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Ancient Hatreds or Elite Manipulation? MEMORY AND POLITICS IN THE FORMER Author(s): STEVEN MAJSTOROVIC Reviewed work(s): Source: World Affairs, Vol. 159, No. 4 (SPRING 1997), pp. 170-182 Published by: World Affairs Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672499 . Accessed: 09/11/2011 10:44

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http://www.jstor.org 170 World Affairs

Ancient Hatreds or Elite

Manipulation? MEMORY AND POLITICS INTHE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

an Steven Majstorovic is assis By STEVENMAJSTOROVIC By threatening to reimpose sanctions against tant professor of science political , American envoy at Duquesne University, Pitts the a when he coerced Serbia's burgh, . optimism generated by Dayton forged compromise Any peace accords in late 1995 was substan President. Slobodan Milosevic into obtaining tially eroded by events during the spring and Karadizic's resignation and retreat from public summer of 1996. These events marked a pro life. But Karadzic is yet to be arrested, and his tracted and tragic endgame in the former political influence behind the scenes is still sub Yugoslavia. The flight from by Bos stantial.6Moreover, of the indicted war nian inFebruary and March 1996 was the criminals roam free throughout , Cro first indication of things to come. During the atia, and rumpYugoslavia. summer, who tried to return to their The complexity of the Yugoslav conflict former homes were harassed and attacked by illustrates that the genesis of the war and the paramilitary gangs. The early focus was on the issues of ethnonational7 identity that fed the behavior of the Bosnian Serbs, but now it is flames of conflict are far from being understood apparent that a policy of ethnic apartheid is in any way that reflects some set of shared per being pursued by all sides in Bosnia.' spectives among scholars and pundits. For It was hoped that elections planned for Sep example, the exodus from Sarajevo by the Serbs tember 1996 would thwart and erode the anti in February and March 1996 seems to defy democratic policies of ethnic separatists. But an logic and rationality. One analytic perspective early attempt at elections as a vehicle for con contends that the war is a product of "ancient flict resolution in the divided city of hatreds" rooted in primordial identity and con produced an impasse in which from the sequently any national group that falls under western part of Mostar refused to recognize thepolitical control of another is inmortal dan election results thatgave a slightmajority to the ger. The experience of some Serbs who left from the eastern part of the city.2 Sarajevo certainly reinforces this contention, as When the (EU) threatened to they ran a gauntlet of hostile Bosnian Muslims, leave Mostar, calling it the "biggest crisis"3 supposedly bent on revenge.8 An opposing per since theDayton peace accords, U.S. President spective views the war as the product of elite Bill Clinton personally pressured Croatian manipulation and fear-mongering by ethnic President Franjo Tudjman, and the situation entrepreneurs who fanned the flames of hatred was at least temporarily resolved.4 However, for their own purposes and who manipulated Mostar's former Serb residents, who made up ethnonational identity issues that are them 20 percent of the prewar population, were com selves just a product of an "invented tradition."9 pletely leftout of the election process inMostar Analysts who adhere to the second perspective and repatriation is extremely unlikely.5 suggested that Serbs should take hold of their The Bosnian election problems were com senses, accept the guarantees of the Bosnian pounded when Bosnian President Alija Izetbe Croat , ignore their leader's warn govic threatened to boycott the elections unless ings, and stay in Sarajevo. Despite assurances, indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic however, the Serbs who stayed in Sarajevo have resigned his office as president of the Bosnian been continually threatened.10 Bosnian Prime Serb Republic and was extradited to theHague Minister Hasan Muratovic promised that the war crimes tribunal for the formerYugoslavia. violence against Serbs in Sarajevo would be Vol. 159No. 4 SPRING 1997 171

an stopped. But unfortunately,most of the Serbs in its unending process that is both root Sarajevo now want to leave, including many ed in antiquity and nurtured by modernity. who were loyal to theBosnian government dur The debate between the primordialist notion ing thewar.11 of ethnonational identity and the argument that Clearly, theYugoslav conflict is an almost this identity is socially constructed is a need ideal laboratory for addressing some of the cen lessly constructed dichotomy in itself.Analyses tral questions that scholars of and that highlight a type of primordial fundamen ethnicity pose. Those who espouse a primor talism14 in the work of Geertz15 and Shils16 dialist conception of national identity have often simplify the primordialist perspective as ample evidence to support theirposition, while one that sees ethnic identity as eternal and the constructionists also have abundant data inflexible, an ontological given.17 Although that support their contention that national iden there are primordial perspectives thatare socio tity is essentially an artificial and modern phe biological in orientation and do articulate eth nomenon that is often at themercy of ambitious nic identity as an ontological given,18 a com leaders who manipulate and instrumentalize mon sense approach to the debate might be ethnonational identity. useful. This article argues thatprevailing analyses of A first step in resolving the dichotomy ethnic conflict in the formerYugoslavia that between ethnonational identity as a given and focus either on a notion of ancient, primordial identity as constructed or manufactured is to hatreds rooted in centuries-old identities, or on substitute the term "premodern" for "primor the premise thatethnic identity in theBalkans is dial" and "modern" for "constructed." Anthony a modern social construction that has been Smith's work is concerned with establishing instrumentalized by political elites,12miss the that ethnic groups and existed long essential nature of the ongoing struggle.Histor before the formation of -states and the con ical memory constrains the options that leaders ideology of modern nationalism.19 This exercise in conflict creation and in peacemak tention is extremely important for understand ing. Ethnic identity in the formerYugoslavia, ing the competing claims of Serbs, Croats, and however, has also been and will continue be Bosnian Muslims. All of these ethnonational somewhat flexible and politically adaptive but groups refer to a "Golden Age" when their only within a framework thatdoes not threaten nation was the epitome of cultural achievement. the constraints imposed by myth and memory. Moreover, the maximum boundaries claimed The constraints on masses and elites imposed today by these groups are the ones thatwere by historical experience are particularly applic temporarily achieved during the zenith of their able for the Serbs, somewhat less so for the respective Golden Ages.20 Smith convincingly Croats, and even less so for the Bosnian Mus argues that modern nations do have their lims. The Balkan conflict has both premodern, antecedents in antiquity. He does not deny that are primordial characteristics and modern, con today nations modern. But he does insist structed/instrumentalized elements in which thatmany of the fundamental characteristics of ancient antagonisms (sometimes hatreds) and the modern nation existed long before the modern politics have both contributed apprecia advent of nationalism: to the and an on bly tragedy, overemphasis We find in premodern eras, even in the ancient either perspective misrepresents the nature of world, striking parallels to the modern idea of in the ethnic conflict and politics in the former national identity and character, way and Romans looked on who did Yugoslavia. people not share theircultures or come fromtheir city ISSUES OF ETHNONATIONAL states; in theway inwhich ancientEgyptians looked Nubians and and in IDENTITY upon Asiatics; Mesopotamian and Biblical distinctionsdrawn Both theprimordialist and constructivist per between different peoples. . . . In the ancient world, we find movements that appear to spectives inform the debate over whether the resemble modern nationalism in several essence of a nation is historically rooted or is a respects,notably a desire to liberate territories to be modern, artificial creation. What needs conquered by aliens, or to resist foreign considered is that ethnonational identity is con encroachments. . .. Are we then really justified tinually reformulated in an iterative process in in regardingnations and nationalism as purely whichmemory and myth shape and limitthe modern phenomena?21 boundaries of social construction. This process Smith has also considered , imagi had been labeled primordialization13 and is by nation, and most importantly,reconstruction in 172 World Affairs

