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ED 073 315 VT 019 207 AUTHCP Turi, Robert R.; And Others TITLE Descriptive Study of Aircraft Hijacking. Criminal Justice Monograph, Volume III, No. 5. INSTITUTION Sam Houston State Univ., Huntsville,Tex. Inst. of Contemporary Corrections and the Behavioral Sciences. PUB DATE 72 NOTE 177p.

EDRS PRICE MF-$0.65 HC-$6.58 DESCRIPTORS *Aerospace Industry; Case Studies; Correctional Rehabilitation; *Criminals; Government Role; *International Crimes; *International Law;Legal' Problems; *Prevention; Program Descriptions; *Psychological Characteristics; Psychological Patterns; Security; Statistical Data IDENTIFIERS Criminal Justice; *Skyjacking ABSTRACT The purpose of this study was to comprehensively describe all aspects of the phenomenonknown as "skyjacking." The latest statistics on airline hijackingare included, which were obtained through written correspondence and personalinterviews with Federal Aviation Authority officials inWashington, D. C. and Houston, Texas. Legal and technical journalsas well as government documents were reviewed, and on the basisof this review:(1) Both the national and international legalaspects of hijacking activities are provided,(2) The personality and emotional state ofthe skyjacker are examined, and (3) Preventionmeasures taken by both the government and the airline industryare discussed, including the sky marshal program, the pre-boarding screeningprocess, and current developments in electronic detection devices.The human dimensions and diverse dangers involved in aircraftpiracy are delineated. Specific hijacking attemptsare enumerated, illustrated by means of case histories. Stages in the evolution of aircrafthijacking and specific suggestions for securitymeasures are discussed, detailing background factors and concomitant problems.(Author) 111100111''

SLC_CLO 0 LOZ6TOIR ;, CRIMINAL JUSTICE MONOGRAPH

U $ DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH Vol. III, No. 5 EOUCATION & WELFARE OFFICE OF EDUCATION 1972 THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRO DUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED Ft OM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION 041G INATING IT POINTS OF VIEW OR OPIN IONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL OFFICE OF EDU CATION POSITION OR POUCY

Descriptive Study of Aircraft Hijacking

Robert T. Turi Charles M. Friel Robert B. Sheldon John P. Matthews

INSTITUTE OF CONTEMPORARY CORRECTIONS AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES SAM HOUSTON STATE UNIVERSITY Huntsville, Texas 77340 TAB,,E OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

I.INTRODUCTION 1

Statement of the Problem 1 Purpose of the Study 2 Methodology 3 The ranger of Aircraft Hijacking 3 Insurance 9 National Law 14 Incidents of Aircraft Hijacking 19 The Hijacking Process 50

II.INTERNATIONAL LAW 54

The Traditional Concept of Piracy 56 The Problem of Jurisdiction 59 The Tokyo Convention 60 Individual State Practices 63 International Organizations 70 Extradition 74 Political Asylum 78 The Hague Convention 95 Penalties and Universal Jurisdiction 97 Custody 97 Extradition or Prosecution 98

III.THE HIJACKER 104

Case Histories 109

The Case of Ted 110 The Case of Elmer 115

IV. CURRENT PREVENTIVE MEASURES 119 Chapter Page

The Sky Marshal Program 120 The Screening Process 126 Legality of Airport Searches 128 Electronic Devices 132 Funding for the Security Program 133 The Effectiveness of the Security Program 134 Additional Measures 137

Rewards 137 ICAO Actions 138 Codes 138

Public Recommendations 140

V. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 142

The Evolution of Aircraft Hijacking 143 The Role of the Media 145 The International Situation 147 The National Situation 148 APPENDIX A Hijacking Cases Involving U. S. Aircraft 1 May 1961-1 March 1972 150 APPENDIX B A Summary of Averted and Incomplete Hijacking Attempts 1 May 1961- 1 March 1972 155

BIBLIOGRAPHY 164 LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1.Summary of Hijacking Incidents Involving U. S. Registered Aircraft (May 1961- March 1972) 2

2.Chronology of Hijacking 1961- March 1972 20

3. Summary of Type Aircraft Involved in Hijacking 49 4. Summary of Types of Weapons Involved in Hijacking Incidents (May 1961- March 1972) 50 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure Page

1.U. S. Hijackings from May 1961 to March 1972 45 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem Aerial hijacking is a relatively new peril for the American airline industry and the millions of passengers who depart each year from American airports. Only a little over a decade has passed since the first "skyjacking" of an American airplane on May 1, 1961.1 Yet, the snowballing effect of this initial incident has been swift and dramatic, as one airplane after another is diverted toan unscheduled destination. In 1961, there were a total of five skyjackings of United States registered aircraft, which were followed by only one in 1962 and none in 1963.In 1968, activity increased with 22 aircraft being seized followed by 40 aircraft in 1969.The 40 aircraft seized in 1969 is the largest total to date. Since then, both 1970 and 1971 had an individual total of 27 per year. As of March 1, 1972, there have been 6 skyjackings, making a grand total of 134 skyjackings since 1961.2 (SeeTable 1)

1New York Times, May 2, 1961,p.1 lb 2Letter from V. L. Krohn, Chief, Operations Laison Staff, Office of Air Transportation Security, February 7, 1972 (hereinafter . referred to as FAA Statistics, February 2, 1972).

1 2

TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF HIJACKING INCIDENTSINVOLVING U. S. REGISTERED AIRCRAFT (MAY 1961-MARCH 1972)

Air Carrier General Aviation Total I S UTotal I S UTotal I S UTotal 1 5 1961 1 3 1 5 0 0 0 0 1 3 1962 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1963 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1964 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 4 1965 0 1 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1966 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1967 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 22 1968 1 13 3 17 0 5 0 5 1 18 3 1 6 40 1969 1 33 6 40 0 0 0 0 33 1970 5 17 4 26 0 1 0 1 5 18 4 27 1971 8 11 6 25 1 1 0 2 9 12 6 27 1 6 1972 4 1 0 5 0 0 1 1 4 1 TOTAL207923 122 1 10 1 12 21 89 24 134 Legend: S - Successful U - Unsuccessful I - Incomplete

Purpose of the Study There have been numerous articles and papers written concerning the problem of hijacking aircraft, however, mosttend to con- centrate on a specific aspect of the problem, i. e. ,the absence of international law.The purpose of this study is to prepare a descriptive study of all aspects of the phenomenonknown as "skyjacking." This study compiles the latest statistics on skyjacking, i. e. ,number of incidents, type of aircraft, type of weapons,disposition or status 3 of the skyjackers.It also reviews the legal aspects, both national and international, related to this crime. The personality and emotional state of the skyjacker ie also examined. The preventive measures taken by both the government and the airline industry are examined.Included in the preventive measures are the sky marshal program, the pre-boarding screeining process and the latest developments in electronic detection devices.

Methodology The major procedure used to gather the information for this study was an extensive review of the pertinent literature.Colum- bia University Law Library provided the legal journals and government documents and the New York Public Library provided the technical journals that were necessary to prepare this study.Government document, Department of State Bulletins and Reports to Congress concerning skyjacking, were also reviewed and analyzed. Current statistics were obtained both through written correspondence and personal interviews with Federal Aviation Authority officials, in Washington, D. C. and Houston, Texas.

The Danger of Aircraft Hijacking While the hijacked aircraft have been used for diverse missions--such as fleeing with a child awarded to the other parent 4 as a result of a broken marriage,3kidnapping citizens of an enemy state in an aircraft registered in a third state,4dropping political leaflets on the capitols of two countries, Lisbon5and Caracas,6and fleeing from Communist to non-communist nations,7the hijackers all have endangered the lives of the passengers on board, have presented the potential of great damage to the aircraft itself, and have added a note of uncertainty to a hitherto tranquil means of international commerce.8 The human dimensions of skyjacking have grown consider- ably; the five skyjackings in 1961 affected one hundred seventy-eight passengers, as well as the crews, while twenty-seven fully reported hijackings in 1968 involved one thousand four hundred ninety passengers (including forty-three hijackers) and one hundred sixty-eight crew members.9

3New York Times, November 3, 1969, p.1. 4 New York Times, August 30, 1969, p.1. 5New York Times, November 11, 1961,p. 1. 6New York Times, November 28, 1961, p. 21.

7New York Times, October 20, 1969, p.1. 8R.L. Smith McKeithen, "Prospects for the Prevention of Aircraft Hijacking Through Law, " Columbia Journal of Tians- national Law, IX (Spring, 1970), 60.

9Gary N. Horlick, "The Developing Law of Air Hijacking,II Harvard International Law Journal, XII (Winter, 1971), 39-40, 1 5

The danger to the aircraft, passengers, and crewmembers was described in the testimony of the Acting Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration as follows:

...hijacking has involved physical danger to the passengers and the crew. Passengers have been held as hostages or intimidated and crewmembers have been subjected to minor assaults.It is obviota that should a bomb or other form of explosive discharge aboard an aircraft that the aircraft could be lost.Gunplay aboard could involve injury or death among the crew or passengers. As to the possible effects of bullets penetrating the aircraft fuselage, there is little danger of catastrophic effects regarding cabin presurization; however, there is danger that critical aircraft parts could be hit and rendered inoperable (hydraulic or electrical systems, radios, or fuel tanks). There is always the danger that the hijacker could insist on diverting the flight to a destination beyond the range of the aircraft's fuel supply.This could result in a ditching, a crash landing, or an emergency landing at an airport without the required runway length for the aircraft involved.The aircraft could be diverted to an airport at which bad weather and a lack of navigational aids would make an approach and landing unsafe.The hijacker could divert the aircraft to an unfriendly or hostile country where the passengers would be subject to imprisonment. The action of the hijacker in exploding a bomb or firing a gun or the general commotion caused by the seizure could cause a fire on board the aircraft with resulting injuries, death, or accident. The act of seizing the aircraft by the hijacker might cause certain passengers to react in an imprudent manner resulting in injuries to themselves or other passengers on the aircraft.10 Danger, ever present in aviation, is magnified many times when the control of the plane is under the direction of a probably

10U.. S.,Congress, House, Report from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House Doc. 91-33, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, p. 3. 6 nervous and perhaps derranged person who is unlikely to be profes- E i onally qualified to make operational decisions.1 1 In November, 1965 a juvenile, Thom: li-al, who attempted to hijack an aircraft fired eight shots into the floor before being subdued by three of the passengers.12No_ hijacker has threatened to take over the controls of an American plane: this is reported to have happened in the hijacking of an Israeli aircraft in July, 1968, by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).13 Given the seriousness of any outbreak of violence on an aircraft in flight, it is not surprising that pilots are instructed to cooperate with the hijacker if there is any prospect of armed attack. An Eastern Airlines Flight Brief, dated March 27, 1968, provides: March 27, 1968 To: All flight officers. Subject: Aircraft piracy--Hijacking policy. The mcst important consideration under the act of aircraft piracy is the safety of the lives of the passengers and crew. Any other factor is secondary. Therefore, company policy is: In the fact of an armed threat to any crewmember, comply with the demands presented. Remember, more than one gunman may be on board. If not allowed to make a radio contact, it is suggested you

11Horlick,"Developing Law," p. 48. 12Alona E. Evans, "Aircraft Hijacking: Its Cause and Cure," The American Journal of International Law, LXIII (October, 1969), 702.

13Ibid. 7

might be able to go to code 77 (emergency) on the trans- 41* ponder.This would alert all ATC air defense radar sta- tions in your vicinity that an emergency exists on your flight. If allowed to make radio contact, as much information as to the status of your condition, whether violencehas or has not taken place, and so forth, is desirable for both the United States and Cuba authorities to know. Previous experience has indicated that the U. S. and Havana centers are well coordinated in these instances and will handle you in a routine mariner, including handoff to the tower. Your Latin American H/L en route chart covers the airways involved to Cuba. There is no published approach procedure for Jose Marti Airport, Havana, Cuba.The jet runway is 5-23, 10,500 feet long, and elevation is 210 feet.The radio facility is a radio beacon, approximately 3 miles south- west of runway 5.The frequency is 348 kilocycles. Ground support for both the aircraft and the passengers and crew have been available at Jose Marti Airport, offered by Cubana. Services have included telephone to the United States, fuel, air starting equipment, weather information, and so forth.It is not recommended that fuel be taken in Cuba unless absolutely required.Fuel is available from the Navy at Key West (Boca Chica).The Swiss Embassy has proved to be most helpful and will probably have a representative at the airport.If not, a call to the Swiss Embassy for any help you require is in order. To sum up; Going on past experience, it is much more prudent to submit to a gunman's demands than to attempt action which may well jeopardize the lives of all on board. J. H. O'Neill Division Vice-President- -Flight.14 The dangers involved in aircraft hijacking are out of all proportion to the number of incidents. Apart from the navigational

14Seymour W. Wurfel, "Aircraft Piracy--Crime or Fun?" William and Mary Law Review, X (Summer, 1969), 864-865. 8 li

difficulties attendant upon changes of course, togetherwith landing and take-off in Cuba, there are otherhazards.Aircraft flying overland routes are not necessarily equipped for emergencylanding 15 at sea, as one pilot pointed out in anincident in November, 1968. Fuel shortage is presumably no problem fortranscontinental flights, as was evident in thehijacking in June, 1969, of an aircraft bound from Oakland, California, to New York.The aircraft made the 2700 mile trip to Havana with fuel to spare.However, for aircraft on shorter runs, refueling maybe necessary.16Refueling has been used by the flight crew as a ruse to regain controlof the aircraft, but this can be a dangerous maneuver. Anattempted hijacking in March, 1969, was successfully frustrated at arefueling stop when an F. B.I. agent, traveling as a passengermanaged to disarm the hijacker. On the other hand, an attempted hijackingof a Columbian aircraft a week earlier led to a shooting affray betweenthe hijacker and local police at a refueling stop, as a resultof which the hijacker and the aircraft's flight engineer were killed andseveral other persons were wounded.17

15Evans, "Aircraft Hijacking," p. 701.

