OP #273 LEAVING THE PAST BEHIND: THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 1996 by Hugh Phillips In 1996, for the first time Russians pay overdue wages influenced 38 chose among rival presidential candi- per cent of “voters in his favor—the dates in a r elatively fr ee and demo- highest figur e for any issue listed.” 5 cratic pr ocess. 1 Pro-democracy reform- Ther e can be no doubt that ers, led by Boris Y eltsin faced the Yeltsin shower ed financial pr omises on Communist-nationalist challenge of the Russians in a fashion grand . Whatever short- enough to embarrass even the most comings may have existed in the cynical western politician. Treisman’s process, Russians wer e unquestionably analysis, however, overlooks the fact free to vote for whomever they wished that Y eltsin’s chief rival and head of a or even “none of the above.” This was revived Communist Party, Gennady important not only for historical Zyuganov, promised the same things. reasons but also because the pr esident At a 17 March rally in , the holds enormous power: Presidential Communist leader pledged to “in- decr ees ar e fully binding, unless they crease wages and pensions, [and] contradict parliamentary laws or the compensate those whose savings were Constitution. 2 As Timothy J. Colton er oded by inflation....” 6 A Russian succinctly noted, ’s choice did journalist calculated just befor e the not concern “legislators who can make first election that the total costs of fiery speeches about this or that, but Zyuganov’s promises for r enewed the next thing to an elected monar ch.” 3 government funding to industry, And this “king” has his finger on a agricultur e, education, health car e and nuclear trigger second only to the social services would be between five in its destr uctive capa- and seven times the pr esent national bility. budget. 7 As early as March, western Literally within days, western economists predicted that the Commu- assessments of the election appear ed. nists’ spending pr omises would Michael McFaul and Peter Reddaway devour Russia’s for eign curr ency spoke before a congr essional commit- reserves and lead to the economy’s tee on 10 July, of fering well informed, collapse “in a matter of months.” 8 So if quite diver gent, assessments of the Zyuganov hardly pr esented a tight- meaning of the election. 4 Daniel fisted economic alternative to Y eltsin. Treisman published the first evaluation M o reover, Y eltsin never deliver ed in For eign Affairs . He wr ote that on these pr omises before the cr ucial Y eltsin’s liberal pr omises of old- vote and even publicly acknowledged fashion American-style pork carried this fact at a May Day rally.9 W ell he the pr esident fr om his abysmal ap- might because ITAR-TASS had re- pr oval ratings to eventual victory. ported on 23 April that the 1996 bud- Specifically, Yeltsin doubled the mini- get allocated only a fifth of the benefits mum pension, effective 1 May, and to which veterans were entitled. 10 On 8 ordered compensation for people May, after r epeated criticism fr o m whose savings had been devoured by Yeltsin, Pension Fund head Vasily the hyperinflation of the last few years. Bar chuk fir ed back, blaming payment By the end of the campaign it was delays on Y eltsin’s failur e to pay the dif ficult to find any significant social government’s debt to the fund, which gr oup that r eceived no pr omises of totaled 4.6 trillion r ubles for the period pr esidential lar gess. Y eltsin’s ef fort to 1992–1995 alone. 11 Just befor e the

1 second vote Yuri Trukhmanov, a retired within which to r eceive their pork. police colonel and campaign worker Even Richard Pipes, one of the Rus- for candidate Aleksandr Lebed, stated sians’ sharpest and most astute observ- flatly: “For all Y eltsin’s pr omises, ers, pointed out that “judging by pensioners here have not been elections, r efer endums, and opinion paid...for January, Febr uary, and polls, about two-thir ds of Russians— M a r ch. Teachers have not been paid for including the vast majority of educated April and May, and ar e now being sent people —favour democracy and the on two months’ unpaid holiday.”12 free market.” 18 If these economic matters were But it also seems clear that Rus- the pivotal issue, why did Russians sians voted for Y eltsin because they bother switching to Yeltsin when had a fairly good idea of what they Zyuganov had already made extrava- would be getting, even if that was gant financial pr omises? The answer har dly exhilarating. Sur ely memories seems twofold: Yeltsin pr omised to of Y eltsin’s her oic stand in the August carry out these pledges in a democratic 1991 communist coup lingered, how- context and Yeltsin was a “known ever tainted by the violence of October quantity” as a national leader. People 1993. Boris Nikolaevich had a certain who know him insist that Yeltsin’s reliable unpr edictability but he made it formidable and ultimate goal is to go absolutely clear that ther e would be no down in history as the man who cre- going back. ated a modern Russian democracy.13 In another assessment of the V iktor Kr emeniuk, an analyst at the election, Angela Stent and Lilia USA-Canada Institute, asserted that, Shevtsova argue that a Communist “ Yeltsin has changed fr om a party victory could not possibly have meant apparatchik into a democratic pr esi- a return to a “command economy, dent.” 14 Zyuganov, however, wanted censorship, and a r einvigorated secr et to spend the money within a recon- police.” “New groups with their own str ucted Soviet system. 15 As the Com- stakes in the system ar e becoming munists’ of ficial platform asserted: m o re powerful and would resist any “Everything was right in Soviet history leader who might seek to impose (industrialization, collectivization). All radical change. The clock cannot be sacrifices ar e justified.”16 What possible turned back....” 19 Perhaps, but the same ar gument could be put forth against a argument was made in the 1920s: system that was always right? And why powerful capitalists had emerged in should anyone have doubted that, once the cities and even mor e important, the returned to power, the Communists peasants were in contr ol of the land would have restor ed so perfect a system? and simply would not allow the state As Alexander Yanov observed just before to take it fr o m them. 20 Only a Commu- the election: “Zyuganov is not just a nist minority seriously contemplated a former communist; his party is not even return to the disastr ous postwar trying to hide its tr ue ‘patriotic’ colors, policies of central contr ol and the fr ee nor is it claiming that it has r eformed use of for ce that had become known as itself. [Mor eover] Zyuganov’s party “war communism.” No one under- belongs not to the liberal pr o - Western stood until it was too late that Stalin wing of its alma mater but to its national- intended to implement his vision of ist, openly anti-Western extr eme.” 17 r egardless of the costs. The majority of Russians pr e- Communist politicians have rarely ferred Yeltsin’s democratic framework been “rational actors” and the Rus- 2 sians know this better than most munists r eceived about 25 per cent of people. Zyuganov is no Stalin; but he the vote, mor e than triple the r esults of spoke admiringly of Stalin and that the 1993 elections. 21 As 1996 opened, was surely suf ficient to chill the mar - many analysts believed Zyuganov row of millions of Russians. was destined to assume the presidency This paper of fers a brief, I hope in the summer. It seemed that history concise, description and analysis of the was about to r epeat itself: once again a Russians’ r ejection of communism and revolution that began as a str uggle Y eltsin’s concomitant political r eincar - against tyranny seemed headed for a nation. It is based lar gely on journalis- new despotism. Many Russians feared tic and scholarly accounts augmented that having ousted the Communists in by personal interviews and discussions 1991, they would see the r eturn of their I had with Russians especially during former masters a scant five years later. May and June, 1996, while in Moscow Others prayed for such an eventuality. and the pr ovincial capital, Tver ’. I In late 1995, ther e existed solid spoke with as many Russians as reasons for the these concerns. Not possible, but most of my conversations only did the December parliamentary w e r e with librarians, ar chivists, aca- elections r eveal that lar ge segments of demics, and other pr ofessionals. With the population would welcome a strangers, for example cab drivers or Communist come back; The New York bar tenders, I would follow a set T imes r eported that in the city of routine: I would ask who they thought Tambov, about 300 miles south of would win the election. If the person Moscow, the citizens had alr eady made was not hostile, I would then ask why their choice publicly clear: the r ed he or she felt one or the other candi- Soviet flag, not the Russian tri-color, date would be victorious. Only if the flew over the city hall and other individual seemed agreeable to con- government buildings. It is important verse further, would I then ask about to remember that while the Soviet their personal attitudes and hopes for Communist Party lost its contr ol of the the election. This is admittedly an top echelons of power, at the local unscientific appr oach, but is certainly level, former Communists continued of some value in assessing general as administrators and leaders, wield- attitudes in Russia. ing gr eat power. Many of these people Ther e is no pr etense of compre- clearly longed for the good old days of hensiveness; it will be many years Soviet socialism. Ther e never was a befor e anything like a full story of the Stalinist-style pur ge thr oughout the 1996 Russian political events can be state bur eaucracy. So in Tambov, they told. Still it is hoped that this examina- came into the open. tion may be useful to scholars and A Communist victory seemed students who desire an outline of the especially likely because all of the most important events. In particular, various splinter communist groups this paper seeks to describe and ana- and many nationalist organizations lyze Y eltsin’s amazing fall and rise in rallied behind Zyuganov. Of particular the first seven months of 1996 against significance was the support of Viktor the background of crisis, crime, and Anpilov’s unregenerate Stalinist party commmunism resur gent. that r eceived 5 million votes in the The 1996 Russian political year December elections, despite little really began with the Duma elections campaigning and no paid advertising. of December 1995 wherein the Com- In addition, several conservative, 3 patriotic gr oups expressed their sup- Not surprisingly, Russians were port for Zyuganov.22 Moreover, a deeply worried about the upsurge in January poll in the military found that crime, a concern that incr eased as the 22 percent supported Zyuganov, 18 election near ed. 28 New millionaires per cent the ultra-nationalist and neo- eagerly bought armored American- fascist, and a made Humvees, something of a cross mere 4 percent favor ed Y eltsin.23 between a Jeep and a tank. A Moscow But several other factors played a dealership advertised the vehicle as much greater r ole in the Communists’ the “ultimate pr otection fr om kidnap- rise in popularity and Y eltsin’s plunge. ping and assassination.” 29 Many of the Crime had spiralled dangerously out poor turned to the Communists’ of contr ol. The USSR, for all its faults, pr omise for a r estoration of or der. A pr ovided its citizens with an almost young bookkeeper, who supported complete fr eedom of fear fr om violent Zyuganov remarked that “I want order crime, especially on the str eets. Statis- and security. I’ve got kids, and I want tics for 1995 r evealed that Russia’s per them to have at least what I had—a capita murder rate was double that of calm atmosphere and a stable upbring- the United States. 24 The killings of even ing.” 30 pr ominent politicians, journalists and A major part of the crime pr oblem businessmen had become so common is that the police, like almost everyone that they har dly elicited much press else, remained grossly underpaid and attention anymore. In early Febr uary, ther efor e deeply involved in bribery Zhirinovsky learned that his close and kickbacks. In Tver ’ in 1994, I saw a associate, Aleksandr Vengerovsky, list compiled by the police giving the narr owly survived an assassination prices accor ding to crimes that a victim attempt. Had the attack been success- must pay before any action would be ful, it would have br ought the number taken. For example, to r ecover a stolen Duma deputies killed since the 1993 car, the owner had to fork over half the elections to five. In that year, 21 per - car ’s value. And when people were cent of Russians believed that the arr ested, pr osecution was dif ficult. In mafia actually contr olled the country.25 the St. Petersbur g District Attorney’s On 26 February 1996, hitmen entered of fice, almost half of the pr ofessional the opulent Nevskii Palace Hotel in St. staf f had no college training. Finally, Petersburg and mowed down two the police estimated that or ganized Russians and a Scottish businessman. crime spends about 50 per cent its In 1995, a total of seventy-seven Rus- pr ofits to bride judges and pr osecutors. sian businessmen were gunned down An of ficial at the Butyrka prison in St. Petersbur g alone. 26 Police esti- revealed that, of the fourteen “thieves mated that in that year, there were at of the law,” as the criminal elite ar e least 500 contract killings in the whole called, that had been arr ested over the country, with 216 such murders in last two years, only one ever went to Moscow, up fr om 181 in 1994. As of court. 31 A substantial portion of Rus- late April, only about 10 per cent of sians wer e near the end of their pr o- such murders had been solved. 27 A verbial patience and many believed Moscow official annoymously told that, if nothing else, the Communists CNN that murder was how the mafia would know how to deal with crimi- routinely dealt with businessmen who nals. refused to pay debts or pr otection But the pictur e remained murky. money. A retired Muscovite engineer told me 4 that crime has always been a major Y et while in Russia befor e the urban problem. The dif fer ence in 1996 election, I saw no incr ease in the was the spectacular public killings and alr eady lar ge numbers of beggars and the fact that most crime is now fully homeless. Nowhere did I detect food reported, whereas during the Soviet shortages or even complains about a era the pr ess ignor ed not only crime lack of goods. 36 Even the Communist but even natural disasters. When I was daily, , conceded that the “most a graduate student in Moscow in 1982- important Yeltsin success during his 83, ther e was much talk of someone years in of fice was to fill the shelves of wielding an axe outside the Hotel stor es in various cities. 37 How the Rossiia, killing several people, but government managed to keep the nothing appeared in the media. A n d stor es full during (and after) the recently marveled election warrants further study, al- about how news of a 1953 earthquake though the answer seems to be contin- in Kazakstan that killed at least 100,000 ued borrowing to purchase for eign was completely suppressed in Russia. 32 goods. Indeed, the crisis of August Nevertheless, most Russians clearly 1998 showed foremost that Russia had believed that crime has risen dramati- been on a borr owing binge for many cally and per ception is often mor e years. important than r eality. In any case, government income The economy remained a prob- on election eve continued to fall. In lem. While hyperinflation r eceded, 1995 oil exports, a sour ce of vital har d (of ficial inflation rates for Febr uary curr ency, dropped by about 5 percent. and March 1996 were a mere 2.8 The head of Russia’s Central Bank per cent) the generally bleak pictur e estimated that a whopping 40 percent persisted. Y eltsin even conceded that of Russian businesses were ignoring “people ar e on the ver ge of starvation the law and paying no taxes. Thus, at in some ar eas.” 33 Russia’s Gr oss the end of March 1996, the Russian Domestic Product in 1995 was 50 Central Bank reported tax arr ears per cent of the 1991 total. 34 The govern- totalling about $8.4 billion. The federal ment announced in March that GDP authorities char ged that businesses, for had declined 17 per cent in the last two the most part, avoided taxes thr ough years; mor e serious was the barter and cash trasactions and mul- acknowledgement that the 1995 harvest tiple bank accounts under various was the worst since 1963. Grain pr oduc- names. 