejiang.45 The implication of this testimony was that the smuggling system through Putuoshan had broken down, but this was not solely because the Qing armies had retaken Zhejiang. The other factor was that the disorder the war had brought, which carried with it a proliferation of bandits and pirates. Qing garrisons, which had formerly been scattered thinly along the coast, also began to concentrate themselves at strategic points, such as Hangzhou Bay. These garrisons had once helped to maintain order, keeping potential bandits and pirates in check, but they were now amassed to counter the Zheng family’s manoeuvres on the coast leaving large swathes of territory with little or no oversight. This combination of factors not only made the major smuggling routes unusable, it also caused the social and economic order of the countryside to deteriorate.

What about the mountain roads through the Xianxia Pass or elsewhere that connected Fujian to the silk producing regions to the north? Kai-fu Tsao has argued that Zheng Jing’s reoccupation of Xiamen and the surrounding area in southern Fujian in 1674 and 1675 made little sense militarily if their objective was to aid in the overthrow of the Qing dynasty. Tsao suggests that Zheng was not confident in the strength of his army as a conquering force and so only hoped to stake out a defensible territorial foothold while the larger powers on China’s mainland fought each other to exhaustion. 46 Aswell, if Jiang Sheng had already managed to establish an effective smuggling outpost on Xiamen in the 1660s, then perhaps Zheng thought a more thorough reoccupation of southern Fujian further inland would facilitate an even greater flow of goods being carried through north-western Fujian whether or not the rebel armies of Geng or Wu managed to wrest Jiangsu and Zhejiang from the Qing.

If this was the case though, he must have been sorely disappointed. The servants of the English East India company’s factory in Taiwan, who had initially been hopeful that Zheng Jing would be able to conquer a large chunk of the mainland that would then be open to the English company,47 wrote gloomily in late 1675 that trade between Xiamen and inland

45 Ship #1 from Putuoshan, April 3, 1679, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 283 – 284. Where these passengers were ultimately attempting to get to is not explained in the crew’s interview. The Tokugawa’s officials in Nagasaki allowed few new Chinese immigrants to permanently settle there, so it is likely that most of them re- embarked for Taiwan or perhaps Southeast Asia when the monsoon changed. 46 Kai-fu Tsao, “The Rebellion,” p. 106. 47 Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to the East India Company in London, December 4, 1674, in Chang, The English Factory in Taiwan , p. 192. 32

Fujian had all but ceased. 48 The crews of merchant ships arriving in Nagasaki in 1675 and 1676 from both Zheng Jing’s new clutch of mainland cities and from Geng’s capital of Fuzhou confirmed that this was the case. The war in Zhejiang had blocked the main roads between the provinces as troops were now marching where merchants’ carts had once rolled, and only along smaller mountain paths could trifling amounts of silk and other goods still be brought into Fujian. 49 In 1677, the situation had not improved, as the English company’s servants reported from their newly founded factory on Xiamen. They explained that only small quantities of silk and other fine goods were trickling to the port because the “inlands are so narrowly watched” that no large quantities could be carried there.50 By this time Geng had surrendered, and the Qing armies were closing in on Zheng Jing’s small domain in southern Fujian and western Guangdong, so it is little wonder that the mountain roads that Zheng Chenggong’s smuggling firms had once used were now almost worthless to the Zheng family’s trade network.

The South Seas Connection The Zheng family’s trade network did not collapse however. Ships from Taiwan and Xiamen kept sailing to both Nagasaki and Manila, and the family managed to continue acquiring copper and silver for the duration of the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories and for a few years after. Maintaining this flow of metal to Taiwan and Xiamen was critical to pay soldiers and equip them for Zheng Jing’s military operations on the mainland, and in the case of copper, to cast bronze guns for the war. To do this, the Zheng merchants needed to continue to carry marketable goods to Japan and Luzon, and without reliable access to the white raw or woven silks from Zhejiang and Jiangsu, a new source needed to be found. Fortunately, there was a fourth spoke of the Zheng family network, which brought goods to their hubs in Taiwan and Xiamen that could compensate for their atrophying trade in China. This was the collection of trade routes to various places in Southeast Asia that had always been secondary to the Japan and Luzon routes in the first half of the seventeenth century, but were still useful contributors of tropical goods for the Zheng merchants’ cargoes, such as pepper, agarwood, medicine, gems, ivory, and bird nests among other things.51

One of the classic studies of this dimension of the Zheng family’s trade was written by Zheng Ruiming in 1986. Zheng describes the Zheng Jing’s trading system as a complicated and interdependent circuit that relied on inputs from China, Taiwan, Japan, and

48 John Dacres, Edward Barwell, and Samuel Griffith at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, December 22, 1675, in Chang, The English Factory in Taiwan , p. 216. 49 See Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, pp. 134, 144, and 159. 50 Edward Barwell and Council at Amoy to the President and Council at Surat, November 2, 1677, in Chang, The English Factory in Taiwan , pp. 287 – 288. 51 For an overview of some of Southeast Asia’s most important mercantile port cities, see John E. Wills, Jr., “China’s Farther Shores: Continuities and Changes in the Destination Ports of China’s Maritime Trade, 1680 – 1690,” in Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, c. 1400 – 1750 , ed. Roderich Ptak and Dietmar Rothermund (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991). 33

Southeast Asia. This, he argues, is evident in the sailing patterns of the family’s ships. Some sailed back and forth between Taiwan or Xiamen and Southeast Asia, but others circulated in a triangular pattern from Taiwan or Xiamen to Southeast Asia, then to Japan, and finally back to the Zheng family’s bases, or in some cases the reverse, sailing from Taiwan or Xiamen to Japan, and from there to Southeast Asia.52 Zheng Ruiming cites several reports in the Kai Hentai as evidence of these patterns. But Zheng, like Zhu Delan, does not make a strong distinction between the types of difficulties the trading system faced in the 1660s before the rebellion and the 1670s during it. He uses evidence from the Kai Hentai to describe the period from 1664 to 1683 as an undifferentiated whole. However, the Kai Hentai only begins its detailed reports in 1674, so Zheng has no examples from before the outbreak of the war.

My contention here is that Zheng’s claim that Southeast Asia was an integral part of the Zheng family’s trading system is much truer of the 1670s than the 1660s. Though direct evidence, such as detailed descriptions of the routes the Zheng ships sailed, is lacking for any time before 1674, there are several pieces of circumstantial evidence that strongly suggest before the outbreak of the rebellion Southeast Asia was a minor part of the trading system. To begin, the nature of the Zheng family’s three big markets in the 1660s made it unlikely that the importation of large volumes of Southeast Asian goods would be advantageous. China had historically provided Southeast Asian artisans and farmers with a huge market for surplus goods. 53 Even in the darkest years of the coastal removal order and the rebellion, there were undoubtedly quantities of Southeast Asian products trickling into the commercial centres of the mainland. But these were likely much smaller than they had been a few decades earlier. One reason was the sharp fall in the Chinese population caused by famines and the Qing war of conquest, and the accompanying contraction of the economy during the Kangxi depression. 54 There were simply less people with less money available to buy tropical luxury goods than there had been in the late-Ming period.

The second reason to suspect that China-Southeast Asian trade was minimal before 1674 was that the coastal removal policy would have increased the difficulty of moving quantities of goods into China without detection. In the few instances where the Qing military captured smugglers or became aware of their activities, there is no mention of any

52 Zheng Ruiming 鄭瑞明, “Taiwan Ming-Zheng yu dong nan ya zhi mao yi guan xi chu tan: Fa zhan dong nan ya mao yi zhi dong ji, shi wu ji wai shang zhi qian lai 臺灣明鄭與東南亞之貿易關係初探 : 發展東南亞貿易之動機、實務及外商之前來,” Taiwan shi fan da xue li shi xue bao 臺灣師範大學歷史學報 14 (1986): 71, 81. 53 There are many surveys of Chinese-Southeast Asian trade before the rise of the Zheng family. For a particularly good one, see Roderich Ptak, “Ming Maritime Trade to Southeast Asia, 1368 – 1567: Visions of a System,” in China, the Portuguese, and the Nanyang , ed. Roderich Ptak (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003). 54 See Mio Kishimoto-Nakayama, “The Kangxi Depression”; Richard von Glahn, “Cycles of Silver,” especially pp. 39 – 40; Ramon H. Myers and Yeh-chien Wang, “Economic Developments, 1644 - 1800,” in The Cambridge History of China, Volume 9, Part One: The Ch’ing Empire to 1800 , ed. Willard J. Peterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 565 – 566; and Robert B. Marks, Tigers, Rice, Silk, and Silt: Environment and Economy in Late Imperial South China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), ch. 4. 34 types of goods being brought into China other than silver, 55 and Yang Ying describes Zheng Chenggong’s ten merchant firms in the late 1650s receiving only silver for reinvestment in the mainland.56 Another hint that Southeast Asian goods were not of much use in China can be found in Ellis Crisp’s 1670 report, in which he mentions that 3000 peculs (about 181 metric tonnes) of black pepper remained from the cache the Dutch left when Zheng Chenggong captured Taiwan in 1662, along with smaller quantities of lead, mercury, myrrh, and amber.57 Cheng Wei-chung views this as a relatively small amount compared to the quantities of pepper that the family bought in the 1650s, and takes it as evidence that the Zheng merchants were not maintaining an adequate supply for their market.58 In this author’s view, if they had not managed to sell the pepper in eight years, it is evidence they actually did not have much of a market for pepper at all. And it is not hard to appreciate why the Zheng family’s merchant-smuggler contacts would have preferred silver to pepper or other tropical goods when those goods would have needed to be moved across the Qing government’s coastal evacuation zone. Silver had a much higher value to mass ratio than most other goods, making it easier to conceal and more worthwhile to smuggle. For the mainland smugglers, travelling with quantities of silver would also have been far less conspicuous than cart-loads of pepper or elephant tusks even if there were markets for these goods.

Neither Japan nor Luzon provided a strong alternative market for Southeast Asian goods either. Data for the imports of goods to Nagasaki are much more complete for the VOC’s vessels than for Chinese ships, and so they can give us some sense of the relative demands for different types of foreign goods in the Japanese market. The Dutch company’s most important import to Japan was clearly silk, woven and raw, though the silk that it carried in the latter half of the seventeenth century was mostly the less valuable varieties from northern Vietnam and Bengal.59 The company also imported various types of Southeast Asian goods, such as pepper, tin, and sandal wood, but these were always of secondary importance.60 This was despite the fact that the company had control of many major ports in the Indonesian archipelago, and had permanent factories in several other regions, including Siam, Cambodia, and northern Vietnam, meaning that it had consistent

55 Kangxi yi tong Taiwan dang an shi liao xuan ji 康熙一統臺灣檔案史料選輯 (Fuzhou: Fujian ren min chu ban she, 1983), p. 7; Qing chu Zheng Chenggong jia zu Man wen dang an yi bian: Shunzhi san nian zhi Kangxi er shi wu nian 清初鄭成功家族滿文檔案譯編 : 順治三年至康熙二十五年 (Beijing: Jiu zhou chu ban she, 2004), vol. 3, p. 244; and Zheng shi shi liao san bian , pp. 161 – 166. 56 Yang Ying 楊英 , Xian wang shi lu 先王實錄 (Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin Chuban She, 1981), pp. 150 – 151. 57 Ellis Crisp at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, October 22, 1670, in Chang, The English Factory in Taiwan , p. 66. 58 Cheng Chung-wei, War, Trade and Piracy, p. 232. 59 C. R. Boxer, “Jan Compagnie in Japan 1672 – 1674, or Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in Japan and Formosa,” in Dutch Merchants and Mariners in Asia, 1602 – 1795 (London: Variorum Reprints, 1988), ch. 4, p. 151; and Innes, “The Door Ajar,” p. 476. 60 For a list of all the goods imported on Dutch ships to Japan from 1672 to 1674, see C. R. Boxer, “Jan Compagnie in Japan 1672 – 1674, or Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in Japan and Formosa,” in Dutch Merchants and Mariners in Asia, 1602 – 1795 (London: Variorum Reprints, 1988), ch. 4, p. 184 – 195. 35 access to large quantities of tropical Southeast Asian goods. That silk maintained the dominant place among the company’s imports when its access to pepper and most other Southeast Asian goods was the best in the world suggests that the most profitable import good in the Japanese market was indeed silk. The Zheng family’s access to Southeast Asian goods was weaker than the Dutch company’s partly because of Dutch naval dominance in southern Southeast Asia and the smouldering war between the two groups that had been going on since the Zheng family’s invasion of Taiwan in 1661.61 The implication is that silk would have been the Zheng family’s most important import to Japan as well, and that Southeast Asian goods played almost no part in their import cargoes before the 1670s.62 After all, the 3000 piculs of pepper and other goods that lay mouldering in the old Dutch warehouse in Taiwan could have been loaded on to a ship and sent to Japan in any of the eight years between 1662 and 1670, but they were apparently not worth the cargo space.

Luzon of course was geographically within Southeast Asia, and many of the typical tropical goods from elsewhere in the region were also available there. 63 Fang Zhenzhen, in what is now probably the definitive work on Luzon’s trading links in the mid seventeenth century, shows that there were merchant ships regularly sailing between Luzon, other islands in the Philippines, Siam, the Malay peninsula, Borneo, Java, and even the Coromandel Coast. 64 So the merchants in Manila already had good access to tropical goods from across Southeast Asia without any help from the Zheng merchants. The Zheng in fact likely re- exported some small quantities of tropical goods from Manila to supplement their China or Japan bound cargoes, but the export from Luzon that was consistently most important was the American silver brought each year by the Manila galleons.65

Therefore, except for Luzon and its silver, Southeast Asia played a very small role in the Zheng family’s trading system before the 1670s, but the final argument in this chapter is that this changed as a direct result of the collapse of the smuggling networks that had fed the Zheng family’s trading system with white silk and other Chinese goods. From 1674 onwards, access to the Chinese market became increasingly unreliable, and this meant the Zheng family needed to look elsewhere for a supply of goods to trade in Nagasaki and Manila. Both markets demanded textiles; Japan craved raw silk and silk cloth, while Luzon’s market

61 See Cheng Wei-chung, War, Trade and Piracy , ch. 13. 62 Zhu Delan 朱德蘭, “Qing Kangxi nian jian Taiwan chang qi mao yi yu guo nei shang pin liu tong guan xi 清康熙年間台灣長崎貿易與國內商品流通關係,” Dong hai xue bao 東海學報 39 (1988): 129 – 148; Zhu Delan 朱德蘭 , “Qing chu qian”: 145 – 151; Innes, “The Door Ajar,” pp. 474 – 475; and Xing Hang, Conflict and Commerce , pp. 278 – 279. 63 The Spanish colonial official Antonio de Morga who served in the Philippines in the early seventeenth century wrote that the Philippines produced “gold, cotton cloth, cloth for padding, cakes of white and yellow wax.” He also notes that it was frequented by ships from Borneo, Siam, and Cambodia, which brought their region’s local products. Antonio de Morga, Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas , trans. and ed. by J. S. Cummins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 309. 64 Fang Zhenzhen 方真真 , Hua ren yu Lusong mao yi (1657 – 1687): Shi liao fen xi yu yi zhu 華人與呂宋貿易 (1657-1687): 史料分析與譯註 (Xinzhu: Qing da chu ban she, 2012), pp. 177 – 179. 65 Fang, Hua ren yu Lusong , pp. 86 – 87. 36 wanted cotton and silk cloth, and raw silk above all other goods. The Zheng family and their merchants were resourceful, and though their overall trading system did contract (based on the numbers of ships sailing to Nagasaki and Manila, and the overall value of their exports from Japan 66 ), they managed to find substitutes from the previously minor Southeast Asian branch of their network to sustain their trading system.

The English East India company’s records are of the utmost importance for demonstrating this structural shift in the network. Because the statistical data for silk imports to Japan becomes fragmentary in the 1670s, and the interviews from the Kai Hentai only begin in 1674, the English company’s servants residing at the hearts of the Zheng family’s network provide invaluable insight. Zhu Delan, Zheng Ruiming, and many other historians have cited the company’s records from Taiwan and Xiamen, but in most cases their use has been limited to the observations made by the company’s servants on the Zheng family’s operations. Almost no reference has been made to the company’s own strategy and its own operation within the trading system. 67 This is understandable because the English company made a relatively small contribution to the overall system, but the variance in its levels of success in the venture are indicative of the overall fluctuations in the Zheng system.

From 1670, when Ellis Crisp and the first English ships arrived in Taiwan’s harbour until 1674, the English company had very little luck selling any of its good to the Zheng merchants. The initial strategy, formulated by the directors in London, was that Taiwan would act as a way station between Banten and Nagasaki where English ships could purchase sugar and deer skins to supplement the ships’ cargo of woollen cloth intended for the Japanese market. This plan was of course a failure both because the Zheng were already exporting all their skins and sugar to Japan, and because the Japanese authorities refused to allow the English to trade. However, Henry Dacres, the company’s imaginative agent in Banten, saw another possibility for a trading relationship with the Zheng family; the company would establish a permanent factory on Taiwan and stock it with tropical goods and Indian and European cloth. These could then be traded to the Zheng merchants for Chinese silk, gold, silver, and copper, which the company would ship back to India or Europe. 68 Consequently two ships were sent to Taiwan with cargoes in 1670, and three more in 1672. Both reported that only very small quantities of their cloth and other goods would sell, and those at unreasonably low prices. Crisp, the leader of the first expedition,

66 Iwao, “Kinsei Nisshi boeki”: 12 – 13; and Innes, “The Door Ajar,” pp. 410, 416. 67 The two exceptions to this are the articles by D. K. Bassett and Derek Massarella. Both do admirable jobs of summarising the East India company’s adventure in Taiwan, but neither are particularly interested in what the Zheng-English relationship meant for the region’s larger trading network. D. K. Bassett, “The Trade of the English East India Company in the Far East 1623-1684: Part II: 1665-84,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland , no. 3/4 (October 1960): 145 – 157; and Derek Massarella, “Chinese, Tartars and “Thea” or a Tale of Two Companies: The English East India Company and Taiwan in the Late Seventeenth Century,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society , 3rd ser., 3, no. 3 (November 1993): 393 – 426. 68 Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to George Foxcroft and Council at Madras, April 7, 1670, in Chang, The English Factory in Taiwan , pp. 50 – 51; and Instructions from Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to David Stephens, Samuel Baron, Simon Delboe, and other factors for their settlement at Taiwan, June 9, 1672, in Chang, The English Factory in Taiwan , pp. 127 – 128. 37 wrote that, “Dayly the China junkes brings in great quantities [of cloth] & sell much cheaper then wee can.”69 Simon Delboe, the leader of the 1672 expedition, also reported that lower than expected prices were offered for all the goods they had brought and very few sales were made even at these unprofitable prices. 70

In the remaining years of the company’s relationship with the Zheng family, 1674 to 1683, its servants never ceased to grumble about poor market conditions, but looking past these complaints, it is clear that beginning in 1675 when the next East India company ship arrived, the situation improved markedly.71 The English company had no good access to silk, so it could make little contribution to the Japanese branch of the Zheng family’s trade, but it did have cotton cloth from South Asia. Luzon, as Fang Zhenzhen has shown, imported more cotton cloth from Chinese traders than any other good almost every year in the 1657 to 1687 period she has studied. 72 As the war brought trade with the mainland to a standstill, the Zheng merchants needed to find new supplies of cotton as well as silk, and the English company’s supply suddenly became useful for lading the Manila-bound ships. According to the company’s servants in Taiwan in 1675, the scarcity of Chinese goods finally prompted the Zheng merchants to begin buying up the company’s large supply of chintz for the two ships bound for Manila that year. 73 Another example can be found in 1678, when the Xiamen factory (established in 1677 to work in parallel with the Taiwan factory) asked their colleagues across the strait to rush two bales of scarlet cloth to Xiamen to be loaded onto the Zheng ships bound for Manila that year. The price the company received for the cloth is not recorded, but we can surmise it was higher than usual because the letter states that the Zheng merchants had failed to buy cloth in Guangdong and no Southeast Asian ships had yet arrived that year. 74

As this latter communication between the company’s two factories suggests, the English trade ships arriving from Banten were only one part of the Zheng family’s newly invigorated relationship with Southeast Asia. The English company’s factory in Siam reported in 1679 that calico cloth from Surat and the Coromandel Coast was available in the Siamese market, as was raw and wrought silk apparently imported from Guangdong, and both of these goods were being bought by Zheng merchants. 75 The VOC may have

69 Ellis Crisp at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, October 22, 1670, in Chang, The English Factory in Taiwan , pp. 64 – 65; and 70 Simon Delboe and Council at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, February 12, 1673, in Chang, The English Factory in Taiwan , pp. 170 – 171. 71 Consultations by Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, May 18, 1675, in Chang, The English Factory in Taiwan , pp. 195 – 196. 72 Fang, Hua ren yu Lusong , pp. 105 – 108. 73 John Dacres, Edward Barwell, and Samuel Griffith at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, December 22, 1675, in Chang, The English Factory in Taiwan , p. 218. 74 Edward Barwell and John Chappell at Amoy to Charles Sweeting and Thomas Angeir at Taiwan, May 28, 1678, in Chang, The English Factory in Taiwan , p. 331. 75 George White at Ayutthaya to Robert Parker and Council at Bantam, November 15, 1679, in The English Factory in Siam 1612 – 1685, ed. Anthony Farrington and Dhiravat na Pombejra (London: The British Library, 2007), vol. 1, pp. 511 – 512. 38 inadvertently contributed some textiles as well despite the Dutch-Zheng hostilities. In the 1670s, the Dutch company was in the market for Japanese copper, which it acquired not only in Japan, but also from Chinese intermediaries who re-exported it to various ports in Southeast Asia including Batavia and Banten. The Zheng merchants themselves could not safely sail to Batavia or anywhere else the Dutch company controlled, but the Batavian and Banten overseas Chinese merchants are known to have sailed to Taiwan and Macau, and traded with the Zheng family. 76 The Dutch company’s agents also bought Japanese copper in ports where both they and the Zheng merchants were active, such as Siam, so it is likely some cloth and other goods passed through intermediaries between the two enemy groups. 77

Finally, almost certainly the most significant Southeast Asian contributor to the Zheng family’s attempt to shore up its flagging trade system during the three feudatories’ rebellion was northern Vietnam. Other than China, northern Vietnam was the only East Asian producer of exportable silk in the seventeenth century, and thus likely the supplier of much of the Zheng merchants’ cargoes to Nagasaki from the mid-1670s until about 1680. 78 Once again, the amount of silk exported from northern Vietnam in the 1670s defies quantification, but the English East India company’s records suggest that it was large and expanded in that decade to meet the needs of not only the English, who were buying for Europe, but the Dutch, Zheng family, and private Chinese traders based out of Vietnam as well.79 According to the crew of a Chinese ship sailing from northern Vietnam to Nagasaki in 1678, a large amount of silk, the majority in fact according to them, was also being shipped overland by Wu Sangui’s merchants to Yunnan because they, like everyone else in the region, had been cut off from Jiangsu and Zhejiang. 80 The crew also stated that Vietnamese silk had become extremely expensive for the past two years. This is supported by Dutch reports from Nagasaki that same year, which claimed that the sale of Vietnamese raw silk was only making a sixteen percent profit. 81

The low profitability of silk and other goods in Nagasaki was probably also acerbated by a new price-setting system instituted by the Japanese authorities in 1671, in which goods

76 Simon Delboe and Council at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, February 12, 1673, in Chang, The English Factory in Taiwan , p. 171; and Leonard Blussé, Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women, and the Dutch in VOC Batavia (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1988), p. 119. 77 Suzuki Yasuko, Japan-Netherlands Trade, 1600-1800: The Dutch East India Company and beyond (Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 2012), pp. 83 – 84. 78 Nara Shuichi, “Silk Trade,” pp. 165 – 166. During the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories, the Trinh regime in northern Vietnam were nominal supporters of the Qing dynasty against Wu Sangui, but this does not seem to have compelled them to do anything to inhibi the trade of Zheng ships at Pho Hien. Kathlene Baldanza, Ming China and Vietnam: Negotiating Borders in Early Modern Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 208. 79 Anthony Farrington, “English East India Company Documents Relating Pho Hien and Tonkin,” in Pho Hien The Centre of International Commerce in the XVII Th - XVIII Th Centuries (Hanoi: The Gio Publishers, 1994), pp. 157 – 158. On some of the most important Chinese traders based in Pho Hien, see Iioka Naoko, “Wei Zhiyan and the Subversion of the Sakoku ,” in Offshore Asia: Maritime Interactions in Eastern Asia Before Steamships , ed. Fujita Kayoko, Momoki Shiro, and Anthony Reid (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013). 80 Ship #13 from Dong Kinh, August 14, 1678, in Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, 208 – 209. 81 Hoang Anh Tuan, Silk for Silver Dutch-Vietnamese Relations, 1637 – 1700 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), p. 117. 39 were given official prices and then bought in bulk by groups of government-appointed Japanese merchants. 82 However, as Robert Innes suggests, the Zheng strategy may have been to increase the volume of silk transported to Japan in order to maintain their profits. The tentative data we have on the volumes of raw silk (of all types) supports this. In the three years we have data for before the rebellion and after the loss of Xiamen (1664, 1665, and 1671), the average volume of raw silk imported to Nagasaki by Chinese merchants was 62 794 kg. For the three years there is data for during the rebellion (1674, 1676, and 1680), the average volume was 102 840 kg (see Table 1.1). Taken together, the implication of these scattered figures is that the Zheng family’s profits were declining, but they were maintaining the system by exporting larger volumes of silk, especially raw silk, from Vietnam to maintain the Japan branch of their trade during the course of the rebellion.

The Final Years of the Zheng Trading System, 1680 – 1683 In March 1680, Zheng Jing and the remainder of his tattered forces fled Xiamen for Taiwan. In March of the following year, he died leaving his statelet to a bitter succession struggle that was eventually won by a faction who setup his teenaged son Zheng Keshaung 鄭克塽 as a figurehead ruler. On the mainland, in November 1681 the Qing armies finally pushed through the last of Yunnan’s defences and captured the capital of that last rebel province, bringing the civil war to an end. This allowed the Qing military to focus its attention on ridding itself of the Zheng family’s holdings in Taiwan, which had been a stubborn irritant for decades. In 1683, using newly constructed ships and Zheng defectors, the Qing military managed to mount an effective naval campaign. In July, it defeated the Zheng’s reduced navy offshore of the Penghu Islands in a bloody battle, and then sent envoys to Taiwan to negotiate a full surrender. The Zheng family capitulated, and in October of that year their state and the trading system that had maintained it came to an end.

During the last few years the family’s rule survived on Taiwan after the rebellion, their trading operations contracted further as ships and crews surrendered to the Qing or deserted the family and sailed to Southeast Asia to join existing Chinese colonies or form new ones there. 83 But the Zhengs’ network did not collapse, and the Southeast Asian branch continued to play its enhanced role. Siam seems to have become a particularly important destination for Zheng ships in these final years. In 1680, of seven ships that disembarked from Siam for Nagasaki, four were originally from Taiwan, 84 and in 1683 five of the nine ships that sailed for Nagasaki from Siam were also originally from Taiwan. 85 The English

82 Innes, “The Door Ajar,” pp. 306 – 307. 83 For an account of some of these deserters who fled to the areas that are now southern Vietnam, see Yumio Sakurai, “Eighteenth-Century Chinese Pioneers on the Water Frontier of Indochina,” in Water Frontier: Commerce and the Chinese in the Lower Mekong Region, 1750 – 1880 , ed. Nola Cooke and Li Tana (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004). 84 Ship #14 from Siam, August 7, 1680, in Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 307 – 308. 85 Ship #24 from Siam, September 22, 1683, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 406. 40

East India company’s records indicate that its trade in Taiwan may have become more important to the Zheng merchants as well. According to the company’s reports, the merchants in Taiwan were willing to trade for larger quantities of the company’s cloth than in past years, and as a consequence the last two English ships that sailed from Taiwan in the 1680s took more valuable export cargoes, mostly in Japanese copper, than the English company had ever managed to gather before. 86

Strangely, Fang Zhenzhen’s research on the Manila customs records indicates that no ships from Taiwan arrived in Luzon after the fall of Xiamen in 1680, so it is not clear what the Zheng family did with the cloth they acquired from the English company. Of the eight ships that she identifies sailing from China to Luzon between 1681 and 1683, seven were from either Guangzhou or Macau, and one’s point of departure was identified only as China.87 This suggests the possibility that the Zheng merchants were carrying the company’s cloth (and likely cloth from Siam and elsewhere as well) on indirect voyages to Luzon via the Pearl River delta, or trading it to other merchants in the delta region, who then carried it to Manila themselves.

Either of these scenarios or a combination of the two is possible. The Pearl River delta in the area near Macau seems to have become a new hub in the region’s trade in the early 1680s; both the English company’s records and the interviews contained in the Kai Hentai testify to this. The East India company ships sent to the Pearl Delta region in 1682 reported that they found there a fleet of Zheng merchant ships, Dutch ships (either belonging to the VOC or Batavian burgers), Chinese-Batavian ships, ships from the southern Vietnamese Nguyen domain, and ships from Siam all riding at anchor near each other. 88 The reason for this sudden interest in Guangdong seems to have been the province’s development of its sericulture industry to the point where it could contribute to the Japan trade, as the crews of Zheng ships sailing from the Pearl River delta to Nagasaki began reporting that they had been able to purchase silk there. 89

The emergence of the Pearl River delta as a new centre for the silk trade was likely aided by the residual effects of the rebellion, and by ecological disasters in the domains of the Trinh lords in northern Vietnam that curtailed silk production. In 1682, a Pho Hien- based Chinese crew reported that there had been no silk available in northern Vietnam in the

86 John Chappell and Council at Taiwan to Edward Barwell and Council at Bantam, December 22, 1681, in Chang, The English Factory in Taiwan , pp. 458 – 460; Edward Barwell and Council at Taiwan to Francis Bowyear and Council at Bantam, December 1680, in Chang, The English Factory in Taiwan , p. 424; and John Chappell and Council in Taiwan to Edward Barwell and Council at Batavia, January 31, 1683, in Chang, The English Factory in Taiwan , p. 503. 87 Fang, Hua ren yu Lusong , pp. 423 – 424. 88 George Gosfright and factors at Tempo Quebrada off Macao to John Chappell and factors at Taiwan, October 30, 1682, in Chang, The English Factory in Taiwan , p. 494. 89 For example, see Ships #6 and #7 from Dongning, August 8, 1681, in Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 328 – 330. For the development of sericulture in Guangdong, see Robert B. Marks, Tigers, Rice, Silk, and Silt: Environment and Economy in Late Imperial South China (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2004), pp. 118 – 120. 41 previous two years because of a famine and a plague that had swept through the countryside. 90 The severity of this famine was confirmed by the English company’s servants stationed in Pho Hien, who reported that by 1682 two thirds of the rural population in some of the silk producing regions of the Trinh domain had starved to death. 91 Meanwhile, the Qing empire kept its newly expanded naval forces stationed in strategic places along the coast of Zhejiang and Jiangsu even after the rebellion. The crew of a Nanjing ship in 1682 reported that Qing military vessels were successfully capturing ships attempting to cross to Japan on the coast and burning them. The crew’s own ship had just barely escaped itself when it was discovered by Qing patrols waiting for smugglers to meet it near Chongming. 92 In light of these conditions, the Pearl River delta, though not free of danger either, would have been an attractive alternative for the Zheng family’s merchants if there was silk available there.

Conclusions The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories prompted a structural change in East Asia’s trading network during the 1670s and early 1680s. Up until 1674, China’s overseas trade was still dominated by the Zheng family and their affiliates, and it was still primarily an exchange of Chinese goods for silver and copper. They had successfully used their position on Taiwan and a network of smugglers on the mainland to maintain a steady flow of material for the cargoes of their merchant vessels bound for Nagasaki and Manila. The demand for silver and copper in China, and for Chinese silk and other goods in Japan and Luzon was such that there was little need for the family to seek markets further afield to supplement their cargoes.

In 1674, this situation changed when the civil war on the mainland closed off all the traditional smuggling routes and blocked the Zheng family’s acces to all but trifling quantities of Chinese cloth and silk. This made it necessary to increase the involvement of outside groups who had hitherto operated on the periphery of the system, including the English East India company, silk merchants in Vietnam, and middleman merchants in Siam. Consequently, the Zheng family’s system expanded southward, incorporating increasingly large volumes of Southeast Asian merchandise into its cargoes to maintain its annual trade in Japan and Luzon.

After the rebellion, China’s pre-eminence within the East Asian trading network recovered with the rise of the Pearl River delta as a trade hub, but the structural shift towards a greater inclusion of Southeast Asia that occurred during the war had a lasting effect on the network. After the demise of the Zheng family’s rule and the Kangxi emperor’s decision to legalise maritime trade in all of China’s ports in 1684, the connections that had been established by the Zheng family’s merchants in Southeast Asia would endure.

90 Ship #4 from Dong Kinh, June 29, 1682, in Hayashi, Kai Hentai, vol. 1, p. 343 – 344. 91 Farrington, “English East India Company,” p. 158. 92 Ship #1 from Nanjing, May 15, 1682, in Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 337 – 340. 42

Thanks in part to the business relationships that had been developed when the family shifted parts of its trade southward in the 1670s, circuits of exchange between Chinese and Southeast Asian ports would flourish even after the family’s surrender.

Chapter 2: Flood Gates & Bottlenecks

The Resurgence and Dissapointment of Chinese Maritime Trade in the Japanese and the Philippine Markets, 1684 – 1690

In October 1684, approximately a year after Zheng Keshuang had surrendered Taiwan to the Qing, the Kangxi emperor ordered that the prohibition on maritime trade, which had been in place since 1657, be lifted throughout the empire. 1 The speed with which China’s larger coastal centres responded was startling. The following year, the number of trade ships from the Qing empire arriving at Manila jumped to at least seventeen, compared to eight at most in 1684. In Nagasaki, seventy-seven ships arrived from the Qing empire compared to just nine the previous year. 2 Some of these ships, especially those sailing from Guangdong and Fujian, were probably converted military vessels that belonged to Qing officials, especially Wu Xingzuo 吳興祚 , the governor general of Guangdong and Guangxi, and Shi Lang 施琅 , the Fujian naval commander. 3 But dozens more must have been hastily constructed in new shipyards near Suzhou, Wenzhou, Xiamen, and elsewhere by private individuals. 4 Hundreds of sailors and minor merchants with small cargoes that they imagined selling overseas for large profits were recruited and brought aboard the new trade ships that began to stream out of the empire’s harbours beginning in the spring of 1685.

This chapter will examine the initial phase of the Qing empire’s opening to the ocean. There are already many studies of the Qing government’s maritime policies and its administration of its empire’s commercial ports, so there is little that still needs to be said about trade from the government’s perspective. 5 The focus here will instead be on the economic transregional effects of the 1684 legalisation, and especially on the evolution of the

1 Qing Shi Lu 清實錄 , vol. 5 (Beijing: Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 1985), p. 212. On the original implementation of the ban see Cheng K’o-ch’eng, “Cheng Ch’eng-kung’s Maritime Expansion and Early Ch’ing Coastal Prohibition,” in Development and Decline of Fukien Province in the 17 th and 18 th Centuries , ed. E. B. Vermeer (Leiden: Brill, 1990), pp. 238 – 239. 2 Iwao Seiichi 岩生成一 , “Kinsei Nisshi boeki ni kansuru suryo teki kosatsu 近世日支貿易に關すゐ数量的考察 ,” Shigaku Zasshi 史學雜誌 62, no. 11 (1953): 12 – 13. 3 Both of these men sent their own ships soon after the 1684 legalisation. For Wu, see Fang Zhenzhen 方真真 , Hua ren yu Lusong mao yi (1657 – 1687): Shi liao fen xi yu yi zhu 華人與呂宋貿易 (1657-1687): 史料分析與譯註 (Xinzhu: Qing da chu ban she, 2012), p. 92. For Shi, see ship #9 from Xiamen, March 11, 1687, Hayashi Shunsai 林春齋 , Hayashi Hoko 林鳳岡 , and Ren'ichi Ura 浦廉一 , ed., Kai Hentai 華夷變態 , (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1958 – 1959), vol. 1, p. 664. 4 On the development of Qing shipbuilding, see Chen Xiyu 陳希育 , Zhongguo fan chuan you hai wai mao yi 中國帆船與海外貿易 (Xiamen: Xiamen da xue chu ban she, 1991), pp. 101 - 104. 5 For good examples, see Huang Guosheng 黃國盛 , Ya pian zhan zheng qian de dong nan si sheng hai guan 鴉片戰爭前的東南四省海關 (Fuzhou: Fujian ren min chu ban she, 2000); Wang Rigen 王日根 , Ming qing hai jiang zheng ce yu Zhong guo she hui fa zhan 明清海疆政策與中國社會發展 (Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin Chuban She, 2006); and Gang Zhao, The Qing Opening to the Ocean: Chinese Maritime Policies, 1684 – 1757 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2013). 44

commercial interaction between China and her overseas neighbours. This chapter argues that in the 1680s economic recovery within the Qing empire stimulated the agricultural and manufacturing industries that produced most of the goods for which there had been historic demand in Japan and Luzon. The beginning of this period of growth coincided with the opening of the ocean, and these two factors working in concert prompted large numbers of China-based entrepeneurs to begin investing in overseas trading ventures. Though the volume of Chinese exports was dwarfed by domestic consumption, would-be merchants from Jiangsu to Guangdong had good access to raw silk, silk cloth, cotton cloth, sugar, porcelain, zinc, and various other types of manufactured goods that could be bought in bulk and loaded into the holds of the rapidly growing fleets of trade ships.

A further, more complicated issue is how these goods were exchanged after they left the Qing empire’s shores. The argument that this chapter advances is that initially most of the merchants and ship owners imagined they could follow the example of the Zheng family in the 1660s and 1670s. The Zheng family’s most valuable trades had been the exchange of Chinese goods for silver and copper in Nagasaki and Manila, and so the vast majority of new Qing merchants in the 1680s began their enterprises by investing in voyages to those same two places. In most respects this was a sound strategy. The post-1685 merchant fleets should have had even greater success than the Zheng family because, unlike the Zheng, they had good access to China’s markets, and would not have had to rely on smuggling networks or textiles imported from Southeast Asia to make up their Japan and Luzon-bound cargoes.

However, from the 1680s onwards they faced a new problem of over-supply. In the case of Japan, the sudden flood of Chinese merchants and merchandise prompted the Tokugawa shogunate to begin placing restrictions on trade in order to control the outflow of silver and copper. In Luzon, the Spanish authorities were happy to have greater numbers of Qing ships arriving because it meant that more cargo tax could be collected, but trade there was dependent on the export of Asian goods to New Spain in usually no more than two galleons each year. The limited cargo space aboard the Spanish ships put a firm ceiling on the market for Qing imports to Luzon that limited their profitability. As this chapter argues, the solution was a new turn towards Southeast Asia, just as it had been for the Zheng family during the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories. But instead of supplying merchandise for Japan and Luzon, Southeast Asia became an alternative to them as a market for Chinese goods.

Qing Economic Recovery Mio Kishimoto-Nakayama has dubbed the period of economic hardship and monetary deflation from the 1660s to the 1680s the ‘Kangxi depression.’ Most of Kishimoto-Nakayama’s contemporaries and followers agree that this depression came to an end in the 1680s when harmfully low prices for grain and other commodities recovered to

roughly what they had been near the end of the Shunzhi period (1643 to 1661). 6 A debate over the possible link between the diminished volume of silver imports in the first half of the Kangxi period and depression continues unresolved. Kishimoto-Nakayama claims that the depression was caused by a decline in silver imports and a subsequent scarcity of money in the economy, while Richard von Glahn and Wu Chengming among others deny any clear link between fluctuations in the volume of maritime trade, the Kangxi depression, and the economic recovery that followed. 7 The recovery of the economy at roughly the same time maritime trade was legalised does suggest a link, but there is no clear causal link. Von Glahn’s strongest counter-argument is that despite the surge in the numbers of Qing ships sailing to Japan after 1684, there was a drop in the importation of Japanese silver to the Qing empire because of Tokugawa regulations, and this was only modestly offset by a rise in the imports of silver from Luzon according to the best available data. He assumes that imports of Indian Ocean silver (silver brought around the Cape of Good Hope or through western Asia) was negligible until at earliest 1700. 8

Answering the question of the impact that imported silver had on the Qing economy is beyond the scope of this chapter, but what is important here is that the simultaneous recovery of the economy and the legalisation of maritime trade allowed for an abrupt rise in the Qing empire’s role as an exporter. As the Chinese scholars Fan Jinmin and Jin Wen have argued, the growth in luxury good industries, especially silk weaving, was primarily caused by a growing domestic demand within the Qing empire. 9 But tens of thousands of merchants and sailors from Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong’s coasts also saw the possibility of making their fortunes in markets beyond China’s shores, and cooperated with one another to send ships filled with manufactured goods overseas.

In the case of Jiangnan, especially the region around Lake Tai (Tai Hu 太湖 ), economic recovery spurred the growth of industries that supplied the goods merchants needed for both foreign and domestic trade. This allowed for an increasing sophistication in the region’s trading mechanisms, including the emergence of collection and redistribution hubs. In 1687 merchants arriving in Nagasaki from Shanghai reported that ships from ‘every place’ were gathering in their port, 10 and that all the merchants there were collecting

6 Mio Kishimoto-Nakayama, “The Kangxi Depression and Early Qing Local Markets,” Modern China 10, no. 2 (April 1984): 230; Chen Zhiping 陳支平 , “Shi lun Kangxi chu nian dong nan zhu sheng de ‘shu huang’ 試論康熙初年東南諸省的 ‘熟荒 ’,” Zhongguo she hui jing ji shi yan jiu 中國社會經濟史研究 2 (1982): 45; and Robert B. Marks, Tigers, Rice, Silk, and Silt: Environment and Economy in Late Imperial South China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 156 – 157. 7 Richard von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000 – 1700 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p. 233; and Wu Chengming 吳承明 , Zhongguo de xian dai hua: shi chang yu she hui 中國的現代 : 市場與社會 (Beijing: Sheng huo du shu xin zhi sanlian shu dian, 2001), p. 240. 8 Von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune , p. 232. 9 Fan Jinmin 范金民 and Jin Wen 金文 , Jiangnan si chou shi yan jiu 江南絲綢史研究 (Beijing: Nong ye chu ban she, 1993), pp. 236 – 237. 10 Ship #19 from Nanjing, April 10, 1687, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 672. 46

passengers with cargo night and day. 11 By 1689, Suzhou and Hangzhou had emerged as the dominant redistribution hubs in the Jiangnan region for merchants trading in silks, medicinal goods, and food stuffs. When a fire swept through the Suzhou suburb of Nanhao 南濠 on January 8, 1690, it destroyed warehouses containing a reported 100 000 kanme (375 000 kg) in silver worth of medicines and sundry goods, driving up prices and disrupting trade to Japan that year. 12 Another fire in Nanhao the following summer destroyed warehouses full of silk gathered for redistribution throughout the empire and beyond it, causing similar problems for merchants. 13 By the early 1690s at the latest, the growing manufacturing industries in Jiangnan had reached a level that also allowed the merchants specialising specifically in overseas trade to increase the sophistication of their operations. Putuoshan 普陀山 , formerly one of the Zheng merchants’ collection points for goods smuggled out of China, re-emerged as a stopover point for trading ships heading to Japan from Fujian, Guangdong, and Southeast Asia. Initially, merchant ships used the island as the final provisioning point before the crossing to Nagasaki, but in 1693 crews began reporting that they were docking there to take on raw silk they had ordered ahead of time to be brought from Ningbo on the mainland. 14

In Fujian, especially the southern part of the province, the relationship between the post-1684 economic recovery and the growth of maritime trade was even more pronounced, largely because the province had fewer industries and therefore depended on its role as a shipping centre on China’s coast. Fujian had no large production of goods for overseas export until the rise of European demand for Wuyi 武夷 tea (referred to as ‘bohea’ in most European records) in the second or third decade of the eighteenth century. 15 A partial exception was the development of sugar cultivation for export in Zhangzhou and Quanzhou beginning in the early 1690s. 16 The sugar produced in southern Fujian seems to have had a relatively minor share in both the domestic and Japanese markets compared to sugar from Guangdong province and from Taiwan. Taiwan, which experienced faster economic growth than the mainland after 1684, was a boon to the development of Fujian’s shipping industry. The island had supplied the Zheng family with sugar and deerskins for their Japan-bound

11 Ship #22 from Nanjing, April 12, 1687, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 678. See also Linda Cooke Johnson, “Shanghai: An Emerging Jiangnan Port, 1683 – 1840,” in Cities of Jiangnan in Late Imperial China , ed. Linda Cooke Johnson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 159 – 160 12 Ship #59 from Nanjing, July 2, 1690, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, pp. 1237 – 1238. 13 Ship #2 from Ningbo, February 13, 1691, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1301; and Ship #22 from Nanjing, March 7, 1691, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1321. 14 For a few examples, see Ship #58 from Đông Kinh, August 9, 1693, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1565; Ship #77 from Ligor, September 8, 1693, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1595; and Ship #46 from Quanzhou, September 29, 1695, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1756. 15 See Robert P. Gardella, “The Min-pei Tea Trade during the Late Chi’en-lung and Chia-ch’ing Eras: Foreign Commerce and the Mid-Ch’ing Fukien Highlands,” in Development and Decline of Fukien Province in the 17 th and 18 th Centuries , ed. E. B. Vermeer (Leiden: Brill, 1990). 16 Ship #65 from Zhangzhou, July 29, 1690, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1246; and Ship #56 from Xiamen, August 15, 1692, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1468. See also Sucheta Mazumdar, Sugar and Society in China: Peasants, Technology, and the World Market (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1998). 47

cargoes, and after the end of the Zheng period, the majority of these products were redirected across the strait to Xiamen, whose merchant fleets then re-exported them to more northerly Chinese ports or to Japan. 17

Guangdong, unlike Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Fujian, was mostly spared the damage done by marauding armies during the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories. Though its ruler, Shang Zhixin 尚之信 , rebelled in 1676, he surrendered in less than a year, pre-empting the Qing invasion that would otherwise have followed. The Pearl River delta also seems to have continued as a centre of illicit maritime trade even after Shang was removed in 1679, so neither the post-rebellion economic recovery nor the growth of trade in Guangdong was as abrupt as it was in other parts of coastal China. In 1687, a ship from Gaozhou in southwestern Guangdong arrived in Nagasaki with sugar, and explained that their region was primarily a sugar producer and that ships seeking to buy it were regularly arriving there. 18 Chaozhou, a prefecture in the far west of the province that bordered Fujian’s Zhangzhou, also began exporting sugar at about the same time. 19

Besides sugar, Guangdong also became an exporter of a number of other products by the 1690s. The crew of a ship arriving at Nagasaki in 1690 from Chaozhou reported that throughout the province, in addition to sugar, there was also zinc that came from the mountains, 20 and various types of woven silks and other cloth. Most of this cloth, the crew claimed, was not produced in Guangdong, but imported from other provinces. Some material though was woven in Guangzhou. 21 However according to Qu Dajun 屈大均 , a scholar who wrote a guidebook to Guangdong in the mid-1690s, Guangdong produced different types of raw silk that were highly valued both within China and overseas. 22 Gazetteers of Guangdong compiled before the 1690s also typically list silk as a native product of the province, particularly of the Leizhou peninsula, though they invariably give

17 Ng Chin-keong, Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast, 1683 – 1735 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983), pp. 95 – 105. For a statement on the role of Taiwan in Xiamen’s trade, see Ship #9 from Xiamen, April 4, 1687, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 666. In 1687, Taiwanese merchants began sending some of Taiwan’s sugar and deerskins to Nagasaki directly on their own ships as well. See Zheng Ruiming 鄭瑞明, “Qing ling chu qi de Tai-Ri mao yi guan xi (1684 – 1722) 清領初期的臺日貿易關係 (1684 – 1722),” Taiwan Shi da li shi xue bao 臺灣師大歷史學報 32 (2004): 43 – 87. 18 Ship #44 from Gaozhou, May 22, 1687, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 700. See also Ship #35 from Gaozhou, June 28, 1688, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 872. 19 Ship #94 from Guangdong, July 16, 1688, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 937. 20 Written as totan とたん here, this is presumably what the English generally called ‘tutenague.’ Tutenague typically referred to zinc (baiqian 白鉛 in Chinese), but was sometimes misapplied to cupronickel ( baiting 白銅 ). See Li Tana, Nguy ễn Cochinchina: Southern Vietnam in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, 1998), pp. 180 – 181; and George B. Souza, “Ballast Goods: Chinese Maritime Trade in Zinc and Sugar in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” in Emporia, Commodities and Entrepeneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, c. 1400 - 1750 , ed. Roderich Ptak and Dietmar Rothermund (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991), pp. 293 – 295. 21 Ship #66 from Chaozhou, July 30, 1690, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1247. 22 Qu Dajun 屈大均 , Guangdong xin yu 廣東新語 [1700], juan 卷 15, 24. 48

no indication of the quantities produced. 23 Chor Yee Wong has suggested that the great boom in Guangdong silk production occurred in the late-1750s when the Qianlong emperor restricted European trade to Guangzhou and prohibited the export of raw silk from Huzhou 湖州 in Jiangnan. But Wong’s study of the silk industry also makes it clear that the elaborate fishpond-mulberry tree farming system that supported sericulture in the province predated the establishment of the Qing by centuries, and that locally produced raw silk was being exported from Guangzhou by 1698. 24 It seems probable that raw silk was being produced and exported from Guangdong at least two decades earlier than 1698 though. In 1681, Zheng ships arriving in Nagasaki reported they were able to purchase raw silk in the Pearl River delta, 25 and servants of the East India company on a ship lying near Macau the following year claimed that they were able to acquire gold, zinc, and raw silk there. 26 Because the Qing control of coastal trade had been strengthened by the early 1680s, it is unlikely that the raw silk sold to the Zheng and English ships could have been brought from Jiangnan, so it is reasonable to assume that it was locally produced.

After the end of the maritime trade prohibition, the Guangdong economy grew along with most of the rest of the Qing empire, and production of both raw silk and finished silk products increased. The weaving industry may have surpassed the ability of local silk producers to supply it, because sericulture required a resource-intensive expansion of mulberry cultivation. If this was the case, it likely prompted a rise in the dependence of local weavers on imported Jiangnan silk thread or raw silk, as the 1690 Chaozhou ship claimed. Supporting this possibility is a note written in 1702 by another English East India company supercargo in his diary that mentions he had bought raw ‘Nankeen’ (Nanjing) silk in Guangzhou. 27 The Pearl River delta therefore likely produced a modest amount of its own exportable silk before 1700, but also relied on the post-1684 revival of coastal shipping to supply its merchants and weavers with raw and finished silks from Jiangnan.

The recovery of China’s economy after the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories caused an expansion in the production of silk and other consumer goods especially within the eastern seaboard provinces. These goods were primarily intended for domestic

23 Chen Dazhen 陳大震 , ed., Nan hai zhi 南海志 [~AD 1297 - 1307], juan 卷 5; Dai Jing 戴璟 and Zhang Yue 張岳 , ed., Guangdong tong zhi chu gao 廣東通志初稿 [1535], juan 卷 31; Guo Fei 郭棐 , ed., Guangdong tong zhi 廣東通志 [1602], juan 卷 41, 55; and Jin Guangzu 金光祖 , ed., Guangdong tong zhi 廣東通志 [compiled 1675, published 1697], juan 卷 22. 24 Chor Yee Wong, “Proto-Industrialization and the Silk Industry of the Canton Delta, 1662 – 1934” (PhD. diss., University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1995), pp. 167 – 172. 25 See the previous chapter and Ships #6 and #7 from Dongning, August 8, 1681, in Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 328 – 330. 26 George Gosfright and factors at Tempo Quebrada off Macao to John Chappell and factors at Taiwan, October 30, 1682, in The English Factory in Taiwan 1670 – 1685 , ed. Chang Hsiu-jung, Anthony Farrington, Huang Fu-san, Ts’ao Yung-ho, Wu Mi-tsa, Cheng Hsi-fu, and Ang Ka-in (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1995), p. 494. 27 “Letter book and diary of Thomas Hillar, chief supercargo of the Fleet (Captain Thomas Burgess) at Macao and Canton and on the voyage home,” British Library, London (hereafter BL), IOR/G/12/16 f. 46v. 49

consumers within China, but the large scale production created a surplus that could be shipped abroad. The end of the maritime prohibition made it possible for men with capital to begin outfitting ships or renting space on them for these types of merchandise. Shipyards in the major coastal and riverine centres quickly began constructing new fleets of vessels to accommodate these projects. Soon these new ships were carrying thousands of tons of silk, cotton, sugar, medicines, tea, zinc, and manufactured goods overseas to foreign markets, and it is to these foreign markets that we now must turn.

Disapointment in Nagasaki In the Qing empire’s coastal cities the news that maritime trade would be legalised created a rush among would-be entrepreneurs to construct ships. The majority of these new seafarers seem to have initially planned to make the route between the Qing empire’s ports and Nagasaki in Japan their primary circuit. The Kangxi’s order came in the autumn of 1684, so it was not until early 1685 that most ships could be launched, but by the summer of 1686, the English East India company’s supercargoes on board the China Merchant riding in Xiamen’s harbour were able to observe what they estimated to be about two hundred fifty sail of ships at anchor there, two of which were Japan-bound trade ships of over three hundred tons. 28 Several days later they counted six ‘great junks’ sailing for Japan with loads of sugar. 29 According to Nagasaki’s customs records, in 1685, seventy-seven ships from Qing ports arrived in Japan. In 1686, there were eighty-seven, six of which may have been the ships the China Merchant ’s crew observed in Xiamen. In 1687, the number jumped to one hundred thirty-one, and in 1688 it peaked at one hundred seventy-eight. 30 The possibility of riches gained from overseas trade, and Japanese trade in particular, had obviously captured the imagination of ship owners in Xiamen and elsewhere.

Table 2.1. Asian Ships arriving in Nagasaki, 1674 – 1715 Year Chinese 1 Southeast Asian Allowed to Trade Turned Away Totals 1674 13 9 22 22 1675 18 11 29 29 1676 16 10 24 24 1677 20 9 29 29 1678 17 9 26 26 1679 22 11 33 33 1680 12 18 29 29 1681 5 4 9 9 1682 14 12 26 26 1683 15 12 27 27 1684 9 15 24 24

28 “Diary and consultations of John Gladman chief, Barker Hibbins and Benjamin Aleyn, supercargoes of the China Merchant (Captain John Utber) from Surat to Amoy,” BL, IOR/G/16, f. 222 r. 29 “Diary and consultations of John Gladman chief, Barker Hibbins and Benjamin Aleyn, supercargoes of the China Merchant (Captain John Utber) from Surat to Amoy,” BL, IOR/G/16, f. 227 r. 30 Iwao, “Kinsei Nisshi”: 12 – 13. 50

1685 77 8 73 12 85 1686 87 15 83 19 102 1687 131 5 115 22 137 1688 178 14 117 75 192 1689 67 12 70 9 79 1690 77 15 70 20 90 1691 78 12 70 20 90 1692 64 9 70 3 73 1693 61 16 70 11 81 1694 53 15 70 3 73 1695 61 10 60 1 61 1696 66 14 70 11 81 1697 84 18 70 33 103 1698 58 13 68 3 71 1699 64 9 69 4 73 1700 51 2 53 53 1701 56 10 66 1702 80 10 90 1703 80 80 1704 80 4 84 1705 80 8 88 1706 80 13 93 1707 80 4 84 1708 59 44 103 1709 54 3 57 1710 51 3 54 1711 57 57 1712 59 3 62 1713 40 9 49 1714 51 51 1715 7 13 20 Sources: 'Chinese' and 'Southeast Asian' columns are drawn from Iwao Seiichi, “Kinsei Nisshi, ” pp. 12 - 13. All other columns are from Robert LeRoy Innes, “The Door Ajar: Japan’s Foreign Trade in the Seventeenth Century” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 1980), p. 636. There are discrepancies between Iwao and Innes' totals, but these are minor. 1) 'Chinese' includes both mainland China and Taiwan here.

But Nagasaki was no longer the endless font of fortune that it had once been. The final ship to arrive from the Qing empire in the first year of the Jokyo 貞享 period (early 1685) brought word that fishing and merchant ships were being allowed to enter and leave China’s ports freely, 31 and this news apparently prompted the Tokugawa government to begin imposing limits on Asian trade in Nagasaki. Robert Innes has described the complicated evolution of these restrictions in great detail, so this chapter will give only a short summary to illustrate the difficulties Qing merchants faced in Japan. The Tokugawa authorities anticipated the 1685 surge in the number of ships arriving that year, and so capped the total value of imports by Asian ships (including both ships sailing from mainland

31 Ship #24 from Nanjing, January 1, 1685, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 443. 51

China and Southeast Asia) at the equivalent of 6000 kanme 貫目 (22 500 kg) worth of silver per year, much to the dismay of the Chinese merchants. 32 Edo also imposed a two or three hundred kanme limit on the maximum value of imports that could be brought by each ship, depending on its port of origin. 33 This was a value much lower than what many of the crews of the large silk-laden merchant vessels had intended to trade, so they faced heavy losses that year. The captains of the tenth to fifty-first ships to arrive in 1685 submitted a joint protest to the Chinese interpreter who was their point of contact with the Tokugawa administration in Nagasaki. 34 They claimed that because the cap on the value of imports had almost been reached by the early summer, all the crews arriving after that time were having difficulty covering the basic expenses of ship maintenance and their upkeep in Nagasaki. 35

Figure 2.1. Asian ships arriving in Nagasaki, 1674 – 1715

Chinese Southeast Asian 200 180 160 140 120 100 80

Number of ships 60 40 20 0 1674 1676 1678 1680 1682 1684 1686 1688 1690 1692 1694 1696 1698 1700 Source: Table 2.1

This petition seems to have fallen on deaf ears though. Three years later the restrictions were modified to make the system more rigid. In 1688, the number of Asian

32 Robert LeRoy Innes, “The Door Ajar: Japan’s Foreign Trade in the Seventeenth Century” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 1980), p. 319. 33 Innes implies that the limits on individual ships were introduced in 1688. Innes, “The Door Ajar,” pp. 322 – 323. But the Tsuukou ichiran 通航一覽 , a nineteenth-compilation of documents relating to foreign trade, which he cites, suggests by its organisation that it was introduced in 1685 along with the 6000 kanme total limit. Hayashi Fukusai 林復齋 , Yamada An'ei 山田安榮 , and Hayakawa Junzaburou 早川純三郎 , ed., Tsuukou ichiran 通航一覽 , (Tokyo: Kokusho Kanko kai,̄ 1912 – 1913), vol. 4, p. 310. 34 For the role of the Chinese interpreters, see Aloysius Chang, "The Chinese Community of Nagasaki in the First Century of the Tokugawa Period (1603 -–1688)" (PhD diss., St. John's University, 1970), chap. 3. 35 Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 502 – 504. It is also reproduced in Hayashi., Tsuukou ichiran , vol. 4, pp. 310 - 318. 52

ships allowed to trade was capped at seventy, with allotted numbers of ships for each major port in the Qing empire and Southeast Asia per season. The total import limit of 6000 kanme was maintained, meaning that even if a ship arrived in time to fall within the ship limit for its port, the cargo value may have already been exceeded. 36 No less than one hundred ninety-two Asian ships arrived in 1688, seventy-five of which were turned away (see Table 2.1). The shogunate deemed these policies too restrictive after a few years, so regulations were loosened slightly in 1695. From that year onwards, individual Japanese merchants were given licences to trade copper for set values of Chinese goods above the 6000 kanme limit, meaning that legal import totals were allowed to rise by a few thousand kanme (see Table 2.2 below). In 1698, the ship limit was also raised to eighty, and the Chinese were allowed to trade an additional 2000 kanme worth of imports, but only for dried seafood products. 37

Table 2.2. Value of imports on Asian ships in kanme of silver, 1674 – 1713 Year Value of Legal Imports 1674 18270.314 1675 16706.876 1676 7399.880 1677 9599.882 1678 12779.977 1679 9568.209 1680 11428.570 1681 1477.560 1682 9529.400 1683 4869.291 1684 4181.849 1685 6000.000 1686 6053.590 1687 6000.000 1688 6000.000 1689 6000.000 1690 6000.000 1691 6000.000 1692 6000.000 1693 5950.569 1694 6000.000 1695 7000.000 1696 10500.000 1697 10500.000 1698 9397.693 1699 10796.051 1700 10300.000

36 Innes, “The Door Ajar,” p. 323. 37 Innes, “The Door Ajar,” pp. 334 – 335. 53

1701 11590.000 1702 6871.760 1703 7685.000 1704 12563.900 1705 7635.263 1706 12520.000 1707 11848.670 1708 11685.000 1709 8740.000 1710 8737.805 1711 4793.692 1712 1713 4997.000 Source: Robert LeRoy Innes, “The Door Ajar: Japan’s Foreign Trade in the Seventeenth Century” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 1980), pp. 416 - 417.

