DOCSLIB.ORG

Curriculum Vitae Michael a Bishop

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Curriculum Vitae Michael a Bishop Curriculum Vitae Michael A Bishop April 02, 2013 General Information University address: Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences Dodd Hall 0151 Florida State University Tallahassee, Florida 32306-1500 Phone: 850/644-4127; Fax: 850/644-3832 E-mail address: [email protected] Professional Preparation 1990 Ph.D., University Of California - San Diego. Major: Philosophy. 1984 B.A., University of Maryland - College Park. Major: Philosophy. cum laude. Professional Experience 2006–present Professor, Philosophy, Florida State University. 2006 Professor (OPS), Philosophy, Florida State University. 2003–2006 Associate Professor, Philosophy, Northern Illinois University. 1996–2003 Associate Professor and Department Chair, Philosophy & Religious Studies, Iowa State University. 1990–1996 Assistant Professor, Iowa State University. Language Proficiency Spanish - fluent in speaking, reading, and writing. Vita for Michael A Bishop Visiting Professorship(s) 1997–1998 Visiting Scholar at NYU and Rutgers. Honors, Awards, and Prizes FSU COFRS Regular Summer Award, Florida State University (2009). ($14,000). Who's Who Among America's Teachers (2006). Instructional Research and Improvement Grant, Northern Illinois University (2005). Who's Who Among America's Teachers (2005). Iowa State University Faculty Improvement Leave (2003). National Science Foundation Collaborative Research Grant (2003). Who's Who Among America's Teachers (2002). Iowa State University Faculty Improvement Leave (1997). Who's Who Among America's Teachers (1996). Liberal Arts and Sciences Award for Early Excellence in Teaching at Iowa State University (1995). National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar for College Teachers (1992). Teaching Courses Taught Epistemology (PHI6306) Knowledge and Belief (PHI3300) History and Philosophy of Science (PHI3400) Reasoning and Critical Thinking (PHI2100) Seminar for Majors (PHI4938) Tutorial in Philosophy (PHI5998) Philosophy of Social Sciences (PHI6425) Tutorial in Philosophy (PHI4999) Seminar in Philosophical Topics (PHI6935) Doctoral Committee Chair Miller, M. B., graduate. (2012). Albahri, A. A., graduate. (2011). Sosis, C. L., graduate. (2011). Watson, J. C., graduate. (2009). Albert, P. M., doctoral candidate. Lang, M. L., doctoral candidate. Perez, H. J., doctoral candidate. (2012). Haines, J. W., doctoral student. Page 2 Vita for Michael A Bishop Doctoral Committee Member Carpenter, J. M., graduate. (2012). Cordero, R., doctoral candidate. Haas, D. D., doctoral candidate. Kelsey, E. B., doctoral candidate. Martin, Z. T., doctoral candidate. McGrew, M. M., doctoral candidate. Miller, J. S., doctoral candidate. Quigley, J. G., doctoral candidate. Stigall, J. C., doctoral candidate. Takacs, P., doctoral candidate. McFarlane, S. P., doctoral candidate. (2013). Shepherd, J. L., doctoral candidate. (2013). Doctoral Committee University Representative Brewer, L. E., doctoral candidate. Diamond, B. F., doctoral candidate. Adams, J. R., doctoral student. Master's Committee Member Crescioni, A. W., student. Research and Original Creative Work Publications Refereed Journal Articles Zarpentine, C., Cipolletti, H., & Bishop, M. A. (2012). WINO Epistemology and the Shifting Sands Problem. The Monist, 95(2), 308-328. Bishop, M. A. (2010). Why the Generality Problem is Everybody's Problem. Philosophical Studies, 151, 285-298. Bishop, M. A., & Trout, J. D. (2008). Strategic Reliabilism: A Naturalistic Approach to Epistemology. Philosophy Compass, 3/5, 1049-1065. Page 3 Vita for Michael A Bishop Bishop, M. A., & Bootz, B. (2007). Goodbye, Justification. Hello, World. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 7, 269-285. Bishop, M. A. (2006). Fast and Frugal Heuristics. Philosophy Compass, 1, 201-223. Bishop, M. A. (2005). The Autonomy of Social Epistemology. Episteme, 2, 65-78. Bishop, M. A., & Trout, J. D. (2005). The Pathologies of Standard Analytic Epistemology. Nous, 39, 696-714. Bishop, M. A., & Trout, J. D. (2003). Epistemology's Search for Significance. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 15(2), 203-216. Bishop, M. A., & Downes, S. M. (2002). The Theory Theory Thrice Over: The Child as Scientist, Superscientist or Social Institution. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 33, 121-136. Bishop, M. A., & Trout, J. D. (2002). 