38 Businessmen, in turn, r e- tion fell a staggering 25 per cent below sponded that because their clientele the levels of 1994. Such a situation was failed to pay its bills, they wer e unable potentially disastr ous in a country to pay taxes. Workers, for their part, where about 35 per cent of the popula- believed that the owners ar e taking tion lived below the of ficial poverty line pr ofits and investing them in the of $69 per month and, therefor e, wer e myriad of fly-by-night and widely heavily dependent on bread for sur - advertised “investment companies” vival. On 20 March, Yevgeny that have pr oliferated all over Russia, Savchenko, the chair of the Federation of fering up to 50 per cent r eturns on Council’s Agricultural Policy Commit- one-year investments. Daily, these tee, estimated that mor e than one thir d schemes failed in lar ge numbers: By of Russia’s food needs were met by early March, 25 million investors had imports in 1995 and conceded that the been defrauded. 39 Y et, people keep problem was gro wing. 35 coming back, hoping for lottery-like 5 success. A month later, the government Once a Soviet bastion of privilege and revealed that its budget deficit for the fat budgets, the Academy saw its first quarter of 1996 continued to gr o w. funding slashed by two-thirds since Only domestic and foreign borr owing 1991. Some members eventually joined enabled the state to meet part of its the strike movement, loudly denounc- obligations. 40 Olga Dmitrieva, the head ing Y eltsin.43 of a subcommittee of the Duma’s Also hard hit wer e coal miners, Budget Committee, sharply criticized who on 1 February 1996, Y eltsin’s both Y eltsin and the Communist- birthday, began a strike that quickly dominated Duma for increasing included about 500,000 people and spending while revenues continued to shut down over half of the coal mines decline. 41 in Russia. The miners’ strike was The general r esults of this finan- unique in that management joined the cial disaster wer e evident when the workers. The stoppage was centered in government announced that for the the western Siberian ar ea known as the year 1995, it owed industrial and Kuzbass. In 1991, these miners were public sector workers $2.8 billion in instr umental in sweeping Yeltsin into late wages, an incr ease of 219 per cent the Russian pr esidency. In the 1995 fr om 1994. The crisis manifested itself duma elections, they gave 53 per cent in many ways: some humorous, all of their votes to the Communists. After tragic. For example, the T imes of a few days, the strike ended with London reported that a textile plant in Y eltsin’s pr omise to begin payments to the city of , located the miners. 44 Where the money would thousands of miles fr om the ocean, come fr om remained a mystery. “paid” it workers with Russian sailor In Mar ch 1996 even soldiers suits. In , a machine-building fighting in had not been plant gave its employees Chinese bras paid since November. Many of them rather than cash. 42 The situation be- had only sneakers, rather than r egula- came so bad for educators in St. Peters- tion boots, to wear. But they wer e bur g that the leaders of the university har dly alone. Interior Minister, Anatoly professors’ union went on a hunger Kulikov, ur ged Yeltsin to dip into har d- strike demanding that professors curr ency r eserves, r enationalize banks, receive their full pay: $128 per month. and incr ease tarif fs to pr ovide the They should perhaps have been funds necessary to avoid a military thankful; secr etaries at St. Petersbur g collapse similar to the one that was State University r eceived $19 a month, instr umental in the fall of the last not even close to the of ficial poverty T sar .45 line. The hospitals and other medical In the countryside, the economic institutes of St. Petersbur g wer e also pictur e was equally bleak. Typical is feeling the pinch. Valery Koryukin, the example of Bor odino, scene of the head of the Mayor ’s Health Commit- savage 1812 battle with the for ces of tee, told The St. Petersbur g Pr ess that Napoleon. In June, Father Igor while 1996 federal funding would V ostriakov, a young priest r esponsible meet staf f salaries, the money left over for 20 parishes and chur ches in the could only buy 9 per cent of the medi- ar ea spoke with the T imes . His parish- cines and 13 per cent of the food ioners, he said, r epr esented the losers needed for patients. fr om five years of r eforms. The closur e Even the pr estigious Russian of the collective farm two years ago left Academy of Sciences felt the pinch. the elderly virtually destitute, while a 6 majority of the young have moved on (and ar e) mor e complicated and better sear ching for work. Vostriakov said than of ficial statistics indicate. In that with a few exceptions—some Russia’s “tr ue” economy, the situation people who were thankful to Y eltsin is not so bad. The private sector, which for opening the chur ches—the people comprises more than half of economic of Borodino supported Zyuganov.46 activity as of early 1996, is gr owing “by The only way for the state and 15 to 150 per cent annually, depending nation to survive was to borr o w on the industry in question.” Mor e- money and import grain. But the over, “about 90 per cent of private government was already so deeply in sector income and 40 per cent of all debt that even the United States wages” go unreported to the govern- government, hardly a model of fiscal ment and therefor e fail to show up in responsibility, publicly ur ged Y eltsin to official statistics.49 This is without balance his books. Moreover, the IMF doubt tr ue. Anyone who has recently and other banks made it clear that spent much time in Russia knows that delivery of a $10.2 billion loan de- all sorts of goods and services ar e pended upon a continuation of eco- readily available on a cash and carry nomic reforms. Having little choice, basis with no r ecor ds kept. The atti- Y eltsin stayed the r eform course and tude often encounter ed is that the on 23 Febr uary, the IMF announced its Soviet government stole fr om the decision to make the loan, with part to nation for so long, that now is the time be sent to Y eltsin befor e the June to get a bit back by not r eporting election. 47 But this was lar gely sym- income. People who thrive in this part bolic; nothing short of an economic of the economy undoubtedly sup- miracle could have provided the funds ported Yeltsin. to meet either Y eltsin’s or Zyuganov’s The president also r eceived campaign promises. But even this deal enormous good will from the public in held potential pr oblems. The New York 1992 when he transferred ownership of T imes r eported that, Michel apartments from the state to the r esi- Camdessus, Managing Director of the dents. Although many Russians have I M F, explained with a straight face that been highly critical of the rampant the loan was granted, after months of corr uption that accompanied much of haggling, because Yeltsin had kept the privatization pr ocess, people I inflation under contr ol. He added that spoke with in Moscow, St. Petersbur g, not making the loan “could be inter - and Tver ’ said r eceiving title to their pr eted as taking sides” in the election. apartment was by far the most popular Of course, all Russians knew that aspect of Y eltsin’s privatization pr o- “taking sides” was precisely what the gram. A pr ofessor pr oudly told me that IMF was doing and Zyuganov went all his two-r oom apartment in Tver ’ out to portray Y eltsin as the puppet of would fetch $20,000. This fact must “imperialist banking cir cles,” asserting have been on people’s minds as the that Russia was becoming “becoming election near ed. dir ectly dependent on for eign interna- In a similar vein, Russia’s r egional tional or ganizations.” 48 It is doubtful leaders owed Yeltsin a gr eat deal. He this char ge helped Zyuganov: Russians had allowed them to become involved pr obably did not car e where financial in business, although only semi- aid came fr om, as long as it came. legally. Many had done quite well as A vraham Shama, however, argues budding capitalists and showed little cogently that economic matters were aversion to corr uption. These powerful 7 figur es knew all that could change bore no resemblance to the heroic under a Zyuganov government, espe- figur e of 1991. 53 Anders Aslund, a cially since the Communists never Swedish economist who advised gave any promises to let the r egional Yeltsin in 1992–93, went much further, elites continue business as usual. So asserting that “Russia needs a change these pr ovincial bosses, for the most of government; unfortunately, the part, sided with Y eltsin.50 Communists are the only alterna- Still it is equally clear that the tive.” 54 Russian economy had serious prob- It would be dif ficult, however, to lems, a situation that benefitted ar gue that the loss of these men seri- Zyuganov. Many people believe they ously hurt Y eltsin with Russian voters. will r eceive no pension upon retire- Kovalev is certainly a r espected man, ment or that inflation will consume but of little political weight, while whatever they do receive. All is far Gaidar remains a widely hated figure, from well when a family that includes associated with the explosive inflation a physician and a medical school that accompanied the fr eeing of prices department head must take in board- in 1992. 55 The vast majority of Russians ers and r egularly sell blood to make undoubtedly have never heard of ends meet. Even more distr essing, the Aslund. Russian military r eported an incr ease Nonetheless, it is little wonder in suicides among its of ficers corps, that people seriously consider ed a with psychiatrists r eporting financial return to communism. The argument pr oblems as a major factor. In one can be made that the election was instance, an of ficer of the 242nd Infan- Zyuganov’s to lose, something he try Regiment, with r esponsibility for managed to achieve with Yeltsin’s the psychological welfar e of his unsolicited help. regiment’s of ficers and soldiers, com- By the end March, of the major mitted suicide in despair over his reformers, only Anatoli Chubais hungry wife and children. He had publicly backed the pr esident’s r e- received “no pay for months.” 51 election bid. In April, he joined Finally, Yeltsin watched the pr o- Yeltsin’s campaign or ganization, reform leaders who rallied ar ound him working especially in the St. Peters- after the collapse of the USSR fall into bur g area. He was quite famous for his almost unanimous opposition. In dir ection of the lar gest privatization of January, Sergei Kovalev, a Soviet-era state assets in history which put most dissident, nominee for the Noble Peace of Russia’s r etail trade in private hands Prize and former member of Russia’s and is very popular with the bankers Human Rights Commission, wrote a and financiers who financed Yeltsin’s searing and comprehensive condemna- re-election ef fort.56 On the other hand, tion of Y eltsin’s policies over the last large numbers of Russians hated or at several months. He was especially least mistr usted Chubais for selling harsh on the war in Chechnya and government holdings at a fraction of concluded that he could not advise any their per ceived value. Y et, even his “decent person” to vote for Yeltsin.52 support was essentially negative: He Former prime minister, Yegor Gaidar, said that Y eltsin was the only person asserted that the Communists’ best capable of stopping Zyuganov. He hope for gaining the pr esidency was added rather extravagantly that a for Y eltsin to stand for r eelection. He return to Communist policies would sadly observed that Y eltsin in 1996 lead to civil war.57 8 By March, however, Y eltsin hit the any case, Y eltsin’s economic adviser, campaign trail. It was immediately Aleksandr Livshits, announced on 8 clear that he had under gone a com- April that the government would pletely unfor eseen physical transfor - make the payments over a long time mation. A former tennis pr o had period, a policy that would prevent worked successfully to get Yeltsin into another burst of inflation. 61 An early better physical condition, including a post-election analysis confirmed that 25 pound weight loss; ther efor e he was government efforts to r educe wage able to put in a far mor e ener getic, arr ears had accomplished little. 62 even hectic, campaign schedule than In another typical example, on 28 anyone anticipated. One journalist March, Y eltsin tried to appease the described him as “full of str ength and technical intelligentsia and the pr ofes- completely sure of himself.” 58 Most sorate. Rossiiskie vesti r eported the important, Y eltsin had his notorious cr eation of 100 “pr esidential grants” drinking under control. Rumors worth a total of 6 billion r ubles ($1.2 cir culated that an aide stayed at the million) to be awar ded annually to president’s side and doled out vodka young scientists. He pledged to pr o- at levels that pr evented obvious vide higher r etirement pensions for drunkenness. In May, he even ad- pr ofessors and r esear chers. Y eltsin also dr essed this issue dir ectly, conceding or der ed the transfer to higher educa- on that he “drinks like a tional establishments of state-owned Russian,” commonly understood to buildings they have leased for over 10 mean “to excess.” He added that if he years. 63 Without question, the people denied his drinking no one would directly concerned were pleased, but, believe him, a point beyond dispute. again, this measur e br ought little On the stump, as Treisman tangible, immediate r elief. pointed out, Y eltsin pr omised money Looming over the whole cam- and benefits to almost everyone, fr o m paign was the bleeding wound of students to r etir ees. Specifically, he Chechnya, an autonomous republic pr omised to eliminate pension arr ears within the Russian Federation which and to compensate people who lost Yeltsin invaded in December 1994 to their savings during the horrific stifle an independence drive started in inflation of 1991–1995. 59 This was 1991. By the eve of the first pr esidential transpar ently a political move: By all vote, the death toll fr om this war to accounts these two socio-economic subdue an area the size of New Jersey gr oups contain lar ge numbers of senior reached at least 30,000, mor e than half citizens and they wer e overwhelm- the number of who per- ingly pr o-Communist. To meet these ished in Vietnam. Many Russians pr omises, Y eltsin had two basic believed that the actual number was choices: r un the r uble printing pr esses closer to 50,000. 64 Five hundr ed and or spread the payments out over fifty soldiers wer e listed as missing or several decades. Andrei Illarionov, hostages of the Chechens. Most of the dir ector of the Institute for Economic dead were civilians. Reports of Russian Analysis in Moscow, observed that the soldiers “fragging,” or shooting, their former policy would bring back r un- own officers r ose, with many of the away inflation and further alienate the former spending most of their time in IMF.60 The latter choice would make no a dr ug- or alcohol-induced haze. real dif fer ence for Russians in the Young civilian men turned to drinking short-term, i.e., befor e the election. In brake fluid to develop stomach ulcers 9 that would fr ee them fr om conscrip- take car e of itself. Especially for ceful tion.65 All candidates denounced the for this point of view was Defense war but the former general and politi- Minister Pavel Grachev.70 But even a cal newcomer, Aleksandr Lebed, had thor oughly westernized and humane the clear est and most specific plan: he university pr ofessor agr eed with bluntly said the war was unwinnable Grachev, saying just befor e the war and a negotiated peace was the only began, “A few battalions and a few solution. 66 Equally important, Lebed weeks and it will all be over.” Instead, was untarnished by long association Russians saw their military humili- with the corr uption of Russia’s politi- ated, their citizens subjected to all but cal establishment. invincible terr orists and their image The war was especially tragic further tarnished in the eyes of the because the Chechens have very good world. reasons to be angry and vengeful The crisis deepened dramatically toward the Soviet government. Under in mid-March as appr oximately 1,000 Stalin, they wer e deported fr om their Chechen rebels slipped into the al- native land into Asia and not allowed ready devastated capital, Gr ozny, and to r eturn until Gorbachev’s era. 67 But, made it a living hell for about a week. as former U.S. Ambassador to Mos- W ithin a few days, the Russians and c o w, Jack Matlock, Jr., has pointed out, their dwindling Chechen supporters everyone except the Communists held only a small fortified ar ea in the suf fer ed under the Soviet r egime. 