Despite the increases in the overall value of imports, securing permission to trade in Nagasaki was still uncertain for the Chinese merchants who arrived each year, and those that were allowed were not able to take full advantage of the restricted market. Because of the limits on the total number of ships from each port and on the value of imports per ship, every year between 1685 and 1699 at least one ship was turned away without being allowed to trade (see Table 2.1). 38 Some managed to trade anyway by smuggling in the late 1680s and early 1690s, 39 but according to the VOC’s agents in Deshima, smuggling had mostly been brought under control by 1693. The crackdown on smugglers, the Dutch claimed, resulted in a steep rise in the price of Chinese goods, which may have been good news for some of the Chinese merchants. 40 However, for the most important Chinese import goods in Japan, raw silk, the anti-competitive market conditions did not benefit the importers. The Chinese merchants had to sell their raw silk at prices set arbitrarily by the itowappu 糸割符 system, which prevented them from benefiting from any changes in the market value. 41

The main rationale behind both the cap on the value of imports in silver, and the itowappu system was to stem the outflow of silver from Japan. For the Chinese merchants attempting to market raw silk and other goods from China, these policies made attempting to export silver an increasingly unprofitable proposition. And Japanese silver became even more unattractive in 1695 when the shogunate opted to devalue the silver chougin 丁銀 , the

38 This is confirmed by the observations of the VOC’s servants on Deshima in the Nagasaki harbour. Leonard Blussé, ed., The Deshima Dagregisters their original tables of contents, Volume II, 1690 – 1700 (Leiden: Leiden Centre for the History of European Expansion, 1987), p. 88, 134. 39 For a description of some of the strategies used, see Engelbert Kaempfer, Engelbert Kaempfer, The History of Japan Together with a Description of the Kingdom of Siam, 1690-92 , trans. J. G. Scheuchzer (Glasgow: James MacLehose, 1906), vol. 2, p. 257. 40 Blussé, The Deshima Dagregisters their original tables of contents, Volume II , p. 31. 41 Innes, “The Door Ajar,” p. 324. 54

usual unit of silver used in trade, from eighty percent to sixty-four percent purity.42 Total annual silver exports on Asian ships had been worth 5952 kanme on average between 1672 and 1684, but dropped to 228.7 kanme between 1685 and 1697, despite the surge in the number of ships arriving in Nagasaki. 43 Silver therefore ceased to be a significant export through Nagasaki after 1685 because of the imposition of the shogunate’s restrictions beginning that year.

As a result of these various policies, by the late 1680s copper had taken silver’s place as Japan’s most important export. During the decade the Zheng family controlled Taiwan before the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories (1663 to 1673), 425 337 kg of copper was exported per year on average. From the beginning of the rebellion until the Qing legalisation of maritime trade (1674 to 1684), the average was 1 053 560 kg per year. This rise probably reflected the Zheng family’s increasing dependence on the copper-hungry Vietnamese states, but it was still less than half the 2 519 398 kg average between 1685 and 1700. 44 Because of the disincentives that had eroded the profitability of Japanese silver exports, by 1685 the Chinese merchants arriving in Nagasaki had accepted copper as their primary export good.

There were problems that kept copper from being a consistently profitable export though. The growing economy in China prompted a demand from Qing mints tasked with producing copper coins that increased the overall demand for copper in China, but by 1689 copper production in Yunnan and Guizhou seems to have lowered its market value. In 1690, many of the crews of ships from China, especially those coming from Zhejiang and Jiangsu, complained in their reports to Nagasaki’s Chinese interpreters that the copper that had been brought back from Japan in the previous year was being sold at a loss because of competition from newly opened copper mines in Yunnan. 45 Similar complaints were made in 1692, 1695, 1696, and 1697. 46 To make matters worse, after a glut of copper exports in 1696 and 1697 thanks to the licencing of Japanese merchants to trade copper for Chinese goods above the import limit, copper stockpiles in Nagasaki were exhausted and production

42 Innes, “The Door Ajar,” p. 599. 43 Tashiro Kazui, "Tsushima-han's Korean Trade, 1684-1710," Acta Asiatica 30 (1976), p. 95. 44 Liu Shiuh-Feng, "Copper Administration Reform and Copper Imports from Japan in the Qianlong Reign of the Qing Dynasty," in Copper in the Early Modern Sino-Japanese Trade , ed. Keiko Nagase Reimer (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp. 112 – 114. Liu provides statistics from both Japanese and Dutch records. Because the Dutch records are only available for some years, and because they move in the same pattern as the Japanese figures, this chapter has only used the Japanese figures here for the sake of simplicity. For the importance of copper in Vietnam, see John K. Whitmore, "Vietnam and the Monetary Flow of Eastern Asia, Thirteenth to Eighteenth Centuries," in Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds , ed. J. F. Richards (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1983). 45 For the first example, see Ship #20 from Ningbo, March 21, 1690, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1191. Helen Dunstan claims that copper production Yunnan was still very limited before 1700, but it evidently was enough to ruin the market for Japanese copper. Helen Dunstan, "Safely Supping with the Devil: The Qing State and Its Merchant Suppliers of Copper," Late Imperial China 13, no. 2 (December 1992): 45. 46 For examples, see Ship #47 from Nanjing, August 9, 1692, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1457; Ship #35 from Putuoshan, August 29, 1695, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1742; Ship #19 from Ningbo, April 4, 1696, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1779; and Ship #18 from Chaozhou, January 30, 1697, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1865. 55

of new copper fell short of Chinese demand, causing delays in the dispatch of ships. 47 In response, Edo capped exports of copper by Asian ships in 1698 at 3 841 200 kg per year, the equivalent value of 6500 kanme of silver. 48

These various restrictions put very firm limits on the volume of trade that merchants from China and Southeast Asia could conduct in Nagasaki. Despite the troubles the Zheng family had experienced during the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories, while their statelet remained viable the average annual value of imports by Asian ships in Nagasaki was higher than it would be in the years following the legalisation of maritime trade. Based on Innes’ calculations, from 1674 to 1682 (the beginning of the rebellion to the last full year of the Zhengs’ independence), imports averaged 10 751.19 kanme per year. From 1685 to 1697 (the year the Tokugawa capped the value of imports to the year before they restricted the export of copper), the average is 6769.55 kanme . If we extend the period to 1711 (the last consecutive year Innes found data for) the average is 8148.79 kanme (see Table 2.2). 49 Though there was some growth in the value of imports after the restrictions were loosened in 1695, their overall yearly values rarely exceeded 11 000 kanme .

It needs to be mentioned here that this did not mean that Japanese interest in Chinese goods had declined. In particular aw silk, which fed Kyoto’s weaving industry, was still very much in demand. 50 Some of this demand was satisfied by trade through Tsushima, an island between Japan and the Korean peninsula that facilitated an indirect trade between China and Japan. Fifty-seven percent of the Japanese imports through Tsushima between 1685 and 1699 were raw silk, most of which probably originated in Jiangnan. 51 This helped ease the shortage created by restrictions placed on imports in Nagasaki, and it demonstrates that Chinese goods were still potentially profitable. As well, the fact that annual legal imports through Nagasaki were typically at or near the maximum permitted value until the first decade of the eighteenth century suggests that trade remained profitable for those allowed to engage in it. So the restrictions placed on Chinese-Japanese trade in the 1680s and 1690s were by no means its death knell.

47 See Blussé, The Deshima Dagregisters their original tables of contents, Volume II , pp. 120, 135. 48 Innes, “The Door Ajar,” p. 335. 49 This chapter excludes Innes’ estimates of illicit trade above the quota system from this discussion, because although smuggling certainly occurred, this author is not convinced that its value can be known with any certainty. Innes’ method of calculating it was to compare the VOC servants’ statements of the value of Chinese imports to what would be legal under the quota each year, and then to assume that the entire difference was smuggled in. Innes, “The Door Ajar,” pp. 419 – 420. It seems more likely that at least occasionally the Chinese merchants, fearing punishment, did what the Japanese authorities expected of them and returned to China with some or all of their excess cargoes. In their interviews, many crews claimed that they were returning to Japan with goods that they had not been allowed to trade in previous years. 50 Kazui Tashiro, “Foreign Trade in the Tokugawa Period – Particularly with Korea,” in The Economic History of Japan: 1600 – 1990, Volume 1: Emergence of Economic Society in Japan, 1600 – 1859 , ed. Akira Hayami, Osamu Saitô, and Ronald P. Toby (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 109 – 110. 51 Tashiro, "Tsushima-han's Korean Trade": 100. 56

However, the limits that the Tokugawa shogunate placed on the overall value of imports and numbers of ships each year ensured that there was a hard ceiling on Japan’s potential as an outlet for Chinese trade goods. At the same time though, there was a steady rise in the availability of Chinese goods for export, and growing numbers of merchants wishing to participate in overseas trade. Japan continued to provide opportunities for some of them, especially those who could arrive early in the season before the ship quotas were filled, but it was no longer capable of satisfying the ambitions of every Chinese merchant with cargo and dreams of accumulating mountains of Japanese chogin . There were simply too many new ships being built by too many would-be merchants. After the glut of 1688, the solution for growing numbers of the merchants was to begin looking for other outlets elsewhere that had been less heavily exploited.

The Manila Galleon Bottleneck As in Nagasaki, the numbers of Chinese ships arriving in Manila and the value of the goods they brought grew spectacularly in the first few years following the 1684 legalisation. After this spike, Chinese trade to Luzon fell, plateaued during the 1690s, and then rose gradually in the final years of the century, but never surpassed Nagasaki. This was not for a want of Qing merchants, ships, or goods; the expansion of the Qing empire’s economy from the 1680s onwards guaranteed an abundance of all of these things. The problem rather was the other half of the equation, the trade between Luzon and New Spain. As discussed in the previous chapter, the bulk of the trade goods imported into Luzon from elsewhere in Asia were exchanged for silver in Manila. The citizens of the city obtained this silver in the port of Acapulco in New Spain on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, where there was a strong demand for Asian luxury commodities. This trade depended on the regular voyages of the one or two galleons that sailed each way most years, and this meant that there were firm limits on the volumes of merchandise that could be exported from Manila towards New Spain annually. To complicate matters further, the Qing merchants not only had to compete with each other for shares in Luzon’s finite market, but also a growing number of South Asian traders determined to break into the trade from the 1680s onwards.

To analyse the development of Chinese-Luzon trade after 1685 there are two types of data available. The first of these is the numbers of Chinese ships arriving each year, and the second is the value of the cargoes they carried based on evaluations by port tax collectors in Manila. Two scholars, Pierre Chaunu and Fang Zhenzhen, have compiled statistics on these types of data from different sets of records held by the Archivo General de Indias (AGI) in Seville, and this chapter will contribute a very modest third set from a number of letters that the present author found in the same archive. All three sets of records have limitations, but used together, they do provide a sense of the approximate dimensions of trade during the last years of the eighteenth century.

Fang Zhenzhen, in her recent study of the Chinese trade in Luzon, has extracted data from two manuscript files in the AGI (Filipinas, 64, volumes 1 and 2) containing information on the management of incoming merchant ships. 52 From them she has compiled a list of every Chinese vessel that was recorded arriving in Luzon between 1657 and 1687. Fang’s book includes a table listing these ships and all the available data related to each of them. In some cases, the value of the cargo was noted by the Spanish customs agents in the documents that would become Fang’s source material, but unfortunately the majority of the ships, including almost all of those that arrived after 1684, do not have cargo values. 53 This leaves us only the numbers of ships arriving per year as a rough gauge of the volume of trade in her work (see Table 2.3 below). The other major limitation is the relatively short time period her research covers; the two files she uses were compiled in 1688, and thus their data ends in 1687.

Pierre Chaunu’s work provides information for a much longer period of Philippine history. 54 He has used records from the account books of the Spanish royal treasury (contaduria ) to collect quantitative data on trade in the Philippines from the late sixteenth to late eighteenth centuries. In regard to the incoming Asian trade ships, his work lacks some types of information that Fang has collected, including crew size, dates of entry, and the names of the ships’ captains. But he does provide numbers of Asian trade vessels arriving each year, and organises them according to their regions of origin. Crucially, he also provides statistics for the six-percent almojarifazgo cargo tax that the Spanish officials collected after valuing the cargo (see Table 2.4 below). Because of relatively long time his work covers, he gives the almojarifazgo amounts in five year averages, subdivided between the different regions the arriving ships had come from.

My contribution is the collection of data from several reports written to Madrid by the governors of the Philippines and members of the audencia (an advisory and administrative body that assisted the governor) in which they give summaries of the collection of the almojarifazgo tax. The present author has only been able to locate reports that give complete information for the years 1680 to 1687, and 1698 to 1701, and partial information for 1688, 1693, and 1694. The information in these reports includes the date of arrival for each ship, the names and sometimes ethnicities of the captains, their ports or regions of origin, and, importantly, the amount of cargo tax collected for each one. The data from these ships is summarised in Table 2.5, and a complete list with each ship his provided in Appendix 2.

Fang and Chaunu’s numbers for ships from China each year are reasonably close between 1657 and 1684. For each of the years they both have data for in this range, there is no more than a three ship difference. However, for 1685, 1686, and 1687, Fang’s numbers are all more than twice those of Chaunu’s. Fang provides little explanation for the

52 Fang, Hua ren yu Lusong , pp. 9 – 10. 53 Fang, Hua ren yu Lusong , pp. 440 – 441. 54 Pierre Chaunu, Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques (XVI e, XVII e, XVIII e siécles) Introduction Méthodologique et Indices d’activité (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1960). 58

difference between her numbers and Chaunu’s, but one possibility is that Fang’s lists includes ships that did not pay the almojarifazgo cargo tax, either because they carried no cargo or were not allowed to trade. This possibility is supported by the number of ships listed in the reports found by the present author, which in most cases give numbers very close to Chaunu’s. The one exception is the year 1686, when Fang reports fifty-nine ships, Chaunu twenty-seven, and the report found by the present author lists just twenty. In this particular case, Chaunu’s number for Chinese ships may be the most reliable because it is supported by another report from the audencia written May 23, 1689, that gives a summary of the numbers of types of ships from 1684 to 1688. The report does not list individual ships, just total numbers according to their type by year. For 1686, the audencia ’s report lists twenty-seven ‘champans’ ( shanban 舢板 55 ), the name the Spanish usually applied to Chinese ships, and eight ‘pataches,’ a European style ship.56 These numbers are identical to those given by Chaunu for Chinese and non-Chinese ships. 57 In general though, the differences between this author’s figures and Chaunu’s for Chinese ships are small enough they can be accounted for by misidentifications or mistakes made by the original Spanish clerks. Perfect agreement between two or more of the three sets of sources is rare, but, with the exception of Fang’s much larger numbers for 1685 to 1687, their numbers all show the same basic pattern.

Table 2.3. Numbers of ships arriving in Luzon, 1657 – 1710 China Southeast Asia South Asia Japan Year Fang 1 Chaunu 1 Holroyd 1 Chaunu Holroyd Chaunu Holroyd Chaunu Holroyd 1657 3 0 2 0 0 1658 18 15+ 8 0 1 1659 0 10 2 0 0 1660 13 11 4 0 0 1661 10 10 4 0 0 1662 6 6 4 0 0 1663 3 2 1 0 0 1664 3 5 7 0 1 1665 12 13 5 0 0 1666 4 4 4 0 1 1667 2 2 3 0 1 1668 4 4 1 0 2 1669 0 3 5 1 0 1670 9 8 9 1 0 1671 1 1 2 0 0 1672 8 5 4 3 1 1673 5 6 3 0 0

55 Fang, Hua ren yu Lusong , pp. 55 – 56. 56 “Carta de Fausto Cruzat sobre monto de distintos derechos,” Archivo General de Indias, Seville (hereafter AGI), Filipinas, 122, N.9. 57 Chaunu, Les Philippines , p. 172. 59

1674 5 1675 3 3 3 1 0 1676 9 9 3 0 0 1677 11 10 1 0 0 1678 5 4 5 2 0 1679 8 6 2 3 0 1680 8 5 5 2 3 4 4 0 0 1681 6 3 7 2 2 5 10 0 0 1682 4 5 1 9 0 1683 6 4 4 2 0 4 1 2 2 1684 8 5 7 4 4 10 9 2 2 1685 43 17 20 1 2 5 10 0 0 1686 59 27 20 1 0 8 7 0 0 1687 33 15 12 1 2 3 1 0 0 1688 7 82 1 4 0 1689 1690 14 3 4 0 1691 13 2 2 0 1692 14 4 5 0 1693 18 12 3 22 3 22 0 1694 12 92 0 22 1 12 0 1695 19 4 3 0 1696 17 3 5 0 1697 17 1 3 1 1698 24 24 2 3 3 9 0 0 1699 20 17 2 3 5 5 0 0 1700 17 17 1 1 1 1 0 0 1701 9 9 1 1 4 4 0 0 1702 15 1 3 0 1703 21 0 1 0 1704 1705 17 1 2 0 1706 27 2 3 0 1707 15 2 1 0 1708 32 0 5 0 1709 43 1 7 0 1710 25 3 3 0 Sources: Fang Zhenzhen 方真真 , Hua ren yu Lusong mao yi (1657 – 1687): Shi liao fen xi yu yi zhu 華人與呂宋貿易 (1657-1687): 史料分析與譯註 (Xinzhu: Qing da chu ban she, 2012), p. 94; and Pierre Chaunu, Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques (XVI e, XVII e, XVIII e siécles) Introduction Méthodologique et Indices d’activité (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1960), pp. 164 – 177. For the sources in the ‘Holroyd’ column, see Appendix 2. 1) These values include ships from China, Macau, and Taiwan. 2) These numbers come from incomplete lists, and thus should be regarded as partial values.

Figure 2.2. Ships arriving in Luzon, 1657 - 1710

Fang Chaunu Holroyd 70

Arrivals Arrivals of Chinese Ships Manila in 10

0 1670 1672 1674 1676 1678 1680 1682 1684 1686 1688 1690 1692 1694 1696 1698 1700 1702 1704 1706 1708 1710

Source: Table 2.3

The second metric that can help us to gauge the volume of trade through Luzon is the amount of the almojarifazgo paid by the Chinese ships arriving there. Though the amount of tax taken should theoretically directly reflect the overall value of imports, the available statistics need to be taken with a grain of salt. The almojarifazgo tax on imported cargo was consistently officially six percent of the value of the goods in each ship, but the valuation of the goods was based on arbitrary assessments made by representatives sent from the audencia and the Real Hacienda (royal household). 58 And like Nagasaki, there was always a certain, unquantifiable amount of smuggling that occurred as well. 59 The market did constrain the valuation of imports however. If the tax was too high it, as some members of the audencia argued when a proposal to increase the tax was made, the Chinese merchants might have withdrawn from commerce jeopardising the economic security of the colony. 60 So although it cannot be taken as an exact guide, changes in the relative amounts of almojarifazgo tax collected per year also contribute to our ability to discern the basic pattern of development that trade underwent in the last decades of the seventeenth century. Fang does not give the amount of almojarifazgo paid in her lists of ships, but Chaunu, using treasury receipts, includes a table summarising the almojarifazgo amounts collected from ships arriving in Luzon with averages for five-year periods.

58 Fang, Hua ren yu Lusong , pp. 60, 75. 59 William Lytle Schurz, The Manila Galleon (Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1985), p. 69. 60 AGI, “Expediente sobre pago de alcabala y creación de aduana,” AGI, Filipinas, 24, R.5, N.32. 61

Table 2.4. Chaunu's five-year averages for almojarifazgo collection from arriving ships in pesos, 1671 – 1715 Year China Southeast Asia South Asia Other Totals 1671 -1675 850.25 454.25 1222.13 78.75 2605.38 1676 -1680 3449.40 1433.00 1832.00 0.00 6714.40 1681 -1685 4841.75 576.50 5523.75 1537.50 12479.50 1686 -1690 13304.50 1030.25 9410.25 475.50 24220.50 1691 -1695 15882.40 534.60 4940.00 0.00 21357.00 1696 -1700 30761.60 1013.80 10544.00 3740.00 46059.40 1701 -1705 22834.25 500.00 9703.00 550.00 33587.25 1706 -1710 23938.40 365.80 6354.40 100.00 30758.60 1711 -1715 17743.00 778.75 5651.75 1000.00 25173.50 Source: Pierre Chaunu, Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques (XVI e, XVII e, XVIII e siécles) Introduction Méthodologique et Indices d’activité (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1960), pp. 208 - 212. The ‘China’ column includes amounts from China and Taiwan. The ‘Southeast Asia’ column includes amounts from Indochina, Indonesia, and elsewhere in the Philippines. The ‘Other’ column includes the amounts from Japan and Macau.

The reports that the present author has used also include ship-by-ship lists of almojarifazgo payments between 1680 and 1701. A complete list of the ships and the tax they each paid can been found in Appendix 2, but for the purposes of illustrating changes in the level of almojarifazgo collection, the total yearly tax receipts from all ships is calculated in Table 2.5 below.

Table 2.5. Almojarifazgo collection amounts for available years in pesos , 1680 – 1701 Year China Southeast South Asia Other Total Asia 1680 2975.31 1725.13 5191.07 0.00 9891.51 1681 4217.44 1057.20 6819.20 0.00 12093.84 1682 2552.71 300.00 6002.00 0.00 8854.71 1683 630.00 0.00 400.04 2710.00 3740.04 1684 2691.21 1150.00 5841.00 1100.00 10782.21 1685 22342.37 1051.79 22260.00 0.00 45654.16 1686 14354.80 0.00 23500.00 0.00 37854.80 1687 10950.00 820.91 2800.00 2240.00 16810.91 June 1693 - June 1694 1 7794.00 1099.90 6600.00 0.00 15493.90 1698 38202.97 216.27 20590.00 3300.00 62309.24 1699 30017.42 335.75 12700.00 2545.00 45598.17 1700 5500.00 129.00 4000.00 6000.00 15629.00 1701 19034.75 1500.00 9295.22 0.00 29829.97 For a ship-by-ship breakdown of the payment and the citation of individual reports, see Appendix 2. 1) Though this author has not been able to locate complete lists for either 1693 or 1694, one report attached to a letter lists the arrivals of ships from June 1693 to June 1694. This period is treated as one year for the purpose of comparison.

Despite discrepancies between these sets of data, such as the difference in ship numbers for 1685 to 1687, an agreement on the basic pattern of the trade’s development is evident. As with Japan, there was an abrupt rise in both the numbers of ships and the value of imports from the Qing empire in 1685 and 1686, undoubtedly caused by the legalisation of maritime trade. The ship numbers and the almojarifazgo collection figures attached to the reports that are summarised in Table 2.5 suggest that there was a relative decline in Chinese interest in the Luzon trade after its peak in the mid-1680s. This decline may have occurred because the sudden arrival of so many trade ships created a glut in the market. In 1686, the VOC’s governor general in Batavia passed on some commercial intelligence in a letter to his superiors, reporting that there was a large supply of cheap textiles in Manila that year. 61 The city’s commerce also likely declined because in 1687 no galleon from Acapulco arrived, and an allegedly over-laden east-bound ship was forced to return to Manila in the same year. 62

For the 1690s, the present author has found no lists of arriving trade ships in reports sent from Manila to Madrid until 1698, save for a period covering June 1693 to June 1694. During that year-long period, only 7794 pesos were paid by Chinese ships, suggesting trade had continued to decline from 1687 onwards. A half-hearted attempt to expel non-Christian Chinese from the colony between 1690 and 1700 may have inhibited commercial intercourse, 63 but Chaunu’s statistics suggest that this had little influence. His calculations give the average Chinese almojarifazgo amount for 1691 to 1695 as 15 882.40 pesos , about 2500 more than 1686 to 1690, and his list of ships range between twelve (1694) and nineteen (1695). The relatively low almojarifazgo amount for the 1693/1694 period may have been an anomaly, possibly because no galleon from Acapulco arrived in 1693. 64

61 Joannes Camphuys, Anthonio Hurdt, Willem van Outhoorn, Marten Pit, Joan van Hoorn, Cornlies van Quaelbergh, Isaac de Saint-Martin, and Gerard de Beveren, Batavia, December 13, 1686, in Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII Der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie , ed. W. Ph. Coolhaas, vol. 5 ('s Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), p. 35. 62 “Events in Filipinas, 1686 – 1688,” in The Philippine Islands (1493-1898) , ed. Emma Helen Blair, James Alexander Robertson, and Edward Gaylord Bourne, vol. 39 (Cleveland: The A.H. Clark Company, 1906), pp. 143 – 144; and "The Augustinians in the Philippines, 1670-94," in Blair, The Philippine Islands , vol. 42, p. 259. The present author would like to express my appreciation to Bruce Cruikshank for his work compiling information and references related to the Manila galleons. His database, which can be found at https://sites.google.com/site/manilagalleonlisting/, has been immensely helpful for this part of my research. 63 Lucille Chia, "The Butcher, the Baker, and the Carpenter: Chinese Sojourners in the Spanish Philippines and Their Impact on Souther Fujian (Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries," Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient 49, no. 4 (2006): 516 – 518. 64 “Transcriptions of documentary information relevant to the voyages of the Manila Galleons, from the Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain,” available at https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo/pubs/garcia2001/garcia2001.html [page 28 of the online document]. This link is to a data set that accompanies a study done by the National Climatic Data Center of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. See Rolando R. Garcia, Henry F. Díaz, Ricardo García Herrera, Jon Eischeid, María del Rosario Prieto, Emiliano Hernández, Luis Gimeno, and Francisco Rubio Durán and Ana María Bascary, "Atmospheric Circulation Changes in the Tropical Pacific Inferred from the Voyages of the Manila Galleons in the Sixteenth - Eighteenth Centuries," Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 82, no. 11 (November 2011): 2435 – 2455. 63

There was another less dramatic spike in the final years of the seventeenth century, particularly in the year 1698, when the Chinese almojarifazgo payments contributed 38 202.97 pesos to the royal treasury. That year twenty-three ships from China and one from Macau arrived in Luzon according to Chaunu (twenty-two from China and two from Macau according to this author’s list, see Appendix 2), the highest number since 1686. The cause of this may have been a recovery from losses sustained in the earlier part of the decade because of failed Manila galleon voyages. In 1690, one Manila-bound patache (a smaller auxiliary vessel) was lost, 65 and in 1692 one Acapulco-bound galleon lost her passage, while a patache carrying 20 000 pesos burned in port at the Marianas Islands. 66 In 1693, no ship arrived in Manila and the Acapulco-bound galleon was lost, 67 while in 1694 the gigantic San Jose sunk as well, taking with it four hundred men and the richest cargo ever to embark from Manila, according to the Augustinian friar and chronicler Casimiro Díaz. 68 These various disasters may have depressed trade in Manila during the 1690s to a level below what it could sustain when there were regular safe arrivals of silver-bearing ships from Acapulco.

Another possibility is that there was an expansion in Manila’s trade with the other Philippine islands, the Malukus, the Sulus, and northern Borneo. As discussed in the following two chapters, though Manila’s main role in the Qing merchants’ trading network was as a supplier of American silver, it also served as a sub-regional emporium that distributed Chinese goods to the smaller economies in and around the Philippines. This role was not dependent on the Manila galleons, and might have allowed the importation of Chinese products through Manila to grow if there were sufficient volumes of Southeast Asian products available that could be re-exported to the Qing empire in place of silver. Chaunu’s figures show a peak from 1696 to 1700 of an average annual almojarifazgo collection amount of 30761.60 pesos . The average then falls to 22 834.25 during the 1701 to 1705 period, and then continues at a similar rate, averaging 23 938.40 during the 1706 to 1710 period. The implication is that the 1698 spike was an anomaly, but after 1700, the average almojarifazgo collection per year remained somewhat higher than it had been during the 1690s, perhaps because there was a rising demand for Chinese products within the Philippines and its immediate Southeast Asian sub-region.

How did trade in Manila compare to trade in Nagasaki? Despite the spike in 1698, all the available statistics indicate that Japan remained a consistently larger market for Chinese imports than Luzon between 1685 and the end of the century. Every year from 1684 onwards, more Chinese ships arrived in Nagasaki than in Manila, even according to Fang Zhenzhen’s list. The yearly values of imports were naturally lower in Luzon as well. If we take the 1698 almojarifazgo amount for Chinese ships, the highest for any individual year that the present author has found data for, and assume that the cargoes were assessed and

65 "The Santa Misericordia of Manila," in Blair, The Philippine Islands , vol. 47, p. 75. 66 "Extracts from Jesuit Letters, 1691-94," in Blair, The Philippine Islands , vol. 41, p. 36. 67 "The Augustinians in the Philippines, 1670-94," in Blair, The Philippine Islands , vol. 42, p. 309. 68 "The Augustinians in the Philippines, 1670-94," in Blair, The Philippine Islands , vol. 42, pp. 307 – 308; and Giovanni Francesco Gemelli Careri, A Voyage to the Philippines (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1963), p. 125. 64

taxed fairly at six percent, their value would be equivalent to 636 716.17 pesos . The true value may in reality be high because the Spanish officials likely would have leaned towards overvaluation to increase their tax receipts, but successful smuggling may have compensated for this. A peso contained 25.56 g of fine silver, so the official 636 716.17 peso amount would be equivalent to 16 274.47 kg of silver. 69 Imports through Nagasaki in the same year were valued at 9397.69 kanme of silver or 35 241.35 kg at sixty-four percent fineness, according to Robert Innes’ calculations. 70 This would only be equivalent to 22 554.47 kg of fine silver, meaning that the value of official imports to Nagasaki were still worth over 6000 kg of silver more than the official value imported in Manila by Qing ships in the latter’s single best year.

There were two reasons that Qing trade to Luzon could not expand to match or exceed trade through Nagasaki, despite the continuing availability of silver in Manila. The first and most important was that it depended on trade between New Spain and Luzon. The trading potential of Luzon was determined by the importation of American silver each year on board the inbound Manila galleons. It was also limited by the cargo capacity of the outbound galleon, because the silver imports had to be bought with Asian trade goods in Acapulco. For the Manila-bound silver cargoes, cargo capacity was not directly an issue. Between 1593 and 1702, the maximum amount of silver that could be legally carried from Acapulco to Manila was 500 000 pesos (equivalent to 12 780.5 kg of fine silver), and only 250 000 pesos ’ worth of Asian goods could be sent from Manila to Acapulco. 71 Anecdotal statements collected by William Schurz in his classic The Manila Galleon suggest that at the end of the seventeenth century, the typical amount of silver that was actually brought to the Luzon from New Spain annually tended to be worth about two million pesos (51 122 kg). 72 This would be a very rich cargo, but at fifty-one metric tons it could still be comfortably loaded onto a galleon that would have had at least three hundred tons of cargo capacity. 73

However, for the Acapulco-bound cargoes of Asian goods, cargo space was the limiting factor. Fine silk cloth was generally worth its weight in silver or more, but almost no other good was worth nearly as much per unit of mass. For example, in Xiamen first grade raw silk was worth 132 liang of silver per dan in 1701, or 82.5 g of silver per kilogram, according to English East India company servants trading there. 74 The result was constant shortage of cargo space on the Acapulco-bound galleons. Their decks were frequently littered with chests full of trade goods, crucial equipment and supplies were sometimes abandoned to make more room, and occasionally rafts with additional goods were towed behind the ship. 75 Giovanni Gemelli Careri, who travelled on the Acapulco-bound galleon in

69 This is based on John Tepaske’s calculation of fine silver per peso. John J. Tepaske, "New World silver, Castile and the Philippines 1590 - 1800," in Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds , ed. J. F. Richards (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1983), p. 440. 70 Innes, “The Door Ajar,” p. 417. 71 Schurz, The Manila Galleon , p. 130; and Tepaske, “New World silver,” p. 436. 72 Schurz, The Manila Galleon , p. 156. 73 Schurz, The Manila Galleon , p. 162. 74 Gabriel Roberts to the Company, October 3, 1702, BL, IOR/E/3/63, doc. 7846, p. 1. 75 Schurz, The Manila Galleon , p. 152. 65

1696, reported that much of the ship’s water supply was removed before departure in an effort to make more room for bales of merchandise. 76 This extreme demand for cargo space was likely what caused the Acapulco-bound galleon of 1687 to lose its voyage, and motivated the hasty construction of the giant San Jose , which sunk on its maiden voyage in 1694. 77

The other obstacle to steady growth in the China-Luzon trade was the presence of South Asian merchants, with whom the Chinese shared the limited market. In the 1670s, the Zheng family had used their relationship with the English East India company to trade for South Asian cotton cloth to supplement their Manila-bound cargoes, but by the mid-1680s, the dynamic had changed. Chaunu and this author’s figures both show that South Asian ships began carrying substantial cargoes of their own to Manila by that decade, bypassing any Chinese middlemen. Serafin Quiason believes that the bulk of these merchants, who were identified as Armenian, Portuguese, or moro (Muslim) in the Spanish records, were actually privately employed by East India company servants stationed in Madras. 78 For the ships listed as coming from Madras or the Coromandel Coast, this may have been true, but the almojarifazgo collection reports show that merchants from Surat and Bengal, who were probably mostly independent operators, were also joining the fray. Interestingly, the figures in Table 2.5 demonstrate that value of South Asian trade moved in step with that from China after 1684. This suggests that both groups were receiving intelligence from Manila on the potential value of the next season’s trade, prompting greater or lesser participation the following year. If this was the case, it would have meant that the potential volume of trade goods flowing from Xiamen and Guangzhou would have been checked by stiff competition from South Asia even in the best years.

Conclusions To briefly summarise the findings of this chapter, because the Chinese economy began to recover in the 1680s after the conclusion of the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories, the Kangxi emperor’s 1684 decision to legalise maritime trade came at a time when the production of luxury commodities, especially silk and sugar, was recovering near important coastal centres. The legalisation combined with the availability of luxury commodities for export prompted a rush among would-be merchants to begin building ships and buying cargoes intended for export. Most of these men seem to have initially imagined that they would be able to imitate the success of the Zheng family and its predecessors by trading silk for silver in Japan and Luzon.

76 Careri, A Voyage to the Philippines , p. 126 – 127. 77 "The Augustinians in the Philippines, 1670-94," in Blair, The Philippine Islands , vol. 42, pp. 307 – 308; and Careri, A Voyage to the Philippines , p. 125. 78 Serafin D. Quiason, English “Country Trade” With The Philippines, 1644 – 1765 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1966), ch. 3. 66

These ambitious men were destined for disappointment though. The markets for Chinese goods in Japan and Luzon persisted, but restrictions on trade in those places, both physical and legal, prevented them from growing to match the potential output of the expanding Chinese industries. The surge in the numbers of Qing merchants arriving in Nagasaki and Manila from about 1685 to 1688 was followed by a slump and then a plateau in the numbers of ships and the value of their trade in both ports. The hundreds of Qing ship owners who had invested in the construction of large ocean-going vessels in the few years following the legalisation of maritime trade were faced with a dilemma. They could continue to sail their ships to Nagasaki seeking copper, and hope that they arrived before the quota had been filled each year. They could also steer a course for Manila and perhaps secure a load of Spanish pesos if the Manila galleon arrived that year and competition was not too great. Or they could try their luck by sailing southward to one of the many verdant islands past Luzon, or down the coast of Indochina and the Malay peninsula to one of the port-cities that connected earth and sea in ‘the lands below the winds.’ 79 It is to this third choice that we turn in the next chapter.

79 Anthony Reid derives this poetic name from descriptions of the region by Persian, Arab, Indian, and Malay seafarers. Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450 - 1680 , Volume One, The Lands below the Winds (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 6. 67

Map 2. The Western Pacific, c. 1700

Nagasaki Shanghai Putuoshan Ningbo

Fuzhou Xiamen Guangzhou Taiwan Pho Hien Macau

Hoi An Ayutthaya Manila Lucena Camarines Sur Mergui Oudong Tenasserim Panay Cebu Chaiya Pulo Condore Negros Bohol Ligor Pulo Obi Songkhla Maguindanao Patani Kelantan Aceh Terengganu Brunei Sulu Archipelago

Melaka Pulo Tioman Johor Ternate Sukadana Tidore Jambi Banjarmasin Bengkulu Palembang Ambon Makassar Batavia Banten Semarang Kupang

Chapter 3: A Borean Tailwind

The Re-Development and Structure of the Chinese-Southeast Asian Trading Network, 1684 – 1700

By the end of 1688, the limited markets for Chinese goods in Japan and Luzon had become apparent to most of the Qing empire’s maritime merchants and ship owners. In Nagasaki, the Tokugawa government’s authorities had refused seventy-five ships the right to trade, and the remaining one hundred seventeen had had to share between them an import quota capped at the value of 6000 kanme worth of silver (see Table 2.1). In Manila, a small ship from New Spain did arrive with silver that summer, but because no galleon had come in 1687, the market was certainly still flooded with Chinese merchandise from the previous season. 1 It would have been clear to most of these merchants that there simply were not enough opportunities in Nagasaki and Luzon to support them all.

These circumstances caused great frustration among the merchants and their financial backers. In Nagasaki captain after captain complained to the Chinese interpreters there that all their merchant passengers were taking losses in Japan, and it was becoming increasingly difficult to find any willing to participate in further ventures. 2 It is not hard to sympathise with these entrepeneurs. Many of them had already invested heavily in outfitting large ocean-going vessels in anticipation of being able to make super-profits in Japan and Luzon. And ship construction was not cheap in the Kangxi period. Writing about thirty years later, the Qing scholar-official Lan Dingyuan 藍鼎元 claimed that building a ship in the Qing empire cost between 2000 and 8000 liang of silver (seventy-five to three hundred kilograms), which was a princely sum even for a reasonably successful merchant. 3 If the owners were not able to send their big ocean-going vessels on profitable voyages, there was no way to recover the capital they had invested in them.

But there was an alternative to Japan and Luzon for the worried businessmen on China’s coasts in the 1680s that would allow the more adventurous among them to avoid ruin. Instead of sailing to Nagasaki and risking being turned away if the trade allotments had already been filled, or sailing to Manila and finding no galleon arrived and the market saturated, they could do what the Zheng family had done in its time of desperation in the 1670s. They could chart a course southward to try their luck in one of the innumerable tropical ports of Southeast Asia. And this is just what many of them began to do.

1 "The Augustinians in the Philippines, 1670-94," in The Philippine Islands (1493-1898) , ed. Emma Helen Blair, James Alexander Robertson, and Edward Gaylord Bourne, vol. 42 (Cleveland: The A.H. Clark Company, 1906), pp. 270 – 272. 2 For one good example, see and ship #3 from Fuzhou, March 3, 1687, Hayashi Shunsai 林春齋 , Hayashi Hoko 林鳳岡 , and Ren’ichi Ura 浦廉一 , ed., Kai Hentai 華夷變態 , (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1958 – 1959), vol. 1, p. 657. 3 Lan Dingyuan 藍鼎元 , “Lun Nan Yang Shi Yi 論南洋事宜 ,” in Luzhou Chu Ji 鹿州初集 [1732], juan 3. 69

This chapter examines the turn towards Southeast Asia in overseas Qing commercial activity beginning in the late 1680s. Its goals are first to describe the development of this new commerce geographically, and to examine the factors that helped solidify its structure. The first conclusion is that the China-based Chinese merchants quickly came to rely on a hub-and-spoke system, in which they would carry goods from Qing ports to one of several large emporia in Southeast Asia, and then rely on locally based merchants to distribute the Chinese goods they had brought to an array of smaller and less accessible markets in the sub-region of the emporium. In these smaller markets, the same sub-regional merchants would trade for a variety of Southeast Asian goods that could be marketed within the Qing empire, and then make them available to the Qing merchants in the major emporium. In several cases, the emporia also act as connecting nodes that allowed the flow of Chinese goods into the trading world of the Indian Ocean as well, and this feature will be discussed in Chapter Five.

The overall structure of the system reflected the challenges Southeast Asia’s trading environment posed for the Qing merchants. During the Zheng-era, merchants sailing from China and Taiwan had been able to rely on the availability of large quantities of silver and copper Nagasaki and Manila, and needed little else for a profitable return voyage. In contrast, the post-1684 Qing merchants in Southeast Asia needed to seek a wider range of import goods for the Qing market. These were often produced in relatively small quantities in individual regions scattered over thousands of miles of land and sea. Smaller production centres usually meant smaller markets as well, so the Chinese goods that the Qing merchants brought needed to be distributed widely across similarly vast distances. Some ship owners sent smaller vessels from China with fewer merchant-passengers and less cargo to minor ports, such as those on the Malay peninsula south of Siam, but this was a less efficient strategy and therefore usually less profitable. Identifying Southeast Asia’s commercial hubs, and using them to tap into existing sub-regional trading networks made far more economic sense, so this is what most of the China-based merchants eventually did.

I have identified five major hubs, or emporia, in Southeast Asia that served as distribution and gathering points for the exchange of Chinese and Southeast Asian goods. These are Ayutthaya, the capital of Siam and suzerain over much of the northern Malay peninsula; Johor, the most economically and militarily powerful state on the southern Malay peninsula; Banjarmasin, southern Borneo’s premier pepper producer; Manila, the commercial centre of the Philippine islands as well as the Manila galleons’ port of call; and Batavia, the beating heart of the VOC’s vast establishment in Asia. To make these selections, this dissertation has relied on sources that give the numbers of Qing merchant vessels arriving yearly and, as far as it is possible to estimate, the volumes of Chinese goods passing through them on their ways to other parts of the region or beyond. Pin-tsun Chang in his 1983 dissertation on southern Fujianese overseas trade during the late Ming period uses a similar approach, identifying four major emporia for the Fujianese merchants (Nagasaki, Macau, Manila, and Batavia). Chang, however, assumes a stronger connection between

Chinese immigration and trade than the present author believe existed, at least in the late seventeenth century, so his analysis looks somewhat different than mine. 4 Batavia, Manila, and Ayutthaya did have large ethnic Chinese communities, but the numbers of overseas Chinese in Johor and Banjarmasin were much more modest. However, the economic roles of the latter two places do not appear to have been diminished by this. Overseas Chinese merchants were potentially useful business partners as carriers of goods from the major hubs along ‘spoke’ routes, but in their absence Bugis, Malay, or Dutch vrijburger shippers played the same roles.

My second conclusion is that a policy change within the Qing empire was at least partially responsible for solidifying this new structure. The policy was a prohibition on Chinese-crewed, foreign-built ships in Qing ports introduced in 1694. This particular move by the Kangxi emperor and his government has been largely ignored, especially in works following a recent trend to portray the Qing government as pro-maritime as possible. 5 From the court’s discussions of the legislation, it is clear that it was intended primarily to help the state monitor and regulate the activities of China-based merchants, but the curious irony of its implementation was that it ended up actually helping the Qing merchants gain a competitive edge over Southeast Asian-based traders in the China-Southeast Asia trade routes.

4 Pin-tsun Chang, “Chinese Maritime Trade: The Case of Sixteenth-Century Fu-chien (Fukien),” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1983), pp. 280 – 281. 5 For example, Gang Zhao, The Qing Opening to the Ocean: Chinese Maritime Policies, 1684 – 1757 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2013); and Zheng Yangwen, How the Maritime World Shaped Modern China (Leiden: Brill, 2012). Three works that do mention it briefly are Ng Chin-keong, Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast, 1683 – 1735 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983), p. 186; Chen Xiyu 陳希育 , Zhong guo fan chuan yu hai wai mao yi 中國帆船與海外貿易 (Xiamen: Xiamen Da Xue Chu Ban She, 1991), p. 115; Huang Guosheng 黃國盛 , Ya Pian Zhan Zheng Qian De Dong Nan Si Sheng Hai Guan 鴉片戰爭前的東南四省海關 (Fuzhou: Fujian Ren Min Chu Ban She, 2000), p. 174. 71

Map 3. The sailing routes of China-based ships in Southeast Asia according to Chen Lunjiong Fuzhou Xiamen Guangzhou Taiwan Pho Hien Macau

Hoi An Ayutthaya Manila Qui Nhon Lucena Camarines Sur Mergui Oudong Tenasserim Panay Cebu Chaiya Negros Bohol Ligor Pulo Condore Songkhla Pulo Obi Maguindanao Patani Aceh Kelantan Sulu Archipelago Terengganu Brunei Melaka Pulo Tioman Johor Ternate Sukadana Tidore Jambi Bengkulu Banjarmasin Palembang Ambon Makassar Batavia Banten Semarang Kupang

Chen Lunjiong and the New Structure of Trade It will be useful to briefly sketch the geographic dimensions of the trading network that developed by the end of the seventeenth century before enlarging on the processes that allowed the formation of its constituent parts. The geographic study of Southeast Asia written closest in time to the 1684 legalisation of the Qing empire’s trade is Chen Lunjiong’s 陳倫炯 Hai Guo Wen Jian Lu 海國聞見錄 . Unfortunately its composition was not actually that close to the end of the maritime prohibition; Chen completed it around 1730, almost fifty years after the Kangxi’s decision. However, he used a wide array of information he had collected over much of his life though, including the memory of a map shown to him by the Kangxi emperor, a voyage to Nagasaki in 1710, interviews with Chinese and foreign sailors, and stories told to him by his father Chen Mao 陳昴 , who sailed to Japan and the Nguyen domain in the late 1680s. The information contained in the Hai Guo Wen Jian Lu therefore should best be taken as a collage of data without any strong temporal focus. In its broadest strokes, it is still probably our single best guide to the structure of the Chinese trading network that evolved after 1684. 1

Like its closest major predecessor, Zhang Xie’s 張燮 1617 Dong Xi Yang Kao 東西洋考, and most of the earlier entries in the long catalogue of Chinese overseas xenologies, Chen divides Southeast Asia into eastern and western halves. 2 In order to distinguish these partitions from his book’s other sections on north-east Asia and the Indian Ocean, he gives them the slightly counter-intuitive labels the ‘South Eastern Sea’ (Dong Nan Yang 東南洋 ) and the ‘Southern Sea’ (Nan Yang 南洋 ). In these sections, he shifts between describing the geography, ethnology, and culture of sub-regional polities, and then provides possible sailing routes that Qing merchants may have followed between them. Tracing these descriptions allows a basic map of the network to emerge, which is described in the following two paragraphs and illustrated in Map 3.

The South Eastern Sea route is the shorter and less complex of Chen’s two Southeast Asian sections, encompassing only the modern Philippines, northern Borneo, and some of the northern Maluku islands. The merchants sailing this route would set out from southern China (Chen assumes Xiamen as the starting point in most cases), and then sail southward until they sighted Cagua mountain (Zainiukeng 宰牛坑) at the northern tip of

1 For Chen’s explanation of his sources, see Chen Lunjiong 陳倫炯 , Hai Guo Wen Jian Lu 海國聞見錄 , ed. Li Changfu 李長傅 (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou gu ji chu ban she, 1985), pp. 18 – 19. For discussions on Hai Guo Wen Jian Lu see J. W. Cushman and A. C. Milner, "Eighteenth and Nineteenth-Century Chinese Accounts of the Malay Peninsula,” Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 52, no. 1 (1979): 1 – 2; and Wang Gungwu, Community and Nation: Essays on Southeast Asia and the Chinese (Singapore: Heinemann, 1981), pp. 108 – 110. 2 Zhang Xie 張燮 , Dong Xi Yang Kao 東西洋考 (Beijing: Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 1981). See also Roderich Ptak, “Jottings on Chinese Sailing Routes to Southeast Asia, Especially on the Eastern Route in Ming Times,” in Roderich Ptak, China, the Portuguese, and the Nanyang: Oceans and Routes, Regions and Trade (c. 1000 – 1600) (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), chap. 7, pp. 106 – 109; and J. V. Mills, “Chinese Navigators in Insulinde about A. D. 1500,” Archipel 18 (1979): 69 - 93. 73

Luzon. 3 There, according to him, they would turn southeast (certainly actually southwest), following the coast until they came to Manila. Manila seems to have served as a major hub, not only for the galleons from Acapulco and the Asian vessels that came to meet them, but also as a jumping off point for ships heading to the archipelago’s southern islands. According to Chen, the relatively close centres of Lucena (Lizaifa 利仔發 ) and Camarines (Qimali 其馬力 ) were serviced by ships based in Luzon, while farther south Panay (Banai 班愛), Negros (Edang 惡黨 ), Cebu (Suwu 宿務 ), Bohol (Maowuyan 貓務煙 ), and Mindanao (Wangjinjiaonao 網巾礁腦) were all visited by Chinese ships that had first come to Luzon. Some vessels also went to the Sulu archipelago (Sulu 蘇祿 ), then to an unidentified place he calls ‘Jiliwen’ 吉里問 on the northern coast of Borneo, and finally to Brunei (Wenlai 文萊 ). If they continued southward though, they would reach the southern termini of Chen’s route, Ternate (Wanlaogao 萬老高 ) and Dingjiyi 丁機宜 (possibly Tidore, but more likely Seram or Ambon) in the Maluku Islands. 4

Chen’s Southern Sea section provides a somewhat fuller description of the possible sailing routes that Chinese ships took. Starting from Xiamen or Guangzhou, the ships would make their ways around Hainan, avoiding the reefs of the South China Sea (Qi Zhou Yang 七州洋 ), then continue west to the Trinh domain, southwest to the Nguyen domain, even further south to the former Champa lands, or to Cambodia by sailing up the Mekong river. Ships could also continue past this coast to Pulo Condore (Kun Lun 崑崙 , the Con island group). There they would head west or continue southward. Those that went west would reach Pulo Obi (Da Zhen Yu 大真嶼 and Xiao Zhen Yu 小真嶼 ), and from there aim for the mouth of the Chao Phraya River, which would take them to Ayutthaya, or for one of the several ports along the Malay Peninsula, Chaiya, Ligor, Songkhla, Patani, Kelantan, Terengganu, or Pahang. Those ships that went south at Pulo Condore would make for Pulo Tioman (Cha Pan 茶盤 ). At this little island near the tip of the Malay peninsula, there were three choices for the crews of the trading vessels. The simplest and closest was to sail a bit farther south, turn west into the Singapore strait, and finally dock at the mouth of the Johor river, where that kingdom’s capital had been located since 1688. 5 Continuing west from Johor was Melaka , and this, according to Chen, was the final port of call for Chinese ships. He briefly mentions Aceh (Yaqi 亞齊 ) and Bengkulu (Wangulu 萬古屢 ) on Sumatra as well, though only in connection to the routes European ships took. From Pulo Tioman, ships could also head southward to the flourishing Javan port of Batavia (Galaba 噶喇吧 ), the VOC’s headquarters in Asia, or they could steer a course eastward to Sukadana (Zhugejiaola 朱葛礁喇 ) or Banjarmasin (Mashen 馬神 ) on the coast of Borneo. From Banjarmasin, they

3 This author has used Chen Jiarong’s 陳佳榮 website to help make many of these identifications. See “Nan Ming Wang 南溟網 ,” at http://www.world10k.com/blog/?p=1916 , accessed September 8, 2017. 4 Chen Lunjiong, Hai Guo Wen Jian Lu , pp. 40 – 45. 5 Leonard Y. Andaya, The Kingdom of Johor, 1641 -1728 (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 166. 74

might continue eastward to Makassar (Mangjiashi 芒佳虱 ), from whence they could reconnect with the South Eastern Sea route in the Maluku islands. 6

The textual map Chen creates in his book ends up sounding quite similar to Zhang Xie’s image of Southeast Asian’s trading network in the early seventeenth century, except that its details become increasingly meagre the farther south Chen pushes. In Chen’s South Eastern Sea section, the southernmost branch terminates in the Maluku islands, just as the Dong Xi Yang Kao ’s does, but offers nothing in the way of description except to say they were similar to other locations along the route. 7 In his Southern Sea section, Chen is able to say little about any countries beyond Johor and Batavia on the sailing routes. He seems to confuse Melaka and Aceh, claiming that it was Aceh that was occupied by Europeans, while Melaka had an independent ruler. On Java and the islands eastwards, besides Batavia he mentions three other locations, a place called ‘Xiagang 下港 ’ whose identity is uncertain, Banten (Wandan 萬丹 ), and Timor (Chiwen 池問 ). But he offers almost no information about these places, and does not bother to explain how ships might sail to them. 8 In contrast, Zhang, despite writing more than a century earlier and having not undertaken the decades’ worth of research that Chen had, provides descriptions of Jakarta (Xiagang 下港 ), 9 Palembang (Jiugang 舊港 ), the Solo River delta (Sijigang 思吉港 ), and Timor (Chimen 遲悶). 10 And he manages to link them all with detailed sailing routes. 11

It may be that Chen was simply in a hurry to get to the real novelties of his work, its descriptions of the Indian and Atlantic oceans, but the relative lack of detail in his South Eastern and Southern Sea sections more likely reflects the evolution of the trading system. When Zhang was writing on the eve of the VOC’s ascendancy in Southeast Asia, Ming- based shipping was active in most branches of the trade network east of the straits of Melaka. Small Javan and Sumatran based ships carried pepper from minor centres, such as Jambi and Cirebon, to the then important entrepôt of Banten, as John Saris described in the 1610s. 12 But the Dong Xi Yang Kao ’s description of the trade routes suggests that long distance voyages to the peripheries of the system, including Aceh, the Maluku Islands, and Timor, were made by

6 Chen Lunjiong, Hai Guo Wen Jian Lu , pp. 48 – 56. 7 Chen Lunjiong, Hai Guo Wen Jian Lu , p. 43 8 Chen Lunjiong, Hai Guo Wen Jian Lu , p. 55. 9 It may be that Chen referenced Zhang’s book for additional Javan ports, and was not aware that Jakarata, Zhang’s Xiagang 下港 , was the same place as Batavia (Galaba 噶喇吧 ) in his own time, as it had been rechristened by the VOC in 1621. He therefore mistakenly believed these were two different places. 10 Zhang and Chen use different names for Timor, but we can be reasonably sure they are referring to the same island. Zhang’s description of the sailing route makes it quite clear that his ‘Chimen 遲悶 ’ is Timor. Chen does not make the location explicit, besides including it in his list of places on the Indonesian archipelago, but the pronunciation of the characters he uses, ‘Chiwen 池問 ,’ are quite similar to those of Zhang’s. Also another ruttier, the fifteenth century work commonly known as the Shun Feng Xiang Song 順風相送 , calls Timor ‘Chiwen 池汶 ’ as well. One character differs from Chen’s name, but the pronunciation is the same. See Mills, “Chinese Navigators”: 87. 11 Zhang, Dong Xi Yang Kao , pp. 171 – 185. 12 John Saris, The Voyage of Captain John Saris to Japan, 1613 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1900), p. 213. 75 ships sailing from China at least occasionally. 13 The greater diversity in overseas destinations for early seventeenth-century ships was partly a result of the administration of foreign trade by the late Ming government. The Ming authorities issued ship owners licences to trade abroad that specified the ports they were allowed to sail to. After 1593, there were exactly one hundred permits issued for fifty-five Southeast Asian ports, and an additional ten for Taiwan. Of the Southeast Asian ones, no more than four permits were issued for any one port save Luzon, so many mostly small centres would have been visited by Ming ships each year if their captains did not cheat. 14

In Chen’s work, the lack of details about the smaller and more peripheral ports suggests that fewer Qing ships, at least proportionately, were sailing all the way to them in the early eighteenth century. One reason for this difference from the trading system in the late Ming period was the lack of any equivalent Qing licencing system for individual Southeast Asian ports. It also may have come about in part because of the VOC’s rising power in the region and its attempts to control trade between the Indonesian islands, the Melaka straits, the Malukus, and from 1670 onwards Sulawesi as well. After 1684 and the resurgence of large scale Chinese activity in the region, the company’s strategy was to enforce a mare clausum regime that sought to regulate trade throughout Southeast Asia’s seas. By the 1680s the company was managing the polities on the periphery of its system under its through treaties imposed on nominal rulers, company appointed syahbandars (harbourmasters) in their ports, licences granted to ships specifying particular places and times they could trade, and flotillas sent to patrol against the incursions of unlicensed vessels. 15 These mechanisms never gave the company the ironclad grip on the region’s trade that its directors hoped for, especially in places where numerous small ships sailing short distances could

13 Especially in the case of the Malukus and Timor, beyond Zhang’s writings, there are only occasional references to the presence of Chinese ships in the region at the beginning of the seventeenth century. For Timor, see Roderich Ptak, “The Transportation of Sandalwood from Timor to China and Macao, c. 1350 - 1600,” in Roderich Ptak, China's Seaborne Trade with South and Southeast Asia (1200 - 1750) (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), chap. 7, pp. 103 – 108; Hans Hägerdal, Lords of the Land, Lords of the Sea: Conflict and Adaptation in Early Colonial Timor, 1600 - 1800 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2012), p. 262; and Geoffrey C. Gunn, "The Timor-Macao Sandalwood Trade and the Asian Discovery of the Great South Land?" Review of Culture 53 (2016): 128. For the Maluku Islands see Roderich Ptak, “Asian Trade in Cloves, circa 1500: Quantities and Trade Routes- A Synopsis of Portuguese and Other Sources,” Roderich Ptak, China's Seaborne Trade with South and Southeast Asia (1200 - 1750) (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), chap. 13, pp. 160 – 161. One rare mention of Chinese in the Maluku Islands before the mid seventeenth century comes from Francis Drake, who in 1580 had a curious encounter with a Chinese man in Ternate. The man told Drake a farfetched tale about how he was a member of the (presumably Ming) imperial family travelling in Southeast Asia as an exile. Francis Drake, The World Encompassed by Sir Francis Drake: Being His Next Voyage to that to Nombre de Dios (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1854), p. 146 – 147. For a very brief mention of the Chinese merchants in Aceh in 1599, see John Davis, “The Voyage of Captaine John Davis, to the Easterne India, Pilot in a Dutch Ship,” in Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes: Contayning a History of the World in Sea Voyages and Lande Travells by Englishmen and others , ed. Samuel Purchas (Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1905), vol. 2, p. 315. 14 Chang, “Chinese Maritime Trade,” pp. 265 – 267. 15 Leonard Y. Andaya, The Kingdom of Johor , p. 55. For the case of Makassar, see Gerrit Knaap and Heather Sutherland, Monsoon Traders: Ships, Skippers and Commodities in Eighteenth-Century Makassar (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004), pp. 22 – 25. 76

evade patrols in shallow coastal waterways, such as the eastern Sumatra. 16 But they do seem to have given the company some control over trade along longer routes. In Makassar after the 1669 company conquest there was constant licensed and unlicensed trade carried from the east coast of Borneo, Flores, and elsewhere in Sulawesi, but it was only in 1746 that the first ship sailing directly from Xiamen docked in the port. 17 In centres such as Ternate that the company’s management regarded as crucial to its trade in spices, patrols seem to have been more rigorous, with even short-distance routes well-policed. In 1693 for example, an ethnic Chinese man referred to as ‘Loenako,’ who was probably a Ternate resident, returned there from trading in Mindanao. The company’s agents stationed on the island intercepted his ship and upon discovering he had no pass seized his cargo.18 The Qing empire’s new maritime merchants who re-entered Southeast Asia after 1684 needed to work around the VOC’s commercial and territorial empire in the region in a way the merchants who sailed in the early seventeenth century did not.

So the overall reason Chen Lunjiong’s description of Southeast Asian trade routes at the periphery of the network becomes vague and occasionally confused was probably that the sailors and merchants who he encountered in his role as an official in coastal districts usually did not sail to these peripheries. The various pieces of evidence we have for Qing ships operating in Southeast Asia in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries point to a system much more dependent on hubs or ‘emporia’ in K. N. Chaudhuri’s sense of the term. They offered “political security to visiting merchants, and provided facilities for anchorage, loading and unloading of ships, warehousing, banking, and the enforcement of contracts.”19 In Southeast Asia, they also served to connect long distance merchants to markets and sites of production in their own interior hinterlands and those of smaller and relatively near centres that could not offer the same levels of service and security to long distance merchants. Bugis, Makassarese, Dutch vrijburgers , and overseas Chinese among others who had relatively good access, legally or culturally, to both the emporium and the smaller markets around it acted as the connective tissue between them. One of the best examples of this can be found in the large numbers of small Malay vessels that sailed from Palembang in Sumatra each year, carrying pepper to Johor where it was exchanged for silk brought on Chinese ships. 20 For the China-based merchants, this system was convenient

16 Barbara Watson Andaya, To Live As Brothers: Southeast Sumatra in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), p. 121. 17 Knaap, Monsoon Traders , pp. 21 – 22, 145. 18 Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Laurens Pijl, Isaac de Saint-Martin, Dirk de Hass, Jan van Leene, Wouter Valckenier, Abraham, van Riebeeck, Manuel Bornezee, and Wybrand Lycochthon, February 9, 1693, in Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII Der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie , ed. W. Ph. Coolhaas, vol. 5 ('s Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), p. 583. 19 K. N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 224. Barbara and Leonard Andaya make this same point regarding the attraction of Johor’s Riau anchorage. Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia (Houndsmills: MacMillan, 1982), p. 79. 20 Barbara Watson Andaya, To Live As Brothers , p. 122. 77 because it spared them both the danger of confrontations with VOC patrol ships and the trouble of sailing to many small markets.