the processes of the mythmaking and legend tween the state and the various ethnonational building thatare so central to the process of pri groups that are incorporated into it. The state mordialization.22 Further, Smith has now used disseminates a picture of a nation that can tran the term "" to examine the re-creation scend and subsume the differences between and reconstruction of the past, which is the political allegiance to the state and ethnona essence of primordialization. tional identity.However, very few states have succeeded inmaking the state and nation con the role of nationalists in [Smith] recognizes This dualism also results in an ideo national but stresses that national gruent.26 are or mere logical conflict between the political ideal of ists not social engineers image the nation-state and the historical of the makers as modernist and post-modernist reality accounts would have it, but rather social and nation. In interwarYugoslavia, the attempt to whose activitiesconsist political archaeologists create congruence between nation and state led in the rediscovery and reinterpretationof the to pronouncements that aYugoslav identitywas ethnic past and throughit the regenerationof in the process of creation. These naive assump their national community.23 tions were inspired by oversimplified policy Although terms such as "re-creation" and approaches that emphasized ethnocultural sim "reconstruction" are useful, I suggest that they ilarities and the inevitable convergence of are still too artificial and unnecessarily rooted Croat, Slovene, and Serb identity.After World in the constructivist orientation and terminolo War II, the Communists tried to construct a gy, while the notion of primordialization socialist national identity that transcended eth implies a process that is more clearly tied to nicity by embarking on Yugoslavianism cam history and yet is capable of constant renewal. paigns. Like the interwar efforts to fashion a The term "geology" and the notion of political common identity, these effortswere in vain and archaeologists are, however, very relevant to in fact only precipitated greater identitydiffer the . These terms depict a cultural entiation.27 milieu in which political leaders are con Walker Connor strongly asserts that ethnici strained and limited in their capacities to ty is generally an independent variable and manipulate and instrumentalize ethnonational social formation whose behavior can be mani identity.Ethnic entrepreneurs have to confront fested by the dimensions of language, religion, the reality of shared historical experience, and and class.28 But those dimensions are them the emotional symbols available for political selves not the essence of ethnic identity or of manipulation cannot just be invented out of thin the forces that drive ethnic politics to such air but must have socio-historical resonance. intense levels of political conflict over the Nineteenth-century nationalism in issues surrounding those dimensions. Connor and twentieth-centurynationalism in the post advances the proposition that ethnicity is a World War II, decolonized Third World have form of shared identity that is subjectively generally produced multiethnic nation-states. defined through historical memory, myth, and These states are almost inevitably dominated by shared experience.29 a single .24 In reaction, ethnic It is the intangibility of this subjective and groups outside of the state apparatus have be historically experienced bond that leads Con come politicized and highly aware of their col nor to conclude that language, religion, and lective interests. "Within these boundaries, the economics/class are epiphenomenal and that question was to whom the new states be the essence of ethnicity and its relationship to longed."25 The notion of who owned the state is politics will remain amorphous and resistant to critical because in the formerYugoslavia no eth analyses thatdepend on objective categories to nic group predominated consistently, although explain ethnopolitical behavior and conflict. the Serbs were a plurality of the population. Connor laments that few scholars have con When Yugoslavia broke up into new states, the fronted the nature of the ethnonational bond issue was thatSerbs were a substantial minority and criticizes others who have little apprecia in the new states.As the president of the former tion for the emotional and psychological hold Yugoslav Republic of once re that ethnonational identityhas on themembers marked, "Why should I be a minority in your of the group.30 He contends that one critical statewhen you can be a minority inmine?" issue thatmany scholars miss is that the objec The problem of dualism also creates ethno tive history of an ethnonational group is irrele political conflict in the nation-state. There is a vant for understanding the critical subjective significant ambiguity in the relationship be essence of ethnic identity: Vol. 159No. 4 SPRING 1997 173

It is not what is, but what people believe is that under secular capitalism is not too esoteric to has behavioral And a subcon consequences. comprehend. In other words, it is the communi scious belief in the group's separate origin and cation between members of a particular group evolution is an essential ingredient of ethnona that creates a sense of shared a tional psychology. A nation is a group of peo psychic space, shared In a similar ple characterized by a myth of common dis subjective identity. vein, sent. Moreover, regardless of its roots, a nation Shils refers to this sense of shared identityas a must remain an essentially endogamous group "collective self-consciousness."37 in order tomaintain its myth.3' Despite Anderson's constructivist position, Rothschild notes that itwould not be useful, however, much of his effort involves a detailed or even possible, to utilize a strictly subjective description of the historical events,myths, leg framework and separate ethnonational identity ends, and real or imagined experiences that are from religious, linguistic, or other dimen part and parcel of the construction project. sions.32He feels that if these dimensions were What seems to be evident in thewhole primor peeled off it would be difficult to see what dialism versus constructivism debate is the would be left to examine and understand. The obvious fact that ethnic identity is malleable, subjective and historically experienced nature but not infinitelymalleable, and that an eth of ethnic identity is, however, precisely what nonational identity cannot be completely imag drives ethnic conflict in Bosnia, "for national ined without something to stimulate the imagi ism, like other profound emotions such as love nation. Identity is not produced upon a blank and hate, is more than the sum of the parts slate, and ethnic groups do not sufferfrom his which are susceptible of cold and rational torical Alzheimer's disease. There is historical analysis."33 Royce resolves the difference clay thatneeds to be reshaped, and the shape of between subjective and objective ethnic identi the clay in a previous epoch lends a constrain tymarkers and suggests that while the ethnic ingfactor to thepolitical elites in a subsequent group identifies itself subjectively and histori historical juncture; in the case of the former cally, other ethnic groups and thirdparty schol Yugoslavia, is a key to understanding themain ars tend use objective criteria.34Consequently, tenance of adversarial and competing histories. from a conflict resolution and analytic perspec The result of this continual process of identity tive itmust be understood that ethnic groups construction and reconstruction is the process usually talk past each other and use objective of primordialization.38 criteria to generalize about the "other" while In other words, primordialization is primari saving subjective and historical categories to ly concerned with creating, re-creating, or en describe the experiences of the "we" or "us." hancing an identity that is subjective and his It is clear from the subjective and historical torically rooted. The upshot of all this is that perspective that ethnic identity is both rooted in some ethnic groups, with a longer history and history and is subject to social engineering. But thus a larger, and perhaps unwieldy, product of even an advocate of the modern notion of a identity-supportinghistorical experience, might nation, Hobsbawn,35 who argues strongly that be less able to adapt to changing circumstances; states make nations and that nations do not in the case ofYugoslavia it is the Serbs who are make states, still presents a chapter on "proto themost rooted, or stuck, in the historical mud. nationalism" that could easily be integrated in For the Serbs, more than for theCroats orMus Anthony Smith's The Ethnic Origins of lims, the parameters of construction and recon Nations. Benedict Anderson sees modern struction become narrower with each historical nations as artificial, imagined communities. For iteration of identity reinforcement, or primor Anderson, the decline of religion and the explo dialization. sion of information through the printed word The instrumentalist perspective sees ethnic have become necessary to transcend death by identity as a dependent variable that is shaped imagining communities that are both sovereign by certain independent, objective processes. and limited and with which anonymous indi Hobsbawm contends that is the viduals can identify. Thus, through printed best approach in trying to establish criteria for communication, people can artificially share a defining the nation. He believes that single cat sense of posterity, shared psychological space, egories such as common territory, cultural and cultural homogeneity.36 Although Ander traits,common history, ethnicity, and language son's argument is somewhat esoteric, the idea are insufficient.39These categories happen to be of a printed word that stresses property rights very similar to Stalin's definition of a nation: and the market to psychologically fill needs "A nation is a historically evolved, stable com 174 World Affairs