68 So center, while only yar ds away rebels it per haps made little sense for the str olled openly with their automatic Chechens to take out their vengeance weapons. During this same month, a on the post-Soviet leaders. tragicomic, paralytic confusion r eigned It is more important, however, that in Moscow as Grachev announced by the beginning of 1996, everyone that, br eaking with past policy, he was blamed Yeltsin for this fiasco; in Mar ch, willing to meet face to face with even his own Presidential Council Dudayev.71 The very next day, he publicly denounced his Chechen policy. retracted his statement, saying it is This criticism was well-deserved: Many “time to for get about Dudayev,” whom of Yeltsin’s own defense and security he described as a “mur derer.”72 Never - specialists warned him against an theless, Y eltsin himself believed that invasion. Still, few seemed to r emember only by ending this fiasco, did he have that in December 1994 Russians were any hope for r e-election. 73 str ongly united in the feeling that On 31 March, Y eltsin unveiled a something had to be done about the new policy to end the war. Hope regime of Dzokhar Dudayev. This soar ed. All Russian tr oops were to Chechen “government,” which seized withdraw from areas where peace power in a 1991 coup that lacked any pr evailed, but they would continue to significant popular support, had openly fight “terr orists.” In a dramatic move provided safe haven for people commit- Yeltsin sent a telegram to Dudayev, ting crimes, usually violent and dr ug- promising he was sincer e in his desir e related, in Russia. 69 Many Russians for peace and pr oposing negotiations. rejected the use of for ce to deal with the But Y eltsin refused to meet dir ectly problem, but even among them there with the former Soviet Air For ce was a str ong feeling that the army general; instead, he appointed would effortlessly cr ush the Chechens, Kazakhstan’s respected leader, showing the world that Russia could Nursultan Nazerbayev, to that task. 74 10 A pro-reform presidential candi- in Chechnya who refused to lay down date, , who favor ed their arms. 80 His policy, ther efor e, was direct negotiations with the Chechen virtually indistinguishable fr o m separatists, dismissed Y eltsin’s plan, Y eltsin’s. In ef fect, Zyuganov endorsed saying the fighting would continue. A s the existing policy of war.81 Mean- it turned out Y avlinsky was right: in while, Y eltsin pr esented himself as a the following weeks, combat raged as man striving to achieve peace. One of befor e. In mid-April, Chechens am- the str ongest impressions I gained in bushed a poorly-protected Russian 1996 was Russians’ anger and shame convoy, killing 93, accor ding to the over the Chechen debacle. independent television network, NTV. Beyond Chechnya, broader In exasperation, Grachev of fer ed to foreign policy concerns loomed large resign; Y eltsin order ed a halt to further on election eve, at least among the troop withdrawals. So the war dragged intelligentsia. While most Russians on and the bitterness in Moscow was remained overwhelmingly preoccu- palpable. But in late April, the Rus- pied with just getting by day to day, sians finally killed Dudayev, the victim almost half of Russia’s voters hoped of a r ocket attack in the Chechen the next pr esident would “restor e countryside. Yeltsin’s camp acknowl- Russia’s status as a gr eat power.”82 edged that Dudayev’s killing was done Several times in 1996, I hear d Russians to win votes. 75 It was also widely express anger and r esentment at known that Yeltsin detested Dudayev Americans crowing about the U.S. as and ther efor e his removal was a sig- the “only” superpower. Many would nificant step towar d ending the war.76 point out that Russia still had about Yet perhaps the war in Chechnya 20,000 nuclear war heads, more than was not as important as some polls or even America. 83 Zyuganov’s support- individual Russians indicated. As the ers warmly applauded his frequent fighting dragged on, Yeltsin’s popular - pr omise to r estor e the might of the ity continued its slow climb. VTsIOM Russian state and its status in the announced that over the course of world. 84 In January, Yeltsin responded M a r ch the pr esident’s popularity rate to this fr ustration when he replaced his gr ew by 13 per cent. 77 By mid-April pr o-western for eign minister, Andrei only one percentage point separated Kozyrev, with the Soviet veteran, Yeltsin and Zyuganov in one opinion Evgenii Primakov. The latter immedi- poll.78 An d Y eltsin’s negative rating ately asserted that Russia had become declined (fr om 43 to 39 per cent) while “excessively pr o-western” after the Zyuganov’s almost doubled to 26 per demise of the USSR and that he in- cent. 79 Zyuganov simply failed to cash tended to r estor e Russia’s “gr eat in on Y eltsin’s liability in Chechnya power” status. To underscore and present a clear alternative to the Primakov’s point, the Minister for pr esident’s policy. Thr oughout the Atomic Energy, Viktor Mikhailov, campaign, Zyuganov clearly stated announced in early March that Russia that Chechnya was within Russia’s would continue developing new “vital inter ests,” as was all of the nuclear weapons whose ultimate former USSR. He had no intention of purpose is to over come any anti- letting the Chechens establish inde- nuclear defense system. 85 A few weeks pendence. Indeed, speaking before the later, The New York T imes reported Duma, Zyuganov declared it was time Mikhailov’s announcement that to get “tougher” with the “gangsters” Russia intended to constr uct and 11 deploy new nuclear weapons in realized ther e was little to be gained by violation of the 1987 INF agr eement. his denunciations of NAT O expansion Moscow justified this forwar d and quietly dr opped the matter in policy in part as a r eaction to the early May.89 United States’ insistence upon for ging Domestic affairs remained para- ahead with the expansion of NATO mount and in late March, Yeltsin made into the states of the former Warsaw a dramatic move that significantly Pact. Secr etary of State Warr en Christo- helped his campaign and may some pher publicly called expansion “non- day alter Russia beyond r ecognition. negotiable,” enraging Yeltsin and He issued a presidential decr ee on land Primakov. When former vice president, ownership that permits people to buy Dan Quayle, spoke in April befor e the and sell land for the first time since the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Communist revolution. In fact, the academicians made abundantly clear only people who have enjoyed the full their anger with NATO expansion right to land ownership in all of although the topic was not on the Russia’s history wer e the pr e-r evolu- meeting’s agenda. No U.S. policy tionary aristocracy and a minority of could have been better calculated to the peasantry. Y eltsin’s or der trans- further damage Yeltsin in the eyes of formed people who rented land fr o m Russians and reinfor ce the per ception the state into outright owners of their of a need for a “str ong man” to deal plot. The millions of people who live with the Americans. The pro-reform on farms that were state-r un can newspaper, Rossiiskaia gazeta , won- henceforth sell their shar es at will; no dered if Clinton “understands how longer must they get the almost unat- much [NATO] expansion helps the tainable permission of their neighbors Communists.” Similarly, Geor ge and colleagues. The only restrictions Kennan, the dean of America’s Russian ar e that for eigners cannot buy land specialists, publicly deplor ed Clinton’s and urban land is of f limits.90 forward policy on NATO as ill-con- Of course, opposition was imme- ceived and dangerous. 86 In an ef fort to diate and vocifer ous. Nikolai lessen the damage, British Prime Kharitonov, a leader of the pr o-Commu- Minister, John Major, assur ed the nist Agrarian faction in the Duma, said Russians that enlar ging NATO would that you “can’t just turn the farmlands proceed “slowly and cautiously,” of Russia into r eal estate.” 91 Zyuganov taking into account Russia’s inter ests.87 asserted that he would never permit the But this issue simply failed to buying and selling of farmland and said resonant with lar ge numbers of voters. Y eltsin’s appr oval of such policies was The Communists’ efforts to cash in on “killing” state and collective farms. 92 So N ATO expansion did not appreciably if the Communists had won, this br oaden their support. Valentin measure would have been revoked or Kuptsov, first deputy chairman of the perhaps become another piece of party, declar ed in late May: “The “superfluous paper,” that has so richly choice could not be gr eater. We will litter ed Russia’s past. Russia’s farmers determine whether Russia is turned understood this: After the issuance of completely into a western vassal this decr ee, Yeltsin enjoyed a “sharp contr olled by the U.S. or r eacquir es its rise” in popularity in the countryside, 93 status as an independent, gr eat calling into question the common power.”88 Yet Zyuganov’s ratings assumption that the farmers were continued to fall or stagnated. Y eltsin satisfied with the kolkhoz system. 12 But fear r emained strong in munist comeback. Similarly, only 23 Y eltsin’s camp. It appears that the percent believed Zyuganov could beat pr esident consider ed a pr eemptive Y eltsin in a r unoff election. 97 At the strike by declaring martial law and same time, however, wealthy Rus- suspending presidential elections, sians flooded the For eign Ministry using Chechen terrorism as justifica- with visa r equests to “vacation” in, say, tion. In late Mar ch, Y eltsin’s top legal until after the election. And, of advisor, Mikhail Krasnov, formally course, these “tourists” intended to announced that elections might be take their money with them. 98 The suspended if a “crisis emer ges in the State Pr operty Committee reported a country.” But how this could have drastic decr ease in the privatization been done was unclear because the rate for the first months of 1996, cr eat- Duma has never passed a federal law ing further r evenue headaches for the on “emergency situations.” 94 When a government. The cause for the slow- Y eltsin aide r enewed such talk in May, down was investors’ fears of a possible ITAR-TASS commentator, Tamara Communist victory with a subsequent Zamiatina, blasted the idea and renationalization of pr operties. 99 Even pointed out that “not a single publica- m o r e alarming, r umors flew around tion,” even the most pr o-Yeltsin or Moscow about the organization of anti-Zyuganov, supported postponing Communist para-military units, remi- the election. 95 Such talk continued, but niscent of the r evolutionary Red Yeltsin and Zyuganov consistently Guards of 1917. One r eport asserted rejected a postponement. that the Communist had 2,000 armed In early April, Y eltsin pr esented a volunteers in Moscow alone. The m o r e polished and clear er campaign Communist head of the Duma Com- strategy and style. He even plunged mittee on Security, V iktor Iliukhin, into southern r ural Russia, impover- str ongly denied this charge, but suspi- ished and Communist-inclined. He cions linger ed. 100 criticized himself harshly and asked In the middle of April, Y eltsin people to for give the fact that life had received more good news. For the first become so difficult for all but the 10 time the pr estigious VTsIOM’s poll of percent known as the “new Russians,” 1,600 people over 18 years of age as the nouveau riches ar e called. In a showed only 1 percentage point m o r e positive, if vague, vein, Y eltsin separating Zyuganov and Yeltsin, with emphasized “broad themes of family, both hovering just under 30 percent. fighting crime, ending the war in The same organization found, how- Chechnya and strengthening CIS ever, that the Russian public r emained integration.” 96 But Yeltsin hammered deeply divided and confused. Asked away most effectively at exposing the “If you wer e pr oposed a list of candi- Communists. He placed before the dates to the pr esidential post, whom people visions not of or der and secu- would you pick out?” the r esults gave rity and superpower status, but of Zyuganov 26 percent to Y eltsin’s 18 and fear and a r epr essive percent. However, when you added to police-state with long lines for most Y eltsin’s vote, Lebed’s and Y avlinsky’s goods when they were available at all. 10 percent each and those who favored This ef fort began to show r esults, other marginal but anti-communist but people were still nervous. Another candidates, the r esult was about a 50 April poll indicated that 40 per cent of percent vote against Zyuganov.101 Thus Russians definitely opposed a Com- if a r un-off occurr ed Y eltsin had a 13 reasonable chance for victory if all the industrial pr oduction should be re- other candidates endorsed him or vived and the tax collecting system simply did not adamantly reject him. improved, but gave no specifics on This poll, combined with the death of how these universally acknowledged Dudayev, sent the Moscow stock needs could be met. He also denied market soaring by 13 per cent in one that he felt any pr essur e fr om “leftist week. Under strong pressur e fro m parties,” pr esumably meaning people Chubais, a r eluctant Gaidar r eversed like Anpilov.106 himself and endorsed Yeltsin.102 In a May radio addr ess, At the same time Yeltsin did well Zyuganov again struck a conciliatory on his China trip and signed a poten- tone. He specifically pledged to sup- tially lucrative petr oleum deal with port a “mixed economy” and rejected a Kazakhstan and Oman, which in- renationalization of privatized enter - volved several U.S. oil companies. If prises as long as they “pay their taxes successful this deal could br eak a honestly and properly.” He added that deadlock of the past few years on “If you start taking things away tomor - exploiting central Asian oil. 103 Even ro w, then I can assur e you the r esult m o r e good news arrived fr om Paris as will be turmoil worse than in April turned to May.104 Eighteen Chechnya.” There would be no perse- cr editor nations granted Russia an cution of political opponents under a extra seven years to r epay its $40 Communist government. He asserted billion debt. Specifically, the deal that “pr oper democratic development meant that Russia would only have to is impossible without political compe- pay $2 billion in 1996, rather than the tition and opposition. The [Communist scheduled $8 billion. The Russian Party of the ] r otted and negotiators then flew to London to talk fell apart because it just could not with other western bankers about the remove from office a general secr etary rescheduling of $25.5 billion in other who sold it out and betrayed it.” 107 loans. Thus, Y eltsin had mor e to spend But in general, his claim that the domestically, although still not nearly Communists had “reformed” was enough to meet obligations that gr e w unconvincing. His disparaging r emark with each pr esidential campaign about Gorbachev indicated that speech. Zyuganov wanted the bureaucratic, On the other hand, Zyuganov’s command form of socialist dictatorship campaign presented a pictur e of developed under Brezhnev. Moreover, confusion, almost incoher ence. The he favor ed a “voluntary” r estoration of Communists’ basic, and insoluble, the Soviet Union, 108 whereas in r eality problem was to r etain their cor e fol- such a move could only be accom- lowing of about 30 per cent of the plished by for ce. Zyuganov even electorate, while somehow appealing publicly r ebuked Yeltsin on election to voters who intensely disliked eve for his “loss” of Ukraine. The men Y eltsin, yet fear ed even more a r eturn around Zyuganov assured their domes- of the old r egime. 105 The r esult often tic audiences that any talk of “social- seemed like a deliberate attempt at democracy” was for export only: The obfuscation. In a 21 April TV interview, party intended to r estor e the Soviet Zyuganov said all forms of pr operty Union and its centralized state-owned would be respected but r efused to give economy if elected. 