Map 4. The hub-and-spoke structure of China-based trade in Southeast Asia, c. 1700 Fuzhou Xiamen Guangzhou Taiwan Pho Hien Legend Major Hub Trunk Route (To Bengal) Hoi An Ayutthaya Manila Spoke Route Lucena Mergui Oudong Camarines Sur Tenasserim Panay Cebu Chaiya Bohol Negros (To the Ligor Pulo Condore Coromandel Songkhla Pulo Obi Maguindanao Coast) Pattani Aceh Kelantan Terengganu Brunei Sulu Archipelago Pulo Tioman Melaka Johor Ternate Sukadana Tidore Jambi Banjarmasin Bengkulu Palembang Makassar Ambon Banten Batavia Cirebon Semarang Kupang

The Five Great Emporia of Southeast Asia What this section offers is a modification to Chen’s sketch of the Chinese trading network in Southeast Asia that highlights the role of several crucial emporia that supported the system. Leaving aside the ports of Pho Hien and Hoi An in the Trinh and Nguyen domains, which functioned primarily as emporia for their own hinterlands, there were five centres that emerged (or re-emerged) as major hubs in the China-based merchants’ trading system of the late 1680s and early 1690s. As listed in the introduction to this chapter, these were Ayutthaya, Johor, Banjarmasin, Manila, and the centre that connected the Qing merchants to the VOC’s empire, Batavia itself. 1

To begin, the Siamese capital of Ayutthaya was the closest of the emporia to the Qing empire, and likely the second most important after Batavia. Its attraction for the Qing merchants included both Siam’s domestic market and produce, its connections to ports along the Malay peninsula, and its access to the Bay of Bengal. The overland link through Siamese territory between the western Pacific and the Bay and Bengal made it particularly important for the Qing merchants. Cloth and other goods were regularly shipped from Surat, the Coromandel Coast, and Bengal to Mergui on the west side of the Malay peninsula, from where they were carried overland to the Gulf of Siam and then shipped to Ayutthaya’s market. For the Chinese merchants delivering their wares to Ayutthaya, this cross-peninsula route connected them to those same markets in South Asia as well. 2 From the detailed account of trade on the west coast of Siam left to us by the Bostonian Francis Davenport, who served as the reluctant assistant of the royal shahbandar of Mergui, Samuel White, in 1686 and 1687, we have a reasonably clear picture of the types of merchandise being carried overland westward. 3 The most important types of merchandise produced in Siam or its

1 See John E. Wills, Jr., “China’s Farther Shores: Continuities and Changes in the Destination Ports of China’s Maritime Trade, 1680 – 1690,” in Emporia, Commodities and Entrepeneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, c. 1400 - 1750 , ed. Roderich Ptak and Dietmar Rothermund (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991). Wills takes a similar approach in his article, analysing the traditionally important ports of Melaka and Banten, alongside Ayutthaya, Batavia, Manila, and Nagasaki in order to highlight changes in the system. James Chin also offers a geographic description of Chinese (specifically ‘Hokkien’) trade in Southeast Asia, though he focuses on the business connections of overseas merchants, rather than the patterns of shipping routes or the flow of goods. James K. Chin, “Junk Trade, Business Networks, and Sojourning Communities: Hokkien Merchants in Early Maritime Asia,” Journal of Chinese Overseas 6 (2010): 193. 2 For mentions of this route, see George White, “Report on the Trade of Siam written in 1678,” in John Anderson , English Intercourse with Siam in the Seventeenth Century (London: Kegan Paul, 1890), p. 425; Francis Davenport, “An Historical Abstract of Mr Samuel White his management of affairs,” in The English Factory in Siam, 1621 - 1685 , ed. Anthony Farrington and Dhiravat na Pombejra (London: British Library, 2007), vol. 2, p. 1217; and ship #93 from Siam, October 9, 1686, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 633; Records of the Relations Between Siam and Foreign Countries in the 17th Century, Volume V, 1688 - 1700 (Bangkok: Vajirañāna National Library, 1921), p. 127. For Mergui’s trade generally see also Gervaise, The Natural and Political History , pp. 17 – 18; Sunait Chutintaranond, “Mergui and Tenasserim as Leading Port Cities in the Context of Autonomous History,” in From Japan to Arabia: Ayutthaya's Maritime Relations with Asia , ed. Kennon Breazeale (Bangkok: Foundation for the Promotion of Social Sciences and Humanities Textbooks Project, 1999), pp. 106 – 108; and J. A. Mills, “The Swinging Pendulum: From Centrality to Marginality - A Study of Southern Tenasserim in the History of Southeast Asia,” Journal of the Siam Society 85 (1997): 43 – 45. 3 For an entertaining account of the careers of White and Davenport, see Maurice Collis, Siamese White (London: Faber and Faber, 1936). 80

neighbouring vassal states that were exported through the port included eaglewood, sappanwood, tin, and elephants. At least as important though were zinc and chinaware from the Qing empire, and copper, originally either from south-western China or from Japan, all of which would have been first brought by ship from China to the emporium of Ayutthaya. 4

Locally based traders, most of them overseas Chinese, also linked Ayutthaya to a string of small states along the east coast of the Malay peninsula that the Siamese kings claimed suzerainty over. Based on Chen Lunjiong’s list, chief amongst these were Chaiya, Ligor, Songkhla, and Patani. Further south Kelantan, and Terengganu were also technical vassals of Siam, though they probably had less direct commercial involvement with Ayutthaya than they did with Johor.5 From Chen’s description of the trade routes, we know that Qing ships could sail to all of these east coast Malay ports as easily as they could to Ayutthaya. They needed merely to chart a course at the proper angle west or southwest from Pulo Obi. 6 And in the records in the Kai Hentai , there are indeed occasional notices of China-based ships sailing directly to Ligor, Songkhla, and Patani. 7 But direct trade in these small Malay ports tended to be a tedious business, so most China-based crews appear to have opted for trading indirectly with them through Ayutthaya. The problem with direct trade with the small Malay peninsula ports was a simple economic one; their populations and production of exports were generally too small to support trade on the scale that the China- based merchants needed to cover the overhead costs of their enterprises. Chen states that the individual Malay ports could not support many ships (“maoyi nan rong duo sao 貿易難容多艘 ”), 8 and Qing crews in Nagasaki complained about the lack of exportable goods in them. For example, the crew of one Chinese ship that sailed from Ligor to Nagasaki in 1693 claimed that the total production of goods in that statelet was only enough to fill two Qing ships each year. 9

The obvious alternative for Qing merchants seeking Malay goods was to tap into the flow of commerce that connected Siam to its vassal states along the peninsula through Ayutthaya. Tin, for example, was mined throughout the Malay peninsula and was regularly carried to Ayutthaya by Siam or Malay-based merchants for resale there. In the case of Ligor,

4 Davenport, “An Historical Abstract,” in Farrington, The English Factory in Siam , vol. 2, p. 1197, 1213, and passim. 5 Chen Lunjiong, Hai Guo Wen Jian Lu , p. 54; and Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thai-Malay Relations: Traditional Intra-regional Relations from the Seventeenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 6. See also Barbara Watson Andaya, “An Examination of Sources concerning the Reign of Sultan Mansur Syah of Terengganu (1741 - 1793), with Special Reference to the Tuhfat Al-Nafis,” Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Society 49, no. 2 (1976): 80 – 106; and Barbara Watson Andaya, “Gates, Elephants, Cannon and Drums: Symbols and Sounds in the Creation of Patani Identity,” in Ghosts of the Past in Southern Thailand: Essays on the History and Historiography of Patani , ed. Patrick Jory (Singapore: Nus Press, 2013). 6 Chen Lunjiong, Hai Guo Wen Jian Lu , p. 54. 7 For examples, see ship #45 from Ligor, August 16, 1689, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1116; ship #73 from Songkhla, August 15, 1696, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1830; and ship #66 from Patani, August 28, 1694, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1682. 8 Chen Lunjiong, Hai Guo Wen Jian Lu , p. 54. 9 Ship #77 from Ligor, June 16, 1693, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1595. 81

likely the most important tin producer in the region, even the Dutch VOC’s licensed monopsony on the export of tin did not stem its flow to Ayutthaya. The king of Siam, Narai (r. 1656 to 1688), had granted the VOC the exclusive right to export this metal in 1671, 10 but in 1695 the company’s agents were complaining that Ligor tin was still being bought up by Chinese Siamese residents. 11 Similarly, the Scottish merchant captain Alexander Hamilton, who sailed to Siam in 1719, claimed that in the port of ‘Cui’ north of Ligor (probably Chaiya) great quantities of tin and ivory originated there, but the total production of both commodities were shipped to Ayutthaya. 12 The implication of these testimonies is that despite the ease with which China-based merchants could sail to the Malay peninsula’s various ports, many, if not most, preferred to buy tin and other Malay goods in Ayutthaya because of the relative reliability of the stocks of merchandise there and the larger potential market for Qing imports in the small Malay centres.13

Following Chen’s Southern Sea route down the Malay peninsula, Johor was the next major emporium for China-based merchants. Too far south to be dominated either politically or economically by Siam, Johor was unquestionably the most powerful Malay state of the late seventeenth century. It possessed a number of characteristics that made it an almost ideal centre for the Qing merchants, both geographic and political. Like Stamford Raffles’ Singapore established a bit more than a century later, Johor sat at the tip of the Malay peninsula and was a natural anchorage for ships sailing southward from China or mainland Southeast Asia, and for ships that had just sailed through the Straits of Melaka from the Indian Ocean. This position also put Johor in close proximity to both the pepper producing regions of eastern Sumatra, and the tin mines on Bangka Island and the Malay peninsula to the north, which meant that like Siam it was able to provide long distance merchants with large quantities of goods in demand in the Qing empire. 14

Politically, Johor’s position as an emporium was also enhanced by the decline of Melaka, its chief potential rival as an entrepôt , thanks primarily to the VOC’s restrictive policies. After the company’s conquest of Melaka in 1641, it maintained Batavia on the straits of Sunda as its central administrative and commercial headquarters and did not allow Melaka to develop as an alternative hub. The company strictly controlled the import and

10 George Vinal Smith, The Dutch in Seventeenth-Century Thailand (Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1974), p. 41; and Bhawan Ruangsilp, Dutch East India Company Merchants at the Court of Ayutthaya: Dutch Perceptions of the Thai Kingdom, c. 1604 - 1765 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), p. 20. 11 Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Laurens Pijl, Dirk de Haas, Abraham van Riebeeck Wouter Valckenier, Joannes Cops, Manuel Bornezee, Wijbrand Lycochthon, and Willem van Wijngaarden, January 19, 1697, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 5, p. 787. It is unclear whether the Chinese men in question were Siam-based Chinese bringing it to Siam, or China-based merchants who had come to Ayutthaya. 12 Hamilton, A New Account , vol. 2, p. 161. 13 For arguments on the attractiveness of Ayutthaya in general see Kennon Breazeale, “Thai Maritime Trade and the Ministry Responsible,” in From Japan to Arabia: Ayutthaya's Maritime Relations with Asia , ed. Kennon Breazeale (Bangkok: Foundation for the Promotion of Social Sciences and Humanities Textbooks Project, 1999), p. 20. 14 Diane Lewis, “The Dutch East India Company and the Straits of Malacca, 1700 – 1784; Trade and Politics in the Eighteenth Century” (PhD diss., Australian National University, 1970), pp. 83 – 84. 82

export of goods to that city, and the result was that Melaka’s trading environment provided little encouragement for foreign merchants. It became, in the words of a Chinese crew that sailed there in 1694, just “a small port, which not many Chinese junks visit.”15 The curtailment of Melaka’s potential was to Batavia’s benefit, but it was an even greater boon to Johor. The Malay port lay outside the company’s control, and was located just down the coast from Melaka. It was perfectly placed to tap into the unceasing flow of commerce crossing through the straits and was unfettered by the VOC’s taxes and monopolistic policies that hampered business in its rival. 16

The Dutch company handed Johor another gift in the form of an unrestricted supply of company passes for ships sailing through the Straits of Melaka. These were distributed among Johor’s leading noblemen and court officials, who could then grant them to the captains of trade ships wishing to cross through the straits without fear of molestation from the company’s forces. 17 This courtesy, intended as an expression of appreciation for Johor’s political support of the VOC, also encouraged foreign vessels on long distance voyages to stop in Johor. After securing the patronage of a noble there and borrowing one of their company passes, a merchant ship would be able to continue through the straits without fear of the company’s patrols.

In theory this meant that ships from the Qing empire could potentially sail beyond Johor after stopping there, and visit Perak, Kedah, or Aceh. But in practice it appears that most China-based crews were content to allow local ships to carry this trade between Johor and its neighbours. According to the Huang Chao Wen Xian Tong Kao 皇朝文獻通考 , an imperially commissioned Qing encyclopaedia compiled between 1747 and 1785, some of the Qing merchants who went to Johor would switch to ‘barbarian’ ( fan 番) ships there and then sail them to other places. 18 The pirate William Dampier, who was in Aceh in 1688, claimed that ten to twelve ships came to that Sumatran port from China each year, but there are almost no other references to China-based ships arriving in the Sumatran city during the late-seventeenth century. 19 If Dampier was not misidentifying overseas Chinese shipping as

15 Ship #65 from Melaka, August 8, 1694, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1681. This translation is from Yoneo Ishii, ed., The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia: Translations from the Tôsen Fusetsu-gaki, 1674 - 1723 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), p. 264. M. R. Fernando, doing preliminary research on the VOC’s harbourmaster’s records from Melaka, has published a table giving the numbers of ships owned by ethnic Chinese that arrived in Melaka for select years (1682, 1698, 1709, 1715, 1720, 1725, 1730, 1735, and 1742), which sorts them according to the port they were based out of. The only ships from the Qing empire that arrived during any of those years were one in 1715 and two in 1742. Both were from Xiamen. M. R. Fernando, “Early Settlers in the Land of Promise: Chinese Traders in the Malay Archipelago in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” in Mainland China in Transition, 1750 – 1850 , ed. Wang Gungwu and Ng Chin-keong (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2004), p. 235. 16 Lewis, “The Dutch East India Company,” pp. 32 – 33. 17 Leonard Y. Andaya, The Kingdom of Johor , pp. 39 – 40; and M. R. Fernando, “Continuity and Change in Maritime Trade in the Straits of Melaka in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” in Trade, Circulation, and Flow in the Indian Ocean World , ed. Michael Pearson (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2015), pp. 118 – 119. 18 Huang Chao Wen Xian Tong Kao 皇朝文獻通考 [1747 – 1785], juan 297: 43b. 19 William Dampier, Voyages and Descriptions, Vol. II (London: James Knapton, 1700), p. 136. 83

China-based, it may have been that he mistook an exceptional circumstance for a regular occurrence; that year Johor’s government happened to be undergoing a coup and a relocation of its capital from Bintan island to the Johor river mouth. 20 Other Dutch and English writers almost always observed either Johor Malay ships or ships belonging to overseas Chinese carrying goods through the straits to the ports between Johor and Aceh. 21 The scale of this locally based trade between Johor and its neighbours was certainly great enough to keep Johor’s emporium and its China-based customers well supplied by the 1690s. In 1693 for example, an estimated sixty to eighty vessels were sailing through the straits to Johor annually, compared to just eight to ten in 1680. 22

Besides Aceh and the other ports within the straits, Johor’s emporium was fed by pepper producers on the east coast of Sumatra, especially Palembang. This situation was irritating for the VOC’s management, who were then attempting to monopolise the pepper trade in eastern Sumatra. 23 According to the company’s agents, small vessels were carrying a steady flow of ‘smuggled’ pepper to Johor, Aceh, Cambodia, Siam, and occasionally the English East India company outpost of Bengkulen on the west side of Sumatra. 24 Evidently some of the pepper was indeed bypassing Johor and being taken to other ports to the north; in 1687 William Dampier, sailing aboard the pirate ship Cygnet , helped capture an Asian ship crewed by ethnic Chinese carrying pepper from Palembang to Siam, 25 probably intended for resale in Ayutthaya to ships from the Qing empire. However, the bulk of it seems to have been taken to Johor by the early 1690s, thanks to its location and its relative immunity from the Dutch’s company’s interference. 26 The steady flow of pepper from Palembang and other small centres to Johor combined with the equally steady traffic of locally-based ships through the straits meant that China-based merchants were able to access these production centres and markets without sailing to any of them directly. Consequently, there were about five to ten China-based merchant ships arriving each year in the port, bringing with them

20 Leonard Y. Andaya, The Kingdom of Johor , pp. 154 – 155. 21 Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Laurens Pijl, Isaac de Saint-Martin, Dirk de Haas, Abraham van Riebeeck, Wouter Valckenier, Joan van Leene, Manuel Bornezee, Wybrand Lycochthon, and Willem van Wijngaerden, December 8, 1693, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 5, p. 628; Charles Lockyer, An Account of the Trade in India (London, 1711), p. 35; British Library, London (hereafter BL), Add MS 43731, “Transcripts, etc., of papers of John Scattergood (1681-1723),” Vol. II, f. 320; and Hamilton, A New Account , vol. 2, p. 94. The overseas Chinese ships were not always small; a letter from an English East India Company ship sent from Aceh in 1697 reported a five hundred ton ship belonging to the ‘Chinese of Malacca’ was taken by a pirate near Aceh. Solomon Lloyd and William Reynolds in Actcheen [Aceh] to John Gayer, August 20, 1697, BL, IOR/E/3/53, f. 127 r. 22 Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Laurens Pijl, Isaac de Saint-Martin, Dirk de Hass, Abraham van Riebeeck, Wouter Valckenier, Joan van Leene, Manuel Bornezee, Wybrand Lycochthon, and Willem van Wijngaerden, December 8, 1693, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 5, p. 628. 23 Barbara Watson Andaya, To Live As Brothers , pp. 121 – 122; and Hamilton, A New Account , vol. 2, p. 119. 24 Joannes Camphuys, Willem van Outhoorn, Marten Pit, Joan van Hoorn, Isaac de Saint-Martin, Gerard de Beveren, and Wouter Valckenier, March 14, 1690, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 5, p. 358; and Joannes Camphuys, Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Wouter Valckenier, Abraham van Riebeeck, and Manuel Bornezee, March 26, 1691, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 5, p. 398. 25 William Dampier, A New Voyage Round the World (London: James Knapton, 1694), vol. 1, p. 401. 26 Leonard Y. Andaya, The Kingdom of Johor , pp. 177 – 178. 84

Chinese silks and zinc, while taking back tin, pepper, and likely a fair quantity of silver leaking in through the Melaka straits from the Indian Ocean. 27

After Johor, the next port on Chen Lunjiong’s Southern Sea route that this dissertation identifies as a major emporium is Banjarmasin on the southern coast of Borneo. To reach it, according to Chen’s directions, ships coming from China would steer southeast at Pulo Tioman, an island to the north of Johor, then follow the coast of Borneo eastward. Of the major emporia for China-based merchants in Southeast Asia between the late 1680s and the ban on Nanyang trade imposed in 1717, Banjarmasin was the most remote from the major arteries of trade that Chen and his predecessors describe, and its inclusion here is the most tentative. Borneo, sitting awkwardly between the eastern and western trade routes, possessed a number of others ports, including Sukadana and Brunei, which ships sailing directly from China may have visited from time to time, but we know less about them because of a paucity of contemporary European interest in those places. Brunei on the northern coast of Borneo was at the south-western extremity of the eastern route, only accessible to China-based ships after they had passed by Luzon and the Sulu Islands, according to Chen’s descriptions. Ambassadors from the Spanish governor of the Philippines sent to Brunei in the mid-1680s make no mention of any Qing ships or merchants there. 28 Sukadana, on the western route and closer to Pulo Tioman than Banjarmasin, was visited at least occasionally by Qing ships, according to Jacob Jansz de Roy, a Dutch adventurer that visited the sultanate in the 1690s. 29 But it was not as well placed to attract Buginese and Makassarese traders from Sulawesi, and does not seem to have been an important pepper producer like Banjarmasin. 30

However there is enough evidence from the observations by Dutch, English, and Portuguese merchants to support a confident assertion that Banjarmasin was a crucial port in the Chinese network, and easily the most important centre in Borneo at the time. 31 Pepper

27 Leonard Y. Andaya, The Kingdom of Johor , pp. 179 – 180; and Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 5 and 6, passim. 28 Robert Nicholl, “Relations between Brunei and Manila A. D. 1682 – 1690,” Brunei Museum Journal 4, no. 1 (1977): 132. 29 B. Brunig, “Jacob Jansz de Roy, ‘Report on his Journey to Boreno (and Atchin) his escape from Batavia thereto undertaken in 1691 and the following years’: A Review and Translation,” Sarawak Museum Journal 6 (1995): 482. 30 For some of the very little information we have on seventeenth-century Sukadana from European sources, see F. Andrew Smith, “Misfortunes in English Trade with Sukadana at the End of the Seventeenth Century, with an Appendix on Thomas Gullock, A Particularly Unlucky Trader,” Borneo Research Bulletin 46 (2015): 75 – 92. 31 Chin Yoon Fong, “VOC Relations With Banjarmasin, 1600 - 1750: A Study in Dutch Trade and Shipping in the 17th and 18th Centuries,” in Kapal dan Harta Karam: Ships and Sunken Treasure , ed. Yusoff Iskandar (Kuala Lumpur: Diterbitkan oleh Persatuan Muzium Malaysia, Muzium Negara untuk Jabatan Sejarah, University Malaya, 1986); R. Suntharalingam, “The British in Banjarmasin: An Abortive Attempt at Settlement 1700-1707,” Journal of Southeast Asian History 4, no. 2 (September 1963): 33 – 50; and George Bryan Souza, The Survival of Empire: Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630 – 1754 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 125 – 128. 85 production was certainly its most attractive characteristic for Qing and Europeans alike. 32 From the early 1690s onwards, the Portuguese from Macau were competing with Qing ships for loads of pepper, 33 and after 1700, when the English new company founded its factory there, the company’s servants blamed China-based ships for forcing the price of pepper up. In the winter of 1703 and 1704 for example, the English reported the arrival of six Chinese ships, to whom the Banjarmasinese traded most of their pepper. 34

Banjarmasin’s role as a link between the Dutch mare clausum around Sulawesi and the Maluku Islands must have attracted China-based traders as well, and this role was enhanced in 1712 by the VOC’s decree prohibiting Chinese ships from sailing east of Makassar. 35 The company was never able to close the seas as thoroughly as its directors wanted, but the prohibition made it easier for the Bugis and Makassarese traders to control the breach between the eastern archipelago and the Chinese trading network, as Heather Sutherland’s many articles on Makassar’s economic role in Southeast Asia argue. 36 Daniel Beeckman, an East India company servant who was sent to buy pepper at Banjarmasin in 1714 wrote that, “the Maccasser praws come in here Yearly about the latter end of September, and bring Slaves, Cloves, Nutmegs, Mace, Gumboage [a tree resin used as a yellow dye], Cassia-lignum, and sundry other Merchandizes.”37 The southern Sulawesi traders also brought ‘tortoise’ (actually sea turtle) shell, trepang (sea cucumbers), and limited quantities of Timorese sandalwood to Banjarmasin, and then sailed back towards Sulawesi to redistribute Chinese silk, cotton, chinaware, tobacco, and various manufactured goods throughout the eastern archipelago. 38 This was a profitable exchange on both sides; one of Beeckman’s predecessors, the chief of the luckless English factory in Banjarmasin in 1706, wrote to his

32 See David Bulbeck, Anthony Reid, Lay Cheng Tan, and Yiqi Wu, Southeast Asian Exports Since the 14th Century: Cloves, Pepper, Coffee, and Sugar (Singapore: KITLV Press, 1998), p. 80. 33 Souza, The Survival of Empire , p. 127. 34 Banjar to London, December 23, 1704 & February 24, 1704, BL, IOR/E/3/66, doc. 8219. See also Goh Yoon Fong, “Trade and Politics in Banjarmasin, 1700 – 1747” (PhD diss. University of London, 1969), pp. 206 – 207. 35 Leonard Y. Andaya, “Local Trade Networks in Maluku in the 16th, 17th, and 18th Centuries,” Cakalele 2, no. 2 (1991): 78. 36 Heather Sutherland, “Mestizos as Middlemen? Ethnicity and Access in Colonial Macassar,” in Papers of the Dutch-Indonesian Historical Conference held at Lage Vuursche, The Netherlands 23-27 June 1980 , ed. Gerrit Schutte and Heather Sutherland (Leiden: Bureau of Indonesian Studies, 1982); Heather Sutherland, “Eastern Emporium and Company Town: Trade and Society in Eighteenth-Century Makassar,” in Brides of the Sea: Port Cities of Asia From the 16th-20th Centuries , ed. Franke Broeze (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989); Heather Sutherland, “Trepang and wangkang: The China trade of eighteenth-century Makassar, c. 1720s-1840s,” in Authority and Enterprise Among the Peoples of South Sulawesi , ed. Roger Tol, Kees van Dijk, and Greg Acciaioli (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2000); Heather Sutherland, “Makassar Malays: Adaptation and Identity, c. 1660 - 1790,” in Contesting Malayness: Malay Identity Across Boundaries , ed. Timothy P. Barnard (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004); and Heather Sutherland, “A Sino-Indonesian Commodity Chain: The Trade in Tortoiseshell in the Late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” in Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia , ed. Eric Tagliacozzo and Wen-Chin Chang (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011). 37 Daniel Beeckman, A Voyage to and From the Island of Borneo in the East Indies (London: T. Warner, 1718), p. 145. 38 Sutherland, “Trepang and wangkang,” p. 78; and Sutherland, “A Sino-Indonesian Commodity Chain,” p. 183. 86

superiors that the Chinese were able to outbid the English for pepper “with very good profit because they purchase with [Chinese] goods,” rather than silver as the Europeans did. 39

Turning to the eastern trade route, the most important emporium was certainly the capital of the Spanish Philippines, Manila. The city’s most celebrated role was the port of call for the silver-bearing galleons from New Spain (discussed at length in the previous chapter), but in the trading world of the Chinese it had a secondary part to play as well. Within the revitalised trading system after 1684 as Chen Lunjiong describes it, Manila also became the primary hub in a sub-regional network that linked Luzon to the other Philippine islands, Jolo, Mindanao, and through them to the Maluku Islands and northern and eastern Borneo. 40 The Spanish colonial centre was in essence the gateway to Chen’s South Eastern Sea. The rise in both Chinese and South Asian commerce in Manila during the late 1690s, apparent in the different data sets compiled by Pierre Chaunu and myself that are described in Chapter II, may have been a result of a gradual increase in the leakage of Chinese and South Asian goods away from the Manila galleons into the southern Philippines, and from there into the eastern archipelago.

This possibility is difficult to prove directly from Spanish records because the movement of goods within the Philippines was not subject to the almojarifazgo tax. Only Jolo, which was not yet part of the Spanish domain, is visible in those records. 41 But there are other sources written by Chinese and European visitors to the islands that shed some sidelights on the shadowy structure of the South Eastern Sea network and Manila’s role within it after 1684. Gemelli Careri, the Italian tourist who came to Luzon in 1696, gives a list of the various goods produced throughout the islands that were brought to Manila, though he offers little explanation of their carriers’ methods or identity. 42 We can surmise that they were primarily being exchanged for goods brought to Manila by ships from the Qing empire and South Asia, because the Manila region itself produced very little. Fang Zhenzhen’s investigation of sixteen account books confiscated from Fujianese merchants by the Spanish authorities in Manila in 1685 and 1686 shows that some residents of the Philippines beyond Manila were travelling there to trade for Chinese goods. The customers included Luzonians from Abucay, Laguna, Pampanga, Cagayan, and Pangasinan, as well as others from Cebu and the Visaya islands. Based on the very limited sample of data the

39 Henry Barre in Banjar, February 4, 1706, BL, IOR/G/35/6, doc. 12. 40 Chen Lunjiong, Hai Guo Wen Jian Lu , pp. 43 – 44. For a discussion on the pre-Qing incarnations of Luzon’s connection with other ‘eastern route’ lands, see Ptak, “Jottings on Chinese Sailing Routes”; and Anthony Reid, “Flows and Seepages in the Long-term Chinese Interaction with Southeast Asia,” in Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese in Honour of Jennifer Cushman , ed. Anthony Reid (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1996), pp. 34 – 35. 41 Pierre Chaunu, Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques (XVI e, XVII e, XVIII e siécles) Introduction Méthodologique et Indices d’activité (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1960), p. 55. 42 The goods include pearls, ambergris, gold, and wax. John Francis Gemelli Careri, A Voyage Round the World , in A Collection of Voyages and Travels (London: Awnsham and John Churchill, 1706), vol. 4, pp. 443 – 444. 87

account books provide, some were ethnic Chinese or Spanish residents of those places, but the majority seem to have been natives. 43

Beyond the sphere of Spanish control, the links in the chains of exchange become even less distinct. For northern Borneo, this author has found very little information for the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries beyond Chen’s very brief description. The reports of Spanish ambassadors sent to Brunei in 1685 suggest that that sultanate had become isolated from Chinese trade at that time because one of the sultan’s requests was that the Spanish should send two sampans of Chinese Luzonians to take up residence there, presumably to establish commercial links with Manila. 44 In the case of Jolo, Chaunu lists only two ships coming to Manila before the 1717 Southeast Asian trade ban in the Qing empire came into effect, one in 1699 and another in 1717, indicating that whatever trade existed between Luzon and that island was being mostly handled by intermediaries. 45

For the sultanate of Maguindanao on Mindanao however, the picture is a bit clearer. 46 William Dampier, once again one of the best observers of our period, was in Maguindanao in 1685 and wrote that the state built good ships, some of which were sent primarily to Manila to sell gold and wax each year.47 Dampier’s claim that Maguindanao managed its own trading network is supported by Dutch observations. VOC envoys to the court in 1694 reported that there would be very little profit in establishing a permanent settlement because the sultanate was already sending its own ships to Manila, Batavia, Melaka, and even Siam. 48 This author has not been able to find reference to ‘Mindanao’ ships arriving in any of these places, but there is a strong possibility that Maguindanao’s merchant marine was operated by crews of overseas Chinese, as they were in Siam and the Nguyen domain, and was not therefore easily recognisable outside of its home port. Some may also have been non-Mindanao residents who the sultan temporarily employed. In 1688, for example, a Chinese captain from Java was coerced by Maguindanao’s sultan into making a trading voyage to Manila on the sultan’s behalf. 49 The presence of Chinese in Maguindanao also seems to have turned it into a modest entrepôt for the re-export of Chinese goods southward into the VOC’s Malukus and beyond as well. In 1700, another Dutch

43 Fang Zhenzhen 方真真 , Hua ren yu Lusong mao yi (1657 – 1687): Shi liao fen xi yu yi zhu 華人與呂宋貿易 (1657-1687): 史料分析與譯註 (Xinzhu: Qing da chu ban she, 2012), pp. 442 – 443. For her discussion, see Fang, Hua ren yu Lusong , pp. 176 – 177. 44 Nicholl, “Relations between Brunei and Manila”: 162. 45 Chaunu, Les Philippines , pp. 173, 180. 46 For the history of Maguindanao generally, see Ruurdje Laarhoven, “Lords of the Great River: The Magindanao Port and Polity During the Seventeenth Century,” in The Southeast Asian Port and Polity: Rise and Demise , ed. J. Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990). 47 Dampier, A New Voyage , vol. 1, pp. 332 – 333. 48 François Valentijn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indien (‘s Gravenhage: H. C. Susan & C. Hzoon, 1856-1858), vol. 1, pp. 163 – 164. Another envoy in 1700 expands this list is expanded to include Makassar and (improbably) Madras by native informants a few pages later in François Valentijn’s retelling. Valentijn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indien , vol. 1, p. 166. 49 Ruurdje Laarhoven, “The Chinese at Maguindanao in the Seventeenth Century,” Philippine Studies 35, no. 1 (First Quarter 1987): 35 – 36. 88

envoy claimed that he had found four Chinese ships in Maguindanao, which may have come directly from China or more likely belonged to Chinese Luzonians; they had apparently brought enough porcelain that the price was cheaper there than it was in Batavia. 50

Finally the last and greates of the emporia was Batavia, the centre of the VOC’s empire, and consequently the commercial epicentre of Southeast Asia. 51 It was also arguably the greatest beneficiary of the Kangxi emperor’s legalisation of maritime trade, because unlike Nagasaki, Manila, Hoi An, Pho Hien, and Banjarmasin, it was not dependent only on its inland market or a finite sub-regional trading network. And unlike Ayutthaya and Johor, which had indirect access to the Indian Ocean, the company’s ships sailed from Batavia directly to South Asia’s greatest ports, to Persia, and to the growing market of western Europe. The volume of Chinese goods the port could absorb was effectively limitless.

Within Southeast Asia, Batavia also served as a hub whose reach went further than any of the other four emporia. The expansion of the company’s territorial control across the archipelago, combined with the sporadic enforcement of its mare clausum policies, afforded it greater control over the ebb and flow of the region’s commerce than any other power. However even amongst its own collection of outposts, the company’s shipping always represented a small fraction of the trade carried, as J. C. van Leur noted in the 1930s. 52 Its true sinews of power within Southeast Asia were the fleets of Asian-based trade ships that connected Batavia to the politically independent states of the region, and carried most of the trade between the company’s own centres as well. And no group of Asian traders were more important in this role than the overseas Chinese. Leonard Blussé and James Chin have both written about Batavia’s overseas Chinese community and its connection to the ‘junk trade,’ carried between Batavia and China’s major ports. 53 But surprisingly little has been written about Bataiva’s trading relationship within Southeast Asia, so this section will point to a few pieces of evidence that suggest how the VOC’s centre linked the flow of goods and people coming from the Qing empire to the rest of the Dutch company’s territories in Southeast Asia.

The two groups who were most active in the trade between Batavia and other parts of the Indonesian archipelago were the Dutch vrijburgers and the overseas Chinese shipowners within the VOC’s many outposts. The Chinese seem to have played a particularly important role because of their tendency towards successful entrepreneurship, and because of the business connections their communities maintained with each other. By

50 Valentijn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indien , vol. 1, p. 169. 51 For the best introductions to Batavia and its importance to the Qing trading system, see Leonard Blussé, Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women, and the Dutch in VOC Batavia (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1988), chap. 7; and Marie-Sybille de Vienne, Les Chinois en Insulinde échanges et sociétés marchandes au XVII e siècle, d’après les sources de la V.O.C. (Paris: Les indes savantes, 2008). 52 J. C. van Leur , Indonesian Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and Economic History (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1955), p. 235. 53 Blussé, Strange Company ; and James Kong Chin, “Merchants and other sojourners: the Hokkiens overseas, 1570 – 1760” (PhD diss., University of Hong Kong, 1998), chap. 4. 89

the latter part of the seventeenth century, Chinese immigration had transformed many of the VOC’s disparate centres into ‘Sino-Dutch hybrid colonies,’ as Tonio Andrade has described pre-1662 Taiwan; they were equally dependent on the company’s political and military structure and on Chinese business acumen for their prosperity. 54 In Ambon for example, according to the colonial writer François Valentijn, around 1709 there were eleven wealthy Chinese residents and an unspecified number of Dutch vrijburgers who owned sixteen to eighteen sloops of fifty to sixty tons that regularly sailed to Makassar and Batavia to buy goods for resale in their colony. 55 In the case of Makassar, we know that in 1720 Batavia and Semarang (another VOC controlled port in Java) were that Sulawesian city’s two most important trading partners based on the destinations of the loaded ships sailing to and from it (nineteen and twenty-five per cent, respectively). 56 The majority of the ships’ captains coming to and from Makassar seem to have been Sulawesians of different ethnicities, but between 1722 and 1726, the second most important ethnic group, in regard to the actual volume of cargo moved, was the Chinese (twenty-two per cent), after only the vrijburgers (thirty-five per cent). 57

Batavia’s centrality within the Qing merchants’ trading system was based partly on the VOC’s demand for Chinese products for the European market, but it also benefited from the commercial network linking the Dutch company’s many Southeast Asian territories. The Dutch vrijburgers and the overseas Chinese communities across the region played the crucial roles within this network. They operated its feeder-lines that spread out from Batavia to the company’s other territories, and their ships carried most of the Chinese goods destined to be distributed across the Indonesian archipelago to its disparate consumer markets. They also supplied the pepper, birds’ nests, spices, and other tropical goods in demand within China to the Qing merchant ships arriving in Batavia each year.

The Dominance of China-based Merchants within the New System The Qing government began its management of maritime trade after the 1684 legalisation in a surprisingly casual manner. The emperor and his court seem to have put little thought into how the ingress and egress of ships should be regulated in the empire’s ports during the first years after they were opened. Initially the court decreed that the size of trade ships be limited, and that the local officials in the homeport of any crew setting out should give the captain a stamped certificate that recorded a number to be branded on the prow of their ship, along with the number and names of all the men on board. But this was

54 Tonio Andrade, “The Rise and Fall of Dutch Taiwan, 1624 - 1662: Cooperative Colonization and the Statist Model of European Expansion,” Journal of World History 17, no. 4 (2006): 435. 55 Valentijn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indien , vol. 2, p. 274. On Valentijn himself, see Katrien Polman, The Central Moluccas: An Annotated Bibliography (Dordrecht: Foris, 1983), pp. 28 – 32. 56 Knaap, Monsoon Traders , p. 130. 57 Knaap, Monsoon Traders , p. 59. 90

as far as the early regulations went. 58 Even the creation of customs offices to collect duties seems to have been a minor consideration for the court in 1684. The only province that Beijing bothered to appoint customs supervisors to in that first year was Fujian, and it deferred to the province’s governor and governor-general on the issue of where to establish the office (they opted for the provincial capital, Fuzhou, unsurprisingly). Xiamen, along with Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang did not receive their customs offices until the following year. 59 For ships from foreign countries coming to the Qing empire, the management seems to have initially been left almost entirely to the discretion of the customs supervisors and local officials, aside from a pronouncement in 1685 that foreigners should not be allowed to stay in Qing ports after their trade was finished. 60 This lack of attention on Beijing’s part left a sticky problem for its local officials to deal with.

The problem was that overseas ethnic Chinese who had fled after the fall of Taiwan and settled more or less permanently in Ayutthaya, Batavia, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia took advantage of the end of the maritime prohibition and began sailing to the Qing empire to trade themselves. The legal identities of these overseas Chinese emigrants and their descendants would be a difficult question for the Qing state through the eighteenth century, 61 but it was a particularly sensitive issue in the delicate period of reconsolidation after the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories. The defeat of the rebel provinces in 1681 and then the Zheng family in Taiwan in 1683 prompted an exodus of people from southern China and Taiwan to Southeast Asia who were either unwilling to accept Qing rule, or were fleeing the economic devastation in their homelands that the wars had caused. Had these ethnic Chinese overseas communities devoted themselves exclusively to settling land or working as craftsmen and shopkeepers in their new homes (as many in fact did), the Qing court and its local officials might have been able to remain indifferent to them. But many of the most adventurous among them continued in their careers as maritime merchants and sailors, and so began returning to the Qing empire’s shores in foreign built ships sometimes in the service of foreign kings.

58 [Kangxi 康熙 ] Da Qing Hui Dian 大清會典 [1690], juan 99. 59 There is disagreement amongst the source regarding when and where all the customs stations were established. This chapter has mostly followed the conclusions in Huang Guosheng’s impressively thorough work. Huang, Ya Pian Zhan Zheng , pp. 21 – 26. It departs from him in the case of the year of the Zhejiang customs office’s establishment, which he gives as 1686 (p. 22). In 1686, many of the ships sailing back to Nagasaki complained bitterly that they had had to pay harbour tax when they returned to China the previous year, including those from Zhejiang, so there were apparently already customs officers collecting tax by mid- 1685 in Ningbo. For example, see Ship #30 from Ningbo April 26, 1686, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 567. 60 Huang, Ya Pian Zhan Zheng , p. 262. 61 For examples of case studies where the identities of overseas Chinese became an issue for the court, see Jennifer Cushman, “Duke Ch’ing-fu Deliberates: A Mid-Eighteenth Century Reassessment of Sino-Nanyang Commercial Relations,” Papers on Far Eastern History 17 (March 1978): 137 – 156; and Ng Chin-Keong, “The Case of Ch’en I-lao: Maritime Trade and Overseas Chinese in Ch’ing Policies, 1717 – 1754,” in Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, c. 1400 – 1750 , ed. Roderich Ptak and Dietmar Rothermund (Stuttgart: Verlag, 1991). 91

In the immediate aftermath of the Kangxi’s legalisation, at least one Qing official recognised that these overseas Chinese were both potential competitors for China-based shipping, and a potentially subversive force with the power to undermine Qing rule along the empire’s coasts. Shi Lang 施琅 , the Fujian naval commander ( shui shi ti du 水師提督 ) and admiral responsible for securing the surrender of the Zheng family, had ambitions of becoming China’s new dominant maritime merchant tycoon himself, so he was especially concerned with the relocation of former-Zheng sailors and ships to Southeast Asia. When he landed in Taiwan in the fall of 1683, at least fifteen trade ships belonging to the Zheng family or its followers were abroad, and Shi knew that each of them carried a crew of at least two or three dozen experienced sailors and merchants. 62 He also knew that these men could continue as participants in the region’s trade beyond the control of the Qing government if they relocated to Southeast Asia and no effort was made to stop them. 63

A good example of how astute Shi’s concerns were can be found in the Kai Hentai . One of the final ships from Zheng Taiwan arrived in Nagasaki on October 1, 1683, two days before Zheng Jing’s son, Zheng Keshuang, formally surrendered to Shi. Its crew explained to the Chinese interpreter that Zheng rule in Taiwan was almost certainly over, so they did not intend to return there. Along with three other Zheng crews still in Nagasaki, they planned to sail with the winter monsoon to Siam and await instructions from their patron, Feng Xifan 馮錫範 , formerly one of the Zheng clan’s most important generals. 64 Unbeknowst to these crews when they did sail for Siam, after Zheng’s surrender Feng and the rest of the Zheng officials were taken by Shi’s forces to Fujian, and then to Beijing in captivity. We can assume therefore that when these crews arrivied in Ayutthaya, they waited in vain for word from their master. Their captains unfortunately did not give their names, so we cannot trace them as individuals, but Chinese-manned ships commissioned by the Siamese king Narai and his successors continued to sail to Japan into the 1720s, when the Kai Hentai ’s record ends. It therefore seems probable that at least some of them joined Ayutthaya’s Chinese community and found employment on the king’s ships.

Shi made an attempt to lure these wayward former Zheng crews back to Xiamen with promises of leniency, and his efforts did meet with some limited success. One former- Zheng ship returned to Xiamen in the summer of 1684 and surrendered voluntarily, perhaps encouraged by Shi’s reputation as a pro-trade official. 65 To convince more crews to return,

62 Thirteen trade ships had arrived at Nagasaki in 1683, two in Manila, and others had likely been sent to ports in Southeast Asia to buy cloth and grain. See Iwao Seiichi 岩生成一 , “Kinsei Nisshi boeki ni kansuru suryo teki kosatsu 近世日支貿易に關すゐ数量的考察 ,” Shigaku Zasshi 史學雜誌 62, no. 11 (1953): 12 – 13; and Fang, Hua ren yu Lusong mao yi , p. 94. 63 For Shi Lang’s concerns, see Shi Lang 施琅 , Jing Hai Ji Shi 靖海紀事 (Taibei: Taiwan Yin Hang, 1958), pp. 70 – 71. 64 Ship #25 from Dongning, October 1, 1683, in Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 406. 65 “Bing Bu wei Lan Ze you Xianluo guo qian lai tou cheng shi 兵部為藍澤由暹羅國前來投誠事 ,” Kangxi 23 nian 8 yue [September or October 1684], Zhong Yang Yan Jiu Yuan 中央研究院 , Taibei, Nei Ge Da Kun Dang An 內閣大庫檔案, doc. 237686-001. 92

Shi sent one of his own ships to Nagasaki in 1684 with a promise of amnesty to any former Zheng vessels that might have been lingering there.66 He also sent another ship to the Nguyen domain on the same mission, an expedition that likely included Chen Mao, the father of Chen Lunjiong. 67 Shi’s agents were partially successful; four former-Zheng vessels were enticed back to Xiamen, according to the crew of a ship that belonged to one of Shi’s subordinates sent to Nagasaki in 1685. 68 However, the majority of the former Zheng crews seem to have stayed in Southeast Asia and joined the overseas Chinese communities there that had been swelling since the fall of the Ming.

As Shi had feared, besides competing with China-based merchants in the Japanese market, these overseas Chinese also began trading directly in the Qing empire’s ports. In 1686, for example, the supercargoes aboard the English East India company vessel China Merchant riding in Xiamen reported bitterly in a letter to their superiors that a Chinese Batavian ship had arrived before them and had already ruined the market for pepper. 69 The same Englishmen in Xiamen also met a ‘very large Jounke from Siam’ that had been sent by Narai and was crewed by Chinese. 70 Supporting the evidence of overseas Chinese activity in Qing ports from the English company servants’ testimony, we can also see that between 1684 and 1694, fourteen crews of ships identifiably based in Southeast Asia from the content of their interviews in the Kai Hentai also stopped off in Qing ports on their way to Nagasaki (see Appendix 3). From this we can reasonably conclude that before 1694 there does not seem to have been any serious obstacles to overseas Chinese casually sailing back to China’s ports and doing business there. Even in Xiamen, where Shi might have been expected to block them to protect his own interests, Batavian and Siamese Chinese-crewed ships were apparently trading without difficulty, perhaps because the naval commander worried that seizing them or preventing them from trading would just prompt other overseas Chinese to take their business to Guangzhou or Ningbo in the future.

This relaxed attitude to overseas Chinese activity in Qing ports came to an abrupt end in 1694. In that year, the Qing court introduced stricter policies that had the effect of curtailing the activity of Southeast Asian-based merchants in their empire. Curiously however, the original intentions of these new measures were to increase the local officials’ ability to police the activities of China-based mariners, and do not seem to have been related to overseas Chinese activity at all. The governor of Fujian, Zhang Penghe 張鵬翮 (in office 1689 to 1698), was the man originally responsible for prompting the Qing court to make this

66 Ship #8 from Xiamen, August 27, 1684, in Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 425. 67 Ship #12 from Quang Nam, August 28, 1684, in Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 431. For Chen Mao, see Chen Lunjiong, Hai Guo Wen Jian Lu , p. 18. Also, Wang, Community and Nation , pp. 108 – 109. 68 Ship #10 from Xiamen, May 5, 1685, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 463. 69 “Diary and consultations of John Gladman chief, Barker Hibbins and Benjamin Aleyn, supercargoes of the China Merchant (Captain John Utber) from Surat to Amoy,” BL, IOR/G/16, f. 236 r. 70 “Diary and consultations of John Gladman chief, Barker Hibbins and Benjamin Aleyn, supercargoes of the China Merchant (Captain John Utber) from Surat to Amoy,” BL, IOR/G/16, f. 228 v. The English did not seem to realise the crew was Chinese until they became entangled in a legal battle with one of the members. See BL, IOR/G/16, f. 246 r. 93

policy change. Early in 1694, he sent a memorial to Beijing claiming merchants from within the Qing empire were building ships in Southeast Asia and sailing them back to the Qing coast with armed crews. This was a problem, according to him, because it made the system for tracking the identity of merchant ships and sailors impossible. Since the legalisation of maritime trade, shipowners sailing abroad had been required to mark their vessels’ hulls with brands when they weighed anchor. Port officials would record the brands and other basic information about the departing ships so that upon their return they would be identifiable. But, according to Zhang, it had become common practice for crews to return with unmarked ships built in foreign countries that could not be traced in the officials’ records. To prove the necessity of maintaining the integrity of the branding system, he cites a case from the previous year in which a fish merchant named Guo Changer 郭昌爾 turned pirate, and was only apprended when he attempted to sell cargo from a captured ship with a brand that did not match the officials’ records. Zhang’s argument for stricter controls on foreign ships was ultimately accepted by Beijing. The court’s new policy, beginning in mid-1694, prohibited Qing merchants from returning in foreign built ships, excepting situations where customs officials were convinced by crews who reported that their original vessels had been lost while abroad.71

In Zhang’s original proposal and in Beijing’s response, there is no acknowledgement that the Chinese sailors might have been sailing in foreign-built ships because they were in fact foreign residents. The documents consistently call them ‘domestic merchants’ (nei di shang ren 內地商人 ). As shown by Zhang’s citation of the Guo Changer case, the main motivation for prohibiting foreign built ships was to ensure the integrity of the branding and registration system for China-based crews sailing abroad. Neither Zhang nor the court in Beijing seem to have been at all concerned at this time about the possibility of overseas Chinese trading in Qing ports. In fact in the documents related to this policy, they do not even acknowledge the existence of populations of ethnic Chinese settled in Southeast Asia.

However in the empire’s ports, local officials were well aware of the existence of overseas Chinese, and perhaps for that reason chose to interpret the new regulations somewhat differently. A crew of a ship from Quanzhou that arrived on June 17, 1694 in Nagasaki delivered a report that gives us some information on how the regulations were actually implemented on the coast. According to the crew, in Quanzhou there was a public notice being distributed that claimed foreign ships, meaning explicitly Southeast Asian ships (oku ho no gai kuni 奥方之外國 ), had been banned from entering Qing ports. The public notice the crew cited, went on to explain that the reason for this prohibition of foreign ships was not simply that they were unbranded and unlicensed; the problem was that the sailors

71 “Hu Bu Jin Zhi Shang Ren Zai Wai Guo Zao Chuan Dai Jun Qi Yuan An 戶部禁止商人在外國造船帶軍器原案 ” Kangxi 33 nian [1694], Zhongguo Ke Xue Yuan 中國科學院 , ed., Ming Qing Shi Liao 明清史料 , Ding Bian 丁編 (Beijing: Guo jia tu shu guan chu ban she, 2008), vol. 3, pp. 317 – 320; [Yongzheng 雍正 ] Da Qing Hui Dian 大清會典 [1734], juan 139; and Chen Xiyu, Zhong guo fan chuan , p. 115. 94

and merchants aboard them were Chinese men who did not recognise the sovereignty of the Qing dynasty.

The ships setting out from foreign countries have crews that are all Chinese, but they left the Ming dynasty to live in foreign countries. Because this group left, [they] are disconnected from current Qing customs [ima hodo dai Shin no fuugi 今程大淸之風儀 ]. Some of them have long hair. 72

If this report of the contents of the public notices distributed in Quanzhou is accurate, the officials there were choosing not to use the new edict against foreign built ships primarily as a way of regulating and monitoring the activities of China-based merchants. Instead, for the customs officials and local magistrates in Quanzhou at least, the new regulations were a means of curbing the return of emigrant Chinese from Southeast Asia whose lack of the obligatory hairstyle for most men in the Qing empire, shaven foreheads and queues, signalled their unwillingness to submit to the new dynasty. And from other reports from Chinese crews arriving in Nagasaki, it does appear that local Qing officials were using the regulation to block Southeast Asian Chinese ships from docking in other Qing harbours. Another Quanzhou ship that also arrived on June 17 told the interpreters in Nagasaki that because of the regulation, foreign ships would no longer enter any major Qing ports. They would instead go to islands on the empire’s coast and employ small ships to conduct clandestine business.73 The crew of a ship from Banten that arrived in Japan later in the same year confirmed this by stating several Siamese ships had planned to buy silk goods in Ningbo, but were forced instead to stop at the island of Putuoshan, which was apparently beyond the reach of Zhejiang’s customs service. The Banten crew themselves were fortunate. They had not known about the policy change, but they had planned only on touching at Putuoshan anyways, and had made prior arrangements for silk to be brought to the island before their arrival. 74

The 1694 ban on foreign-built ships appears to have given a decisive advantage to merchants based in the Qing empire who had licences, Qing-built ships, and the proper hairstyles. The path of least resistance, and therefore most profit, was for the merchants to maintain the Manchu queue and base themselves out of one of the major Qing ports, and this was what most of the Chinese merchants seem to have done from that point forward. Compared to the fourteen identifiable Southeast Asian ships in the Kai Hentai ’s records that are known to have touched at Qing ports between 1684 and 1694, from 1694 to 1724 (the last year the Kai Hentai has data for), there are only three ships, two of which were forced

72 Ship #46 from Quanzhou, June 17, 1694, in Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1654. 73 Ship #48 from Quanzhou, June 17, 1694, in Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1656. 74 Ship #72 from Banten, September 15, in Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1690. Putuoshan does not seem to have had any formal customs office, perhaps because of its role as a Buddhist religious centre and the traditional site of the bodhimanda (dao chang 道場 ) of the bodhisattva Guanyin 觀音 . A customs office was set up in Dinghai 定海 on the neighbouring 舟山 island in 1698. Li Wei 李衛 and Ji Huiyun 嵇會筠 , ed., [Yongzheng 雍正 ] Zhejiang Tong Zhi 浙江同志 [1736], juan 86. 95

into Qing ports by storms.75 These numbers strongly suggest a trend towards a decline in independent Southeast Asian-based merchant activity on China’s coasts.

One caveat should be added here though. The dominance of China-based shipping between Southeast Asia and China did not mean an end to all participation by Southeast Asian-based merchants by any means. By at latest the second decade of the eighteenth century, there were joint ventures being made between China-based merchants and overseas Chinese businessmen, as an incident in 1715 in which a private British trading vessel commandeered a Chinese ship riding at anchor in Xiamen shows. An investigation by the British East India company following this incident revealed that the Chinese ship’s cargo was owned by Xiamen-based merchants, but the ship itself was actually the property of an overseas Chinese man who was serving as Siam’s phrakhlang or treasury minister.76 Later in the century, the case of Chen Yilao 陳怡老 shows similar cooperation. Chen was a Zhangzhou-born sojourner in Batavia who, upon deciding to return to the Qing empire in 1749, invested all of his wealth in a cargo of Southeast Asian goods and silver to be sent onboard two Fujianese ships bound from Batavia to China. 77 Similar arrangements, in which overseas Chinese businessmen invested cash or goods in Southeast Asian-Qing voyages, were likely very common throughout the eighteenth centuries. The 1694 decision was a turning point because it ended most independent Southeast Asian trade in China, guaranteeing China-based merchants a dominant role in these enterprises.

Conclusions The essential argument this chapter seeks to make in this chapter is that a combination of factors came together to prompt the re-establishment of commercial links between China and Southeast Asia. The initial catalyst was of course the Kangxi’s legalisation of maritime trade in 1684, but a large scale turn southward also required the dashing of the hopes among China-based merchants for a revival of a silk-for-silver exchange in Japan and Luzon that was incredibly profitable for all comers. It also needed the reorganisation of the region’s trade into a system that resembled neither Zheng Jing’s hunt for textiles in Southeast Asia during the 1670s, nor the closely regulated and dispersed system of the late Ming period. The new China-based merchants sought supplies of import

75 Siam ship, March 8, 1717, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 3, p. 2718; and Batavia ship, November 3, 1718, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 3, p. 2832. 76 Joseph Collet, Thomas Frederick, William Jennings, Richard Horden, Thomas Cooke, John Legg, Joseph Cooke, and Randall Fowke, Fort St. George General, August 17, 1717, BL, IOR/E/4/2, p. 110. Unfortunately there is no information on where the ship was originally built. This incident is discussed in greater detail in the final chapter. 77 Ng, “The Case of Ch’en I-lao,” pp. 373 – 375. Another example was the Batavian-born Lian Fuguang 連富光, who in addition to serving briefly as the Batavian Chinese captain in 1739 and 1740 was also a ‘great merchant’ involved in the importation of Chinese tea. Denys Lombard, Le Carrefour Javanais: Essai d’histoire globale. II: Les réseaux asiatiques (Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1990), p. 242; and Kai Ba Li Dai Shi Ji 開吧歷代史記 , Nan Yang Xue Bao 南洋學報 9, no. 1: 42. 96

commodities acceptable to their society’s expanding consumer class, and, just as important, foreign markets that could absorb increasing volumes of Chinese silks, ceramics, and zinc that were being disgorged by the Qing empire’s growing luxury goods industries. The result was a dependence on a series of large emporia at several crucial places within Southeast Asia that facilitated the collection of tropical products and the distribution of Chinese goods along arrays of feeder routes that connected to smaller centres in their respective sub-regions. The five that this dissertation identifies are Ayutthaya, Johor, Banjarmasin, Manila, and Batavia.

I also argue here that the legalisation of maritime trade within the Qing empire did not guarantee the dominance of the trading system by China-based merchants. It initially allowed overseas Chinese communities to expand their own commercial operations to China’s shores, especially those communities in Siam and Batavia who had benefitted from an influx of manpower and maritime skill following the surrender of the Zheng regime in Taiwan. However the 1694 decision by Beijing to prohibit China-based merchants from entering Qing ports in foreign-built ships ended up damaging the business of the overseas Chinese groups. Local officials in Qing ports appear to have interpreted the new rule as a ban not simply on foreign-built ships, but also as one on the activity of foreign Chinese merchants operating on the Qing coast. Consequently, China-based merchants dominated commerce between China and Southeast Asia from 1694 onwards.

Chapter 4: The Swell

Chinese Trade Goods in Southeast Asia, 1694 – 1717

The preceding chapter outlined the structure of the new Qing-centred trading network that emerged in Southeast Asia in the late 1680s and early 1690s. This chapter will turn to the economic effects of the network within Southeast Asia, and specifically the penetration of Chinese trade goods in the region’s diverse consumer markets from the maturation of the trading network around 1694 until the Kangxi emperor’s decision to prohibit Qing merchants from sailing to Southeast Asia in 1717. The central argument that is advanced here is that the economic relationship between Southeast Asia and the Qing empire strengthened rapidly at the expense of the Dutch VOC’s interests in the region over this period.

As discussed briefly in the introduction, the thesis that this chapter seeks to revise in this chapter is Anthony Reid’s ‘age of commerce’ formulation, originally laid out in the second volume of his Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce published in 1993, and more recently restated in his 2015 A History of Southeast Asia: Critical Crossroads with only minor modifications. 1 In these books he claims that there was a period of economic and demographic expansion across Southeast Asia from the far eastern end of the Indonesian archipelago to Burma in the northwest that lasted from the fifteenth century until about 1680. This age of commerce saw an integration of Southeast Asia’s economies through the expansion of trading networks, technological development, population growth, and a strengthening of the region’s political systems. 2 According to Reid, this long efflorescence came to an end in the latter part of the seventeenth century, and he offers two basic reasons to explain this abrupt change in the region’s fortunes. The first was a cooling of Earth’s climate in the middle part of the century that affected societies around the globe, but seemed to hit Southeast Asia particularly hard. The second was a withdrawal of Southeast Asian participation in global trade that left the region economically isolated by around 1680.

In support of the claim that Southeast Asia withdrew from global trade, Reid provides two main pieces of evidence. The first of these is a decline in the fortunes of the VOC’s business in the region, especially its ability to market South Asian cotton cloth to Southeast Asian consumers. The second piece of evidence is that the entries in the Kai Hentai show the numbers of Asian ships sailing from Southeast Asian ports to Nagasaki

1 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce: 1450 – 1680, Volume Two, Expansion and Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); and Anthony Reid, A History of Southeast Asia: Critical Crossroads (Chichester: Wiley, 2015). 2 Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce , p. 268. 98

falling quickly after an initial bounce in the mid-1680s. 3 There have been a number of objections to the age of commerce thesis made already by historians of Southeast Asia. In the main, their criticisms have been based on claims of incommensurability between the disparate parts of the region, especially between its mainland and insular Southeast Asia. Some historians have also observed that Reid gave little attention to groups whose trade either expanded or remained stable in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, including the Bugis and Gujarati merchants. 4 Among these valid criticisms though, none have yet seriously questioned his two main evidential pillars for a decline in Southeast Asian trade. This willingness among Reid’s Southeast Asianist followers and critics to let his evidence stand is understandable considering the generally focussed nature of their works, but it is Reid’s master narrative of regional development that this chapter is primarily interested in, so it is these pillars that it takes aim at. The basic revision to Reid’s conclusions proposed here is that the sudden flood of Qing merchants and merchandise into Southeast Asia was the most transformative force in the region’s diverse economies during the late seventeenth century. It is not a coincidence therefore that 1680, the year that Reid identifies as the end point of his age of commerce, is just shy of the year that the Kangxi emperor’s decided to legalise maritime trade in his empire. They are the same historical moment, and one that brought a sea change to Southeast Asia’s economic engagement with the rest of the world, but the change was not a collapse in the region’s trade as Reid claims. As this chapter seeks to show, if his evidence is interpreted only slightly differently, it suggests that there was an inexorable commercial reorientation across Southeast Asia towards the ascendant economy of the Qing empire.