16Ibid. "Ibid.,p. 702.

-., it- 9

rapidly spread so . The dangerous activity of hijacking has that it is no longer purely a matterof concern in the WesternHemi- sphere. None of the hijackings in1961 or thereafter were: outside the Americas until 1967, when anEgyptian aircraft was forced to land in Jordan, and a smallchartered British plane was diverted to Algiers as part of thekidnapping of Moise Tshombe. The next year there were threein the Eastern Hemisphere; aNigerian plane to Biafra, an Israeliflight from Rome to Tel Aviv divertedto Al- giers, and an Olympic Paris-Athensflight forced to return toParis. In 1969, there were eighteennon-American hijackings within the course of the year.18

Insurance Air piracy exploded into a world problemin September, 1970, when four aircraft were successfullyhijacked and destroyed by Arab guerrillas.This upsurge of air piracy byArab guerrillas forced a boost in premiums on insurancecovering hijacking. Hi- jacking insurance was now placed in the samecategory as war risk insurance.19

18Horlick, "Developing Law," pp. 39-40. 19"Arab Guerrillas Adopt Air Piracy as Tactic," Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 14,1970, pp. 33-38. 10

Until then, hijacking was treated by insurance groups in the same class as standard hull and liability coverage and was handled through normal channels. War risk, and now hijacking, insurance is purchased in a market separate from that which handled standard aircraft policies.In war risk, Lloyds of London normally will pick up 60% of the coverage with the United States Transportation De- partment handling the balance for United States carriers.The Transportation Department maintains a revolving fund which provides premium aviation war risk insurance in the event of an outbreak of war.Binders are issued to cover aircraft, persons and property and will become war risk insurance in wartime and "in situations short of war."20 The United States government's entry as a major aviation insurer was based on existing congressional authority permitting it to provide United States airlines war risk coverage when commercial insurance is not available at reasonable rates and conditions.When the government announced that through the Transporta- tion Department, it was offering fully underwritten aviation hull insurance, Transportation Secretary John A. Volpe said, "Commercial insurance premiums have been deemed prohibitively expensive due

20rbidspp. 33-38. 11 to the present situation ..."21 The United States government's entrance into the insurance field, began on a grand scale as of 12:01 A. M. , September 21,1970. This was timed to coincide with termination of most war-riskpoli- cies that had been obtained by United States airlines fromLondon - based syndicates.Both hull and liability insurance policies were cancelled, with renewal offered only for hull insurance at rates es- timated at from 10-15 times higher than before the four 1970Labor Day weekend hijackings for similarcoverage.22 Prior to September 21, 1970, the Transportation Depart- ment's insurance involvement had been limited.Owing to the in- ability of United States international airlines to obtain100% hull insurance coverage for the then new Boeing 747's, the department began offering in July of 1970 a deductible form of war risk hullin- surance covering the last40% of the insured value.The London syndicates were covering the first 60%. A common United States airline practice was to obtain so- called all-risk insurance from United States insurance companies and then to go to the London insurance market for coverage excluded

21Harold D. Watkins, "Relations of U. S. Airlines Al- tered," Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 28, 1970, p. 23. 22Ibid.

1 12

1 i r from this domestic policy.This exclusion has been typically war S r risk coverage, with hijacking not excluded.23 i Confusion that has been created over whether certain hijackings are war risk or other coverage is a major problem within i . the aviation insurance market. A case in 1962 is relevant in the fact that an insurance company sought to invoke the exclusionary clause of the policy on the grounds that the loss had taken place in Cuba as a result of warlike activity.The aircraft, chartered for a flight from Fort Lauderdale, Florida, to Orlando, was hijacked to Cuba. On take-off from a Cuban pasture, the plane was intercepted by a Cuban military plane and damaged by gunfire.The pilot was eventually able to get the aircraft back to Florida where the claim for loss was filed.The District Court of Appeals held that, as the act had taken place in the United States, the resultant damage must

be considered "... tohave occurred in the United States in and by the theft," so" that the exclusionary clause would not constitute a bar to recovery; the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed that the act of hijacking constituted a theft in that it involved the taking of per-

sonal property without consent "... in such a manner asto create an unreasonable risk of permanent loss. " Presumably, recovery could be obtained for theft if the hijacked aircraft were not

23Ibid., p.24.

r 13

24 returned by Cuba. This same issue was at stake ina more recent case when Trans World Airlines attemptedto collect from $2.5-3 million in damages toone of its aircraft caused by a hijacker's bomb in Damascus in 1969.The all-risk and war-riskinsurers could not agree on who was responsible and the airlinehad to take the matter to court for judgment.25

Under congressional authoritythere are certain terms under which the government insurancecan be written.It must be for war- risk only, hijacking bypersons seeking political asylumor by de- ranged persons is not coveredby the U. S. government undercur- rent law. However, the war-riskdoes explicitly cover the type of piracy conducted by Arab guerrillasin 1970.The terms of the policy includes protection against "... independent unit or individual activities in furtherance ofa program of irregular warfare. "26 The government war-riskinsurance is also limited topro- tection of international flights.The classification of the flightis determined by the intended destination.Thus a flight scheduled between domestic points wculdnot be covered if itwas commandeered to some foreign point.

24 Evans, "Aircraft Hijacking,"p. 702. 25Watkins, "Relations Altered,"p. 24. 26Ibid. 14

The Transportation Department insurance is being offered for $.20 per $100 of value per year, regardless of the type of aircraft.This may be retroactively increased to $. 80 during any one policy year, if premiums are inadequate to cover losses suffered within one year. Pre Labor Day 1970 rates for London war-risk insurance were about 1/2-3/4 the Transportation Department's rate.27

National Law In May of 1961, when an armed Cuban named Antulio Ramirez Ortiz, using as an alias "Elpirata Corfrisi," the name of an eighteenth century Spanish pirate, forced the pilot of a National Airlines Convair 440 flying from Marathon to Key West with eight passengers to change course and land at Havana, and thus began what may be called the modern era of hijacking, he flew into what was in many ways a legal vacuum.28 Not only was there a complete lack of international agreement to a solution of the jurisdiction problem of hijacking, municipal legal systems themselves were not completely clear for a long time about their jurisdiction over airborne crimes. A 1959 summary of the laws of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

27Ibid. 28Horlick, "Developing Law,"p. 33. 15

members on the subject of jurisdictionover crimes in the air, uncovered forty-one states with suchlaws. Twenty-three relied mainly on the law of the flag, but onlynine of these twenty-three did so without attaching exceptionsor conditions to this as a ground for jurisdiction.Thirteen states, not necessarilydifferent ones from those above, had a base ofjurisdiction in territoriality, but each under a different set ofconditions, and six had specificpro- visions for jurisdiction where the offensehad effect within their territory.Nationality of the offenderwas invoked by twenty-seven states in some form, and the nationalityof the victim of the offense by fifteen.Nine states had legislationpermitting jurisdictionas place of first landing, andseven as the place of arrest.Finally, all states had general jurisdictionbased on the nature of the offense, i. e., those involving universal jurisdiction, such as piracy, and those affecting the securityor credit of the state.29 The famous case of United Statesv. Cordove (89 F. Supp. 298 (E. D. N. Y.,1949)), for instance, seemedto indicate that one could literally get away with murderin an American airplaneover international waters. Cordova involvedcharges of assault resulting from a drunken brawl on a commercialairliner over international waters.The court held that the federalstatutes relied upon

29Ibid.,p. 34. 16 to give jurisdiction, which were cast in terms of acts "within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, " could not be read to include acts occurring in aircraft.The court recognized that this interpretation left a gap in the law.30 Then in 1961, a drunken passenger,. who boarded a nonstop flight from Chicago to Los Angeles, became angry when he was forced to give up a private supply of liquor and attacked the pilot with a knife.After the plane landed, the offender escaped prosecution because of a conflict of jurisdiction.In order to plug this gap in the criminal code, the late Senator Clair Engle of California introduced a bill in the Senate to amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to make it a federal offense to commit assaults and certain other crimes of violence, including aircraft piracy, aboard aircraft in flight.31 On July 28, 1961, N. E. Halaby, Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) forwarded to a House Committee a series of suggested amendments to the Federal Aviation Act to protect against any future hijackings of U. S. aircraft.32 In the House,

3Orbid.

31Robert Burkhardt, The Federal Aviation Administration (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 90. 32"Halaby Proposes Amendments to FAA Act to Guard Against Hijacking of Aircraft," FAA News, XCVII, July 28, 1961, p. 4. Representative John Eell Williams of Mississippiintroduced a bill, which, after various amendments, became Public Law 87-197,an Act "to amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to providefor the application of federal criminal law to certain eventsoccurring aboard aircraft in air commerce. "33 However, before this Act was signed into law by President John F. Kennedy on September 5, 1961, the UnitedStates government was forced to use its kidnapping and obstruction ofcommerce laws to try skyjacking cases. These lawswere held applicable to a hijacking which occurred within the countryon August 3, 1961 (United States v. Bearden, 304 F. 2d 532 (5th Cir. 1962)).

President Kennedy personally intervened in theBearden case.This case involved a man and his sixteenyear old son who hijacked a Continental Airlines Boeing 707 between Phoenix and

El Paso.President Kennedy personally ordered the airline notto allow the plane to be taken to Cuba.The aircraft was halted by shooting out the tires as it headed fora takeoff at El Paso after the pilot had talked the hijackers into letting him landto refuel.34The

Bearden's were charged with "Interruption of Commerceby

33Burkhardt,Federal Aviation Administration,p. 90. 34 Donald R. Witnah, Safer Skyways: FederalControl of Aviation, 1926-1966 (Ames, Iowa: Iowa StateUniversity Press, 1966), p. 326. 18

Threats" (18 U. S. C. Sec. 1951) and subsequently foundguilty, the father was sentenced to 20 years, theson went to reform school.35 Public Law 87-197 gave the United States thepower to try such incidents as interference with the aircraft'screw, carrying weapons aboard an aircraft and conveying false information about a hijacking.It also provided that: (1) Whoever commits or attempts to commit aircraft piracy, as herein defined, shall be punished (a) by death... or (b) by imprisonment for not leRe thantwenty years if the death penalty is not imposed. (2) As used in this subsection, the term "aircraft piracy" means any seizure or exercise of control, by force or violence or threat of forceor violence and with wrongful intent, of an aircraft in flight in aircommerce.36 These laws also authorize an air carrier, subjectto reasonable FAA rules, to refuse to transportpersons or property that it believes would endanger safety in flight.37

They also charge the Federal Bureau of Investigationwith the investigation of these crimes. 38

35Arthur I. Hirsch and David Fuller, "Aircraft Piracy and Extradition," New York Law Forum, XVI (Spring, 1970),406. 36Act of September 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-197,Sec. 1, 75 Stat. 466; amending Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Sec.902 [49 U. S. C. Sec. 1472(i)-(n)(1964)]. 37Ibid., Sec. 1111. 38Ibid.,Sec. 902(n). 19

Incidents of Aircraft tii4acking Since 1961, there have been approximately 177persons involved in the 134 hijackings of U. S. registered aircraft and of one foreign aircraft engaged in U. S. air commerce.39 Of these 177 persons, 102 are still listed as fugitives by the Department of

Justice, and there have been 35 convictions to date.40(Table 2) Those convicted have had a wide variety ofsentences imposed upon them. (See Appendix A, pp. 1 50- 1 54 ) Some airline industry officials feel that an alleged leniency insome U. S. Federal Courts as opposed to severity in others is "tempering therisk of hijacking and, consequently, possibly encouraging theact."41 In addition, disparity of laws among nations, lack ofex- tradition authority in many areas and abuse of political asylum practices imply favorable odds in escaping rigid punishment for acts of air piracy.42These aspects of the problem will be discussed in detail in Chapter II.

The best example of the differences in U. S.court attitude toward hijacking was shown in June 1970,on the same day in the same

39FAAStatistics, February 2, 1972. 40Ibid.