50 Years of Successful Predictive Modeling Should Be Enough: Lessons for Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Science: PSA 2000 Symposium Papers, 69, S197-S208. Bishop, M. A. (2000). In Praise of Epistemic Irresponsibility: How Lazy and Ignorant Can You Be? Synthese, 122, 179-208. Bishop, M. A. (1999). Semantic Flexibility in Scientific Practice: A Study of Newton's Optics. Philosophy and Rhetoric, 32, 210-232. Bishop, M. A. (1999). Why Thought Experiments are Not Arguments. Philosophy of Science, 66, 534-541. Bishop, M. A., & Stich, S. P. (1998). The Flight to Reference, or How Not to Make Progress in the Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Science, 65, 33-49. Bishop, M. A. (1992). The Possibility of Conceptual Clarity in Philosophy. American Philosophical Quarerly, 29, 267-277. Bishop, M. A. (1992). Theory-ladenness of Perception Arguments. PSA, 1, 287-299. Bishop, M. A. (1991). Why the Semantic Incommensurability Thesis is Self-Defeating. Philosophical Studies, 63, 343-356. Page 4 Vita for Michael A Bishop Refereed Books Bishop, M. A. (contract). The Nature of Well-Being. Manuscript under contract for publication, New York: Oxford University Press. Bishop, M. A., & Trout, J. D. (2005). Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. New York: Oxford University Press. Edited Books Murphy, D., & Bishop, M. A. (Eds.). (2009). Stephen Stich and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell. Refereed Book Chapters Shepherd, J., & Bishop, M. A. (in press). Ein Plädoyer für die naturalisierte Erkenntnistheorie (The Case for Naturalized Epistemology. In Dirk Koppleberg, & Stefan Tolksdorf (Eds.), Erkenntnistheorie: wie und wozu?. Berlin: Mentis Publishers. Bishop, M. A., & Feltz, A. (2010). The Role of Intuitions in Naturalized Epistemology. In M. Milkowski, & K. Talmont-Kaminski (Eds.), Beyond Description: Normativity in Naturalised Philosophy (pp. 101-122). College Publications. Bishop, M. A. (2009). Reflections on Cognitive and Epistemic Diversity: Does a Stich in Time Save Quine? In D. Murphy, & M. Bishop (Eds.), Stephen Stich and His Critics (pp. 113-136). Wiley-Blackwell. Bishop, M. A. (2008). Reflections on a Normative Psychology. In A. Beckermann, H. Tetens, & S. Walter (Eds.), Philosophy: Foundations and Applications. Main Lectures and Colloquia Talks of GAP 6 (pp. 277-290). Paderborn: Mentis. Samuels, R., Stich, S., & Bishop, M. A. (2002). Ending the Rationality Wars: How to Make Normative Disputes about Cognitive Illusions Disappear. In R. Elio (Ed.), Common Sense, Reasoning and Rationality. New York: Oxford University Press. Bishop, M. A. (1998). An Epistemological Role for Thought Experiments. In Niall Shanks (Ed.), Idealization IX: Idealization in Contemporary Physics. Poznan Studies in Philosophy of Science and Humanities Bookseries, Rodopi. Bishop, M. A. (1994). Conceptual Change in Science: The Newton-Hooke Controversy. In Peter Achinstein, & Laura Snyder (Eds.), Scientific Methods: Conceptual and Historical Problems. Krieger Press. Page 5 Vita for Michael A Bishop Refereed Encyclopedia Entries Bishop, M. A. (in press). Knowledge. In Mastering Endovascular Techniques: Guide to Excellence (2nd ed.). Springer. Bishop, M. A., & Trout, J. D. (in press). Prognosis and Prediction. In Bill Fulford (Ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychiatry. Oxford University Press. Sosis, C., & Bishop, M. A. (in press). Knowledge. In Lynn Nadel (Ed.), Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science. John Wiley & Sons. Bishop, M. A. (2008). Decision-Making. In W. A. Darity, Jr. (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (2nd ed., Vol. 2, p. 251-253). Macmillan Reference. Invited Reviews Bishop, M. A. (2007). Notice Critique: Reconstructing Reason and Representation. Philosophiques, 34(2), 367-374. Bishop, M. A. (2007). Review ofMurray Clark, Reconstructing Reason and Representation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75, 492-495. Bishop, M. A. (2006). Review of William J. Talbot, Which Rights Should Be Universal?. Review of Metaphysics, 59, 683-685. Bishop, M. A. (2003). Review of Andrew Brook and Don Ross, eds., Daniel Dennett. Philosophical Psychology, 2, 347-350. Bishop, M. A. (1997). Review of Ron McClamrock, Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the World. International Studies in Philosophy. Bishop, M. A. (1996). Review of A.F. Chalmers, What Is This Thing Called Science?. Teaching Philosophy, 19, 204-205. Bishop, M. A. (1996). Review of Allan Megill, ed., Rethinking Objectivity. Philosophy of Science, 63, 145-146. Bishop, M. A. (1996). Review of Holmes Rolston III, Biology, Ethics, and the Origins of Life. Teaching Philosophy, 19, 302-304. Page 6 Vita for Michael A Bishop Refereed Reviews Bishop, M. A. (1992). The Nature and Evolution of Human Language: A Response to Maxine Sheets-Johnstone. Between the Species, 8, 95-97. Nonrefereed Journal Articles Bishop, M. A. (2012). The Network Theory of Well-Being: An Introduction. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic, and Communication, 7, 1-29. Bishop, M. A. (2003). The Pessimistic Induction, the Flight to Reference and the Metaphysical Zoo. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 17, 161-178. Presentations Invited Keynote and Plenary Presentations at Conferences Bishop, M. A. (presented 2012). The
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Gibson's Ecological Approach: Perceiving What Exists
    1 TRENDS IN INTERDISCIPLINARY STU DIES AVANT The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard AVANT Pismo awangardy filozoficzno-naukowej 2/2012 EDITORS OF THIS ISSUE / REDAKTORZY TEGO NUMERU Witold Hensel, Dawid Lubiszewski, Przemysław Nowakowski, Nelly Strehlau, Witold Wachowski TORUŃ 3 ISSN: 2082-6710 AVANT. The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard AVANT. Pismo Awangardy Filozoficzno-Naukowej Vol. III, No. 2/2012 (October-December 2012), English Issue Toruń 2012 The texts are licensed under / Teksty udostępniono na licencji: CC BY-NC-ND 3.0. Graphics design / Opracowanie graficzne: Karolina Pluta & Jacek S. Podgórski. Cover/Okładka: pictures by / obrazy autorstwa: Teresa Young (front/przód: "The Ripple Effect"; back/tył: " Flight Of The Humblebee"). Graphics inside by / Grafika wewnątrz autorstwa: Karolina Pluta. Address of the Editorial Office / Adres redakcji: skr. poczt. nr 34, U.P. Toruń 2. Filia, ul. Mazowiecka 63/65, 87-100 Toruń, Poland www.avant.edu.pl/en [email protected] Publisher / Wydawca: Ośrodek Badań Filozoficznych, ul. Stawki 3/20, 00-193 Warszawa, Poland www.obf.edu.pl Academic cooperation: university workers and PhD students of Nicolaus Copernicus University (Toruń, Poland). Współpraca naukowa: pracownicy i doktoranci Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu. The Journal has been registered in District Court in Warsaw, under number: PR 17724. Czasopismo zarejestrowano w Sądzie Okręgowym w Warszawie pod numerem: PR 17724. ADVISORY BOARD / RADA NAUKOWA Chairman/Przewodniczący: Włodzisław
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Merleau-Ponty for Cognitive Science
    Chapter 1 1 Merleau-Ponty for Cognitive Science Preamble: A Remarkable Convergence My attention was first drawn to the relevance of Merleau-Ponty for cognitive science through reading Andy Clark's Being There (1997). Clark indicates that Merleau-Ponty's depiction of everyday intelligent activities in terms of "the playing out of whole organism-body-world synergies" is close in spirit and execution to Clark's own project. Moreover, Clark is particularly fond of Merleau-Ponty's stress on the activity of the organism in perception, and he coins the term 'continuous reciprocal causation' to describe this interaction between perceiver and perceived. Clark thus sees Merleau-Ponty as presenting a kind of 'free-form interactive dance' view of perception, which he endorses on the grounds of its compatibility with "recent work in the computational foundations of animate vision." (Clark 1997, p172) I want to take a moment to look at the compatibility that Clark refers to – with the findings of researchers in animate vision – which I think is surprisingly compelling. I offer this as a kind of intuition pump for appreciating the affinity between Merleau-Ponty's writing and certain developments within cognitive science. In the main part of this chapter, I'll go through the ways in which this affinity has been cashed out, supported, and formalised. Merleau-Ponty and animate vision Animate vision is a new engineering paradigm of robot vision which seeks to replace the traditional account of a system which constructs and updates an accurate 3-D model of the viewer's surroundings. This traditional approach is often unfavourably referred to as passive or pure vision and is generally criticised on the grounds that it makes infeasible computational demands on the observer robot, especially when it comes to tasks involving a moving object, a moving observer, or, in the worst case, both.
