Arc of Convergence: AQAP, Ansar Al-Shari`A and the Struggle for Yemen
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JUNE 2012 . VOL 5 . ISSUE 6 Contents Arc of Convergence: AQAP, FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Arc of Convergence: AQAP, Ansar al- Ansar al-Shari`a and the Shari`a and the Struggle for Yemen By Christopher Swift Struggle for Yemen REPORTS By Christopher Swift 7 Los Zetas and MS-13: Nontraditional Alliances By John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus 10 The Evolution of an American Jihadi: The Case of Omar Hammami By Christopher Anzalone 13 The Holsworthy Barracks Plot: A Case Study of an Al-Shabab Support Network in Australia By Andrew Zammit 16 European Experiences in Counterradicalization By James Brandon and Lorenzo Vidino 19 The Southern Thailand Insurgency in the Wake of the March 2012 Bombings By Zachary Abuza 22 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts Yemeni army officials pray over the coffins of soldiers killed in a May 21 suicide bombing in Sana`a. - AFP/Getty Images he may 21, 2012, suicide attack The bombing also revealed more on Yemeni soldiers parading parochial motives. In addition to in Sana`a’s al-Sabin Square retaliation, Ansar al-Shari`a claimed marked a turning point in to avenge “the demonstrators and all TYemen’s struggle against al-Qa`ida in Muslims who tasted the scourge of the the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and its Yemeni central security forces” during subsidiary, Ansar al-Shari`a. Coming the Arab Spring protests.3 Recalling two weeks after Yemeni President Abd the violent crackdown on protestors in Rabbuh Mansur Hadi’s pledge to purge Sana`a and the alleged torture of Islamist About the CTC Sentinel terrorists from “every district, village, activists, the communiqué justified the The Combating Terrorism Center is an and place,”1 the perpetrators cast the slaughter of Yemeni soldiers in populist independent educational and research bombing as a retaliatory strike. “The terms while appealing to citizens who institution based in the Department of Social primary target of this blessed operation survived similar “massacres” at the Sciences at the United States Military Academy, was the defense minister of the Sana`a hands of the previous regime. This West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses regime and his corrupt entourage,” reasoning minimized global jihad while the Center’s global network of scholars and proclaimed Ansar al-Shari`a’s Madad emphasizing national struggle. Despite practitioners to understand and confront News Agency. “It came in response to its Salafi-jihadi boilerplate, however, contemporary threats posed by terrorism and the unjust war launched by the Sana`a Ansar al-Shari`a appeared far more other forms of political violence. regime’s forces in cooperation with the concerned with co-opting the “recent American and Saudi forces.”2 revolution” in Yemen than resisting the unholy U.S.-Saudi alliance. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, 1 “Hadi: I Won’t Allow Split in Army,” Yemen Fox [Sana`a], the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. May 6, 2012. Agency [Azzan], May 21, 2012. 2 “Statement on the Sabin Square Bombing,” Madad News 3 Ibid. 1 JUNE 2012 . VOL 5. ISSUE 6 This emphasis on national struggle Tribal Equilibrium Much of this engagement now occurs reflects a phase shift in al-Qa`ida’s AQAP is, and still remains, a through Ansar al-Shari`a, which was messaging and methods. As Barak Barfi conglomerate. Conceived in a January reportedly founded in 2009.13 Operating and Ryan Evans have observed, AQAP 2009 merger between al-Qa`ida under its own banner, the movement eschews tribal domination in favor cells operating in Saudi Arabia and issues communiqués, operates media of more nuanced efforts to capture Yemen, its members brought different outlets, and generates propaganda aimed indigenous support.4 Other studies perspectives and experiences to their at Yemen’s Sunni tribesmen.14 In doing reinforce this point, explaining how regional franchise. Some, like former “strong norms of retribution, tribal Guantanamo detainees Said Ali al- coherence, and force of arms” limit Shihri and Mohamed Atiq Awayd al- “AQAP has proven its ability to “seize support through Harbi, fled to Yemen following their remarkably adept at repression.”5 Despite being rooted in repatriation and failed rehabilitation Yemen’s culture, society, and tribal in Saudi Arabia.7 Others, including reconciling the ideological system, the movement maintains its Yemenis such as Nasir al-Wahayshi, dictates of global jihad with rhetorical and operational focus on the served with Usama bin Ladin in far enemy—underscored by the recent Afghanistan before bringing the the practical realities of attempt to bomb a passenger aircraft jihad back home.8 Proven in war and local insurgency.” bound for the United States.6 These hardened by prison, this cohort rejected parallel approaches could ultimately the informal accommodation between diverge, creating tensions between their Arab Afghan predecessors and national objectives and international Yemen’s security services and called for so, Ansar al-Shari`a has abandoned the ambitions. For the moment, however, jihad against the Yemeni regime.9 elitist, quasi-jurisprudential rhetoric AQAP has proven remarkably adept at espoused by al-Qa`ida purists in favor reconciling the ideological dictates of AQAP also drew lessons directly from of a more populist (and often parochial) global jihad with the practical realities other al-Qa`ida franchises. Like al- message.15 As senior AQAP official Abu of local insurgency. Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI), the movement Zubayr Adel al-Abab observed, “the established its own provisional Islamic name Ansar al-Shari`a is what we use This article examines that reconciliation state.10 Like al-Qa`ida’s central to introduce ourselves in areas where in three stages. First, it explains how leadership, it courted religious and tribal we work, to tell people about our work AQAP uses Ansar al-Shari`a to operate leaders with longstanding grievances, and goals, and [to show] that we are on and propagate within Yemen’s tribal encouraging conservative clerics like the path of Allah.”16 society. Second, it discusses AQAP’s Abdul Majid al-Zindani to challenge the current capabilities and structure, with Yemeni regime11 and prominent shaykhs Tribal leaders confirm this subsidiary particular emphasis on its operations in like Tariq al-Fadhli to turn against it.12 relationship. Despite its unique brand, Abyan and Shabwa provinces. Third, Despite these similarities, however, AQAP uses Ansar al-Shari`a to promote it examines AQAP’s efforts to knit AQAP built its movement from the its activities in tribal areas, legitimize Saudi ideologues, Yemeni tribesmen, ground up rather than the top down. its members as “supporters” of Islamic and a diverse cohort of foreign fighters Anxious to avoid an indigenous uprising law, and elicit popular support without into an ideologically and operationally similar to the Sunni Awakening in Iraq, implicating the controversial al-Qa`ida coherent coalition. Drawing on more al-Wahayshi pursued a three-pronged brand.17 Combined with its direct appeals than 40 interviews with religious, strategy of engagement, empowerment, to demonstrators and Arab youth, this political, and tribal leaders from 14 and dependency among Yemen’s tribes. of Yemen’s 21 provinces conducted 13 “Interactive: Fractured Yemen,” al-Jazira, June 5, in May and June 2012, this analysis 2012. addresses the arc of convergence among 14 Personal interview, tribal mediator from Marib Prov- these factions and the implications for ince, Yemen, May 30, 2012, June 1, 2012; personal inter- regional counterterrorism operations. view, tribal leader from al-Jawf Province, Yemen, June 7 Abdullah al-Oraifij and Khaled al-Shalahi, “Al-Oufi, 1, 2012. Al-Shihiri Betrayed Our Trust: Families, Friends,” Saudi 15 Personal interview, resident director, Yemeni non- Gazette, January 28, 2009. governmental organization, Sana`a, Yemen, June 2, 8 Sudarsan Raghavan, “Al-Qaeda Group in Yemen Gain- 2012. ing Prominence,” Washington Post, December 28, 2009. 16 “Online Question and Answer Session with Abu 9 Gregory D. Johnsen, “Testimony Before the Senate Zubayr Adel al-Abab, Shari`a Official for al-Qa`ida in 4 Barak Barfi, “AQAP’s Soft Power Strategy in Yemen,” Foreign Relations Committee,” U.S. Senate, January 20, the Arabian Peninsula, April 18, 2012,” translation by CTC Sentinel 3:11-12 (2010); Ryan Evans, “From Iraq to 2010. Amany Soliman from the International Center for the Yemen: Al-Qa`ida’s Shifting Strategies,” CTC Sentinel 10 Aradar Madayah and Sawsan Abu-Husain, “Al-Qae- Study of Radicalization and Political Violence. 3:10 (2010). da Call for Islamic State in Southern Yemen,” Asharq al- 17 Personal interview, independent Yemeni researcher, 5 Gabriel Koehler-Derrick ed., A False Foundation: AQAP, Awsat, May 14, 2009. Sana`a, Yemen, May 27, 2012; personal interview, tribal Tribes, and Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen (West Point, NY: 11 Personal interview, senior shaykh, Bakhil Tribal Con- leader from Ibb Province, Sana`a, Yemen, June 1, 2012; Combating Terrorism Center, 2011). federation, Sana`a, Yemen, May 27, 2012. personal interview, Yemeni think-tank director, Sana`a, 6 “Al-Qaeda Yemen Plane Bomb Plot Foiled by ‘Insid- 12 Personal interview, senior provincial security official, Yemen, June 2, 2012; personal interview, independent er,’” BBC News, May 8, 2012. Aden, Yemen, May 28, 2012. Yemeni journalist, Sana`a, Yemen, June 2, 2012. 2 JUNE 2012 . VOL 5. ISSUE 6 approach suggests an attempt to shelter day,24 al-Qa`ida’s compensation offers loyalty, the syndicate discourages its AQAP’s hard core within a broader, a level of security and sustenance that partners from pursuing alternative organically derived popular front. As many tribal leaders cannot provide.25 sources of patronage.29 A similar Ansar al-Shari`a leader Jalal Muhsin calculus operates among some tribal Balidi al-Murqoshi explained, “We Empowerment also operates at the leaders.