41"AirlinesDemand Stiffer Hijack Penalties, " Aviation Week and Space Technology, July 6, 1970,p. 32. 421bid. TABLE 2 Date Hijacker(e) DOB CHRONOLOGY OF HIJACKINGS 1961 to MARCHL. kground Ethnic Status lineAir- 1972 To From DestinationHijacker 5/1/61 Antulio11/20/26Ortiz,Ramirez- Santurce,P.Latin R. + POB Fugitive NA Key West Miami SObjective - Cuba 7/21/617/24/61 Britt,Wilfredo2/28/25Oquendo, Bruce R. WhiteCubaHavana,Latin * + ConvictedFugitive (illegal PACEA SanTampa Fran- MiamiChico, US - CubaUnit. 8/3/61 Bearden,DOBMcRae unk WhitePOB +unk. possessionOrville,20arms) Sentenced Calif. of fire- in yrs. CO cisco Ca. 1945CodyBearden,DOBLeon unk.(son) POBWhite unkunk. + Juvenilemerce,ruption.(Released)Convicted-Inter- of20 Detention Corn- yrs. El Paso nixPhoe- I - Cuba TABLE 2--Continued Date Hijacker(s) DOB I Background EthnicPOB Status Air-line To From ObjectiveDestinationHijacker 8/9/61 bertCadon,11/28/33 C. Al- WhiteParis, + France yrs.ofgalDeportedRobberyico firearms possession 9 - mo.Convicted to & Mex-- ille- 8 PA malaGuate- City .s; Mexico City S - Cuba 4/13/62 nard8/2/33Deth,6/4/39DavidHealy, M. Leo-Ths. IllinoisWhiteFloridaGrandtoule,Coral * Gables yrskidnappingcraftrun11/12/64,Both & piracyconcurrently 1convicted yr to- &Air- 20 Ch. Local Miami S - Cuba 2/18/64 RodriquezLopez-6/30/30E.Hernandez, C. Havana,Havana,LatinCuba * Fugitives Ch. Local Miami S - Cuba 8/31/65 HarryStrom,Ferger-3/22/391949 F. WhitePOBCuba +unit. terminatetenceJuvenile Ben- - Inde- HA Kauai luluHono- luluS - Hono- TABLE 2--Continued Date Hijacker(s) DOB Background Ethnic Status 1 Air- Hijacker 10/11/65 Boyd,DOBLawrenceHeisler, unk. WhitePOB *unk. POB D.tialGen.Both D. - 4 -Courtyrs U. &S. Mar-Navy TSline Honolulu To Hi.kai,Molo-From UObjectiveDestination - Unk. 10/26/65 8/19/45Perez,Medina-DOBRichard unk. L. Havana,CubaLatinPOB + unit. InsanityAcquitted - NA Key West Miami U - Cuba 11/17/65 3/1/49ThomasRobinson, H. Marion,White + Ky. 6/8/67tence;terminateJuvenile paroled sen-- bide- NA , leansNew Or- tonHous- U - Cuba 2/9/6811/20/67 Clark,3/10/34Babler,Louis G. WhiteHungaryBudapest,White * * CourtFugitive of Mili- PACh. HongB.Bimini, W. I. wood,SaigonFla.Holly- US -- CubaUnk. 2/17/68 2/2/37ThomasBoynton,DOBWilliam unk. J. WhiteMich.Kalamazoo,POB * unk. viaReturnedmissedtaryConvicted Canada Appeals charge U. S.20 dis- yr (mil.vatePri-ch. ) MiamiKing thon,Fla.Mara- S - Cuba Hijacker(s) Ethnic TABLE 2--Continued Date2/21/68 11/12/39LawrenceRhodes, DOB Welch,WhiteBackground + W. Va. POB dismissed;1/4/71 Charges com- Status lineAir-DL BeachPalmWest To FromTampa SObjectiveDestinationHijacker - Cuba 3/12/68 11/19/34GonzalesCarrazana y LatinCubaCamajuani, + Fugitivesinstitutionmitted to mental NA Miami Tampa S - Cuba RamonJesusArmenteros,8/4/22Donato-Martin7/1/29 CubaCamajuani,Latin + 7/1/686/29/68 DOBH.Velasquez-"Carter, " unk. E. LatinBlackPOB # unk ficationpositiveFugitive identi- - no NWSL MiamiKey West Chi-Fla.thon,Mara- S - Cuba 7/4/68 9/8/20HamiltonMorris,6/30/34Fonseca, John M. MichiganWhiteMartin,CubaGuantanamo, * Sentenced 5 yrs TW VegasLas CityKan.cago U - Mexico TABLE 2--Continued Date7/12/68 6/16/35Bendicks,Leonard Hijacker(s) DOB Renovo,WhiteBackground * Pa. EthnicPOB Sentenced 10 yrs Statue Air-Ch.line Miami To WestKey From SObjectiveDestinationHijacker - Cuba 7/17/687/12/68 Hernandez-Leyva5/26/35OranRichards, D. Guantanamo,LatinColumbus,White ++ Ga. Fugitivemissed;Charges insane Dis NADL leansNewHouston Or- Ange-moreLosBalti- SI -- CubaCuba 8/22/688/4/68 "McBride,5/22/41WillisJessie,6/8/44 WhiteEthel,WhiteCuba * *W. Va. FugitiveSentenced - no10 yrs Pri.Fri. George-Local NassauFla.lesNaples S - Cuba 9/20/68 Suarez-DOBBill" unk. LatinPOB unk,+ ficationpositiveFugitive Identi- -p EA Miamitown,Bahamas p- San 1 S - Cuba Garcia Yateras, , . 10/23/68 W.Truitt,2/13/4312/16/33 Barkley Alben . MissouriSt.WhiteCuba Louis, * 20aircraftSentenced yrs kidnapping piracy 20 yrs & Pri. tugasDry Isl.Tor- h Juan WestKey ... S - Cuba Hijacker(s) DOB Ethnic TABLE 2--Continued Air- Hijacker Date11/2/68 RogerPastorich,1951 C. Ala.BackgroundBayminette,White # POB tionJuvenile Proba- Statue lineEA Chicago To hamBirming- From ObjectiveDestinationVietnamU - South 11/23/6811/4/68 GarciaSuarez-RaymondJohnson,1/8/47 Yateras,LatinLa.Cheveyville,Black ++ Cuba FugitivesFugitive EANA Miami cagoChi-leansNew Or- S - Cuba VelasquesMayor-8/1/46 Guantanamo,Latin + . Arroyo-Quintero9/24/24 CubaLatin + . Mendoza-9/12/498/3/38VieraRodriguez-Rodriguez HavanaLatinOrte,Latin + Cuba + 11/24/68 Rios-Cruz1/419/4/30 P.BarcelonetaLatin R. + Fugitives PA San Juan York New S - Cuba U' Date Hijacker(s) DOB Ethnic TABLE 2--Continued Status Air- To Hijacker (contide11 /24/68 ) Castro,Pena-Soltren1/15/43 , LatinMaya.quez,Background + P. R. POB - line From ObjectiveDestination 11 /30/68 SanchezMontesino-DOBMiguel unk. CubaPinarLatinPOB unk. +Del Rio, Fugitive EA Dallas Miami S - Cuba 12/3/68 DOBEduardo"9/24/24"Cantera, unk. CubaLatin - ficationpositiveFugitive identi-- no TWNA Miami , Tampa S - Cuba 12/11/68 3/21/49GwendolinPatterson,James11/15/47Patterson, J. Tenn.Memphis,BlackJamaica,Black + + N. Y Fugitives Miami CityKansas S - Cuba 1/2/6912/19/68 Austin,10/3/49Tyrone2/1/41ThomasWashington, G. JerseyBlackN.Phil.Black J. + City, # , Pa. 4/22/71bery,flightinterferringSentencedKilled, crewN. BankY. 2 withyrs. rob- EA Miami Pa.YorkNewPhil. S - Cuba TABLE 2--Continued (cont'cl.1/2/69Date ) -- Austin,10/15/48 Linda Hijacker(s) DOB Brooklyn,BlackBackground + N. Y. EthnicPOB Fugitive Status LineAir- To From ObjectiveDestinationHijacker 1/11/691/9/69 Helmey,2/27/47aldBohle, Thomas Ron- WhiteMich.MichiganWhite + * City Acquittedtrialreversed,Orig. pending sentence new UAEA MiamiNassau Jack-Miami S S- Cuba- Cuba e Robert10/28/32 Savannah, Ga villeson- 1/19/691/13/69 PayandNavarro-1/29/37KennethMc Peek, Dom.Mich.LatinBerkeley.White Rep. +# FugitiveSentenced 15 yrs EADL Miami YorkNewDetroit SU -- CubaCuba 1/28/691/24/69 Booth,DOB7/12/49"Ayre" unk. Byron BlackPOBWhite unk. + FugitivespositiveFugitive I. D. - no NANA MiamiMiami LosWestKey S S- Cuba- Cuba 1/28/69 "Mason,"Brooks,4/14/44Smith,9/1/44 Clinton N. L. " " BlackL.Chicago, A. + Calif. Ill. positiveFugitives I. D. - no EA Miami toAtlan-lesAnge- S - Cuba TABLE 2--Continued T Date Hijacker(s) DOB 1 Background Ethnic Status Air- To Hijacker 1/31/69(cont'd)1/28/69 "Jackson,DOB's"White, unk. L. L." " WhitePOB'sBlack # + unk. POB Fugitive - no NAline Tampa San From ObjectiveDestination 2/3/69 Michael11/3/47Peparo,DOB unk. N.ColdWhitePOB Y. Spring, +unk. tionJuvenilepositive Deten- I. D. (Both) NA Miami NewYorkciscoFran- US - -Cuba Cuba 2/3/69 GarciaHernandez-11/13/267/4/50Fritzgerald,Tamsin Placetas,LatinN.WhitePoughkeepsie, Y. ++ Cuba Fugitives EA Miami Newark F - Cuba 2/10/69 9/29/37Alvarez-Dequesada9/17/27EstradaBabin- HavanaLatinCubaLatin + + Fugitive EA Miami JuanSan S - Cuba 2/25/69 ' 3/30/47L.Ervin, R. Jr. Tenn.BlackChattanooga, + prison,Sentenced 7/7/70 life EA Miami TantaAt- S - Cuba . Hijacker(s) Ethnic TABLE 2-- Continued 3/5/69Date 2/23/38AnthonyBryant, DOB Calif.SanBlackBackground Bernadino * POB Fugitive Statue NAlineAir- Miami To YorkNew From SObjectiveDestinationHijacker - Cuba 3/19/693/17/69 DouglasDickey,8/27/50RobertSand lin, CasaWhiteHouston, Grande, + Tex. institutionCommittedMentalCustody Institution (11/25/70) mental DLDL leansNewAugusta Or- lantaDallasAt- IS -- CubaCuba 4/13/693/25/69 SanchezCourouneaux-9/16/29Frese,3/19/43 Luis SanA7iz.CubaLatin Juan, + P. R. FugitivesFugitive PADL MiamiSanDiego JuanSanDallas S S- Cuba- Cuba AguerosDiaz-Claro3/9/30Vargas-2/10/4410/2/43 CubaLatinCubaLatin + + Ramirez-Castaneda8/8/39 LatinCuba + .0DJ TABLE 2--Continued 5/5/69Date JeanCharrette, P. Hijacker(s) DOB Quebec,WhiteBackground + Ethnic POB Fugitives Status lineAir-NA Miami To NewYork From HijackerSObjectiveDestination - Cuba 5/26/69 Allard,7/15/46Zamora,Parra-7/7/231/21/47 Alain C. CubaLatinPOBWhiteCanada unk. *+ Fugitives NE New York Miami S - Cuba 7/8/49SamonBolivar-4/8/45GracialRomero- M. R. CubaLatirCubaLatin -r* 6/17/695/30/69 Brent,DOBNiemeyer,Terrance unk. , BlackWhite +* FugitivemittedFound 4/15/71insane, corn- TWTT leansNew YorkOr- Alex.Oak-La. SU -- CubaCuba 6/22/69 DOBMedranoEsquivel-6/2/30William unk. L. Franklin,POBLatin unk. # La. Fugitive EA Miami landNewark S - Cuba Date Hijacker(s) DOB Background Ethnic TABLE 2--Continued Status lineAir- To From DestinationHijacker 6/25/69 2/27/38JohnMarques, G. SantaLatin Monica # POB . Fugitive UA New York L.A. SObjective - Cuba 7/27/696/28/69 Crawford,4/11/14RaymondAnthony, BlackMidland,White +- Md. ha. Sentenced9/14/70Sentenced 50 15 yrs yrs COEA MidlandMiami moreElBalti- Paso S - Cuba Joseph1/13/41 Ga.St. Simons Texas 1 8/5/697/31/69 JohnMcCreery,8/8/37Perry, Lester WhitePhil.Chicago, * Ill. , - Pa. talCommittedFugitive institution men- EATW TampaL. A. lotteburghChar-Pitts- US -- CubaCuba 8/ 14/69 Perez,D.10/1/39 -Torres-Diaz, 2/17/438/14/95 Julio CubaLatinLatinCuba + + Fugitives NE Miami Boston S - Cuba 8/29/69 Khaled,SalimEssawai,19441945 Leila ArabArabBaghdad,Haifa, Israe). Iraq Fugitives TW Tel Aviv L. A. S - Syria TABLE 2--Continued Date Hijacker(s) DOB Background EthnicPOB Status lineAir- To .=== .--=. From ObjectiveDestinationHijacker 9/7/698/29/69 CopPeterson-3/2/29Delgado11/20/34Carballe- lin, F. SantaDom.Latin Domingo Rep. Fugitive EANA SanleansNew Juan Or- YorkNewMiami S S- Cuba- Cuba 9/24/699/10/69 AlfredHernandez,3/20/43MedinaGonzalez-1/4/49 Placetas,LatinLares, + CubaP. R. Fugitivetal1/30/70Committed institution men- NAEA villeJackson-San Juan lestonChar-YorkNew S U- Cuba - Cuba 10/21/6910/9/69 11/3/51Shorr,8/24/20Rivera-Perez Henry Detroit,WhiteCubaLatin + Mich. SuicideFugitive in Cuba . PANA Merida,MiamiMexico , Mex.L.City A. . S - Cuba 10/31/69 Minichiello,12/1/49 R WhiteItaly Sentencedyrs,5/1/71muted.yrs w/ duced(Italy). 2 7-1/2Released yrs to com- Re- 3-1/2 TW San Fran-cisco L. A. S - Italy TABLE 2--Continued 11/10/69Date 6/24/55Booth, David Hijacker(s) DOB CincinnatiWhiteBackground * EthnicPOB Juvenile Detention Status DLlineAir- Chicago To Cinci- From UObjectiveDestinationHijacker - Sweden 12/26/6912/2/69 "Martinez,5/11/46BennyHa Milton M. " LatinHouston,Black # - Tex. Fugitive - no UATW ChicagoPhil. Pa. NewciscoFran-Sannatti Sor - Mexico Cuba 1/8/701/6/70 ChristianBeFunjek,1/17/28DOB lon, unk. Anton FranceWhiteYugoslaviaPOB #+unk. inSentencedSentenced LebanonPositive 9 I.25mo. D. yrs TWDL RomevilleJackson- YorkNewdoOrYork lan- Sland - UBeirut - Switzer. 3/11/702/16/70 Stubbs,Abad,ClemmieLopez12/22/43 6/4/30 Del 4 BlackCubaLatinPittsburgh, +# FugitiveFugitive -. EAUA MiamiAtlanta NewarklandCleve- S - CubaS - Cuba 4/6/703/17/70 8/27/47Little,6/24/42Divivo,10/3/34 Lynn John WhiteMcKeesport,EnglewoodWhite +Pa. * talSuicideCommitted institution in prison to men- TWEA burghPitts-Boston S.Newark F. burgUI - -Unk. Pitts- TABLE 2--Continued Date Hijacker(s) DOB Background EthnicPOB Status lineAir- To From ObjectiveDestinationHijacker 4/23/704/22/70 Wagstaff,6/25/52Meeks,2/23/44Meeks, Dianne Ira WhiteBaltimoreBlack*York,Black * *S. C. CustodyFugitives (? ) NCCh. SaultLocal St. N.tonia,Gas- C. S - Cuba Joseph F POB unk. Marie keyPetos- U - Detroit 5/25/705/25/70 4/29/42Molina,GraciellaQuesada.6/24/28 HavanaLatin - Fugitive AADL Miami goChica- S - Cuba 6/4/70 Arthur5/23/21Barkley,5/20/46Nelson Logan,WhiteHavana # Tex. talCommitted InstitutionFugitive men- TW St. LouisN. Y. nir.goPhoe-Chica- I -S Unk. - Cuba 7/1/706/22/70 12/5/49Lopez,1/10/38Xhaferi, Geo. Haxhi NewLatin AlbaniaOrleansWhite + # FugitiveCustody-Egypt(?) NAPA TampaRome VegasLasBeirut S - CubaS - Cairo Date Hijacker(s) DOB Background Ethnic TABLE 2- - Continued Status lineAir- To From DestinationHijacker 8/2/70 5/23/425/15/43R.Rivera-Rios, or , 5/2/43; Albonito,Latin + P. R. POB Fugitive PA San Juan YorkNew SObjective - Cuba 8/19/708/3/70 Arrue-Marti-Ramos-Cobasnez,DOBHuber, 4/20/48unk. Johan LatinCubaGermanyWhite +# FugitivesUnknown PATC SanBerlinWest Juan MunichNewark SpestU -- CubaBuda- LlurdanTorres-4/3/4711/27/45 CubaLatinColona, + Spain , 8/24/708/20/70 RobertLabadie,4/17/49Graves,Gregory Detroit,WhiteBlackKansas #Mich. * City ta'CommittedFugitive institution men- TWDL delphiaPhila-Savannah ChicagoAtlanta S S- Cuba- Cuba 9/6/70 DOBIbrahim,Ali,2/27/43Khalil, Said unk. SamerAli Mazin POBArab unk.# Fugitives PA New York damAmster- S - Cairo TABLE 2--Continued Date Hijacker(s) DOB Background EthnicPOB Status lineAir- To From ObjectiveDestinationHijacker 9/15/709/6/70 Irwin,DOB"Lapez""Vasques" unk. Don- WhiteArabPOBArab # # unk.# positiveConvictedFugitives I. D. - 11/23/71 No TW S.New F. York furtL.Frank- A. IS -- NorthJordan 9/19/70 12/22/52Witt,ald, 11/19/42 Richard _ PittsburghBlackDetroit, # Mich temptedFugitive12-1/2 kidnapping yrs. At- AL Boston burghPitts- S Korea- Cuba 9/22/7010/30/70 DOBDavidDonovan,"Rosas, unk.unk L." POBLatinWhite unk. #* murdertriedFugitiveCustody. for charge unrelated - No To be NAEA S.San F. Juan MiamiBoston S U- Cuba- Unk. 11/13/7011/1/70 FelipeLarrazolo,11/13/35"Jones, G. " MexicoLatinBlack # + FugitivepositiveFugitive I. D. - No UAEA L.Atlanta A. DiegoSanRaleigh S - SCuba - Cuba 12/19/70 11/25/35Denis,DOB unk. Carlos NewBlackPOB York unk. # piracytoinfo.conveyingSentencedpositive commit re I.attempt air D.falseto 5 yrs CO Tulsa querqueAlbu- I - Cuba TABLE 2--Continued Date Hijacker(s) DOB Background EthnicPOB Status lineAir- To From DestinationHijacker 1/3/7112/21/70 Wilson,7/10/48Morales,Lopez- V. BlackSalinas,Latin + # P. R. institutionFugitivesCommitted men- NAPQ TampaPonce SanL.Juan A. SIObjective -- MexicoCuba White,Arthur5/5/47LolitaGraves,11/1/46 Carl BlackPOB unk. +# 1/22/71 GarlandGrant,J.,White,10/20/508/29/46 8/5/47 Norma Milwaukee,BlackHaynesville,Detroit,Black + # Mich Wis La Fugitive NW D.Wash. C. keeMilwau- S - Cuba 2/26/712/4/71 8/23/51ChapinPaterson,DOBAbdalah, unk. A. WhiteCalif.LongPOBBlack * unk. Beach,+ toedConvictedpositiveFugitive 10 from yrs. I.Canada - D.No6/11/71 Deport- WADI. SeattlevilleNash- S.Chicago F. S - CubaCanada Alb TABLE 7- -Continued Date Hijacker(s) DOB Background EthnicPOB Status lineAir- To From ObjectiveDestinationHijacker 3/8/71 9/4/54Marston,Thomas Augusta,White * Ga. . finiteJuvenile sentence - Inde- . NA - leansNew Or- Mobile I - Canada 3/31/71 8/30/06DiegoRamirez,JohnMathews,14 yrs old WhiteVenezuelaLatinPOB *unk. - Fugitive3 yrs Probation EADL SanChicago Juan Birming-NewhamYork SU -- CubaCuba 4/5/71 Hernandez-Tranhs _.4 CubaLatin * Fugitive Ch. Miami WestKey S - Cuba 5/28/714/21/71 Bennet,cesco,Anile,10/18/48 Fran-8/9/40 James WhiteNewItalyWhite +York + Custody,5/25/71Released onmental bond EA NewMiami York MiamiNewark IU - -Ireland Italy 6/4/715/29/71 daeta,Riggs,Garcia-Lan-5/22/31 1/8/49 Glen WhiteVenezuelaLatin - * 2Fugitiveexam. concurrent 20 -, UAPA NewarkMiami Char-casCara- IS -- IsraelCuba 12/1/12 W.Powellton, V. yr. sentences W.leston Va. 00V.V Date Hijacker(s) DOB Background Ethnic TABLE 2--Continued Status lineAir- To Hijacker 6/18/716/12/71 White,9/25/47GregoryWhite, Bobby WhiteChicagoBlack * * POB SentencedtalCommitted institution 5 men- TW New York cagoChi-From I -VietnamObjectiveDestination North 7/2/71 RobertJackson,12/25/347/23/44 Tenn.WhiteTownsend,Tenn.Kings - Port, Custody Argentina yrs BNPI tonioSanSalemWirston- An- CityMexicoGround I -U Algeria - Cuba 7/23/71 RichardObergfell,6/7/48ArchilaSanchez- WhiteGuatemalaLatin + * Killed by F. B. I. TW Chicago New I - Italy 9/3/717/24/71 dez,Borges-GuerraGuerra-9/26/44 8/19/32 Val- LatinCubaBrooklyn + CustodyFugitive EANA MiamivilleJackson-. ChicagoMiamiYork US -- Cuba 9/24/71 bara,Jackson,Pliskow,da,6/24/51 9/14/33 2/27/48 Bren-Bar- Detroit,WhiteCubaPOBBlack - uniteMich * Custody NA New York Detroit U - Algeria TABLE 2--Continued Date10/4/71 Giffe, Geo. Hijacker(s) DOB 1 WhiteBackground * EthnicPOB Suicide Status lineCh.Air- Atlanta To Nash- From I -ObjectiveDestinationHijacker Bahama 10/9/71 8/5/40Dixon,BobbyWallace,3235 yrs. John old WhitePontiac,POBWhite + unk. * Mich FugitiveCustody EA Miami Detroitville S - Cuba 10/25/7110/18/71 Lugo-Casado12/29/42Thomas, Del Hawthorne,LatinWhite *+ Ca. _ FugitiveCustody AAWC Bethel NewageAnchor- I - Cuba 11/24/71 DOB3/1/49"Cooper, unk. D. B" POBWhitePonce, unk. + P. R. parachutedpositiveFugitive I. D. en - No NW SeattleSan Juan landPort-York SExtortion$200S - Cuba K 11/27/71 4/29/47Goodwin,MichaelFinney,1Z/9/50 Ralph Berkeley,BlackciscoSanBlack Fran- * * Ca. Fugitivesroute to Reno TW Ground querqueAlbu- S - Cuba 12/15/49Hill, Chas. Olney,Black Ill.* 04.. Date Hijacker(s) DOB Ethnic TABLE 2--Continued Air- Hijacker 12/26/7112/24/71 DOBColeman,Holt, 1946 Everett WhitePOBBackground +-unk POB Custody Status AAlineNW Chicago To Minn. From ExtortionIObjectiveDestination - $300 K 1/7/72 Robinson,DOBSims,9/17/47Donald 1947 Allen Ida BlackPOB + unk. Fugitives PS S.L. F. A. S.Chicago F. S ExtortionU- Cuba - $200 K 1/20/721/12/72 9/10/48Hurst,RichardLaPoint,9/29/49DOB 1951Billy WhiteWalters,BostonPOB's + unk. Ok. leasedchutedCaptured,Custody on jump. bail pars- Re- . RWBN RenoDallas , HoustonVegasLas ExtortionI - $50$1 M K 1/26/72 AgeMcAlroy,AgeVon 26 mid-40's Geo. P. H. POBWhite unk. +* jackattemptingCapturedKilled1/25/72 helicopter by whileF.to B.hi- I. N/AMO N/ANew York ley,Berke-Albany Ca. I -UExtortion $200 - Cuba K Legend:1/29/72 profileI = IncompleteDOBGarrettTrapnell, unk. * = Profile not applicable S = SuccessfulPOBWhite unk. + byShot F.U & =B. apprehendedUnsuccessful I. in N. Y. if = Probably met profile + =TW Met Profile New York -L. = A. Did not meet releasePrisonerExtortionI - $306, 80( 42 building in Miami.Federal District Judge William 0. Mehrtens sentenced Thomas James Boynton to 20 years for commandeering a private aircraft after he had chartered it for a flight in the Florida Keys, on February 17, 1968. By contrast, Thomas George Washington was given two years by District Judge Joe Caston for hijacking an Eastern Airlines trans - port carrying 151 persons on December 19, 1968.In order to get around the Federal Aviation Act that requires a penalty not less than 20 years. Washington was not charged with air piracy but rather with "interfering with the crew of an aircraft."43 In the first prosecution of a pair of successful hijackers, the accused, who had hijacked a chartered aircraft, were indicted on charges of air piracy as well as kidnapping the pilot of theaircraft.The District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the indictment before trial on grounds that a chartered aircraft is not a "commercial aircraft" within the meaning of the statute and that a kidnapping must be for the "pecuniary benefit" of the accused, which could not be shown here. When the government's petition for rehearing was denied, the government appealed directly to the Supreme Court which reversed the judgment of dismissal. The Court held "inter alia," that the act of kidnapping is illegal 43