munity of language, territory,economic life and MEMORY AND MYTH IN , psychological make-up manifested in a com CROATIAN, AND BOSNIAN MUSLIM munity of culture."' Although Hobsbawm con ETHNONATIONAL IDENTITY siders these objective criteria, he still dismisses When the term "Balkan is them as "fuzzy, shifting,and ambiguous."41 politics" conjured up, a mental thatmany The alternative to an objective definition of picture people might have is one of incessant conflict, ethnic tinder ethnic or national identity is a subjective one. boxes, and terrorist This But Hobsbawm warns that a subjective defini plots. stereotypical view not tion can lead the "incautious into extremes of of Balkan politics is wholly inaccurate. The Balkans have been a crossroads voluntarism which suggests that all that is historically for and area needed to be or create or recreate a nation is the conquest occupation. The that is now Yugoslavia was settled by themigration of tribes during the sixth century. Those tribes were until the of In addition to from each other independent beginning being distinguished the twelfthcentury, when theCroatians yielded by self-defined differences in tribal custom and toHungarian political dominance, and until the culture, the South were further differentiated beginning of the fifteenthcentury when the Ser bians were defeated the Ottoman . the in the Christian church. by by split External rule from , , , or lasted until the beginning of the twenti eth century, although in a series of revolts the Serbs had formed an independent state by the middle of the nineteenth century. In addition to being distinguished from each other by self-defined differences in tribal custom and culture," the South Slavs47 were furtherdif ferentiated the in the Christian church. will to be one; if enough inhabitants of the Isle by split As a theCroats and iden ofWight wanted to be aWightian nation, there consequence, tifiedwith Roman while the Serbs would be one."42 Despite Hobsbawm's admoni Catholicism, were under the of and tion, however, it is precisely the subjective and jurisdiction had formed the thirteenth an inde historically experienced nature of a nation and by century its extreme voluntarism thatwe see in the former pendent . This division between East andWest was reinforcedwhen the Yugoslavia, and it is thisnature that is central for Eastern Orthodox Serbs fell under Turkish an understanding of ethnonational identity. rule, while the Croats and Slovenes answered to Rabushka and Shepsle argue that ethnicity is and and to theAus used instrumentally in electoral politics within Hungary, eventually when the South plural societies, as it was in the secessionist tro-Hungarian . Thus, were a common state elections in , , and Bosnia.43 Slavs brought into in 1918, the for ethnonational conflict had been set Although they never address the question of stage a thousand of ethnicity as a dependent or independent vari by years history. can as a able, theirwork implies that the process of eth Serbian identity best be understood nic outbidding by elites and rational ethnic vot combination of threehistorical experiences: the ing by individuals is an instrumental use of memory of the Battle of in 1389 and ethnicity in which the political process is the subsequent five hundred years of servitude shaped by ethnicity and the political process in and resistance against the Ottoman Turks; the turn shapes ethnic identity. Consequently, successful revolts against theTurks early in the instrumentalism by political elites44 is an inter nineteenth century that culminated in an inde vening or mediating force that combines with pendent Serbian state by themiddle of the cen the process of primordialization. This combina tury; and the role of the Serbs as allies of the tion strongly suggests thatethnonational identi West in twoWorld Wars. ty is both a dependent and an independent vari By the fourteenth century, the Serbs under able and the relationship between the primor Dusan had grown into a medieval empire dialization process and instrumentalist forces that spanned the Balkans from theAdriatic to of political elites is, like the relationship be Western and to most of and tween the primordialist and constructivist some areas in northernGreece. After his death dimensions, reciprocal or interdependent.45 in 1355, centralized power started to ebb, and Vol. 159 No. 4 SPRING~ 19971 7