To make the case for the growth of trade, this chapter will propose two arguments. First, it will briefly try to show that Reid’s interpretation of the data gleaned from the Kai Hentai does not take into account the complexity of the post-1684 trading system. A closer examination of its entries and the other available evidence indicate growth in the volume of commerce between Southeast Asia and Japan rather than a decline. Japanese-Southeast Asian exchanges merely became less visible in the Kai Hentai ’s shipping lists because they were increasingly channelled through Qing ports after the Kangxi’s legalisation. Second, it will propose a different explanation for the fall in the VOC’s profit margins from the 1680s

3 Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce , chap. 5; and Reid, A History of Southeast Asia , chap. 7. Also Anthony Reid, “Flows and Seepages in the Long-term Chinese Interaction with Southeast Asia,” Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese in Honour of Jennifer Cushman , ed. Anthony Reid (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1996), p. 42. 4 Victor Lieberman, “An Age of Commerce in Southeast Asia? Problems of Regional Coherence – A Review Article,” Journal of Asian Studies 54, no. 3 (August 1995):796 – 807; Barbara Watson Andaya, “The Unity of Southeast Asia: Historical Approaches and Questions,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 28, no. 1 (March 1997): 161 – 171; David K. Wyatt, “The Eighteenth Century in Southeast Asia,” in On the Eighteenth Century as a Category of Asian History: Van Leur in Retrospect , ed. Leonard Blussé and Femme Gaastra (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), p. 40; Victor Lieberman, Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800 – 1830, Volume 1, Integration on the Mainland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 15 – 21; and Heather Sutherland, “Geography as destiny? The role of water in Southeast Asian History,” in A World of Water: Rain, rivers and seas in Southeast Asian histories , ed. Peter Boomgaard (Leiden: KITLV, 2007), p. 40. 99

onwards until the third decade of the eighteenth century. Part of the problem for the Dutch company was the popularity of Javan batik cloth, but at the end of the seventeenth century Southeast Asians were also taking advantage of the growing circulation of silver in their economies and the increasing numbers of foreign traders arriving on their shores who were making a wider range of trade goods available. Especially visible within this rising tide of imports were the products of the Qing empire, unleashed on the region by the 1684 Qing legalisation of maritime trade and by the inability of Japan and Luzon to absorb all of them. To support this claim, this chapter will attempt to demonstrate an increased distribution of Chinese trade goods across Southeast Asia’s markets through the entrepôt -based network described in the previous chapter.

One final clarification concerning periodisation needs to be made. In articles published after Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce , Anthony Reid has posited that the period of fragmentation and economic decline following his age of commerce came to an end in about 1760. Starting roughly at that time, there was a surge in state building and economic expansion throughout the region that lasted until around 1850 in societies not under European rule. 5 Contributing to this pre-colonial Southeast Asian renaissance was a partly overlapping period of increased Chinese immigration and business activity throughout the region that Reid calls the ‘Chinese century.’ He places the beginning of this period around 1740, and believes it lasted until about 1840. 6 These later periods fall outside the chronological scope of this dissertation, and it does not dispute this part of Reid’s periodisation of Southeast Asian history. The growing power and influence of Southeast Asian ethnic Chinese communities in the late eighteenth century was indeed dramatically demonstrated by the appearance of politically powerful individuals and groups in various parts of the region. 7 But the important point here is that maritime trade driven by China- based merchants needs to be understood as a related but separate process from the settlement of ethnic Chinese communities in the region. Qing trade ships carried new

5 Anthony Reid, “A New Phase of Commercial Expansion in Southeast Asia, 1760 – 1850,” in The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750 – 1900 , ed. Anthony Reid (Houndmills: MacMillan Press, 1997). 6 Anthony Reid, “Introduction,” in The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750 – 1900 , ed. Anthony Reid (Houndmills: MacMillan Press, 1997), pp. 11 – 14; and Reid, “Flows and Seepages,” p. 42. 7 Yumio Sakurai and Takako Kitagawa, “Ha Tien or Banteay Meas in the Time of the Fall of Ayutthaya,” in From Japan to Arabia: Ayutthaya’s Maritime Relations with Asia , ed. Kennon Breazeale (Bangkok: The Foundation for the Promotion of Social Sciences and Humanities Textbooks Project, 1999); Liam C. Kelley, “Thoughts on a Chinese Diaspora: The Case of the M ạcs of Hà Tiên,” Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 14, no. 1 (2000): 71 – 98; Yumio Sakurai, “Eighteenth-Century Chinese Pioneers on the Water Frontier of Indochina,” in Water Frontier: Commerce and the Chinese in the Lower Mekong Region, 1750 – 1880 , ed. Nola Cooke and Li Tana (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); Chen Chingho A., “Mac Thien Tu and Phrayataksin: A Survey on their Political Stand. Conflicts and Background,” in The Chinese Diaspora in the Pacific , ed. Anthony Reid (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008); Li Qingxin 李慶新 , “‘Haishang Ming Chao’: Mo Jiu Hexian Zhengquan de Zhonghua Tese “ 海上明朝 ”: 鄚氏河仙政權的中華特色 ,” Xueshu Yuekan 學術月刊 40, no. 10 (Oct 2008): 133 – 138; and Li Qingxin 李慶新 , “Mo Jiu yu Hexian Zhengquan (Gangkou Guo) 鄚玖與河仙政權 (港口國),” Nanfang Huayi Yanjiu Zazhi 南方華裔研究雜誌 4 (2010): 176 – 188. 100

Chinese sojourners and immigrants to Southeast Asian ports who gradually gained economic and political power in their adoptive homes, but the conquests of the southern seas’ markets by Chinese merchandise occurred well before the apogee of Chinese political power anywhere in the region. 8

The Triangular Trades between Southeast Asia, China, and Japan Anthony Reid includes tables in both Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce and A History of Southeast Asia that show a decade upon decade decline of the number of Chinese ships that nominally originated in Southeast Asian ports arriving in Nagasaki between the 1650s and 1720s. 9 These figures, he claims, are evidence for a general decline in the condition of maritime trade in the region, and specifically a decline in Chinese interests there. This chapter’s contention is that a closer examination of the entries in the Kai Hentai , combined with some attention to the particular goods being traded, indicates that the decline in numbers of ships labelled as belonging to particular Southeast Asian ports is actually evidence of an increasing sophistication of the China-based merchants’ trading system.

After 1684 and the development of Guangzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo, and Shanghai into coastal entrepôts in their own right, the appeal of long voyages directly from Southeast Asian ports to Japan must have fallen. There were of course some politically minded ship owners and merchants based in Southeast Asia sailing directly to Japan, such as the long-haired self- proclaimed Ming loyalist Lin Yuteng 林于騰 who captained vessels crossing between Pho Hien and Nagasaki for decades without stopping anywhere in Qing territory. 10 But by 1690 or so, merchant captains with Lin’s political conviction seem to have become rare. By then it was common practice for China-based merchants returning with Southeast Asian cargoes intended for Japan to stop in a Qing port en route , usually Ningbo or Putuoshan (see Appendix 3). This strategy gave the ships the opportunity to re-victual, to dispose of parts of their Southeast Asian cargoes that would be more marketable in China than Japan, and to augment their remaining Japan-bound cargoes with highly marketable Chinese goods, especially raw silk. 11 Sometimes the ships that sailed from Southeast Asia in the late summer

8 For a periodisation of Southeast Asian Chinese labourer communities and gongsi 公司 , see Carl A. Trocki, “Chinese Pioneering in Eighteenth-Century Southeast Asia,” in The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750 – 1900 , ed. Anthony Reid (Houndmills: MacMillan Press, 1997), especially pp. 86, 99. 9 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce , p. 290; and Reid, A History of Southeast Asia , p. 148. 10 Ship #72 from Dong Kinh, August 30, 1686, in Hayashi Shunsai 林春齋 , Hayashi Hoko 林鳳岡 , and Ren'ichi Ura 浦廉一 , ed., Kai Hentai 華夷變態 , (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1958 – 1959), vol. 1, p. 608. See also Qian Jiang 錢江 , "Shi qi zhi shi jiu shi ji chu Yuenan yan hai de Zhongguo fan chuan mao yi 十七至十九世紀初越南沿海的中國帆船貿易 ," in Zhongguo hai yang fa zhan shi lun wen ji 中國海洋發展史論文集 , vol. 9, ed. Liu Xufeng 劉序楓 (Taibei: Zhong ying yan jiu yuan, 2005), pp. 305 – 306; and William Dampier, A Collection of Voyages, Vol. II (London: James and John Knapton, 1729), p. 15. 11 For examples, see ship #57 from Ligor, June 25, 1691, in Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1359 (which stopped in Xiamen); ship #58 from Dong Kinh, August 9, 1693, in Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1568 (which stopped 101 would also winter in Zhejiang, waiting for the monsoons to change before sailing the short remaining distance to Nagasaki when spring began. Doing so allowed them to enter Nagasaki’s harbour shortly after the beginning of the new year, giving them a greater chance of arriving before the Tokugawa regime’s official allotments for foreign trade ships were filled. 12 Through the 1690s however, these stop-over strategies seem to have gradually given way to a use of Qing ports as entrepôts . Instead of sailing to Japan themselves, many of the merchants coming from Southeast Asia would trade their tropical goods in Qing ports to the crews of ships being fitted out for Japan, who would then carry them to Nagasaki. There are many instances of ships arriving in Japan from Xiamen, Fuzhou, and Zhejiang whose crews mention securing cargoes of aloe wood and shark products in their home ports, merchandise which ships in earlier years had commonly procured primarily in the Nguyen domain and Champa. 13

Besides this, consideration must be given to the types of trade goods that moved across Asia’s seas packed in the holds of the wooden vessels. In his now classic work on Sino-Siamese trade, Sarasin Viraphol includes a chapter on triangular trade between the Qing empire, Siam, and Japan, which he describes functioning primarily in a counter-clockwise fashion. In his account, royal Siamese ships and China-based private ones would leave Siam for Nagasaki, sell their tropical goods there, then sail to some port on the Qing empire’s coast to sell the Japanese copper they had acquired. Finally, they would return to Southeast Asia with a hold full of silks and ceramics from the weaving houses of Suzhou or Hangzhou and the kilns of Jingdezhen or Dehua. 14 Actually though, clockwise circuits were probably more common simply because of the demand in Japan for raw Chinese silk, and the demand for copper in Siam and the Nguyen domain. 15 The relatively high price of copper in those two Southeast Asian states would have encouraged Qing ships that had acquired large loads of it in Nagasaki to sail for Ayutthaya or Hoi An where it could have been exchanged for tropical goods (aloe woods, shark products, tin, and ivory, among other things). These Southeast Asian commodities were profitable in Japan, but they were also in demand in the Qing empire where there sale might be used to support the acquisition of more high value white silk that brought large profits in the Japanese market. Thus, the declining numbers of ships identified as Southeast Asian arriving in Nagasaki at the end of the seventeenth century does not necessarily mean that trade between Japan and Southeast Asia was declining. in Putuoshan); and Ship #64 from Batavia, August 10, 1696, in Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1821 (which also stopped in Putuoshan). 12 For an example, see Ship #7 from Quang Nam, February 15, 1691 in Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1305. This ship arrived on the eighteenth day of the first month of the Japanese year. 13 For examples, see ship #21 from Fuzhou, March 7, 1691, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1320; ship #57 from Taizhou, October 25, 1695, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1767; and ship #65 from Xiamen, August 10, 1696, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1822. 14 Sarasin Viraphol, Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652 - 1853 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 60 – 61. 15 For the demand for copper in the Nguyen domain, see Li Tana, Nguy ễn Cochinchina: Southern Vietnam in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, 1998), pp. 92 – 93. For Siam, see the “Siam” section in this chapter below. 102

Exchanges between those two regions likely became merely less visible because the economic logic of East Asian maritime trade from the late 1680s onwards encouraged the flow of goods from Southeast Asia to pass through Qing ports before arriving in Japan.

The Qing Commodity Conquest of Southeast Asia With that, we come to the heart of the matter. The second, and more important part of Anthony Reid’s formulation for a Southeast Asian withdrawal from the world economy between about 1680 and 1760 is the weakening health of the VOC’s trading system in Asia. In his original formulation in Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce , the root of the Dutch company’s problem lay in the impoverishment of Southeast Asians, especially those in the archipelago. The company had relied on the importation of South Asian cloth to fund its purchases of pepper and spices, but this system broke down as Javans found themselves too poor to buy the company’s cloth, and so began weaving their own. Within a matter of years they were exporting it to other parts of the archipelago that had also become too poor to buy expensive South Asian imports. 16 In more recent publications, Reid has put less weight on the impoverishment part of the explanation, but does not completely abandon it. He instead emphasises the rising cost of South Asian textiles and falling demand for Southeast Asian spices in Europe. 17 The probable reason for this change in tack is that a stronger alternative explanation has been offered by Lucas Nagtegaal for a commercial re-orientation of Java’s economy away from the VOC. Nagtegaal shows that the company’s sales of South Asian cloth in the latter half of the seventeenth century declined far faster than its sales of opium, suggesting that the fall in cloth sales were not exclusively the result of a loss of purchasing power among Javan consumers, but rather a change in market conditions. Nagtegaal’s explanation for this is that the South Asian cloth was actually used as a form of currency, and thus had a different role than the domestically produced sort, which was generally used for clothing and decorations. So the true reason for the decline in the purchase of South Asian textiles was the monetisation (actually silverisation) of the Javan economy. According to him, in 1677 the VOC began paying for the materials it needed in Java (rice, timber, sugar, and ships primarily) with small silver dubbeltje (or dubbelde stuiver) coins, which created a suddenly readily available supply of silver that soon pushed out South Asian cloth as currency, conquering the island’s money markets. 18

Anthony Reid’s student Ruurdje Laarhoven raises a reasonable objection to Nagtegaal’s conclusions, pointing out that the latter’s chronology does not seem to make

16 Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce , p. 302. Also, Anthony Reid, “An ‘Age of Commerce’ in Southeast Asian History,” Modern Asian Studies 24, no. 1 (February 1990): 24. 17 Anthony Reid, “Southeast Asian Consumption of Indian and British Cotton Cloth, 1600-1850,” in How India Clothed the World: The World of South Asian Textiles, 1500 – 1850 , ed. Giorgio Riello and Tirthankar Roy (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 38 – 39. 18 Lucas Wilhelmus Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch tiger: the Dutch East Indies Company and the northeast coast of Java, 1680-1743 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996), pp. 151 – 155. 103

sense. The main problem is that the decline in the VOC’s sale of South Asian cloth began in the 1650s, long before the alleged dominance of the dubbeltjes .19 Laarhoven also claims that Nagtegaal likely overestimated the amount of Dutch silver circulating in the Javan economy because although the volumes of specie shipped from the Netherlands to Batavia increased year after year, most of it was re-exported to South Asia to buy cloth for the European market. 20 Instead, Laarhoven argues that the decline in demand for the company’s cloth was caused by a combination of technical improvements in the domestic Javan weaving industry and a promotion of domestic cloth by the rulers of Mataram, who were unrelentingly hostile towards the company in the latter half of the seventeenth century. 21

Laarhoven’s explanation for the decline in the sales of company cloth seems the most reasonable in light of the earliness of its onset. His description though does not take into account the full extent of Batavia’s economic dependence on north-eastern Java and Madura. If the demand for South Asian textiles declined because of import substitution, that would not have removed the company’s need to support its Asian headquarters with rice, timber, and other basic materials from Java and Madura. 22 Besides this, his key piece of evidence against Nagetaal’s claim that there was a large increase in the value of silver imported to Java is a table comparing the values of silver exported from the Netherlands against the value of South Asian textiles brought to Europe, which shows the two figures rising more or less in step. 23 But the figures for the values of the textiles are based on those collected by Kristof Glamann in his Dutch-Asiatic Trade , which lists the sale-prices in the Kamer Amsterdam, and not the cost-prices on the subcontinent. 24 Because both cost and sale prices varied, these figures are not a particularly reliable guide to the volumes of silver expended by the company in South Asia versus other parts of its trading system. So even if we discard Nagetaal’s claim that silver coins were responsible for the declining imports South Asian cloth, his argument that the company’s use of silver coins to purchase raw materials gradually silverised the Javan economy still seems valid to me.

There is one other factor in the evolution of this new trading arrangement that Nagetaal only hints at briefly, but this author believes is the key to explaining the VOC’s declining fortunes in Java, and indeed the rest of Southeast Asia. This of course is the dramatic entry of China-based merchants and their merchandise into the region after 1684. As Nagetaal shows, despite the VOC’s increasing reliance on its silver dubeltjes to buy timber, rice, and other necessities from east Java and Madura, there was no sign of inflation on the

19 Ruurdje Laarhoven, “The Power of Cloth: The Textile Trade of the Dutch East India Company (VOC), 1600 – 1780” (PhD diss., Australian National University, 1994), pp. 389. Laarhoven refers to Nagetaal’s 1988 dissertation. The present author does not have access to a copy of the original dissertation, so he has referred to the 1996 published version. 20 Laarhoven, “The Power of Cloth,” pp. 387 – 388. 21 Laarhoven, “The Power of Cloth,” pp. 409 – 410. 22 M. C. Ricklefs, War, Culture and Economy in Java, 1677 – 1726: Asian and European Imperialism in the Early Kartasura Period (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993), p. 83. 23 Laarhoven, “The Power of Cloth,” p. 388. 24 Kristof Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 1620 – 1740 (Copenhagen: Danish Science Press, 1958), p. 143. 104

island, suggesting the supply of coins in the economy remained more or less stable, and the simplest explanation for this is that the coins were flowing out of the Javan economy at about the same rate they were entering it. 25 The sudden reappearance of large scale China- based commerce reconnecting Java to the silver-hungry Qing economy in the 1680s would have provided the mechanism for this outflow. Therefore the argument here is that it was the Qing demand for silver, the VOC’s constant injection of it into the Javan economy, and the Javan consumers’ desire for Chinese goods that together shaped the island’s economy from the 1680s onwards.

The remainder of this chapter will argue that the basic economic pattern visible in Java was evident across Southeast Asia. The large-scale entry of Qing merchants and Chinese merchandise into the region beginning in the 1680s re-oriented local economies towards the Qing trading network, and ultimately linked even the remotest corners of Southeast Asia to the Qing empire commercially. It is not coincidental that Femme Gaastra sees this decade as the turning point at which the VOC’s intra-Asian trading system began to erode, and that the company started relying on large scale bullion imports from Europe to sustain its operations. 26 It was not that Southeast Asia became impoverished from this point forward, or that it withdrew from the world economy. It was in fact the dawning of a new Qing-centred age of commerce in which the VOC was recast in a supporting role.

The Trinh and Nguyen Domains The previous chapter gave only brief mention to the territories of the Trinh and Nguyen lords in what is now Vietnam. This was not because their main ports, Pho Hien and Hoi An respectively, were less important for the China-based merchants than the five major entrepôts described in the previous chapter. Rather, it was because their trade with the Qing empire was far more bilateral than any of the other major ports in the region. Other than silver in the case of the Trinh, most of the material they used for trade with the Qing empire was produced within their own hinterlands or at furthest Champa and Cambodia. But the post-1684 sea change in Southeast Asia’s trading systems was as apparent in these two ports as it was anywhere else.

Pho Hien provides the only really good example of a withdrawal from the world economy around 1680 in Southeast Asia, but the primary reason for this was the particular role it had played in the region’s trade up until that time. As Li Tana has already argued, in the mid eighteenth century the Trinh domain was an exporter of the same types of goods as

25 Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch tiger , pp. 157 – 158. 26 F. S. Gaastra, “The Exports of Precious Metal from Europe to Asia by the Dutch East India Company, 1602 – 1795,” in Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds , ed. J. F. Richards (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1983), p. 467. 105

China, silk and porcelain primarily. 27 As a result the merchants of Pho Hien were among the greatest beneficiaries of the mid seventeenth-century chaos in China, and the Zheng family’s limited access to Chinese goods during the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories in the 1670s discussed in Chapter One. During this period, both the Zheng and the VOC came to rely on Trinh silk for their import cargoes to Japan. After the 1684 Qing legalisation of maritime trade, Chinese woven and raw silk once again flooded into the Japanese and Luzon markets, marginalising Pho Hien’s role as a supplier. 28 Various other problems compounded the loss of its major role in the region’s economy, including frequent floods and famines, 29 a rapacious administration relatively disinterested in trade, 30 and the lack of adequate facilities for ship repairs. 31 The market size was also limited partly because there were no convenient smaller markets to receive surplus re-exports when supply exceeded demand. In 1687 seven Qing ships arrived in Pho Hien, which would have been a respectable number even for one of the major trading hubs in the region. The English company agents reported that the Qing merchants were only able to sell their Chinaware, drugs, and sugar at ‘low rates,’ and consequently that ‘it’s thought they will come no more.’ 32 Together these factors combined to make Pho Hien a relatively unattractive destination for maritime traders in East Asia compared to the other major ports in the region, and as a result the English East India company withdrew its factory in 1697 because of a lack of profitable cargo, 33 and the Dutch company followed suit in 1700. 34 Even some of the adaptable China-based merchants began complaining in the 1690s that there was very little of value in the Trinh domain and so very few ships were sailing there. 35

Yet some Qing ships did continue to dock in Pho Hien, at least until the end of the seventeenth century. Samuel Baron, a half-Dutch native of the Trinh domain who wrote an account of the country in the 1680s, describes its only major export product as silk. 36 This was obviously not a good that was particularly attractive to any post-Zheng Chinese merchants with access to Jiangnan, but before the English and Dutch companies removed

27 Li Tana, “Tongking in the Age of Commerce,” in Anthony Reid and the Study of the Southeast Asian Past , ed. Geoff Wade and Li Tana (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), p. 249. 28 Iioka Naoko, “The Trading Environment and the Failure of Tongking’s Mid-Seventeenth-Century Commercial Resurgence,” in The Tongking Gulf Through History, ed. Nola Cooke, Li Tana, and James A. Anderson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), pp. 122 – 123. 29 Iioka, “The Trading Environment,” p. 126. 30 Samuel Baron, A Description of the Kingdom of Tonqueen , in A General Collection of the Best and Most Interesting Voyages and Travels in All Parts of the World , ed. John Pinkerton (London: Longman, 1811), vol. 9, p. 663. 31 Ship #82 from Dong Kinh, August 11, 1690, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1275. 32 Tonqueen General, December 31, 1687, British Library, London (hereafter BL), IOR/G/21/7, p. 105. 33 Abstract of Court to Madras, March 6, 1694, BL, IOR, G/12/4, p. 581. 34 Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Laurens Pijl, Dirk de Haas, Abraham van Riebeeck, Joannes Cops, Manuel Bornezee, Laurens Pit, Thomas van Rhee, and Jacob van Dam, February 16, 1700, in Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII Der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie , ed. W. Ph. Coolhaas, vol. 6 ('s Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), p. 107. 35 Ship #86 from Dong Kinh, August 24, 1697, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 3, p. 1933. 36 Baron, “A Description of the Kingdom of Tonqueen,” pp. 663. For Samuel Baron’s life, see Olga Dror and K. W. Taylor, ed., Views of Seventeenth-Century Vietnam: Christoforo Borri on Cochinchina & Samuel Baron on Tonkin (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, 2006), pp. 74 – 83. 106

their trading posts and ceased sending ships to Pho Hien, the Trinh domain also had a regular supply of silver brought by the Europeans that was sufficient to attract China-based maritime and overland merchants. After 1700 when both the European factories had been dismantled, silver supplies were likely less steady, but there were private English traders that came intermittently until 1719, according to Alexander Hamilton, a private trader himself. 37 Pho Hien-based ships, operated by resident ethnic Chinese, sailed to Batavia semi-regularly as well, and would have been able to access silver brought from Europe by the VOC. 38 The chief import that the Qing merchants exchanged for silver in Pho Hien, according to Baron, was copper cash, which the Trinh used as their sole currency. 39

The English and Dutch records suggest that in the final decade of the seventeenth century the elites of the Trinh domain had developed a taste for Chinese luxury commodities as well. In 1688, the VOC’s agents complained that the king (presumably Trinh Can 鄭根 , r. 1682 – 1709) would not buy their ‘ lijwaten ’ South Asian cloth because, they wrote, “cloth comes here daily in quantity out of China.”40 Evidently both Chinese cloth (probably meaning woven silk in most cases) and porcelain had a certain cachet that local products did not. In 1694, on the birthday of a Trinh prince (it is not clear which prince), the English factory sent ‘China silks’ as a gift, and the factory’s diarist claimed that they were well received.41 The prince also seems to have had an interest in Chinese porcelain because the English noted that he ordered some from a Portuguese trader the same year. 42 At least among the wealthiest Trinh courtiers therefore, ownership of Chinese silk and porcelain must have offered some mark of distinction that the equivalent local products could not.

One other Chinese good that seems to have become popular in the years following 1684 was Chinese tea. In the 1680s, Baron observed that the ‘grandees’ occasionally drank tea from China and Japan, but it was less popular than the local product. 43 By the 1690s though, it appears to have become more esteemed. In 1695, the English factory, once again attempting to curry favour, sent one of the Trinh officials a coat of broadcloth and a catty (0.6 kg) of tea, presumably Chinese tea because the English had no direct access to the Japanese variety.44 The Abbe Richard, a Frenchman who published a description of the Trinh domain in 1778 based on missionary reports from the middle part of the century, claims that Chinese tea had become fashionable among the elites, and that it was regularly

37 Alexander Hamilton, A New Account of the East Indies (Edinburgh: John Mosman, 1727), vol. 2, p. 213. 38 George Bryan Souza, The Survival of Empire: Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630 – 1754 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 136. 39 Baron, “A Description of the Kingdom of Tonqueen,” pp. 664. On the importance of copper as an import, see Hoang Anh Tuan, Silk for Silver: Dutch-Vietnamese Relations, 1637 - 1700 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 133 – 139. 40 Joannes Camphuys, Anthonio Hurdt, Willem van Outhoorn, Marten Pit, Jacob Pits, Joan van Hoorn, Nicolaas Schaghen, Isaac de Saint-Martin, and Robert Padtbrugge, March 13, 1688, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven, vol. 5, p. 173. 41 ‘Copy of Tonqueen diary & consultations,’ BL, IOR/G/12/17, p. 724. 42 ‘Copy of Tonqueen diary & consultations,’ BL, IOR/G/12/17, p. 736. 43 Baron, “A Description of the Kingdom of Tonqueen,” pp. 678. 44 ‘Copy of Tonqueen diary & consultations,‘ BL, IOR/G/12/17, p. 856. 107

imported along with porcelain Chinaware, silk stuffs, sugar and other Qing products. 45 So in spite of the much reduced role Pho Hien played in East Asian maritime trade after 1684, there was a sustained and quite probably expanding market for the Qing empire’s luxury goods in the Trinh domain that kept it connected commercially to the Qing empire through at least the first half of the eighteenth century.

In the Nguyen domain the demand for Chinese luxury goods was at least as great, but because of the resources available to it, there was far less need for the Nguyen to remain connected to the VOC’s trading system or maintain a relationship with any other group of silver-bearing Europeans. The VOC pulled out its factory in 1638 and did not return. And despite a brief flirtation in 1695 and 1696, the English East India companies never bothered to establish a trading post in Hoi An at all. 46 Even the Portuguese in Macau, who had access to Chinese luxury goods, were absent from 1684 until 1712 because of disputes with the Nguyen government. 47 The reason for the almost complete absence of Europeans in Hoi An at the end of the seventeenth century seems to have been the result of a disinterest in doing business with them within the Nguyen court. Alexander Hamilton alludes to this when he states that “they give little encouragement for strangers to trade with them.”48 If by ‘strangers’ he meant Europeans, this does seem to have been the case; lists of port taxes charged in Hoi An that were compiled later in the eighteenth century show that the government was discriminating against European merchants. Each European trade ship arriving had to pay 8000 quan (strings of 600 copper coins), compared to 4000 for a ship from Macau or Japan, 3000 for a ship from Shanghai or Guangzhou, 2000 for a ship from Fujian, Siam, or the Philippines, and lesser amounts for all other ports. 49 Perhaps this indicates that the Nguyen court believed European ships could afford to pay more, but it also shows that they were not inclined to encourage European trade in their main port.

The disinclination among Nguyen rulers to encourage European trade was likely partly a result of conflicts earlier in the seventeenth century with European groups, particularly a small scale war with the VOC in the 1640s. 50 The more important reason though seems to have been the lack of much need to import silver to support its economy or maintain its foreign trade. The domestic economy required copper coins imported from the Qing empire or Japan for currency, 51 while the Nguyen domain’s foreign trade, dominated by

45 Richard, History of Tonquin , in A General Collection of the Best and Most Interesting Voyages and Travels in All Parts of the World , ed. John Pinkerton (London: Longman, 1811), vol. 9, pp. 727, 738. 46 Hoang, Silk for Silver , pp. 61 – 66; and Alastair Lamb, The Mandarin Road to Old Hue: Narratives of Anglo- Vietnamese Diplomacy from the 17th century to the eve of the French Conquest (London: Chatto & Windus, 1970), p. 9. 47 Pierre-Yves Manguin, Les Portugais Sur les Côtes du Viêt-Nam et du Campā: Étude su les routes maritime et les relations commerciales, d’après les sources portugaises (XVI e VII e, XVIII e siècles) (Paris: École Français D’Extrême-Orient, 1972), pp. 209 – 213. 48 Hamilton, A New Account , vol. 2, p. 208. 49 Le Quy Don, Phu Bien Tap Luc , in Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on the Economic History of Cochinchina (Dang Trong), 1602 – 1777 , ed. Li Tana and Anthony Reid (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), p. 116. 50 Hoang, Silk for Silver , pp. 83 – 86. 51 Li, Nguy ễn Cochinchina , pp. 93 – 96. 108

Qing merchants, relied on the export of tropical goods (aloe woods and shark products, among other things) rather than silver. 52 The small amounts of silver that did enter the Nguyen market seem to have been brought by Hoi An-based ships. Hamilton does mention seeing vessels from the Nguyen domain in both Johor and Batavia, ports where silver from the Indian Ocean would have been available, 53 but even this trade seems to have been quite small. In Batavia, according to the numbers collected from the VOC’s archives by George Bryan Souza, between 1684 and 1714 there was only one ship that arrived from the Nguyen domain compared to twenty-five from the Trinh. 54

Despite the absence of any regular European trade, Hoi An was still certainly the most important port along the coast of what would become modern Vietnam through most of the eighteenth century. 55 It owed its influence primarily and perhaps almost entirely to the trade carried by China-based merchants after 1684, who came in greater numbers than their late Ming predecessors had in the first half of the seventeenth century. In 1626, for example, the captain of a ship from Quanzhou (by far the most important late-Ming port) that arrived in Batavia stated there were three ships from his city bound for the Nguyen domain that year. 56 Another report from a captain in 1638 claimed that no Chinese vessels at all had appeared in Nguyen territory (or several other important ports). 57 In contrast, after 1684 there seem to have usually been at least five Qing ships per year dropping anchor in Hoi An’s harbour, and often more than ten. Thomas Bowyear, an Englishman who travelled to Hoi An in 1695, reported that ten to twelve Chinese ships came annually from Japan, Guangzhou, Siam, Cambodia, Manila, and Batavia. 58 Da Shan 大汕 , a Qing Buddhist monk who visited the same port in the same year as Bowyear wrote that the Nguyen lord (Nguyen Phuc Chu 阮福淍 ) told him seventeen ships had come that season, whereas in former years the number was typically six or seven.59 Another Englishman, investigating the possibility of trade in Hoi An in 1703 claimed there were no less than thirteen Chinese ships in port while he was there. 60

52 Charles Wheeler also notes this relative absence of silver in records relating to Hoi An. Charles J. Wheeler, “Cross-Cultural Trade and Trans-Regional Networks in the Port of Hoi An: Maritime Vietnam in the Early Modern Era” (PhD diss., Yale University, 2001), p. 166. 53 Hamilton, A New Account , vol. 2, p. 208. 54 Souza, The Survival of Empire , p. 136. 55 Alexander Woodside, “Central Vietnam’s Trading World in the Eighteenth Century as Seen in Le Quy Don’s ‘Frontier Chronicles’,” in Essays Into Vietnamese Pasts , ed. K. W. Taylor and John K. Whitmore (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, 1995), p. 116. 56 Pieter de Carpentier, Jacques Specx, Dr. Pieter Vlack, and Antonio van Diemen, February 3, 1626, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 1, p. 201. 57 Antonio van Diemen, Philips Lucasz., Carel Reniers, Abraham Welsing, and Cornelis van der Lijn, December 22, 1638, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 1, p. 705. 58 "Thomas Bowyear's Narrative," in The Mandarin Road to Old Hue: Narratives of Anglo-Vietnamese Diplomacy from the 17th century to the eve of the French Conquest , ed. Alastair Lamb (London: Chatto & Windus, 1970), p. 52. 59 Da Shan 大汕 , Hai wai ji shi 海外記事 (Beijing: Zhong hua shu ju, 1987), p. 63. This is also cited in Li, Nguy ễn Cochinchina , p. 85. 60 Henry Smith, “Products of Cochinchina & Importations,” 1703, BL, IOR/E/3/66, doc. 8211. 109

The consensus among contemporary observers was that the post-1684 rise in Qing shipping to Hoi An resulted in the dominance of Qing imports in its market by the turn of the eighteenth century as well. In 1702, when servants of the English East India company ask for advice on the commercial situation in Hoi An from a Franciscan missionary living there, they received a letter from him advising them to collect cargoes consisting only of copper coins and Chinese silk ‘flower’d with gold’ from Guangdong. The missionary also recommended gifts for the Nguyen court, including “a large looking glass, some pieces of silk flower’d with gold, some sort of arms, some geographicall Chinese maps not European, some European toy, some sweet meat, good Chinese wine, but no great quantity, and such things as are bulkie but of small value.”61 An even more detailed report was sent by one of the company’s own agents the next year that largely confirmed the Franciscan’s advice. The company man’s list of profitable imports includes more than ten types of wrought silks from Guangdong and Jiangnan, black dye, dried lychees and longans, various types of paper, blue and white bowls, iron implements, Chinese copper coins, ‘wrought brass’ (probably meaning refined copper), sago (a Southeast Asian flour made from palm stems), and dried betel nuts. They liked European ‘toys,’ he adds, but not many would actually sell, and neither would English woollen cloth. 62 Besides the dried fruit, betel nuts, and sago, which were Southeast Asian products, and possibly the dye and brass, every recommended import was a Qing product. In essence, what the two informants were both saying was that if the English company wished to make a profit in the Nguyen domain, they needed to act as country traders sailing between the Qing empire and Hoi An. It was Chinese silks and other Qing goods that the people of south-central Vietnam wanted, not European or Indian ones. Not surprisingly, the company did not act on this advice. If it had, it would have been in direct competition with the five to fifteen Qing ships sailing to Hoi An each year that had better access to Qing commodities than the English ever would.

Siam As in other parts of Southeast Asia, the VOC’s fortunes in Siam began to decline in the 1680s. The traditional explanation for this was that Phetracha (r. 1688 – 1703), who usurped the throne after the death of Narai in 1688, initiated a phase of commercial isolationism. Dhiravat na Pombejra’s work has revised this position by showing that Muslim South Asian and Chinese merchants and adventurers continued to arrive in Siam both to trade and to take up various posts in the new king’s administration. It was only Europeans whose presence was diminished in Siam, but even then the VOC maintained regular trade with Ayutthaya. 63 Anthony Reid, building on Pombejra’s work, finds a place for Siam within his Age of Commerce thesis by arguing that there was an overall decline of Siam’s trade with

61 Stephnus Iliecto to the Company, Cochinchina, June 10, 1702, BL, IOR/E/3/64, doc. 7961. 62 Henry Smith, “Products of Cochinchina & Importations,” 1703, BL, IOR/E/3/66, doc. 8211. 63 Dhiravat na Pombejra, “Ayutthaya at the End of the Seventeenth Century: Was There a Shift to Isolation?” in Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era: Trade, Power, and Belief , ed. Anthony Reid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 252 – 253. 110

the outside world after 1688 because of an impoverishment of the kingdom. According to him, after Phetracha’s ascent the China-based merchants became the overwhelmingly dominant commercial force in Ayutthaya simply because the volume of their trade in Siam declined less than that of the VOC, the English, and the various South Asian participants. 64 This section proposes that it was not impoverishment but competition that forced prices down in Ayutthaya and damaged the VOC’s interests. The competition came both directly from Qing imports of luxury goods (primarily silk, porcelain, and tea), and from the importation of South Asian cloth by Muslim, Armenian, and English merchants that was facilitated by Japanese and Chinese copper brought by the Qing merchants as well.

To begin, the decline in the VOC’s commerce in Siam was connected to the rise in the volume of trade carried by China-based merchants. Between 1680 and 1689, the company had been relying on silver imports for most of its business in the kingdom. It had found that its Dutch coins with high silver content were well received in the Siamese market, most likely because, like the silver dubbeltjes in Java, they were easily tradable to the Zheng and then Qing merchants who sailed to Ayutthaya. But by 1689, Japan had ceased supplying the company with significant quantities of silver, and much of its coin shipments from Europe were required in other parts of its Asian system, leaving less silver available for the Siamese factory. The death of Narai and subsequent revolution in Siam also removed most of the VOC’s European competitors, and this in combination with the relative scarcity of silver encouraged its managers to make a renewed effort to support the company’s acquisition of Siamese tin and sappanwood with imports of South Asian cloth, spices, and other Asian goods. 65

But the weakness of this new strategy quickly became clear; the other Europeans who had been forced out after Narai’s death were not the VOC’s most important potential competitors; it was the Qing merchants who were seriously challenging the company’s position in the 1690s. In 1692, the company decided not to send any sugar to Ayutthaya for fear of Chinese competition, and its agents reported that they could not sell more than small amounts of Coromandel cloth, likely for the same reason. 66 In 1696, the agents again reported that they had been attempting to sell cloth in Siam for the past two years, both for the domestic market and for re-export to the Philippines, but were having very little success. 67 The following year, the company effectively lost its monopoly on Ligor tin to

64 Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce , pp. 308 – 309; and Reid, A History of Southeast Asia , p. 154. 65 George Vinal Smith, The Dutch in Seventeenth-Century Thailand (Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1974), pp. 68 – 69; and F. S. Gaastra, “The Exports of Precious Metal from Europe to Asia by the Dutch East India Company, 1602 – 1795,” in Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds , ed. J. F. Richards (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1983), p. 465. 66 Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Laurens Pijl, Isaac de Saint Martin, Dirk de Haas, Jan van Leene, Wouter Valckenier, Abraham van Riebeeck, Manuel Bornezee, and Wijbrand Lycochthon, December 11, 1692, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 5, p. 531. 67 Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Laurens Pijl, Isaac de Saint-Martin, Dirk de Haas, Abraham van Riebeeck, Wouter Valckenier, Joannes Cops, Manuel Bornezee, Wijbrand Lycohthon, and Joachim Nieustadt, February 8, 1696, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 5, p. 754. 111

Chinese merchants (probably those based in Ayutthaya who would resell it to Qing ships or to South Asian merchants arriving on the western side of the isthmus) because it had insisted on paying in cloth rather than silver. Significantly, that year the company’s fine cloth, the product most directly in competition with Chinese silk, also earned nothing in Siam. 68 In 1700, the company’s cloth became briefly profitable again, 69 possibly because of a rise in silk prices in Jiangnan and an uprising within Siam that discouraged China-based ships from arriving; according to a French missionary only three or four Chinese ships came that year. 70 But in 1703 about ten Qing ships arrived, 71 and the Dutch found that there was once again no profit from their textiles. 72 From then until 1765 when the VOC’s Ayutthaya factory was permanently withdrawn, trade with Siam brought, at best, very modest returns. 73

In the meantime, there was clear growth in the volume of Qing shipping to Ayutthaya. It began in the last years of Narai’s long reign (1656 to 1688), but continued on through the Ban Phlu Luang dynasty (1688 to 1767). Contrary to what the Age of Commerce model suggests, the volume of Sino-Siamese trade in the post 1684 (or the post- 1688 period as Siam-focussed studies usually divide it) appears to have exceeded that of the early seventeenth century based on numbers of ships. Reports from the English East India company’s agents in Siam during the 1610s and 1620s suggest that there were usually about three or four ships from Ming China arriving in Ayutthaya per year. 74 Jeremias van Vliet, the head of the VOC’s factory between 1629 and 1634, concurred, writing that two or three ships from Quanzhou came annually, while the king of Siam (Prasatthong, r. 1629 – 1656) sent three or four of his own to China. 75 Occasional reports from Batavia to Amsterdam support these figures. In 1625, there were reportedly four ‘badly laden’ Chinese ships in Siam. 76 The following year in early February, a report from a Chinese captain in Batavia on

68 Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Laurens Pijl, Dirk de Haas, Abraham van Riebeeck, Wouter Valckenier, Joannes Cops, Manuel Bornezee, Wijbrand Lychochthon, and Willem van Wijngaarden, January 16, 1697, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven, vol. 5, p. 787. 69 Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Laurens Pijl, Dirk de Haas, Abraham van Riebeeck, Joannes Cops, Manuel Bornezee, Thomas van Rhee, Jacob van Dam, and Christoffel van Swoll, December 1, 1700, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven, vol. 6, p. 124. 70 Ship #26 from Nanjing, July 31, 1699, Hayashi, Kai Hentai, vol. 3, p. 2054; Bhawan Ruangsilp, Dutch East India Company Merchants at the Court of Ayutthaya: Dutch Perceptions of the Thai Kingdom, c. 1604 – 1765 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 171 – 172; and M. Braud to the Directors of the Seminary of the Missions étrangères, August 1700, in Adrien Launay, Histoire de la Mission de Siam, 1662 – 1811, Documents Historiques II (Paris: Missions étrangères de Paris, 1920), p. 46. 71 Ship #69 from Siam, September 17, 1703, Hayashi, Kai Hentai, vol. 3, p. 2332. 72 Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Abraham van Riebeeck, Laurens Pijl, Joannes Cops, Manuel Bornezee, Jacob van Dam, Christoffel van Swoll, Abraham Douglas, and Adam van Rijn, December 1, 1703, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 6, p. 243. 73 Dhiravat na Pombejra, “Ayutthaya at the End of the Seventeenth Century,” p. 266. 74 In 1613 there were four; in 1617 there were three; and in 1621 there were three again. Anthony Farrington and Dhiravat na Pombejra, ed., The English Factory in Siam, 1621 – 1685 (London: British Library, 2007), vol. 1, pp. 105, 227, 268. 75 Jeremias van Vliet, Description of the Kingdom of Siam , trans. L. F. van Ravenswaay, Journal of the Siam Society 7, no. 1 (1910): 89, 92. 76 Pieter de Carpentier, Jacques Specx, Dr. Pieter Vlack, and Antonio van Diemen, February 3, 1626, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 1, p. 192. 112

shipping from his home port of Quanzhou stated that there would be three ships arriving in Siam during that monsoon season. 77 And in 1633 there were only two ships directly from China and one from the Nguyen domain that sailed up the Chao Phraya River. 78

For comparison, in 1685, near the end of Narai’s reign, the French ambassador Alexandre de Chaumont reported that there were five or six royal ships, supposedly of 1000 to 1500 tons each, sent to the Qing empire annually for trade. 79 In addition to these royal ships, Nicolas Gervaise, a French missionary who lived in Siam from 1681 to 1685, claimed that each year the Chinese brought fifteen to twenty ships to Siam with goods from China and Japan. 80 Neither the coup of the allegedly less cosmopolitan Phetracha, nor the 1694 Qing crackdown on the presence of long-haired overseas Chinese in its ports (see the previous chapter) seem to have affected the volume of this trade very much. Dhiravat na Pombejra, citing documents in the VOC archives, states that there were twenty Chinese ships that arrived in Ayutthaya in 1695, a relatively good year, and ten in 1697, a relatively dull year. 81 An examination of scattered reports on the numbers of Qing ships arriving in Ayutthaya in the Kai Hentai , which were sometimes based on second-hand information or partial observations during brief stopovers, suggests fewer arrivals but still puts the annual number at about five to ten China-based ships (see Table 4.1 below).

77 Pieter de Carpentier, Jacques Specx, Dr. Pieter Vlack, and Antonio van Diemen, February 3, 1626, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 1, p. 201. 78 Henrick Brouwer, Antonio van Diemen, Jan van der Burch, and Jan van Broeckum, December 1634, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 1, p. 469. 79 Alexandre de Chaumont, Relation of the Embassy to Siam 1685 , in The Chevalier de Chaumont and the Abbe de Choisy: Aspects of the Embassy to Siam 1685 , ed. Michael Smithies (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1997), p. 94 80 Nicolas Gervaise, The Natural and Political History of the Kingdom of Siam , trans. John Villiers (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1989), p. 63. 81 Dhiravat na Pombejra, “Ayutthaya at the End of the Seventeenth Century,” p. 263. 113

Table 4.1. China-based Trade Ships Sailing to Siam According to Scattered Mentions in the Kai Hentai, 1684 – 1710 Year Number of Ships Kai Hentai Reference 1684 5 vol. 1, p. 433 1686 Many vol. 1, p. 618 1688 Some vol. 2, p. 988 1689 14 or 15 vol. 2, p. 1273 1690 12 vol. 2, p. 1270 1695 8 vol. 2, p. 1735 1696 13 vol. 2, p. 1828 1697 2 vol. 3, p. 1932 1698 7 vol. 3, p. 1997 1699 6 vol. 3, p. 2080 1703 ~10 vol. 3, p. 2332 1707 Some vol. 3, p. 2496 1710 Some vol. 3, p. 2667

These China-based ships brought a range of imports to Siam, most of which seem to have been luxury goods. Alexandre de Chaumont lists “raw silks, silk lengths, satins, tea, musk, rhubarb, porcelains, varnished works, China wood, gold, and rubies” as the chief ones. 82 To these can be added the goods George White reported coming from Guangzhou and Macau in 1678, which included quicksilver, zinc, copper, and iron pans. 83 And from the VOC’s report cited above, we know that Qing ships were also bringing sugar by 1692. Four types of goods from this composite list bear closer examination. The most visible and probably most profitable imports were Qing silks, raw and wrought, and porcelain. Tea deserves special consideration as well because it is the one type of good whose supply the Qing empire monopolised, and because it does not seem to have become popular in Siam until the second half of the seventeenth century, so evidence of its consumption provides a strong indicator of the gathering commercial strength of the Qing merchants. Finally, copper played a special role as a re-export to South Asia, particularly the Coromandel Coast, in exchange for cotton cloth.

I will begin with copper because it likely had the greatest effect on the VOC’s interests in Siam. Dhiravat na Pombejra (whom Anthony Reid follows) proposes that the apogee of South Asian-Siamese trade occurred in the reigns of Prasatthong and Narai (1629 to 1688) and declined thereafter, but he seems to base this assertion on the relatively great amount of political power South Asian Muslims held in Siam’s court in these two reigns,

82 Chaumont, Relation of the Embassy to Siam 1685 , p. 95. 83 George White, “Report on the Trade of Siam written in 1678,” in John Anderson , English Intercourse with Siam in the Seventeenth Century (London: Kegan Paul, 1890), p. 424. 114 rather than any trading data. 84 Muslim power within the Siamese court does seem to have declined during Phetracha’s reign, but it does not follow that the volume of Siam’s trade with South Asia necessarily fell as a consequence. In fact, Sinnappah Arasartnam’s reconstruction of the Coromandel Coast’s commercial world posits that in the first four decades of the eighteenth century the region’s merchants lost most of their stake in the western Indian Ocean, and consequently focussed their activities on Southeast Asia, especially in the region of Mergui and Tenasserim on Siam’s western coast. The importance of Mergui was that it served as the western terminus of an overland route that connected the Bay of Bengal to Ayutthaya and the eastern coast of the Malay peninsula. 85 The reason that the Coromandel merchants were interested in Mergui in particular seems to have been because of the advent of the large scale copper trade in East Asia, which began when the Zheng family’s merchants started trading for Japanese copper in the 1650s or 1660s. 86 The best documented period of Mergui’s role as a conduit for copper and cloth came in the last years of Narai’s reign when Samuel White served as his shahbandar there in 1686 and 1687. White sent copper, elephants, sappanwood, tin, and other local products from Mergui to ports on the Coromandel Coast in exchange for silver and South Asian cloth on vessels nominally owned by Narai or by a motley assortment of private shippers plying the sea lanes. 87 After Phetracha’s usurpation of the throne in 1688, White was gone from Mergui, but the trade continued. English and Dutch sources mention private ships taking copper (along with tin, zinc, elephants, and sappanwood) from Mergui in 1692 and 1693, 88 and in 1697 the VOC’s agents claimed there were even royal Siamese ships setting out from Tenasserim bound for Coromandel yearly with the same types of cargoes. 89

84 Dhiravat na Pombejra, “Ayutthaya at the End of the Seventeenth Century,” p. 263; and Dhiravat na Pombejra, “A Political History of Siam under the Prasatthong Dynasty, 1629 – 1688” (Phd diss., University of London, 1984), pp. 325 – 330. 85 Sinnappah Arasaratnam, Merchants, Companies and Commerce on the Coromandel Coast, 1650 – 1740 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 206 – 208. 86 See for example Joan Maetsuyker, Carel Hartsinck, Arnold de Vlaming van Oudtshoorn, Nicolaes Verburch, Dirck Jansz. Steur, and Pieter Sterthemius, December 16, 1659, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 3, p. 289. 87 See for instance Francois Martin, director-general of the French East India company at Pondicherry, to William Gyfford, February 7, 1687, in Farrington, The English Factory in Siam , vol. 2, p. 1019; John Davis at Cudalore to William Gyfford, February 12, 1687, in in Farrington, The English Factory in Siam , vol. 2, p. 1022; Francis Davenport, “An Historical Abstract of Mr Samuel White his management of affairs,” in in Farrington, The English Factory in Siam , vol. 2, p. 1195; and Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Laurens Pijl, Dirk de Haas, Abraham van Riebeeck, Wouter Valckenier, Joannes Cops, Manuel Bornezee, Wijbrand Lychochthon, and Willem van Wijngaarden, January 16, 1697, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 5, p. 787. For a general description of the trade through Mergui, see Sinnappah Arasaratnam, “The Coromandel-Southeast Asia Trade, 1650 – 1740: Challenges and Responses of a Commercial System,” Journal of Asian History 18, no. 2 (1984): 123. 88 Consultation by Elihu Yale and Council at Madras, January 29, 1692, in Farrington, The English Factory in Siam , vol. 2, p. 1369; and Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Laurens Pijl, Isaac de Saint-Martin, Dirk de Haas, Abraham van Riebeeck Wouter Valckenier, Manuel Bornezee, Wijbrand Lycochthon, Joachim Nieustadt, and Willem van Wijngaerden, February 6, 1694, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 5, pp. 659 – 660. 89 Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Laurens Pijl, Dirk de Haas, Abraham van Riebeeck, Wouter Valckenier, Joannes Cops, Manuel Bornezee, Wijbrand Lycochthon, and Willem van Wijngaarden, January 19, 1697, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 5, p. 779. 115

Trade through Mergui may have been the most important alternative to the VOC as a conduit between Siam and South Asia during Phetracha’s reign, but by the middle of the first decade of the eighteenth century, increasing numbers of South Asian-based merchants were also sailing through the straits of Melaka or Sunda to trade directly in Ayutthaya. Chief amongst them were private English, Armenian, and Portuguese ships commissioned by the English United East India company’s Madras presidency, which was then seeking better access to Japanese and Chinese copper. 90 By 1706, the VOC was complaining that English sales of Japanese copper were driving down copper prices in Coromandel, 91 and nine years later they were explicitly accusing the English, and the interlopers cooperating with them, of ruining the market for textiles in Siam. 92

Trade between South Asia and Siam would have persisted even if all the Siamese had to offer was tin, elephants, and sappanwood. But it was the copper imported by Qing ships, and to a lesser extent the royal Siamese vessels, that was responsible for encouraging regular participation by South Asian-based merchants, especially those on the Coromandel Coast. They ensured a steady flow of cotton textiles into Ayutthaya, which in turn forced down the prices of the VOC’s own South Asian cloth, its most important import good. This was likely the most significant effect that China-based merchants had on the Dutch company’s interests in Siam.

It was not the only effect though. In addition to copper, the Qing merchants were also importing a range of other goods that commanded a large share of the luxury good market in Siam. Only wrought silk competed directly with the VOC’s ‘fine’ cloth imports, but even among the wealthy there was a finite amount of disposable income, so the flood of silks, porcelain, and tea, among other things from the Qing empire, had the effect of luring away business that might have otherwise come to the VOC factory, making it harder to sell the company’s calicoes, Bengali silks, pepper, and spices. And of course the popularity of the Chinese luxury goods also helped the Qing merchants load their ships with the tin and sappanwood the Siamese market offered, thus lowering the supply available for the Dutch company.

90 D. K. Bassett, “British ‘Country’ Trade and Local Trade Networks in the Thai and Malay States, c. 1680 – 1770,” Modern Asian Studies 23, no. 4 (1989): 633. 91 Joan van Hoorn, Abraham van Riebeeck, Christoffel van Swoll, Herman de Wilde, Abraham Douglas, Pieter de Vos, Dirk Comans, Bernard Phoonsen, Adam van Rijn, Hendrik Zwaardecroon, Henrik Becker, Conelis Chasteleyn, and Mattheus de Haan, January 25, 1706, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 6, p. 396. 92 Christoffel van Swoll, Frans Castelijn, Mattheus de Haan, Hendrik Zwaardecroon, Theodorus de Haeze, Laurens Tolling, Samuel Timmerman, Jacob Faes, Joan Cornelis d’Ableing, and Ferdinand de Groot, February 19, 1716, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 7, p. 219; Christoffel van Swoll, Frans Castelijn, Mattheus de Haan, Hendrik Zwaardecroon, Theodorus de Haeze, Samuel Timmerman, Jacob Faes, Laurens Tolling, Joan Cornelis d’Ableing, Ferdinand de Groot, and Willem Six, March 23, 1717, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 7, p. 281; and Christoffel van Swoll, Frans Castelijn, Mattheus de Haan, Hendrik Zwaardecroon, Theodorus de Haeze, Samuel Timmerman, Jacob Faes, Laurens Tolling, Joan Cornelis d’Ableing, Ferdinand de Groot, Willem Six, and Cornelis Hasselaar, January 15, 1718, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 7, p. 327. 116

The most profitable Qing import in Siam seems to have been silk, raw and wrought. Chaumont’s co-leader of the French embassy in 1685, François-Timoléon de Choisy, claimed that a Qing merchant had told him that Chinese raw silk could be sold in Siam for two or three hundred per cent of its price in Guangdong or Jiangnan, respectively. 93 The main reason for this profitability seems to have been a steady demand based on its cachet among consumers in Ayutthaya and perhaps the other larger Siamese and Malay towns connected to it commercially. This demand for silk apparently crossed class boundaries despite the Qing merchants’ high mark up. De Choisy’s account also suggests that the use of silk (Chinese or otherwise) was not restricted to the wealthy; according to him even the locksmiths in Ayutthaya dressed in silk (he evidently regarded locksmithing as a particularly lowly profession). 94 In the decades that followed Phetracha’s usurpation, Qing silk became popular enough that it was also the most common gift in various forms from the Siamese kings and state officials to the French Missions Étrangères who maintained a mission in Ayutthaya. From Phetracha, the missionaries recorded receiving at different times a robe and mantle of Chinese black satin, a dress of violet silk, a fine piece of silk, and a coat of satin. 95 The king’s successor, Sua (r. 1703 – 1709), continued the tradition, sending the missionaries a coat of silk upon his enthronement. 96

After silk, Qing porcelain was likely the most fashionable import from the Qing empire. The quality and style varied, but like silk it appears to have pervaded society from the palaces of the royal family to the relatively modest households of Ayutthaya’s urban residents. Gervaise, for example, criticises the lack of what he considered real furnishings even in Siamese palaces, claiming that there were typically only Chinese or Japanese cabinets, porcelain (presumably also either Chinese or Japanese), Persian carpets, and silk cushions to be found in most rooms. 97 Simon de la Loubère, who led another French embassy to Ayutthaya in 1687, mentions China dishes and other ceramic objects imports being frequently used as decorations, 98 including some of pornographic design. 99 In a list of goods common to most households, he claims that the Siamese used a great deal of porcelain in their homes because they had consistently good access to coarse and cheap articles of it. 100 Qing porcelain also seems to have become a typical good used as a gift, a sure sign of its fashionability. Alexander Chaumont took a large variety of ceramics from both China and

93 L’Abbé de Choisy, Journal du Voyage de Siam fait 1685 & 1686 (Paris: Sebastien Mabre-Cramoist, 1687), p. 469. 94 Choisy, Journal du Voyage , p. 326. 95 Launay, Histoire de la Mission de Siam, 1662 – 1811, Documents Historiques II , pp. 10, 21, 30. 96 Monseigneur de Cicé to the Directors of the Seminary of the Missions étrangères, May 30, 1703, in Launay, Histoire de la Mission de Siam, 1662 – 1811, Documents Historiques II , p. 92. 97 Gervaise, The Natural and Political History , p. 94. 98 Simon de la Loubère, A New Historical Relation of the Kingdom of Siam (London: Thomas Horne, 1693), p. 31. 99 Loubère, A New Historical Relatio , p. 27. In the wreck of a Qing trade ship off the Con Dao islands that sank around 1690 (discussed below), forty ceramic figurines were recovered that depicted naked men and women with comically large genitalia; Loubère may have been to the homes of Siamese who had purchased similar Qing products. Michael Flecker, “Excavation of an oriental vessel of c. 1690 off Con Dao, Vietnam,” International Journal of Nautical Archaeology 21, no. 3 (1992): 234. 100 Loubère, A New Historical Relation , p. 166. 117

Japan back to France as part of a gift from Narai to Louis XIV in 1685, 101 and Guy Tachard, the leader of the last French embassy to Siam in 1687, received tea, ‘China-night gowns,’ and ‘fine China-dishes of all sizes,’ among other things from Narai’s favourite Constantine Phaulkon. 102 Even the VOC’s agents record receiving porcelain as a gift from Phetracha in 1691. 103

In the early part of the seventeenth century, the observations of English agents and other Europeans make it clear that silk and porcelain had already been regular imports to Siam from Ming China, so the late seventeenth-century descriptions of these types of goods as ubiquitous among gifts and household possessions only suggest an increase in the volume of their import after 1684.104 The large scale consumption of Chinese tea in Siam, on the other hand, seems to have been a new phenomenon in the late seventeenth century, and therefore is a much clearer indicator of the growing commercial power of the Qing empire’s merchants. In the early part of the century, the European merchants often described the types of cloth, porcelain, spices, musk, and precious metals that were imported to Ayutthaya, but tea is never mentioned. Joost Schouten, the head of the VOC’s factory in Siam from 1624 to 1629 and author of a short book on the country, describes the typical beverages of the Siamese as including only water, arak, and ‘brandy-wine.’ 105 Another book by Schouten’s successor, Jeremias van Vliet (in office 1629 to 1634), similarly makes no mention of tea. It claims that the typical beverage were ‘cocos water,’ and arak. 106 The earliest mention of tea being served in Siam that this author has been able to find is in the account of Jacques du Bourges, a priest that was part of the French Missions Étrangères’ initial operation in Asia. He wrote another account of the country based on his time there in 1662, in which he describes being served tea with sugar after a feast. 107 The first mention of tea as an import good in the English East India company’s records comes in 1680 when Narai included it in a list of goods he wanted the company to procure for him. 108 In that year, Zheng Jing and his forces lost Xiamen and consequently their easy access to Fujian where much of the tea was grown (see Chapter One), so we can tentatively hypothesise that tea had become a regular import during the Zheng Chenggong’s reign as patriarch of the family (1646 to 1662), and then likely became widespread in the 1670s when the family’s merchants were dependent on

101 Chaumont, Relation of the Embassy to Siam 1685 , pp. 137 – 149. 102 Guy Tachard, A Relation of the Voyage to Siam Performed by Six Jesuits Sent by the French King, to the Indies and China, in the Year, 1685 (London: J. Robinson, 1688), pp. 210 – 211. 103 Joannes Camphuys, Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Wouter Valckenier, Abraham van Riebeeck, and Manuel Bornezee, March 26, 1691, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 5, p. 431. 104 See for example Peter Floris’ journal of the Globe at Patani and Ayutthaya, January 15, 1613, in Farrington, The English Factory in Siam , vol. 1, p. 98. 105 Joost Schouten, A Description of the Government, Might, Religion, Customes, Traffick, and other remarkable Affairs in the Kingdom of Siam , in Francis Caron and Joost Schouten, A True Description of the Mighty Kingdoms of Japan and Siam , trans. Roger Manley (London: Robert Boulter, 1671), p. 146. 106 Vliet, “Description of the Kingdom of Siam”: 83. He does mention “Chinese sweets” on the following page. 107 [Jacques] de Bourges, Relation du voyage de Monseigneur Veveque de Beryte, vicaire apostolique du royaume de la Cochinchine, par la Turquie, la Perse, les Indies, et jusqu’au royaume de Siam (Paris: Denys Bechet, 1666), p. 155. 108 List of goods desired by King Narai, Ayutthaya, December 10, 1680, in Farrington, The English Factory in Siam, vol. 1, p. 558. 118

Siam and other parts of Southeast Asia to compensate for the disruption caused by the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories. In the twilight of the Zheng family’s commercial empire in the early 1680s, the English and other Europeans had an opportunity to step into the breach as suppliers of some goods that the Zheng no longer had access to, such as tea. The Europeans’ opportunity to act as suppliers of tea did not last long though. After 1684, there was more than enough direct shipping from the Qing empire to keep the Siamese kings supplied and then some. By 1686 Siam was re-exporting some of its imported tea to English merchants, who were buying it for the European market. 109 It seems to have become a household staple in Siam as well. The French ambassadors in the 1680s repeatedly mention tea being commonly served at social events. According to Simon de la Loubère in 1687 for example, serving tea as a social custom was ‘thoroughly settled’ in Ayutthaya, though he goes on to state it had not yet spread to other parts of the country. 110

The popularity of tea in Siam starting in the 1680s, even more than silk or porcelain, shows how quickly Qing merchants achieved a dominant position in that market. The VOC’s difficulty selling its imports in Siam was partly a result of the increasing numbers of English and South Asian merchant ships arriving in Ayutthaya and Mergui with their loads of South Asian cloth to exchange for the copper brought from China and Japan. The company also had increasing difficulty because its high-end products (fine silk and cotton cloth mostly) were competing with the increasingly fashionable luxury goods from the Qing empire that were redirecting the disposable wealth of Siamese consumers away from the company’s struggling factory.