whatever the purpose of the kidnapper and that Congressclearly intended to include private aircraft within thescope of the air piracy clause of the Federal Aviation Act.44The two offenders, David Healy and Oeth Leonard,were convicted and sentenced to 20 years for air piracy and one year for kidnapping.45

Only one hijacker, Lorenzo Edward Ervin, Jr.,who hijacked an Eastern Airline DC-8 from Atlantato Cuba on February 25, 1969, has been sentenced to life.The next most severe sentence was given to J. C. Crawford who also successfully hijacked an aircraft to Cuba; he was given 50 years. Both of these hijackers were returned to the United States through third party nations.Ervin returned via Czechoslovakia and Crawford via Canada.'"

Is there any definite pattern to the 134 hijacking::of United States registered aircraft? Computers have been employedto sort the facts surrounding each case and attemptto relate them to the others.Generally, little has been gleaned from analyzingthese incidents. The Department of Justice states flatly that"no definite pattern" can be perceived in the statistics ofhijackings. 47

44Evars, "Aircraft Hijacking, "p. 706. 45Hirsh, "Extradition, " p. 406. 46FAA Statistics, February 2, 1972. 47John E. Stephen,'"Going South'- Air Piracy and Unlaw- ful Interference with Air Commerce, " InternationalLawyer, IX (1970), 434. 44

However, three facts stand out in the incidents of hijacking according to John E. Stephen. First, the overwhelming number of United States hijackings are to Cuba, ninety-six since 1961.This is reasonably to be explained on the obvious ground that Cuba, under present abnormal U. S.- Cuba diplomatic relationships, is the only practical destination which appears to offer some possibility of asylum or sanctuary to the hijacker.48This aspect of political asylum will be discussed in detail in Chapter II. Another reason is the fact that a great many of the hijackers are Cuban nationals, using the hijacking as a means of returning to

Cuba.There have been thirty-nine known Cuban nationals involved in hijacking U. S. registered aircraft.There also has been some reason to believe that some incidents have involved the return to Cuba of Cuban agents working in the United States.49 The second significant common denominator of the U. S. hijackings is that they :lave been cyclical and have occured in flurries.(See Figure 1) There has been some evidence of political conspiracy in the timing and modus operandi of some of the cases, particularly by violent extremist groups in the United States such

48Ibid.

49Ibid. No. of Hijackings20 - 16..171819- 10,-1112k- - 6-789L r 24-35- Quarters 1 - f r 1961 1962 Fig. 1. - -U. S. Hijackings from 19631961 to March 1972 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 'Laisiammt 1972 46

such as the "Black Panthers. "50 Peter G. Masefield, chairman of the British Airports

Authority, told an international symposium that organizedhijacking of aircraft can be traced back to a tri-continentalf ommunist congress in Cuba in 1966. He claims that it was a school for hijackers to "export terrorism and subversion. "51

However, the evidence in this respect is inconclusive ina majority of the cases.In the report on hearings on "Air Piracy in the Cr ribbean Area" by the House Subcommitteeon Inter-American

Affai,.,it is stated that, ". there is no evidence available to show that the Castro regime has sponsored these activities. "52

Many believe that these epidemics of hijackings feedon the inordinate publicity which accompanies nearlyevery incident. A study committee of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA)reported in 1970 that the coverage of hijackingcases by the news media has been "sensational and disproportionate" and has thereby

50Ibid.