109 Zyuganov flatly specific guarantees about private added that “western European-style property. He added that domestic social democracy stands no chance in 14 Russia.” 110 Anatoly Lukhianov, the dr eadfully familiar to Russians: The Communists’ top legal expert and the nationalization of “enterprises, shops, man slated to have become companies, subsidiaries of those Zyuganov’s attorney-general, asserted: companies, equipment, buildings, “We ar e the same Marxist-Leninist patents, shar es, and stocks.” 117 party.” The published party pr ogram In early April, and after pr o- called for the “end to the blackening... tracted fighting among the party and of the teachings of Lenin.” 111 For good its allies, the Communists finally measure, Lukhianov accused Yeltsin of published a summary of their eco- “genocide” for the violent clashes in nomic program. 118 As in 1917, ther e September and October 1993 between were promises of guaranteed employ- the pr esident and the Supr eme So- ment, cheap housing and consumer viet.112 As early as March, a high- goods, and elimination of capitalists’ ranking party member (and conspira- “excessive pr ofits” by means of a tor fr om the failed coup of August confiscatory tax on the rich. As in 1991), Valentin Varennikov, asserted Stalin’s time, the chief empahisis was that the party had a secr e t “maximum on heavy industry, which the Commu- program” which would be unveiled nists intended to r estor e to 1990 levels and implemented only after Zyuganov by pr otective tarif fs and higher was in the Kr emlin. 113 A week before governent investment. Private land the first vote, in a stunning blunder, ownership would be strictly limited to Zyuganov spoke admiringly of Stalin, small gar den plots, with r etention of the gr eatest mass murderer in Russian the r emarkably inefficient collective and western history, asserting that the farms. Pr ofits of private businesses dictator had died too soon; had Stalin would be strictly limited and prices of lived “five or six years longer, the industrial, agricultural and consumer Soviet Union would have been goods would also be controlled, beg- undefeatable for ages.” 114 Zyuganov ging the question “what’s left unr egu- also claimed that under Stalin “ fewer” lated?” Rent and utilities would also than a million people wer e killed, be set by the government and could suggesting that such slaughter was cost no mor e than 5 per cent of a lease- acceptable. 115 With a Zhirinovsky-like holders’ salary. Families of r etired disr egar d for the tr uth and in an srevicemen would recieve fr ee hous- awkward attempt to court the Ortho- ing. Jobs would be guaranteed for dox vote, Zyuganov publicly put forth university graduates in their chosen the bizarr e notion that one of Hitler ’s speciality. For eign companies would be goals in Russia was to establish Pr otes- closely supervised and could not hold tantism. Y et Zyuganov’s version of contr olling inter ests in “key industries Hitler had its good points: he publicly of the basic branches of the economy.” declar ed that in the 1930s, Jews held a A state monopoly would be estab- “contr olling inter est in the entir e lished for “strategically important economic system of western civiliza- export goods,” meaning petroleum tion.” 116 and gas. Finally the Communists But most r evealing and tr oubling called for the “certification of harmful of all, Igor Bratishchev, a party econo- intellectual output,” whatever that mist openly r evived one of the Bolshe- means. The funds for this massively viks’ original goals: The global estab- expensive program would come not lishment of socialism in the next from the IMF but the reestablishment century. And his vision of socialism is of export tarrif fs on oil and gas. 119 15 Many Russians told me it was highly Another effort on 27 May to elucidate unlikely such a policy could raise the Communists’ policy positions suf ficient r evenue to meet its goals. yielded nothing concrete. Rather the Duma member, Irina Khakamada, said platform simply contained trite pr o m - that Zyuganov’s plans meant “govern- ises to do things like “accelerate ment monopolies on international modernization” and give priority to trade, strict state contr ol of banks, the inter ests of “Russia and labor....”123 m o r e attempts at r enationalization of Andrei Illarionov said that property.”120 In the 1920s the Commu- Zyuganov’s economic platform consti- nists faced a simliar pr oblem with tuted a “common set of modern insuf fficiet capital; Stalin “solved” this myths” that r evealed either the delemma thourgh forced labor and Communist’s ignorance or his effort to terror. On the stump, Yeltsin guaran- position himself for the of fice of prime teed that Russians r emained acutely minister.124 Mor e bluntly, Viktor Linnik, aware of this fact. 121 the former editor of Pravda , pointed A serious pr oblem with out that too much of Zyuganov’s Zyuganov’s economic plan was its campaign was simply negative, “child- general vagueness, especially in the ishly anti-Yeltsin,” in his wor ds, and area of privatization. The Communists that the Communists “proved weak on pledged absolute r espect for all the positive signs which finally limited privatization accomplished “without his voter appeal.” 125 violating the law.” But, as The St. Finally it is important to note that Petersbur g Times asked, what does this the Communists never successfully mean? “Privatization was largely backed away from this extr eme, r eac- accomplished not by law but by tionary pr ogram. Indeed, if anything pr esidential decr eee.” Had the Com- their stance toughened as the first vote munists won, they might well have neared. And the press pounced: the ruled that Y eltsin’s decr ees were null historian, Y evgenii Anisimov, wrote a and void because he had carried out a devastating critique of the Zyuganov “coup d’etat” in September 1993 and program in mid-May that must have ther efor e all his subsequent actions caused a shudder in most r eaders. 126 w e r e illegal. Or they could have ar - In short, the Communists be- gued that privatization was illegal lieved that the r ural and senior citizen because it had never been confirmed vote would be sufficient to win the by the Duma. 122 These were quite presidency. Thus they failed to r each serious matters and, judging fr o m out to gr oups that might have been conversations with Russians, many their allies: “skilled workers, youth, people fear ed a Communist regime the intelligentsia and r esidents of the might well r enationalize most private lar gest cities.” The Communists talked property. Others wer e not so sur e: A of new people and new methods; at restaurant owner in Tver ’ told me that one point, Zyuganov spoke of the such a drastic action was unlikely serious need to r each “young people because private business and apart- and many who are skilled labor ers in ment ownershop were too well- high-technology” parts of the esatablished. Still the fear on his face economy.127 But in the end they r elied was real. It was impossible to say with on the gr oups that had voted for them confidence what the Communists in 1995. 128 might do and Zyuganov’s ambiguity By mid-April, the Communists only exacerbated fears of the worst. had clear warning that their fortunes 16 had plunged considerably from the the issue of conscription. In a bid for heady days of December 1995. In re- the youth vote, he decr eed the gradual gional elections in Sver dlovsk pr ovince, transformation of the Russian military the pr o-Yeltsin Eduar d Rossel’s or gani- into an all-volunteer for ce, with an end zation triumphed, with the Communists to conscription by 2000. In a separate receiving only 16 per cent of the vote. In decr ee, Y eltsin also or der ed that only other r ecent r egional contests, Commu- volunteers be sent to combat zones, nists had lost ten seats in the Altai like Chechnya. Boris Gr omov, a former territory’s legislative assembly. And this deputy defense minister active in despite (or because of), Zyuganov’s visit Yeltsin’s campaign, claimed these just befor e the vote. In the Com- moves were unrelated to the impend- munist failed to win a single seat in the ing election, an assertion only the most regional assembly. Most ominous, these purblind could have believed. 132 ar eas had traditionally been ar eas of Whatever the motivation, the gesture Communist support. 129 was probably not necessary. A poll of Nonetheless and fearing the students at Moscow State University worst, German Chancellor Helmut and the city’s various institutes of Kohl and French Premier Jacques higher education, r evealed an over- Chirac publicly and vigorously en- whelming majority favoring Yeltsin. dorsed Yeltsin. Mor e important, they Only at the Federal Security Service quietly pour ed substantial sums into Academy did Zyuganov obtain a Y eltsin’s election cof fers. Michael plurality of 49 per cent; among students McFaul, a senior analyst at the at Moscow State’s Department of Carnegie Endowment’s Moscow office Economics, the Communist leader supported this lar gess. Regar ding a received not a single vote. 133 possible Communist victory he said, “I Meanwhile, Yeltsin continued think the west is right to panic.” 130 The str ewing extravagant fiscal pr omises. Clinton administration’s ef forts wer e He signed a decree authorizing the far milder and lar gely nullified by its payment of compensation to deposi- stance on NATO expansion. tors over eighty years old who lost As the campaign wore on, Y eltsin their savings to inflation. Compensa- moved to counter Communist and tion is to be on a sliding scale up to nationalist nostalgia for the former 1,000 times their initial deposit, with a USSR. He met with the presidents of maximum payment of one million Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Belar us rubles ($200). While this policy imme- on 16 May. They signed an integration diately af fected only a small number of agr eement that dealt mainly with tarif f voters, it was a gr oup str ongly in the regulation, the unification of for eign Communist camp. And it had a ripple curr ency contr ol, and statistical ac- ef fect: In general Y eltsin’s ratings counting. The next day, the four pr esi- among the elderly r ose “notably dents gather ed with the other CIS higher.”134 Also, a new Federal Social leaders to discuss further integration State Fund for the Defense of Deposi- measures. At the end of the meeting, tors and Shar eholders was formed at the other pr esidents indir ectly en- the beginning of May. The IMF forked dorsed Yeltsin, declaring their “sup- over $31 million to be used to compen- port of the democratic pr ocess in sate investors. 135 Russia.” 131 As if to compound the state’s At the same time, on 16 May, monetary problems, Yeltsin issued a Y eltsin completely r eversed himself on decr ee on 21 May promising to fr eeze 17 the number and level of taxes as of radio journalists. Meetings with top January 1997. The president also government officials highlighted the exempted firms from the 10 trillion event. Y eltsin pointedly asserted that “I rubles ($2 billion) in penalty payments am not calling on you to campaign on owed as a r esult of late payment of [my behalf], but I expect fr om you a taxes. Finally, he cut the daily penalty responsible attitude towar d what is for futur e tax arr ears fr om 1 per cent to happening in Russia.” Procurator- 0.3 per cent. With a revised Tax Code General Yuri Skuratov pr omised he languishing in the Duma, Yeltsin’s would devote “special attention to decr ee carried the weight of law and pr otecting journalists’ rights in cases was extraordinarily popular with when the victim of a crime, or the business. It also showed a fiscal irr e- accused, is a journalist.” On 7 May, sponsibility that would embarrass State Pr ess Committee Chairman, Ivan even most western politicians. 136 Laptev, advised the journalists on Continuing his policy of lavish obtaining legal tax and customs privi- pr omises, on a late May trip to the far leges under the law on state support north, Y eltsin flatly declar ed, “I’ve for the mass media. 139 come with full pockets....Today a little The media’s bias was sufficiently money will be coming into blatant that in the Moscow apartment Arkhangelsk Oblast’.” In Vorkuta, building where I stayed in June, a Yeltsin announced 133 billion r ubles resident Zyuganov supporter became ($26.6 million) for the Pechora coal so furious that he climbed to the r oof basin. More telling, the head of the and destr oyed the television antenna Independent Miners’ Union said that for the building. Y asen Zasursky, dean 78 billion r ubles in back wages arrived of Moscow University’s journalism just befor e Y eltsin. In addition, the school r emarked that “the old heritage pr esident pr omised other benefits for of partisanship is still ther e.”140 Mikhail the miners, including “subsidized Gorbachev told an audience in summer holidays for thousands of that “You ar e under a complete infor - childr en, grants for the constr uction of mation blockade.” 141 In a similar vein, retirement homes in warmer regions, Yavlinsky said that the whole cam- and a 40–60 percent r eduction in paign had revolved around “to what railr oad tarif fs on coal fr o m extent Zyuganov [is] worse than V orkuta.” 137 Similar pr omises would Y eltsin .”142 Simply because the pr ess continue fr om a government already was no longer under government deeply in debt. contr ol did not mean it was impartial. Y et, few journalists asked Y eltsin Of particular inter est was the slick the tough and obvious question: and fr ee “newspaper,” Ne dai bog (God Where will the money come fro m ? 138 forbid), which was almost entir ely The r eason for this attitude was that devoted to bashing Zyuganov. It first the media, especially television, un- appeared in Zyuganov’s home region, abashedly favored Yeltsin. Daily he O r el pr ovince, left fr ee of char ge in the received only positive coverage fr o m mailboxes of practically all newspaper most reporters. Without a doubt, subscribers. It had a daily r un of 10 Y eltsin’s camp used its full powers of million and usually featur ed a doc- incumbency to win over the media. On tor ed, full page color photograph of a 6–7 May, the government’s r egional hideous Zyuganov, making him ap- press agency opened an all-expenses pear insane or devilish or both. Anti- paid “seminar” for 80 television and 60 Communists loved it and delighted in 18 showing it to for eigners. The govern- people in the West understand that a ment issued instr uctions that no one political fight is going on her e that has was to interfer e with the distribution no r ules. And if the Communists win, of Ne dai bog .143 On election eve, the then the media will lose their indepen- state owned television network, ORT, dence. There is no choice.” 149 br oadcast a four -part serial on the Similarly, Igor Golembevsky, writer Maxim Gorky, that str essed the editor of the pr o-reform Izvestiia, br utal excesses of the Stalinist r egime. remarked that “Naturally the people The film ended with a solemn who work here are democrats and that voiceover: “Now, at the end of the influences their stories. Ther e is a century, Russia is once again in danger political str uggle going on here that of losing its way, and turning towar d peaks on 16 June, and it is not like the this evil system.” 144 W est, wher e ther e is no danger of On the other hand, Zyuganov democracy being destroyed.” 150 received favorable pr ess only fr o m However, one should be car eful in Pravda and Sovetskaia Rossiia . It is, assessing the media’s r ole in the however, important to note that these election. For obvious r easons, the newspapers were r eadily available former citizens of the Soviet Union ar e throughout Russia. And OSCE observ- quite cynical about veracity in the ers said that legal pr ovisions about fr ee pr ess. In most of the twentieth century, TV and radio time for candidates were it has been the tool of the r uling clique followed with “scr upulous fairness.” 