Johor and the Malay World Johor’s late seventeenth-century political history is even more turbulent than that of Siam, but it retained its role as the premier emporium of the western Malay region until well into the eighteenth century. Unlike Siam and the Vietnamese states, Johor possessed a population in its mobile capital and immediate dependencies that numbered in the tens of thousands rather than hundreds of thousands or millions. 111 For Qing importers, its usefulness therefore depended on its role as an emporium that facilitated the distribution of Qing products to many small pockets of consumers in the southern Malay peninsula and the

109 Henry Guy, Secretary to the Treasury, to the Customs Commissioners, October 4, 1686, Farrington, English Factory in Siam , vol. 2, p. 963. 110 Loubere, A New Historical Relation , p. 21. See also Tachard, A Relation of the Voyage , pp. 269; and Chaumont, Relation of the Embassy to Siam 1685 , p. 37. By the late-eighteenth century it had apparently spread to other parts of the kingdom as well, because Thomas Forrest reported being served tea by the governor of Phuket in 1784. Thomas Forrest, A Voyage from Calcutta to the Mergui Archipelago, Lying on the East Side of the Bay of Bengal (London: J. Robson, 1792), p. 32. 111 A sense of Johor’s population can be got from the VOC’s estimates of the numbers of soldiers and sailors it could raise in 1714. See Leonard Y. Andaya, The Kingdom of Johor, 1641 -1728 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 50, 332 – 333. 119

east side of Sumatra. Despite political upheaval, Johor managed to play this role as the sub- region’s emporium until about 1718.

Johor’s economic and political dominance in the straits of Melaka was achieved in the late seventeenth century through a combination of changes within Johor’s government and the expansion of maritime commerce thanks largely to the appearance of Qing ships. Johor’s capital at the mouth of the Johor river had been destroyed in 1673 by the forces of the east Sumatran kingdom of Jambi, so for several years there was no strong centre of commercial activity in the straits sub-region. 112 The destruction of Johor’s old capital likely made little difference though, because it happened during the on-going conflict between the VOC and the Zheng family. As Balthasar Bort, the company’s governor of Melaka, reported in 1678, almost no ships from either China or Taiwan were sailing to the straits during that decade anyways. 113 In the early 1680s, operating from the new capital of Riau on Bintan island, a reinvigorated Johor defeated both Jambi and Palembang, and partly as a result of its continued alliance with the VOC, it was able to enforce its commercial dominance over its neighbours. 114 A coup within Johor’s government occurred in 1688 (the same year as Siam’s revolution coincidentally), which saw the able bendahara , or first minister, Sri Maharaja Tun Habib Abdul Majid take effective control of Johor. The bendahara moved the capital back to the mouth of the Johor river, and then focussed the energies of his state on enhancing its position as a trading power. 115 According to Dutch observers, he was especially concerned with encouraging his own people to transport goods, Qing ones in particular, from Johor through the Melaka straits. In 1693, an estimated sixty to eighty vessels were sailing through the straits to Johor annually, compared to eight to ten in 1680. 116 Consequently, by the 1690s there were about five to ten China-based merchant ships arriving each year in the port, bringing with them Chinese silk, porcelain, and zinc. 117

In 1699 another revolution in Johor took place that would also have lasting consequences for trade. The bendahara , Abdul Majid, had continued to rule effectively in the name of the young sultan, Mahmud Syah (r. 1685 – 1699), providing good government up until his death in 1697. The numbers of Qing ships coming to Johor had also remained high

112 Leonard Y. Andaya, The Kingdom of Johor , pp. 98 – 100. 113 M. J. Bremner and C. O. Blagden, trans. and ed., “Report of Governor Balthasar Bort on Malacca 1678,” Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 5, no. 1 (August 1927): 131. 114 Leonard Y. Andaya, The Kingdom of Johor , p. 150; and Barbara Watson Andaya, To Live As Brothers: Southeast Sumatra in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), pp. 122 – 123. 115 In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Johor’s capital was moved frequently, and there were several different sites on the Johor river that served as its administrative and royal centre. For the sake of simplicity here the present chapter only distinguishes between the sites on Bintain island (Riau) and those along the river on the peninsular mainland. For the details, see C. A. Gibson-Hill, “Johore Lama and other ancient sites on the Johore River,” Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 28, no. 2 (May 1955): 127 – 197; and Leonard Y. Andaya, The Kingdom of Johor , pp. 177 – 178. 116 Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Laurens Pijl, Isaac de Saint-Martin, Dirk de Hass, Abraham van Riebeeck, Wouter Valckenier, Joan van Leene, Manuel Bornezee, Wybrand Lycochthon, and Willem van Wijngaerden, December 8, 1693, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 5, p. 628. 117 Leonard Y. Andaya, The Kingdom of Johor , pp. 179 – 180; and Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 5 and 6, passim. 120

under his management, with at least eleven arriving in the year before his death. 118 After the bendahara ’s death though, Mahmud Syah began to rule in his own name. He was, according to all observers, a sadist and unrepentant sociopath, who within two years of taking charge of the government managed to alienate most of his own court and followers. A cabal of noblemen assassinated the sultan, and the new bendahara (Abdul Majid’s son) took control of the state. Instead of ruling in the name of a figurehead sultan as his father had done though, he took the throne for himself. In the course of this new brief dynasty, Johor did recover some of its pre-eminence in the Malay world, but the bendahara’ s family lacked the prestige of the old ruling family. Consequently Johor’s role as a territorial power slowly eroded. Revolts against its rule or suzerainty began to break out in former dependencies, and the power of Abdul Majid’s family was gradually weakened until 1718, when the state was conquered by Sumatran Minangkabau and Bugis invaders. 119

The volume of trade arriving in Johor recovered after a nadir during Mahmud’s misrule, but Qing trade seems to have fallen from around ten ships per year in the mid- 1690s to about five or six during the first decade of the eighteenth century. In 1703, Walter Vaughan, an employee of the new English East India company who had been shipwrecked and then held captive in Johor reported that six ‘great China junks’ were there that year. 120 The VOC’s agents, who collected intelligence on Johor intermittently, report five Qing ships in 1710, 121 five again in 1713, 122 four in 1714, 123 and six in 1715. 124 Writing in the 1720s based on information collected earlier, Chen Lunjiong puts the annual number at three or four large ships per year. 125 These numbers are enough for us to remain confident that Johor maintained its position as one of the great Southeast Asian emporia for Qing ships at least until the Bugis conquest in 1718, but that it was not quite as attractive as it had been in the 1690s. This did not however mean that Qing trade with the region declined; instead it seems that a minority of Qing captains who would have sailed directly to Johor before 1700 sailed to the more important markets that had been formerly dependent on it as a hub, perhaps to avoid unrest in Johor itself. In 1714, for example, two Qing ships from Guangzhou sailed

118 Leonard Y. Andaya, The Kingdom of Johor, 1641 -1728 , p. 180. 119 Leonard Y. Andaya, The Kingdom of Johor , pp. 284 – 285; and Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia (Houndsmills: MacMillan, 1982), p. 82. 120 Walter Vaughan, The Adventures of Five Englishmen from Pulo Condoro, A Factory of the New Company in the East- Indies (London: C. Bates, 1714), p. 61. 121 Leonard Y. Andaya, The Kingdom of Johor , p. 214. 122 Leonard Y. Andaya, The Kingdom of Johor , p. 223. 123 Christoffel van Swoll, Abraham Douglas, Mattheus de Haan, Frans Castelijn, Laurens Tolling, Hendrik Zwaardecroon, Pieter Rooselaar, Theodorus de Haeze, Samuel Timmerman, Jacob Faes, and Joan Cornelis d’Ableing, November 26, 1714, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 7, p. 99. 124 Christoffel van Swoll, Abraham Douglas, Mattheus de Haan, Frans Castelijn, Hendrik Zwaardecroon, Theodorus de Haeze, Laurens Tolling, Pieter Rooselaar, Samuel Timmerman, Jacob Faes, Joan Cornelis d’Ableing, and Ferdinand de Groot, September 13, 1715, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 7, p. 178. 125 Chen Lunjiong 陳倫炯 , Hai Guo Wen Jian Lu 海國聞見錄 , ed. Li Changfu 李長傅 (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou gu ji chu ban she, 1985), p. 54. On the type and size of the ships ( bo 舶), see J. W. Cushman and A. C. Milner, "Eighteenth and Nineteenth-Century Chinese Accounts of the Malay Peninsula,” Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 52, no. 1 (1979): 11, note 74. 121

directly to Palembang, the biggest pepper producer in the region. 126 Terengganu, on the east coast of the Malay peninsula north of Johor, also seems to have become important enough that by the late 1710s it was able to attract some direct Qing trade. According to Alexander Hamilton, who visited Terengganu in 1719, three or four ships from the Qing empire were arriving there annually. 127 The conclusion that we may draw from these scattered figures is that although Johor’s position in the early eighteenth century was never quite as central as it had been in the 1680s and 1690s, the Malay territories of the southern peninsula and eastern Sumatra were collectively nearly as important to the Qing merchant community as Siam and the Nguyen domain were. Even with the political upheaval in Johor that began in 1699, visiting the region was still quite worthwhile for Qing merchants.

The most celebrated role that Johor played in the minds of contemporary European observers in the late seventeenth century was as a reshipment point through which goods from both the Indian and western Pacific oceans passed on their way to more distant markets. But after the turn of the eighteenth century, and certainly after 1718, for Qing importers it was even more important as a consumer of Chinese goods itself and as a redistribution centre for the other Malay and Sumatran markets within the straits sub-region. The castaway Walter Vaughan, for example, describes the sultan’s palace on a festival day decorated with both cotton and ‘very rich silk’ cloth. 128 Archaeological digs on the sites of Johor’s capitals also suggest that the use of Qing porcelain became common in the early eighteenth century after a period of negligible consumption following the close of the Ming period. 129 Other parts of the southern Malay peninsula consumed Qing goods as well. John Scattergood, a Madras-based private merchant, left a memorandum in his notes around 1714 listing the Chinese goods that were in demand with ‘the Mallays,’ presumably meaning any of the important cities on the coast of the southern part of the peninsula and perhaps the east coast of Sumatra as well. These included gold thread, tobacco, gilt paper, gelongs (a type of silk cloth), raw Guangdong silk (he notes here ‘great bundles’), and China root, among other things. 130 The Huang Chao Wen Xian Tong Kao 皇朝文獻通考 , a mid-Qianlong era encyclopaedia, states that Guangdong-based merchants sailed to Terengganu and brought tea leaves, porcelain, and ‘coloured paper’ ( se zhi 色紙 , perhaps the same sort of ‘gilt paper’ that Scattergood refers to). The encyclopaedia also alludes to a demand for Chinese raw silk in Terengganu because it immediately segues into a note about a request made in 1764 by the

126 Christoffel van Swoll, Abraham Douglas, Mattheus de Haan, Frans Castelijn, Laurens Tolling, Hendrik Zwaardecroon, Pieter Rooselaar, Theodorus de Haeze, Samuel Timmerman, Jacob Faes, and Joan Cornelis d’Ableing, November 26, 1714, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 7, p. 91. 127 Hamilton, A New Account , vol. 2, p. 152. On the rise of Terengganu in the eighteenth century, see Shaharil Talib, “The Port and Polity of Terengganu During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: Realizing its Potential,” in The Southeast Asian Port and Polity: Rise and Demise , ed. J. Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990). 128 Vaughan, The Adventures of Five Englishmen , pp. 94 – 95. 129 Gibson-Hill, “Johore Lama”: 172. 130 “Transcripts, etc., of papers of John Scattergood (1681-1723),” BL, Add MS 43732, vol. III, f. 354. 122

governor general of Guangdong and Guangxi for the relaxation of a prohibition on the export of raw silk by domestic merchants then in place. 131

In Melaka, despite the VOC’s control over the imports flowing in and out of the port, Qing trade goods were also reportedly common. This appears to have been partly because the relatively large settled Chinese community there maintained an especially high demand for them. William Dampier, who stopped in Melaka in 1688 during his tour of Southeast Asia, notes that the Chinese “bring commodities of their country hither, especially tea, sugar candy, and other sweet-meats,” which, he goes on to explain, were all served in tea houses kept by local Chinese businessmen. 132 Gemelli Careri arrived at Melaka in 1695 during his global tour as well, and took note of the rarities available from China, along with those from Japan, Bengal, the Coromandel Coast, and Persia. 133 Similarly, the English company man Charles Lockyer, who visited in 1704, agreed with Dampier and Careri, claiming that “the Chinese keep the best shops in the place, which are well fill’d with the manufactures, and produce of their own country.”134 He also gives a list of the prices for trade goods current in Melaka to assist English merchants considering ventures there. Among the types of potentially lucrative imports he includes are Chinese gold and silks. The profit on the latter was only twenty-eight per cent, according to a marginal note, but the implication is that there was enough demand for it that even English merchants, who had limited access to the Qing market then, could still expect to see at least a small return from sales of Qing goods in Melaka. 135

Across the strait on Sumatra, the independent kingdom of Aceh was also consuming a steady flow of Qing goods and probably distributing them to smaller centres around it. The VOC’s agents complained in 1693 that overseas Chinese and vrijburger ships from both Johor and Batavia were sailing to Aceh and selling rice, arak, and sugar (all likely produced in Java), along with gold thread, porcelain, textiles, and other ‘Chinese wares.’ The Dutch observers seem to have thought that the primary problem with this was that it gave English ships access to these sorts of goods for re-export. 136 But though some of the Qing goods may have been re-exported in small quantities on English ships, it actually seems that by the 1710s, it was the English who were importing Qing goods to Aceh. In Lockyer’s account of his 1704 voyage from Madras to Guangzhou, he describes Aceh’s market as being glutted

131 Huang Chao Wen Xian Tong Kao 皇朝文獻通考 [1747 – 1785], juan 297: 17a. 132 William Dampier, Voyages and Descriptions, Vol. II (London: James Knapton, 1700), p. 162. 133 John Francis Gemelli Careri, A Voyage Round the World , in A Collection of Voyages and Travels (London: Awnsham and John Churchill, 1706), vol. 3, p. 272. 134 Charles Lockyer, An Account of the Trade in India (London, 1711), p. 75. 135 Lockyer, An Account of the Trade , pp. 70 – 71. 136 Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Laurens Pijl, Isaac de Saint-Martin, Dirk de Haas, Jan van Leene, Wouter Valckenier, Abraham van Riebeeck, Manuel Bornezee, and Wybrand Lycochthon, February 9, 1693, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 5, p. 597; and Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Laurens Pijl, Isaac de Saint-Martin, Dirk de Haas, Abraham van Riebeeck, Wouter Valckenier, Joan van Leene, Manuel Bornezee, Wybrand Lycochthon, and Willem van Wijngaerden, December 8, 1693, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 5, p. 628. 123 with Qing commodities, 137 implying that there would be little profit for English merchants to import them at that time, but that there was nevertheless a strong demand. During the Kangxi emperor’s prohibition on China-based traders sailing to Southeast Asia (implemented in 1718 and enforced until about 1722), the demand for Qing goods in Aceh remained, and the English were evidently able to step into the breach. John Scattergood, in another memorandum probably written in 1719 or 1720, lists goods that he intended to sell in Aceh on the way back to Madras from a voyage to Guangzhou. These included a large variety of porcelain dishes, iron kettles, gold thread from both China and Japan, copper, and cloth. 138

Further south on the east coast of Sumatra, Palembang, the biggest pepper producer in the sub-region, underwent a gradual silverisation through the seventeenth century, 139 then a shift away from VOC imports of South Asian cloth towards Javan or locally woven material, similar to the process that was occurring in Java at the same time. 140 The interconnections were somewhat different in eastern Sumatra though, because the silver that the VOC imported does not seem to have been used primarily as a means of purchasing Qing goods. William Marsden, a British orientalist who lived in Bengkulu in the 1770s and published The History of Sumatra in 1783, wrote that “China is supposed, with reason, to be the gulph which, sooner or later, swallows up all the silver of India; but in the instances before us [the economy of Palembang], it is hard to trace the subsidiary streams.” His observation is that in the case of Palembang there was a large and steady inflow of silver money brought by Dutch and English traders to be exchanged for pepper and tin, but at the same time there was no obvious ‘subsidiary stream’ of outbound silver, so the rumours of the country’s wealth might be credible. 141 If Marsden’s speculation was correct in the 1770s, it may well have been true in the first decades of the century as well. According to Barbara Andaya, the critical role silver played, especially in the form of Spanish dollars, was to maintain the commercial and subsequently political relationships between the downstream courts and the upstream pepper producing areas within Sumatra. 142 This arrangement existed not because there was no demand for Qing products, but because the merchants of Sumatra had at their disposal significant supplies of pepper, tin, and tropical forest products for which there was a strong demand within the Qing empire. 143 Illustrating this

137 Lockyer, An Account of the Trade , p. 35. 138 “Transcripts, etc., of papers of John Scattergood (1681-1723),” BL, Add MS 43731, vol. II, f. 433 – 434. It is unclear what kind of cloth Scattergood means; he refers to it as ‘ pesarias ,’ which the transcriber of the manuscript suggests may mean ‘piece goods.’ 139 Barbara Watson Andaya, To Live As Brothers , pp. 81 – 82. 140 Barbara Watson Andaya, “The Cloth Trade in Jambi and Palembang Society during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” Indonesia 48 (October 1989): 39 – 41. For a quantitative illustration of how the VOC’s imports of textiles to Palembang were eclipsed by silver, see the figures for the company’s trade compiled in Els M. Jacobs, Merchant in Asia: The Trade of the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth Century (Leiden: CNWS, 2006), p. 315. 141 William Marsden, The History of Sumatra (London, 1783), p. 289. 142 Barbara Watson Andaya, To Live As Brothers , pp. 81 – 82. 143 David Bulbeck, Anthony Reid, Lay Cheng Tan, and Yiqi Wu, Southeast Asian Exports since the 14 th Century: Cloves, Pepper, Coffee, and Sugar (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), pp. 77 – 81; Diane Lewis, 124

arrangement for example is the case of a private English trader who, the VOC’s directors later learned, secretly visited Trumon on the northwest coast of Sumatra in 1717 to acquire camphor, for which he exchanged a mixed cargo of iron bars, Spanish silver dollars, and Chinese porcelain. 144 Sumatra’s bountiful resources seem to have put her populations in the enviable position of being able to import both silver and Chinese luxury goods simultaneously.

The specific Qing goods in demand in Sumatra were similar to those on the other side of the Melaka straits. Porcelain and iron cookware were the primary articles of trade, but raw silk likely came to play a secondary role in the early eighteenth century as well. According to Marsden, in exchange for pepper and tin, and some smaller quantities of tropical forest products, the Qing empire supplied Sumatra primarily with coarse porcelain, tobacco, and iron pans. 145 Interestingly he does not include raw silk on this list, probably because he believed that most of the silk and cotton used by Sumatran weavers was produced locally, which may have been true in late eighteenth-century Bengkulu on the western and less prosperous side of the island where Marsden was stationed. 146 Barbara Andaya however has used the VOC’s archives to show that by 1759 the company had begun importing raw silk to Palembang because of a demand among elite women for high quality weaving material. 147 Importation of Chinese raw silk to Palembang outside of the VOC’s system via Johor or directly from the Qing empire almost certainly predated 1759, though of course it would have been done behind the back (and under the nose) of the company, who sought to monopolise trade in the region as much as possible. Some evidence of the earlier availability of Chinese silk in Sumatra comes from the letter book of Joseph Collet, the deputy governor of the English company’s establishment in Bengkulu from 1711 to 1717, who was apparently able to get his hands on various articles of silk, including ‘China damask,’ to send back to England as gifts. 148 The result for the Dutch company was ultimately as negative as it was in Java, Siam, and elsewhere in region. Instead of being able to control the export of the goods it wanted from Sumatra with South Asian cloth, it was forced to use increasing quantities of silver to compete with Qing merchants whose persistence in the market steadily reduced the supply of pepper and tin available to the company.

“The Dutch East India Company and the Straits of Malacca, 1700 - 1784; Trade and Politics in the Eighteenth Century” (PhD diss., Australian National University, 1970), p. 77; and Hamilton, A New Account , vol. 2, p. 120. 144 Christoffel van Swoll, Frans Castelijn, Mattheus de Haan, Hendrik Zwaardecroon, Theodorus de Haeze, Samule Timmerman, Jacob Faes, Laurens Tolling Joan Cornelis d’Ableing, Ferdinand de Groot, Willem Six, and Cornelis Hasselaar, March 20, 1718, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 7, p. 340. 145 Marsden, The History of Sumatra , p. 142. 146 Marsden, The History of Sumatra , p. 75, 148. 147 Barbara Watson Andaya, “The Cloth Trade in Jambi”: 41 – 42. 148 [Joseph Collet], The Private Letter Books of Joseph Collet, Sometime Governor of Fort St. George, Madras , ed. H. H. Dodwell (London: Longmans [no date]), pp. 83, 88, and 108. In one letter from Bengkulu, Collet also mentions that his breakfasts usually consisted of “bread and butter and Bohea Tea.” Ibid , p. 26. 125

Banjarmasin Banjarmasin’s potential role in the VOC’s trading system was primarily as a supplier of pepper, similar to Palembang. In the early eighteenth century, the company was intermittently interested in trade through Banjarmasin when its agents began having difficulty procuring pepper profitably in Sumatra and western Java. Banjarmasin was an even more difficult environment for the VOC than western Sumatra because of the political instability of the Banjar sultanate though. The inability of the sultanate to consistently enforce its rule even within its core area along the Barito river meant that the VOC’s usual strategy of putting political pressure on the dominant authority in a particular area to reshape the economic environment was never effective in southern Borneo. The result was that the VOC, along with the new and later united English East India companies were consistently outcompeted by Qing merchants who had a commercial advantage as suppliers of Chinese goods in the sub-region.

What allowed the China-based merchants to get their way most of the time was their economic clout in the several communities along the Barito River. They both traded more consistently and brought goods that were in greater demand in southern Borneo than their European rivals. The key disadvantage the Europeans faced in Banjarmasin was that the silverisation of its economy did not progress to the same extent as Java or Sumatra. Lead picis , which were imported from the Qing empire and had already been eclipsed by silver Dutch and Spanish coins in Java, were still commonly used there in 1714, according to the English united company agent Daniel Beeckman. 149 Exchanges between the Banjarmasin and Qing merchants were usually based on barter arrangements with small quantities of picis or silver coins only used to make up marginal differences in value. Because it was Chinese goods that were primarily in demand in southern Borneo, this economic arrangement cut the English and Dutch merchants out almost entirely. Alexander Reid, another united East India company agent, complained in 1715 that “could I afford to give those prices the Chinese does, by way of barter, albeit ours was ready money and good silver, yet at that rate I could not purchase 20 pecull at 9 & 10 dollars, as they pay for the pepper in exchange for China ware of which they make three of one.”150 The only Europeans who had any real success trading in Banjarmasin were the Portuguese from Macau who were able to take advantage of their access to Chinese goods and the Zheng family’s limited access to China during the 1670s. After 1684 however, the Macanese continued to send ships intermittently to Banjarmasin, but by the early 1690s they had been easily outcompeted by the new generation of Qing merchants and maintained only a secondary place in the market. 151

149 Daniel Beeckman, A Voyage to and From the Island of Borneo in the East Indies (London: T. Warner, 1718), p. 91. On the use of picis in Java and generally, see Leonard Blussé, Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women, and the Dutch in VOC Batavia (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1988), chap. 3. 150 “Captain Reids Account of his proceedings since he left Bencoolen 11 th December 1714 to May fourth of his being at Banjar &c,” May 1715, BL, IOR/G/21/9, Factory Records Java (1707-1818), doc. 4, p. 11. 151 Souza, The Survival of Empire , pp. 126 – 128. 126

Though there is currently not enough available data to reconstruct the volume of trade between the Qing empire and Banjarmasin in the 1680s and 1690s in detail, English and Dutch records give a fairly clear picture for the period between 1700 and 1717, the start of the Kangxi emperor’s prohibition on trade with Southeast Asia. Alexander Reid alludes to an increase in the volume of Chinese trade after 1707, when the English new company’s agents were driven out. 152 He suggests that during the period of the first English settlement (1701 to 1707) there were two or three Qing ships arriving per year, compared to seven in 1714 when he was there. 153 The numbers in Table 4.2 below indicate that during the 1700 to 1706 period there were slightly more ships than Reid allows, with three or four arriving per year. His basic argument that the annual numbers increased in the second decade of the century is supported though. The VOC chaplain François Valentijn, who was a resident in the nearby Maluku islands from 1686 to 1694, and again from 1707 to 1712, also agrees. Probably based on observations made during his second residence in the Malukus, he claims that there were ten to twelve large ships of two hundred to three hundred lasten (four hundred to six hundred tons) arriving in Banjarmasin per year from China, Siam, and Johor. 154 The lower numbers of ships between 1700 and 1707 were probably a result of the disruptive English presence there. The new company’s agents came into conflict with the sultanate almost immediately after their arrival, prompting them to use aggressive but mostly ineffective tactics against Banjarmasinese and Qing merchants alike to secure a better share of the market. 155 A short period of relative peace followed in which Qing trade increased up until 1712, when a small uprising that had broken out the previous year became a full scale civil war. The war lasted until 1717, disrupting the flow of pepper to the country’s riverine port centres and diminishing trade once again, but by no means extinguishing it. 156

Table 4.2. China-based trade ships sailing to Banjarmasin, 1692 – 1719 Year Number of Ships Sources 1692 3 Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 5, p. 521. 1694 6 Brunig, “Jacob Jansz de Roy”: 478. 1700 4 BL, IOR/L/MAR/A/CXXVII, entry for April 21, 1700. 1701 4 BL, IOR/L/MAR/A/CXLVII, f. 22r. 1702 ≥3 BL, IOR/L/MAR/A/CXLVII, f. 35r. 1704 6 BL, IOR/E/3/66, doc. 8219. 1705 ≥3 BL, IOR/E/3/68, doc. 8361. 1706 ≥2 BL, IOR/G/35/6, doc. 14.

152 Goh Yoon Fong, “Trade and Politics in Banjarmasin, 1700 – 1747” (PhD diss. University of London, 1969), pp. 109 – 111; and R. Suntharalingam, “The British in Banjarmasin: An Abortive Attempt at Settlement, 1700 – 1707,” Journal of Southeast Asian History 4, no. 2 (September 1963): 49. 153 “Captain Reids Account of his proceedings since he left Bencoolen 11 th December 1714 to May fourth of his being at Banjar &c,” May 1715, BL, IOR/G/21/9, Factory Records Java (1707-1818), doc. 4, p. 15. 154 François Valentijn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indien (‘s Gravenhage: H. C. Susan & C. Hzoon, 1856-1858), vol. 3, p. 222. 155 Goh, “Trade and Politics in Banjarmasin,” chap. 2. 156 Goh, “Trade and Politics in Banjarmasin,” chap. 3. 127

1710 13 Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 6, p. 107. 1714 7 BL, IOR/G/21/9, Factory, doc. 4, p. 15. 1715 5 Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 7, p. 173. 1716 6 Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 7, p. 340. 1719 0 Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 7, p. 419.

In spite of the frequent instability in Banjarmasin, its markets for Chinese goods were strong enough that in every year before 1718 that this author has found shipping numbers for, at least two Qing trade vessels arrived. Some of the goods that they brought were re-exported by small vessels from elsewhere in the Indonesian archipelago, 157 but they were also consumed in the numerous small villages in the productive upland regions of southern Borneo that supplied the birds’ nests, rattans, incense woods, dyes, and most importantly pepper that the Qing merchants used as return cargoes. 158 The English new company, which originally hoped to buy both pepper and Chinese goods in Banjarmasin, reported that the Qing ships brought copper, zinc, raw silk, tea, porcelain, and drugs. 159 The VOC’s agents made similar observations, reporting that the Qing ships brought silk cloth, porcelain, copper, and many low value items (probably meaning manufactured articles). 160

The consumption of these Chinese goods, especially silk, was as visible in Banjarmasin as it was elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Daniel Beeckman’s invitation to the palace in 1713 or 1714 gave him the opportunity to observe how frequently silk was used by the sultan and his servants. First Beeckman and his party were asked to place their gifts in baskets covered by wrought silk, and then they were taken into the throne room and brought before a chair with a large silk canopy. When the sultan himself appeared, he was dressed in a ‘Chinese gown’ and accompanied by two children both dressed in silks. After a dinner, the English watched a dance performance by four teenage girls who were all dressed in ‘rich silk’ as well. 161 Henry Barre, a new company supercargo who was also received by the sultan in 1701, adds that the ruler’s throne was a ‘crimson velvet chair.’ 162 From these accounts it is clear that the use of silk, most of it likely originating in Guangdong or Jiangnan, was a status symbol within Banjarmasin’s elite circles.

157 Goh, “Trade and Politics in Banjarmasin,” p. 132. 158 See Silvanus Landon to Company, April 20, 1702, BL, IOR/E/3/64, doc. 7923; and Valentijn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indien , vol. 3, p. 222. 159 Silvanus Landon to Company, April 20, 1702, BL, IOR/E/3/64, doc. 7923. 160 Abraham van Riebeeck, Abraham Douglas, Christoffel van Swoll, Cornelis Chastelein, Mattheus de Haan, Frans Castelijn, Laurens Tolling, Hendrik Zwaardecroon, Pieter Rooselaar, Theodorus de Haeze, Joannes van Steelant, Samuel Timmerman, Jacob Faes, and Joan Cornelis d’Ableing, January 15, 1712, Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 6, p. 810. 161 Beeckman, A Voyage , pp. 71 – 78. 162 “Proceedings of the Borneo One her Intended Voyage to Banjar in the service of the Honourable the English Company trading to the East Indies Anno 1700 By Henry Barre Commander,” BL, IOR/L/MAR/A/CXLVII, f. 25 r. 128

The Philippines, Northern Borneo, and the Maluku Islands The volume of Qing goods entering Chen Lunjiong’s South Eastern Sea route is harder to measure than any of the other Southeast Asian sub-regions. The majority of the vessels arriving in Manila, the Qing merchants’ primary hub in the east, were attracted by shipments of silver brought from Acapulco on the Manila galleons, and the majority of the goods they brought were likely re-exported across the Pacific most years. Therefore the numbers of Qing ships arriving yearly in Manila (see Table 2.3 in Chapter Two) are not as reliable as indicators of the impact Qing trade had in Luzon compared to numbers of ships arriving elsewhere in the region. However, it is clear that quantities of goods significant enough to affect the economies and consumer patterns of societies farther along the South Eastern Sea route were leaking out through Manila to Mindanao, northern Borneo, and especially the Maluku islands. The Malukus, which gave the VOC its crucial supplies of spice, provide a particularly clear example of how deeply Qing exports could penetrate Southeast Asian society after the 1680s.

To begin, in Mindanao, the southernmost major island of the modern Philippines, the sultanate of Maguindanao became both a consumer of Qing products and a distribution point where merchants from other parts of eastern Southeast Asia came to collect Chinese luxury goods. Maguindanao’s ability to attract foreign trade goods grew steadily with its commercial and territorial power after the death of the powerful Sultan Kudarat (r. 1619 – 1671) until about 1718, according to Ruurdje Laarhoven’s study of that state based on the VOC’s archives. The key factor in the rise of Maguindanao’s commercial power seems to have been the VOC’s mare clausum policies in insular Southeast Asia. Private traders who had frequented maritime centres in and around Sulawesi until about 1670 were forced to look for new ports beyond the company’s direct control by the fall of Makassar and the subsequent tightening of the company’s grip on the sea lanes of the central archipelago. 163 The independent state of Maguindanao, lying between Luzon, the Malukus, and Borneo was an obvious choice for them.

As a result, Maguindanao attracted a steady flow of Qing merchandise from Manila that was exchanged for tropical goods brought by Bugis, vrijburger , and overseas Chinese merchants. According to VOC agents sent from Ternate to Mindanao in 1701, by that time there were also some ships from the Qing empire that were bypassing Manila and sailing directly to Maguindanao to exchange porcelain, iron and brassware, silk cloth, bolo knife handles, lead, and knick-knacks (manufactured tools and toys) for wax, slaves, sea turtle shell, birds’ nests, and dried betel nuts. 164 Of the goods the Qing merchants were trading for, only the wax and slaves typically originated within Mindanao, which suggests that many, perhaps most, of the Qing imports were re-exported by the same merchants who brought the

163 Ruurdje Laarhoven, The Maguindanao Sultanate in the 17 th Century: Triumph of Moro Diplomacy (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1989), pp. 177 – 179. 164 Paulus de Brievings and Jacob Cloeck, June 15, 1700 to January 14, 1701, in Laarhoven, The Maguindanao Sultanate , p. 207. 129

tropical goods. But it is probable that Chinese luxury goods came to dominate Mindanao’s market as they did elsewhere. The Maguindanao sultanate did have a relatively large population of potential consumers, with about 25 000 in the immediate vicinity of the capital and 180 000 within the sultanate’s wider area of control according to Laarhoven’s estimates. 165 At the very least, Chinese goods became popular with elite consumers; William Dampier mentions meeting the sultan’s nieces who were all “richly drest, with garments of loose silk,”166 and the Huang Chao Wen Xian Tong Kao states that in Mindanao (Mangjundalao 莽均逹老 ) men and women both wore short clothes made of silk sheets. 167

For the ports along the branches of the eastern route that carried goods to the southwest of the Philippine Islands, there is less extant information. This area, which included the coast of northern Borneo and the Sulu islands, held little interest for the VOC, so the impact of post-1684 Qing commerce is less visible. The bits of information that are available do suggest that in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Chinese goods began reaching these ports as well. Chen Lunjiong, writing in the 1720s, offers that the natives of the Sulu islands, Brunei, Sukanda, and Jiliwen 吉里問 (an unidentified port somewhere in northern Borneo) all liked copper gongs and used copper tools and dishes, while they made their clothing from colourful cloth and silk. 168 Chen does not mention Qing merchandise explicitly, but, like much of the rest of insular Southeast Asia, the most likely source of both copper and silk was the Qing empire. Much later in the century, Alexander Dalrymple offered a plan to the British united company’s managers suggesting that the island of Balambangan off the northern tip of Borneo be occupied and used as the site of a factory to attract ships from the Qing empire. Recounting his own observations from the 1760s, he claimed that ships from Ningbo came to Brunei regularly and that he also met ships from Xiamen in the Sulu islands. 169 By Dalrymple’s time, the trading system had already changed radically, but in light of Chen’s claims, it is not unreasonable to assume that the demand in the sub-region for the goods carried by the Ningbo and Xiamen ships in the 1760s had its origins in the early part of the century or before, when they would have become available via intermediaries sailing from Manila or Maguindanao.

Finally in the spice producing Maluku islands, thanks largely to the frequently vivid descriptions left to us by François Valentijn, the ubiquity of Chinese luxury items is very visible. According to Valentijn, Chinese goods of various types had made their way into homes of people across the social spectrum of Malukuan society. He reports, for example, that the sultan of Ternate Said Kaicili Toloko (r. 1692 – 1714) was fond of giving fine cloth as a gift, and would occasionally go to the shop of a Chinese resident of Ternate where he

165 Ruurdje Laarhoven, “We are Many Nations: The Emergence of a Multi-Ethnic Maguindanao Sultanate,” Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society 14, no. 1 (March 1986): 49 – 50. 166 William Dampier, A New Voyage Round the World (London: James Knapton, 1694), p. 342. 167 Huang Chao Wen Xian Tong Kao , juan 297: 20a. 168 Chen Lunjiong, Hai Guo Wen Jian Lu , p. 44. 169 Alexander Dalrymple, A Plan for Extending the Commerce of this Kingdom and of the East India Company (London, 1769), pp. 16, 82. 130 would spend between 1000 and 1200 rijksdaalders (150 to 180 pesos ) at a time on Chinese clothing or fabric, sometimes buying the shop out. 170 Toloko also typically consumed a beverage called ‘masq,’ made from knijp (apparently a type of low quality liquor drunk by Dutch sailors and soldiers that Valentijn hated), limes, eggs, sugar, and tea. 171 On Ambon, where Valentijn usually resided, he notes that the natives drank Japanese sake , which was quite expensive, and Chinese ‘ sampsoe ’ (probably shaojiu 燒酒 or sanshaojiu 三燒酒 ), which was cheaper. Valentijn (who seems to have had a keen interest in beverage culture in general) also claims that the Ambonese did not typically drink tea or coffee, but tea was then becoming more common, and was frequently served in social occasions that included Dutchmen. 172

Chinese porcelain had also found its way into the homes of both the wealthy and humble in Ambon. Its import to the island was observed by William Dampier in 1699, while he was sailing an English navy ship through eastern Southeast Asia. On that voyage, he encountered a Chinese brigantine north of Buru (a large island to the east of Seram and Ambon) headed for Ambon with a load of rice, arak, tea, and porcelain. 173 Valentijn, who spent most of his residence in Asia on Ambon, is able to testify to the use of Chinaware there as well. According to him, in the homes of people of ordinary means, much of the tableware was produced locally, but coarse Chinese plates were not uncommon as well. And in wealthier households, ‘good porcelain dishes’ were typically used. 174

Not surprisingly the settled ethnic Chinese populations in the Malukus were disproportionately important consumers of goods from the Qing empire. In most places at least before the Kangxi’s trade ban in 1717, they were a small minority of the population, but tended to be among the most successful business people and were therefore a significant consumer demographic. Ambon, according to a VOC census in 1697, had one hundred seventy ethnic Chinese adult male residents out of a total adult male population of 25 418. 175 Valentijn however writes that these Chinese residents owned and ran most of the retail establishments, the bakeries, carpentry shops, and arak breweries. Most importantly, along with some Dutch vrijburgers , they also operated most of the independent trading vessels based out of the island. 176 The wealth of the richest of the Chinese residents is illustrated by an extended description by Valentijn of a wedding of the daughter of Lim Thiangko, the Chinese captain in Ambon and a member of Valentijn’s social network on the island. In

170 Valentijn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indien , vol. 1, p. 528. 171 Valentijn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indien , vol. 1, p. 529. 172 Valentijn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indien , vol. 2, p. 170. 173 William Dampier, A Continuation of a Voyage to New Holland, &c. In the Year 1699 (London: W. Botham, 1709), p. 167. 174 Valentijn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indien , vol. 2, pp. 174 – 175. 175 Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Laurens Pijl, Dirk de Haas, Abraham van Riebeeck, Wouter Valkenier, Joannes Cops, Manuel Bornezee, Wybrand Lycochthon, and Thomas van Rhee, November 30, 1697, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 5, p. 836. The total population, including men, women, and children was 78 737, so by extrapolation the population of Chinese households was probably a bit more than five hundred. 176 Valentijn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indien , vol. 2, p. 274. 131

great detail, he describes her wedding apparel, most of which was made of Chinese silk, the exquisitely lacquered Chinese furniture in her father’s home, and the tea that was served to the bride and groom and their guests. 177 Valentijn also describes the homes of other wealthy Chinese residents, which were filled with lacquered furniture and large porcelain pots containing goldfish. 178 He goes on to write about a number of festivals in which performers dressed in silken costumes and food was offered to the dead on fine Chinaware. 179 This author is aware of no other depiction of the material lives of overseas Chinese in the early eighteenth century as rich as that which Valentijn offers, but throughout the Malukus and other parts of the VOC’s empire where Chinese-European co-colonisation took place, the culture and economic impact were likely very similar. 180 Even without the rising popularity of Qing products among native and European Southeast Asian consumers, the growing and usually disproportionately wealthy ethnic Chinese populations ensured a steady demand of goods for their own use.

What impact did the influx of Chinese products have on the Maluku islands and the Dutch company’s economic interests there? If the spread of Chinese luxury goods had meant there was an equivalent outflow of the islands primary products, cloves and nutmeg, towards the Qing empire, this would probably have been to the advantage of the VOC. The company’s strategy was to monopolise and restrict the importation of the spices to its two largest consumer markets, Europe and South Asia. 181 It was never entirely successful in this because even when it attempted to eradicate clove trees on most of the islands, there were still production centres that it could not control. These leaks allowed an outflow towards the sub-region’s nearest major entrepôts , Makassar especially, which in turn meant there were spice cargoes accessible to the company’s competitors in the European and South Asian markets. 182 The Qing empire was not a target market for cloves or nutmeg in the VOC’s late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century strategy, so spices that entered Chinese ports did not compete with the company’s sales. If a significant amount of the spice that leaked out beyond the company’s control had been sold to Qing ships who returned with it to their home ports, this would have effectively reduced the volume that could otherwise have found its way to Europe or South Asia.

But it is not clear that significant volumes of nutmeg or cloves did find their way into the Qing empire during the late seventeenth century or in the first half of the eighteenth. This is perhaps surprising, because in earlier centuries cloves and nutmeg had been regularly imported into China. Zhang Xie, who wrote his maritime treatise in the 1610s, lists cloves

177 Valentijn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indien , vol. 2, pp. 277 – 279. 178 Valentijn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indien , vol. 2, p. 280. 179 Valentijn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indien , vol. 2, pp. 281 – 286. 180 On the power and influence of the settled Chinese population in Batavia in particular, see Blussé, Strange Company , chap. 5. 181 Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade , chap. 5. 182 Leonard Y. Andaya, The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), p. 205. 132

(though not nutmeg) among the Southeast Asian imports that were taxed in the late Ming period, suggesting there was a regular inflow. 183 In the post-1684 period however, the spices had not been entirely forgotten by Chinese gourmets, but the available information about both them and the Maluku islands seems to have become quite limited and confused, suggesting there was no longer a regular supply available. Qu Dajun, writing in the 1690s, lists the goods of different Southeast Asian countries based on official reports on tribute brought by embassies during the Ming period. He identifies Siam, Melaka, Brunei, Sumatra, and Patani as the sources of China’s cloves, and Siam, Java, and Melaka as the sources of its nutmeg. 184 He makes no reference to their production in the Malukus. Similarly, Chen Lunjiong seems to have believed that both types of spice were produced somewhere in the Indian Ocean. 185 And the Qianlong-era Huang Chao Wen Xian Tong Kao rather strangely indicates that Aceh was their place of production. 186 Only in the late eighteenth century did writers on overseas countries rediscover the Malukus as the source of cloves; Wang Dahai 王大海 , the author of the Hai Dao Yi Zhi 海島逸志 , finally correctly informed the Qing reading public in 1791 that cloves and nutmeg were produced on Ambon and Banda. 187 There were some small quantities of cloves that were evidently being imported earlier in the Qing dynasty though. In 1716, the governor of Guangdong listed cloves among the imports brought to Guangzhou by British and Surat ships (see Table 5.3 in the following chapter). Also, a Kangxi-era cookbook, the Zhejiangese scholar Zhu Yizun’s 朱彜尊 Shi Xian Hong Mi 食憲鴻秘 , does mention cloves as ingredients in two recipes. 188 This author has been unable to find any other examples from the same period however. What this probably means is that the volumes of Qing imports of cloves between 1684 and 1717 may not have been completely trivial, but were still quite small in comparison to the volumes brought to Europe and India by the VOC and its competitors. 189 Most of the porcelain, silk, and other Qing trade goods that entered the Malukus were therefore probably the result of indirect trades through Makassar or eastern Seram, with ships from the Maluku islands trading their spices for Qing products that had been previously obtained by intermediaries for pepper, trepang , bird of paradise plumes, or other tropical goods.190

183 Zhang Xie 張燮 , Dong Xi Yang Kao 東西洋考 (Beijing: Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 1981), p. 142. See also Roderich Ptak, “China and the Trade in Cloves, Circa 960 – 1435,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 113, no. 1 (January – March, 1993): 1 – 13. 184 Qu Dajun 屈大均 , Guangdong xin yu 廣東新語 [1700], juan 卷 15. 185 Chen Lunjiong, Hai Guo Wen Jian Lu , p. 63. 186 Huang Chao Wen Xian Tong Kao , juan 297: 17b. 187 Ong-Tae-Hae [Wang Dahai 王大海 ], The Chinaman Abroad; An Account of the Malayan Archipelago, Particularly Java [Hai Dao Yi Zhi 海岛逸志 ], trans. W. H. Medhurst (London: John Snow, 1850), p. 39. 188 Zhu Yizun 朱彜尊 , Shi Xian Hong Mi 食憲鴻秘 (Beijing: Zhong Guo Shang Ye Chu Ban She, 1985), pp. 64, 135. 189 David Bulbeck and the other authors of Southeast Asian Exports since the 14 th Century do not mention China at all as a destination for cloves in the late seventeenth or early eighteenth century. Bulbeck, Southeast Asian Exports , pp. 38 – 39. 190 Leonard Y. Andaya, The World of Maluku , p. 205; Roy Ellen, On the Edge of the Banda Zone: Past and Present in the Social Organization of a Moluccan Trading Network (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003), p. 87; and 133

Whatever cloves may have been taken from the Malukan islands to the Qing empire probably helped the VOC, but trade between the Qing domain and the islands through intermediaries also had the less desirable effect of weakening the company’s grip on commerce in general. The steady supply of Chinese luxury goods through non-company affiliated Makassaraese, Bugis, and ethnic Chinese Southeast Asian merchants made the company’s own offerings in the form of goods for sale and gifts to local leaders in exchange for cooperation less potent. 191 Once the VOC began insisting on the eradication of clove trees on all islands outside of their direct control, the sultans of Ternate and Tidore, along with other local rulers who had once been able to extend their power throughout the Malukan sub-region by exporting spices, were compelled to find new sources of material to maintain their dominance over their sub-region’s peripheries. They therefore were inclined to allow the export of slaves, sea turtle shell, and secretly harvested cloves. 192 Private traders from Mindanao or Makassar were in turn willing to take these goods in exchange for luxury imports, including and perhaps especially Qing products, some of which could then be used by the rulers as gifts or re-exports to enhance their control over areas within their spheres of influence.

In Ambon, which supplied most of the cloves for the company’s export markets, the problem was similar to that in Java. An inflow of Qing products outside the company’s control lowered its ability to recoup its expenses through the sale of its own goods to the local population. The company was therefore forced to import a greater supply of silver coins to pay for both its clove cargoes and its operating costs. The local population on the island who demanded Qing products then used the silver to trade with Southeast Asian merchants who brought the desired cargoes. As the company’s agents there observed in 1693, most of the silver was likely ultimately carried away by Chinese merchants and delivered back into the Qing empire, which was still the best market for silver in the world. 193

Pamela Swadling, Plumes from Paradise: Trade Cycles in outer Southeast Asia and their impact on New Guinea and nearby islands until 1920 (Boroko: Papau New Guinea, 1996), p. 43. 191 Leonard Y. Andaya, “Local Trade Networks in Maluku in the 16th, 17th, and 18th Centuries,” Cakalele 2, no. 2 (1991): 78. 192 For a mention of the sale of sea turtle shell to ethnic Chinese merchants in Ternate, see Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Abraham van Riebeeck, Laurens Pijl, Manuel Bornezee, Christoffel van Swoll, Herman de Wilde, Abraham Douglas, Adam van Rijn, and Adriaan van der Stel, February 26, 1704, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 6, p. 277. See also Heather Sutherland, “A Sino-Indonesian Commodity Chain: The Trade in Tortoiseshell in the Late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” in Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia , ed. Eric Tagliacozzo and Wen-Chin Chang (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), p. 178; and Leonard Y. Andaya, “Local Trade Networks”: 90. 193 Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Laurens Pijl, Isaac de Saint-Martin, Dirk de Haas, Abraham van Riebeeck, Joan van Leene, Wouter Valckenier, Manuel Bornezee, Wijbrand Lycochthon, and Joachim Nieustadt, March 14, 1693, Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 5, p. 599. 134

Java and the Core of the VOC’s Empire To return finally to Java and the surrounding islands where the VOC’s economic and military power was the greatest, the effect of the Kangxi’s opening of the oceans on Southeast Asia is the most apparent. Here the rise of Qing merchant shipping was a mixed blessing for the company. On the one hand, the growing numbers of Qing merchants arriving in Batavia’s harbour each year delivered the Chinese goods the company wanted to its doorstep, which allowed it to escape the expense of sending its own ships to Guangzhou or Xiamen. On the other though, the sudden ready availability of the goods the Qing merchants brought undermined the company’s ability to market its South Asian imports in Java and the surrounding islands. As described at the beginning of this chapter, in Java and Madura, and to a lesser extent the islands further eastward in the archipelago, consumers began demanding payment in silver from the Dutch company, because it was the currency that could most easily be turned into luxury goods from the Qing empire.

Demonstrating that the volume of Chinese trade was greater than it had ever been in the 1690s is easier in Java than it is for most other parts of Southeast Asia, thanks to the more or less continuous presence of European observers there. In the case of Batavia, Marie-Sybille de Vienne has calculated five year averages for the numbers of arrivals from China and Taiwan from 1621 (the year of the city’s official refounding) until the Qing legalisation of maritime trade. For each of the five year periods within this range, the number of ships arriving never surpassed seven (see Table 4.3 below). The other great Javan port city through most of the seventeenth century was Banten, which also drew Chinese ships until the end of its independence in 1682, despite the VOC’s best efforts to divert them. 194 According to David Middleton, an early English East India company employee, there were four Chinese ships in Banten when he arrived there in 1608. 195 The testimony of John Saris, another English company captain who was in the western Pacific in the 1610s, suggests that Middleton’s observation was probably typical. Saris claims that there were usually three or four Chinese ships that arrived each February or March. 196 A later observer, Johan Albrecht de Mandelslo, a German traveller and diplomat who was in Java in the 1630s,

194 See J. Kathirithamby-Wells, “Banten: A West Indonesian Port and Polity During the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” in The Southeast Asian Port and Polity: Rise and Demise , ed. J. Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990). 195 David Middleton, The Voyage of M. David Middleton in the Consent, a Ship of one hundred and fifteene Tuns, which set forth from Tilburie Hope on the twelfth of March, 1606 , in Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes: Contayning a History of the World in Sea Voyages and Lande Travells by Englishmen and others , ed. Samuel Purchas (Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1905), vol. 3, p. 60. 196 John Saris, The eighth Voyage set forth by the East-Indian Societie, wherein were imployed three Ships, the Clove, the Hector, and the Thomas, under the command of Captaine John Saris: His Course and Acts to and in the Red Sea, Java, Molucca’s, and Japan (by the Inhabitants called Nessoon, where also he first began and setled an English Trade and Factorie) with other remarkable Rarities, collected out of his owne Journall , in Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes: Contayning a History of the World in Sea Voyages and Lande Travells by Englishmen and others , ed. Samuel Purchas (Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1905), vol. 3, p. 508. 135

states that the annual fleet of Chinese ships docking in Banten consisted of eight to ten vessels, but that they were usually very small ships of only forty or fifty tons. 197

Table 4.3. Five year averages for the numbers of Chinese ships arriving in Batavia, 1621 – 1685 Years Average Annual Arrivals 1621 – 1625 6.6 1626 – 1630 2.2 1631 – 1635 2.2 1636 – 1640 3.4 1641 – 1645 6 1646 – 1650 2 1651 – 1655 3 1656 – 1660 2 1661 – 1665 0.6 1666 – 1670 0.8 1671 – 1675 5.2 1676 – 1680 6.8 1681 – 1685 4.6 Source: Marie -Sybille de Vienne, Les Chinois en Insulinde échanges et sociétés marchandes au XVII e siècle, d’après les sources de la V.O.C. (Paris: Les indes savantes, 2008), p. 99. Ship numbers include only arrivals from China, and not Japan or Taiwan.

As in other parts of Southeast Asia, the numbers of ships arriving annually increased markedly in Batavia after 1684. For these ship numbers, George Bryan Souza has compiled a detailed data set from the VOC archives that is reproduced in Table 4.4 below. Based on the table’s figures, between 1685 and 1717, the average number of ships that were identified as belonging to a specific Qing port arriving in Batavia was 8.1. The actual average is certainly higher though, because this calculation excludes both arrivals that came after the reports to Europe were submitted each year, and Chinese ships whose origins were not specified. Some of these unspecified Chinese vessels may have belonged to overseas Chinese, but the majority were likely China-based ships that the Dutch scribes who Souza cites did not bother to investigate in detail. The VOC’s observers rarely attempted to estimate the sizes of Asian ships, but the privateer Woodes Rogers, who was in Batavia in 1710, claims that there were usually fourteen to sixteen large ships annually, of three hundred to five hundred tons each. 198 Even allowing for some exaggeration on Rogers’ part, it seems fairly certain that the post-Qing legalisation period saw a significantly greater volume of trade passing between China and Java than what had existed in the early seventeenth century. It really was the ‘heyday of the junk trade’ as Leonard Blussé describes it. 199

197 John Albert de Mandelslo, The Travels of John Albert de Mandelslo, (a Gentleman belonging to the Embassay) from Persia, into the East-Indies , in Adam Olearius, The Voyages and Travells of the Ambassadors Sent by Frederick Duke of Holstein, to the Great Duke of Muscovy, and the King of Persia , trans. John Davies (London: John Starkey, 1669), p. 117 198 Woodes Rogers, A Cruising Voyage Round the World (London: Cassell and Company, 1928), p. 298. 199 Blussé, Strange Company , p. 121. 136

Table 4.4. Arrivals of Chinese ships in Batavia, 1684 – 1717 Years Qing Empire Japan Manila Southeast Asia Unspecified 1685 0 2 2 4 1686 6 2 1 2 1687 11 1 2 1688 10 4 1689 11 1 1690 10 1691 0 1692 0 1693 0 16 1694 3 18 1695 4 1696 0 1697 12 2 1698 6 1699 17 1700 10 1701 2 17 1702 10 2 1703 15 1 3 5 1704 10 3 1 1705 3 6 1706 15 1 1 3 1707 7 1 1 1708 6 1 1709 9 1 2 1710 8 1711 9 1 1 1712 10 1 2 1 3 1713 12 1 1 1 1714 7 1 2 6 1715 15 3 1716 12 3 1717 14 2 Source: George Bryan Souza, The Survival of Empire: Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630 – 1754 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 136, 140.

A strong market for the Chinese products the Qing ships brought is visible within Batavia itself, and in the rest of Java and its neighbouring islands. Similar to the Malukus, one small but important consumer demographic were the Dutch and Chinese elite in the various enclaves that the company maintained. William Dampier, for instance, mentions being served on dishes of fine China in Fort Concordia on the island of Timor, 200 and there are still many surviving examples in Indonesia’s museums today of fine Chinese porcelain with the company’s insignia or the coats of arms of the powerful Dutch colonial families. 201 The porcelain and other Chinese trade goods brought to Batavia were not exclusively for the colonial elites though. In the case of Banten, archaeological work on porcelain potsherds

200 Dampier, A Continuation of a Voyage , p. 50. 201 Jean Gelman Taylor, The Social World of Batavia: Europeans and Eurasians in Colonial Indonesia (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), p. 58. 137

has shown that in mid seventeenth century, there was a shift in Chinese porcelain imports from primarily high-value decorative pieces towards plainer more affordable and utilitarian types, which by the start of the eighteenth century had for the first time become common in ordinary Bantenese homes. 202 Further evidence of this shift can be found in the analysis of the remains of a Qing ship that sank near Pulo Condore around 1690. The unfortunate vessel contained a cargo of porcelain, and a variety of other miscellaneous goods that were almost certainly intended for sale in Batavia’s Chinese community (grooming kits, brass chests, buttons, and similar things). 203 The porcelain included blue-and-white ceramics and the delicate white ‘ blanc de china ,’ some of which were decorated with painted scenes of European-style buildings, all but confirming that the destination was Batavia. Most of these expensive pieces were probably intended for re-export on the company’s ships to Europe or South Asia, but the second largest part of the ship’s cargo, after only the blue-and-white ceramics, was what the Dutch typically referred to as ‘coarse Chinaware’ (‘ grove Chineese wharen ’). This relatively cheap porcelain would not have been worth the cargo space on Europe-bound ships, or of interest to the elite consumers in Java’s surviving sultanates. Had the Qing ship not sunk, some of the coarse porcelain may have been sent to the Coromandel Coast, which the English company’s agents identified as the best market for low value Chinaware. 204 But, as the archaeological investigations of potsherds in Banten suggests, it would just as likely have been consumed by Java’s residents of modest means, and some of it may have been re-exported by private merchants to smaller markets in the surrounding islands. In 1689 for example, a Chinese-owned sloop sent by Conco, the captain of the Chinese in Batavia (Lin Jingguan 林敬觀 205 ) arrived in the English East India company’s factory in Bengkulu on the west coast of Sumatra with a load of arak, sugar, and coarse Chinaware. 206

Finally, as in Siam, tea also appears to have become a fashionable imported consumable in Java following the 1684 legalisation. François Valentijn participated in a military campaign during the Javan War of Succession (1704 to 1708) and recalls being treated to tea by several different Javan and Maduran potentates, 207 and in one case even

202 Kaoru Ueda, “An archaeological investigation of hybridization in Bantenese and Dutch colonial encounters: food and foodways in the Sultanate of Banten, Java, 17th to early 19th century” (PhD diss., Boston University, 2015), p. 331. 203 Flecker, “Excavation of an oriental vessel”: 221 – 244. The written records in the Kai Hentai offer some support for Flecker’s 1690 date; that year appears to have been exceptionally dangerous for ships sailing on the coast of Vietnam. The crew of a ship from the Nguyen domain that arrived in 1691 reported that out of the eight ships that had sailed from Nguyen territory the previous year, three had been sunk in a storm. #7 from Quang Nam, February 15, 1691, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1305. 204 See ‘To Mr Joseph Hynmars and the rest of the Supra Cargoes of the Ship Toddinton,’ London, January 18 1704 [1705], BL, IOR/E/94, f. 245 r. See also, ‘Memoirs for the Trade from Bengal to several ports of India,’ FelixArchief, Antwerp, Generale Indische of Ostendse Compagnie, Varia I. 1720-1734, 24.Richtlijnen voor Bengalen wat de vrachten en beheer van de Moorse bestuur betreft. Rapport over de handel van Bengalen naar verschillende havens in India, unnumbered. 205 Kai Ba Li Dai Shi Ji 開吧歷代史記 , Nan Yang Xue Bao 南洋學報 9, no. 1: 33. 206 York Fort Day Book, BL, IOR/G/35/2, f. 42 v. 207 Valentijn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indien , vol. 3, pp. 423 – 442. 138

identifies the tea as ‘boeithee’ (bohea or southern Fujianese Wuyi 武夷 tea). 208 Cornelius de Bruijn, a Dutch traveller and writer, similarly reported being served tea in the court of the sultan of Banten in 1706. 209 And its consumption seems to have extended beyond court functions, because demand in central Java was apparently great enough that in 1722 (during the period the Kangxi’s ban on trade with Southeast Asia was in effect) a Macanese ‘tea ship’ chose to pass Batavia by, and dock in Cirebon, further west on Java’s north coast. 210 For comparison, Jean Baptiste Tavernier visited the court of Banten in 1648, and makes no mention of tea. 211 Johan Albrecht de Mandelslo was also there about a decade earlier, and describes Banten’s various marketplaces in detail, but he makes no mention of tea either. 212 The earliest observer to remark on tea as an import for consumers on the island was Wouter Schouten, a VOC surgeon who was resident in Batavia from 1658 to 1665. 213

From this, we can surmise that tea may have become popular within Batavia because of the large ethnic Chinese population there in the mid seventeenth century, and spread to the rest of the island after 1684 when it became readily available along with the various other Qing products that were arriving by the shipload each year. Along with the other Qing commodities, the spread of tea amongst Javanese consumers beyond Batavia therefore seems to have been a late seventeenth-century phenomenon. Unlike Chinese porcelain, the evidence points towards tea having remained a commodity consumed primarily by the wealthy in Java, but the effect on the VOC’s business would have been the same. From 1685, there was an increased willingness among people at all levels of society to take the company’s silver dubbeltjes , but far less interest in any of its other imports, save opium alone. 214 The tea sipped in the palaces of Mataram and Banten, and the coarse porcelain on which the commoners served their curries all came from the Qing empire allowing their carriers a period of unrivalled commercial dominance.