51"MasefieldTraces Hijacking to Cuba Congress," Avia- tion Week and Space Technology, December 6, 1971,p. 22, 52U.S., Congress, House, Report from the House Com- mittee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommitteeon Inter-American Af- fairs, House Doc. 9-19, 90th Cong. 2nd Sess., 1968. 47 tended to encourage publicity seeking offenders and mentally disturbed persons.53Captair Walter C. Hill, safety director of Eastern Airlines, recommended in 1970 that increased efforts be made to publicize the fate of hijackers.Captain Hill stated that this could be a very powerful deterrent if the facts concerning the poor treatment of hijackers by the Cuban government and the number of U. S. convictions were made public. However, what is played up is the glamorous escapes and the large sums of money that are extorted from the airlines. 54 Dr. David G. Hubbard, a psychiatrist who has created a center to study hijackers, said recently that the news media is responsible for the latest rash of hijackings.55Both government and industry have leveled an obverse criticism at the news media for giving insufficient publicity to the drastic federal criminal penalties for aircraftpiracy.56 A third feature of U. S. hijackings is that a large proportion of them involve mentally-disturbed persons and persons in

"Stephen, "'Going South', "p. 434. 54"EasternAccelerates Anti-Hijack Preboarding Screen- ing Program," Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 4, 1970, p. 34. 55SecuritySystems Digest, February 2, 1972, pp. 3-4. 56Stephen, '"Going South', " p. 435. 48

difficulty with the law,In fact, in an incidentin 1970 an aircraft was commandeered by an unarmedfederal prisoner beingtrans- ported by two U. S. Marshals.This attempl...d hijackingwas unsuccessful in that the hijacker,David W. Donovan,was overpowered and forcibly subdued by thetwo U. S. Marshals. 57 Therehave been forty-six unsuccessfulor incomplete hijackings since 1961,for details see Appendix B (pp.155-163).

There have been ten hijackerscommitted to mental insti-

tutions, two of these havebeen since released. 58 (SeeAppendix A, p. 153) A detailed discussion ofthe psychologicalaspects of hijacking will be presentedin Chapter III.

Even though these factorsstand out in the majorityof hijackings, the fact remainsthat hijackingsoccur under a variety of conditions. Almostevery type of aircraft has beenhijacked from Boeing 747's to helicopters, 59(See Table 3) and almostevery type of weapon, from themost popular, the firearm,to acid and ice picks, has been used. 60(See Table 4) Theseare the facts that make aircraft hijackingsuch a difficult crimeto control.

57Ibid.

58 FAA Statistics, February2, 1972. 59 Ibid. 6°Ibid. 49

TABLE 3

SUMMARY OF TYPE AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN HIJACKING INCIDENTS (MAY 1961-MARCH 1972)

Air Carriers General Aviation

Jets 111 Jets 0 Prop-Jets 5 Prop-Jets 0 Propeller Driven. 6 Propeller Driven. 11 TOTAL 122 Helicopter 1 TOTAL 12 Type Aircraft Number of Incidents

B-747 3 B-727 40 DC-8 27 B-707 15 DC-9 15 B-720 3 DC-3 3 DC-6 1 Convair 880 4 Convair 440 1 Piper Apache 3 Lockheed 188 2 Fairchild F-27 2 Cessna Twin 2 Cessna 182 1 Cessna 177 1 Cessna 172 2 Convair 600 1 Heron 1 B-737 4 Cessna 402 1 Aero Commander 1 U/I Helicopter 1 TOTAL 134 50

TABLE 4

SUMMARY OF TYPES OF WEAPONS INVOLVED IN HIJACKING INCIDENTS (MAY 1961-MARCH 1972)

Number of Type Incidents Firearms (Alleged and Real) 92

BB Gun 1

Knives 21

Bombs, Explosives (Alleged and Real) 39

Razor or Razor Blade 3

Tear Gas Pen 1

Broken Bottle 1

Fire Threat 1

Hatchet 1

Acid 1

Ice Pick 1 *Several hijackers used combinations of two or more weapons.

The Hijacking Process A hijacker usually begins by seizing a stewardess and forcing her at gunpoint to take him to the cockpit where the pilot is ordered to proceed, in most cases, to Havana, or the stewardess may be held in the cabin and forced torelay the order to the pilot 51 through the aircraft's internal communication system.61:n some instances, especially in chartered aircraft, an attack is made directly on the pilot.In a recent case, both the pilot and mechanic of a chartered seaplane were wounded by hijackers who then forced the co-pilot to fly them toHavana.62 As soon as he is aware of a hija :king, the pilot notifies the nearest FAA traffic control center which, in turn,proceeds to obtain clearance for the aircraft from the Havana traffic control center, together with the necessary information forlanding at Ha- vana's Jose Marti Airport.This information is relayed to the aircraft.The Department of State is immediately notifed aboutthe incident and either informs the Czech Embassy at Washington, representing Cuban interests in the United States, or theSwiss Govern- ment which sends the information on to the SwissEmbassy at Havana, representing the ITnited States in Cuba.The Swiss Embassy arranges for exit clearances for the aircraft, passengers and flight crewand pays for any charges arising from the stopover.63These costs for landing_fees and lost commercial time might amount to$3, 000-

$4,000.However, a recent B-747 hijacking to Cuba costAmerican

61Evans, "Aircraft Hijacking, " p. 698.

62Houston Post, March 8, 1972, sec. A, p.8. 63Evans, "Aircraft Hijacking," p. 699. 52

Airlines over $100, 000 in direct dollar outlay.64 The Swiss Government is reimbursed by the Department of State which, in turn, is reimbursed by the carrier.65In route to Havana the aircraft may be followed while over the high seas by United States Air Force planes for safety purposes.The Air Force planes will not attempt to force the airplane down through active maneuvers or use of weapons but is rather an attempt to bring passive pressure on the hijackers.Their main purpose is the continued monitoring of the flight for search and rescue operations should itcrash.66 On landing in Cuba, the hijacker is removed by Cuban military authorities, and the aircraft, crew, and passengers are allowed to return to the United States.Upon reaching the U. S., passengers and crew are interviewed by agents of the F.B.I. with a view to identifying tlie hijacker and to clarifying the circumstances of the incident.In the majority of cases identification is made and a complaint is filed against the hijacker on a charge of air piracy in the place of last departure of the aircraft, or a John Doe warrant

64Letter from V. L. Krohn, February 7, 1972. 65Evans, "Aircraft Hijacking, " p. 699. 66U.S. Federal Aviation Agency, "Hijacking of Civil Aircraft, " Notice at 7500.4 (Washington, D. C.: FAA, January 14, 1964), pp. 1-2.

i 53 for the hijacker's arrest may be sworn out so that he can be promptly taken into custody should he return to the United States. The key words in the last sentence are "should he return," as we shall see in the following chapter there is great difficulty in gaining jurisdiction over a hijacker once he leaves the country. CHAPTER II

INTERNATIONAL LAW

"Aircraft hijacking" isa contemporary addition to the roster of international crimes, andthe necessity for its control at the international as wellas national level has only recently be- gun to be recognized. In the wake of the four hijackingson Labor Day weekend 1970, President Nixonreceived many proposals from his advisors on the problem ofhijacking. Some of themore ve- hement proposed that:

(1) Legislation should be passedthat would preventany hijacker entering the United Statesfrom disembarking from the aircraft he has hijacked, if the aircraftflies the flag of a nation other than the United States.He would be disarmed ifpossible but would remain on the aircraftas the responsibility of the carrier or the nation of that carrier's registration.The United States would have no interest in the final destinationof the aircraft outside the continental limits but atno point would the hijacker be permitted to disembark within the UnitedStates.There would be

'Evans, "Aircraft Hijacking,"p. 699. 54 no consideration of political asylum, which the United States traditionally had a tendency to acknowledge if the culprit is a refugee from a Communist nation. (2) An Executive order should be adopted which would authorize the President to sever all air commerce with any nation that fails to return the hijacker of a United States aircraft to the United States within 48 hours.It would be expected that the hijacker be disarmed and retained on board the aircraft until it is flown back to the United States.Cancellation of air service would include those provided by the United States as well as those operated by the flag carrier of the negligent nation.

(3)If a third country is involved--any nation that re- leases and permits a hijacked airplane to continue on to the air pirate's destination - -air commerce with that country would also be cut off immediately.2 These proposals were aimed directly at those international processes that were, and in some cases are still, preventing a solution to the problem of aircraft hijacking.This chapter will discuss these international aspects and bring the reader up to date on the international conventions and other actions that have been

2Laurence Dody, "Stiffer Measures Rejected in Nixon Hijacking Plans, " Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 5, 1970, p. 30. 56

initiated for the suppression of aircraft hijacking.

The Traditional Concept of Piracy First of all, the term "hijacking" is a relic of the Prohi- bition Era, it is not entirely descriptive of the act, for incommon usage hijacking applies to the seizure of a private commercial ve- hicle or vessel with the intent of theft of its loador cargo.The offense of "aircraft hijacking" essentially consists ofa taking or conversion to private use of an aircraft as a means oftransporta- tion and forcibly changing its flight plan to a different destination.3 Likewise, the offense is often called "air piracy," although it does not always fit within the definition of piracy,as it has been codified in Article 15 of the Geneva Conventionon the High Seas: Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (1) Any illegal acts of violence, detentionor any act of depredation, committed for private ends by thecrew or the passengers of a private ship or private aircraft, and directed: (a) On the high seas, against another shipor aircraft, or against persons or property on board such shipor aircraft; (b) Against a ship, aircraft, personsor.property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state. (2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operationof a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; ...4

3Evans, "AircraftHijacking, " p. 696. 4 Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958 (1962)2 U. S. T. 2312, T. I. A. S. No. 5200, 450 U. N. T. S. 82. 57

Hijacking is not committed byone aircraft against another, nor is it always committed "on the high seas" or outside the jurisdiction of any state.

Dr. Van Panhuys states that, "thescope of the traditional concept of piracy is rather limited and thatany automatic or mechanical application to air piracy of the existing rulesof international law with regard to sea piracy would not leadto a satisfactory result. "5

In particular he finds three main points of differencebe- tween sea and air piracy.First, the rules of international law with respect to piracy are limited to acts perpetratedon the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction ofany state.6 Although the hijacking of aircraftcan occur outside the sovereign airspace of any state, it is different from piracy inthe classical sense in that it is nearly always wholly or partially perpetrated within the territorial airspace, or territory, ofa state.Having the character of a so-called "continuouswrong, " the hijacking may commence at a place outside national airspace.If it is successful, however, it will continue until the aircraft has landedwithin the

5HaroF. Van Panhuys, "Aircraft Hijacking and Inter- national Law," Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, IX (Spring, 1970), 11.

6Ibid.,p. 4. 58 territory of a state.7 Second, for the purpose of defining piracy, only those acts are taken into consideration which are committed by the crew or passengers of the pirate ship and which are directed against another ship or aircraft.This excludes acts committed on board an ordinary, non-pirate, merchant ship and directed against property or persons aboard that ship. Third, to be properly called acts of piracy, the relevant acts must have been committed "for private ends," whereas in many cases of aircraft hijacking, the offense is quite frequently prompted by political motives. 8 Amir Rafat states that,

... most hijackingshave been carried out for reasons which cannot be described as 'personal,' such as asking political asylum, as with hijackings originating from the Communist-bloc countries, or publicizing a political cause, which has been the principal reason behind hijackings by the Arab commandos.9 He concludes that, "hijacking is not a piratical act and therefore does not have the same legal status as 'piracy, '--that is to say,

7Ibid.,p. 7.

8Ibid.,p.5. 9AmirRafat, "Control of Aircraft Hijacking: The Law of International Civil Aviation, " World Affairs, CXXXIV (Fall, 1971), 145. 59

it is not a recognized offense under customary internationallaw. "10

The Problem of Jurisdiction

Now the problem was to create internationallaw dealing with aircraft piracy so that the question of jurisdictionwould become clear.Lack of jurisdiction over those who commitair piracy has been a major obstacle to successful prosecutionin these types of crimes.11

The question of jurisdiction in this area isa two-fold problem.In 1959, Dr. Bin Cheng made a distinctionbetween "juris- faction" and "jurisaction." This difference between"the legislative power of a State, as well as the competence of its courts to apply such rules" and "the actual administration of justiceand the enforcement of such laws"12 is the heart of the problemof hijacking in international law. The very nature of hijackingis that the hijackers will attempt to divert the airplanes outsideof the exercise of national "jurisaction" against them.Construction of an international system of "jurisaction" is essentialto the control of crime aboard aircraft, but the suppression of theproblem of

11 "ICAO Actions May Reduce Aircraft CivilViolence Threat," Aviation Week and Space Technology, July13, 1970, p. 24.

12Bin Cheng, "CrimesOn Board Aircraft," Current Legal Problems XII (1959), 181-182. 60 of hijacking requires an internationally-agreed system of "jurisaction" as well.13

The Tokyo Convention The first efforts to create international law dealing with aircraft seizure were made at a meeting of the Legal Subcommittee of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) whichwas then considering a convention on crimes aboard aircraft in Montreal during March and April of 1962.14 At that meeting the United States proposed the inclusion of a section dealing with forcible seizure of aircraft.This convention, which became known as the Tokyo Convention was drafted by ICAO and its members to provide a clear international agreement on jurisdiction, in the sense of "jurisaction," over in-aircraft crimes, including those municipal law crimes which constitute hijacking.It was not a hijackingprevention device, although that misconception is widespread.In fact, the Tokyo Convention was not specifically aimed at aircraft hijacking, and did not even provide for the offenseper se.The substance of the convention goes back at least to Geneva in 1956, yet in the drafts there was no mention of hijacking as a separate category until 1962.This is why the United States, whichwar. the

13Horlick,"Developing Law," p. 34. "McKeithen, "Prospects for thePrevention," p. 63. 61

nation most concerned with hijacking, found it necessary along with Venezuela, to introduce the subject into the convention.15 The proposed section would have required the state in which the plane landed to take custody of the hijacker and, if so requested, to extradite him either to the state of registry of the aircraft or to the state in whose territory the hijacking occurred.If extradition were not requested, the state of landing could try the hijacker under its own laws.The proposal also contained provisions for the safe return of the passengers, crew, cargo, and aircraft.The Four- teenth Session of the ICAO Legal Committee (Rome., August-Septem- ber, 1962) deleted the section dealing with custody, extradition and punishment, but kept the section concerning restoration of crntrol to the aircraft commander and expeditious continuation of the jour-

ney.16 With minor exceptions, the draft emerging from the Rome meeting was included as Chapter IV, Article II (Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft) of the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed in Tokyo on September 14, 17 1963.