various Serb nobles started to unravel the sys The memory of an independent state thatwas tem set up by Dusan. In 1371, however, relinquished to form the Kingdom of South Lazar came to power and a temporary recen Slavs is also a critical part of Serb identity.The tralization of control was established. This short theme of successful revolt and emancipation period ended at (The Field of dominates the mythicizing of the Balkan Blackbirds) on 28 June 1389.48 Wars.55 Finally, the Serbian role inWorld War I The battle between the Serb forces of Prince and World War II completes the picture. Serbs Lazar and the Ottoman Turks was at the time suffered enormous losses in both wars and con perceived as either a pyrrhic victory for the tinually stress theirpart in theAllied victories, Turks or indecisive. The Serbian state survived comparing their role toCroat, Bosnian Muslim, for another seventy years before finally suc and Albanian collaboration. In particular, the cumbing to Ottoman rule. However, the cata role of General Draza Mihailovich and the a clysmic nature of battle inwhich Prince Lazar Chetnik resistance inWorld War II is highlight and his son were beheaded, the Turkish ed, as archival evidence has suggested a reas Murad disemboweled by the Serbian sessment of Tito and the role of the partisans.56 Milos Obilic, and in which therewere horrific Surprisingly, Serbs do not consider the geno losses on both sides (over 100,000 deaths in an cidal policies of theCroatian Ustasha state and eight-to-ten-hour battle) created amyth-making theirBosnian Muslim allies duringWorld War apparatus that has shaped Serbian conscious II as an importantelement of Serbian identity.57 ness to this day.49 Instead, the events are often used as a way to The battle decimated the Serb and stereotype all Croatians and Muslims by both cost theOttomans dearly. Almost immediately, Serb masses and elites. In particular, the Serbian poets, priests, and peasants started to Ustasha- and Muslim-led of Serbs in propagate the notion of Christian martyrdom by Croatia and Bosnia inWorld War II has been the Serbian people, Prince Lazar, and Milos the key to understanding Bosnian Serb and Obilic. The primordialization of the event had Croatian Serb and military mobi all the elements of a passion play played out in lization strategies against Croats and Muslims real life. Interestingly enough, the perspective in the contemporary period. Both Radovan of the Ottoman Turks only reinforces the Ser Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb bian myths: military leader, have used the events ofWorld War II to demonize Croats and Yet thisOttoman view in some ways mirrors successfully traditionalSerbian views. Both theOttoman Muslims in the eyes of the Serbs. and Serbian accounts emphasize the battle's Croatian identity also has a memory of a nature. Both traditions have mar cataclysmic medieval kingdom, but one thatpeacefully gave tyrdom as a theme.50 up its sovereignty to the Hungarian crown in Added to this vision shared between the 1102. The project of identityprimordialization Serbs and theTurks, the battle itself is routine by the Croats has been to present events since ly listed in historical surveys as one of themost 1102 as evidence for the continuity of a Croat important events in history.The result of all this ian state inwaiting. The keys to this continuity valorization is an identitymarker that is so root are peasant uprisings, a succession of Croatian ed in real historical events that it is almost ,58 advances inCroatian culture and learn impossible for Serbs to escape its ubiquitous ing that depict Croatia as a part of a Western presence in Serbian identity. European culture that is distinct from the Serbs, Also a part of theKosovo myth is the tale of and the unbroken reality of Croatian national migration by Serbs from Kosovo, the failed consciousness thatgoes back to the seventh cen attempts tomigrate back over a period of cen tury.59What is often ignored by Serbs is that it turies,5' and the final triumphantreturn toKoso was the effortsof Croat intellectuals and church vo in 1912.52 Taken together, these events,which leaders in the nineteenth century that first were kept alive by the Serbian Orthodox church broached the idea of a single South Slav state." in the liturgy53and by traveling troubadourswho Croatian identity is also tied to theCatholic annually embellished the story in a ever-growing church and its role in resisting Serbian domi epic poem ("The Kosovo Cycle"),54 suggest that nance in the . The issue of Ser even the horrible events in Bosnia may have bian dominance is hotly debated between Serbs been less destructive than thepotential for catas and Croats. While Croats refer to Serbian dom trophe in the Serbian province of Kosovo that is inance,61 Serbs refer to Croat obstructionism.62 today 90 percent Albanian. The debate has no resolution, but by 1938 Cro 176 World Affairs

atia did win considerable autonomy from Bel and the -led recognition by the world grade and was, effectively, a state within a community. Pronouncements from state. seem to support this view, although it is still too Another part of the Croatian primordializa early for any complete evaluation. tion project is to address the events ofWorld Until the and the siege of Sara War II by minimizing the Ustasha aspect and jevo began in 1992, Bosnian Muslim identity emphasizing the role of theCroats in the parti was essentially a tug of war between Serbian, san resistance led by Tito.63 This interpretation, Croatian, and Bosnian Muslim interpretations however, is also open for debate between of history.The Serb perspective is that theMus Croats and Serbs, since most sources that lims are Islamicized Slavs who were mostly address Tito's partisan movement make it clear Serbs. The Croat view is that these same Slavs that an overwhelming majority of the partisans were Catholic Croats. Some Bosnian Muslims, were Serbs, and thatmany Croatians did not however, claim that they are descended from join until Tito, a Croat, offered a pardon at the the Bogomils, who were a heretic Manechean end of 1943 to anyone who joined the parti sect.67Moreover, many Muslim intellectuals " sans, although Tito's action did alienate many during the nineteenth century started to claim Serb partisans. It should also be noted that that theBogomils were really Turks fromAna many Serb renegade units participated in tolia and that the "only thing Slavic about the revenge massacres against Croatian and Mus Bosnian Muslims is their language, which they civilians toward the end ofWorld War II. absorbed from the indigenous population."68 These killings numbered in the thousands and There are also perspectives that contend that are remembered by Croats and Muslims who theBogomils were much more than a sect and insist that the slaughter was mutual and that the that contemporary Bosnian Serbs are not really world has tended to ignore Croatian and Mus Serbs but an offshoot of theVlachs, a sheep lim victims ofWorld War II. herding people related to theRumanians.69 Croatian identity is also reinforced by the Muslim ethnic identity got a boost in 1971 failure of the Croatian Republic to separate when theywere officially declared a nationali fromYugoslavia during what is called theCroa tyby the Tito regime. He thought that this dec tianCrises or of 1968-72. The larationmight end thewarring claims forMus crises started out as an attempt to liberalize the lim identity by the Serbs and Croats. Tito's economic and political system. But themove rationale was that the creation of Bosnia ment was eventually taken over by nationalist Hercegovina as a republic at the end ofWorld elements who pushed for Croatian indepen War II had outlived its usefulness as a buffer dence. An alarmed Tito brutally ended the between theCroats and the Serbs and that some was movement and purged theCroatian party of lib other policy necessary. erals. He then did the same thing to the Serbian There are many recentworks thatpresent the party to effect some semblance of ethnic sym history of Bosnia as generally one of intereth metry.65 Unfortunately, many of the liberals nic harmony and cooperation.70 But it isDonia who were purged in both the Serbian and Croa and Fine's thorough research that,despite their tianCommunist parties were the type of leaders contentions, highlights very ancient roots of the who might have been effective in heading off conflict in Bosnia.71 They present a rich the level of conflict in theYugoslav conflict of chronology of Bosnian life from antiquity to 1991-95. But it is from the experience of the present tragedy.Their most important con 1968-72 thatmany Croatians today stereotype tribution is the thorough and impressive Serbs as conservative Communists while debunking of the incessant claims of Croatian Croats see themselves as liberal democrats in and Serbian chauvinists. Serb nationalists pro theWestern tradition. It was also during the duce evidence thatmost Bosnian Muslims are period of theCroatian Crises thatFranjo Tudj Orthodox Serbs who were forcibly converted to man became a staunch nationalist who started by the Ottoman Turks, while Croat towrite revisionist tracts about what he labeled nationalists argue thatBosnian Muslims are by the myth of the number of Serbian deaths in blood the "truest" and "purest" of Catholic World War 11.66 Croats who were led astray by theTurks. The next element in the continual primor The conversion to Islam inBosnia was char dialization of Croatian identitywill become the acterized by a very complex process. Bosnian successful secession from Yugoslavia in 1991, Muslims were once Slavic who were Croatian suffering at the hands of the Serbs, neither Serbs nor Croats but had a distinct Vol. 159No. 4 SPRING 1997 177