Conclusions Through this circuitous journey across maritime Asia, this chapter has attempted to show that between about 1690 and 1717 (the year the Kangxi emperor banned trade with

208 Valentijn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indien , vol. 3, p. 440. 209 Cornelius Le Bruyn, Travels into Muscovy, Persia, and Part of the East-Indies (London: A. Bettesworth, 1737), vol. 2, p. 104. 210 Hendrik Zwaardecroon, Mattheus de Haan, Jacob Faes, Anthony Huysman, Cornelis Hasselaar, Joan Adriaan Crudop, Laurens Tolling, Hans Frederik Bergman, Diderik Durven, Wijbrant Blom, and Petrus Vuyst, March 31, 1722, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 7, p. 603. 211 Jean Baptiste Tavernier, Travels in India (London: MacMillan and Co., 1889), vol. 2, chap. 23. 212 Mandelslo, “The Travels of John Albert de Mandelslo,” p. 114. Mandelslo was likely aware of tea because his co-ambassador Adam Olearius mentions drinking while they were in Persia in 1637. That tea, Olearius believed, had been carried overland from ‘Chattai’ (Cathay?). Adam Olearius, The Voyages and Travells of the Ambassadors Sent by Frederick Duke of Holstein, to the Great Duke of Muscovy, and the King of Persia (London: John Starkey, 1669), p. 241. 213 Gautier Schouten [Wouter Schouten], Voiage de Gautier Schouten Aux Indes Orientales, Commencé l’an 1658 & fini l’an 1685 (Amsterdam: Pierre Mortier, 1708), vol. 2, p. 406. 214 Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch tiger , pp. 143 – 148. 139

Southeast Asia) the development of the new Qing trading network had a profound effect on the existing commercial systems in the region. The post-1684 period was not merely a re- establishment of the trading system that had existed in the late Ming period. For every sub- region within Southeast Asia that we have adequate data from, save perhaps the Trinh domain, the volume of Chinese commerce was substantially larger after 1684 than it was at the beginning of the century based on the numbers of trade ships reaching specific ports. And there appears to have been a greater variety in the types of goods delivered as well. Chinese tea, a drink almost never mentioned before the mid seventeenth century by any observer in Southeast Asia, could be commonly found in the late seventeenth-century Trinh domain, Siam, Melaka, the Malukus, and Java. Similarly, Chinese porcelain, which had typically been a type of good reserved for the wealthiest buyers, became common among the housewares of economically ordinary people across the region.

This sudden influx of Chinese goods had dire implications for the VOC’s operations. The company had benefited immensely from the relative absence of Chinese commerce in Southeast Asia for much of the seventeenth century. Before the 1680s, there had been no group of competitors who had been able to seriously challenge its position as the dominant importer in most of the region. The sudden re-entry of Qing merchants and merchandise changed this situation for the Dutch company drastically. The overall result was that the company’s position in Asia weakened because it could no longer rely on intra-Asian trade as a means of supporting the purchase of Asian goods for its Atlantic markets, and therefore had to rely more heavily on bullion imports from Europe to Asia. This was bad news for the Heeren XVII in Amsterdam, but for the Southeast Asian consumer there is no reason to see this as the end of an age of commerce. The sudden widespread availability of Qing goods made the region a buyer’s market, and only served to enrich its people.

140

Map 5. The eastern Indian and western Pacific oceans, c. 1720

Nagasaki Shanghai Ningbo

Xiamen Calcutta Guangzhou Taiwan Pho Hien Macau Surat Bombay

Hoi An Manila Goa Ayutthaya Madras Tenasserim San Thome Cochin Pondicherry Mergui Porto Novo

Aceh Kedah Melaka Johor

Banjarmasin

Batavia

141

Chapter 5: More Distant Shores

Chinese Trade Goods in South Asia, 1700 – 1740

This final chapter will examine the growth of Chinese exports to South Asia before about 1740. There are numerous studies of European trade to the Qing empire in the eighteenth century, but almost all of these have been primarily interested in the emergent economic relationship between China and Europe, and so have focussed on the activities of Europe’s many East India companies. 1 There is now also a growing body of work on ‘private’ (meaning non-company) trade by Europeans and South Asians who performed intra-Asian ‘country’ trade within the Indian and western Pacific oceans, 2 but none that this author is aware of that have been primarily about the links between China and South Asia. This chapter will make an attempt to begin remedying this gap in the literature, and it will also sketch an outline of how the links between the two regions developed in light of the rapidly expanding China-based network in Southeast Asia.

The approach here, as in the previous chapters, is non-Braudelian. In contrast to K. N. Chaudhuri’s longue durée examinations of the unities within a greater Indian Ocean stretching from Japan to the Cape of Good Hope, 3 this chapter posits that the development of long-distance trade between the western Pacific and Indian oceans between 1684 and the early eighteenth century was a unique phenomenon. It was not merely the continuation of the trading systems of Arab and Chinese merchants in the Song or Yuan dynasties, or that of the Portuguese during the Ming. The political structures, the economic conditions, and the commercial actors in maritime Asia during the early Qing era created a new environment for the emergence of unique trading patterns that had never existed before. The monsoon

1 For some important examples, see Louis Dermigny, La Chine et L’Occident: Le Commerce a Canton au XVIII e Siécle, 1719 – 1833 , 4 vols. (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N. 1964); Paul A. Van Dyke, Merchants of Canton and Macao: politics and strategies in eighteenth-century Chinese trade (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011); Paul A. Van Dyke, The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006); Weng Eang Cheong, The Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade (Richmond: Curzon, 1997); Hosea Ballou Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China 1635 – 1834 , 5 vols. (Taipei: Ch’eng-Wen Publishing Company, 1966); Jaap R. Bruijn and Femme S. Gaastra, ed., Ships, Sailors and Spices: East India Companies and their Shipping in the 16 th , 17 th and 18 th Centuries (Amsterdam: Neha, 1993); K. N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660 – 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Kristof Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 1620 – 1740 (Copenhagen: Danish Science Press, 1958); and Holden Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600 – 1800 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976). 2 See P. J. Marshall, East Indian fortunes: the British in Bengal in the eighteenth century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976); Ian Bruce Watson, Foundation for Empire: English Private Trade in India 1659 – 1760 (New Delhi: Vikas, 1980); and Timothy Davies, “British Private Trade Networks in the Arabian Seas, c. 1680 – c. 1760” (PhD diss., University of Warwick, 2012). 3 K. N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and K. N. Chaudhuri, Asia Before Europe: Economy and civilisation of the Indian Ocean from the rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 142

cycles and basic geography aside, the late seventeenth century was a new world for South Asians and the subjects of the Qing empire to discover each other in.

The crucial context in which trading links between the two regions began to form was the expansion of maritime commerce in both regions. In the mid seventeenth century there was what Sinnappah Arasaratnam has described as a ‘boom’ in Indian Ocean trade, 4 marked by the emergence of several important entrepôts that dominated commerce in their own sub-regions. Key among these were Surat in Gujarat, and Madras, Porto Novo, and San Thome on the Coromandel Coast. In these centres arose new groups of Hindu, Muslim, and Christian Armenian merchants who operated trading circuits from South Asia’s coasts to the more distant shores of the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the western side of the Bay of Bengal. The most important new group for this story of trade between the Qing empire and South Asia though were the European private merchants, especially those based out of Madras, who had become a respectable force in the region’s systems of exchange during the second half of the seventeenth century. 5 On the other side of the Malay peninsula, the critical factor before 1684 was the growth of the VOC’s territorial power and its control of sea lanes during the latter part of the century. This factor resulted in the relative absence of South Asian-based merchants beyond the Straits of Melaka, especially after the fall of Banten in 1682. 6

What this chapter proposes is that beginning from the time of the Kangxi emperor’s legalisation of maritime trade in 1684, there were two basic ways that Chinese goods reached South Asia. The first was direct trade carried by ships that bypassed the China-based trading network by sailing from South Asian ports to Qing ones and back. The dominant group along these direct trade routes from the beginning to the end of our period were English private merchants, though through the remainder of the seventeenth century their trade was concentrated in Xiamen and was reportedly relatively slight compared to what it would become in the eighteenth century. Probably more important than this direct trade until the second decade of the eighteenth century were indirect routes through the China-based merchants’ Southeast Asian trading system. The two emporia through which most of the Chinese goods destined for the Indian Ocean flowed were Johor and Ayutthaya. Both of these routes involved a relay of goods from Qing ships into the emporia, and then to the warehouses or ships of sub-regional merchants who would take them either directly to South Asia, through the Straits of Melaka to other sub-regional hubs such as Aceh, or across the Malay peninsula to Tenasserim and Mergui in western Siam.

4 S. Arasaratnam, “India and the Indian Ocean in the Seventeenth Century,” in India and the Indian Ocean, 1500 – 1800 , ed. Ashin Das Gupta and M. N. Pearson (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 116. 5 P. J. Marshall, “Private British Trade in the Indian Ocean Before 1800,” in India and the Indian Ocean, 1500 – 1800 , ed. Ashin Das Gupta and M. N. Pearson (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 279. 6 Sinnappah Arasaratnam, Merchants, Companies and Commerce on the Coromandel Coast, 1650 – 1740 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 145 – 146. 143

A turning point came in the decade between 1715 and 1725 that altered the balance between these two types of routes. A combination of factors prompted an expansion of commerce carried directly between the Qing empire and South Asia, and at the same time a contraction of the indirect trade through Johor and Ayutthaya. First and most obviously was the Kangxi emperor’s decision to prohibit China-based merchants from sailing to Southeast Asia in 1716. 7 Though it was only enforced from 1717 to 1722, the prohibition naturally had the effect of disrupting established chains of supply and encouraging other groups of merchants to increase their participation in the carriage of merchandise between the Qing empire and overseas markets for Chinese goods. At almost the same time, the flows of merchandise through Johor and Ayutthaya were reduced because of political changes within their sub-regions. And in the meantime the War of Spanish Succession (1701 to 1714) ended in Europe, which made silver more available to European companies and private merchants, while also making the sea routes to and through Asia safer.

Consequently the balance of the trade between China and South Asia tipped in favour of the direct route. The British private merchants from Madras who had been the dominant force in the trade from 1684 to about 1715 were joined by a number of other groups. Surat’s wealthiest merchant, Abdul Ghafur, and his family appear to have increased the frequency of their ships’ voyages to Guangzhou around this time, and might have sent more had it not been for the difficulties Surat was then facing because of the Maratha invasion of Gujarat and the declining quality of its Mughal administration. Macau’s merchant community also began to use Madras as a base in South Asia to collect Southeast Asian cargoes and silver, and began buying pepper for the China market on the Malabar Coast as well. And French country traders, mostly based out of Pondicherry, also entered the fray by beginning almost annual voyages to Guangzhou in the early 1720s.

The Flow of Chinese Goods into the Indian Ocean before c. 1715 In the first three decades following the Kangxi emperor’s decision to legalise maritime trade, the flow of Qing goods arriving in South Asian ports was a trickle. There were South Asian and European ships that carried cargoes back from Macau, Guangzhou, and Xiamen each year, but until the second decade of the eighteenth century, based on the ship numbers laid out in the previous chapters, the flows through Mergui and Johor were likely more consistent sources of Chinese products for South Asia, indirect though they may have been. The flow to Europe may have been slightly stronger, thanks to the Dutch VOC’s use of Batavia as a link between the China-based trading system and Amsterdam. But in each case the westward flow of Qing goods beyond the Melaka and Sunda straits was probably much less important than consumption within Southeast Asia during the first three decades after legalisation, and only a shadow of what was to come.

7 For a discussion on the reasoning behind this prohibition, see Gang Zhao, The Qing Opening to the Ocean: Chinese Maritime Policies, 1684 – 1757 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2013), chap. 8. 144

The English, represented initially by the original East India company, got a foot in the door during the Zheng era of the 1670s, and sent voyages intermittently after 1684. But it was not until 1717 that the company began consistently sending annual voyages directly from Britain. The original English East India company (or ‘old company,’ as it is often styled), signed an agreement with Zheng Jing in 1670 that gave it limited access to Chinese goods in Taiwan and Xiamen while the Zheng regime controlled those places. 8 After the Zheng family’s surrender in 1683, the company was invited by Shi Lang, the admiral who had conquered Taiwan and was then the Fujian naval commander, to trade in Xiamen. He told the company’s servants that he would advocate in Beijing for a legalisation of foreign trade in the empire’s ports, 9 and the following year sent one of his own vessels to invite the English company ship Delight in the Pearl River delta to come to Xiamen. 10 Through the remainder of the 1680s and 1690s, a handful of company ships sailed from both India and England to the Qing empire, meaning Xiamen in all but two instances. Difficulty reaching mutually acceptable compromises with the various officials in Xiamen during these early years discouraged the company from regularising their trade. Consequently, the court of directors gave permission to its Fort St. George presidency, based in Madras on the Coromandel Coast, to allow private English merchant ships to trade between South Asia and the Qing empire, provided the company could continue to monopolise the importation of Chinese goods to Europe. 11

As a result, before 1700 the majority of English ships sailing to the Qing empire were owned by private South Asia-based merchants. Table 5.1 below compares the numbers of voyages sent to Xiamen that were organised by the East India company, either by the court in London or by its presidencies in India, to the total annual numbers of English ships observed in Xiamen by Qing merchants sailing to Nagasaki. From it we can see that there were almost three times as many private English ships not reported in the company records than there were company ships that did appear. According to the Chinese observers, the English ships’ cargoes remained comparatively slight during these years though; their estimates ranged between 400 and 700 kanme (1500 kg to 2625 kg) worth of silver in bullion and goods. 12 For comparison, after 1717, the cargoes of the English company ships sent to Guangzhou were rarely worth less than 3000 kg of silver in each instance. 13

8 Ryan Holroyd, “The English East India Company's Trade in the Western Pacific through Taiwan, 1670–1683” (MA thesis, University of Alberta, 2011). 9 Thomas Angier and Thomas Woolhouse at Taiwan to the Agent and Council in Siam, December 20, 1683, in in The English Factory in Taiwan 1670 – 1685 , ed. Chang Hsiu-jung, Anthony Farrington, Huang Fu-san, Ts’ao Yung-ho, Wu Mi-tsa, Cheng Hsi-fu, and Ang Ka-in (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1995), p. 563. 10 Journal of Peter Crouch, supercargo of the Delight, in Chang, The English Factory , p. 578. 11 “Factory Records: China and Japan,” BL, IOR/G/12/4, pp. 454, 509. 12 Ship #43 from Xiamen, May 22, 1687, Hayashi Shunsai 林春齋 , Hayashi Hoko 林鳳岡 , and Ren'ichi Ura 浦廉一 , ed., Kai Hentai 華夷變態 , (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1958 – 1959), vol. 1, p. 698; and ship #89 from Fuzhou, July 14, 1687, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 761. 13 Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company , vol. 1, ‘Table of English Ships which Traded to China for the East India Companies, from 1635 – 1753.’ 145

Table 5.1. Yearly Arrivals of English Ships at Xiamen, 1684 - 1700 Company All English ships Year Kai Hentai References ships from the Kai Hentai 1684 1 1 vol. 1, p. 425 1685 1 2 vol. 1, p. 463 1686 3 vol. 1, p. 707, 708 1687 3 5 vol. 1, p. 800 1688 3 vol. 2, p. 1032 1689 3 vol. 2, p. 1139, p. 1173, p. 1186 1690 3 vol. 2, p. 1311, p. 1315 1691 3 vol. 2, p. 1406 1692 1 vol. 2, p. 1511 1693 1 vol. 2, 1622 1694 1 3 vol. 2, 1716 1695 1696 0 vol. 3, p. 1849 1697 2 vol. 3, p. 1988 1698 2 1699 1 2 vol. 3, p. 2062 1700 1 6 vol. 3, p. 2134 Totals 10 38 Source for 'Company ships' column: Hosea Ballou Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, 1635 - 1834 (Taipei: Ch'eng-Wen, 1966), vol. 1.

In the 1680s and 1690s, the favoured port for English ships was Xiamen. Guangdong received very little attention from either the old English company or private traders. The only major attempt before the last years of the seventeenth century that the company made at securing trade there happened in 1688 when it sent the large ship Defence to the Pearl River delta. The voyage was a disaster, ending in a shootout between Qing soldiers and the ship’s crew when the latter attempted to retake confiscated sailing equipment by force. 14 The Defence ’s overly belligerent captain William Heath seems to deserve most of the blame for this bloody incident, but concern about the safety of trade in Guangdong discouraged the company from sending any more of its capital to that province until 1699. 15 Perhaps also because of the fear amongst Bombay and Madras’ merchant community created by this incident, private English traders seem to have largely stayed away

14 “Diary and consultations of Thomas Yates, supercargo of the Defence (Captain William Heath) from Madras to Canton,” British Library, London (hereafter BL), IOR/G/12/16, ff. 254 – 266. 15 In 1699, the old company ship Wentworth was at Guangzhou, but unfortunately no detailed record of her passage or transactions has survived. Henry Smith and Henry Patenger to London, May 6, 1707, BL, IOR/E/3/61, doc. 7570. 146

from Guangzhou as well; the Chinese crews arriving in Nagasaki only mention one English ship there between 1685 and 1700. 16

In 1698 William III chartered a new East India company, the ‘English Company Trading to the East Indies.’ The original company was still in operation, so the new company’s board of directors began plotting to expand into markets in which their older rival was relatively absent. Key amongst these was the Qing empire, and specifically Zhejiang province where no English ships had previously sailed in living memory. In 1699, the new company dispatched a small fleet to the Qing empire under the command of the company’s China president, Allen Catchpoole, who had instructions to establish a permanent factory in the Zhejiang port of Ningbo. The Qing authorities in Zhejiang only allowed the ships to anchor in Dinghai on the island of Zhoushan, keeping them at arm’s length from the important administrative centre in Ningbo, but Catchpoole and his subordinates did their best to trade on their employer’s behalf. New company ships sailed there until 1703, though they found the trade was far less profitable than the company’s directors had hoped, partly because Zhoushan was somewhat removed from the main arteries of Qing coastal and maritime commerce, and partly because like Xiamen there were a number of officials with overlapping jurisdictions making competing demands for toll payments and gifts. 17

Following the disappointment in Dinghai, Catchpoole advocated a new imaginative idea to secure access to Chinese goods based on his reading of William Dampier’s first book. He proposed that the company could imitate the VOC by setting up an independent factory on the island of Pulo Condore in the Con island group off the southeast coast of what is now Vietnam. His logic was that because Pulo Condore lay at a crucial point in the China- based merchants’ sailing routes, an English company factory there would have little trouble encouraging passing Qing ships to stop and trade. 18 Having failed miserably at their first gambit in the China trade, the company’s managers were willing to take Catchpoole’s advice, and gave him permission to establish the factory on Pulo Condore. Perhaps Pulo Condore could have served as a major conduit for the outflow of Chinese goods from Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean had the new company’s factory there lasted longer, but the experiment was terminated prematurely. In 1705, the Bugis mercenaries who Catchpoole had hired to

16 Ship #50 from Guangdong, July 18, 1694, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 2, p. 1659. 17 See “Diary and consultations of Alan Cathchpoole and Council for China at Chusan, and of their voyage to and stay at Batavia,” BL, IOR/G12/16, ff. 267 – 277. For a more detailed summary than is given here, see Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company , vol. 1, chap. 10. 18 Allen Catchpoole, Solomon Lloyd, Henry Rouse, John Ridges, and Robert Master at Chusan to London, December 21, 1700, BL, IOR/E/3/59, doc. 7287; and Allen Catchpoole, Solomon Lloyd, Henry Rouse, John Ridges, and Robert Master at Chusan to London, January 31, 1701, BL, IOR/E/3/60, doc. 7408. Catchpoole’s reference to Dampier is William Dampier, A New Voyage Round the World (London: James Knapton, 1694), p. 389. 147

garrison his factory turned on him and massacred most of the company’s servants on the island. 19

In the meantime, there was a realisation within the ranks of the new company that they did not have the resources or the backing to supplant their older rival anywhere in Asia, and the competition was destroying both of them. The companies began negotiations and agreed to a merger, resulting the formation of a new ‘United Company of Merchants of England Trading to the East-Indies’ in 1702, though they were not fully merged until 1707 (coincidentally the same year the Act of Union was passed in England and Scotland, making the new organisation the first properly ‘British’ company). For about five years in the beginning of the century therefore, there were three different English East India companies doing business in Asia. From the beginning of the merger negotiation to 1715, these companies continued to send voyages to the Qing empire that made enough profit to justify continued attempts. However, disappointments in Dinghai and Xiamen gradually convinced the companies’ managers that the Pearl River delta was the only sensible place in the empire for their ships to land.20 Business was still hampered by misunderstandings between Qing officials and the companies’ supercargoes, and for a time by the presence of merchants sent by the then crown prince Yinreng to monopolise trade with foreign ships on their master’s behalf. 21 Probably the greatest obstacle to trade during these years though was the War of Spanish Succession against France, which both disrupted the companies’ access to foreign silver and discouraged them from risking overly large amounts on voyages where their shipping would be vulnerable to French attacks. 22

Peace was concluded between Britain, France, and Spain in 1713, but another incident in the Qing empire also soon obstructed British trade again. In 1715, the captain of the Anne , a private British merchant ship from Madras was cheated out of 26 000 liang of silver (975 kg) by a conspiracy of the Qing merchants and officials in Xiamen, according to his own account. In retaliation, he cut the cable of a Chinese ship lying at anchor in Xiamen and towed her back to Madras. 23 This threw the united company’s management into a brief panic, as they feared retribution from the Qing authorities. Fortunately for the company and the merchant community in Madras, the Qing officials in Guangdong saw the value in foreign trade, and made no attempt to punish British ships coming to the Pearl River delta. 24 From that point forward almost all British trade, both company and private, was

19 “On the 3 rd March 1704/5 at one a clock in the morning ye Masacre at Pulo Condore was committed by ye Buggisses and Mascasser soldiers,” BL, IOR/E/3/67, doc. 8339. 20 Cheong, The Hong Merchants of Canton , p. 33. 21 “Factory Records: China and Japan,” BL, IOR/G/12/7, p. 976. Silas H. L. Wu, Passage to Power: K’ang-his and His Heir Apparent, 1661 – 1722 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 214, n. 18. 22 Chaudhuri, The Trading World , p. 437. 23 Edward Harrison, Joseph Collet, Thomas Frederick, William Jennings, Richard Horden, Thomas Cooke, John Legg, and Randall Fowke, Fort St. George General, August 29, 1716, BL, IOR/E/4/2, p. 53. 24 Edward Harrison, Joseph Collet, Thomas Frederick, William Jennings, Richard Horden, Thomas Cooke, John Legg, Joseph Cooke, and Randall Fowke, Fort St. George General, October 9, 1716, BL, IOR/E/4/2, p. 68. 148

concentrated in Guangzhou. Changing tastes in Britain and Europe, especially the steadily rising popularity of tea, gradually made this route integral to Britain’s global trade network.

Meanwhile, British intra-Asian trade seems to have continued to be more or less steady through the first two decades of the eighteenth century. A lack of detailed records from the Qing empire’s ports make assessing precise trade volumes difficult, but from the diaries and consultation books kept by the Fort St. George council in Madras, a basic sense can be had. Most years between 1700 and 1719 saw the departures and arrivals of one to three China ships, including both those owned privately and a few owned by the company (see Table 5.2 below). Private ships from Bombay also began sailing to Guangzhou intermittently from the first decade of the eighteenth century, but the western presidency’s regular participation in the China markets appears to date from the tenure of the ambitious Charles Boone, president from 1715 to 1722. 25 Madras therefore seems to have enjoyed a period of dominance in the early eighteenth century as the single most important South Asian port for the direct inflow of Chinese goods.

25 Davies, “British Private Trade Networks,” pp. 121 – 124. 149

Table 5.2. Ships departing from and arriving at Madras to and from China, 1700 - 1719 Departures Arrivals Year Xiamen Guangzhou Unknown Totals Xiamen Guangzhou Unknown Totals

1700 1 1 1 1 2 1701 2 1 3 1 1 1702 1 2 1 4 2 1 3 1703 1 1 2 2 1704 1 2 3 1 2 3 1705 1 1 1 2 3 1706 1 1 1 1 1707 0 1 1 1708 1 1 1 1 1709 0 1 1 1710 1 2 3 1 1 1711 2 2 1 1 2 1712 0 1 1 1713 2 2 1 1 1714 2 2 0 1715 0 1 1 1716 1 1 2 2 1717 0 1 1 2 1718 1 1 0 1719 1 1 3 3 Source: Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book , 1700-1719 (Madras: Superintendent, Government Press, 1922-1930).

The French were late entrants to the China trade despite having made forays into the Indian Ocean since the 1660s. There may have been ships sailing between Xiamen or Guangzhou and Pondicherry, the main French centre in Asia from the time the original French East India company (the Compagnie Française pour le Commerce des Indes Orientales) was founded in 1674, but the first documented appearance of a French ship in a Qing port is that of the privately owned Amphitrite in 1698. 26 Its voyage to Guangzhou was successful and its owners organised a second, ultimately less profitable expedition in 1701. 27 The outbreak of the War of Spanish Succession that same year interrupted the development of what might have been a more regular annual trade between France and the Qing empire. But French ships did continue to call at Guangzhou throughout the war, most of them

26 Furber, Rival Empires , p. 120. 27 Dermigny, La Chine et L’Occident, vol. 1, p. 151. 150

sailing through the Straits of Magellan and across the Pacific. 28 Because at least seven ships had left France in 1714 sailing westward through the Atlantic and across the Pacific, a sailing route that could take years to complete, there were French ships straggling into Guangzhou up until about 1716.

Meanwhile, no new ships appear to have been sent from France from 1715 to the end of the decade. 29 There is some conflicting information that suggests a continued French presence in Guangzhou until the early 1720s though. Yang Lin 楊琳 , the governor of Guangdong (1714 to 1716) and then governor general of Guangdong and Guangxi (1716 to 1724), wrote memorials to the Kangxi emperor between 1715 and 1722 that gave details on foreign trade in Guangzhou, including the numbers of ships arriving there (see Table 5.3 below). His reports indicate that every year in that period at least one French ship sailed up the Pearl River. Some of the ships he labels as ‘French’ (Folanxi 佛蘭西 or Falanxi 法蘭西 ) may have actually have belonged to the Ostend company, which started sending its own ships to Guangzhou in 1718, 30 and some of them may have also belonged to the two French settlements in South Asia, Pondicherry or Chandannagar, both of which were left more or less to their own devices through the 1710s for lack of any managerial or economic support from Europe. But if they were French country ships from South Asia, their voyages would have been very minor affairs because of the poverty and commercial marginality of the French settlements. It was only after 1719, when a new French East India company, the Compagnie des Indes, was finally formed, that Pondicherry began to play a significant role in the commercial world of the Coromandel Coast, or in wider intra-Asian trade. 31

Table 5.3. Annual arrivals of foreign ships in Guangzhou according to Yang Lin's memorials, 1715 – 1722 British French Surat Other Reference

Year Ships Cargo Ships Cargo Ships Cargo Ships Cargo

serge ( bizi 哻吱 ), Medicine, 1715 1 woollen cloth, 1 silver 1 vol. 6, p. 439 incense lead

28 Dermigny, La Chine et L’Occident , vol. 1, pp. 152 – 153; and Donald C. Wellington, French East India Companies: A Historical Account and Record of Trade (Lanham: Hamilton Books, 2006), pp. 45 – 47. 29 Dermigny, La Chine et L’Occident , vol. 1, pp. 153 – 154. 30 K. Degryse and J. Parmentier, “Maritime Aspects of the Ostend Trade to Mocha, India and China (1715 – 1732),” in Ships, Sailors and Spices: East India Companies and their Shipping in the 16 th , 17 th and 18 th Centuries , ed. Jaap R. Bruijn and Femme S. Gaastra (Amsterdam: Neha, 1993), p. 165. 31 Catherine Manning, Fortunes a Faire: The French in Asian Trade, 1719 – 48 (Aldershot: Variorium, 1996), pp. 26 – 27; and Wellington, French East India Companies , chap. 7 – 8. 151

lead, lead, sandalwood, sandalwood, woollen cloth, woollen cloth, gamboge, sandalwood, frankincense, gamboage, vol. 7, pp. 127, 1716 3 myrrh, sago ( xi 6 silver 2 frankincense, 253, 331, 356, qiao mi 西殼米 ), myrrh, sago, 422, 440 clocks, glassware, clocks, mirrors, cloves, glassware, silver mirrors, cloves, silver woollen woollen cloth, cloth, sandalwood, 1 vol. 7, p. 1148; 1717 3 1 silver sandalwood pepper, lead, (Bombay) vol. 8, p. 76 , pepper, rattans lead, rattans woollen cloth, vol. 8, pp. 76, 1718 6 serge, silver, lead, 1 silver 198, 310, 343 rattans, pepper pepper, lead, shark fins, incense wood, woollen cloth, rattans, wax, vol. 8, pp. 548, 1719 8 1 1 incense wood, cloth, lead, 588 rattans, wax, pepper, silver silver vol. 8, p. 701, 1720 2 1 719, 725, 737 Cloth, lead, vol. 8, pp. 766, 1721 7 3 silver 821, 827 rattans, betel vol. 8, pp. 903, 1722 1 silver 1 nut, incense 912 wood, medicine

Source: Kangxi chao Han wen zhu pi zou zhe hui bian 康熙朝漢文硃批奏摺彙編 , 8 volumes (Beijing: Dang an chu ban she, 1984 - 1985).

Finally, we need to consider the Dutch VOC’s role in intra-Asian trade. In the summer of 1684 before foreign trade had been formally legalised, both the VOC and the original English East India company sent ships to Xiamen. After some negotiation, the supercargoes of both companies were allowed to trade their goods. For the Dutch, this even-handed treatment was a bit galling. In the Qing-Zheng conflict that had ended only one year earlier, they had been allies of the Qing empire, whereas the English had established a commercial relationship with the Zheng family and, as the Qing court well-knew, had provided silver, cloth, and occasionally weapons for the Zhengs’ commercial and military

152

enterprises. On top of this, the Dutch company had established what its managers had understood as a formal diplomatic relationship with the Qing in the 1660s by sending an embassy to Beijing, whereas the English had never bothered to take this expensive and elaborate symbolic step. 32

Following this first new foray into the Qing market, the governor-general and his council in Batavia decided in 1685 to send a new embassy to the Kangxi emperor’s court in order to secure, and if possible enhance their company’s commercial prospects on China’s coasts. The company’s ambassadors were granted an audience with the emperor when they arrived in 1686, but the mission accomplished nothing of any importance diplomatically, and the Qing court granted them no new privileges. 33 The emperor had already decided to legalise both the trade of foreign-based ships in Qing ports, and China-based overseas ventures, so while the VOC embassy was groping its way through the labyrinth of court etiquette in Beijing, other foreign ships, including those of Batavia’s Chinese community, were successfully securing cargoes in Xiamen, Guangzhou, and Ningbo. And by 1686, substantial numbers of China-based ships were also sailing to Batavia carrying the same sorts of cargoes (see Table 4.4 in the previous chapter). Batavia sent ships to Xiamen and Guangzhou through the remainder of the 1680s, but these voyages encountered the same basic problems that the English company’s vessels did. 34 For this reason, the VOC’s governor-general, Willem van Outhoorn, who assumed the office in 1691, proposed abandoning direct trade to the Qing empire in 1692 in favour of relying on the China-based junks that arrived in Batavia with loads of tea, porcelain, and other Chinese goods each spring. 35 The Heeren XVII in Amsterdam approved this proposal, and from then until 1729, the company sent no ships to China. 36 That year, the Dutch company, conscious of the growing value of British trade through Guangzhou, made a brief experiment with direct shipping between Amsterdam and Guangzhou, but this was cancelled in 1734. From then to 1757, Batavia sent between two and six ships to Guangzhou each year. 37

Batavia therefore remained the hub through which almost all Chinese products in the company’s possession flowed, save those that were sent directly from Guangzhou to

32 John E. Wills, Jr., Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese Envoys to K’ang-hsi, 1666 – 1687 (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, 1984), pp. 146 – 149. 33 Wills, Embassies and Illusions , pp. 159 – 169. 34 See for example a description of the Eemland ’s trade at Xiamen in 1689. Joannes Camphuys, Willem van Outhoorn, Marten Pit, Joan van Hoorn, Isaac de Saint-Martin, Gerard de Beveren, and Wouter Valckenier, March 14, 1690, in Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII Der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie , ed. W. Ph. Coolhaas, vol. 5 ('s Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), p. 360. 35 Willem van Outhoorn Joan van Hoorn, Isaac de Saint-Martin, Dirk de Haas, Wouter Valckenier, Abraham van Riebeeck, Manuel Bornezee, and Wybrand Lycochthon, January 31, 1692, in Generale Missiven , Coolhaas, vol. 5, p. 466. 36 Leonard Blussé, Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women, and the Dutch in VOC Batavia (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1988), p. 123; and Leonard Blussé, “No Boats to China. The Dutch East India Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635 – 1690,” Modern Asian Studies 30, no. 1 (February 1996): 54. 37 Yong Liu, The Dutch East India Company’s Tea Trade with China, 1757 – 1781 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), p. 5. 153

Europe after 1734. This arrangement would suggest that the VOC was well-placed to carry out an intra-Asian trade in Chinese goods, but this does not seem to have happened to any significant extent in the eighteenth century. In the company’s various factories in South Asia, some Chinese products do appear in lists compiled by the company’s many modern historians. Chief amongst them are alum, zinc, quicksilver, and vermillion. 38 However, thanks to statistical analyses that Els Jacobs has recently done on the company’s eighteenth- century operations, we are able to put the trade in these products in a quantitative perspective. Jacobs has examined the intra-Asian country trade carried on between the company’s factories, showing imports types and values of imports and exports for select trading seasons (1711 to 1713, 1730 to 1732, 1751 to 1753, 1771 to 1773, and 1789 to 1790). Her criterion for the inclusion of specific types of goods in each instance is that they accounted for at least one per cent of the total export or import values. In not one instance did any Chinese products make the cut for any of the company’s South Asian factories in any of the seasons Jacobs has investigated. 39 We can conclude therefore that the company was buying Chinese goods almost exclusively for the European market or for consumption within the environs of Batavia itself. There is a possibility that Batavia’s vrijburgers carried greater volumes of Chinese goods into the Indian Ocean, but if so, they managed to do so without drawing much attention from the company’s management. Leaving that possibility aside, this chapter’s tentative conclusion is that the VOC played nothing but an extremely minor role in the flow of goods between the Qing empire and South Asia during the eighteenth century. So besides the limited amount of English trade between Guangzhou and Madras, how did Chinese goods enter the Indian Ocean from the western Pacific?

The Inadequacy of the Old Routes through Southeast Asia Most of the Chinese goods imported into South Asia during the early eighteenth century, both before and after 1720, seem to have been carried by merchants, both Asian and European, who were independent of the trading companies from whom much of our data on early modern oceanic trade in Asia has been drawn. Because of this, it is not possible to quantify the volume of trade with any precision, but this chapter will identify the basic trends. The conclusion that it proposes is that beginning in the 1680s there were a number of ways that Chinese goods flowed into the Indian Ocean through Southeast Asian entrepôts , but as European interest in the Qing empire intensified, these routes were gradually eclipsed by direct shipping between South Asian ports and Guangzhou. Beginning around 1718, when the Qing ban on domestic-based trade with Southeast Asia was first enforced,

38 Arasaratnam, Merchants, Companies and Commerce , p. 185; Om Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal, 1630 – 1720 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 162; and Binu John Mailaparambil, Lords of the Sea: The Ali Rajas of Cannanore and the Political Economy of Malabar (1663 – 1723) (Leiden: Brill, 2012), p. 117. 39 Els M. Jacobs, Merchant in Asia: The Trade of the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth Century (Leiden: CNWS, 2006), pp. 298, 307 – 373. 154

these entrepôt routes were largely reduced to minor side channels as South Asian-based merchants began to dominate the carriage of Qing goods to the subcontinent.

While in the late seventeenth century direct trade between South Asia and China was sporadic at best, the flow of Chinese goods towards South Asian ports through two of the Southeast Asian emporia discussed in Chapter Three seems to have been far more regular, if not as efficient. These two centres were Johor, which was well-positioned to send and receive goods travelling through the Straits of Melaka, and Ayutthaya, which re-exported Chinese goods both through the Chao Phraya River on its eastern side, and through Tenasserim and its port of Mergui on its west coast. The Tenasserim-Mergui conduit appears to have been the most resilient of these routes in the early eighteenth century, but all of them declined in relative importance from about the mid-1710s onwards, as the direct trading links gradually strengthened.

In the case of trade through the Straits of Melaka, the origin of the breakdown in the re-export of Chinese goods towards South Asia is quite clear; the conquest of Johor in the late 1710s brought political instability to the straits sub-region and left a gaping wound in the trading system that had evolved after 1684. The revolution in Johor in 1699 had begun to erode the state’s power, and consequently its centrality in the straits’ trading system. Its conquest by Minangkabau and Bugis invaders in 1718, coincidentally the same year that the Kangxi’s ban on Southeast Asian trade came into force, brought its declining fortunes to a nadir. The once great kingdom’s bustling emporium was reduced to a minor role in Southeast Asia’s trading networks, and it was not until the 1730s that it began to recover.

The available evidence suggests that Johor itself had never been nearly as popular with ships sailing from South Asia as it was with those coming from the Qing empire. With some difficulty, examples of English company or private ships docking there can be found. The old company ship Catherine and the new company ship Sarah & Jane were both in Johor in 1702, along with the ship of Abdell Roman, presumably a South Asian Muslim merchant judging by his name, 40 and the VOC’s agents in Melaka noted in 1717 that the private British merchant William Shotbolt had rescued an enslaved German sailor from Riau, Johor’s then capital.41 But this author has found few other examples of South Asian ships that docked in Johor. The diaries and consultation books kept by the Fort St. George presidency also record only two ships departing from Madras for Johor between 1700 and 1728 (see Table 5.4 below). South Asian-based merchants, European and otherwise, seemed to have preferred going to Aceh, Kedah, or Melaka rather than directly to Johor despite its popularity with China-based merchants. From the late-1680s until the 1710s the system for moving Chinese goods, as well as spices, through the straits usually worked as a relay route.

40 “Edward Hurst Protest against Captain Crust,” 1702, BL, IOR/E/3/64, doc. 8025; and “Copy of Alexander Hamilton and John Maxwell, attestations,” 1702, BL, IOR/E/3/64, doc. 8027. 41 Christoffel van Swoll, Frans Castelijn, Mattheus de Haan, Hendrik Zwaardecroon, Theodorus de Haeze, Samuel Timmerman, Jacob Faes, Laurens Tolling, Joan Cornelis d’Ableing, Ferdinand de Groot, and Willem Six, March 23, 1717, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 7, p. 282. 155

The goods were brought to Johor by the Qing merchants, and then reshipped on Johor- based vessels carrying VOC passes to Melaka, Aceh, and sometimes Kedah. 42 In these places, South Asian-based crews would buy the Chinese goods and carry them back to Bengal, the Coromandel Coast, or Surat.

Table 5.4. Ships sailing between Madras and Siam, Mergui/Tenasserim, and Johor, 1700 – 1728 Year Siam Mergui/Tenasserim Johor Arrivals 1700 Departures Arrivals 1701 Departures Arrivals 1702 Departures Arrivals 1703 Departures Arrivals 1 1704 Departures Arrivals 1705 Departures 2 Arrivals 3 1706 Departures 1 Arrivals 1707 Departures 1 Arrivals 1 2 1708 Departures 1 1 1 Arrivals 5 1709 Departures 1 Arrivals 1 3 1710 Departures Arrivals 5 1711 Departures 1 1 Arrivals 1 6 1712 Departures 1 Arrivals 1 1713 Departures 1 2 Arrivals 4 1714 Departures 1 4 Arrivals 1 3 1715 Departures 2 1716 Arrivals 1 1

42 See Chapter Three. Also Charles Lockyer, An Account of the Trade in India (London, 1711), p. 35. 156

Departures 1 3 Arrivals 1 3 1717 Departures 1 3 Arrivals 1 4 1718 Departures 2 Arrivals 3 1719 Departures 1 1 Arrivals 1 1720 Departures 1 2 Arrivals 2 1 1721 Departures 1 Arrivals 1 2 1722 Departures 4 Arrivals 4 1723 Departures 1 3 Arrivals From 1 1 1724 Departures For 1 1 Arrivals 1 2 1725 Departures 1 Arrivals 1 4 1726 Departures 1 4 Arrivals 1 2 1727 Departures 1 2 Arrivals 1 1728 Departures 1 2 Source: Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book , 1700 - 1728 (Madras: Superintendent, Government Press, 1922 - 1930).

This system was disrupted when a Bugis invasion of the straits began in 1715, which initiated a long period of naval warfare between the old rulers of Johor, the Bugis, and the Sumatran Minangkabaus. Johor’s old regime fell in 1718, but warfare continued into the 1730s, when the site of the kingdom’s former capital finally began to recover as a commercial centre under Bugis control. 43 In the meantime the traditional systems of exchange had ceased to reliably carry goods from Johor through the straits. To illustrate, Charles Lockyer on a trading voyage in 1704 found Aceh’s markets glutted with Chinese commodities that he suggested could be purchased by English trade ships coming from South Asia. 44 In contrast, by the late 1710s it was British ships sailing from the Qing empire who were selling the Chinese goods in Aceh. The previous chapter cited a memorandum

43 Diane Lewis, “The Dutch East India Company and the Straits of Malacca, 1700 - 1784; Trade and Politics in the Eighteenth Century” (PhD diss., Australian National University, 1970), pp. 161 – 162. 44 Lockyer, An Account of the Trade , p. 35. 157 written by John Scattergood in 1719 or 1720 listing Chinese goods he intended to sell in Aceh as evidence of the market for the Qing empire’s products among consumers in northern Sumatra, but it also suggests that the market was no longer being well-served by the sub-regional trade route through the straits. 45 The scarcity of Chinese goods in Aceh when Scattergood was there may have been partly the result of the Kangxi’s ban on Southeast Asian trade, but the absence of Chines goods in Aceh and Melaka is also attested to by an essay on Bengal’s trade with other parts of Asia written by an anonymous employee (or at least associate) of the Ostend company sometime in the late 1720s or early 1730s, after the Qing ban had ended. According to him, Aceh supplied gold, pepper, benzoin (an incense from tree resin), camphor, and other drugs, while Melaka could supply tin, rattans, benzoin, dammer (tree resin used in place of pitch), camphor, pepper, gold, and goods that had been brought from Batavia. In neither case does the writer mention Chinese goods or the participation of Chinese merchants, and tellingly there is no mention of Johor in his essay at all. 46

Turning to Ayutthaya, the previous chapter discussed the role of Siam as a consumer and re-exporter of Chinese goods at some length, so it only needs to be revisited here briefly with a focus on the evolution of this role before and after the Kangxi’s Southeast Asian trade ban. In the late 1680s, when the burgeoning Qing merchant community sought new markets beyond Japan and the Philippines, Ayutthaya became one of the most important destinations for their ships. In the wake of the coup that brought Phetracha to power in 1688, English and French ships that had formerly traded in Ayutthaya suspended their voyages to the Chao Phraya River, but the lure of Japanese copper along with native Siamese products encouraged merchants based on the Coromandel Coast to continue sailing to Mergui or further upriver to Tenasserim in the kingdom’s western territory. Around 1705, vessels from Madras began returning to Ayutthaya as well.

Direct South Asian trade to Ayutthaya seems to have become partially restricted in the mid-1710s, however. According to statements made by a French member of the Missions Étrangères in Siam within a 1714 letter to the governor of Pondicherry, after the succession of Thai Sa (r. 1709 – 1732), commerce in the kingdom’s capital seems to have been entirely in the hands of the phrakhlang (treasury minister). 47 The phrakhlang was an ethnic Chinese resident of Ayutthaya who had enjoyed the favour of Thai Sa’s father, and achieved even greater power under the new king. Led by this official, Ayutthaya’s Chinese community as a whole had come to wield an unprecedented level of influence within the kingdom. The missionary’s letter goes onto explain that the phrakhlang and his followers were then conspiring with the VOC’s agents in Siam to block other foreigners from trading

45 “Transcripts, etc., of papers of John Scattergood (1681-1723),” BL, Add MS 43731, vol. II, f. 433 – 434. 46 ‘Memoirs for the Trade from Bengal to several ports of India,’ FelixArchief, Antwerp, Generale Indische of Ostendse Compagnie, Varia I. 1720-1734, 24.Richtlijnen voor Bengalen wat de vrachten en beheer van de Moorse bestuur betreft. Rapport over de handel van Bengalen naar verschillende havens in India, unnumbered. 47 For a description of this office, see Suebsaeng Promboon, “Sino-Siamese Tributary Relations, 1282 – 1853” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 1971), pp. 13 – 22. 158

in the kingdom. 48 The overall point that the missionary was attempting to convey to his compatriots in Pondicherry was that there would be very little opportunity to trade in Ayutthaya for the French because the kingdom’s commerce was being monopolised by a Sino-Dutch alliance.

Dutch sources give a somewhat different perspective on the arrangement, though they too attest to the overwhelming influence of the phrakhlang . The VOC’s agents in their reports to Batavia in the 1710s agreed with the French that the phrakhlang and his fellow Chinese had become an incredibly powerful force within the kingdom, but they give no sense that a mutually agreeable Sino-Dutch alliance was at work in Ayutthaya. The company’s agents instead complain that the company now needed to appease him in order to maintain its operations. 49 In their view, every other group of merchants seem to have been at a disadvantage compared to the Chinese. In 1715 the council in Batavia reported to Amsterdam that merchants from other nations (the British and the “Moors”) in Siam who did not have prior agreements with Siamese officials typically ended up selling as much as one third of their import cargoes at a loss in exchange for the right to do business, while the Chinese merchants were met with much gentler terms thanks to the agency of the phrakhlang .50

The power of this Chinese phrakhlang over the region’s trade and the restrictiveness of his management are also testified to by the private merchant captain Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton sailed to the Chao Phraya River in 1719, naively expecting to be able to trade according to the terms of an Anglo-Siamese treaty that had been concluded in Narai’s reign. To his sorrow the Siamese customs officials actually demanded both measurage fees of about £500 (2000 Spanish pesos ) on his three hundred-ton ship, and an eight per cent tax on all of his imports. Hamilton did not blame the phrakhlang , reserving his ire instead for the united company’s president at Fort St. George, Joseph Collet (in office 1717 to 1720), and John Powney, another merchant captain whom Hamilton claimed was serving as Collet’s ambassador. According to Hamilton, Powney had conspired with the Siamese to discourage

48 Monsieur de Cicé to Monsieur Hébert, 1714, in Adrien Launay, Histoire de la Mission de Siam, 1662 – 1811, Documents Historiques II (Paris: Missions étrangères de Paris, 1920), pp. 98 – 100. Sarasin Viraphol briefly mentions this phrakhlang and the growing power of the Chinese community in Siam. Sarasin Viraphol, Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652 - 1853 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 47 – 48. For the rise and fall of Chinese power in the Ayutthaya court, especially during the reign of Thai Sa, see Dhiravat na Pombejra, “Princes, Pretenders, and the Chinese Phrakhlang: An Analysis of the Dutch Evidence Concerning Siamese Court Politics, 1699 – 1734,” in On the Eighteenth Century as a Category of Asian History: Van Leur in Retrospect , ed. Leonard Blussé and Femme Gaastra (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998). 49 Christoffel van Swoll, Abraham Douglas, Mattheus de Haan, Frans Castelijn, Laurens Tolling, Hendrik Zwaardecroon, Pieter Rooselaar, Theodorus de Haeze, Samuel Timmerman, Jacob Faes, and Joan Cornelis d’Ableing, November 26, 1714, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 7, p. 97. 50 Christoffel van Swoll, Abraham Douglas, Mattheus de Haan, Frans Castelijn, Laurens Tolling, Hendrik Zwaardecroon, Pieter Rooselaar, Theodorus de Haeze, Samuel Tummerman, Jacob Faes, and Joan Cornelis d’Ableing, January 14, 1715, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 7, p. 141. 159

all British shipping that Collet did not have an interest in. 51 In light of other evidence, it seems certain that there was indeed an arrangement between Powney and the Siamese court, and likely the phrakhlang specifically. Powney had been sailing to Siam since 1713, 52 and had later been the man that Collet’s predecessor in Fort St. George had charged with handling a sensitive matter regarding the same phrakhlang . After 1715 when the Anne took a Chinese ship as a prize in Xiamen’s harbour in retribution for mistreatment by the port’s officials and merchants, the Fort St. George presidency had sent an agent to Guangzhou to assess the situation. The agent discovered that though the cargo of the captured ship belonged to China-based merchants, the ship itself actually belonged to the phrakhlang of the Siamese court. 53 Powney, likely because he had a relatively great amount of experience in Siam and perhaps because he had a pre-existing relationship with the phrakhlang , was given the task of negotiating the appropriate compensation in Ayutthaya on behalf of Fort St. George. These negotiations dragged on for years; the parties did not manage to finally reach a settlement until 1726. 54

With this in mind, we can surmise that Hamilton was probably right. When he arrived in 1719, Powney was still acting as agent of the Fort St. George presidency in its negotiations with the phrakhlang . For the phrakhlang therefore, maintaining a relationship with Powney was a necessary prerequisite for getting compensation for the loss of his ship. This situation of course gave Powney an advantage in Ayutthaya, which likely allowed him to continue making profitable ventures in Siam from the mid-1710s into the mid-1720s while other merchants, such as Hamilton, languished. The Fort St. George diaries and consultation books kept by the presidency also support this possibility. In most years between 1705 and 1728 there was a single departure from Madras bound for Siam and usually a single arrival as well (see Table 5.4). The captains of the departing ships were almost always the same men; Powney, Alexander Dalgleish, John Domingos, and William Montgomery together account for the vast majority of all voyages between Madras and Siam in this period. 55

The strong implication of this situation, when considered in light of the testimonies of the French missionaries and the VOC’s agents, is that during the long administration of this phrakhlang , he strictly controlled trade up the Chao Phraya River, and effectively restricted it to merchants with whom he had an interest in working with. We can surmise

51 Alexander Hamilton, A New Account of the East Indies (Edinburgh: John Mosman, 1727), vol. 1, pp. 362 – 363, vol. 2, pp. 182 – 182. 52 Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book, 1713 (Madras: Superintendent, Government Press, 1929), p. 72. 53 Joseph Collet, Thomas Frederick, William Jennings, Richard Horden, Thomas Cooke, John Legg, Joseph Cooke, and Randall Fowke, Fort St. George General, August 17, 1717, BL, IOR/E/4/2, p. 110. 54 Francis Hastings, Richard Horden, Thomas Cooke, Randall Fowke, Nathaniel Turner, Richard Benyon, John Emmerson, Joshua Draper, and Thomas Wright, Fort St. George General, January 20, 1721, BL, IOR/E/4/2, p. 291; Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book, 1726, p. 120. For a shorter version of this same story with less emphasis on the agency of the phrakhlang , see D. K. Bassett, “British ‘Country’ Trade and Local Trade Networks in the Thai and Malay States, c. 1680 – 1770,” Modern Asian Studies 23, no. 4 (1989): 633 – 634. 55 Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book , 1700 - 1728, passim. 160

that Powney and the other Madras merchants carried some quantity of copper and other goods imported by Qing merchants out of Ayutthaya each year back to South Asia, but Ayutthaya’s potential as a transhipment point between the two oceans was limited by the venality of the phrakhlang during Thai Sa’s reign.

This leaves the trans-peninsular route from Ayutthaya to Tennaserim and Mergui. No permanent obstacle seems to have arisen to block this route, though after the departure of the adventurers Samuel White and Francis Davenport in the late 1680s, there are very few sources that give direct testimony to the commercial situation in that region. However, there are some hints that the route may have also suffered from the influence of the phrakhlang in Ayutthaya. John Scattergood, in notes he made around 1714, lists the goods available in Tenasserim as sandalwood, sappanwood, tin, and two items he calls ‘lina de passara’ and ‘pau fiscal,’ which were probably medicines. He does not mention ivory, copper, or any Chinese products that would have been shipped overland from Ayutthaya. 56 This may have been because his observations came shortly after a small rebellion in 1712 within the Tennaserim region, but it may also have been because the phrakhlang or his allies were monopolising the export of the most valuable goods through Mergui. The French missionaries and Dutch company servants claimed that the phrakhlang had helped fellow Chinese residents of Siam into various offices within the capital region, and Alexander Hamilton states that in Phuket (Junkceylon), an island on the coast of the Malay peninsula south of Mergui, the ‘governors’ were usually Chinese, who had bought their positions from the Siamese court. 57 Dhiravat Na Pombejra also cites the VOC’s agent in Ligor, who wrote in 1716 that, “the Chinese have, in order to obtain positions, done their utmost to further their policy with a liberal hand, and insinuated themselves into this kingdom so that at present [they] have in their control the best and most prominent positions at the court as well as in the provinces.”58 With this statement in mind, it seems reasonable to imagine that if Chinese Siamese residents were able to obtain posts in the relatively peripheral province of Phuket, then they likely also had some authority in the more important centres of Tenasserim and Mergui.

However, whoever was in control of Tenasserim and Mergui does not seem to have restricted access to those places nearly so much as Ayutthaya’s phrakhlang did in his own centre. From the Fort St. George diaries and consultation books we can see there were commonly two or three arrivals at Madras from Tenasserim and Mergui, and similar numbers of departures (see Table 5.4). In contrast to Ayutthaya, where Madras’ trade seems to have been restricted to a small number of mostly British men, the names of the captains departing for and arriving from Tenasserim and Mergui include a large number of Hindus, Muslims, Armenians, Portuguese, and British ones, with no one group clearly dominating. Other ports on the Coromandel Coast, especially San Thome and Porto Novo, likely sent

56 “Transcripts, etc., of papers of John Scattergood (1681-1723),” BL, Add MS 43732, vol. III, f. 354. 57 Hamilton, A New Account , vol. 2, p. 69. 58 Cited in Dhiravat na Pombejra, “Princes, Pretenders, and the Chinese Phrakhlang,” pp. 116 – 117. 161

significant numbers of ships as well. 59 A Siamese ship was also sent to Masulipatnam on at least one occasion in 1721 with elephants, ivory, tin, and copper, according to the VOC’s reports. 60

Tenasserim and Mergui remained the most consistent link through an intermediary Southeast Asian entrepôt for goods travelling between the Qing empire and South Asia. The VOC report just cited above indicates that Chinese or Japanese copper at least was still being moved overland from the Gulf of Siam to the Bay of Bengal for re-export to South Asia by the early 1720s. There were likely limited quantities of porcelain, zinc, quicksilver, and vermillion as well that were acquired by Coromandel-based ships riding at Mergui or Tenasserim. However, the necessity of employing teams of men to portage all of the trade goods across the peninsula meant that this would always be a slow and logistically complicated route for Chinese merchandise to take on its journey to South Asia. As the following sections of this chapter will show, by the second decade of the eighteenth century there were a number of more efficient links between the Qing empire and South Asia’s markets developing, and it is to these that we now must turn.

Surat’s Ships at Guangzhou The first category of South Asian merchants who intensified their participation in direct trade with the Qing empire during the early eighteenth century were non-Europeans. In this category there are three identifiable groups whose ships appear in the available records arriving in the Pearl River delta. Two of these groups, ships from the Malabar Coast and independent Armenian ships, appear to have made a near negligible contribution to the overall volume of South Asian-Qing trade in the first four decades of the eighteenth century. The third, the ships of the family of Abdul Ghafur, Surat’s wealthiest merchant and South Asia’s most important independent ship owner of his day, made a much more substantial contribution, though still less than the British or Macanese.

We will begin very briefly with the Armenian and Malabar ships. For the latter, this author has only found two mentions of vessels arriving in the Pearl River delta. The first was noted by the British company’ supercargoes in 1723, 61 and the other was mentioned in

59 Sinnappah Arasaratnam, “The Coromandel-Southeast Asia Trade, 1650 – 1740: Challenges and Responses of a Commercial System,” Journal of Asian History 18, no. 2 (1984): 124 – 125. 60 Henrik Zwaardecroon, Frans Castelijn, Mattheus de Haan, Jacob Faes, Anthony Huysman, Cornelis Hasselaar, Joan Adriaan Crudop, Laurens Tolling, Diderik Durven, Wijbrant Blom, and Petrus Vuyst, November 30, 1721, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 7, p. 566; and Henrik Zwaardecroon, Mattheus de Haan, Anthony Huysman, Cornelis Hasselaar, Joan Adriaan Crudop, Laurens Tolling Hans Frederik Bergman, Diderik Durven, and Wijbrant Blom, November 30, 1722, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 7, p. 621. See also J. A. Mills, “The Swinging Pendulum: From Centrality to Marginality - A Study of Southern Tenasserim in the History of Southeast Asia,” Journal of the Siam Society 85 (1997): 45. 61 “Diary & Consultation Book…,” BL, IOR/G/12/24, p. 27 162

1725 by the governor general of Guangdong and Guangxi. 62 The governor general describes the Malabar ship arriving about the same time as two British ships, and according to him all three of them brought pepper, sandalwood, lead, and silver coins. The sources offer no other information on either of these ships unfortunately. In the case of the Armenians, the records are similarly ungenerous. The English laconically note one Armenian-owned ship riding at Huangpu 黃埔 (Whampoa), Guangzhou’s main anchorage, in 1701, and their later records also mention another called the London , which was at Guangzhou in both 1722 and 1723 (see Table 5.5 below). There may have been more Armenian ships that sailed to the Pearl River delta in the first four decades of the eighteenth century that are not mentioned in the British company’s records because they remained in Macau rather than Guangzhou, and thus went unnoticed or were mistaken as Macanese. But there were likely not many of these. Armenian activity in the Pearl River delta only became regular and obvious from the 1740s onwards when they established themselves in niche roles as money lenders and suppliers of high value-to-weight luxury imports.63 The majority of the earlier Armenian activity in the Qing empire likely took the form of joint ventures with private British or Macanese merchants.

In the case of Abdul Ghafur’s family and their Surat-based shipping, we have a great deal more information both because of the higher frequency with which their vessels called in Guangzhou, and because of the incredibly detailed work Ashin Das Gupta did in his study of Surat’s Muslim merchant community in the first half of the eighteenth century. 64 Unfortunately, as with the other participants, there are gaps in the records that make reconstructing the evolution of Ghafur’s business interests in the Qing empire difficult. The outline for Surat’s participation in trade with China that this chapter proposes follows what the present author believes was the basic overall pattern of direct South Asian-Chinese trade. Essentially, the records offer a handful of mentions relating to Muslim or specifically Surat ships and merchants between 1684 and 1700, and these suggest that Ghafur may have been testing the waters then. From 1700 to 1714, only one source that this author knows of even hints at Surat or Muslim ships sailing to the Qing empire. During this second period though, no one was keeping consistent records of the shipping in either Guangzhou or Surat. No Qing officials reported on trade to Beijing until 1715, the VOC’s agents in Surat only began recording arrivals of returning ships in 1713, 65 and the British company sent voyages only sporadically and mostly to Xiamen until 1715. However, because of a conflict between Ghafur and the VOC in the first decade of the eighteenth century that inhibited his shipping, we can guess that this was probably not a period in which he made significant inroads into

62 Yongzheng chao Han wen zhu pi zou zhe hui bian 雍正朝漢文硃批奏摺彙編 (Jiangsu sheng xin hua shu dian, 1989 – 1991), vol. 6, p. 60. He refers to the ship as a ‘Mabalasi guo yang chuan 嗎吧喇嘶國洋船 .’ The year 1725 is the only year between 1721 and 1742 for which there is no surviving diary written by the British supercargoes in Guangzhou. 63 Carl T. Smith and Paul A. Van Dyke, “Armenian Footprints in Macao,” Review of Culture , International Edition 8 (October 2003): 20 – 39. 64 Ashin Das Gupta, Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat, c. 1700 – 1750 (Wiesbaden: Verlag, 1979). 65 Gupta, Indian Merchants , pp. 282 – 283. 163

the Chinese market. Starting in 1715 though, we do have consistent records of shipping in Guangzhou from both Qing and British sources, and these indicate that ships sent from Surat were arriving more or less regularly, at a rate of about three a decade up until 1740, the end of the period under examination here.