15Horlick, "Developing Law,"pp. 35-36. 16McKeithen, "Prospects for the Prevention," p. 63.

17Ibid.

I 62

Article 11 deals with unlawful commission "by force or threat thereof" of "an act of interference, seizure, or other wrongful exercise of control of an aircraft," and charges the signatories, when such acts are committed or are about to be committed, to "take all appropriate measures to restore control of an aircraft to its lawful commander or to preserve his control of the aircraft." Paragraph 2 of this same Article commits the rontracting state where the hijacked plane lands to "permit its passengers and crew to continue their journey as soon as practicable" and "returnthe craft and its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to possession. "-18 The Tokyo Convention went into effect on December 4, 1969, a long six years after it was first proposed.It se'ms that one of the chief problems in attaining any force in international agreements is an inbred complacency on the part of nations which have never suffered from piracy,Japan had no laws governing hijacking, nor had it ratified the Tokyo Convention, until a Japan Air Lines Boeing 727 was forced to fly to North Korea by a band of radicals.19 It required a wave of hijackings to accelerate the ratification of the Tokyo Convention. The United States became the twelfth

18Convention on Offenses and Cert lin Other Acts Com- mitted on Board Aircraft, ICAO Doc. 8364 (1963), Art. 11[hereinafter cited as Tokyo Convention]. 19Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 21, 1970, p. 27. 63

nation to ratify the Conventionon September 5, 1969.By January 1, 1970, there were fourteen partiesto the Convention, and six more nations had their acceptance becomeeffective during the first three months of 1970.20 By the end of1970, thirty-seven states 'ratified 21 the Convention. This is stark contrast to the sixyears that were necessary to get the first twelve ratifications needed for theconvention to go into effect.22

Individual State Practices

It has been noted that the practice oflanding states, whether parties to the Conventionor not, has for the most part conformed to the standards set by Article 11.According to Dr. Rafat, in only three cases has state practice diverged fromthese standards.23 The first case arose on June 30, 1967,when a plane carrying former Congolese Prime Minister MoiseTshombe was forced by a Frenchman to altercourse and land at Algiers.All persons aboard the aircraft, including Tshombe, the pilots,and the hijacker, were immediately placed underdetention by Algerian a security officials.The Algerian government justified thedetention

20Horlick, "DevelopingLaw," p. 42. 21Rafat, "Controlof Aircraft Hijacking,"p. 145. 22Horlick,"Developing Law," p. 42.

23Rafat, "Controlof Aircraft Hijacking," p. 145. 64

of those travelling with Tshombe on the grounds that they were needed

for questioning in connection with an inquiry into the incident.How- ever, by the end of September 1967 all occupants of the plane had been released except for Moise Tshombe who was kept under detention until his death on January "4.9, 1969. The second case involved the hijacking of an El Al airliner by Arab commandos of the Popular Front to Free Israel.This aircraft was also taken to Algiers.The Algerian government permitted all non-Israeli passengers to depart, but kept the airliner and its 22 Israeli passengers and crew members. This led to strong protests, not only from the Israeli government but from the International Fed- eration of Airline Pilots' Associations (IFAPA). 24 Therewas a con- certed drive in April 1970 by some members of the IFAPA for an aggressive policy against aircraft hijacking.This policy called for the utilization of boycotts and twenty-four hour strikes "to bring

offending states to heel. " This policy failed to be passed whena majority of the 250 IFALPA delegates went along with elder states- men of the group who wanted a more diplomatic approach via the United Nations and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 25

25Herbert J. Coleman, "Hijack Policy Reflects Conserva- tive View, " Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 13, 1970, p. 43. 65

The ICAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations withcognizance over international civil aviation matters.26 On August 30, 1969, Arab commandos hijackeda Trans- World Airline Jetliner to Damascus. The Syriangovernment released all passengers except for two Israeli nationals whowere taken into custody and kept in Syria formore than two me .ths until they were released in exchange for 13 Syrian commandos held by Israel, on December 5, 1969.27 In addition to the three cases reviewed here, the hijackings carried out by the Arab commandos in September 1970 alsoled to temporary detention of the passengers and crew members. Here, three civilian airliners, a TWA and a Swissairon September 6 and a BOAC on September 7, were forced to changecourse and land in a desert strip in Northern Jordan.The airliners were blown up and some passengers and crew members--between 354persons at different stages of the hijacking episode--were keptby Arab commandos as hostages for exchange for Arab commandosheld in Israel, Britain, West Germany, and Switzerland.This action, however, cannot le taken as evidence of state practice because itwas taken by the Popular Front to Free Israel (PFLP) whichis not a

26U. S.Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, LX, March 10, 1969, p. 213. 27Rafat, "Controlof Aircraft Hijacking, " p. 146. 66 recognized sovereign entity under international law.28 Aside from the exceptions noted here, in all other hijacking cases the conduct of the landing state has conformed to the pre- scriptions imposed by Article11.29In a statement before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on February 5, 1969, Frank E. Loy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transporta- tion and Telecommunications, said, "In the hijackings that involved United States aircraft we have in fact been very fortunate that the aircraft, the passengers, and the crew have been permitted to return in each case without undue delay."30This policy is true not only of signatories cf the Tokyo Convention but also of states such as Iraq, the United Arab Republic, Cuba, and North Korea, which are not parties to that Convention.31 The Cubans, for example have returned all planes, allowing immediate refueling and return since February 10, 1969.They did, however, charge Venezuela $31,450 after four days detention, following the Venezuelan detention of a Cuban fishing boat for six weeks. As previously stated, the normal fee paid for the return of the aircraft is $3, 000.They also held a United States aircraft in

28ibid.

29Ibid. 30Department of State Bulletin, March 10, 1969, p. 213. 31Rafat,"Control of Aircraft Hijacking," p. 146. 67

1961 for three weeks until it was exchanged for a Cuban SV-8 patrol boat.32 The worst record for return of planes is that of the United States before 1961, "of 25 planes (18 hijacked, 7 seized in the United States), 11 were sold pursuant to court orders, while 14 were returned--at least one after a plea of sovereign immunity entered by Cuba through the Czech Embassy. "33 Besides these few exceptions, Cuba has steadfastly allowed

hijacked airliners to return to the country of registration.34In only one instance has Cuba arrested and charged a person claimed by a foreign country as its national, and then with some justification. This case arose out of the hijacking on June 30, 1968, of a plane piloted by George Prellezo.Prellezo, a former Cuban national, had defected to the United States, adopting American citizenship. After landing in Havana, he was taken into custody by Cuban officials and charged with defection.This case involved a case of dual citizenship which afforded Cuba legitimate ground for regarding Prellezo as a Cuban national.The Cuban government subsequently

32Horlick, "Developing Law," p. 43. 33U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, LXV, 1961, p. 278. 34Department of State Bulletin, March 10, 1969,p. 213. 68

decided not to proceed withthe defection charge andPrellezo was allowed to return to theUnited States two weeksafter his arrest.35

In view of these factsit appears that the principlesof Article 11 of the TokyoConvention have been establishedas an internationally acceptednorm. At the 16th Assembly of the Inter- national Civil AviationOrganization (ICAO) in BuenosAires during September 1968, the UnitedStates was largely responsiblefor a unanimous resolution callingupon all member states to enforce

Article 11 of the Conventionas if it were already in effect.The resolution was adopted, theCubans joining in the votefor its adoption.36

The fact remains thatthe provisions of theTokyo Conven- tion, including those inArticle 11, importantas they are to the freedom of internationalair travel, do not directlyattack the hi-

jacking problem. Therelevant provisions of the TokyoConvention aim at protectingpassengers, crew, and airlines againstarbitrary treatment by the landingstate, but fall short of institutingan international system aimedat the prevention of hijacking.Any preventive system must includeprovisions to ensure theapprehension, prosecution, and punishment ofwould-be hijackers and,on this

35 Rafat, "Control of AircraftHijacking," p. 146. 36U.S. Congrers, House, 1969, p. 6. Report, House Doc. 91-33, 69 score, the obligations created by the Tokyo Convention are of little significance. 37 The only provision in the Tokyo Convention relating to the hijacker himself and which is mandatory upon signatory states provides for an immediate inquiry and a report of the results to the state of registration of the aircraft and the state of nationality of the hijacker.38The Convention does not provide for the extradition or prosecution and punishment of hijackers.It merely allows for temporary detention of the hijacker, and this only if the state of landing is satisfied that "the circumstances so warrant."39 In "The Developing Law of Air Hijacking, " Gary N. Horlick states that Article 11 "represents the barest minimum of agreement among nations with any aviatior interest at all, since every nation would like to ensure the return of Its own planes, and consequently will agree to act reciprocally."40 Although the Tokyo Convention imposed no responsibility on contracting states to extradite or punish, it served the useful purpose of categorizing the possible responses of states to aircraft

37Rafat, "Control of Aircraft Hijacking," p. 147. 38McKeithen, "Prospects for the Prevention," p. 64. 39Tokyo Convention, Art. 13, par. 1. 40Horlick, "Developing Law," p. 38. 70

seizures. By setting minimum standards of conduct and showing the concern of the international community for this problem,it also served as a basis for the drafting of further internationalagree- ments.41

International Or In order to close the gap left by the Tokyo Conventionre- specting the punishment of hijackers, additional measures had to be instituted.Knut Hammarskjold, Director General of the Inter- national Air Transport Association (IATA) said,

... the only way to stop hijacking is for all governments either to extradite the hijackers to the country of the airline concerned or to punish them severely at the point of landing. The cause of continued hijackings is the failure ofmany governments to fulfill their responsibilities in this respect, including some governments who, although they have punished the hijackers, have awarded such light sentences that they have no deterrent effect. 42 In order to foster this international punitive policy against hijackers, various agencies were calledupon. Congressman Darte B. Fascell, United States Representative to the United Nations, stated: The United Nations itself is not the forum best suited for working out the technical details of practical arrangements

41McKeithen, "Prospects for the Prevention, "p. 64. 42"IATA,Official of Munich Airport Debate Over Anti- Hijacking Roles," Aviation Week and Space Technology,November 16, 1970, p. 29. 71

for dealing with the problemor drafting international legal instruments embodying thosearrangements.These tasks are best pursued through anotherorgan in the UN family, the International Civil AviationOrganization.The UN General Assembly, however,can serve as a forum for the marshalling of a strong body ofopinion in favor of taking vigorous action on the problem ofhijacking and consequently for expressing support for the specificsteps, both national and collective, which should betaken in the immediate future. 43

In October of 1970, the American Societyof Travel Agents (ASTA) discontinued customer servicesfor any travel to four Arabian countries; Algeria, Iraq, Jordanand Syria.The organization's board of directors met in Ottawaon September 12, 1970 and decided to requestseven nations "to declare themselves op-

posed to hijacking... and to take whatever steps are necessary to halt these acts of air piracy. 1144

The seven nations were Algeria, Iraq,Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic(Egypt). Only three governments, Egypt, Lebanon and Tunisia hadtaken actions that conformed with ASTA's requests, leavingthe other four on the group's boycott list.

43U. S.Department of State, Department of StateBulletin, LXII, January 19, 1970,p. 62.

"Laurence Dody,"Anti-Hijacking Drive Gains Added Impetus," Aviation Week and Space Technology,October 19, 1970, p. 27. 72

The boycott includedthe return of all ticketstocks of natic-3.1 carriers ofthe countries involvedto those nations,re- moval from agents' files of all tariffs andschedules pertainingto those countries andrefusal to acceptany travel literatureor bro- chure from the countriesinvolved.45

In addition to theseand other agencies,private individuals also made variousproposals designedto solve the problem ofaircraft hijacking. In November of 1970,Chester Leo Smithsubmitted to the World Peace ThroughLaw Center,a suggested approach to the problem. Theessence of the draft proposalfor a model treaty was that each contractingjurisdiction to sucha treaty or convention would, within a period of 24 hours afterobtaining custody ofany alleged hijacker,transport suchperson to the now unused Spandau Prison in West Berlin. He would bedetained until guiltor innocence was determined byan appropriate tribunal andwhere, thereafter, any sentence would be served.It was suggested thatthe In- ternational Court ofJustice be suchan appropriate tribunal. 46

In October of 1970,U Thant proposed theestablishment of an international tribunal to try hijackers.This proposalwas

451bid.

46ChesterLeo Smith, "TheProbable Necessity ofan Inter- national Prison inSolving AircraftHijacking," The International Lawyer, V (April,1971), 273-274. 73

received very cooly in the General Assembly. 47 Whilethese and other suggested solutions to the problemwere debated, official diplomatic efforts to close thegap left by thL Tokyo Convention were also being initiated.In February 1969, the United States had proposed at the ICAO Legal Subcommittee meeting inMontreal, a draft international agreement which would makeit a crime to hijack a commercial aircraft carrying passengers for hire, and require the return of persons committing that crime to thestate of registration of the hijacked aircraft.48

However, most of th,.. other states representedon the ICAO Subcommittee took the position that it would be preferableto provide for the punishment of the hijacker in the statewhere he disem- barks and to carry out the extradition of hijackers, ifat all, under normal extradition agreements.49

This brings up two major points: first, justwhat actions have the various states most involved with hijacking takenin the past; second, what are the international implicationsinvolved in the extradition of hijackers?