145 and is still viewed with gr eat skepti- On all other fr onts, Zyuganov cism. Moreover, its power is clearly constantly faced questions about the limited: Pr ofessor Zasursky pointed horr ors of Soviet communism, espe- out that during the 1995 parliamentary cially the pur ges, the anti-chur ch elections, two of the main television campaigns, and the cr ushing of dis- channels, ORT and RTR, clearly fa- sent. An exasperated Zyuganov ac- vored Prime Minister Viktor cused the national media, particularly Chernomyrdin’s Our Home is Russia. television, of conducting an “informa- That failed to pr event the Communists tion blockade” of his campaign. Politi- from outpolling that party by more cal commentator, Andrei Cherkizov, than two to one. 151 shot back that “ther e is a Communist Then in early May, the pr estigous press to build up Zyuganov’s im- Institute of the Sociology of Parlia- age.” 146 Cherikizov had a point. In late mentarianism dropped a genuine M a rch, Moscow-based sociologist bombshell: it announced that a poll of Boris Gr ushin analyzed almost a 6,000 people acr oss Russia showed month of campaign coverage and Zyuganov’s support at between 38 and found not one of Pravda ’s 56 stories 47 per cent. If accurate it appear ed about Yeltsin was favorable. 147 possible that the Communists could The r eason for this bias was win outright in the first ballot. What obvious: To a great extent, the media made the news especially significant is owed its fr eedom to Yeltsin. Journalists that this institute was virtually alone felt that to have been impartial to in pr edicting a str ong showing by Zyuganov, who clearly intended to Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic reintr oduce censorship, would have Party in both the 1993 and 1995 elec- been foolish and suicidal. 148 As Nikolai tions. 152 In the 26 May New York T imes Svanidze, a Russian television dir ector, Magazine ,Alessandra Stanley wrote said on 1 May 1996: “I am not sur e that from Moscow: “If Y eltsin makes it into 19 the second r ound,” he still might fail to prices 74 per cent in dollar terms in just pick up enough support to beat two months. The Moscow Times r uble- Zyuganov.” (Italics added). adjusted index leaped to an all-time But almost simultaneously, CNN high of 233.50. One exhausted trader and The Moscow News r eleased a poll exclaimed “We hit the r ecor d number indicating that Y eltsin was pulling of deals we’ve done. All our clients ar e ahead in the pr esidential race, having calling in at the same time. The dealers opened a significant lead over ar e on the phone constantly.” 156 Zyuganov. The poll gave Y eltsin an In early June, Russian eyes tem- advantage over his opponent with 27.7 porarily focused on St. Petersbur g’s per cent of r espondents favoring the mayoral r un-off between incumbent president, contrasted with Zyuganov’s Anatoly Sobchak and his breakaway 19.3 per cent. Twenty percent wer e First Deputy Mayor, Vladimir undecided. A VTsIOM poll gave Yeltsin Yakovlev. The final Gallup poll gave a mor e modest 28 to 27 per cent advan- Sobchak a solid ten point lead and a tage. 153 The deputy dir ector of The poll by the Academy of Sciences gave Institute for Comparative Social Re- Sobchak an eleven point lead. 157 But in sear ch, Anna Andreyenkova, pre- a major upset, Y akovlev won 47.9 dicted that the pr esident would per cent to Sobchak’s 45.8 per cent, with continue his rise in popularity. “We 6.3 per cent voting against both candi- have been monitoring Yeltsin’s dates. 158 Moscow was abuzz with pr ogr ess constantly,” she said. “Since speculation about the implications for mid-April he has been gaining in the pr esidential race (and the r eliability popularity at a rate of 1 to 3 per cent of Russian polls) because Sobchak had per week. Zyuganov’s support is tried to link his quest to r emain in absolutely stable, he is standing in power to Yeltsin’s str uggle with the place.” Andreyenkova added that Communists. Aleksandr Yer ofiyev, a “ Yeltsin is waging a very ef fective resear cher for Gallup in Russia, said campaign, if not completely openly. He the ultimate national ef fect depended is constantly on television, constantly on who would be able to put his spin traveling, cr eating the impression of on events. “The Communists will the balanced, moderate master of the pr obably try to cr eate the myth that the country, something we haven’t seen defeat of Sobchak signals a defeat for much of for the past two years.Yeltsin’s Y eltsin. If they can perpetuate this most ef fective tactic has been to say ‘I myth then the r esults will hurt may not be great, but I’m the best of a Y eltsin.” 159 bad lot’. That is what he is doing As it turned out, the Communists now.”154 never got a chance to try to exploit Y eltsin continued his ascent fr o m Yakovlev’s upset. The day of his the depths and some believed a victory election the new mayor said “There are in the first r ound was possible, Yeltsin today no alternatives to Boris Y eltsin, included. The economy did its bit to and people that I r espect, like help the incumbent: inflation r emained Yavlinsky, should understand this and very low.155 Optimism gripped the confirm it.” 160 business community. On 29 May, Meanwhile, Yeltsin continued his Moscow stock markets reached hectic pace. In Perm, on 31 May, he recor d-setting highs, with The Moscow str olled ar ound the city talking with T imes index soaring 18.96 points, pensioners and teenagers alike, r ein- continuing a rally that raised stock for cing his vigor ous, yet smooth, 20 image. Even when an elderly woman agreement with the r ebels that called berated him on her wholly inadequate for a complete cease-fir e and cessation pension, Y eltsin remained cool and of hostilities as of midnight 31 May. On promised that minimum pensions the 29th, Y eltsin made a well-televised would eventually equal the minimum visit to the tr oops near Grozny cr eating standard of living. 161 But the cr owds a mostly favorably impact. 165 Even a wer e mostly sympathetic. In his after - few Communists admitted that the noon speech, he promised a landslide pr esident’s trip was a brilliant political victory in the first vote and an end to stroke. Reactions varied and many “civil and ethnic unr est in Russia,” a people were simply bewildered, but refer ence to Chechnya. 162 most seemed favorably impressed. In the week befor e the first vote, Even the str ongly anti-war Izvestiia, Y eltsin put in a mur der ous schedule, found praise for Yeltsin, but lamented accented by his continuing lar gess, that that he had should have taken similar soon led to an undisclosed heart steps earlier.166 On 10 June, Y eltsin attack. He spent Monday, the 10th, obtained an agr eement to end the 18- criss-cr ossing Russia fr om to month war. The deal pr ovided for a the Black Earth r egion. Wednesday Russian tr oop withdrawal by the end saw a whirlwind tour of St. Petersbur g, of August and for the Chechens fight- where he promised 350 billion r ubles ers to disarm. Once Russia’s tr oops ($70 million) to the Baltic Shipbuilding had left, local elections wer e to be held, Factory for the completion of an seemingly removing an obstacle that icebr eaker. He also issued a series of had been blocking agreement. The decr ees on 7 and 8 June that included arrangement, however, failed to deal the transfer of 3.8 trillion r ubles ($790 with the futur e status of Chechnya, an million) to pay for teachers’ annual issue that had wr ecked previous leave, instr ucted Chernomyrdin to agreements. 167 Nonetheless, the mili- submit a bill within twenty days to the tary appr oved Yeltsin’s peace initiative: Duma that would give civil servant A poll in January gave him only 4 status to health and education special- percent support among Russia’s ists and raise their salaries. Y eltsin also soldiers; in the June election a majority gave r esidents of Russia’s Far East a 50 of the military supported him and a per cent discount on rail or air far es to whopping 82 per cent of those fighting central r egions once every two years. in Chechnya voted for Yeltsin.168 Finally, he pr oposed a bill that would As it turned out, this agr eement raise child allowances for single had little af fect on events in Chechnya. mothers and reduce taxes on families The press continued to r eport viola- with several childr en. On Friday he tions of the ceasefir e. Still, despite the returned to his hometown, opinion polls, ther e is no evidence that Ekaterinburg.163 Ther e the vodka the fighting hurt Y eltsin significantly began to flow unabated once again. or that the Communists were able to However, befor e the party began benefit fr om it. Y eltsin had a final pr oblem to tackle. Meanwhile, Zyuganov kept an A war e of an opinion poll which equally active travel pace, especially claimed that almost 60 per cent of since he had completely eschewed any Russians felt ending, not winning, the national advertising campaign. In- war in Chechnya was of paramount stead, he r elied on grassr oots activism, importance, he worked hard at just something Zyuganov called “man to that.164 In late May, he signed an man, heart to heart” canvassing. But in 21 the week before the first balloting, Russia is with us.” 171 Russians ar e Zyuganov speeches remained entirely certainly unsophisticated in western- negative: he spoke of the hungry style political campaigning, but sur ely Russians who, if placed one after they can spot such blatant incoherence. another, would str etch fr o m Moscow Just days befor e the election, a to the ; the unem- bomb ripped through a metro car ployed fr om Moscow to the Volga killing four and injuring twelve. River and those swindled in the no- Yeltsin blamed it on unnamed ele- holds-barr ed investment companies, ments attempting to destabilize the from Moscow to Lake Baikal, north of nation at that important time. How- the Mongolian border. A western ever, Y eltsin’s friend and supporter, reporter covering the Communists, Moscow mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, was observed that “Zyuganov said he less political. “The explosion was would change the country, r estoring carried out by those who doubt their the Russia of old. He did not explain success in the elections and want to h o w. He just said he would....” 169 aggravate the situation in or der to Even more telling wer e the cancel voting. The terr orist act is remarks of Valentin Romanov, first backed by the for ces which want to secr etary of the Samara city Commu- bring the country back to 1917, the nist Party committee. Speaking before 1930s, the postwar years, the years of a secr et party plenum on 18 May, he queues, shortages, limited fr eedom characterized Zyuganov’s campaign and limited consciousness.” Once statements as “insipid” and described again, Zyuganov stumbled badly. His his platform as “nothing but slogans.” response to this vitriolic attack showed There was no dissent fr om Romanov’s either r emarkable restraint or an remarks. 170 Clearly many Communists inability to take of f the gloves politi- were already prepared for the coming cally. In neither case, did it net him defeat. political points. He told a gathering of At a final Moscow rally, the students near Moscow University that atmosphere was positively bizarr e. A “This [bombing] is the latest symptom few hundred young people, brought in of several years of fr ee-for -all politics,” especially for the occasion, mixed a bit presumably referring to the often uneasily with the far mor e numerous messy nature of emergent democracy. elderly rank and file with their posters He then offer ed his standar d attack on of Lenin and Stalin. The speakers gave rampant crime. “We demand that the forth a wholly muddled “message.” authorities take ef fective security Zyuganov said, “We will lead the measures and fight those who commit people not to the past but to the futur e. such atr ocities.” 172 Thus, having been W e will r ely not on concentration char ged practically with terr orism, camps, not on an Ir on Curtain, not on Zyuganov responded with an ordinary prison labor but on modern culture, campaign speech. the best Russian and Soviet tradi- At a final pr ess confer ence, tions.” Zyuganov then quoted exten- Zyuganov predicted a Communist sively fr om the Bible, comparing victory in the first r ound. “Mr. Y eltsin Y eltsin to a “beast fr om Hell” and claims that his rating has gr own from 6 making a str ong pitch for the national- to 50 percent. Only bamboo in the ist vote. V iktor Anpilov followed, tr opics gr ows at such a rate,” crying that “We will win because Zyuganov quipped in rare effort at Lenin is with us, Stalin is with us, and humor. “We ar e confidently going to 22 the polls, and I can say that we have Most surprising was Aleksandr won because the latest opinion polls Lebed’s thir d place finish with 15 say that two-thir ds of the country’s per cent. 178 The former general, para- citizens support the ideals of popular trooper and boxer, ran on a no-non- patriotism and social justice,” he sense anti-crime and corr uption plat- said. 173 form. 179 Moreover, his intention to end There were little grounds for conscription and cr eate a pr ofessional Zyuganov’s optimism. On the army appealed to many young voters. election’s eve, a final poll showed that According to one specialist, the Y eltsin while only 36 per cent of the r espon- camp had been in touch with Lebed dents intended to vote for Y eltsin on since March and in April a deal was the 16th, a whopping 57 percent str uck that included giving Lebed believed Y eltsin would ultimately be access to Y eltsin’s financial backers and re-elected. In January, only 14 per cent promised him a prominent post in thought Yeltsin could win a second Yeltsin’s next government. 180 After the term. Indeed, of the people who June vote, Y eltsin’s people pr esented definitely intended to vote in the the general with $20 million to finance second round, 53 per cent favor ed a last minute media blitz. 181 As the Y eltsin with only 36 per cent for ballot count was still under way, Zyuganov.174 This VTsIOM poll shows Yeltsin and Lebed began discussions clearly the deep division and sense of that quickly led to the latter ’s appoint- resignation that gripped Russia in the ment as Russia’s new security minis- late spring and what a r emarkable ter.182 Within hours, Grachev was comeback Yeltsin had managed. While sacked and promptly went into a only about a thir d of the electorate had vodka-soaked depression. 183 a reasonably favorable opinion of Nezavisimaia Gazeta, citing “a well- Y eltsin, a solid majority shr ugged and informed source in the Kr emlin,” expected his victory. Clearly, the asserted that Y eltsin intended to make feeling was ther e was no viable alter - Grachev the “main culprit for the native. failur e of the federal for ces in In fact, neither candidate called it Chechnya, the collapse of military corr ectly for the first r ound. In the June reform and the calamitous situation in 16th balloting Y eltsin got 35 per cent to the army.” Yavlinsky had also made it Zyuganov’s 32. In all, democratic- clear that Grachev’s head was his price centrist candidates garner ed 60 per for supporting Y eltsin in the r un-off cent of the vote and most observers election. 184 corr ectly believed they would rally Yet Lebed kept his distance. around Yeltsin, if only because of their Speaking of the choice between distaste for Zyuganov. While the first Zyuganov and Yeltsin, he gr owled to round showed clearly that many reporters: “I faced two ideas, an old Russians longed for a r eturn to com- one which caused much bloodshed munism,175 a solid majority wer e anti- and a new one which is being carried Communist.176 Nonetheless, Y eltsin out very poorly. I chose the new could not be complacent. A poll of idea.” 185 An individual close to Lebed 1,500 people in fifty-six cities and flatly stated that: “We’ve got to empha- villages conducted by the All-Russian size that Lebed is joining the adminis- Public Opinion Centre on 18–19 June tration so as to r eform it, get rid of the revealed that only 47 per cent definitely corr upt element, and keep Yeltsin up to intended to vote for Y eltsin.177 the mark.” 186 The emphasis was more 23 on fear of Communism, than positive W ith Lebed on board, it looked support for Y eltsin. like things would go smoothly: A poll An All-Russian Public Opinion from CNN/ Moscow News gave Center on 19 June announced that of Y eltsin 50 per cent to Zyuganov’s 24.8. Lebed supporters 39 percent favor ed Therefor e, even if Zyuganov got all of Y eltsin while only 14 per cent would the 13 per cent who remained unde- vote for Zyuganov. But 39 per cent also cided, Y eltsin would still win. Then had yet to make up their minds. 187 Not Yeltsin disappear ed for the week surprisingly, Lebed voters felt little befor e the r unoff. Of ficially he had a zeal come election day. As Y uri cold and laryngitis; unof ficially, all Andreyevichy, an engineer, said: “I fears wer e on his heart and drinking. voted for Lebed because I believe he The concerns were well-founded: the would try to do something against T imes reported that between the two crime and corr uption. Now he’s with elections Y eltsin let himself go in a Y eltsin, I suppose I’ll vote for Y eltsin, grand manner, guzzling vodka and but I’m afraid Y eltsin’s regime may neglecting his medication. First r eports simply stifle him, or sack him again, indicated Y eltsin had suf fer ed a mild and nothing will change.” 