    [Show full text]
  • Curriculum Vitae 04/04/2021
    Curriculum Vitae 04/04/2021 PETER CARRUTHERS [email protected] http://faculty.philosophy.umd.edu/pcarruthers/ 7400 Glenside Drive Department of Philosophy Takoma Park University of Maryland MD 20912-6923 College Park, MD 20742 Tel.: 301 270 5107 Tel.: 301 405 5705 EMPLOYMENT HISTORY 2001-present UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, COLLEGE PARK. Professor (2001–2018), Department of Philosophy; Distinguished University Professor (2018–present). Chair of Department (June 2001–December 2008). Associate Member, Neuroscience and Cognitive Science Program (NACS) (2002–present). Member, Brain and Behavior Initiative (BBI) (2016–present). 1991-2001 UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD. Senior Lecturer (1991-2), Department of Philosophy; Professor (1992-2001). Head of Department (1993-8). Director, Hang Seng Centre for Cognitive Studies (1992-2000). 1985-91 UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX. Lecturer (tenured) (1985-9), Department of Philosophy; Senior Lecturer (1989-91). 1989-90 — UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, ANN ARBOR. Visiting Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy. 1981-85 QUEEN’S UNIVERSITY OF BELFAST. Lecturer, Department of Philosophy (confirmed in post 1984). 1979-81 UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS. Temporary Lecturer, Department of Logic and Metaphysics. 1978-79 UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, LADY MARGARET HALL. Temporary Lecturer (part-time: 6 hours tutoring per week). EDUCATION AND QUALIFICATIONS 1977-79 UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, BALLIOL COLLEGE. D.Phil. in Philosophy (1980). Thesis: “The place of the private language argument in the philosophy of language.” (Supervisor: Michael Dummett. Examiners: Elizabeth Anscombe, Christopher Peacocke.) 1971-77 UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS. M.Phil. in Philosophy (1977). Thesis: “Blame: an analysis.” (Supervisor: Jennifer Jackson.) Papers: Wittgenstein, Philosophical Logic, Political Philosophy. B.A. (Honors) in Philosophy (1975). 1st Class. “Congratulatory 1st.” Carruthers CV 2 HONORS AND AWARDS 2020: Graduate Faculty Mentor of the Year Award (one of 10 awards made annually among faculty at the University of Maryland).
    [Show full text]
  • A Cognitive Theory of Pretense
    A revised and abbreviated version of this paper is forthcoming in Cognition. Archived at Website for the Rutgers University Research Group on Evolution and Higher Cognition. A Cognitive Theory of Pretense Shaun Nichols Department of Philosophy College of Charleston Charleston, SC 29424 [email protected] and Stephen Stich Department of Philosophy and Center for Cognitive Science Rutgers University New Brunswick, NJ 08901 [email protected] Contents 1. Introduction 2. Some Examples of Pretense 3. Some Features of Pretense 4. A Theory about the Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying Pretense 5. A Comparison with Other Theories 6. Conclusion Abstract Recent accounts of pretense have been underdescribed in a number of ways. In this paper, we present a much more explicit cognitive account of pretense. We begin by presenting a number of real examples of pretense in children and adults. These examples bring out several features of pretense that any adequate theory of pretense must accommodate, and we use these features to develop our theory of pretense. On our theory, pretense representations are contained in a separate workspace, a Possible World Box which is part of the basic architecture of the human mind. The representations in the Possible World Box can have the same content as beliefs. Indeed, we suggest that pretense representations are in the same representational "code" as beliefs and that the representations in the Possible World Box are processed by the same inference and UpDating mechanisms that operate over real beliefs. Our model also posits a Script Elaborator which is implicated in the embellishment that occurs in pretense. Finally, we claim that the behavior that is seen in pretend play is motivated not from a "pretend desire", but from a real desire to act in a way that fits the description being constructed in the Possible World Box.