47New York Times, October 2, 1970,p. 69. 48U. S.Congress, House, Report, House Doc. 91-33, 1969, p. 6. 49Thid. 1

Extradition It appears that while some states do nothing, others view unlawful seizure of aircraft as a serious matter and have taken steps to discourage it.50Cuba has been the primary site for the landing of hijacked aircraft.The facts seem to indicate that the motivation for this is that the perpetrator is unlikely to divert a plane to a country where it is likely that he would be returned for prosecution. 51 Of one hundred thirty-four hijackings between January 1, 1961 and March 1, 1972, where an intended destination can be determined, nearly all were to places from where the hijacker could reasonably expect not to be sent back.Eighty have been of American planes from the United States to Cuba.52 Cuba has not been consistent in her actions against hijackers. On the basis of a 1925 treaty, Cuba granted Mexico's request in 1961 to extradite the French-Algerian hijacker of a Pan American jet.53The man's name was Albert Cadon and he was convicted of robbery and illegal carrying of firearms and sentenced to eight years nine months by Mexican officials.54Since then, Cuba has

50McKeithen, "Prospects for the Prevention, " p. 66. 51Horlick, "Developing Law," p. 44. 52 FAA Statistics, February 2, 1972. 53McKeithen,"Prospects for the Prevention," p. 66. 54Hirsh, "Extradition, "p. 406. 75 reportedly signed an extradition treaty with Mexico providing for provisional detention of a hijacker pending a formal extradition demand.55 On the other hand, Cuba has reserved her right to refuse extradition when the hijackers are wanted for political crimes, and on that ground has denied extradition on four subsequent Mexican hijackings during 1968 and 1969.56 Cuba does not institute any domestic proceedings against those who land there.However, it seems that although no official action is publicly taken, hijackers are not accorded hero status or otherwise given any prominence in Cuba. A member of the Black PanCier organization who had hijacked a plane to Cuba gave a press interview in Havana in which he condemned the Cuban government for the way he had been treated. According to him, Black Panthers were "isolated and imprisoned" in Cuba, although they were seeking political asylum there.57There have been cases where many non- Cuban hijackers have been allowed to leave for third countries or to return of their own volition to the states from which they fled.

55McKeithen,"Prospects for the Prevention, " p. o7. 56Horlick, "Developing Law, " p. 44. 57Frank E. Loy, "Some International Approaches to Dealing with Hijacking of Aircraft," International Lawyer, IV (1970), 446. 76

In the case of United States nationals, they usually return to the United States via Canada.88 Although, the Cubans in September, 1970, did turn over a hijacker directly to the United States.This was not evidence of a new pattern, since the particular hijacker, Robert Ladadie, was an escaped mental patient from an Army hospital.It has bee!, an American practice to supply Cuba with deroga- tory background information on hijackers, however, up until this incident this information did not have any impact.59 Algeria, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan are among other states where hijacked planes have landed which have taken no action to prosecute or extradite hijackers.The hijackers who landed in Algeria and Syria were either their own nationals or nationals of thei allies and were engages in political seizures.They were apparently not detained.Those who landed in Jordan and Egypt had fled from other countries and were granted political asylum.60 The rule seems to be thr..t hijackers operate almost ex- clusively where the existence of two antagonistic sides assure.) them a sympathetic reception from one ofthem.61This problem

58Hirsh, "Extradition, " pp. 406-4:2. 59Horlick,"Developing Law, " p. 44.

60McKeithen, "Prospects or the Prevention, " 67. 6IHorlick, ''Developing Law,"p. 44. 77 of political asylum will be dis :ussed in detail later in this chapter. There are some states that take aircraft hijacking as a serious offense as evidenced by their actions.62The Netherlands, Great Britain, Saudi Arabia and Bulgaria have all chosen to return hijackers to the places in which the aircraftwere seized or were registered, in some instances without applicali:a extradition treat-es.63In the Soviet Union, several persons recently tried on charges of planning or attempting to hijack Soviet aircraftwere sentenr,xi to death, however, their sentences were reducedon ap- peal to fifteen years in prison, the maximum imprisonmentper- mitted by Soviet law.It is interesting to note that they were not charged under a law specifically applicable to hijacking, whichap- parently is lacking in Soviet legislation, but rather undera law for- bidding attempts to leave the country without permission.64 A French statute enacted in 1970 prescribes penalties of five to ten years in prison fur simple hijacking. ten to twentyyears for hijacking resulting in injury or illness, and life imprisonment

62Gerhaid, 0. W. Mueller and Fre Le Poole-Griffiths, Comparative Criminal Procedure (New York: University Press, 1969), p. 159-174. 63McKeithen, "Prospects for the Prevention," p. 67. 64Oliver J. Lissitzyn, "International Control of Aerial Hi- jacking: The Role of Values and Interests," American Journal of International Law, LXV (September, 1971), 84.

4 78 for hijacking resulting in death.65

Political Asylum With reference to political asylum, the question is, is there a duty for the state which may at any time find a hijackerwithin its territory, either to extradite or to ,,unish him? Can the hijacking act ever be considered to be a ,:olitical crime entitling the perpetrator to political asylum, and if so, when? The attitude of mankind wit's regard to the moral and judicial evaluation of so-called political crimes has undergone considerable change in the course of c.-ntaries.The 19th century has left us the conceptual legacy that political offenders should not be extradited and that, as a matter of principle, political asylum should be granted tothem.66In this evaluation two considerations have played a significant role.First, the conception prevails in liberal democracies that very often a person considered to be a political offender may in fact be a defender of liberty against an oppressive or tyrannical government.Second, the fear exists that a person who is sought by his political opponents is not likely to receive an impartial hearing.67

65Ibid. 66Van Panhuys, "International Law, "p. 13.

6 7Ibid. 79

These feelings may account for the fact that the United States did not prosecute or extradite those who flew stolen airplanes from Cuba to the United States between 1959 and1961.68 Frank E. Loy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation and Telecommunica- tions, addressed this potential loophole for hijackers in a statement made be.3re the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com- merce on February 5, 1969.Mr. Loy said, In our extradition treaties--and this is true for treaties of other countries as well--we traditionally have not accepted an obligation to return fugitives accused of common crimes whom we determined to be fleeing from political persecution. We have taken a hard look at this traditional policy in the light of the increasing danger to innocent persons from hijacking of commercial aircraft, and of the im- portance of an effect:ye deterrent; and we have concluded that the hijacker of a commercial aircraft carrying passengers for hire should be returned regardless of any claim that he was fleeing political persecution.69 What are some of the conceivable political motivations which may govern the behavior of hijackers?First, one motive is the violent overthrow of a government, or even the annihilation of a state, as is the proclaimed purpose of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), an organization claiming responsibility for various hijacking cases.70In such cases, the hijacker

68McKeithen, "Prospects for the Prevention, " p. 68. 69Departmentof State Bulletin, March 10, 1969, p. 213. 70Aviation Week and Technology, September 14, 1970, pp. 33-38. 80 acts as a member of an organized group, and the unlawful seizure of the airplane, or the kidnapping ofpassengers, is incident to a more general plan.The second type of motive may be to "demon- strate" against a political regime, or merely to embarrassa government.In these cases the offense can be committed byone individual acting independently of any organized political movement. 71Finally, there are instances where the hijacker wants toescape from his country for political reasons or "quasi-political"reasons.72 To a great extent attempts to organize the control of hijacking on an international basis have founderedon the easily made argument that "the implications of international confrontationpre- sent in nearly every hijacking ensure that the hijackers will never be extradited to face prosecution, any extradition agreementsnot- withstanding, as they would be classed as non-extraditable political offenders. "73 The Cubans have accepted this view: The question was whether a given offense wasa political offense and whether the offenders could be extradited... For the purposes of extradition the concept ofa political offense seemed not to be an objective notion, and the problem of determining such offenses dependedon psychological

71VanPanhuys, "International Lay., "p. 13. 72Peter Martin, "The Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, " The Law Society's Gazette, LXVI (July, 1969), 716. 731-lorlick, "Developing Law,"pp. 45-46. 81

considerations, the motives of the alleged offender, and above all the political relationship between the State where he had taken refuge and the State where the political offense had been committed.74 This relationship between the states is evident even in cases where the hijacker is punished by the state in which helanded.In Western European countries penalties imposed on hijackersfleeing from states in the Soviet bloc have been mild, generallyranging from one to six years injail.75In a case involving two East Ger- mans, who directed a Polish airliner toland in the French sector of West Berlin, they were sentenced to two years imprisonmentby a French military tribunal.This followed a refusal to grant an extradition request made by Poland.76 The extent of this traditional concern for the right of asylum can be seen in the minuses of theICAO Subcommittee of the Legal Committee on the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, meeting in February

1969: A majority of 9 meni.bers against 3 believed that any State, whether or not it was the State in the territory of which the tffender left the aircraft, may refuse extradition of the alleged offender in accordance with its own national law, for example where the offender was its own national or

74thid.

75Lissitzyn, "International Control," p. 84. 76New York Times, November 21, 1969, p. 3. 82

was asking asylum from persecutionor acted from political motives. The minority took theview that the existence of political motives should not bea basis for refusal of extradition. 77

A majority of states,particularly Switzerland hold the principle of political asylumto be sacrosanct.78A decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal ina case involving one of the earliest hijackings explained the broadapplication of asylum to airplane hijackings:

Extradition is not granted forpolitical offenses.This applies not only to offenses directedagainst the State... but also to so-called relativepolitical offenses, which consist iti the commission ofa common offense, but which, by virtue of taecircumstances and in particular, the motive, of their commission,acquire a political colouring...it is also necessary that theirpolitical colouring outweigh theircommon characteristics... Such a [political] charactermust also be attributed to offenses which were committedin order to escape the constraint of 1 State which makesall opposition and, therefore, the fight forpower impossible.In this connection there can also beapplied the principle that the relation between thepurpose and the means adopted for its achievement must be suchthat the ideals connected with purpose are sufficientlystrong to excuse, if not justify, the injury to privateproperty, and to make the offender appear worthy of asylum...79

77 "DevelopingDeveloping Law, "p. 46. 78AviationWeek and Space Technology, p. 13. September 8, 1969,

79Horlick,"Developing Law, "p. 47. This decision may still be a valid exposition of the international law of asylum, but changed circumstances have altered its application to hijackings.Hijacling is coming to be recognized by some as.a danger to the aircraft, crew, and passengers distinctly out of proportion to the needs of most of the hijackers; thus this ex- posure of innocent bystanders to danger should not be excused by its political colorings.This view is expressed by Frank E. Loy when he stated: We do not propose to change in any way our general policy on political asylum; but ,re think the risks involved in the hijacking of commercial aircraft are great enough so that neither we nor others should treat hijackers--whatever their motivation- -as simple political offenders. 80 In his 1969 address to the General Assembly, President Nixon said the hijacking could not be curtailed "as long as the pi- rates receive asylum."81His viewpoint is not shared universally, however, and even the United States' extradition treaties with Brazil and Sweden affirm the requested state's right to grant political asylum. 82 The traditional test for the granting of asylum requiredar act done in the c4.,urse of acting 'n a political matter,a political

80Departmentof State Bullttin, March 10, 1969,p. 213. 81U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, LXI, March 17, 1969, p. 300. 82McKeithen, "Prospects for the Prevention,"p. 70.

1 84

rising or a dispute between two partiesin the State. "83 This test evolved from the case, Inre Castioni which occurred in 1891.This test was later expanded in 1955 by the Englishcase of Re Kolczynski which included in the testan action "to prevent [the actors] from being prosecuted for a political offense. ,,84

In this case thecrewmen of a Polish fishing boat mutinied and sought asylum in Great Britain.The Polish government de-

manded their return for trial,citing damage to the vessel anda slight injury to the captain duringthe mutiny.The court said that notwithstanding the fact t!Lat actsordinarily constituting a crime had been committed, itwas clear that any trial in Poland would be basically political and that thereforethe British statute would not permit extradition or prosecution.85

The traditional concept ofa political offense has been broadened by ::ne change in attitudein response to the rising tide of totalitarian regimes whichdo not permit any domestic opposition, so that dissidents often have no -hoice other thanto leave the country by secret and unlawfulmeans.86

83Thid.

84thid.