188 str oke. 192 (In fact, Y eltsin’s condition On the evening of the 19th, ther e had been quite serious. His heart was occurr ed a bizarr e af fair wher ein mem- able to pump only one-third of the bers of the Federal Security Service usual blood flow and doctors stopped arr ested two Yeltsin campaign aides and his heart attack only by the injection of interr ogated them at gunpoint for eleven a clot-dissolving dr ug.) 193 hours, befor e char ging them with the Yeltsin’s camp was in a near attempted robbery of $500,000. frenzy, the main concern being a low Zyuganov painted this as another turnout that would benefit the Com- example of the sleaze ar ound the presi- munists, who, with their gr eater dent, while the pr ess called it an attempt dedication would be at the ballot boxes to thwart democracy and prevent the en masse . Even with a good turnout, final r ound of voting. 189 However, Yeltsin Yeltsin supporters wer e nervous. and Lebed quickly turned the affair to Deputy Chairman of the All-Russian their political advantage. Aleksandr Movement for the Social Support of Korzhakov, pr esidential security chief, the Pr esident, Vyacheslav Nikonov, Lev Soskovets, first deputy prime said he expected a turnout of 64 per - minister and Mikhail Barsukov, head of cent and that Y eltsin would squeak by the FSB, the successor to the KGB, all lost with 50.8 per cent, while Zyuganov their jobs. 190 Korzhakov had been would receive 46.8 per cent. 194 Good Y eltsin’s most tr usted aide and long-time weather was a major concern: younger, drinking companion. But many Russians Y eltsin-inclined voters might take the and western reporters saw all thr ee as day of f and head for their dachas. A closer to the Communists than r eform- turnout under sixty per cent was ers: The T imes asserted that they disliked viewed as potentially diastr ous. 195 the pr ess, westerners and intellectuals, Some consolation came in the had protectionist views on the eco n o m y form of Y avlinsky’s backhanded and considered elections as an evil to be endorsement: he urged his supporters avoided if necessary.191 Y eltsin was not to vote for Zyganov or “against cleaning house again, but this time the both.” Zhirinovsky’s position was opponents of reform were being shown equally lukewarm. On the eve of the the door. final vote, Chernomyrdin said “We are 24 not in the grip of euphoria at all. Ther e Just after the election, while ther e is a general feeling of concern.” 196 were reports of some infringement of But the Communists were also electoral laws, ther e wer e no “gr oss scar ed. On 24 June, Zyuganov pro- violations,” accor ding to the T imes . The posed a pact between himself and elections wer e conducted in a fair and Yeltsin that would guarantee that no open fashion. This was lar gely due to matter who won the runoff vote, the the Communists, who conducted Communists would not be shut out. themselves with laudable honesty at One-third of the new government’s the polls. Possessing by far the lar gest members would be Zyuganov support- political or ganization in Russia, they ers, one-thir d fr om Yeltsin’s people and could easily have used intimidation the final thir d fr om other factions and stuf fed or destr oyed ballots. Ther e represented in the Duma. With Lebed is no indication they did so; by all in Y eltsin’s camp, the pr esident had accounts people were fr ee to vote as little reason to take Zyuganov’s offer.197 they pleased. 201 On the fourth, Finally, Y eltsin won 54 per cent to Zyuganov conceded defeat but the Zyuganov’s 40 percent, with a 69 Communists were not about to give per cent turnout. In the most general up. Zyuganov’s top aid, Anatoly terms, Y eltsin carried most districts in Lukianov, remarked ominously that the Far East and Siberia and his native “even God cannot defeat the idea of Urals r egion and secured more than 70 communism.”202 per cent of the vote in Moscow and St. Unfortunately, gr oss violations Petersburg. Zyuganov carried districts did indeed occur. Russia’s electoral law south of Moscow in the Communist limited each candidate to a spending “” and in Siberian mining limit of appr oximately $3 million. districts. Yeltsin’s top campaigner According to the W ashington Post and Ser gei Filatov called it a dif ficult Peter Reddaway of George Washing- victory, adding that “We now see that ton University and a veteran Russian our people ar e not thoughtless ma- observer, the Y eltsin team violated this chines but ar e civilized personalities.” 198 limit by per haps as much as 17,000 However that may be, a close per cent. It is easy to imagine how analysis of Russia’s electoral geogra- loudly any western politician would phy in 1996 r evealed a highly complex have protested such a staggering pictur e. Contrary to expectations, violation of the r ules. Yet, Zyuganov voters did not choose a candidate remained largely quiet on this issue based on their socioeconomic status: pr obably because he felt unsur e of his They did not “vote accor ding to their ability of r ule a Russian many believed stomachs.” One example should on the “edge of financial and economic suf fice: Yeltsin swept Ivanovo pr ovince crisis.”203 which also had some of Russia’s Comparing the 1996 election with highest unemployment rates. 199 What the pr evious years’ parliamentary seems to have been of most impor- elections, a few facts stand out. Elec- tance in 1996 was an urban versus toral turnout was high in both cam- rural political cultur e; the former paigns. About 65 percent of the elector - identified most with the r eformist ate turned out in December 1995; the tendencies of Y eltsin and the latter number was slightly higher about six looked more to the Communists and months later. Apathy played little r ole “traditionalism, especially ‘r ed’ tradi- in the contests. In 1995, the Commu- tionalism.” 200 nist faction r eceived 32.2 per cent of the 25 vote and in June 1996, they actually attitudes towar ds the policies of the dropped to 32 percent. In a head-to- leadership.” 207 The clear lesson her e is head fight with Y eltsin, Zyuganov only that if the leadership fails to r espond to managed to increase his total by 8.3 the voters’ needs, they will per haps percent; meanwhile Yeltsin moved abandon the ballot box in favor of from 35.3 percent in June to 53.8 in m o r e traditional, and violent, means of July. And this despite the fact in the Russian political action. interval between pr esidential voting But a pr oblem remains: what rounds Yeltsin virtually vanished, needs, or simply attitudes, did the Chernenko-like, fr om public view.204 voters expr ess in the final r ound? Both But a close look at the political candidates had promised much the landscape in 1995–96, also r evealed the same: incr eased social spending, law terrible divisions among the “liberal- and order, some sort of end to the democratic” gr oups and factions. One Chechen war. But ther e wer e differ- specialist, V. L. Sheinis, put the number ences: Zyuganov stressed Russia’s loss of such national gr oups at seven, and of its “superpower” status and its noted that after the elections they had “humiliation” before the western shown no propensity toward coopera- capitalists. Apparently only a decided, tion. Indeed, these or ganizations if sizable minority, cared. More impor- fought to maintain their independence, tant was history. Zyuganov was unable which can only weaken Russian to shake of f the heritage of seventy democracy. Furthermore, Sheinis years of communism, not that he tried believes that the democratic for ces very har d to do this. Many people must look beyond Russia’s new voted “purely in or der to pr event middle class and address the pr oblems Communist revenge.” 208 faced by Russia’s wage earners, who Russians were still not very still constitute a majority and ar e not enthusiastic about the futur e after the enthusiastic with simplistic slogans election. A VTsIOM poll asked: “In about “Less government!” 205 Nonethe- What Way Will the Political Situation less in 1996 these democrats had in Russia Change after the Election?” “nowhere to turn but Y eltsin.” 206 The r esults was that 30 per cent From discussions with Russians thought the situation would become and a r eading of the contemporary “more quiet and stable;” 19 per cent literatur e, it is clear that Yeltsin won thought it would “become worse;” 39 because of a widespread fear of com- per cent thought ther e would be no munism and a desire to stay the course change and 12 percent were unde- within a fledgling and imperfect cided. 209 In other wor ds, a majority democracy. The Institute of Social and believed things would get worse or Political Studies of the Academy of remain the same. And few Russians Sciences conducted a poll in June 1996 wer e happy with the status quo in that r evealed some basic facts. First the 1996. Indeed, one poll found 92 per cent vast majority of Russians believed that believed that “or dinary people do not their political leaders, at all levels, did receive a just shar e of the national not car e about the concerns of “or di- wealth.” 210 And in polls fr om 1994 nary people,” but were responsive to thr ough 1996, a solid majority of the desir es of “other inter ests much Russians asserted that “the rich will m o r e powerful.” Y et 80 per cent voted get richer, and the poor, poor er.”21 1 because it was the only way for these W ithout question, Y eltsin’s ex- or dinary people to “convey their travagant financial pr omises were 26 important (and utterly r eckless) and western elections and ther efor e often he used the power of incumbency to misunderstood outside Russia. the utmost, but, as noted, Y eltsin had It is also important that Y eltsin’s failed to deliver much by the final vote health and his alcoholism, which and Zyuganov also promised a finan- fascinated the western media, aroused cial cornucopia. But for emost, it must little inter est in Russia. 217 A retired be kept in mind that the Russians nurse who voted for him remarked endured over seventy years of Com- that “I or any one of us could dr op munist r ule and the memories simply dead tomorro w.” An advertising refused to go away. The majority of executive pr obably spoke for many Russians with whom I spoke recalled Russians when he asserted that “it’s the Soviet era with fear and loathing. the court that makes the king.” 218 A Americans usually forget that Stalin Muscovite named Gleb emphasized had to kill literally millions of Russians that: “We ar e voting today to keep the to impose his grisly vision of socialism Communists from coming back to on the country. Russians r emember power. We have no choice but to vote this all too well. And Yeltsin quite for Yeltsin. It is irr elevant if he is sensibly hammered away mercilessly healthy or sick, alive or dead .”219 on this point. Zyuganov’s ill-advised Few people were wildly enthusi- response that Stalin made the USSR a astic about either candidate. But as the superpower and maintained “order,” election near ed, and people r ealized simply failed to appeal beyond his they had to make a final and irr evo- existing cor e of supporters. 212 On the cable choice with enormous, incalcu- eve of the first vote, a World War II lable consequences for the futur e, they veteran exclaimed to a gr oup of Com- rejected communism. A Russian physi- munists in Perm, “You want cian and pr ofessor summed up a Zyuganov, you want to go back to the feeling I often encounter ed just befor e time of the Soviet Gestapo? You must the election: “I hate Y eltsin and I hate all be mad!” 213 The elderly ballerina, Zyuganov. But I’m voting for Y eltsin.” Maya Plisetskaia, r emarked “I will When I asked him why, he r eplied that vote for Boris Y eltsin. We cannot allow a return of the Communists was a r epetition of a Stalinist, Communist, “unthinkable.” 220 socialist, or whatever name you call it, Nevertheless, it is an historical regime.” 214 Natalia Saprykina, a stu- fact that the Russians have never dent who voted for Yeltsin said that experienced democracy, at least for any Zyuganov, “is mostly supported by appreciable length of time. Ther efor e, former Communists. They’re used to it is dif ficult to ar gue that most Rus- living under that r egime and they’re sians understood fully what they not comfortable now. I don’t wish meant when they voted for such a anything bad for them, but it’s time for system. An elderly citizen of the us to live.” 215 The issue was Soviet- Siberian city of Akademgorodok style communism 216 versus an emerg- eloquently addressed the bur den of ing democracy, whatever its imperfec- Russia’s past and the political backwar d- tions. Yeltsin and Zyuganov were ness of its citizens. Speaking with a primarily the symbols of these two western r eporter she said: “Its not our alternatives. Their personalities or fault, you know. For 70 years we wer e “charisma” meant little. The Russian slaves in a totalitarian r egime. It will take election was above all a battle of a long time for us to be able to think for principles, something uncommon in ourselves. Pray for us.” 22 1 Nonetheless, 27 in 1996 Russians voted to stay on a ably the Communists’ last thr oe, espe- course that allowed them to elect their cially if they fail to remodel themselves own leaders: to think for themselves. along social-democratic lines, as many Also it seems that the Commu- east Eur opean communists have done. 22 6 nists’ historical penchant for r eligious But it was almost certainly Y eltsin’s last persecution hurt them. Zyuganov tried major political fight. Despite his r ecov- to persuade people that was all in the ery from triple bypass surgery and the past, but few uncommitted voters were new energy he has shown at least on convinced. Often, over the past several occasions after the election, Y eltsin’s years, Russians of all types (even some remarkable political car eer is over. It is Communists) have told me that the root too early to tell if he will indeed be of their country’s continuing crises is a remembered as he man who brought loss of spiritual values. Only under democracy to Russia. 22 7 Gorbachev, when it was too late, did the Finally, not only democracy but Communists cease their systematic the institution of the state itself is harassment and abuse of religious again in serious tr ouble in the spring believers. Zyuganov was simply “un- of 1999. The pr evious August, the able to attract tr ue believers to his economy took a serious nose dive, the bloc.” 22 2 A retired engineer conceivably value of the r uble dr opping fr om 6 to spoke for many older Russians when the dollar to 24 in early May. The he said that the Communists had government’s hard curr ency r eserves irreparably damaged what he believed have fallen to about $15 billion. In is one of Russia’s gr eat historical other words, Bill Gates’ personal str engths: its r eligious piety.223 fortune is about thr ee times that of the That the election simply took Russian state. With the NAT O attack place is of gr eat historical significance. on Yugoslavia, nationalists and com- Russia’s political cultur e has always munists and just about everyone else emphasized such notions as “he who have indulged in an outburst of anti- is not with us, is against us” and “if western rage that could quite easily the enemy will not submit, he will be turn into anti-democratic and anti- annihilated.” The Soviet r egime fully capitalist movements. It seems that institutionalized this attitude. 224 But in only the “do nothing and hope” strat- 1996, rather than annihilation or for ce, egy of Prime Minister Evgenii Russians had a choice. And the victors Primakov is holding the country to- and losers accepted the nation’s ver - gether. In the summer of 1990 as dict. per estr oika enter ed its death thr oes, the It is important to note that the dezhurnaia on my floor of Moscow’s typical Zyuganov supporter is fifty- University Hotel told me “I don’t know five years old and lives in the country- what the futur e holds; I only know we side.22 5 Russia is now a mostly urban can’t go on like this.” The same holds society and with life expectancy at about tr ue for Russia just a year befor e the 60 –65 years and falling, this was pr ob- next pr esidential election in 2000.