Bosnian identity and belonged to a Bosnian non-ethnic marker to identifyCroats and Serbs, church that ostensibly bowed toward Rome, a a pre-nineteenth-century Croat and Bosnian fact thatCroats seize upon tomake theirclaims. ethnicity did not exist. But Serbian settlers But the rites of this church closely followed the started moving into Bosnia by the early fif Eastern Orthodox model, which Serbs contend teenth century to escape Ottoman expansion establishes Serbian identity.But what is most intoKosovo, the Serbian heartland. After some evident is that the was never initial migration of Croats out of Bosnia, the well established, therewere few priests, and the Franciscan order successfully helped tomain Bosnian Slavic peasants maintained only a ten tain a Croat presence in the area of western uous as tie toChristianity. Thus, with theOttoman Bosnia known Hercegovina. Furthermore, penetration intoBosnia in the fifteenthcentury, theAustrians offered Serbs land to act as a mil these peasants began a gradual conversion to itarybuffer against theTurks, and by the seven Islam in a pragmatic decisionmaking process teenth century Serbs occupied the Krajina in that took between one and two centuries.More Croatia and adjacent areas inBosnia. Croat and over, the contention by some modern Bosnian Serb consciousness was well established and Muslim scholars that Muslim identity was was not simply a construction of nineteenth never Christian but instead sprang from the century nationalism.74 Bogomils, a sect that rejected and In the social system built by the Ottomans, its rituals, is also refuted by evidence that the theMuslim converts were landowners and free Bogomils in Bosnia were very few in number holders, and the overwhelming majority of and were never influential in the development peasants, who were taxed heavily and lived as of Bosnian history.72 second-class citizens, were Serbs, along with a Eventually, Muslims adapted to the erosion number of Croats.75 The peasants, especially of Ottoman hegemony, the nineteenth century the Serbs, who lived in this Jim Crow system influence of theAustro-Hungarian empire, the chafed at the inequities and started to revolt by and , the first the nineteenth century.Of particular interest to Yugoslavia in which Serbs predominated, a contemporary understanding of ethnic fric World War II, theTito period inwhich theMus tions is that, as theOttoman empire eroded and lims finally gained official status as a nation in was forced tomake concessions to subject pop Bosnia, and the final degeneration into civil ulations, itwas in Bosnia where the local Mus war. During this period, the Muslims often lim landlords were the most reactionary and exhibited a predilection for compromise and hostile to any changes that threatened their

pragmatism, especially after the fall of the paramountcy.76 , as theMuslims formed politi If the above-recounted issues are not evi cal parties and interest groups whose purpose dence of "ancient hatreds," then at least there was to tread the narrow balance point between was fertile ground in Bosnia for ancient antag blatant Croat and Serb attempts to capture their onisms. When it came tomanipulating public loyalty. Throughout the period, the tolerant, opinion, Milosevic in Serbia and Tudjman in cooperative, and multicultural nature of Bos Croatia are often cited as architects of thewar nian society is stressed by Bosnian Muslim in Bosnia. However, Bosnian President Alija nationalists.73 But a closer examination reveals Izetbegovic should not be leftoff the hook. His thatBosnian society was somewhat less toler role in the war, his rather radical political ant and harmonious that some would contend. views,77 and his reneging on theLisbon Agree The constructionist and instrumentalist per ment of 1992 that would have maintained a spectives suggest that Croat and Serb ethnic multiethnic Bosnia need to be examined close consciousness did not exist in Bosnia prior to ly.78 Still, it is clear from the evidence that the nineteenth century and that the often men despite the protestations of extremist Serbs and tioned notion that the current war is based on Croats, the reality of a Muslim national identi "ancient hatreds" is false. But history presents a ty is undeniable. The notion of a Bosnia inmul more complex picture. It is clear that the devel tiethnic harmony before the current struggle is opment ofmedieval Bosnia did not occur in iso an insupportable myth thatcould be maintained lation and was closely connected to events in only by a centralized Communist system.When Serbia and Croatia. Also, the Ottoman Tito died and the system collapsed, history system identified ethnic groups by religion started to catch up rather quickly. instead of ethnicity. Consequently, it is often It should be apparent that at this point Mus mistakenly assumed that since theTurks used a lim identity is still in theprocess of primordial 178 Worldl AIhr

ization. The sieges of Sarajevo and Mostar and era. An example of this effort is the release of the killing fields of will be the the new Croatian currency during May 1994. building blocks as Kosovo was for the Serbs. The new currency is called the "Kuna" and Instead of historical records and oral history, refers to a forestmarten. The only memory of theBosnian Muslims will have access to video this currency dates back to theUstasha regime, tapes, and Benedict Anderson's notion of the and Jews and Serbs inCroatia have protested in printing press as a vehicle for the imaging of vain. Croatian historians, some quite reluctant identity has evolved to NPR and PBS. The ly,have scrambled to discover or perhaps imag Bosnian Muslims are quickly moving from ine instances where marten skins have been being to Bosnian Muslims, and used in trade within Croatia during the past women wearing veils have started to appear in thousand years. Some isolated instances have been discovered and so the process of primor dialization continues.83 The Serbs have started to the Moreover, theCroats, as they did during the already mythicize have declared thatCroat is a of civilians from the 1960s,84 recently expulsion 250,000 Krajina separate language from Serbian and have intro of Croatia, an expulsion that theUnited duced numerous words that go back to Slavic anachronisms from the Differences in States refrained from labeling "." past. dialect between Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian are probably less pronounced, according to most linguists, than between American and British English. But the process of identity dif ferentiation through language policy is in high villages and even on the streets of Sarajevo.79 gear. In reaction, the Serbs and the Bosnian Moreover, the flirtation with Islamic forces Muslims have also jumped on the bandwagon, from the , particularly Iran, has and perhaps in five hundred years therewill be been recently documented.80 three different languages created from the cur In contrast toMuslim identity,Serbian iden rent Serbo-Croatian.85 tity is rooted in a centuries-old primordializa The Muslims are in some sense themost free tion project. Despite Milosevic's manipulation to pursue their own vision of an ethnic identity. of the Serbian media and elections, the force of Without a Kosovo or a thousand-year state to elite manipulation in an instrumentalist fashion guide them, they are in a Big Bang period of is not as significant as one would think for Ser imagining theirplace in theworld. The process bian identity today because Milosevic, or any of primordialization occurs under thewatchful democratic alternative to him, would be con eye of theworld, and the instrumental policies strained by history from stepping too far out of the government in Sarajevo are profoundly side the successful Kosovo-inspired primor tied to this process. Primordialist, construc dialization of identity.81 There are even tivist, and instrumentalist categories have col arguments that in the case of the Serbs it is the lapsed upon each other in Sarajevo, and the elites who have been shaped by thememories Bosnian Muslims have the luxury of picking and themyths of themasses.82 The Serbs, more and choosing, although there is growing evi than the Croats or Muslims, are shackled by dence that their role as absolute victim is start their view of history and may not be able to ing to come under question as more recent evi escape what they see as an apocalyptic destiny, dence has started to point toward a more a destiny that unfortunately combines national symmetrical structure of suffering in the cur paranoia with a sense of a messianic mission to rent conflict.86Choices for theCroats are more defend Christianity from the mounting forces limited but still possible. of Islam. The Serbs are fanatically committed to a The Croatian model represents an ethnic mythic identity that may not allow choices, identity that is still in the process of primor even if they desire them.Moreover, the Serbs dialization, which is conmmittedto reinforce the have already started tomythicize the expulsion notion of a thousand-year history. This project of 250,000 civilians from theKrajina region of is augmented by a heavy dose of instrumental Croatia, an expulsion that the ism as President Tudjman and his supporters on refrained from labeling "ethnic cleansing." The theRight try to hold onto the power and privi Serbs have also started to focus on the slaugh leges that they enjoyed during the Communist ter of Serbs in the Srebrenica area87 before the Vol. 159No. 4 SPRING 1997 179