When Ghafur first began contemplating sending his own ships to the Qing empire is uncertain, but he and other merchants from the Mughal empire may have had their eyes on the possibility of establishing commercial ties in the Qing domain as early as the Dutch and English did. In 1683, the last year of the Zheng regime’s existence and the year before the Kangxi’s decision to legalise maritime trade, three ‘Moor’ people (Mouru hito もうる人) were picked up in Siam by a Zheng ship. They apparently hoped to land in Guangzhou, but were disappointed when the vessel that gave them passage was chased out of the Pearl River delta by Qing warships, and so ended up sailing to Taiwan instead. After this detour, the Moors were apparently gave up on their scheme to get to Guangzhou because the Zheng crew who told this story in Nagasaki conclude by stating that the three men were planning to hitch another ride from Taiwan back to Siam that summer. 66

The first direct record of Ghafur’s efforts to trade in the Qing empire that this author has been able to find comes in the 1690s, though he apparently had very little initial success then. In a letter written in 1695, the original English company’s agents in Surat reported to the company’s directors in London that Ghafur was planning to send his ships on round-about trips to Manila and then Guangzhou, but had not actually managed it at that point. They wrote the following.

Abdull Guffore a great merchant in Surat hath for several years endeavoured his ships should goe from the Maneels [the Philippines] to China, but it never was effected; such trade should itt come into the Moores hands would soon be worth nothing. Last year a ship of 400 tons [belonging to Ghafur] got late to Canton, but the Chineses treated them with such exactions in the customes, measuring the ship, forced presents and overrate of their goods that they came away with no more then 5000 Doller of their cargoe in sugar, alome and silks and not 1/3 percent laden. 67

Spanish records confirm that Surat ships were indeed arriving in Manila fairly regularly at least until the start of the eighteenth century (see Appendix 2), but how regular the arrivals of Surat ships were in Guangzhou before 1700 is harder to assess because European voyages there were intermittent until around 1715 and no Qing records of port

66 Ship #18 from Dongning, September 1, 1683, Hayashi, Kai Hentai , vol. 1, p. 393. In 1661, there was apparently an earlier group of Muslim South Asian merchants who sought passage to Japan on board a Chinese ship. It is not known what outcome their venture met. Arasaratnam, Merchants, Companies and Commerce , pp. 161. 67 Samuel Annesley and Council at Surat to the East India Company in London, May 13, 1695, BL, IOR/E/3/51, f. 62 r. 164

administration from that period survive. If the English agents in Surat were correct in their assessment of Ghafur’s 1694 venture to Guangzhou, then we can guess that he may not have sent many more ships to the Qing empire for the rest of the 1690s. The only other reference in that decade that this author has found is an English report of a Moor ship from Surat riding at Huangpu in 1699. 68

In the first decade of the eighteenth century, the only possible reference to one of Ghafur’s ships heading to China that this author is aware of is a contract dated 1704 that Ashin Das Gupta has found in the VOC’s archives made between Ghafur and members of the crew of one of his ships. The contract lists the rates the crew were to pay for private trade in specific items they shipped on the vessel. The types of items it lists make it obvious that the ship was intended for the Qing empire; these include copper, zinc, vermilion, quicksilver, porcelain, Japanese or Chinese lacquerware, and ‘all kinds of Chinese commodities.’ 69 However, between 1703 and 1707, Ghafur was embroiled in a conflict with the Dutch company, who blockaded Surat’s harbour and began seizing his ships when they were caught abroad, 70 and this may in fact be why the 1704 contract that Das Gupta found was in the VOC’s archives. So despite the lack of detailed documentation we can assume that the first decade of the eighteenth century did not see many Surat ships completing a round trip voyage to Guangzhou. The VOC Surat factory’s list of ships docking in that city begins in 1713, and it does not mention any arrivals from China until 1716, so between the end of the Ghafur-Dutch conflict and 1715, the only realistic period of time in which Surat ships may have arrived in Guangzhou is 1708 to 1711. From 1715 though, we have fairly reliable documentation of ships arriving in Guangzhou, and from them we can see that Ghafur had begun sending his vessels to the Qing empire semi-regularly. Yang Lin, the conscientious governor general of Guangdong and Guangxi mentioned above, recorded the arrivals of Surat ships as well as European ones in his memorials on trade sent to the Kangxi emperor between 1715 and 1722. From his lists, we can see that Surat ships arrived in 1715, 1716, 1719, and 1722 (see Table 5.3). Surat ships did not therefore come to Guangzhou annually, but they came often enough that they were a recognisable sight at the Huangpu anchorage.

After Ghafur’s death in 1718, his grandson Muhammad Ali took control of his family’s business empire, and continued his grandfather’s practice of sending ships to Guangzhou. 71 Upon the succession of the Yongzheng emperor in 1722, Yang unfortunately seems to have stopped bothering to include trade details in his missives to the throne, but

68 “A Journal of a voyage from England to China In the Ship Macklesfield Galley…,” BL, IOR/L/MAR/A/CXXIII, p. 55. 69 Ashin Das Gupta, “A note on the Shipowning Merchants of Surat, c. 1700,” in Ashin Das Gupta, Merchants of Maritime India, 1500 – 1800 (Aldershot: Variorum, 1994), p. 113. 70 Gupta, Indian Merchants , p. 123; and Joan van Hoorn, Abraham van Riebeeck, Laurens Pijl, Joannes Cops, Manuel Bornezee, Christoffel van Swoll, Herman de Wilde, Abraham Douglas, Adam van Rijn, Adriaan van der Stel, Hendrik Zwaardecroon, and Mattheus de Haan, January 31, 1705, Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 5, p. 338. 71 Gupta, Indian Merchants , pp. 197 – 198. 165

from the observations of the British merchants who were by then arriving annually in Guangzhou, we know that Muhammad Ali continued to send ships irregularly up until his death in 1733. The British noted the arrivals of a Surat ship in 1724, 72 1727, 73 and 1731. 74 The last of these sparked a conflict in Surat between Muhammad Ali and the city’s Mughal governor over customs tax on Chinese porcelain, which grew into a larger struggle and ultimately brought about Muhammad’s imprisonment and death in 1733. 75

Table 5.5. South Asian Ships in Guangzhou and Macau according to British records, 1699 – 1709 Year Description Source 1699 Moor ship from Surat BL, IOR/L/MAR/A/CXXIII, p. 55.

1701 Armenian ship BL, IOR/E/3/61, doc. 7075

1721 Moor ship from Surat BL, IOR/G/12/22, p. 31

1722 Armenian ship London from Madras BL, IOR/G/12/21, p. 42

1723 Moor ship from Malabar BL, IOR/G/12/24, p. 27

1723 Armenian ship London from Madras BL, IOR/G/12/8, p. 1422

1724 Moor ship from Surat BL, IOR/G/12/25, p. 8

Moor ship from Surat, belonging to 1727 BL, IOR/G/12/26, p. 20 ‘Abdul Ghafur's son'

1731 Moor ship from Surat BL, IOR/G/12/31, p. 70

BL, IOR/G/12/44, p. 115; BL, 1738 Fessenbonne , Moor ship from Surat IOR/G/12/45, p. 58

BL, IOR/G/12/46, p. 23; BL, 1739 Moor ship from Surat IOR/G/12/47, p. 16

Surat’s trade languished in the mid-1730s, but seems to have begun to recover at the end of the decade. The lack of ships between 1732 and 1737 is easy to explain. Following

72 “Macclesfields China Diary 1724,” BL, IOR/G/12/25, p. 8. 73 “Diary and Consultation Book containing the Transactions & Management of Affaires relating to the disposall & Investing of the Cargoe of the Prince Augustus…,” BL, IOR/G/12/26, p. 20. 74 “Dyary & Consultation Book of such occurrances as may be worth the notice of our Honourable Employers during the Intended voyage of the Hartford, Macclesfield, Ceasar, & Harrison bound for China & consign’d to James Naish, Richard Moreton & Thomas Flytche,” BL, IOR/G/12/31, p. 70. 75 For a very detailed analysis of the events leading up to Muhammad Ali’s death, see Gupta, Indian Merchants , pp. 215 – 239. 166

Muhammad Ali’s death, Surat was subjected to a blockade by the British company that stopped outbound ships from sailing in the 1733-1734 season. This disruption was followed by the attack of a Siddi fleet from Danda Rajapuri south of Bombay on Surat’s port in 1735. The Siddis took most of Surat’s trading vessels hostage, and held them until early the following year. 76

Surprisingly, despite the death of Muhammad Ali, and despite the difficulties Surat was facing because of the Maratha invasions of Gujarat, at the end of our period Surat vessels returned to Guangzhou. In 1738 and 1739, the British company’s supercargoes in Guangzhou noted vessels from Surat once more, though it is not clear which merchant or merchants these belonged to. Ghulam Nadra’s research on Gujarat’s commercial world in the latter half of the eighteenth century has shown that there were actually a number of wealthy merchants from the different ethnic and religious communities in the city that took up the torch of Abdul Ghafur and Muhammad Ali by sending ships east of the Melaka straits from the late 1730s until the end of the century. Like Ghafur and Muhammad, these new merchants did not send annual voyages to Guangzhou, but Surat vessels continued to dock occasionally in Huangpu up until at least the 1790s. 77

This persistence of Surat’s trade with the Qing empire in spite of the turmoil caused by the Maratha invasion of the Gujarati countryside in the 1720s and the various disruptions within the city itself may be at least partly explained by a growing demand for raw cotton in Guangdong. 78 The cultivation of cotton in Guangdong appears to have ended in the eighteenth century, prompting a reliance on imports from both Jiangnan and South Asia. 79 Past historians have placed the beginning of Guangdong’s importation of raw Indian cotton in the late eighteenth century or even in the nineteenth, 80 but it actually may well have begun in the 1730s or earlier on a smaller scale carried by private European and Surat-based vessels whose trade went largely unrecorded. The “large Moor ship belonging to Surat” that arrived in Guangzhou in 1739, brought cotton, tin, betel nut, drugs, sandalwood, and pepper, according to the British observers there. 81 The British company ships that were sent from

76 Ashin Das Gupta, “Trade and Politics in 18 th Century India,” in Ashin Das Gupta, Merchants of Maritime India, 1500 – 1800 (Aldershot: Variorum, 1994), pp. 192 – 194. 77 Ghulam A. Nadri, Eighteenth-Century Gujarat: The Dynamics of Its Political Economy, 1750 – 1800 (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 54 – 60; and Ghulam Ahmad Nadri, “Commercial World of Mancherji Khurshedji and the Dutch East India Company: A Study of Mutual Relationships,” Modern Asian Studies 41, no. 2 (2007): 340. 78 For the Marathas in Gujarat, see Stewart Gordon, The New Cambridge History of India, II ·4: The Marathas, 1600 – 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 116; and Gupta, “Trade and Politics,” pp. 188 – 193. 79 Robert B. Marks, Tigers, Rice, Silk, and Silt: Environment and Economy in Late Imperial South China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 172. 80 Sucheta Mazumdar, Sugar and Society in China: Peasants, Technology, and the World Market (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1998), p. 105; Kang Chao, The Development of Cotton Textile Production in China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 23; and Chen Ruiyu 陳慈玉 , “Yi Zhong Yin Ying San Jiao Mao Yi Wei Ji Zhou Tan Tao Shi Jiu Shi Ji Zhoungguo De Dui Wai Mao Yi 以中印英三角貿易爲基軸探討十九世紀中國的對外貿易 ,” in Zhongguo Hai Yang Fa Zhan Shi Lun Wen Ji 中國海洋發展史論文集, vol. 1 (Taibei: Zhong Yang Yan Jiu Yuan, 1984), pp. 135 – 138. 81 “Diary and Consultation Book of the Transactions…,” BL, IOR/G/12/46, p. 23. 167

Bombay to Guangzhou in the 1730s also brought cargoes that included cotton which sold profitably,82 so by this time there was good economic logic prompting the Gujarati merchants to maintain a direct connection to the Qing empire.

The Macanese Compared to the story of Surat’s merchants, reconstructing the course of Macau’s participation in the trade between China and South Asia is far more straightforward. Because Macau was within the Qing empire in the eighteenth century, legally and economically, any Macanese ships sailing to or from South Asia can reasonably be assumed to be a participant in the trade. From their appearances in South Asian ports, particularly Cochin and Madras, we can see that the Macanaese’s trade followed the same basic pattern as that of the Surat, British, and French merchants, but with some minor differences. In the first decade of the eighteenth century, when most of the detailed records relating to Macanese trade in Asia begin, their role in South Asia was minor. Beginning around 1710, there was a more steady flow of Macanese ships arriving at Madras. This trend lasted until 1717 or 1718, when there was a temporary break in the flow, perhaps because a larger proportion of Macau’s shipping was being redirected towards Batavia and other Southeast Asian ports during the enforcement of the Kangxi’s prohibition on Qing trade to Southeast Asia. Finally, the early 1720s witnessed a recovery of more or less steady Macanese shipping to Madras and Cochin that was sustained until the end of our period.

The origins of Macau’s trade to South Asia can be found in the late seventeenth century. Despite the overall decline of Portuguese power in Asia, Macau was able to enjoy some advantages from about 1660 to 1684. The Qing-Zheng conflict and the Qing coastal prohibition eliminated most China-based competition by the early 1660s, giving the Macanese a relatively strong hand in the exportation of Chinese goods during these decades. The Tokugawa had barred the Macanese from Japan in 1639, but most of Southeast Asia remained open to them. For several decades in the middle part of the century, the city had operated as a commercial link between southern China and various Southeast Asian hubs that the Zheng merchants did not bother with. However this system was gradually eroded first by the expansion of the VOC’s conquest or co-option of several of Southeast Asia’s crucial hubs (Makassar in 1669 and Banten in 1682, especially), and then by the rapid advance of China-based merchants into the region after 1684. Consequently, by the 1690s, they were left with their sandalwood trade in Timor and secondary roles in Manila and some of the region’s western entrepôts , such as Ayutthaya and Batavia. 83

82 “Diary and Consultation Book…,” BL, IOR/G/12/40, p. 9; and “Diary and Consultation Book of the Transactions…,” BL, IOR/G/12/46, p. 10. 83 A. R. Disney, A History of Portugal and the Portuguese Empire: From Beginnings to 1807, Volume 2: The Portuguese Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 333 – 334; and John Villiers, “Makassar: The Rise and Fall of an East Indonesian Maritime Trading State, 1512 – 1669,” in The Southeast Asian Port and Polity: Rise and Demise , ed. J. Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990), p. 156. 168

The solution that the Macanese seem to have hit upon for reviving their centre as a commercial hub around the turn of the eighteenth century was to foster their hitherto relatively minor trading links to the Indian Ocean. They did this primarily by sending more of their own shipping through the Straits of Melaka. A VOC report from early 1685 tells us that in the previous year nine ships sailed from Macau; three were bound for Goa (the capital of the Portuguese crown’s Estado da Índia), one for Diu (another Portuguese possession on the north-western coast of India), three for Timor, one for Banjarmasin, and one for Patani. 84 Besides the four ships that sailed to the two Portuguese colonies in India, at least some of which probably belonged to the Estado da Índia rather than the Macanese, the rest were bound for Southeast Asian ports. For comparison, we have detailed records of Macau’s shipping in the British East India company’s archives from 1732, 1733, and 1740 (see Table 5.6 below). From them we can see that Macanese ships continued to sail to Southeast Asia, and that Batavia was still likely their single most important destination. But by then South Asian ports on the Malabar and Coromandel coasts had become almost as important.

Table 5.6. Intended Destinations of Ships Sailing from Macau for 1732, 1733, and 1740 South Asian Destinations Southeast Asian Destinations Other Ha ships Year Goa Surat Malabar Coromandel Batavia Timor Aceh Siam Manila Tien then abroad 1732 2 1 2 1 1

1733 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3

1740 1 1 3 5 2 Sources: BL, IOR/G/12/33, p. 154; BL, IOR/G/12/35, p. 99; and BL, IOR/G/12/48, p. 54.

A look at the relative tonnages of Macanese ships sent to various ports further emphasises the importance of South Asia in Macau’s trading system by the 1730s. The only year that the British company’s supercargoes give complete tonnage data for is 1740 (see Table 5.7). For that year we can observe that although there were more ships sailing to Batavia and Manila than there were to South Asia (six compared to five), the Batavia and Manila ships were relatively small, amounting to a combined 1400 tons, compared to 2750 tons for all the South Asian-bound ships. Also, significantly for the discussion below, the British company’s enclave of Madras was the single most important destination in that year.

This section follows the basic narrative laid out by George Souza. It relies on his book for much of the following discussion as well. George Bryan Souza, The Survival of Empire: Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630 – 1754 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 84 Joannes Camphuys, Anthonio Hurdt, Willem van Outhoorn, Marten Pit, Cornelis van Quaelbergh, and Joan van Hoorn, February 12, 1685, in Coolhaas, Generale Missiven , vol. 4, p. 760. 169

Table 5.7. Ships and their tonnages sailing from Macau in 1740 Individual Total Tonnage per Destination Ship Name Tonnage Destination Surat St. Michael 800 800 Goa Penha 700 700 Piedadie 800 Madras 1050 St. Katherine 250 Masulipatnam Coelho Sloop 200 200 St. Ann 300 Blackboy 250 Batavia 1000 St. Katherine 200 Nostra Senora 250 Jesus Nazarine 250 Manila 400 Adimirante 150 Source: BL, IOR/G/12/48, p.54

After 1700, we can gain a sense of the development of the trade between Macau and South Asia from arrivals recorded in several different ports. George Souza has used the VOC’s archives to create a data series listing the numbers of ships arriving at Melaka from Macau, and for those departing Melaka on their way back to the same city (see Table 5.8 below). Because Melaka lay in the centre of the straits that take its name, it was the one port that most Macanese ships bound to or from South Asia would have passed; its records should therefore give at least a sense of their sailing patterns. The data is obviously quite patchy, and a comparison to the available numbers of ships sailing to or from the two South Asian ports we have Macau-related data for, Madras and Cochin, it is clear that the Melaka series does not capture anything close to a complete picture of the ebb and flow of trade between Macau and South Asia. Nonetheless, if Souza’s numbers are taken as absolute minimums in each case, then we may surmise that beginning in the mid-1720s at the latest, Macau had become one of the most reliable conduits for Chinese goods to South Asia.

Examining the other available qualitative and quantitative data (especially that collected by Souza), we can reasonably postulate that the two most important regions for Macanese merchants in South Asia after 1700 were the Malabar and Coromandel coasts. Surat, even in its halcyon days before the Maratha invasions of Gujarat, does not seem to have been much visited by Macanese merchants in the eighteenth century, the despatch of the 800 ton St. Michael for that port in 1740 notwithstanding (see Table 5.7). This was partly because of a conflict in the century’s first two decades between Macau’s country traders and the Estado over whether Macanese ship sailing past Cape Comorin to west coast ports, such as Surat, needed to pay customs duties in Goa or not. 85 It was also likely because Surat’s

85 Souza, The Survival of Empire , pp. 178 – 179. 170

trade was already being split between the VOC, the English East India companies, and an aggressive locally-based merchant fleet who traded in all the same ports the Macanese sailed to, including the Qing market.

The attraction of Malabar for the Macanese was of course its pepper production. The Qing empire’s economic recovery in the 1690s had allowed growth in the Chinese demand for pepper, and it had become a staple import commodity for almost all merchant groups operating in Qing ports. When the Macanese began participating as importers of Malabar pepper is difficult to say from the available documents. The key port was the VOC- controlled centre of Cochin, and the data on the Macanese trade there comes from the Dutch company’s records (which this author also has Souza to thank for). Unfortunately these only include arrivals of foreign ships beginning in the 1720s (see Table 5.8 below). But from them we can at least see that starting in 1724, Macanese ships were arriving in Cochin regularly, though their trade may have predated that year. The tentative hypothesis this section will put forward is that Macanese trade to Cochin and elsewhere on the Malabar Coast emerged as an important part of their trading system between 1718 and 1723 in response to the Kangxi emperor’s ban on China-based trade in Southeast Asia. During this period the pepper that had been regularly supplied to the Qing market by the Xiamen and Guangzhou-based merchants who traded in Batavia, Johor, and Banjarmasin was temporarily cut-off, giving an opportunity to the Macanese to enter the pepper market more aggressively. Similarly, during the same period the small supply of Chinese goods that the Malabar markets had received from Batavia (vermillion, quicksilver, and perhaps zinc and Chinaware) would also suddenly have disappeared. The Macanese, who were still able to sail from the Qing empire’s coast, would have been very well-positioned to step into this breach. Further investigation into local Malabar and Chinese market conditions is needed to test this hypothesis, of course.

In the case of Madras on the Coromandel Coast, the available evidence provides firmer ground for conclusions. The diaries and consultation books of Fort St. George allow us to see that in Madras there were arrivals and departures from and for Macau occurring regularly during the period from 1701 to 1703. After 1703, there was a lull in the traffic until 1710, possibly because of the presence of hostile French warships in Asia’s seas during the War of Spanish Succession. 86 Beginning in 1710 there was a resumption of regular arrivals that lasted until 1717. After this there was another lull in the Macau-Madras trade until 1721. This second lull was probably not coincidentally about the same period that the Kangxi emperor’s ban on the trade of China-based merchants to Southeast Asia was being enforced. During these years Portuguese shipping to Batavia (and probably other Southeast Asian ports we have less data for) surged as Macanese merchants hurried to take advantage of the demand for Chinese goods left suddenly unsupplied by the curtailment of China-based shipping (see Table 5.8 below). Shipping that the Macanese merchants would have

86 Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book, 1708, p. 73. 171

otherwise sent to Madras was probably re-directed towards Batavia, other ports in Southeast Asia, and perhaps also Cochin if the hypothesis proposed above is correct.

In March 1722 a Macanese ship docked in Madras, bringing an end to the drought. 87 Thereafter until 1740 the council in Fort St. George recorded the arrivals of at least one ship from Macau every year except 1725, 1730, 1733, and 1734. By the end of our period Macanese trade was well enough established in Madras that in 1739 the Fort St. George council was able to declare in defence of its port’s openness to foreign shipping that “As to the Maccao Men, they sold their China Cargoes & took in their returns here, This is a trade which has been carried on longer than any one of us can remember.”88

Table 5.8. Ships Sailing to and from Macau in Different Asian Ports A) Portuguese B) Portuguese C) Ships D) Ships E) Shi ps F) Macanese ships arriving ships arriving departing arriving ships at Melaka departing from Macau from in Cochin arriving in from Macau Melaka for in Madras Madras for from Batavia Macau Macau Macau 1700 3 1 0 1 2

1701 4 1 3 1 0

1702 0 0 2 1 1

1703 0 0 1 1 0

1704 0 0 0 0 1

1705 1 0 0 0 3

1706 3 3 0 0 2

1707 4 5 0 0 4

1708 5 2 0 0 4

1709 1 0 0 0 2

1710 2 0 1

1711 2 2 2

1712 0 1 1 1 2

1713 2 1 2

1714 1 0 0

1715 1 1 3

1716 1 1 2

1717 2 0 0 1 1

1718 0 1 4

1719 1 0 9

1720 0 0 6

1721 0 0 6

1722 1 0 13

87 Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book, 1722, p. 49. 88 Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book, 1739, p. 97. 172

1723 1 1 5

1724 1 2 2 1 1 7 1725 2 3 0 1 2 9 1726 2 2 1 0 3 6 1727 4 3 0 0 1 9 1728 2 2 2 2 2 5 1729 1 2 3 3 1 7 1730 1 2 0 0 1 6 1731 1 2 2 7

1732 1 1 3 3

1733 0 2 0 0 0 6 1734 0 0 2 3

1735 1 4 1 1 3 3 1736 2 4 1 2 3 2 1737 2 2 2 2

1738 2 2 3 2

1739 2 4 2 3

1740 0 0 2 4

Sources: Columns A and B, George Bryan Souza, The Survival of Empire: Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630 – 1754 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 160 - 161. Column C and D, Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book , 1700 - 1740 (Madras: Superintendent, Government Press, 1922 - 1931). Column E, Souza, The Survival of Empire , p. 159. Column F) Souza, The Survival of Empire , pp. 134, 138.

Private British and French Trade from c. 1720 to 1740 In the early eighteenth century, the attractions of Madras for the Macanese were essentially the same as those that had made it the centre of English private trade directed towards the Qing empire in the late seventeenth century. Most obvious was its location; situated as it was on the Coromandel Coast in south-eastern India, ships sailing from Madras enjoyed quick passages to the Melaka straits on their voyages to the Qing empire. But this convenience also made Madras the most important of the British companies’ outposts for trade to the Malay peninsula and Indochina. Through the first half of the eighteenth century, private ships owned by both Asians and Europeans sailed with greater or lesser regularity to Burma, Mergui, Tenasserim, Aceh, Kedah, Bengkulu, Melaka, Batavia, Banjarmasin, Ayutthaya, Pho Hien, and other lesser ports. 89 These connections gave the merchants who planned voyages from Madras to the Qing empire access to a variety of Southeast Asian

89 Several important late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century books give tours of Southeast Asia from the point of view of British merchants who operated out of Madras, emphasising the trade goods available in those ports. See Thomas Bowrey, A Geographical Account of Countries Round the Bay of Bengal, 1669 to 1679 (Cambridge: Hakluyt Society, 1905); Lockyer, An Account of the Trade ; and Hamilton, A New Account . 173

products that were marketable in China. 90 As evidence of this, we have a memorandum written by John Scattergood in 1718 that lists cargo on his ship the Bonita, which set out from Madras bound for Guangzhou that year. It includes such Southeast Asian products as tin, sandalwood, and birds’ nests. 91 About two decades later the Fort St. George council claimed in defence of foreign trade through their port that some tin, which a French ship had recently bought for re-export to China, had originally been imported to Madras on private British ships from Mergui, Kedah, and Phuket. 92

The other resource that Madras could offer to would-be participants in the China- India trade in greater quantities than most other ports in South Asia was silver. There were two main sources of silver for Madras’ private merchants. The first was Manila, which was visited regularly by Armenian, Portuguese, and Hindu merchants based in Madras. The silver they brought back from Luzon, according to Serafin Quiason, accounted for perhaps twenty-five to thirty per cent of all silver imports to Madras between 1708 and 1757. 93 The balance was imported from Europe by the British company for its expenses and investments. Following the conclusion of the War of Spanish Succession in 1714, greater volumes of silver were available to the united company in Europe, 94 and it accordingly increased the amounts it shipped to the Coromandel Coast and elsewhere in Asia (see Figure 5.1 below). 95 Fort St. George used part of this imported silver to purchase goods locally, but general economic decline on the Coromandel Coast prevented the region from playing the important role it formerly had in the old company’s system during the seventeenth century. Consequently, much of the presidency’s silver ended up being re-exported in one form or another. Perhaps the most important direction of this outflow was towards Guangzhou, both on company ships sent from Madras and in the hands of private merchants. In 1718, Joseph Collet, the president at Fort St. George, proposed that his presidency begin loaning silver to private merchants planning voyages to China in order to make profit through interest on the loans and to stimulate trade in Madras. The plan was adopted, and between 1723 and 1728 several private voyages to Guangzhou were partially funded in this way. 96

90 Sinnappah Arasaratnam observes the usefulness of Southeast Asian goods to the Madras-China trade as well. See Arasaratnam, “The Coromandel-Southeast Asia Trade”: 131 – 132. 91 “Transcripts, etc., of papers of John Scattergood (1681-1723),” BL, Add MS 43731, vol. II, f. 254. 92 Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book, 1739, p. 98. 93 Serafin D. Quiason, English “Country Trade” With The Philippines, 1644 – 1765 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1966), p. 76. 94 Artur Attman, American Bullion in the European World Trade, 1600 – 1800 (Göteborg: Kungl. Vetenskaps, 1986), p. 60. 95 Arasaratnam, Merchants, Companies and Commerce , pp. 190 – 191. 96 Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book, 1723, pp. 38, 55; Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book, 1725, p. 88; Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book, 1726, p. 84; and Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book, 1728, p. 87. For the original proposal to sell silver at easy rates to merchants sending ships to China, see Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book, 1718, p. 88 174

Figure 5.1. British companies’ investment in Asia, 1700 - 1740

China Bombay Madras Bengal Southeast Asia 550000 500000 450000 400000 350000 300000 250000 200000 150000 Value in Pounds Sterling Pounds in Value 100000 50000 0 1700 1705 1710 1715 1720 1725 1730 1735 1740 Source: K. N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660 – 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 509 - 510.

Through the 1720s the combined availability of Southeast Asian products and silver served to encourage the Macanese to direct a large portion of their shipping to Madras, and at the same time it also encouraged private British merchants from the British united company’s various enclaves on the subcontinent to send their ships to China via Madras. The trend from 1720 to 1725 for both private ships based in Madras and even those based in Bombay was to make Madras their last port of call in South Asia before sailing for the Qing empire. On their return voyages, the Madras-based ships usually returned to their home port, while the others would sail for the subcontinent’s west coast. For example, the Boone , a ship owned by the former Bombay president Charles Boone, made voyages to Guangzhou using this same pattern in 1723, 1724, and 1725 (see Appendix 4). 97

By about 1730, Madras’ pre-eminence among the British company’s factories in Asia had passed; Bengal had replaced it as the most important centre for both British company

97 Timothy Davies’ use of private account books held by the British National Archives shows that Charles Boone was a regular investor in China voyages prior to 1721, when the extant detailed records of the company’s trade in Guangzhou begin. The Boone sailed to China in 1719, but does not appear to have used Madras as its jumping off point, as it is not mentioned arriving or departing in Fort St. George’s diary for 1719. See Davies, “British Private Trade Networks,” pp. 124 – 125; and Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book, 1719 (Madras: Superintendent, Government Press, 1930). 175

and private trade in Asia. 98 However, Calcutta did not become a central node for trade between India and the Qing empire. Between 1720 and 1740, only four private ships sailed directly from Bengal to China, and the diarists in Guangzhou indicate that only one of these planned to sail directly back to its home port. Part of the reason for this lack of a sustained connection between Bengal and the Qing empire was geographic. The Ostend company’s anonymous informant who wrote the treatise on the trade from Bengal around 1730 explains that it was difficult for ships from Bengal to make the round trip voyage to Guangzhou in less than a year because of the monsoon cycles. Even those who did make it usually lost their passage for the next season. This was because ships returning from the Melaka straits typically could not arrive in Bengal before the end of February, which did not allow enough time to refit them for the southern monsoon in the spring. 99 The other obstacle was economic. In terms of exports supplied and imports demanded, Bengal was far more similar to China than any other part of South Asia. Its main export goods were silks, raw and wrought, finished cotton textiles, saltpetre, and opium. 100 In the early eighteenth century, southern China’s opium problem had not yet taken root, and the rest were products that were also produced within the Qing empire. The imports that both markets demanded were also much alike. Chief amongst these was silver, which was in greater demand in Bengal than anywhere else in the subcontinent. 101 In the first half of the eighteenth century, the Dutch and British companies also imported pepper and a variety of Southeast Asian tropical goods (sandalwood, ivory, and tin among other things), which were exactly the same types of merchandise that the Qing merchants were carrying back to Guangzhou and Xiamen in the same period. 102 The outbound China cargoes simply held relatively little interest for the Bengal market, and vice versa. The anonymous Ostend informant lists only zinc, copper, vermillion, and quicksilver as Chinese products marketable in Bengal, and these could generally be had through Bengal’s coastal trade with Madras and Bombay. 103

By the mid-1730s, Bombay, rather than Bengal, had replaced Madras as the centre for British trade between South Asia and the Qing empire. It is beyond the scope of this

98 Marshall, “Private British Trade,” p. 288. 99 Memoirs for the Trade from Bengal to several ports of India,’ FelixArchief, Antwerp, Generale Indische of Ostendse Compagnie, Varia I. 1720-1734, 24.Richtlijnen voor Bengalen wat de vrachten en beheer van de Moorse bestuur betreft. Rapport over de handel van Bengalen naar verschillende havens in India, unnumbered. 100 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company , pp. 54 – 65. 101 Prasannan Parthasarathi has recently claimed that India was China’s equal as a silver sink in the early modern world, but during the second half of the eighteenth century only Bengal actually appears to have been as important a destination for silver brought by Europeans via the Cape of Good Hope as China. Prasannan Parthasarathi, Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not: Global Economic Divergence, 1600 – 1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 46 – 50; Sushil Chaudhury, Companies, Commerce and Merchants: Bengal in the Pre-Colonial Era (New Delhi: Manhohar, 2015), chap. 16; and Memoirs for the Trade from Bengal to several ports of India,’ FelixArchief, Antwerp, Generale Indische of Ostendse Compagnie, Varia I. 1720-1734, 24.Richtlijnen voor Bengalen wat de vrachten en beheer van de Moorse bestuur betreft. Rapport over de handel van Bengalen naar verschillende havens in India, unnumbered. 102 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company , p. 54. 103 Memoirs for the Trade from Bengal to several ports of India,’ FelixArchief, Antwerp, Generale Indische of Ostendse Compagnie, Varia I. 1720-1734, 24.Richtlijnen voor Bengalen wat de vrachten en beheer van de Moorse bestuur betreft. Rapport over de handel van Bengalen naar verschillende havens in India, unnumbered. 176

chapter to explore the evolution of the relationship beyond the 1730s, but to conclude this section will offer a few points on the shift from Madras to Bombay. Madras, it should be emphasised, did not cease to be an important hub linking Guangzhou and South Asia, but it was primarily through the perseverance of the Macanese rather than the British private merchants that the link was sustained. In 1733, the Fort St. George council began attempting to ‘rationalise’ private trade in their port (with approval from London) by taking control of the organisation of voyages to China to prevent over-trading in the various Asian markets that British private merchants operated in.104 In 1734 and 1735, the council did not organise any voyages to the Qing empire, and gave an explanation in their consultation. In part, they claimed, the decision not to send a ship to Guangzhou was because of the lack of tin and pepper then available in Madras, and because the last company ship to sail from Madras to China and back had received very poor rates for her outbound cargo. But the other large problem, according to them, was that Macanese ships in recent years had imported such large quantities of cargo from the Qing empire that the Coromandel market was still flooded. 105

Bombay’s presidency in the meantime had re-invented their island centre as an intra- Asian trade hub, taking advantage of the decline in both Goa and Surat as the Marathas carved into former coastal possessions of the Estado and invaded the Gujarati countryside. 106 Some credit for the improvement of trade in the western presidency must go to Charles Boone, who consciously began plotting to make it imitate Madras’ commercial success after he assumed his office in 1715. 107 He appears to have been largely successful, as it was from about the time of his tenure that private British merchants began to infiltrate the trading systems that had previously been dominated by Surat’s Muslim community, especially their westward trading routes. The expansion of Bombay’s trade into the western Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea regions may have provided them with new markets for the Chinese goods that were being brought back on the increasingly frequent voyages of Bombay’s private ships. John Scattergood in 1722 chose to send Chinaware to Bombay and tea to Surat, so there were evident demands for Chinese goods in north-west India and in markets connected to it through country trade. 108 Consequently by the late 1720s, Bombay was sharing the British private trade to China about equally with Madras, and by 1734, it dominated it (see Appendix 4).

Finally the last group of merchants to join the growing direct trade between the Indian subcontinent and the Qing empire were the French merchants in Asia who were

104 Watson, Foundation for Empire , pp. 128 – 129. See also Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book, 1733, p. 123. 105 Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book, 1735, p. 68. 106 Furber, Rival Empires , pp. 134 – 135; and Gupta, Indian Merchants , p. 8. 107 Davies, “British Private Trade Networks,” pp. 85 – 86. 108 “Transcripts, etc., of papers of John Scattergood (1681-1723),” BL, Add MS 43732, vol. III, f. 238. On Gujarat’s tea habit, see J. Ovington, A Voyage to Surat in the Year, 1689 (London, 1696), p. 306; and William Symson, A New Voyage to the East-Indies (London, 1715), pp. 48 – 49. 177

mostly based out of Pondicherry, a city south of Madras on the Coromandel Coast. Neglected by the French government and the various ephemeral French East India companies that existed during the first two decades of the eighteenth century, Pondicherry finally revived under the management of the Compagnie des Indes in the early 1720s. This new company allowed private merchants to organise intra-Asian country voyages beginning in 1722, except to Guangzhou and Mocha. From 1723 to 1727, all the ventures made to the Qing empire from Pondicherry were organised by the company. But from 1728 on, the company refocused its resources primarily on Europe-China voyages, and left the Pondicherry-Guangzhou route to private merchants in India. 109 Between them, the company and private merchants managed to send a ship to either Guangzhou or Macau almost annually between 1723 and 1740 (see Table 5.9 below).

Table 5.9. French intra-Asian trading voyages to China, 1723 - 1740 Year Name Tonnage Origin Destination Additional reference 1723 St. François Pondicherry Guangzhou

1724 St. Joseph 500 Pondicherry Guangzhou IOR/G/12/25, p. 6 1725 St. Louis Pondicherry Macau 1726 Pondichéry Pondicherry Macau? 1727 St. Pierre 250 Pondicherry Guangzhou IOR/G/12/26, p. 19 1729 Argonaut 600 Mauritius Guangzhou IOR/G/12/28, p. 55 1730 Thalante 550 Mauritius Guangzhou IOR/G/12/30, p. 34 1733 ? Madras Guangzhou? 1734 ? Macau Machilipatnam 1736 St. Benoit 500 Pondicherry Guangzhou IOR/G/12/40, p. 93 1738 St. Benoit 500 Pondicherry Guangzhou 1739 St. Benoit 500 Pondicherry Guangzhou IOR/G/12/47, p. 16 1739 St. Dominique Madras Guangzhou IOR/G/12/46, p. 23

1740 St. Pierre Pondicherry Guangzhou IOR/G/12/48, p. 54 Source: Catherine Manning, Fortunes a Faire: The French in Asian Trade, 1719 – 48 (Aldershot: Variorium, 1996), p. 236.

Pondicherry’s community of traders were late comers to a system in which the merchants of Surat, Macau, Madras, and Bombay were entrenched. Like the other groups, they benefited from the same advantages that accrued from the changes to Asia’s trading network that were happening in the early eighteenth century. As with Madras, their centre sat on the Coromandel Coast and had easy access to the western Malay peninsula from which tin, sappanwood, and other tropical goods could be collected for the Chinese market. They were also able to tap into the network that Madras had already established and acquire

109 Manning, Fortunes a Faire , pp. 184 – 185. 178

Southeast Asian goods through it for their China-bound cargoes, especially in the 1730s after most private British trade to Guangzhou through Madras had ceased. 110

As well, Pondicherry benefited from the increasing availability of silver in Europe and subsequently in India. According to Catherine Manning, this was crucial after 1727 because the French private merchants in Pondicherry were not well-capitalised enough to maintain a foothold in the silver-hungry Chinese market without constant injections of specie from investors in France. 111 But with a Bourbon king on the Spanish throne and strong trade between France and Spain, both the French company and numerous private investors had even easier access to American silver than the British did during the long peace between the wars of Spanish and Austrian succession. For the duration of the peace, French private traders therefore had consistently good access to silver for their operations in Asia, and their ships joined the growing fleet at Huangpu almost every year.

Conclusions This chapter has provided an outline of the development of trade between the Qing empire and South Asia in the early eighteenth century. Its central proposition is that after the development of the China-based trading network in Southeast Asia in the late seventeenth century, the most important routes Chinese goods took from the western Pacific to the Indian Ocean were indirect ones through Ayutthaya and Johor. Though some merchant groups in South Asia, the British in Madras primarily, sent direct voyages to the Qing empire through the first decade of the eighteenth century the momentum of the China-based merchants’ system kept a steady flow of Chinese goods available in Ayutthaya and Johor and their subordinate distribution centres for South Asian merchants to collect. Indirect trade therefore was a more reliable and probably more important means of carrying the Qing empire’s merchandise to Chinese markets up until the second decade of the eighteenth century.

This situation changed in the years between 1715 and 1722 for a number of reasons. The most immediate were problems affecting trade in the two Southeast Asian emporia. Ayutthaya suffered under the influence of an aggressively self-interested phrakhlang , while Johor fell to foreign invaders. Making matters worse for those who had relied upon the old system, the Kangxi emperor banned China-based trade in Southeast Asia in 1716, and the emporia and the supply chains that linked them to other centres were temporarily broken, giving outside groups the opportunity to increase their participation in various parts of the suddenly moribund network. Meanwhile, Europe’s East India companies took advantage of the peace following the conclusion of the War of Spanish Succession to import larger

110 Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book, 1739, p. 98. 111 Manning, Fortunes a Faire , pp. 186 – 187. See also Philippe Haudrère, “The French India Company and its trade in the eighteenth century,” in Merchants, Companies and Trade: Europe and Asia in the Early Modern Era , ed. Sushil Chaudhury and Michel Morineau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 202. 179 volumes of silver, which were then used to capitalise the expansion of intra-Asian trading ventures.

Taking advantage of these changes to greater or lesser degrees were Abdul Ghafur’s organisation in Surat, Macau’s merchant community, Madras’ private British merchant community and later Bombay’s, and finally the French enclave of Pondicherry. Together they guaranteed that there were usually at least several large ships hauling cargo from the Pearl River delta back to South Asia every year beginning in the early 1720s. From this time forward it is almost certain that the direct trade link forged by these disparate merchant groups had surpassed the indirect system, even after the Kangxi’s ban ceased to be enforced in 1723.

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Conclusions

To conclude, it will be useful to revisit the major claims advanced by this study, and to suggest several possible avenues for future research. The first and most central argument this dissertation makes is that by the late 1680s, the trading network operated by Chinese merchants was radically different than the one that had existed in the mid seventeenth century up until 1674. The Zheng family, who had a near monopoly on China’s foreign maritime trade for much of the seventeenth century, relied primarily on an exchange of Chinese silk and cotton for Japanese copper and silver in Nagasaki and American silver in Manila between the 1640s and early 1670s, while only investing marginally and irregularly in trade with Southeast Asia. After 1684, the post-Zheng trading network continued to link China to Japan and Luzon, but it quickly incorporated Southeast Asia as a major component as well. The decade from 1673 to 1683 was an intermediate period between these two systems. In it the followers of the Taiwan-based Zheng family were forced to begin expanding into Southeast Asia because their access to most Chinese goods was severed during the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories, and they needed alternative sources of cargo for their Japan and Luzon-bound ships.

Like most other modern studies of Qing-era Chinese maritime activity, this dissertation sees the Kangxi emperor’s legalisation of trade in 1684 as a turning point. It however attempts to describe the transition from the Zheng family’s system in the 1670s and early 1680s to the one operated by Chinese merchants based on the Qing empire’s coasts after the legalisation in greater detail than any previous study has done. Essentially its argument is that the 1684 legalisation, along with China’s economic recovery after the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories, prompted a surge in investment by Chinese entrepreneurs in foreign trade; this is evident in the immediate spike in the numbers of ships arriving in Nagasaki and Manila beginning in 1685. However, the merchants soon realised that they would not all be able to rely solely on trade in Japan and Luzon to turn a profit. For different reasons these markets could only supply finite amounts of silver and copper each year, and in both cases the availability of these metals was far less than the aggregate demand amongst the China-based merchants who arrived to trade in their ports during the first few years after the 1684 legalisation.

By about 1689, the need to expand the system beyond Luzon and Japan was apparent to all, and consequently a large number of the China-based merchants began choosing to trade their merchandise in Southeast Asian markets for locally produced goods. No precise guide to the organisation of their trade in the region has been left to us, so to reconstruct the new network it is necessary to rely on many small bits of evidence from which it can be pieced together. Some important parts of the system, such as Batavia and Ayutthaya, are obvious because of the relative abundance of surviving records relating to

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trade in those places. The roles of other major Southeast Asian ports, such as Johor and Banjarmasin, are much more shadowy though, and it is only through the occasional and usually laconic descriptions left to us by travellers that we can get a sense of their importance.

When all the available evidence examined in this study is taken together, it suggests that the China-based merchants focussed their business in several major trading centres across the region. Relatively close to China were Pho Hien and Hoi An in the Trinh and Nguyen lords’ territories. These places served primarily as emporia for the domains of their rulers, which were extensive and populous by Southeast Asian standards, and for the interior of Indochina where many tropical commodities demanded by the Chinese market were produced. Further afield, the China-based merchants found coastal hubs that were already commercially connected to many other smaller markets within their sub-regions. The dissertation identifies five ports that acted as hubs connecting the China-based merchants’ trunk-lines to smaller markets through sub-regional ‘spoke’ routes. Ayutthaya was the capital of Siam, and served as the hub for that kingdom and the northern Malay peninsula. The capital centre of the kingdom of Johor on the southern tip of the Malay peninsula was the hub for the Melaka straits sub-region, including the southern part of the peninsula and western Sumatra. Banjarmasin, a pepper producing sultanate in Borneo, was the centre of trade for the southern part of that island, and was connected to Makassar on Sulawesi as well. Manila, the capital of the Spanish colonial dominion in the Philippine islands and the terminal port for the silver-bearing galleons from Acapulco, was also a hub for the rest of the Philippines, northern Borneo, and the Sulu islands. Through Maguindanao on Mindanao, it was also linked to Ternate, Tidore, and the other Maluku islands. Finally the Dutch VOC’s Asian headquarters in Batavia redirected Chinese trade goods both to Europe on the company’s ships, and to many other centres in the Indonesian archipelago that the company had establishments in as well.

The dissertation also investigates the macroeconomic impact of the development of this trading network in Southeast Asia. It concludes that there was a reorientation of the region’s existing trading patterns towards the Qing empire. In the case of trade between Southeast Asia and Japan, there was a decline in the number of direct trading voyages between the two regions beginning in the late 1680s, while at the same time there was a growth in the amount of indirect Southeast Asian-Japanese trade carried by Qing merchants and channelled through Chinese ports. The extent of the economic impact that the new trading network had in Southeast Asia can be gauged by the influence it had on European trade in the region. The agents of the English and Dutch East India companies frequently complained that they were outcompeted by China-based merchants in various parts of Southeast Asia where they had been able to operate with relative ease before the 1680s. The China-based merchants offered Chinese goods, which seem to have been in demand in almost every Southeast Asian market, and this reduced the European companies’ ability to trade their merchandise for locally produced Southeast Asian goods. The Dutch company also attempted to regulate maritime trade through much of the Indonesian archipelago, but

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the sudden appearance of Chinese goods in significant quantities appears to have undermined its efforts by encouraging the establishment of alternative trade routes beyond Dutch control.

Finally, the trading network served as the most important mechanism connecting the Qing empire to the trading world of the Indian Ocean between 1684 and about 1720. Some South Asian-based merchants, primarily Muslims in Surat and Englishmen in Madras, sailed directly between their homeports and Chinese ones during this period, but the more important conduits were probably the emporia of Ayutthaya and Johor. Both of these centres redirected Chinese goods towards the Indian Ocean, either by relaying them to sub- regional centres that were frequented by South Asian merchant ships, such as Mergui and Aceh, or by acting as open ports where both South Asian and China-based merchants could meet one another. Between about 1715 and 1725, a combination of factors prompted a shift in the balance of trade between the two types of routes in favour of the direct ones. Johor and Ayutthaya became less attractive destinations for South Asian ships because of political changes within their sub-regions, while a short ban on China-based traders sailing to Southeast Asia between 1718 and 1723 gave a number of different merchant groups an incentive to begin trading directly. Besides these circumstances, the end of the War of Spanish Succession in Europe also increased the availability of silver to European companies and private merchants in South Asia, and this helped finance more frequent intra-Asian trading voyages, including and especially those to the Qing empire.

Having summarised the basic arguments that this dissertation makes, it seems only reasonable to acknowledge some of its limitations and suggest a few possible avenues that future research seeking to advance our knowledge of the subject might take. The first and probably most obvious strategy for creating a sequel to this story would be to push it forward in time and investigate how well the China-based merchants’ network held up against environmental shocks in the increasingly globalised economy of the eighteenth century. The dominance of China-based or joint Qing-overseas Chinese shipping between the Qing empire and Southeast Asia survived until the last few decades of the eighteenth century, 1 but in its twilight the network appears to have been quite a different creature than it had been in 1717. In Batavia, the volume of Qing shipping slumped after 1740 when the VOC’s administration committed a large scale massacre of the city’s Chinese residents, and it never fully recovered its old vitality. 2 Perhaps partly because of Batavia’s decline and the China-based merchants’ decision to take their business elsewhere, Johor did regain some of its former importance as a trading hub under Bugis rule after the dark days of the 1720s. By the 1760s it had become a common meeting point for Qing and South Asian-based merchants, and so managed to restore some fraction of the old indirect trade between the

1 Paul A. Van Dyke, “Operational Efficiencies and the Decline of the Chinese Junk Trade in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: The Connection,” in Shipping and Economic Growth, 1350 – 1850 , ed. Richard W. Unger (Leiden: Brill, 2011). 2 Leonard Blussé, Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women, and the Dutch in VOC Batavia (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1988), pp. 140 – 153. 183

two regions.3 Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, new centres began to enjoy direct trading voyages from Qing ports, and perhaps some of these became new hubs as well. Ships from Xiamen began to sail directly to Makassar on Sulawesi in 1746 and continued to arrive intermittently through the remainder of the century as the VOC’s management vacillated over whether or not to allow them. 4 In the 1760s and the 1770s, British merchants also noted that Brunei and the Sulu islands, distant satellites of Manila or Maguindanao at the beginning of the century, were then receiving their own annual fleets of Qing ships. 5 Clearly the structure of the system did not cease to evolve after it was restored following the practical end of the Kangxi’s Southeast Asian ban in 1723, but the process of this evolution after the ban has never been systematically examined to the knowledge of the present author.

A second trajectory could take the story of exported Chinese trade goods farther in space as well as time. The final chapter of this dissertation does not venture west of Gujarat, largely limiting its analysis to Madras’ role as the original hub for direct Qing-South Asian trade, and consequently only touches on its gradual loss of this function to Bombay in the 1730s. However, as early as the turn of the eighteenth century there was reportedly a thriving market for Chinese porcelain in the Maldives, 6 and it also supposedly fetched good prices in the Persian port of Bandar Abbas. 7 After Bombay became a central node for direct trade between the subcontinent and Guangzhou, it is certain that porcelain, tea, zinc, vermillion, and other Qing goods were leaking into Persia and the Ottoman empire through the western presidency’s country trade routes to the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. 8 An indirect proof of the significant size of this commerce can be found in the observations of a bemused British navy midshipman who landed on the island of St. Mary’s off the coast of Madagascar in 1722, and found there piles of Chinese porcelain discarded by pirates who had formerly used the island as a base to prey upon ships sailing between Surat and the Red Sea.9 Though this and many other scraps of evidence that historians of the Indian Ocean world have found demonstrate that in the eighteenth century Chinese goods were flowing into African and western Asian markets, the history of their consumption there remains yet unchartered water.

3 Dianne Lewis, “Growth of the Country Trade to the Straits of Malacca, 1760 – 1777,” Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 43, no. 2 (1970): 118. 4 Gerrit Knaap and Heather Sutherland, Monsoon Traders: Ships, Skippers and Commodities in Eighteenth-Century Makassar (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004), pp. 145 – 149. 5 Thomas Forrest, A Voyage to New Guinea, and the Moluccas, from Balambangan (Dublin, 1779), pp. 405 – 406; and Alexander Dalrymple, A Plan for Extending the Commerce of this Kingdom and of the East India Company (London, 1769), pp. 16, 82. See also James F. Warren, “Sino-Sulu Trade in the Late Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” Philippine Studies 25, no. 1 (1877): 51. 6 William Symson, A New Voyage to the East-Indies (London, 1715), p. 189. 7 Charles Lockyer, An Account of the Trade in India (London, 1711), p. 127. 8 The VOC was already carrying porcelain and tea to Persia in the 1690s. Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn, Laurens Pijl, Isaac de Saint-Martin, Dirk de Haas, Abraham van Riebeeck, Wouter Valckenier, Joannes Cops, Manuel Bornezee, Wybrand Lycochthon, Joachim Nieustadt, and Willem van Wijngaerden, November 30, 1694, in Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII Der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie , ed. W. Ph. Coolhaas, vol. 5 ('s Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), p. 688. 9 Ryan Holroyd, “Whatever happened to those villains of the Indian seas? The happy retirement of the Madagascar pirates, 1698 – 1721,” International Journal of Maritime History 29, no. 4 (2017): 753. 184

The last and potentially most interesting path beyond this dissertation’s conclusions would be an investigation that looks in greater depth at the ways in which the Qing era China-based trading network influenced Southeast Asian economies. This study has only traced the structure of the trading networks that delivered Chinese goods across maritime Asia and demonstrated their penetration into Southeast Asian markets. It does not attempt to explain what this meant for the macroeconomic relationships between the different Southeast Asian economies and the Qing empire’s. But if we were to look closer at the effects that these systems of exchange had on the societies of both regions, perhaps a greater significance for the destiny of Southeast Asia might be found in the history of Chinese trade.

It seems quite possible to this author that in the post-1684 world, in which regular asymmetrical exchanges were taking place between the Qing economy and many much smaller Southeast Asian ones, there was a development of core-periphery relationships that were at least roughly analogous to those Immanuel Wallerstein has posited for his world- systems models. Economic historians of early modern Asia, in their rush to discover the means and moment of Asia’s incorporation into a Europe-centred capitalist ‘world-economy’ (or to deny it happened at all), have paid little attention to the possibility that there may have been other types of world-economies developing in parallel.10 Wallerstein himself rejects the possibility of parallel Asian capitalist world-economies because the largest early modern Asian states lacked what in his view were the crucial ingredients, namely merchant-controlled manufacturing industries and political systems that had shared interests with those of the merchant class.11 But even if we reject the notion of a nascent Asian capitalist world- economy, there is no compelling reason not to consider the possibility that long distance trade caused unequal structural economic relationships to evolve between the Qing empire and other parts of Asia. We might even be bold enough to go further and suggest that these manifested as a core and peripheral region, mirroring in discrete ways other better studied contemporaneous asymmetrical relationships, such as that between western Europe and the Caribbean. 12 It is the present author’s hope that this dissertation will help to provide some basis for future investigations of the maritime worlds of the early modern western Pacific that will deepen our understandings of the region’s interconnections and perhaps begin to test some of these hypotheses as well.

10 For overviews of the literature on the historical macro-economic relationships between Europe and Asia, see Marcus Vink, “A match made in Heaven? World-system Analysis and ‘Dutch Indian Ocean’ Studies, in Rivalry and Conflict: European Traders and Asian Trading Networks in the 16 th and 17 th Centuries , ed. Ernst van Veen and Leonard Blussé (Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2005); and P. W. Klein, “The China Seas and the World Economy between the Sixteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: the Changing Structures of Trade,” in Interactions in the World Economy: Perspectives from International Economic History , ed. Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich (New York: New York University Press, 1989). 11 Ravi Arvind Palat and Immanuel Wallerstein, “Of what world-system was pre-1500 ‘India’ a part?” in Merchants, Companies and Trade: Europe and Asia in the Early Modern Era , ed. Sushil Chaudhury and Michel Morineau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 38 – 40. 12 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World- Economy, 1600 – 1750 (New York: Academic Press, 1980), chap. 4. 185

Appendix A. Notes on masses, currencies, and dates

Masses

1 kanme 貫目 = 3.75 kg 1

1 jin 斤/catty = 0.6 kg

1 dan 擔/picul = 60 kg 2

1 liang 兩/tael = 37.5 g 3

1 last = ~2 metric tons 4

For the size and capacities of ships, this dissertation retains the old style tonnage measurements used at the time. 5 Because the ‘tonnage’ of ships in the period covered by this dissertation was only a rough estimate of its deadweight capacity, and because the modern metric tonne is close to equivalent to the long ton (1 long ton = 1.016 tonne), the dissertation continues to refer to the capacity of ships in terms of ‘tons’ throughout this.

Currencies

1 peso = 8 tomines /reales = 96 granos

1 peso = 5 English shillings= 0.25 English pounds

1 peso = 0.75 liang 兩/tael 6

1 peso = 6.67 rijksdaalders 7

1 Robert LeRoy Innes, “The Door Ajar: Japan’s Foreign Trade in the Seventeenth Century” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 1980), p. 6. 2 Endymion Wilkinson, Chinese History: A New Manual (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2013), p. 560. 3 Richard von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000 – 1700 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p. 233. 4 George Bryan Souza, The Survival of Empire: Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630 – 1754 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. xvi. 5 See Peter Kemp, ed., The Oxford Companion to Ships & the Sea (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 876, for a description of the historical use of the term “tonnage” when applied to ships. 6 K. N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660 - 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 471. 186

Dates

All dates in the text have been converted to the ‘new style’ Gregorian calendar, which during the period covered in this thesis was ten days in advance of the ‘old style’ Julian calendar used by the English at that time. Also according to the Gregorian calendar, January 1 is considered New Year’s Day throughout. Old style Julian calendar dates have been preserved in the citations of English documents. For ease of comparison, Japanese and Chinese dates have been converted to the Gregorian new style as well.