    [Show full text]
  • Newsletter Template
    Rutgers Philosophy Newsletter Spring 2009 Rutgers is once again ranked 2nd overall Philosophy Department in the US… Inside: Every two years, Blackwell Publishers releases its Philosophical The doctoral program Gourmet Report—a ranking of the fifty best Philosophy departments 4 continues to attract top in the English-speaking world, based on the reputation and graduate students. Meet the accomplishments of their faculty members. In the February 2009 current group and learn what edition, Rutgers was once again ranked 2nd overall in the United rd recent PhDs have done. States (after NYU) and 3 overall in the world (after NYU and Oxford). In the specialty rankings, Rutgers was voted the top department internationally for Philosophy of Language and The New York Times highlights Cognitive Science, and tied for #1 in Epistemology and Mind. 6 Rutgers’ undergraduate Rutgers was among the top four departments for Metaphysics. And Philosophy program. Rutgers was within the top ten for Philosophy of Science, Applied Ethics, Decision Theory and Early Modern Philosophy. The surveys reflect the outstanding strength our department has in core areas. A Letter from the Chair 8 See more of the rankings at www.philosophicalgourmet.com. Catching up with the Faculty: New Research by Rutgers Professors; Conferences, Talks and Upcoming Projects This past year has brought some selection. In April, Larry Temkin changes to the Rutgers faculty. hosted a two-day conference While Barry Loewer continued on human rights in honor of as Chair, Jeff King took over as James Griffin. On May 13th- Graduate Vice-Chair and 14thRutgers will be hosting its first Martin Lin as Undergraduate Foundations of Statistical Vice-Chair.
    [Show full text]
  • Experimental Philosophy Jordan Kiper, Stephen Stich, H. Clark Barrett
    Experimental Philosophy Jordan Kiper, Stephen Stich, H. Clark Barrett, & Edouard Machery Kiper, J., Stich, S., Barrett, H.C., & Machery, E. (in press). Experimental philosophy. In D. Ludwig, I. Koskinen, Z. Mncube, L. Poliseli, & L. Reyes-Garcia (Eds.), Global Epistemologies and Philosophies of Science. New York, NY: Routledge. Acknowledgments: This publication was made possible through the support of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation. Abstract Philosophers have argued that some philosophical concepts are universal, but it is increasingly clear that the question of philosophical universals is far from settled, and that far more cross- cultural research is necessary. In this chapter, we illustrate the relevance of investigating philosophical concepts and describe results from recent cross-cultural studies in experimental philosophy. We focus on the concept of knowledge and outline an ongoing project, the Geography of Philosophy Project, which empirically investigates the concepts of knowledge, understanding, and wisdom across cultures, languages, religions, and socioeconomic groups. We outline questions for future research on philosophical concepts across cultures, with an aim towards resolving questions about universals and variation in philosophical concepts. 1 Introduction For centuries, thinkers have urged that fundamental philosophical concepts, such as the concepts of knowledge or right and wrong, are universal or at least shared by all rational people (e.g., Plato 1892/375 BCE; Kant, 1998/1781; Foot, 2003). Yet many social scientists, in particular cultural anthropologists (e.g., Boas, 1940), but also continental philosophers such as Foucault (1969) have remained skeptical of these claims.
    [Show full text]
  • Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition*
    1 Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition* In recent decades, an intriguing view of human cognition has garnered increasing support. According to this view, which I will call ‘the hypothesis of extended cognition’ (‘HEC’, hereafter), human cognitive processing literally extends into the environment surrounding the organism, and human cognitive states literally comprise—as wholes do their proper parts— elements in that environment; in consequence, while the skin and scalp may encase the human organism, they do not delimit the thinking subject.1 The hypothesis of extended cognition should provoke our critical interest. Acceptance of HEC would alter our approach to research and theorizing in cognitive science and, it would seem, significantly change our conception of persons. Thus, if HEC faces substantive difficulties, these should be brought to light; this paper is meant to do just that, exposing some of the problems HEC must overcome if it is to stand among leading views of the nature of human cognition. The essay unfolds as follows: The first section consists of preliminary remarks, mostly about the scope and content of HEC as I will construe it. Sections II and III clarify HEC by situating it with respect to related theses one finds in the literature—the hypothesis of embedded cognition * I would like to thank Aaron Meskin, David Chalmers, Philip Robbins, and Josh Osbun for comments on earlier drafts of this essay. Shorter versions of the paper were presented at the Mountain-Plains Philosophy Conference (2001), Texas Tech University, and the 2002 meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association.