Bosnian Serb army atrocities of July 1995 as interchangeable. For an extended and helpful discus new fodder for their continued vision of mar sion of these terms, see Walker Connor, "A Nation is a a an a Nation is State, is Ethnic Group, is ..." Eth tyrdom. If the Serbs cannot break out of a pri nic and Racial Studies 1 (1978): 377-400. mordialization thathas exhausted process itself, 8. Kuzmanovic, "Serbs Stoned, Taunted then the outlook for the Balkans is bleak very in Bosnia Takeover" Associated Press, 24 February indeed, and the post-Dayton events of 1996 1996. 9. E. Hobsbawm and T. The Inven may be the harbinger of tragedy when the Ranger, eds., tion Tradition NATO forces leave Bosnia. of (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1983). The of the ethnic conflict in the complexity 10. See Mike O'Connor, "Bosnian Serbs Are former has illustrated the Yugoslavia difficulty Threatened in Sarajevo," New York Times, 6 June of mono-causal analyses. Despite the penchant 1996. 11.Patrick Moore, "Bosnian Prime Minister in postmodern analysis for stressing the decen End toHarassment of 26 tered who can identities like Pledges Serbs,"OMRI, July person change 1996. ethnonational often clothing,88 identity predis 12. See V. P. Gagnon, Jr., "Serbia's Road toWar," to with rational decision poses people dispense in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Nation making and instead embrace a policy of radical alism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy (Baltimore: ethnic altruism in which lives are sacrificed.89 JohnsHopkins UniversityPress, 1994). 13. StevenMajstorovic, "The Primordializationof And although the examination of elite behavior Ethnonational Identityin theFormer Yugoslavia: A is and of the of social part parcel methodology SyntheticModel," Conference paper presentedat the scientists, this methodology falls short when Annual Meeting of theWestern Political Science historically rooted conflicts are examined. In Association, San Francisco, CA, 14-16 March 1996. JackDavid Eller M. the dark street of available data, it is elite 14. See and Reed Coughlan, "The Povertyof Primordialism:The D?mystification behavior that is litby the lamp at the end of the of Ethnic Attachments," Ethnic and Racial Studies street.But it is the rest of the street inwhich the 16 (April 1993): 183-201. richness and cultural thickness of memory, 15.Clifford Geertz, The Interpretationof Cultures myth, and shared experience lurks in shadows. (NewYork: Basic Books, 1973). The data in these shadows are often difficult to 16.Edward Shils, "Primordial,Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties," British Journal of Sociology 1 measure empirically. We must, however, seri (1957): 113-45. ously consider their lest we validity ignore 17.A spiritedresponse to Eller and Coughlin is them at cost to future and great peacemaking presented by StevenGrosby inwhich he argues for conflict resolution. the importanceof historical experience in ethnona tionalmemory and for a less simplisticanalysis of NOTES thework of Geertz and Shils. See Steven Grosby, "The Verdict of History: The InexpungeableTie of 1. See Liam McDowall, "Group Bosnia Primordiality?A Response toEller and Coughlan," Refugees Blocked," Associated Press, 3 August Ethnic and Racial Studies 17 (January 1994): 164 1996. 70.

2. See Ivica Profaca, "Bosnian Factions at 18. See R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong, The Genet Impasse,"Associated Press, 5August 1996. ic Seeds of Warfare: Evolution, Nationalism, and 3. Christine Spolar, "EU Considers Leaving as Patriotism (Boston:Un win Hyman, 1989). Croats in Mostar Disregard Deadline," Washington 19. See, forexample, Anthony Smith,The Ethnic Post, 5 August 1996. Origins ofNations (Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1986) 4. See JanePerez, "Divided City's Croats Agree and Anthony Smith,Theories ofNationalism (New toHonor Vote Results," New YorkTimes, 7 August York: Holes & Meier Publishers, 1983). 1996; ChristineSpolar, " End Dispute Over 20. See G. Roskin, The Rebirth of East Divided City,"Washington Post, 1 August 1996. Europe, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 5. See John Pomfret, "Bosnian City Bombing 1994) . Bodes 111for Elections," Washington Post, 28 June 21. Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of 1996. Pomfretalso discusses how theEU made elec Nations, 12-13. tionbooths available forMostar's Muslim and Croat 22. See Anthony Smith, "The Nation: Invented, refugees throughout Europe and the former Imagined, Reconstructed?" Millennium: Journal of Yugoslavia but not for theSerbs. Moreover, Pomfret InternationalStudies 20 (1991): 353-68. reveals that the NATO commander in the region 23. See Anthony Smith, "Gastronomy or Geolo arrangedfor safe bus passage of formerMuslim res gy? The Role of Nationalism in theReconstruction identswho wanted tovote in theMostar election but of Nations," Nations and Nationalism 1 (March refrainedfor making similararrangements for Serbs. 1995) : 3-23. 6. See JanePerlez, "Bosnian Serb Chief Agrees 24. JosephRothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Concep toGive Up Power,"New YorkTimes, 20 July 1996. tual Framework (New York: 7. In the context of ethnic groups thatmake Press, 1981), 216. claims to nationhood and even to states, the terms 25. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict ethnic group, ethnonational group, and nation are (Berkeley:University of Press, 1985), 4. 180 World Affairs