28 Notes 1. Y eltsin’s election as pr esident in June 1991 was dif fer ent, having been con- ducted within the old Soviet system. 2. Christian Science Monitor , 11 September 1996. An apt comparison is to the “de Gaulle-era Fr ench constitution.” David Remnick, Resurr ection: The Struggle for a New Russia (New York: Random House, 1997), 94. It must be noted, however, that local authorities often block or delay implementation of pr esidential decr ees. 3. Timothy J. Colton, “Russians Get Real about Politics,” Demokratizatsiya (Sum- mer 1996): 373. 4. Russia’ s Election: What Does it Mean? Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 10 July 1996 (Washington D. C.: Government Printing O f fice, 1996.) 5. Daniel Treisman, “Why Yeltsin Won,” For eign Affairs , (September/October 1996): 67-69. 6. Open Media Research Institute, Daily Digest , 19 March 1996. He also denounced the dissolution of the USSR. This now defunct sour ce was an invaluable tool for resear chers on the World Wide Web, who lack access to major r esear ch libraries. It consisted of information gleaned fr om a number of Western and Russian sour ces. Her eafter cited as OMRI. Pr esently, the online service of Radio Fr ee Eur ope/Radio Liberty fulfills a similar need. 7. The T imes , 14 June 1996. 8. The Sunday Times , 31 Mar ch 1996. 9. OMRI, 2 May 1996. A few days later in Y ar oslavl’, Y eltsin blamed local authori- ties and enterprise dir ectors for the failur e to pay salaries on time. OMRI, 6 May 1996. 10. OMRI, 3 May 1996. 11. OMRI, 8 May 1996. 12. The T imes , 28 June 1996. 13. The Sunday Times , 23 June 1996. 14. The Sunday Times , 23 June 1996. 15. The Communists and their allies cr eated quite a stir in Mar ch when they formally denounced the Belovezhaskaia agreements of December 1991 that effec- tively dissolved the USSR. 16. Cited in Alessandra Stanley, “The Hacks ar e Back,” New York T imes Magazine , 26 May 1996. Historians ar e still calculating the total “sacrifices” involved in the Soviet experiment; but the numbers of dead are in the tens of millions. 17. Alexander Yanov, “The Puzzles Of Patriotic Communism: Gennadii Zyuganov, The Russian Milosevic?” University, Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy, Publication Series Number 12, 1996, . 18. Richar d Pipes, “Russia Finally Buys Fr eedom,” The Sunday Times , 30 Mar ch 1997. 19. Angela Stent and Lilia Shevtsova, “Russia’s Election: No Turning Back,” 29 For eign Policy ,(Summer, 1996): 92. 20. In fact, “Communists were rare bir ds in the countryside of the 1920s.” Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin’ s Peasants , (New York, 1994), 26. 21. Of the 450 seats in the Duma, the Communists won 157, Our Home is Russia 54, the Liberal Democrats 51, Y abloko 45 and the Congress of Russian Communi- ties, 5. Minton F. Goldman, Russia, the Eurasian Republics and Central/Eastern Europe, 6th ed. (Guilfor d, Connecticut, 1996), 72. 22. OMRI, 18 March 1996. 23. OMRI, 4 April 1996. 24. On 5 November 1996, The New York T imes reported that the Moscow daily m u r der rate was almost twice that of New York. The occasion was the murder of an American businessman, who took 12 machine gun slugs in the back outside the Radisson-Slavianskaia. 25. Stephen White, Current History , October, 1993. Pr obably Zhirinovsky’s anti- Semitism hurt him in the summer elections: an April poll by the American Jewish Committee found that only about 16 per cent of Russians harbor anti-Semitic feelings. Morning Edition, National Public Radio, 16 April 1996. 26. St. Petersbur g Pr ess, 5–11 Mar ch 1996. In the middle of the campaign this newspaper changed its title to the St. Petersbur g T imes . A vailable online, it is a gr eat sour ce for curr ent events. 27. OMRI, 29 April 1996. 28. Segodnia , 18 April 1996. Sour ce was a VTsIOM poll conducted from 4–10 April. 29. The Sunday Times , 18 Febr uary 1996. 30. The Christian Science Monitor , 1 December 1995. 31. St. Petersbur g Pr ess, 1 January–5 Febr uary 1996. 32. Interview with Vasilii Aksyonov, NPR, “All Things Considered,” 19 September 1996. 33. Segodnia , 16 Febr uary 1996. 34. Segodnia , 28 Febr uary 1996. 35. OMRI, 22 March 1996. 36. A VTsIOM poll in May found that only about 5 percent of Russians were concerned about a “lack of foodstuf fs and basic commodities.” Segodnia , 15 May 1996. 37. Pravda , 9 July 1996. 38. OMRI, 10 April 1996. 39. Nezavisimaia gazeta , 17 Febr uary 1996. Moscow Metro cars, for example, wer e liberally plaster ed with advertisement for these “investment” companies. Zyuganov tirelessly attacked such fraudulent operations but to no apparent avail. See for example, Pravda Rossii , 12 January 1996. This was the weekly supplement to Pravda. 40. OMRI, 23 April 1996.

30 41. Segodnia , 20 April 1996. 42. The Sunday Times , 3 Mar ch 1996. 43. St. Petersbur g Pr ess, 30 January–2 Febr uary 1996. 44. Kommersant-Daily, 6 Febr uary 1996. 45.OMRI, 12 February 1996. Despite Yeltsin’s pr omises, Russia’s General Confed- eration of Trade Unions reported in late September that wage arr ears had actually incr eased to $9 billion for the first eight month of 1996. Mor eover, unemployment totaled 8 million, or six per cent of the employment-age population. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 30 September 1996. 46. The Sunday Times , 9 June 1996. 47. Segodnia , 23 Febr uary 1996. 48. OMRI, 20 April 1996. 49. A vraham Shama, “Inside Russia’s True Economy,” For eign Policy , (Summer 1996): 1 11–127. 50. Nezavisimaia gazeta , 6 June 1996. 51. Radio Fr ee Eur ope/Radio Liberty, 30 September 1996. 52. Izvestiia, 24 January 1996. 53. Nezavisimaia gazeta , 24 January 1996. 54. New York T imes , 13 Febr uary 1996. 55. Goldman, Russia , p. 75. 56. New York T imes , 11 September 1996. Russia now has a smaller state sector than (EU and OECD member) Italy. St. Petersbur g Pr ess, 23–29 January 1996. 57. St Petersbur g Pr ess, 16–22 April 1996. 58. Kommersant-Daily, 9 April 1996. 59. Rossiskaia gazeta , 24 Febr uary 1996. 60. OMRI, 14 February 1996. 61. OMRI, 9 April 1996; Ibid., 8 July 1996. 62. Treisman, “How Yeltsin Won,” p. 69. 63. Rossiiskie vesti , 29 Mar ch 1996. 64. Jer emy Bransten estimated that 30,000 died in the Chechen war. May 28, RFE/ R L Online Report. On 3 September, Russia’s Security Minister, Aleksandr Lebed, reported that 80,000 had perished in Chechnya. OMRI, 4 September 1996. 65. The Sunday Times , 14 April 1996. 66. For an excellent, concise portrait of Lebed see S. Fr ederick Starr “A Russian Politician to Reckon With” in The Christian Science Monitor , 15 December 1995. 67. John M. Thompson, A Vision Unfulfilled: Russia and the Soviet Union in the Twentieth Century (Lexington, , 1996), 337. 68. Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador ’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York, 1995), 23.

31 69. Bill Keller , who covered Russia fr om 1986 to 1991 observed that “the Chechens exploited their position within Russia to raise the money for their war of inde- pendence. This included siphoning off oil, swindling the Russian state in a series of bank frauds, transforming Grozny into a gr eat black-market emporium and serving as home base for Moscow’s toughest network of gangsters.” The New York T imes book r eview of Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus , by Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal. 70. Goldman, Russia, the Eurasian Republics, and Central/Eastern Eur ope , 6th ed., p. 70; 84–85. 71. OMRI, 4 March 1996. 72. OMRI, 5 March 1996. 73. Segodnia , 9 April 1996. Sound r easons existed for Y eltsin’s attitude about the necessity of ending the war if he was to win an extr emely close race. In late 1995, when Yeltsin’s poll numbers were in the cellar , the All-Russia Center for Public Opinion Research found that fifteen per cent of Russians said they “could sup- port” Y eltsin if he “stopped the fighting in Chechnya.” Y uri Levada, “Uneasy Lies the Head that Wears the Cr own,” New Times , Mar ch 1996: 4-5. In mid-April, Natalia Zorkaia of VTsIOM attributed much of Yeltsin’s pr oblems to his failur e to find a peace settlement. Moscow Tribune , 17 April 1996. In May, voters in one poll placed “ending the Chechen war” as the top national priority. Segodnia , 15 May 1996. The paper ’s sour ce was a VTsIOM poll. 74. The T imes , 1-2 April 1996. 75. Michael Kramer, “The People Choose,” Time , 27 May 1996. 76. Segodnia , 24 April 1996. 77. Komsomolskaia pravda , 10 April 1996. 78. National News Service, Moscow, Nd. Web site: < nns.r u/e-elects/e-president/ e-opr os14.html>. 79. OMRI, 27 March 1996. 80. Segodnia , 8 Febr uary 1996. 81.Christian Science Monitor , 30 May 1996. 82. Segodnia , 18 April 1996. The newspaper ’s sour ce was a VTsIOM poll. 83. New York T imes , 20 September 1996. 84. Izvestiia, 3 Febr uary 1996. 85. OMRI, 6 March 1996. 86. PBS News Hour, 19 April 1996. 87. The T imes , 20 April 1996. Clinton’s NAT O policy gr eatly accelerated an im- proved Sino-Russian relationship as seen in Y eltsin’s visit to China in late April wherein he and Chinese leaders implicitly complained of America’s “attempt to monopolize international af fairs” and China denounced the eastward expansion of NAT O. The two countries also signed substantive economic and military agreements. OMRI, 25 April 1996. 88. Michael Kramer, “The People Choose,” Time , 27 May 1996.

