JUSTIFICATION and Knowledgenew Studies in Epistemology JONATHAN BENNETT, University Board of Consulting Editors: GEORGE S
PHILOSOPHICALIN PHILOSOPHYSTUDIES SERIES JUSTIFICATION AND¶87 W ILKEITH F RID SLEHRER, ELLA REditors.s, UniversityUniversityofof Arizona Pittsburgh KNOWLEDGENew Studies in Epistemology JONATHAN BENNETT,Board of Consulting University Editors: GEORGEEdited S. byPAPPAS ROBERTROBERTALAN G.GIBBARD, STALNAKER,TURNBULL, UniversityOhioCornell Stateofof PittsburghBritishUniversity University Columbia The Ohio State University VOLUME 17 DORDRECHT:D. REIDELLONDON PUBLISHING HOLLAND: ENGLAND / BOSTON COMPANY: U.S.A. ALVIN I. GOLDMAN WHAT IS JUSTIFIED BELIEF? The aim of this paper is to sketch a theory of justified belief. What I have in mind is an explanatory theory, one that explains in a generalway why certain beliefs are counted as justified and others as unjustified. Unlikesome tradi- tiorial approaches, I do not try to prescribe standards for justification that differ from, or improve upon, our ordinary standards. I merely try to expli- cate the ordinary standards, which are, I believe, quite different from those of many classical, e.g., 'Cartesian', accounts. Many epistemologists have been interested in justification because of its presumed close relationship to knowledge. This relationship is intendedto be preserved in the conception of justified belief presented here. In previous papers on knowledge,1I have denied that justification isnecessary for knowing, but there I had in mind 'Cartesian' accounts of justification.On the account of justified belief suggested here, it isnecessary for knowing, and closely related to it. The term 'justified', I presume, is an evaluativeterm, a term of appraisal. Any correct definition or synonym of it would also feature evaluativeterms. I assume that such definitions orsynonyms might be given, but I am not interested in them. I want a set of substantive conditions that specify when a belief is justified.
[Show full text]