now 26. , Iceland, , Slovenia, and itics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic are Croatia exceptions to the general incongruence Instability(Columbus: Merrill, 1972). between the stateand nation that is characteristicof 44. Instead of collapsing primordialism and con are one themajority of nation-statesthat in factmultina structivism into category?primordialization? tional or multiethnic. See Walker Connor, "Nation as I have above, others have combined instrumental or Building Nation-Destroying?" World Politics 24 ism and constructivism. See for example, Hudson (1972): 319-55. Meadwell, "Cultural and Instrumental Approaches 27. See Alex N. Dragnich, The First Yugoslavia: toEthnic Nationalism," Ethnic and Racial Studies!! Search For a Viable Political System (Stanford: (1989): 309-27; and Ernst B. Haas, "Nationalism: Hoover InstitutionPress, 1983) and Pedro Ramet, An Instrumental Social Construction," Millennium: Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia (Bloom Journal of InternationalStudies 22 (1993): 505-45. ington: IndianaUniversity Press, 1984). 45. The obvious objection to this depiction of a 28. Describing ethnicityas an independentvari complex relationship is that it is tautological since a able does not imply simplisticcausal assumption. theremust be some independentvariable out there no It is clear that sociopolitical variables are com somewhere thatcan drive the relationships through pletely independentor dependent. It argued here, history.I would suggest that this type of objection, however, that the force of ethnicity is powerful althoughwell grounded from a particular epistemo to a manner enough shape political outcomes in that logica! perspective, needs to consider the inherent is largely independent of class structures. See Steven voluntarism and self-consciousness involved in eth Maj storovie, "Politicized Ethnicity and Economic nopolitics and ethnic identity. And, consciousness Inequality:A Subjective Perspective and a Cross itselfhas yet to be reduced to objective categories National Examination," Nationalism and Ethnic Pol and its subjectivenature lends itselfeasily tomodels itics 1 (Spring 1995): 33-53. that may seem tautological from certain perspec 29. For representative examples of Connor's tives. see or important insights, Walker Connor, "Eco- 46. See for example, Ivo Banac, The National Ethno-Nationalism," Ethnic and Racial Studies 1 Question in Yugoslavia: Origins. History, Politics (1984): 342-59;Walker Connor, "Nation-Buildingor (Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 1984) andAlex N. Nation-Destroying?"; Walker Connor, "A Nation is a Dragnich and Slavko Todorovich, The Saga ofKoso a an . . Nation is State, is Ethnic Group, is a ."; and vo (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1984). Walker Connor, "Ethnonationalism" in Understand 47. In Serbo-Croatian the word yug means south. ing Political Development, Myron Weiner and Thus, Yugoslavia was the land of the Southern Slavs. Samuel P. Huntington, eds. (Boston: Little, Brown 48. 28 June (15 June in theEastern Orthodox cal and Company, 1987), 196-220. endar) is a critical day in Serbian mythology. This 30. Walker Connor, "Ethnonationalism," 204-05. day, called for St. day, commemo 31. Ibid., p. 206. rates the , the assassination of Aus 32. Rothschild, Ethnopolitics, 8-9. trianArchduke Ferdinand by a Bosnian Serb (Gavri 33. Rupert Emerson, From Empire toNation: The lo Princip) in 1914, and thedate of thefirst Yugoslav to Rise Self-Assertionof Asian and African Peoples Constitution in 1921. Along with , , (Cambridge:Harvard UniversityPress, 1960), 102. and the Serbian family saint day (), it is con 34. See Anya PetersonRoyce, "NeitherChristian sidered theholiest of days. nor Jewish," inEthnic Identity(Bloomington: Indi 49. See Nicholas C. J.Pappas and Lee Brigance ana University Press, 1982), 17-33. Pappas, "The Ottoman View of the Battle Kosovo," 35. See E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and National inWayne S. Vucinich and Thomas A. Emmert, eds. a ismSince 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Kosovo: Legacy of Medieval Battle (Minneapolis, Press, 1990). University ofMinnesota Press, 1991), 41-60. 36. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communi 50. Ibid., 53. ties: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 51. See Dragnich and Todorovich, The Saga of Nationalism, revised ed. (Verso: New Left Books, Kosovo. 1991). 52.When Serbian soldiers returnedto theField of 37. Edward Shils, "Nation, Nationality, National Blackbirds in thewinter of 1912 theycrept over the ism and Civil Society,"Nations and Nationalism 1 field barefoot so as not todisturb the fallenwarriors (1995): 93-118. from the 1389 battle. Certainly, this is an instance 38.1 have to thankRick Coughlin of Drury Col where historicalmemory seemed to reach mythic lege for inspiringthis terminologyduring thecourse dimensions. of an on NEH-sponsored seminar cultural pluralism 53. Thomas Emmert, "The Battle of Kosovo: at theUniversity ofWisconsin Madison, July 1994. Early Reports ofVictory and Defeat," inPappas and For him thismight have been a throwawaycomment Pappas, Kosovo: Legacy of a Medieval Battle. but tome it seemed like a mini-Rosetta Stone. 54.While doing research in the former 39. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since Yugoslavia, I happened to be inBelgrade during the 1780, 8. summer of 1990. The street scene was filled with 40. , Marxism and the National and peddlers of all sorts of merchandise, musicians, and acres Colonial Question (: Lawrence and Wishart, of food stands. At some point, it seemed as if 1947), 8. the whole city started to converge on a spot where an 41. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since ancient fellowwas playing theguslo (a one-stringed 1780, 6. instrument made out of a gourd and stretched goat 42. Ibid., 8. skin). This guslar was singing the "Kosovo Cycle." 43. Alvin Rabushka and KennethA. Shepsle, Pol Its telling took about twohours and no one left.The Vl. 159 N. 4 SPRING 1997