7 Souza, The Survival of Empire, p. xvi. 187

Appendix B. Non-Spanish ships arriving in Luzon, 1680-1701

Categories Totals Date of Arrival Origin Captain/ Almoarifazgo Reference (Year.Month.Day) Owner (Pesos )

Ships from 1680.3.26 China Quiunco 505.76 AGI, Filipinas, China, 12, R.1, N.38 1680 1680.3.3 China Jabcua 610.15 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1680.4.6 China Tianqua 604.2 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1680.4.21 Guangdong Quecua 695.7 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1680.4.26 Guangdong Quincua 559.5 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 Subtotal 2975.31 Ships from 1680.7.23 Cambodia Antonio 116.92 AGI, Filipinas, Southeast Palla de Lima 12, R.1, N.38 Asia, 1680 1680.8.4 Banten Macu de 768.24 AGI, Filipinas, Naina 12, R.1, N.38 (Moro) 1680? Calamian Juan de 839.97 AGI, Filipinas, Islands [?] Salomon 12, R.1, N.38 (Armenio)

Subtotal 1725.13 Ships from 1680.8.10 Surat Maradma 1714.95 AGI, Filipinas, South Asia, Damin 12, R.1, N.38 1680 (Moro) 1680.9.3 Madras Juan 886.5 AGI, Filipinas, Dominguez 12, R.1, N.38 (Armenio) 1680.9.6 Madras Franco 1295.54 AGI, Filipinas, Carniero 12, R.1, N.38 1680.9.13 Surat Esteuan de 1294.08 AGI, Filipinas, Marcara 12, R.1, N.38 (Armenio) Subtotal 5191.07 1680 9891.51 Total

Ships from 1681.1.8 Taiwan Alisiqua 383.4 AGI, Filipinas, China, 1681 (Sangley) 12, R.1, N.38 1681.2.3 Taiwan Chemqua 349.79 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1681.2.3 Taiwan Sengua 494.4 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1681.3.8 Taiwan Anqua 568.55 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1681.5.10 Taiwan Hiqua 419.09 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1681.6.1 Guangdong Antoni Nieto 1013.79 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1681.6.11 Guangdong Yqua 988.42 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38

188

Subtotal 4217.44 Ships from 1681.8.23 Banten Sundana 1057.2 AGI, Filipinas, Southeast (Moro) 12, R.1, N.38 Asia, 1681 1681.9.10 Siam Juan Bentura 0 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 Subtotal 1057.2 Ships from 1681.6.1 Coromandel Thomas 400.79 AGI, Filipinas, South Asia, Nunez de 12, R.1, N.38 1681 Luarca 1681.6.11 Coromandel Manuel 668.4 AGI, Filipinas, Madera 12, R.1, N.38 1681.6.11 Madras Juan Paez 1405.5 AGI, Filipinas, and Manuel 12, R.1, N.38 Rivero 1681.6.25 Coromandel Marcos 672 AGI, Filipinas, Raposo 12, R.1, N.38 1681.6.27 Porto Novo Franco Milan 540 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1681.9.5 Porto Novo Comorazo 468 AGI, Filipinas, Ami 12, R.1, N.38 1681.9.10 Madras Franco Brito 801.52 AGI, Filipinas, Correa 12, R.1, N.38 1681.9.13 Coromandel Nina (Moro) 840 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1681.9.22 Madras Baltazar 424.2 AGI, Filipinas, Pablo 12, R.1, N.38 1681.9.24 Porto Novo Fano 598.79 AGI, Filipinas, Marcana 12, R.1, N.38 Subtotal 6819.2 1681 12093.84 Total

Ships from 1682.2.8 Taiwan Taunio 300 AGI, Filipinas, China, 12, R.1, N.38 1682 1682.2.20 Desioqua 500 AGI, Filipinas, (Sangley) 12, R.1, N.38 1682.2.26 Taiwan Cambal 502.71 AGI, Filipinas, Sanqua 12, R.1, N.38 1682.4.15 Taiwan Juanqua 450 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1682.5.8 Guangdong Suasia 800 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 Subtotal 2552.71 Ships from 1682.8.25 Nguyen Aisonqua 300 AGI, Filipinas, Southeast Domain (Sangley) 12, R.1, N.38 Asia, 1682 Subtotal 300 Ships from 1682.6.15 Porto Novo Juan 700 AGI, Filipinas, South Asia, Domingo 12, R.1, N.38 1682 (Armenio) 1682.7.3 Madras Franco 900 AGI, Filipinas, Carneiro 12, R.1, N.38 1682.7.21 Surat Maral Mud 900 AGI, Filipinas, (Moro) 12, R.1, N.38 1682.8.5 Surat Cabers 1000 AGI, Filipinas, Masamit 12, R.1, N.38 (Moro)

189

1682.9.15 Porto Novo Juan de Leon 402 AGI, Filipinas, y Menezes 12, R.1, N.38 1682.9.17 Madras Fenrnando 600 AGI, Filipinas, de Torrez 12, R.1, N.38 1682.9.17 Madras Manuel 1400 AGI, Filipinas, Rivero and 12, R.1, N.38 Juan Paez 1682.9.17 Madras Manuel 300 AGI, Filipinas, Madera 12, R.1, N.38 1682.9.25 Madras Domingo de 500 AGI, Filipinas, Luzarral 12, R.1, N.38 Subtotal 6002 1682 8854.71 Total

Ships from 1683.6.30 Taiwan Ayuqua 320 AGI, Filipinas, China, 12, R.1, N.38 1683 1683.7.27 Taiwan Tianqua 310 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 Subtotal 630 Ships from 1683.12.16 Madras Joachim de 400.04 AGI, Filipinas, South Asia, Iguia 12, R.1, N.38 1683 Subtotal 400.04 Ships from 1683.8.7 Japan Chansia 310 AGI, Filipinas, Elsewhere, 12, R.1, N.38 1683 1683.8.7 Japan 500 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1683.9.17 Macau Joseph 900 AGI, Filipinas, Gomez 12, R.1, N.38 1683.9.20 Macau Juan Bautista 1000 AGI, Filipinas, Pereira 12, R.1, N.38 Subtotal 2710 1683 3740.04 Total

Ships from 1684.6.3 Taiwan Tiongnio 300 AGI, Filipinas, China, 12, R.1, N.38 1684 1684.6.3 Xiamen Poqua 100 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1684.7.13 Taiwan Anguan 200 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1684.7.13 Taiwan Penqua 100 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1684.12.21 China Baqua 1500 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1684.12.27 China Poqua 491.21 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 Subtotal 2691.21 Ships from 1684.3.13 Nguyen Moqua 400 AGI, Filipinas, Southeast Domain (Sangley) 12, R.1, N.38 Asia, 1684 1684.3.22 Siam Fray Estuan 250 AGI, Filipinas, de Sovsa 12, R.1, N.38 1684.9.15 Siam Quenqua 250 AGI, Filipinas, (Sangley) 12, R.1, N.38

190

1684.10.12 Macassar Casen 250 AGI, Filipinas, (Moro) 12, R.1, N.38 Subtotal 1150 Ships from 1684.1.10 Bengal Baltazar 425 AGI, Filipinas, South Asia, Pablo 12, R.1, N.38 1684 (Armenio) 1684.2.4 Madras Lopez de 450 AGI, Filipinas, Guesuara 12, R.1, N.38 1684.3.24 Madras Domingo de 400 AGI, Filipinas, Suzarral 12, R.1, N.38 1684.10.7 Coromandel Phelipe 300 AGI, Filipinas, Matheo de 12, R.1, N.38 Nazron (Armenio) 1684.10.10 Surat Samin 1100 AGI, Filipinas, (Moro) 12, R.1, N.38 1684.10.22 Madras Lopez de 450 AGI, Filipinas, Grebara 12, R.1, N.38 Dueno 1684.9.8 Madras Franco 1000 AGI, Filipinas, Mendez and 12, R.1, N.38 Juan Paez 1684.9.27 Porto Novo Juan de Leon 600 AGI, Filipinas, y Menezes 12, R.1, N.38 1684.10.22 Pulicat Nacuden 1116 AGI, Filipinas, Naina 12, R.1, N.38 (Moro) Subtotal 5841 Ships from 1684.7.13 Japan Penqua 500 AGI, Filipinas, Elsewhere, 12, R.1, N.38 1684 1684.7.13 Japan Tengqua 200 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1684.7.29 Macau Juan Bautista 400 AGI, Filipinas, Pereira 12, R.1, N.38 Subtotal 1100 1684 10782.21 Total

Ships from 1685.1.11 China Pouqua 1700 AGI, Filipinas, China, 12, R.1, N.38 1685 1685.1.12 China Quenqua 1700 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1685.1.13 China Fencia 1400 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1685.1.27 China Muequa 602 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1685.1.29 China Senqua 1000 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1685.2.5 China Siongqua 108.32 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1685.2.14 China Suiqua 1200 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1685.3.30 China Fionqua 1200 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1685.4.4 China Ytaqua 266.6 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1685.4.5 China Hianco 200 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38

191

1685.4.16 China Tequa 2400 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1685.5.3 China Yonqua 561.58 AGI, Filipinas, 12, R.1, N.38 1685.5.15 “Jochu, ” Saqua 800 AGI, Filipinas, China 12, R.1, N.38 1685.12.4 Xiamen Moqua 931.79 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1685.12.5 Xiamen Goqua 1800 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1685.12.14 Xiamen Goqua 583.68 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1685.12.17 Xiamen Chonqua 595.27 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1685.12.20 Xiamen Leochua 1000 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1685.12.22 Xiamen Choqua 3000 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1685.12.23 Xiamen Hianqua 1293.13 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 Subtotal 22342.37 Ships 1685.7.5 Siam Soqua 51.79 AGI, Filipinas, From 13, R.1, N.14 Southeast Asia, 1685 1685.8.10 Siam Rodrigues 1000 AGI, Filipinas, Fator 13, R.1, N.14 Subtotal 1051.79 Ships from 1685.4.12 Coromandel Manuel 2500 AGI, Filipinas, South Asia, Madera 13, R.1, N.14 1685 1685.4.12 Coromandel Diego de 2500 AGI, Filipinas, Liuanes 12, R.1, N.38 1685.6.25 Bengal Antonio de la 480 AGI, Filipinas, Cruz 13, R.1, N.14 (Portuguese) 1685.8.7 Goa Manuel 480 AGI, Filipinas, Rodrigues de 13, R.1, N.14 Fonesca 1685.8.20 Surat Nacudur 3000 AGI, Filipinas, Daisit 13, R.1, N.14 (Moro) 1685.8.29 Coromandel Juan Lorengo 1000 AGI, Filipinas, (Spanish) 13, R.1, N.14 1685.9.3 Porto Novo Pedro Perez 2100 AGI, Filipinas, (Spanish) 13, R.1, N.14 1685. 9.20 Coromandel Juan de Leon 4000 AGI, Filipinas, y Meneses 13, R.1, N.14 1685.9.23 Coromandel Thomas Piris 5000 AGI, Filipinas, and Manuel 13, R.1, N.14 Gomes 1685.12.30 Coromandel Marcos 1200 AGI, Filipinas, Raposo 13, R.1, N.14 Subtotal 22260 1685 45654.16 Total

Ships from 1686.1.4 “Chanchui, ” Sinqua 597 AGI, Filipinas, China, in China 13, R.1, N.14 1686

192

1686.1.6 “Lamio, ” in Tochiqua 600 AGI, Filipinas, China 13, R.1, N.14 1686.1.13 Xiamen Foanqua 218.23 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1686.1.14 Xiamen Genqua 500 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1686.1.15 Xiamen Poqua 700 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1686.1.25 Xiamen Sonchoa 350 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1686.1.27 Xiamen Couya 149.19 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1686.1.28 “Juasia, ” in Chaqua 650 AGI, Filipinas, China 13, R.1, N.14 1686.2.5 Xiamen Quico 280.44 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1686.2.24 “Jochiu, ” in Pochitqua 2000 AGI, Filipinas, China 13, R.1, N.14 1686.3.29 Xiamen Jusia 251.31 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1686.4.1 Xiamen Chequa 800 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1686.4.3 Xiamen Vaqua 1200 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1686.4.7 Xiamen Tiqua 700 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1686.4.8 Xiamen Ynqua 700 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1686.4.10 Xiamen Yunqua 1000 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1686.4.10 Xiamen Ygnacio 558.63 AGI, Filipinas, Jagsulon 13, R.1, N.14 (Sangley) 1686.4.18 Xiamen Caqua 700 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1686.5.18 “Casiloe, ” in Yauca 1200 AGI, Filipinas, China 13, R.1, N.14 1686.6.5 Xiamen Fianqua 1200 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 Subtotal 14354.8 Ships from 1686.7.28 Madras Juan Raez 7100 AGI, Filipinas, South Asia, Gario y Pan 13, R.1, N.14 1686 1686.8.5 Surat Mahamat 6000 AGI, Filipinas, (Moro) 13, R.1, N.14 1686.9.8 Surat Vinason 3000 AGI, Filipinas, (Moro) 13, R.1, N.14 1686.9.8 Madras Batholomew 800 AGI, Filipinas, de y Barlesea 13, R.1, N.14 1686.9.10 Madras Pazqual de 4000 AGI, Filipinas, Gracia y 13, R.1, N.14 Nina (Moro) 1686.9.10 Porto Novo Domingo de 1500 AGI, Filipinas, Luzarral 13, R.1, N.14 1686.9.23 Porto Novo Francisco de 1100 AGI, Filipinas, Lima 13, R.1, N.14 Subtotal 23500 1686 37854.8 Total

193

Ships from 1687.2.20 Xiamen Poqua 1000 AGI, Filipinas, China, 13, R.1, N.14 1687 1687.2.25 Xiamen Tonqua 1400 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1687.3.12 Xiamen Couya 400 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1687.3.18 Xiamen Vacua 1850 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1687.4.10 Ningbo Juanqua 1400 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1687.4.12 “Songcan, ” Yangye 500 AGI, Filipinas, China 13, R.1, N.14 1687.4.12 Xiamen Govcua 1200 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1687.4.12 Xiamen Tenqua 500 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1687.4.16 Xiamen Vinco 400 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1687.4.17 “Anay, ” Boqua 600 AGI, Filipinas, China 13, R.1, N.14 1687.4.24 Chachia,' Fiongco 1000 AGI, Filipinas, China 13, R.1, N.14 1687.4.28 Foanchin,' Banca 700 AGI, Filipinas, China 13, R.1, N.14 Subtotal 10950 Ships 1687.4.17 Trinh Ignacio 600 AGI, Filipinas, From Domain Tagsulon 13, R.1, N.14 Southeast Asia, 1687 1687.6 Coast of Gaspar 220.91 AGI, Filipinas, Batavia Franco de 13, R.1, N.14 Sillva Subtotal 820.91 Ships from 1687.10.3 Surat Dauri (Moro) 2800 AGI, Filipinas, South Asia, 13, R.1, N.14 1687 Subtotal 2800 Ships from 1687.6.4 “Barrer ” Juan de 240 AGI, Filipinas, Elsewhere, Chauarua y 13, R.1, N.14 1687 Deue 1687.9.26 “Deciar ” Pedro 900 AGI, Filipinas, Gomes de la 13, R.1, N.14 Cueba 1687.9.26 “Novo Theodoro de 1100 AGI, Filipinas, Acargo” San Cucan 13, R.1, N.14 Subtotal 2240 1687 16810.91 Total

Ships 1688.1.10 China Chiqua 600 AGI, Filipinas, From 13, R.1, N.14 China, 1688 1688.1.23 Xiamen Tronqua 322.71 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1688.1.27 Xiamen Poceia 800 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14

194

1688.1.27 “Amio, ” Juanqua 3000 AGI, Filipinas, China 13, R.1, N.14 1688.4.1 Xiamen Chinqua 500 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1688.4.10 Xiamen Chinqua 211.51 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1688.4.24 Xiamen Chiqua 500 AGI, Filipinas, 13, R.1, N.14 1688.4.24 “Chanchuy, ” Chiuqua 600 AGI, Filipinas, in China 13, R.1, N.14 Subtotal 6534.22

Ships from 1693.6.2 Xiamen Anqua 24 AGI, Filipinas, China, 122, N.9 1693 Subtotal 24 Ships from 1693.10.24 Siam Niqueo 80 AGI, Filipinas, Southeast 122, N.9 Asia, 1693 1693.10.30 Siam Pedro 100 AGI, Filipinas, Simoes de 122, N.9 Caraullo Subtotal 180 Ships from 1693.11.23 Surat Abid Bula 2700 AGI, Filipinas, South Asia, 122, N.9 1693 1693.12.10 Madras Fernando 400 AGI, Filipinas, Manuel Tello 122, N.9 Subtotal 3100 1693 3304 Total

Ships from 1694.5.21 China Sonqua 150 AGI, Filipinas, China, 122, N.9 1694 1694.5.21 China Chuiqua 200 AGI, Filipinas, 122, N.9 1694.5.21 China Guancua 220 AGI, Filipinas, 122, N.9 1694.5.21 Siam Sipcua 200 AGI, Filipinas, 122, N.9 1694.6.4 China Sonqua 800 AGI, Filipinas, 122, N.9 1694.6.4 China Chequa 1200 AGI, Filipinas, 122, N.9 1694.6.4 China Longqua 1000 AGI, Filipinas, 122, N.9 1694.4.20 China Gacua 500 AGI, Filipinas, 122, N.9 1694.4.20 China Sonqua 3500 AGI, Filipinas, 122, N.9 Subtotal 7770 Ships from 1694.3.1 Cebu Fernando 419.9 AGI, Filipinas, Southeast (originally Joseph 122, N.9 Asia, 1694 China) 1694.6 Coast of Java Juan de 500 AGI, Filipinas, Abrio 122, N.9 Subtotal 919.9

195

Ships from 1694.6.3 Bengal Bernardo de 3500 AGI, Filipinas, South Asia, en Daya 122, N.9 1694 Cuyos Subtotal 3500 1694 12189.9 Total

Ships from 1698.5.13 China Boqua 4000 AGI, Filipinas, China, 163, N.85 1698 1698.5.13 China Bianqua 1200 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1698.5.13 China Banqua 1000 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1698.5.13 China Anqua 1100 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1698.5.13 China Chunqua 67.83 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1698.5.13 China Chanqua 366.54 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1698.5.13 China Saqua 398.7 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1698.5.13 China Siuqua 400.92 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1698.5.22 China Sinqua 800 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1698.5.27 Xiamen Linqua 3000 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1698.5.27 Xiamen Mouqua 200 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1698.6.3 China Chiqua 5000 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1698.6.3 China Chuanqua 5000 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1698.6.20 China Siunqua 1000 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1698.6.20 China Choqua 2000 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1698.6.20 China Totqua 159.83 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1698.6.20 China Chonqua 24.75 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1698.6.20 China Chiqua 18 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1698.6.27 China Choqua 4000 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1698.7.7 China Goaqua 88.96 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1698.7.7 China Suqua 377.44 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1698.10.14 Guangdong Imcia 8000 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 Subtotal 38202.97 Ships from 1698.1.11 Siam Bentura Dias 17 AGI, Filipinas, Southeast 163, N.85 Asia, 1698 1698.12.12 Semarang, Juan de 119.33 AGI, Filipinas, Java Abreo 163, N.85 1698.12.15 Coast of Java Domingo 79.94 AGI, Filipinas, Pinto 163, N.85

196

Subtotal 216.27 Ships from 1698.10.29 Coromandel Franco 1800 AGI, Filipinas, South Asia, Cardoso de 163, N.85 1698 Merado 1698.10.31 Coromandel Antonio 2200 AGI, Filipinas, Basconcelos 163, N.85 Cauallero 1698.12.1 Surat Dauchi 3000 AGI, Filipinas, (Moro) 163, N.85 1698.12.6 Surat Dandi 90 AGI, Filipinas, (Moro) 163, N.85 1698.12.9 Coromandel Domingo de 2000 AGI, Filipinas, a Costa 163, N.85 1698.12.16 Surat Rasidcan 1000 AGI, Filipinas, (Moro) 163, N.85 1698.12.19 Bengal Marcos 7000 AGI, Filipinas, David 163, N.85 1698.12.19 Coromandel Ignacio 2000 AGI, Filipinas, Marco 163, N.85 1698.12.24 Surat Rasidcan 1500 AGI, Filipinas, (Moro) 163, N.85 Subtotal 20590 Ships from 1698.9.23 Macau Diego Brito 2500 AGI, Filipinas, Elsewhere, 163, N.85 1698 1698.10.22 Macau Antonio de la 800 AGI, Filipinas, Cruz 163, N.85 Subtotal 3300 Total 62309.24

Ships from 1699.4.3 China Binqua 3000 AGI, Filipinas, China, 163, N.85 1699 1699.4.9 China Uqua 1500 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1699.4.11 China Junio 1500 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1699.4.11 China Sonqua 2000 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1699.4.28 China Diqua 18.25 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1699.5.27 Taiwan Conqua 10.79 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1699.6.10 Xiamen Goaqua 528.18 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1699.6.10 Xiamen Puanchay 30 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1699.6.10 “Sanjay, ” in Chanqua 730.2 AGI, Filipinas, China 163, N.85 1699.6.10 China Tonqua 5500 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1699.6.10 China Dinqua 5500 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1699.7.20 Xiamen Chioqua 4200 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1699.8.17 Guangdong Imcia 5500 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 Subtotal 30017.42

197

1699.8.30 Cambodia Sra. Del Pilar 180 AGI, Filipinas, y Santiago 163, N.85 1699.12.5 Jolo Jumica 60 AGI, Filipinas, (Sangley) 163, N.85 1699.12.14 Semarang, Juan de 95.75 AGI, Filipinas, Java Abreo 163, N.85 Subtotal 335.75 1699.8.26 Coromandel Miguel 2200 AGI, Filipinas, Gaspar 163, N.85 Franco 1699.12.1 Coromandel Franco 2500 AGI, Filipinas, Cardoso 163, N.85 1699.12.9 Surat Abdul Razul 5000 AGI, Filipinas, (Moro) 163, N.85 1699.12.17 Madras Juan Ruero 3000 AGI, Filipinas, de Coto 163, N.85 Subtotal 12700 1699.2.4 Macau Domingo de 45 AGI, Filipinas, Acosta 163, N.85 1699.6.22 Macau Antonio de la 1200 AGI, Filipinas, Cruz 163, N.85 1699.9.10 Macau Juan Riberos 300 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1699.9.23 Macau Domingo de 1000 AGI, Filipinas, Sela y Pardo 163, N.85 Subtotal 2545 1699 45598.17 Total

Ships from 1700.5.10 Xiamen Chianqua 929.36 AGI, Filipinas, China, 163, N.85 1700 1700.5.10 Xiamen Bianqua 2500 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1700.5.21 China Goaqua 1000 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1700.6.3 China Tequa 4000 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1700.6.3 China Sanqua 5500 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1700.6.3 China Ponqua 5500 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1700.6.3 China Inqua 4000 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1700.6.3 China Saqua 1535.23 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1700.7.3 Xiamen Sinqua 261.06 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1700.7.10 China Tanqua 5500 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1700.7.10 China Anqua 485.39 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1700.8.13 Xiamen Joseph 363.5 AGI, Filipinas, Lanqua 163, N.85 1700.11.8 Xiamen Dinqua 5500 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1700.11.8 Xiamen Chinqua 84.08 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1700.12.9 Guangdong Imcia 5500 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85

198

Subtotal 42658.62 Ships from 1700.12.20 Siam Juan Abres 129 AGI, Filipinas, Southeast 163, N.85 Asia, 1700 Subtotal 129 1700.11.20 Coromandel Antonio de 4000 AGI, Filipinas, Siquera 163, N.85 Subtotal 4000 Ships from 1700.11.16 Macau Antonio de 4000 AGI, Filipinas, Elsewhere, Bazarte 163, N.85 1700 1700.11.17 Macau Antonio da 2000 AGI, Filipinas, Cruz 163, N.85 Subtotal 6000 1700 52787.62 Total

Ships from 1701.4.6 Xiamen Quitqua 43 AGI, Filipinas, China, 1701 163, N.85 1701.5.9 Xiamen Loqua 1855.32 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1701.5.27 China Guaqua 1118.58 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1701.5.27 China Quaqua 604.38 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1701.6.21 China Quinqua 3576.96 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1701.6.21 Ningbo Sonqua 3000 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1701.6.25 Ningbo Aqua 5000 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1701.7.5 Xiamen Quanqua 2280.82 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 1701.7.5 China Tiotunqua 1555.69 AGI, Filipinas, 163, N.85 Subtotal 19034.75 Ships from 1701.7.11 Semarang, Antonio 1500 AGI, Filipinas, Southeast Java Dauz 163, N.85 Asia, 1701 Subtotal 1500 Ships from 1701.3.16 Coromandel Domingo 922.2 AGI, Filipinas, South Asia, Pinto 163, N.85 1701 1701.12.20 Coromandel Juan Antonio 68.06 AGI, Filipinas, Franco 163, N.85 1701.12.22 Coromandel Diego 2304.96 AGI, Filipinas, Marcos 163, N.85 Antonio 1701.12.22 Coromandel Ignacio 6000 AGI, Filipinas, Marcos 163, N.85 Subtotal 9295.22 1701 29829.97 Total

199

Appendix C. Ships arriving in Nagasaki from Southeast Asia in the Kai Hentai, 1684 - 1724

ID Stated Kai Japanese Crew (Chinese (Year/Entry Entry Port on Origin of Affiliation Apparent Hentai Year Calendar Stop Over Ports Captain + Other #) From # Record Captain or or Owner Origin Reference Date Nationalities) Previous Crew Page Entries

1684 7.17 1 Nguyen Batavia Lin Zongniang 林宗娘 Southeast Asia 414 domain (Quang Nam 廣南 )

1684 7.17 2 Trinh Unknown 417 domain (Dong Kinh 東京 )

1684 7.17 4 Trinh Unknown 420 domain

1684 7.17 5 Guangdong Cambodia Southeast Asia 422

1684 7.17 6 Guangdong Siam Southeast Asia 423

1684 7.17 7 Guangdong Siam Southeast Asia 424

1684 No date 9 Guangdong Siam Zheng Zheng 429, 463

1684 No date 10 Nguyen Unknown 430 domain

1684 No date 11 Nguyen Taiwan Zheng Zheng 430 domain

200

1684 7.18 12 Nguyen Nguyen Southeast Asia 431 domain domain

1684 7.19 13 Batavia Batavia Southeast Asia 431

1684 7.19 14 Siam Taiwan Zheng Zheng 433

1684 8.2 15 Ligor Guangdong Unknown 433

1684 8.4 16 Batavia Guangdong Batavia Southeast Asia 435

1684 8.8 17 Pa tani Fengwei Shan 鳳 Taiwan Zheng Zheng 435 尾山 (Near Putuoshan)

1684 8.8 18 Siam Siam Southeast Asia 436

1684 8.8 19 Siam Siam Southeast Asia 436

1684 8.8 20 Siam Taiwan Zheng Zheng 437

1684 8.16 21 Batavia Batavia Southeast Asia 438

1685 No date 17 Batavia Unknown 473

1685 7.15 27 Melaka Guangdong, Zhangzhou Wang Shunguan 王順 Qing empire 485 Xiamen, Meizhou 官眉州

1685 53 Nguyen Unknown 520 domain

1685 9.19 63 Nguyen Unknown 520 domain

1686 5.23 56 Batavia Xu Yanguan 徐岩官 Unknown 589

201

1686 5.23 58 Melaka Guangdong Qing empire 591

1686 5.29 63 Batavia Chen Canguan 陳燦官 Unknown 596

1686 7.12 71 Trinh Xue Shuashe 薛耍舍 Unknown 607 domain

1686 7.12 72 Trinh Trinh Lin Yuteng 林于騰 Southeast Asia 608 domain domain

1686 7.12 73 Nguyen Nguyen Southeast Asia 609 domain domain

1686 7.12 76 Nguyen Nguyen Southeast Asia 612 domain domain

1686 7.12 77 Cambodia Guangdong Qing empire 613

1686 7.12 78 Guangdong Nguyen Southeast Asia 614 domain

1686 7.13 80 Siam Siam Lin Senguan 徐森官 Southeast Asia 616

1686 7.13 82 Siam Unknown 618

1686 7.14 86 Xiamen Southeast Southeast Asia 622 Asia

1686 7.14 87 Nguyen Unknown 623 domain

1686 7.23 93 Siam Wang Zhuguan 王鑄官 Unknown 633

202

1686 8.4 94 Annam 安 Xiamen Qing empire 634 南 (Nguyen domain)

1686 8.5 95 Melaka Melaka Wang Shunguan 王順 Southeast Asia 636 官

1686 9.1 100 Songkhla Xiamen Qing empire 646

1686 9.29/30 101 Pa tani Putuoshan Pat ani Southeast Asia 647

1687 5.19 68 Cambodia [Shan 山] Tai Yu Guangdong 94 1686/77 Unknown 734 秦嶼 (near Sha ? Cheng 沙城 )

1687 6.25 98 Pat ani Ningbo Pa tani Xue Baguan 薛八官 71 1686/101 Southeast Asia 770

1687 7.13 104 Melaka Guangdong Melaka Wang Shunguan 王順 24 -1 1686/95 Southeast Asia 778 官

1687 7.23 107 Siam Siam Xu Senguan 徐森官 ? 103+9 Siamese Southeast Asia 783

1687 8.7 115 Pa tani Bei Liaoyue 北寮 Xiamen Qing empire 797 粵

1688 5. 晦 33 Nguyen Nguyen Xu Zhenguan 許禎官 59 1687/94 Unknown 869 domain domain?

1688 6.19 97 Batavia Batavia Lu Yaoguan 呂堯官 45 First Timer Unknown 940

1688 7.8 138 Batavia Batavia Chen Zhaoguan 陳肇 61 First Timer Southeast Asia 972 官

203

1688 7.8 144 Melaka Guangdong Melaka Huang Xianyin 黃賢因 15 1673 Southeast Asia 981

1688 7.9 149 Ningbo Ningbo Pa tani Xue Baguan 薛八官 78 1687/98 Southeast Asia 987

1688 7.9 150 Siam Siam Guo Zhengguan 郭正 61 First Timer Southeast Asia 988 官

1688 7.9 152 Siam Siam Xu Rangguan 徐讓官 100+4 Siamese 1687/107 Southeast Asia 990

1688 7.14 162 Batavia Xiamen Batavia Chen Sangguan 陳三官 65 First Timer Southeast Asia 1001

1688 7.15 163 Batavia Lin Zanguan 林贊官 38 First Timer Unknown 1002

1688 7.29 170 Melaka Guangdong Melaka Wang Shunguan 王順 25 1687/104 Southeast Asia 1013 官

1688 8.13 185 Nguyen Xiamen Huang Kuanguan 黃寬 95 Qing empire 1033 domain 官

1688 8.19 186 Nguyen Fuzhou Zeng Sishi 曾四使 51 1687/89 Qing empire 1048 domain

1688 9.15 189 Annam 安 Nguyen Shi Liangshe 史良舍 77 First Timer Unknown 1052 南 (Nguyen domain? domain)

1688 9.25 191 Nguyen Ningbo Zhou Duanqing 周端 52 1686/26 Qing empire 1054 domain 卿

1688 10.19 193 Nguyen Xiamen Chen Hongguan 陳鴻 73 First Timer Qing empire 1057 domain 官

204

1689 6.2 42 Trinh Trinh Lin Yuteng 林于騰 66 1686/72 Southeast Asia 1113 domain domain

1689 6.2 44 Trinh Xiamen Hong Chouguan 紅丑 47 1688/23 Qing empire 1115 domain 官

1689 6.2 45 Ligor Ligor Chen Xiongguan 陳雄 62 1687/62 Southeast Asia 1116 觀

1689 6.2 46 Siam Siam Xu Senguan 徐森官 106 1685/82 Southeast Asia 1117

1689 6.3 48 Pat ani Guangdong Huang Erguan 黃二官 36 First Timer Qing empire 1120

1689 6.7 51 Siam Siam Not Zeng Mingguan 曾明 107 First Timer Southeast Asia 1124 Phetracha 官

1689 6.1 52 Cambodia Siam Yan Haoguan 嚴好官 58 First Timer Southeast Asia 1126

1689 6.13 56 Nguyen Ningbo, Nguyen Shi Liangshe 史良舍 87 1688/189 Southeast Asia 1131 domain Putuoshan domain

1689 6.14 57 Xiamen Siam? Xu Foguan 徐佛官 82 1687/150 Southeast Asia 1133

1689 8.6 69 Nguyen Guangdong Zeng Yunguan 曾允官 62 1688/140 Qing empire 1140 domain

1689 8.9 73 Nguyen Nguyen Xu Xiangguan 許相官 73 1688/33 Southeast Asia 1153 domain domain?

1689 8.1 74 Cambodia Fuzhou Liu Taishe 劉太舍 59 1686/186 Qing empire 1154

1690 1.24 14 Nguyen Putuoshan Ningbo Kong Tian 孔天 60 1688/26 Qing empire 1185 domain

205

1690 4.23 39 Trinh Ningbo Quanzhou Zhou Tianlin 周天麟 39 First Timer Qing empire 1213 domain

1690 6.26 68 Pat ani Xiamen Pa tani Zhao Yiguan 趙一官 71 1687/98 Southeast Asia 1250

1690 6.27 69 Batavia Guangdong ? Wang Shiguan 王仕官 84 1688/79 Qing empire 1252

1690 7.2 74 Ligor Ningbo Chen Jianhou 陳建侯 66+1 Siamese 1689/27 Qing empire 1260

1690 7.2 75 Cambodia Xiamen Chen Sanguan 陳三官 40 1690/162 Qing empire 1264

1690 7.4 77 Batavia Batavia Ou Binguan 歐斌官 44+1 Javan First Timer Southeast Asia 1267

1690 6.23 78 Pa tani Guangdong Huang Erguan 黃二官 60 1689/47 Qing empire 1268

1690 7.6 81 Siam Siam Chinese Xu Foguan 徐佛官 59+1 Siamese 1689/57 Southeast Asia 1273 official

1690 7.7 82 Trinh Trinh Lin Yuteng 林于騰 47+6 1689/42 Southeast Asia 1275 domain domain Vietnamese

1690 7.8 84 Siam Siam Phetracha? Guo Heguan 郭合官 93+5 Siamese 1688/152 Southeast Asia 1279

1690 7.18 86 Siam Siam Phetracha Chen Zuoguan 陳祚官 98+1 Siamese 1689/51 Southeast Asia 1283

1690 7.23 87 Trinh Ningbo Xie Shudan 謝叔旦 46+4 First Timer Qing empire 1284 domain Vietnamese

1690 8.29 89 Nguyen Xiamen Guangdong Zeng Yunguan 曾允官 67 1689/69 Qing empire 1289 domain ?

206

1690 9.25 90 Nguyen Zhoushan Nguyen Xu Shangguan 許尚官 45 1689/73 Southeast Asia 1291 domain domain

1691 1.18 7 Nguyen Ningbo Fuzhou Zhan Weize 詹惟澤 48 1689/66 Qing empire 1305 domain

1691 1.22 14 Nguyen Ningbo Nguyen Xu Xiangguan 許相官 96 1690/90 Southeast Asia 1313 domain domain

1691 1.27 18 Trinh Ningbo Ningbo? Xie Shudan 謝叔旦 52 1690/87 Qing empire 1316 domain

1691 5.29 57 Ligor Xiamen Chaozhou Lu Zhouguan 呂宙官 61 1690/66 Qing empire 1359

1691 6.8 64 Melaka Jinmen Xu Foguan 徐佛官 45 First Timer Unknown 1367

1691 6.25 69 Cambodia Wang Deguan 王德官 52+1 1690/62 Unknown 1373 Cambodians

1691 7.2 74 Cambodia Cambodia? Huang Weiguan 黃尾 33 First Timer Unknown 1378 官

1691 7.4 79 Siam Siam Phetracha Gao Xingguan 高興官 114+4 Siamese 1682 Southeast Asia 1384

1691 7.8 82 Siam Liu Yueguan 劉岳官 87+2 Siamese First Timer Unknown 1387

1691 8.3 88 Siam Siam Zeng Mingguan 曾明 95+3 Siamese 1690/46 Southeast Asia 1394 官

1691 8.17 89 Nguyen Guangdong Zeng Yunguan 曾允官 70 1690/89 Qing empire 1396 domain

1691 8.2 90 Nguyen Guangdong Li Caiguan 李才官 68 First Timer Qing empire 1397 domain ?

207

1692 7.4 55 Siam Zeng Anguan 曾安官 56+1 Siamese First Timer Unknown 1466

1692 7.5 58 Cambodia Gongxie 弓鞋 in Chen Yulong 陳于龍 44+1 Unknown 1469 Guangdong Cambodian

1692 7.5 59 Trinh Trinh Lin Yuteng 林于騰 45+6 1691/85 Southeast Asia 1471 domain domain Vietnamese

1692 7.8 61 Cambodia Guo Jinsheng 郭進昇 First Timer Unknown 1473

1692 7.1 62 Ligor Yushan 魚山 in Zhou Dacheng 周大成 39 1691/78 Unknown 1474 Guangdong

1692 7.11 63 Cambodia Huang Youguan 黃友 63 1690/83 Unknown 1475 官

1692 7.12 64 Siam Siam Guo Heguan 郭合官 110+2 Siamese 1691/79 Southeast Asia 1478

1692 7.18 68 Nguyen Chen Yinguan 陳印官 41+1 Nguyen First Timer Unknown 1482 domain Vietnamese

1692 8.1 71 Siam Siam Shen Miaoguan 沈妙官 115+4 Siamese 1691/88 Southeast Asia 1486

1692 9.13 NA Siam Siam? Zeng Mingguan 曾明 92+1 Siamese 1691/82 Unknown 1491 官

1693 1.23 17 Nguyen Putuoshan Ningbo Chen Zongguan 陳宗 40 First Timer Qing empire 1516 domain 官

1693 1.23 19 Nguyen Jinshan 盡山 Ningbo Lin Liangguan 林兩官 48 First Timer Qing empire 1519 domain

208

1693 1.27 21 Nguyen Putuoshan, Guangdong Zeng Yunguan 曾允官 57 1691/89 Unknown 1521 domain Ningbo ?

1693 2.11 26 Nguyen Putuoshan, Nguyen Xu Xiangguan 許相官 51 First Timer Southeast Asia 1527 domain Ningbo domain

1693 7.8 58 Trinh Putuoshan Trinh Lin Sanguan 林三官 45+1 1692/59 Southeast Asia 1565 domain domain Vietnamese (56?)

1693 7.11 64 Songkhla Xiamen Xiamen Zhou Dongguan 周棟 70 1692/41 Qing empire 1573 官

1693 7.12 65 Nguyen Putuoshan, Jie Shi Shi Erguan 世二官 52 First Timer Unknown 1574 domain Wei 碣石衛 in Guangdong

1693 7.12 66 Nguyen Li Caiguan 李才官 50 First Timer Unknown 1575 domain

1693 7.15 67 Cambodia Cambodia? Huang Youguan 黃友 55 First Timer Unknown 1577 官

1693 8.1 72 Batavia Putuoshan Fuzhou Lin Wuguan 林五官 50 First Timer Qing empire 1583

1693 8.1 73 Batavia Putuoshan Ningbo Huang Erguan 黃二官 54 1692/36 Qing empire 1585

1693 8.4 75 Siam Siam Phetracha Jiang Jingguan 江景官 102+4 Siamese 1692/71 Southeast Asia 1588

1693 8.9 77 Ligor Putuoshan Chen Yiwen 陳翼文 41 First Timer Unknown 1595

1693 8.11 78 Batavia Putuoshan Fuzhou Zhan Weize 詹惟澤 41 First Timer Qing empire 1598

1693 8.29 80 Pa tani Putuoshan Hong Lianguan 洪聯 66 1689/37 Unknown 1606 官

209

1693 9.3 81 Nguyen Putuoshan Ningbo Yan Chengguan 嚴誠 49 First Timer Qing empire 1608 domain 官

1694 3.8 27 Nguyen Ningbo, Chen Zaiguan 陳再官 62 1693/68 Unknown 1635 domain Putuoshan

1694 閏 5.14 40 Songkhla Lin Wuguan 林五官 46 1693/32 Unknown 1647 (72?)

1694 5.25 47 Siam Chaozhou Siam Xu Xuanguan 許軒官 119+1 Siamese 1692/64 Southeast Asia 1655

1694 6.22 57 Ligor Shen Nianxiu 沈念修 41 First Timer Unknown 1668

1694 6.27 61 Siam Siam Phetracha Jiang Jingguan 江景官 103+3 Siamese 1693/75 Southeast Asia 1674

1694 7.4 62 Cambodia Zhangzhou Xu Shengguan 徐[木+ 38 1693/26 Qing empire 1674 盛]官

1694 7.5 63 Batavia Putuoshan Zhan Weize 詹惟澤 39 1693/78 Unknown 1677

1694 7.7 64 Batavia Putuoshan Lin Youguan (Lin 76 First Timer Unknown 1680 Wuguan) 林又官 (林五官 )

1694 7.8 65 Melaka Taizhou 台州 Wu Tiandi 吳天地 47 First Timer Unknown 1681

1694 7.8 66 Pat ani Wenzhou Li Yuanguan 李苑觀 67 First Timer Unknown 1682

1694 7.8 67 Nguyen Putuoshan Lin Sanguan 林三官 47 First Timer Unknown 1684 domain

1694 7.9 68 Pa tani Putuoshan Zhao Yiguan 趙一官 37 First Timer Unknown 1685

210

1694 7.9 69 Songkhla Putuoshan Zhou Baoshe (Zhou 104 1693/64 Unknown 1687 Dongguan) 周寶舍 (周棟官 )

1694 7.26 72 Banten Putuoshan Banten Lin Erguan 林二官 70 First Timer Unknown 1690

1694 8.14 73 Nguyen Putuoshan Zeng Yunguan 曾允官 43 1693/21 Unknown 1691 domain

1695 1.25 11 Nguyen Ningbo Li Caiguan 李才官 60 1693/66 Unknown 1713 domain

1695 1.29 15 Nguyen Ningbo Li Queguan 李却官 47 1693/65 Unknown 1717 domain

1695 6.29 26 Cambodia Ningbo Chen Yuanguan 陳瑗 56 1694/43 Qing empire 1730 官

1695 6.3 27 Cambodia Ningbo Lin Liangguan 林兩官 62 First Timer Unknown 1731

1695 28 Cambodia Ningbo Zhou Cheguan 周徹官 74 1694/60 Unknown 1732

1695 7.1 29 Pa tani Huang Erguan 黃二官 65 1694/50 Unknown 1734

1695 7.1 30 Siam Xiamen Lin Nanguan 林楠官 44 First Timer Qing empire 1735

1695 8.16 41 Songkhla Putuoshan Chen Siguan 陳四官 38 First Timer Unknown 1750

1695 8.19 43 Batavia Putuoshan Ningbo Lin Wuguan 林五官 52 First Timer Qing empire 1753

1695 8.2 45 Batavia Zhoushan Ningbo Zhan Weize 詹惟澤 38 1694/35 Qing empire 1755

1696 7.11 48 Nguyen Ningbo Zeng Yunguan 曾允官 50 1694/73 Qing empire 1803 domain

211

1696 7.12 49 Nguyen Ningbo Jiang Yiguan 江一官 49 First Timer Qing empire 1806 domain

1696 7.12 50 Nguyen Ningbo Cai Zhouguan 蔡周官 49 First Timer Qing empire 1808 domain

1696 7.12 51 Cambodia Ningbo Li Lianguan 李廉官 46 First Timer Qing empire 1809

1696 7.12 52 Nguyen Xiamen Chen Shiguan 陳時官 53 1694/37 Qing empire 1810 domain

1696 7.13 63 Ligor Ningbo Zhou Dacheng 周大成 42 First Timer Qing empire 1820

1696 7.13 64 Batavia Putuoshan Ningbo Bi Wenguan 薜文觀 46 First Timer Qing empire 1821

1696 7.14 69 Cambodia Xiamen Lin Youguan 林友官 71 First Timer Qing empire 1826

1696 7.15 71 Siam Ningbo Kang Yanguan 康嚴官 52 First Timer Qing empire 1828

1696 7.18 73 Songkhla Putuoshan Li Erguan 李二官 46 First Timer Unknown 1830

1696 7.19 74 Siam Hong Shuguan 洪束官 93+2 Siamese 1695/61 Unknown 1832

1696 8.16 79 Pa tani Putuoshan Ningbo Zhao Yiguan 趙一官 40 First Timer Qing empire 1838

1696 8.17 80 Ligor Ningbo Yao Weisheng 姚蔚生 37 First Timer Qing empire 1839

1696 8.17 81 Cambodia Ningbo Gao Aiguan 高愛官 78 1695/69 Qing empire 1840

1697 6.4 77 Cambodia Xiamen Li Lianguan 李簾官 43 1696/51 Unknown 1923

1697 6.4 78 Batavia Xiamen Cai Puguan 蔡浦官 41 First Timer Qing empire 1924

1697 6.5 80 Batavia Xiamen Wang Shiguan 王是官 56 First Timer Qing empire 1927

212

1697 6.7 81 Cambodia You Ruibi 尤瑞碧 92 First Timer Unknown 1928

1697 6.7 83 Cambodia Ningbo Gao Aiguan 高愛官 64 1696/27 Unknown 1930

1697 6.7 85 Siam Hong Laoguan 洪老官 104+3 Siamese 1696/74 Southeast Asia 1932

1697 6.8 86 Trinh Wu Qidi 吳啓迪 29+3 First Timer Unknown 1933 domain Vietnamese

1697 6.8 87 Cambodia Xiamen Huang Tingguan 黃廷 52 First Timer Qing empire 1934 官

1697 6.8 88 Siam Wang Dingguan 王定 89+1 Siamese First Timer Unknown 1934 官

1697 6.11 90 Batavia Xiamen Xu Foguan 徐佛官 74 First Timer Qing empire 1937

1697 6.16 93 Pa tani Ningbo Ningbo Chen Yuanhou 陳元矦 57 Qing empire 1940

1697 6.21 95 Songkhla Xiamen Xiamen Zhou Baoshe 周寶舍 73 First Timer Qing empire 1942

1697 7.2 96 Champa Guangdong Su Fuguan 蘇復官 49 First Timer Qing empire 1943

1697 7.2 97 Pa tani Xiamen Kang Zhixiang 康致祥 41 1696/35 Qing empire 1944

1697 7.2 98 Nguyen Guangdong Yang Yiguan 楊宜官 59 1695/29 Qing empire 1945 domain

1697 7.7 100 Siam Xu Senguan 徐森官 66 First Timer Southeast Asia 1947

1697 7.11 101 Ligor Ningbo Bao Yunliang 鮑允諒 47 First Timer Qing empire 1948

1697 7.16 102 Ligor Ningbo Li Shifang 李時芳 55 First Timer Qing empire 1949

213

1698 1.10 14 Nguyen Ningbo Gao Daiguan 高代官 70 First Timer Unknown 1968 domain

1698 1.17 21 Nguyen Ningbo Jiang Yiguan 江一官 46 First Timer Unknown 1974 domain

1698 1.19 24 Nguyen Ningbo Wang Yuanguan 王元 71 First Timer Unknown 1978 domain 官

1698 1.19 25 Nguyen Ningbo Zeng Yunguan 曾允官 67 First Timer Unknown 1979 domain

1698 6.17 34 Batavia Xu Fuguan 徐拂官 66 1697/90 Qing empire 1989

1698 37 Batavia Wang Shiguan 王是官 56 1697/80 Qing empire 1992

1698 6.23 38 Cambodia Cambodia King of Cheng Huishi 程徽士 49+2 First Timer Southeast Asia 1992 Cambodia Cambodians

1698 7.7 40 Cambodia Ningbo Huang Yingguan 黃應 85 First Timer Qing empire 1994 官

1698 7.20 43 Siam Siam Phetracha Wang Dingguan 王定 102+2 Siamese 1697/88 Southeast Asia 1997 官

1698 8.24 56 Nguyen Ningbo Cai Shuguan 蔡束官 50 1697/31 Qing empire 2009 domain

1698 10.3 68 Nguyen Ningbo Ningbo Wei Yanhou 魏彥厚 43 First Timer Qing empire 2020 domain

1698 10.6 69 Cambodia Ningbo Xiamen Chen Yuanbin 陳元濱 34 First Timer Qing empire 2021

1698 10.14 70 Trinh Putuoshan Ningbo Ke Langguan 柯郎官 44 First Timer Qing empire 2022 domain

214

1699 6.18 25 Batavia Guo Shangguan 郭上 82 First Timer Unknown 2053 官

1699 7.13 34 Cambodia Xiamen Hong Zhongguan 洪鐘 69 First Timer Qing empire 2063 官

1699 7.14 37 Trinh Ningbo Xu Shangshe 許尚舍 52 First Timer Qing empire 2065 domain

1699 9.3 53 Cambodia Ningbo Liu Sanguan 劉三官 56 First Timer Qing empire 2079

1699 9.3 54 Siam Siam Phetracha Wang Kuanguan 王寬 111+2 Siamese First Timer Southeast Asia 2080 官

1699 閏 9.4 60 Nguyen Putuoshan Ningbo Zeng Yunguan 曾允官 66 First Timer Qing empire 2087 domain

1699 閏 9.4 61 Nguyen Putuoshan Ningbo Li Caiguan 李才官 55 1698/63 Qing empire 2089 domain

1699 閏 9.4 62 Nguyen Putuoshan Ningbo Huang Zijian 黃子兼 50 1698/56 Qing empire 2090 domain

1699 閏 9.7 63 Siam Siam Phetracha Lin Chuguan 林楚官 99+3 Siamese 1698/43 Southeast Asia 2091

1700 9.24 33 Batavia Shanghai Ke Zhiguan 柯志官 40 First Timer Unknown 2143

1700 10.21 50 Batavia Ningbo Wang Shiguan 王是官 63 1698/33 Unknown 2161

1701 10.10 58 Champa Ningbo Ningbo Chen Zaiguan 陳再官 55 1698/72 Qing empire 2235

1702 54 Batavia Unknown 2293

1702 88 Trinh Unknown 2296 domain

215

1702 89 Nguyen Unknown 2296 domain

1703 7.8 69 Siam Siam Sua Guo Longguan 郭隆官 74+3 Siamese First Timer Southeast Asia 2332

1703 7.8 70 Siam Siam Sua Huang Shiguan 黃使官 112+2 Siamese 1702/59 Southeast Asia 2333

1703 7.9 71 Siam Siam Sua Wang Dingguan 王定 95+3 Siamese 1702/66 Southeast Asia 2334 官

1703 7.17 74 Batavia Putuoshan Trinh Xu Dejun (Xu 52+1 First Timer Unknown 2339 domain? Shangshe?) 許德俊 (許 Vietnamese 尚舍 ?)

1703 10.3 80 Nguyen Fuzhou, Ningbo Wei Jinguan 魏金官 73 First Timer Qing empire 2345 domain Putuoshan

1704 8.27 80 Siam Korea Siam Sua Guo Luguan 郭陸官 76+3 Siamese 1703/69 Southeast Asia 2409

1704 10.8 83 Nguyen Putuoshan Ningbo Huang Lifu 黃禮甫 60 First Timer Qing empire 2412 domain

1704 10.15 84 Nguyen Putuoshan Ningbo Wu Cuiguan 吳凗官 48 First Timer Qing empire 2413 domain

1705 9.26 87 Nguyen Nanyue 南粵 , Ningbo Wei Jinguan 魏金官 71 First Timer Qing empire 2434 domain Putuoshan

1705 9.26 88 Nguyen Nanyue 南粵 , Ningbo Chen Zaiguan 陳再官 54 First Timer Qing empire 2435 domain Putuoshan

1706 46 Nguyen Su Wenguan 蘇文官 57 Unknown 2451 domain

216

1706 9. 28 93 Nguyen Shanghai Zheng Danian 鄭大年 50 First Timer Unknown 2461 domain

1707 7.28 79 Siam Siam Sua Wang Dingguan 王定 78 1706/80 Southeast Asia 2496 官

1707 7.28 80 Siam Siam Sua Wu Chishen 呉赤申 103 1705/52 Southeast Asia 2497

1707 7.29 82 Siam Siam Sua Yang Yaoguan 楊耀官 79 Southeast Asia 2499

1708 7.5 100 Siam Nguyen domain Siam Siam? Guo Yinguan 郭隱官 79+2 Siamese 1706/74 Southeast Asia 2579

1708 7.11 101 Trinh Guangdong Cai Dingguan 蔡定官 50 Qing empire 2580 domain

1708 7.28 102 Trinh Lin Yuteng 林于騰 46 1705/27 Southeast Asia 2581 domain

1708 8.26 103 Nguyen Putuoshan Shanghai Zhang Sanguan 張三官 58 First Timer Qing empire 2581 domain

1708 9.19 104 Cambodia Putuoshan Zheng Yuguan 鄭裕官 33 First Timer Unknown 2582

1709 7.20 53 Siam Siam Thai Sa Xu Zeguan 徐澤官 67 1708/100 Southeast Asia 2636

1709 6.22 55 Pa tani Zhoushan Ningbo Lin Binsheng 林賓生 37 1708/47 Qing empire 2639

1710 7.13 36 Batavia Xiamen Lin Huanguan 林桓官 59 First Timer Qing empire 2666

1710 7.16 37 Siam Siam Thai Sa Xu Xiaguan 徐轄官 67+3 Siamese First Timer Southeast Asia 2667

1710 閏 8.14 49 Nguyen Shanghai Gao Cuncheng 高存成 49+1 First Timer Qing empire 2677 domain Vietnamese

1710 9.16 52 Trinh Ningbo Ningbo Jiang Yanhua 江彥華 44 1708/102 Qing empire 2680 domain

217

1711 8.26 55 Trinh Putuoshan Ningbo Yu Yizhe 俞以哲 38 1710/3 Qing empire 2687 domain

1712 11.26 62 Trinh Putuoshan Yu Yizhe 俞以哲 39 1711/10 Unknown 2688 domain

1716 10.3 4 Nguyen Guo Hengtong 郭亨統 53 First Timer Unknown 2715 domain

1717 1.26 Siam Nanyu, Zhoushan Siam Thai Sa Lin Lueguan 林略觀 56 First Timer Southeast Asia 2718

1717 7.13 Nguyen Chen Zuguan 陳祖觀 46 1714/13 Unknown 2728 domain

1717 7.20 Cambodia Ningbo Chen Bicheng 陳必成 59 First Timer Qing empire 2730

1717 7.22 Champa Xuhe Yangyi 徐鶴羊儀 40 First Timer Unknown 2733

1717 8.10 2 Siam Siam Thai Sa Guo Yizhou 郭奕周 99 1716/7 Southeast Asia 2737

1717 8.24 8 Batavia Ningbo Wu Songdang 吳送観 55 First Timer Unknown 2748

1717 10.6 30 Nguyen Shanghai Guo Hengtong 郭亨統 42 1713/49 Unknown 2771 domain

1718 8.10 23 Siam Siam Thai Sa Hu Yinghou 胡應候 62+2 Siamese Southeast Asia 2805

1718 2.23 Batavia Xiamen Sun Shuqian 孫書謙 50 First Timer Qing empire 2810

1718 11.17 33 Nguyen Shanghai Guo Henglian 郭亨聯 49 1717/30 Qing empire 2824 domain

1718 12.17 38 Batavia Ningbo, Shanghai Wu Songguan 吳送觀 66 First Timer Unknown 2829

218

1718 Batavia Wenzhou Batavia Zheng Kongdian 鄭孔 38+23 Chinese First Timer Southeast Asia 2832 典 Batavians +4 Batavians

1719 7.15 26 Siam Siam Thai Sa Guo Zifei 郭子蜚 98+3 Siamese 1718/2 Southeast Asia 2849

1719 11.25 33 Nguyen Shanghai Guo Henglian 郭亨聯 38 First Timer Qing empire 2854 domain

1720 12.25 1 Batavia Shanghai Wu Songguan 吳送觀 52 1718/38 Unknown 2865

1720 7.7 27 Nguyen Ningbo Chen Juguan 陳鋸觀 61 First Timer Unknown 2892 domain

1720 12.22 35 Batavia Zhoushan Shanghai Zheng Kongqing 鄭孔 44 1719/31 Batavia 2896 靑

1721 2.15 3 Nguyen Shanghai Fuzhou? Dong Yiye 董宜叶 39 First Timer Unknown 2900 domain

1721 12.12 29 Nguyen Shanghai Chen Qihui 陳啓輝 40 First Timer Unknown 2917 domain

1722 1.21 2 Siam Shanghai Chen Huanqing 陳煥 57 1720/18 Unknown 2928 卿

1722 12.2 20 Batavia Zhapu Ningbo Zheng Kongdian 鄭孔 49 First Timer Batavia 2947 典

1723 7.3 12 Cambodia Putuoshan Wu Ziyun 吳子雲 50 First Timer Unknown 2974

1723 10.23 22 Champa Ningbo Jiang Fanjiu 蔣範九 38 First Timer Unknown 2983

1724 12.12 27 Siam Putuoshan Ningbo Li Yisheng 李亦聖 47 First Timer Qing empire 2987

219

1724 12.13 29 Nguyen Zhapu Ningbo Guo Xianglian 郭享聯 36 1722/23 Qing empire 2989 domain

220

Appendix D. British company and private ships sailing between South Asia and China, 1720 – 1740

Company ships sent from Company ships arriving in China Company ships departing China for Private ships sailing between the Indian Ocean England to China from the Indian Ocean the Indian Ocean and China

Year No. Names Tonn No. Names Last Tonn - No. Names Inbound Tonn No. Names Tonn - Last Inbound -age Indian age destination -age age Indian destination Ocean Ocean port of port call 1720 4 Carnavron 370 0 1 Bridgewater Madras 4 Boone 600 Bombay Bombay Sarum 370 Prosperous Surat ? Mountague 380 Daulphin Surat ? Bridgewater 360 Bonita Madras Madras 1721 4 Cadogan 450 0 0 2 Bonita Madras Surat Frances 390 Macclesfield 450 Hastings 500 Madras Surat Morice 380 1722 3 Eyles 480 0 1 Eyles Madras 2 Bonita Madras Madras Lyell 460 King 500 Madras Surat Princess 350 George Emilia 1723 5 Duke of 430 0 2 Walpole Madras 3 Boone 600 Madras Surat Cambridge Hartford 440 Hanover 600 Madras Bombay Mountague 380 Duke of Bombay Cambridge Princess 380 King 500 Madras Madras Anne George Walpole 490 1724 1 Macclesfield 450 0 1 Macclesfield Madras 5 Boone 600 Madras Cuddalore ? Gloucester Bengal ? Morning Madras Malabar Star

221

Moylin Madras Malabar Santa Madras Manila Maria 1725 3 Caesar 430 0 1 Princess Mocha 350 ≥4 Boone 600 Madras Bombay? Houghton 450 Emilia Oxford Madras ? Princess 350 Royal 700 Madras Surat Emilia George Southgate Madras Surat 1726 1 Townshend 370 0 0 ≥1 Decker Madras Madras 1727 1 Prince 495 0 0 2 Balls 300 Bombay Bombay Augustus Lyell Madras Madras 1728 4 Caesar 430 0 0 2 Balls 300 Bombay Bombay Harrison 460 Macclesfield 450 Lyell 350 Madras Madras Sunderland 410 1729 4 Enfield 470 0 0 2 Balls 300 Bombay Bombay Houghton 460 Lynn 480 Lyell 350 Madras Madras Monmouth 490 1730 5 Devonshire 470 0 1 King George Madras 200 3 Balls 300 Bombay Bombay King George 200 Canton Madras Madras sloop Merchant Lyell 470 Prince 495 Prince Madras Lost Augustus George Princess of 460 Wales 1731 4 Caesar 460 0 0 3 Catherine Bengal Bengal Harrison 460 Richmond Madras Madras Hartford 460 Nassau Bombay Bombay Macclesfield 450 1732 4 Compton 440 0 2 Compton Bombay 440 2 Royal 700 Madras Surat Lynn 480 George Richmond 460 Wyndham Madras 470 Nassau 70 Bombay Surat Wyndham 470 1733 0 3 Compton Madras 440 1 Prince Madras 495 2 Wakefield 200 Bengal ?

222

Prince Madras 495 Augustus Hallifax 200 ? ? Augustus Wyndham Madras 470 1734 2 Grafton 350 0 0 1 Cowan Bombay ? Harrison 460 1735 3 Houghton 495 0 1 Richmond Bombay 460 1 Cowan Bombay ? London 460 Richmond 460 1736 3 Normanton 490 1 Richmond Bombay 460 1 Princess Bengal ? Princess of 470 Amelia Wales Walpole 495 1737 3 Harrison 460 1 Royal Madras 480 1 Royal Madras 480 1 Jenny 240 Bombay Bombay Sussex 490 Guardian Guardian Winchester 490 1738 4 London 495 1 Godolphin Madras 480 1 Godolphin Madras 480 0 Prince of 480 Orange Prince of 495 Wales Princess 490 Royal 1739 3 Augusta 495 2 Harrington Bombay 490 2 Harrington Bombay 490 1 Mary Bombay ? Houghton 495 Duke of Madras 495 Duke of Madras 495 Lorrain Lorrain Walpole 495 1740 2 Princess 495 0 0 0 Emilia Winchester 495 Sources: BL, IOR/G/12/8, IOR/G/12/21 -48, passim ; Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book, 1720 - 1740 (Madras: Superintendent, Government Press, 1922 - 1931), passim; and Hosea Ballou Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, 1635 - 1834 (Taipei: Ch'eng-Wen, 1966), vol. 1., ‘Table of English Ships which Traded to China for the East India Companies, from 1635 – 1753.’

223

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Ryan Holroyd, Vita 127 Thomas Street, West Hartford, Connecticut, 06119 [email protected]

EDUCATION

2012 – 2018 PhD, Pennsylvania State University Departments of History and Asian Studies

2008 – 2011 MA, University of Alberta Department of History & Classics

2002 – 2007 BA, University of Alberta History and Psychology with distinction

PUBLICATIONS

“Whatever Happened to the Villains of the Indian Seas? The Happy Retirement of the Madagascar Pirates, 1698 – 1721,” International Journal of Maritime History 29(4) (November 2017): 752 – 770.

“Schools, Temples, and Tombs Across the Sea: The Re-Civilization of Post-Zheng Taiwan, 1683 – 1722,” Frontiers in Chinese History 10(4) (2015): 571 – 593.

CONFERENCES & PRESENTATIONS

2017 “The Diversification and Expansion of China’s Maritime Trade after the Zheng Family, 1684-1700” Association for Asian Studies Annual Conference, Toronto, Ontario 2017 “Both Sides Now: The Role of the Caribbean in the Emergence of New Trade Links between Asia and Latin America, 1680 – 1760” Association of Caribbean Historians Annual Meeting, Tobago, Trinidad & Tobago 2017 “The Qing Empire’s Naval Blockade Strategy and the Zheng Family’s Trade, 1662 – 1683” Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History, Jacksonville, Florida 2017 “The Revival of Trade Between China and Southeast Asia, 1684-1717” New England Region Association for Asian Studies Annual Conference, Boston, Massachusetts 2016 “Upheaval and Transformation in China’s Maritime Trade during the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories, 1673 – 1681” Appalachian Spring Conference in World History & Economics, Boone, North Carolina 2015 “Responsibility, Red Tape, & Wretchedness: The English East India Company’s Disappointment in the Chinese Port of Xiamen, 1684 – 1720” The Hakluyt Society Conference, Hull, United Kingdom 2014 “The Pacification of Post-Zheng Taiwan, 1683 – 1722” Mid-Atlantic Association for Asian Studies and New York Conference on Asian Studies, Hempstead, New York