32 89. Speaking befor e the Council of Eur ope, Primakov soothingly said that Moscow would like to see the council as the “cornerstone” of a new all- European security system “without dividing lines or blocs.” OMRI, 5 May 1996. 90. New York T imes , 7 April 1996. As of April 1999, this measur e existed, for the most part, only on paper. 91. New York T imes , 7 April 1996. 92. OMRI, 28 March 1996. 93. Treisman, “Why Yeltsin Won,” p. 66. 94. OMRI, 22 March 1996. 95. Nezavisimaia gazeta , 17 May 1996; OMRI, 29 May 1996. 96. Segodnia , 9 April 1996. 97. Chicago Tribune , 18 April 1996. 98. The Sunday Times , 31 Mar ch 1996. 99. OMRI, 22 April 1996. 100. Moskovskii komsomolets, 12 April 1996. 101. National News Service, Moscow, Internet Service, “Campaign ’96,” Nd. This invaluable sour ce can be accessed on the web at: . 102. Moskovskie novosti , 28 April–5 May. 103. Rossiiskie vesti , 26 April 1996. 104. OMRI, 29 April 1996. 105. Nezavisimaia gazeta , 26 April 1996. 106. OMRI, 23 April 1996. 107. OMRI, 15 May 1996. 108. OMRI, 18 March 1996. 109. Christian Science Monitor , 23 April 1996. 110. Chicago Tribune , 18 April 1996. For more details on Zyuganov’s anti-western attitudes, see his book, I Believe In Russia . 111. The Moscow Times , 25 May 1996. 112. The Sunday Times , 31 Mar ch 1996. 113. OMRI, 17 May 1996. 114. OMRI, 11 June 1996. 115. The Moscow News, 25 May 1996. Italics added. In his r ecent biography of Stalin, the late Dmitrii Volkogonov asserts that 1.75 million wer e of ficially ex- ecuted in 1937–38 alone. 116. Fr om Zyuganov’s, Beyond the Horizon, cited by Stanley, “The Hacks ar e Back,” p. 45. 117. Stanley, “The Hacks ar e Back,” p. 46. 118. Izvestiia, 13 April 1996. 33 119. The New York T imes , 5 April 1996; Izvestiia, 13 April 1996; Zavtra , 1996, 1:1–3. Zavtra is a sharply anti-Yeltsin weekly. 120. The New York T imes , 5 April 1996. 121. In late May, Zyuganov elaborated more bluntly on his economic plans. He stated that the “state must take car e of all forms of ownership useful to Russia.” The Times , 15 June 1996. 122. St. Petersbur g T imes , 26 May–1 June. This information came fr om a commen- tary by Ser gei Markov, a senior associate at the Moscow Carnegie Center. Nezavisimaia gazeta ran a similar article on 12 May. 123. Sovetskaia Rossiia , 28 May 1996. 124. Nezavisimaia gazeta , 31 May 1996. 125. The T imes , 14 June 1996. Minton Goldman agrees that Zyuganov’s vague and negative campaign limited his voter appeal. Goldman, Russia , p. 74. 126. Komsomolskaia pravda , 16 May 1996. 127. Pravda Rossii, 18 January 1996. This was the weekly supplement to Pravda. 128. Boris Kagarlitskii, “O prichinakh porazheniia levykh,” Svobodnaia mysl’ 1996, 9: 3. Kagarlitski is a political scientist with the Russian Academy of Sciences. 129. Nezavisimaia gazeta , 17 April 1996. 130. The Sunday Times , 31 Mar ch 1996. 131. OMRI, 17 May 1996. 132. OMRI, 17 May 1996. 133. Moskovskii komsomolets , 12 May 1996. 134. Treisman, “Why Yeltsin Won,” p.67. 135. OMRI, 17 May 1996. 136. OMRI, 22 May 1996. 137. OMRI, 27 May 1996. Well might Y eltsin addr ess the issue of wage arr ears: 42 per cent of Russians rated it one of their main complaints against the government. Segodnia , 15 May 1996. The sour ce was a VTsIOM poll. 138. Regar ding Communist promises for a plethora of new spending pr ograms, the majority of journalists wer e mer ciless in asking how they would be funded. For example, see the extensive analysis and condemnation of the Communist economic program in Kommersant-Daily , 13 April 1996. 139. OMRI, 9 May 1996. 140. Christian Science Monitor , 26 April 1996. 141. The Times , 6 June 1996. 142. Nezavisimaia gazeta , 7 June 1996. 143. Time , 27 May 1996. 144. St. Petersbur g T imes , 17 July 1996. 145. Ron Synovitz, 1996 In Review: Election Roundup II — Russia, Romania, , Bulgaria, Moldova , Radio Fr ee Eur ope/Radio Liberty. ND.

34 146. OMRI, 10 April 1996. 147. Christian Science Monitor , 26 April 1996. Pravda has not far ed well since the election: In late May, its Gr eek owners decided to turn the newspaper into a tabloid. They said the paper consistently lost money, its staf f wer e dr unks, and it printed nothing of inter est. The T imes , 31 July 1996. 148. Zyuganov’s platform specifically called for “public contr ol of state radio and television.” Kommersant Daily , 16 Febr uary 1996. 149. The T imes , 2 May 1996. 150. Christian Science Monitor , 26 April 1996. 151. Christian Science Monitor , 26 April 1996; Izvestiia, 12 April 1996. 152. The Times , 1 May 1996. 153. Izvestiia, 14 May 1996. 154. St. Petersbur g T imes , 26 May–1 June 1996. 155. Segodnia , 7 May 1996. 156. St. Petersbur g T imes , 10–16 June 1996. 157. St. Petersbur g T imes , Ibid. 158. St. Petersbur g T imes , Ibid. 159. St. Petersbur g T imes , Ibid. 160. St. Petersbur g T imes , Ibid. 161. Rossiiskie vesti , 1 June 1996. 162. The T imes , 1 June 1996. 163. St. Petersbur g T imes , 16-23 June 1996; OMRI, 10 June 1996. 164. Segodnia , 15 May 1996; Radio Fr ee Eur ope/Radio Liberty, Daily Report, Russia, 28 May 1996. 165. Segodnia , 28-29 May 1996. 166. Izvestiia, 29 May 1996. 167. The T imes , 11 June 1996. 168.The soldiers voted as they did on or ders fr om their superiors, with Defense Minister Grachev leading the way in bringing the military in line. The Sunday T imes , 2 June 1996. It would be Grachev’s last service to Y eltsin, who fir ed him after the June 16 vote. Part of the explanation for Y eltsin’s success with the sol- diers is that in April Grachev denied a request fr om Communist Party campaign organizer Valentin Kuptsov to allow Zyuganov to meet with servicemen. 169. The Sunday Times , 9 June 1996. 170. Kommersant-Daily, 21 May 1996. 171. The T imes , 10 June 1996. 172.The Times , 13 June 1996. 173. Segodnia , 14 June 1996. 174. Segodnia , 13 June 1996.

35 175. V. O. Rukavishnikov, T. P. Rukavishnikova, A. D. Zolotykh, and Iu. Iu. Shestakov, “V chem edino ‘raskolotoe obshchestov’?”, Sotsiologicheskii issledovanii, 1997, 6: 89. 176. Interview with Aleksei Salmin, Pr esident of the Russian Social-Political Center. Nd. This interview occurr ed between the first and second votes. . 177. . This is fr om the web site of the Russian National News Service. Hereafter cited as NNS after the web site citation. 178. “Results of Pr esidential Elections-1 Round,” National News Service, Moscow, Internet Service, nd. 179. Trud , 4 June 1996. 180. Michael McFaul, Russia’ s 1996 Pr esidential Election: The End of Polarized Politics (Stanfor d, California: Hoover Institution Pr ess, 1997), 50–51. McFaul gives no source for this specific information. His pr ediction that 1996 meant the end of polarized politics has not pr oven tr ue. 181. The Sunday Times , 23 June 1996. 182. The T imes , 17 June 1996. 183. The Sunday Times , 23 June 1996. 184. St. Petersbur g Pr ess. Petersbur g T imes , 26 May–1 June 1996.Yavlinsky r eceived 6 per cent of the vote. 185. Christian Science Monitor , 19 June 1996. 186. The T imes , 28 June 1996. 187. . NNS. 188. The T imes , 28 June 1996. 189. The Sunday Times , 23 June 1996. 190. Izvestiia, 21 June 1996. 191. Besides the T imes account of the events of 19 June, the r eader can consult the Christian Science Monitor , 24 June 1996. 192. The Sunday Times , 6 July 1996. Subsequently, the Kr emlin admitted Yeltsin had suf fer ed a mild heart attack. 193. The New York T imes , 13 December 1996. 194. OMRI, 26 June 1996. 195. Christian Science Monitor , 28 June 1996. 196. Christian Science Monitor , 2 July 1996. 197. Christian Science Monitor , 25 June 1996. 198.Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 4 July 1996. 199. Andrei Maximov, ed. Maximov’s Companion to the 1996 Russian Pr esidential Elections (Moscow: Maximov Publications, 1997), 200; V. A. Kolosov and R. F. Tur ovskii, “Elektoral’naia karta sovr emennoi Rossii: Genizis, struktura i evoliutsiia,” Polis, (1996) 4: 41. 36 200. Kolosov and Turovskii, “Elektoral’naia karta sovr emennoi Rossii: Genezis, str uktura ii evoliutsiia,” Polis, (1996) 4: 42. 201. A t a Moscow press confer ence on 4 July, international election observers fr o m the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the Eur opean Parliament, declared that the 3 July r unoff had been “fr ee, unbiased, and fair,” Russian and Western agencies reported. ”Russian Pr esidential Elections, ‘96,” OMRI, 4 July. 202. St. Petersbur g Pr ess. Petersbur g T imes , July 8–17, 1996 203. Peter Reddaway’s Testimony before the U. S. House Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 10 July 1996. Some of Zyuganov’s own supporters doubted that he r eally wanted to take power because he “would not know what to do with it.” Moskovskii komsomolets , 25 July 1996. 204. V. L. Sheinis, “Pr oiden li istoricheskii r ubezh?” Polis, January 1997: 96. Sheinis is a economist and member of ’s Duma faction. 205. Sheinis, “Pr oiden,” 95. 206. John Lloyd, “Nowhere to Turn but Y eltsin,” Demokratizatsiya , (1996) 4:325– 329. 207. V. O. Rukavishnikov, et al, “V chem edino ‘raskolotoe obshchestov’?”, Sotsiologicheskii issledovanii, (1997) 6: 90. 208. Kommersant-Daily , 1 Mar ch 1996. 209. Moskovsky Komsomolets, 18 July 1996. 210. V. O. Rukavishnikov, et al, “V chem edino ‘raskolotoe obshchestov’?”, Sotsiologicheskii issledovanii, (1997) 6: 91. 211. “Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia,” Sotsiologicheskii Issledovanie , (1997) 1:153. 212. Even Pravda conceded this point in its 9 July issue. 213. Ibid., 1 June 1996. 214. The T imes , 13 June 1996. 215. Christian Science Monitor , 28 June 1996. 216. By this term I mean for emost, a political dictatorship dir ecting a command economy through force and thr eats. Or even better is Academician Tatiana Zaslavskaia’s blunt statement that the “Soviet system was pr ofoundly criminal.” Trud , 1 Mar ch 1996. 217. In 1994, a Russian university pr ofessor, when telling me of Yeltsin’s inability to sober up suf ficiently to meet the Irish prime minister some months earlier, was unable to contain his laughter at what western observers saw as a major blunder. 218. New York T imes , 4 July 1996. 219. The Times , 4 July 1996. Italics added. 220.Interview with Dr. Anatoly Sokolovsky, Tver, Russia, 15 May 1996. 221. The Sunday Times , 9 June 1996. 222. Pravda, 9 July 1996.

37 223. Interview with Albert A. Tsvetkov, Moscow, 2 June 1996. Mr. Tsvetkov is a retir ed military engineer. 224. I. G. Chaikovskaia, “Sovr emennye politicheskie pr otsessy (Aktual’nye pr oblemy I obshchie tendentsii), V estnik Nauchnoi Informatsii , (1997), 6:7–8. 225. Even among Russians over-55 Zyuganov’s margin of victory was not huge: 41 per cent to 34 per cent. Segodnia , 26 July 1996. 226. Writing in 6 October 1997 The Washington Post , Fr ed Hiatt noted that Zyuganov’s party “hasn’t followed its Eastern European cousins into social- democratic r espectability....” 227. As of April 1999, Russian democracy was on the ropes. Following the August collapse of the r uble, Y eltsin appointed a government headed by Evgenii Primakov with a large number of Soviet-era bureaucrats. However, Communist calls for a general strike in October 1998 failed and ther e is little evidence that Russians desir e a r eturn of the Soviet system.

38 Note fr om the Author I am grateful to many individuals and institutions for direct and indirect support for this project. Western Kentucky University and the International Research and Exchanges Board provided funds for travel to Russia and the Kennan Institute made possible a month of work in Washington D. C. My friend, Cynthia Etkin, read and commented on the entire manuscript for which I am deeply grateful. In Russia my research was facilitated by Boris Gubman, Elena Deshvoi, Anatolii Sokolovskii, Albert Tsvetkov and Lara Dubrova and the staff of the Gorki Public Library in Tver’. Back home I obtained invaluable and cheerful aid from the staff of the various libraries at Vanderbilt University, Duke University, and the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. I also want to thank my friends and colleagues James Baker, Richard Troutman, Elmer Gray, and Bob Blalock for their encouragement and support. Finally limitations on space prevent an adequate expression of appreciation to Laura, Daniel, and Jonathan, who have been there from the beginning.

39