crowd continued to grow and came to a the perspective of the development of modern halt. I knew then that a war was certainly brewing. nationalism. The historical record is clear that Croa 55. Alex N. Dragnich, Serb and Croats (New tian ethnic consciousness certainly predates the nine York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1992). teenth century. 56.Michael Lees, The Rape of Serbia (NewYork: 60. Branka Prpa-Jovanovic, "The Making of Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1992); David Martin, Yugoslavia (1830-1945)," in JasminkaUdovicki and The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav James Ridgeway, eds., Yugoslavia's Ethnic Night Blunder (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, mare (NewYork: Lawrence Hill Books, 1995). 1990); andDavid Owen, Balkan Odyssey (NewYork: 61. See Banac, The National Question. Harcourt Brace & Company, 1995), 9. Owen notes 62. See Dragnich, The First Yugoslavia. thatMihailovich was exonerated of collaboration 63. See Branka Magas, The Destruction of charges leveled at him by Tito in a 1946 Yugoslavia (London: Verso, 1993). after which Mihailovich was executed despite 64. Pedor Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in protests throughoutthe world. An American investi Yugoslavia (Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press, gation during theTruman administrationcompletely 1984), 145. exoneratedMihailovich and he was posthumously 65. See Dennison I. Rusinow, "Crisis in Croatia awarded the Legion of Merit in 1948, America's Part I," and "Crisis in Croatia Part II," American Uni highest honor for a foreigner. The award notes versitiesField Staff: Series, 19,4 Mihailovich's substantialcontributions to theAllied 20 (Part I), 1-17 (Part II); and Ramet, Nationalism cause and the rescue of over five hundred American and Federalism, 104-43. pilots by theMihailovich forces.The awardwas kept 66. See RichardWest, Tito: And The Rise and Fall secret, however, until after Tito's death to ensure sta of Yugoslavia (New York: Carrol and , 1994), ble relationswith Yugoslavia during thecold war. 300-01. 57. The number of killed is an itemof 67. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 156. considerable interestto Serbs, Croats, andMuslims 68. Ibid., 146. During my research inYugoslavia alike. Serbian churchofficials insistthat more thana in 1990,1 encounteredquite a fewBosnian Muslims, million Serb civilians (1.2 million) were slaughtered. particularlyprofessionals and political elites, who CurrentCroatian PresidentTudj man contends that claimed that they are ethnically Turks and not thenumber is closer to 60,000; see Franjo Tudjman, descended from Slavs. Wastelands?Historical Reality (Zagreb: Matice 69. See Noel Malcom, Bosnia: A ShortHistory Hrvatske, 1989). Tudjman also presents arguments (NewYork: New YorkUniversity Press, 1994), 70-81. thatless thana million people died in theHolocaust 70. See Robert J. Donia and John V. A. Fine, Jr., in all ofEurope. Most independentsources place the Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed number of Serbian civilian victims at between (London: Hurst and Company, 1994); Francine 500,000 to 850,000. The findingsof theNuremberg Friedman,The Bosnian Muslims: Denial ofa Nation Commission and of the Simon Wiesenthal Center (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); Noel Malcom, place theirestimates at 750,000. See Aleksa Djilas, Bosnia: A ShortHistory (NewYork: New York Uni The Contested Country (Cambridge: Harvard Uni versityPress, 1994); andMark Pinson, ed., TheMus versityPress, 1991); Constantin Fotic, The War We lims of Bosnia- (Cambridge: Harvard Lost: Yugoslavia 's Tragedy and the Failure of the UniversityPress, 1993). West (NewYork: The Viking Press, 1948); and Lazo 71. Although non-nativeBalkan scholars tend to Kostich,Holocaust in theIndependent State ofCroa be less biased thannative scholars, it is often thecase tia (Chicago: Liberty Press, 1981). Kostich uses that researchers tend to drift toward a Serb, a Croat, strictlyGerman and Italianmilitary archives to pre or a Muslim perspective. The works cited above sent a disturbing account of the events. (note 70) are all somewhatMuslimcentric, although 58. See Knezevic, Anthony,A ShortHistory of the Donia and Fine are by far the least biased. Croatian Nation (Philadelphia: Croatian Catholic 72. Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 13 Union, 1983). 70. 59. Ivo Banac's beautifully written and painstak 73. Ibid., 75-135; Friedman, The Bosnian Mus ingly cited volume on Yugoslavia, The National lims, 57-116. Question, makes a strong case for an unbroken Croa 74. See Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, tian consciousness and state for at least a 1,000 13-75. years, However, Hobsbawm, Nations and National 75. Ibid., 78. ismSince 1780, 76-77, takes issue with Banac and 76. Ibid., 78-119; Friedman, The Muslims of claims thatalthough Serbs canmake theclaim foran Bosnia, 61-80. unbroken history of national consciousness since 77. See Alija Izetbegovic, , medieval times, Croatian consciousness can be 2nd ed. (Sarajevo: Mala Muslimanska Bibliot?ka, traced only to the nineteenth century,and chides 1990). In his book Izetbegovic scathingly attacks Banac for his "Failure to allow for this adequately Kemal Ataturk's secular reforms in Turkey in the [which]makes [an]

79. NPR report,1 July 1994. and George Kenney, 'The Bosnia Calculation: How as some 80. See Chris Hedges, "Bosnians Sending Sol Many Have Died? Not nearly as many diers to Iran for InfantryTraining," New YorkTimes, would have you think," New York Times Magazine, 3 March 1996; Laurent Rebours, "NATO Seizes 23 April 1995. Kenney resigned from theU.S. State Bosnia TerroristTraining Site,"Associated Press, 17 Department in 1992 in protest over U.S. policy in February 1996; and Kit B. Roane, "NATO Accuses Bosnia. Since thenhe has augmented his views and Sarajevo of Link to Terror Training," New York now sees the conflict in terms that are almost as crit Times, 17 February 1996. ical of the Croats and Muslims as they are of the 81. When Milan Panic, a U.S. citizen and million Serbs. aire businessman, was brought to Yugoslavia and 87. See David Rhode, interviewedby Charlene coopted to be vice president by theMilosevic Hunter-Gault on the PBS News Hour With Jim regime,he quicklymade a critical errorwhich may Lehrer, 17 November 1995. Under pressure from have cost him theelection when he opposedMilose Gault, Rhode admitted that theMuslims used the vic innational elections; seeMisha Glenny, The Fall safe haven of Srebrenica to launch attacks against I of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (New York: Serb villages. In these attacks, theMuslims took women Penguin Books, 1993), 213-14. Panic, who was a videos of the beheading of Serb civilians, before he then showed them in the product of the communist system emigrat and children included, and ed to theUnited States, suggested to the Serbs that cafes of Srebrenica. These videos were shown to on was compromise Kosovo necessary and the Ser shockedWestern reportersat the time.The Muslim bian focus on this issue was excessive. After this leader responsible for these acts,Nasir Oric, is now even to the suggestion, his stock in Serbia, and among in , Bosnia, and is yet be indicted by American Serbs who overwhelmingly detest the Hague. This only reinforcesthe contentions of Serbs Milosevic regime, quickly faded. Only supportby about the double standard of justice in Bosnia. Of otherSerbian opposition groups created enough of a course, Rhode did mention that despite Muslim mobilized electorate to get Panic around 40 percent atrocities around Srebrenica, the massive Serb of the vote. response had no justification. To further complicate 82. See Sabrina Petra Ramet, "Nationalism and matters, the Bosnian parliamentary member for Sre the 'Idiocy' of theCountryside: The Case of Serbia," brenica, Ibran Mustafic, accused the Bosnian gov Ethnic and Racial Studies (1996): 19, 70-87. ernmentof orderingattacks against Serbs within the area so would lead the 83. Roger Cohen, "Croatia Currency's Name UN safe any Serb response a Protested,"The New YorkTimes, 26May 1994. Muslims "into catastrophe." See Dario Sito Sucic, 84. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 107-09. "Bosnian Government, Srebrenica Survivors Divid 85. See Chris Hedges, "In the Balkans, Three ed Over Fall of Town," OMRI Reports, , 15 Languages Now Fight ItOut," New YorkTimes, 15 July 1996. May 1996; and Chuck Sudetic, "Balkan Conflicts 88. See Dorinne K. Kondo, Crafting Selves: and Discourses in a Are Uncoupling Serbo-Croatian," New York Times, Power, Gender, of Identity 26 1993. Japanese Workplace (Chicago: The University of 86. See Brock, "Dateline Yugoslavia: The Chicago Press, 1990). Partisan Press," Foreign Policy 93 (Winter 1993-94): 89. See Paul C. Stern, "WhyDo People Sacrifice 152-72; George Kenney, "SteeringClear of Balkan forTheir Nations?" Political Psychology 16 (June Shoals," TheNation 262 (8/15 January1996): 21-24; 1995): 217-35.