    [Show full text]
  • Book Reviews
    Journal of cognition and culture �4 (�0�4) �49–�55 brill.com/jocc Book Reviews Joshua Alexander Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction. Polity Press: Cambridge, MA, 2012. US$22.95 Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction is somewhat narrower in scope than Experimental Philosophy by Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols (2008, Oxford University Press, Oxford) and broader than Experiments in Ethics by Kwame Anthony Appiah (2008, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA). The brevity, concise writing style, and focus will make Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction a useful background text for undergraduate teaching and the best introduction to this exciting field for some time to come. Because the field of experimental philosophy is new, customary readers of Journal of Cognition and Culture may not be aware of the purview of such a book. First, Alexander’s book requires background knowledge in analytic phi- losophy; the audience is exclusively analytic philosophy students and profes- sionals. This allows the book its tight focus but gives the impression that, just like in mainstream analytic philosophy, philosophers are still talking amongst themselves. For example, we don’t have an account of the treatment of the cognitive psychology of reasoning and other cognate disciplines in this book. This, and larger discussion of the work of Jesse Prinz, Shaun Nichols and Shaun Gallagher would have been most welcome. Second, Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction appears to dichotomize experimental philosophy and main- stream analytic philosophy in ways that oversimplify how philosophers work. It omits any consideration of the historical tradition of experimental philoso- phy that went under the name ‘natural philosophy’. Overall Experimental Philosophy does not aim to answer fundamental ques- tions about the relationship of philosophy to empirical research, but rather aims to provide helpful, clearly structured summaries of articles, with glosses on them, that have appeared in the recent experimental philosophical litera- ture.
    [Show full text]
  • Scientific Enquiry and Natural Kinds: from Planets to Mallards
    Scientific enquiry and natural kinds: From planets to mallards a philosophical monograph by P.D. Magnus pmagnus<at>fecundity.com This is the authors' final draft. Any citations should refer to the final typeset book, published by Palgrave Macmillan. In addition to canonical pagination and nice binding, the book has a cool picture of mallards on the cover. DOI: 10.1057/9781137271259 c 2012 P.D. Magnus, except where indicated; some figures are used by per- mission or under open licenses Acknowledgements5 Introduction7 1 How to think about natural kinds 10 A Why history is no help...................... 11 B Some criteria considered..................... 13 B.1 The induction assumption................ 14 B.2 The essence assumption................. 24 B.3 The science assumption................. 25 B.4 The law assumption................... 26 B.5 Artifacts and artificial kinds............... 28 B.6 The sharpness assumption................ 31 B.7 Starting with language.................. 34 B.8 The intrinsic feature assumption............. 37 B.9 The hierarchy assumption................ 41 1 B.10 The scarcity assumption................. 43 B.11 The implicit simpliciter assumption........... 44 C Keeping score........................... 50 2 A modest definition 52 A First formulation......................... 52 B More or less natural kinds.................... 54 B.1 Lessons from underdetermination............ 55 B.2 The lessons applied.................... 57 C Induction redux.......................... 59 D Natural kinds for settled science................. 61 D.1 Example: the domain of chemistry........... 62 D.2 Fungible kinds....................... 66 3 Natural kinds put to work 72 A Eight planets, great planets................... 72 A.1 Numerology and asteroids................ 74 A.2 Enter Pluto........................ 75 A.3 The constraints of astronomy.............. 78 A.4 Natural kinds and the fate of Pluto..........
    [Show full text]
  • Society for Philosophy and Psychology
    PROGRAM OF THE 36th MEETING OF THE SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY LEWIS AND CLARK COLLEGE, PORTLAND, OREGON JUNE 9-12, 2010 WEDNESDAY, JUNE 9 7:45-4:00 Pre-conference Workshop: Howard 102 The Psychology and Philosophy of Morality Box lunch included in the workshop registration fee Fiery Cushman, Harvard University / Brown University Julia Driver, Washington University in St. Louis Susan Dwyer, University of Maryland, Baltimore County Joshua Knobe, Yale University Debra Lieberman, University of Miami Thomas Nadelhoffer, Dickinson College / Duke University David Pizarro, Cornell University Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Duke University Jen Wright, College of Charleston Liane Young, MIT / Boston College 4:20-4:30 SPP 2010 Conference Welcome Council Chambers 4:30-5:45 Invited Speaker Council Chambers Chair: Ron Mallon, University of Utah Stephen Stich, Rutgers University, & Wesley Buckwalter, CUNY Graduate Center, Gender and Philosophical Intuitions: Why Are There So Few Women in Philosophy? 5:45-6:30 Poster Madness! Council Chambers 6:30-7:30 Poster Session 1 and Reception Howard Halls 1 THURSDAY, JUNE 10 8:00-8:30 Coffee/Light Breakfast 8:30-9:45 Invited Speaker Council Chambers Chair: Jen Cole Wright, College of Charleston Linda Skitka, University of Illinois at Chicago, The Social and Political Implications of Moral Conviction 9:45-9:55 Break 9:55-11:55 Invited Symposium: Cognizing Human Groups Council Chambers Chair: Colin Allen, Indiana University Katie Kinzler, University of Chicago, The Native Language of Social Cognition Edouard Machery, University of Pittsburg, Title TBA 11:55-1:10 Lunch Break SPP Diversity Committee Meeting Trail Room 1:10-2:10 On the Cutting Edge, Session 1 Howard 102 Chair: David Rose, Carnegie-Mellon University Jonathan Phillips, Yale University, Luke Misenheimer, University of California, Berkeley, & Joshua Knobe, Yale University, “Love and Happiness” Jennifer Zamzow, University of Arizona, Perspective Taking in Moral Judgments Steve Guglielmo, Andrew Monroe, & Kyle Dillon, Brown University, “Coming Up Short vs.
    [Show full text]
  • The Cognitive Basis of Science
    The cognitive basis of science edited by Peter Carruthers Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland College Park Stephen Stich Board of Governors Professor, Department of Philosophy and Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University and Michael Siegal Professor of Psychology, University of Sheffield Published in association with the Hang Seng Centre for Cognitive Studies, University of Sheffield, and the Evolution and Higher Cognition Research Group, Rutgers University PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK 40 West 20th Street, NewYork, NY 10011-4211, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia Ruiz de Alarc´on 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa http://www.cambridge.org C Peter Carruthers, Stephen Stich and Michael Siegal 2002 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2002 Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge Typeface Times 10/12 pt. System LATEX2ε [TB] A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication data The cognitive basis of science/edited by Peter Carruthers, Stephen Stich and Michael Siegal. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-521-81229-1 – ISBN 0-521-01177-9 (pb.) 1. Science – Philosophy. 2. Science – Psychological aspects. I. Carruthers, Peter, 1952– II.
    [Show full text]
  • Strategic Reliabilism: a Naturalistic Approach to Epistemology Michael A
    Philosophy Compass 3/5 (2008): 1049–1065, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00161.x Strategic Reliabilism: A Naturalistic Approach to Epistemology Michael A. Bishop Florida State University J. D. Trout* Loyola University Chicago Abstract Strategic Reliabilism is a framework that yields relative epistemic evaluations of belief-producing cognitive processes. It is a theory of cognitive excellence, or more colloquially, a theory of reasoning excellence (where ‘reasoning’ is understood very broadly as any sort of cognitive process for coming to judgments or beliefs). First introduced in our book, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment (henceforth EPHJ), the basic idea behind SR is that epistemically excellent reasoning is efficient reasoning that leads in a robustly reliable fashion to significant, true beliefs. It differs from most contemporary epistemological theories in two ways. First, it is not a theory of justification or knowledge – a theory of epistemically worthy belief. Strategic Reliabilism is a theory of epistemically worthy ways of forming beliefs. And second, Strategic Reliabilism does not attempt to account for an epistemological property that is assumed to be faithfully reflected in the epistemic judgments and intuitions of philosophers. If SR makes recommendations that accord with our reflective epistemic judgments and intuitions, great. If not, then so much the worse for our reflective epistemic judgments and intuitions. 1. Strategic Reliabilism Strategic Reliabilism (SR) has three parts: 1. The core theory, which articulates the standards according to which cognitive processes are evaluated. 2. The theory of the proper acquisition and revision of cognitive processes. 3. The applied theory, which recommends specific reasoning strategies for particular domains.
    [Show full text]