85Horlick,"Developing Law,"p. 49. 86Van Panhuys, "International Law,"p. 14. 85

In this connection the questionmay well be asked whether in such cases there exists a proportionality betweenends and means? It was precisely this question which the Swiss FederalTribunal had to answer in In Re Kavic, Bjelanovic and Arsenijevic,concerning a request by Yugoslavia for the extradition of three Yugoslav nationals, members of the crew of a Yugoslavpassenger airplane, who had diverted the airplane from its destination in Yugoslaviato Switzer- land.During the flight the other members of thecrew were subjected to constraint.The Court held that the-extradition could not be granted, since the offenses in question constituteda means to effectuate the perpetrators' escape froma country with whose regime they were not in agreement and had, for thatreason, a politi- 87 cal character. The court we t on to strikea balance between the motivations of the hijackers and what it consideredto be the effects of their actions:

... on the one hand, the offenses against the other members of the crew were not very serious, and,on the other, the political freedom and even existence ofthe accused was at stake, and could only be achieved through thecom- mission of these offenses. 88

However, ." one takes into account theenormous risks brought upon the members of thecrew and the passengers, it seems

87Ibid,, pp. 14-15. 88McKeithen, "Prospects for the Prevention,"p. 71. 86 hazardous to maintain that the possible political freedom of one or two individuals should be held to outweigh the risks to the lives of all involved. 89 These hazards were emphasized by Mr. P. Houben, speak- ing for the Netherlands and twenty-seven supporting delegates at the 6th Committee of the 24th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, when he introduced a resolution on hijacking: As the number of incidents and as the demands of hijackers escalate, the risk to the safety of passengers and crew will rise.With the advent...of newer types of aircraft carrying greater numbers of passengers, an even greater number of hu lives may bc: placed in jeopardy by these inciden.90 The September 16, 1969 Cuban Law 1226 on hijacking also takes into account these dangers: The forced diverting of air and maritime ships from their normal routes and activities endangers the lives of innocent persons, affects the development of air and maritime na-igation, inf)4,.7es national and international legislation and the general regulation of migration in effect in all countries, and likewise, implies the danger of the introduction of epidemics, plagues, or infectious disease which may affect the health of the Cuban people... The Cuban Revolutionary Government considers it necessary to adopt measures tending to end the climate of insecurity created in air and maritime navigation through the forced diversion of air and maritime vessels from their routes and normal activities. 91

89Van Panhuys, "InternationalLaw, " p. 15. "Horlick,"Developing La- ," pp. 49-50. 91Ibid.,p. 51...... -

The Palestinian guerrillaorganization responsible for the September 1970 hijackings, the PFLP,was expelled from the um- brella organization, the PLO,as protests mounting from around the world even included criticismfrom Iraq and Syria, usually among the most militant of Arab states. As AlAhram, the "semi- official spokesman" for the Cairogovernment, pointed out, "the attack on international civilaviation does not encourage world feeling of solidarity with thePalestine cause. "92 These facts would tend toindicate that even the most radi-

cal countries realize the dangersinvolved in aircraft hijacking.It is this widespread realization ofthe dangers, to persons andstates, which will eventually allowstates to subordinate rights of political asylum to the need tosuppress hijacking.This was illustrated in a September 1970 incident when threemen diverted an Algerian domestic flight to Albania.They said they did it because "wedon't agree with our socialist regime. Wewanted to live in a realso- cialist country. " Albania refusedthem permission to land, and

the hijackers_ finally soughtasylum in Yugoslavia. 93 Even if states made knowntheir retention to refuse extradition in actuations with politicalovertones, they could still include

92TimeSeptember 21, 1970,pp. 20-27. 93New YorkTimes, September 1, 1970,p. 70. 88 aircraft hijacking in a bilateralagreement.These bilateral agreements would serve as effective deterrentsif they are predictable.94 For example, onegroup of hijackers flew from Venezuela to Trini- dad because they thought thatthere was no extradition treaty in force which covered their act.They were sadly disappointed when the Trinidad authorities said thatthey would be returned to Vene- zuela;95if such a policy had been madeknown beforehand, however, the hijacking might not have occurred.

Recent treaties with Italy and Spain, haveprovisions that call for a "presumption" thathijacking is a crime and not a political cause.Constitutional laws or basic policies ofa number of countries prevent them from expressly establishinghijacking as a common crime, for this reasona "presumption" is used in the pattern of bilateral treaties being negotiatedby the United States. As of Sep- tember 1970 therewere seven [Italy, Spain, Brazil, Sweden, France,

New Zealand, and Great Britain]such pacts in effect and talkswere in session on an additionaleleven.96

94 McKeithen, "Prospects for the Prevention,"pp. 68-71. 95New YorkTimes, November 29, 1963,p. 1. 96LaurenceDody, "White House Drive Gainsto Unify In- ternational Laws on Air Piracy,"Aviation Week and Space Tech- nologyj September 28, 1970. 89

Cuba will enter only bilateralagreements concerning hijackings.It has been speculated that Cuba'sdesire for United States recognition is onereason why it is determined to maintain thispolicy.97

Since Cuba has diplomatic relations with onlyone country in the Western Hemisphere, Mexico, therequisite bilateral agreements are unlikely to be negotiated, although the UnitedStates' State Department has recently indicateea willingness to honor reciprocal commitments to return 1ijackers. 98 The Cubansdid offer to return all hijackers on a reciprocal basis in 1961.However, this was when the traffic was mostly in the other direction, Cuba to the United States.99 More recently, Frank E. Loy stated before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce:

We are encouraged by recent indications thatthe Cuban Governmentrep rds the hijacking problem as a serious one and that it neither encouragesnor con- dones hijacking. We are now trying to workout with them some of the practical problems relatingto the handling of planes, crews, andpassengers once a hijacking takes place and havereason to believe that from now on the return of passengers, for example, may becar- ried out more simply and expeditiously than heretofore.

97New York Times, September 20, 1969,p. 58. 98Department of State Bulletin, March 10, 1969,p. 214. "Departmentof State Bulletin, 1961, p. 407. ) 90 S With regard to the larger problem of deterring future hijackings, so far we have not been able to effect a bilateral arrangement for return of hijackers forprose- cution, but there are indications that if hijackingscon- tinue on the present scale the Cuban Governmentmay adopt measures of its own. 100

Just what these measures are was not rr 9.oned.However, it does seem likely that if the practice of stateswere to prosecute or extradite hijackers and this practice was well-known, it might

deter hijackers as readily as would an international treaty.In 1969, a Federal Aviation Administration psychologist linked a lull in hijacking with publicity of unfavorable treatment of hijackers in Cuba and with Cuba's announcement of her willingnessto negotiate extradition treaties covering hijacking. Cuba's actions and announce- ments on hijacking showed a concern which reflects its desire to

enhance its stature as a member of the internationalcommunity. Cuba's delegate to the ICAO conference in BuenosAires in Septem- ber, 1969, said that Cuba would supportmeasures to prevent hijacking.102

A year earlier the 16th Session of the ICAO Assemblyat Buenos Aires passed Resolution A 16-37, which requested "the

100Departmentof State Bulletin, March 10, 1969,p. 214. 101New York Times, September 20, 1969,p. 1. 102New York Times, September 22, 1969,p. 10.

, 91

Council at the earliest possible date,to institute a study of other

measures to cope with the problem of unlawful seizure. "103The Council, in December, 1968, decidedto convene a special subcommittee of the Legal Committee in Montrealthe next February to ex-

amine the development both of modelnational legislation and ofan international convention dealing with theprosecution of hijackers. At this meeting in Montreal, theUnited States proposed a draft protocol to the Tokyo Convention. 104This protocol constituted a multilateral mandatory extraditionconvention limited to hijackers of any aircraft in flight whichwas carrying passengers for hire. The draft contained the proceduralprotections that are normally found in extradition treaties. 105 Thatis, provisions to insure that an extradited hijacker could only be tried for thatoffense, unless the extraditing government consentedto prosecution on other charges. This was designed to vitiate the objectionthat extradited persons could be prosecuted for "political"offenses.106

103Horlick,"Developing Law,"p. 59. 104ThidP. 60. 105K. E. Malmorg, "New Developmentsin the Law of In- ternational Aviation: The Control of AerialHijacking, " American Journal of International Law, LXV (September,1971), 76. 106Horlick, "Developing Law, "p. 60.

1 92

This proposal was rejected,as was a compromise which would have created an obligation toprosecute if extradition was re- fused on the ground that the offenderwas sought for political persecution.107

The United States position thatvigorous international action is necessary to bring hijacking undercontrol was for the most part

shared by its allies in Europe and theWestern Hemisphere.Yet some members of the Western coalition suchas Great Britain, France, Denmark, Mexico, and Venezuelawere reluctant to corn- mit themselves to treaty obligations callingfor automatic extradition of hijackers regardless of motivation. 108

The evolution of the Soviet positionon the question of the international control of hijacking isinteresting because it improved the prospects for the effectiveimplementation of the international arrangements developed by the Hague Convention.109This convention which is the present majorinternational control against aircraft hijacking will be discussedin detail below. The Soviets had originally beenvery cautious about accept- ing the various Western-sponsoredproposals for the control of

107Wurfel,"Aircraft Piracy, "pp. 867-871. 108 Rafat, "Control of Aircraft Hijacking," p. 149. 1091bid. 93

hijacking.Without going so far as to actuallyoppose Western efforts, the Soviet Union refrained from givingsupport and occasionally expressed skepticism -.bout Westernmotives. For example, in Octo- ber of 1969, the Soviet delegate tothe United Nations accused West- ern proponents of action against hijacking of "unsavorypolitical purposes.110

However, on November 14, 1970,the Soviet Union became an official member of the International CivilAviation Organization (ICAO).Since joining the ICAO they havevoiced strong support for international cooperation in prosecutinghijackers.111

What accounts for the shift inthe Soviet position? Thean- swer simply is certain hijacking incidents in 1969and 1970, involving aircraft from the Soviet Unionand its East European allies, caused the Kremlin leaders tosee that the communist world has a vital interest in the prevention ofhijacking.112 The first successful hijacking ofan airliner from a Com- munist-bloc country occurredon October 19, 1969, involving forcible diversion of a Sovietairliner to West Berlin bytwo East

110 New York Times, October 11, 1969,p.1. 111 P. Woolsey, "U. S. Sees Anti-HijackingSup- port in Soviet's Membership in ICAO,"Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 23, 1970,p. 26. 112 Rafat, "Control of Aircraft Hijacking," p. 149. 94

German youths who after landing demanded politicalasylum. There were nine other acts of hijacking involving aircraft fromfour countries in Eastern Europe, Poland, Czechoslovakia,Rumania, and East Germany. Then, on October 15,1970, two Lithuanians hijacked a Soviet aircraft and forced it to land at the Turkishport of Trebi- zand. The airline was on a domestic flightbetween two Black Sea cities when it was hijacked. The hijackerskilled a stewardess and seriously injured the pilot and co-pilot.On October 27, 1970, another Soviet plane was hijackedto Turkey, this time by two Rus- sian citizens seeking political asylum. 113

These last hijackings occurred justprior to the Hague Con- ference and caused the Soviets tocome to that conference with a bloc of votes favoringa stronger convention.114

Another major reason why the internationalcommunity had strong feelings about strengthening the conventionwas the fact that between the Legal Committee meetingand the Conference at The Hague there occurred a series ofhijackings for what have been called international blackmailpurposes.This was the forcible seizure and diversion of civil aircraft,not to flee from one country to another, but to hold the aircraft,passengers and crew hostage

113Ibid.

114 Malmorg, "New Developments,"pp. 76-77. 95

for specific demands. 115These were the so-called Labor Day hijackings that were discussed in Chapter I.

The Hague Convention Following this rash of worldwide incidents, those countries who rejected the United States' earlier proposals to strengthen the Tokyo Convention, became avid supporters of a strong convention. By the end of 1970 the ICAO Legal Committee had prepareda draft convention which was submitted to a 77 nation international conference on air law which met at The Hague December 1-16, 1970.116 The Hague convention greatly strengthens the Tokyo Con- vention especially in the area of apprehension, prosecution and punishment.Its significance lies in the fact that it defines hijacking as an offense, creates an obligation to apprehend, extradite, or penalize hijackers, and extends the obligations regardingprosecu- tion and extradition of hijackers to all third partieson whose territory the alleged hijacker may be found.Each of these actions further internationalizes the hijacking offense.117

115Ibid.

116U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, LXIV, January 11, 1971, p. 50. 117Rafat, "Control of Aircraft Hijacking,"p. 153. 96

If we look at some of the majorprovisions of the Convention more closely we see that this Convention appliesto any unlawful seizure or exercise of control, by forceor threat of force or by any other form of intimidation, committedon board a civil aircraft in flight and to any attempt at suchan act committed on board.118 An aircraft is defined to be inflight from the moment when all its external doorsare closed following embarkation until the

moment when any door is opened fordisembarkation.But in the event of a hijacking, the flight is deemedto be continued until the competent authorities where the plane landsassume responsibility for the aircraft and thepersons and property on board. The Con- vention does not apply to aircraft usedin military, customs,or police services.This is in accordance withthe usual practice of limiting international air law conventionsto civil aircraft.119 The convention also containsprovisions which limit its scope of application geographically. Thusflights which occur solely within the state of registrationof the aircraftare excluded.120Per- haps examples will best illustratethe operation of that paragraph: 118 Convention for the Suppression ofUnlawful Seizure of Aircraft, "Department of StateBulletin, LXIV, January 11, 1971, pp. 53-55 (hereinafter referredto as The Hague Convention). 119m..ia, Art. 3, para. 1. 120rb, Art. 3, para. 3. 97

An Eastern Airlines aircraftscheduled from New Yorkto

Montreal is hijackeden route and diverted to Chicago--theConven- tion does not apply (unless the hijackerescapes to another country, in which case the extradition,punishment, and certain otherpro- visions become applicable).

An Eastern Airlines aircraftscheduled from New Yorkto

Chicago is hijackeden route and diverted to Canada--theConvention does apply.121

Penalties and Universal Jurisdiction

Each state is obliged tomake hijacking punishableby severe 1 22 penalties and to establish its criminaljurisdiction to covercases where an alleged hijacker ispresent in its territory, regardlessof where the hijacking takes place. 123

Custody

Under the convention eachstate is obliged, when it is "satisfied that the circumstancesso warrant," to take a hijacker into immediate custody or to take othermeasures to insure his presence

121u. S. Department of State,Department of State Bulletin, LXV, July 19, 1971,p. 86. 122The Hague Convention, Art.2. 123Ibid., Art. 4. 98

for such time as is necessary to enable criminalor extradition proceedings to be instituted.124 Normally the circumstances are quite clear,an aircraft lands with the alleged hijacker on board, but thereare cases where there is little or no evidence to support placinga person in custody and a certain flexibility is required. For example, thecase of

"D. B. Cooper, " the individual who successfully extorted $200,000 from the airlines and parachuted to freedomon November 24, 1971.125 Once the decision is made that the circumstanceswarrant taking the hijacker into custody, however, there isno exception to the obligations on contracting states that flowfrom action under this paragraph--notification to the otherstates specified in the Con- vention and extradition or submission to prosecution.126

Extradition or Prosecution The convention amends existing extraditiontreaties, all bilateral in the case of the United States, to includehijacking as an extraditable offense and also provides that it shall bean extraditable offense between states which donot make extradition

124Ibid., Art. 6. 125FAA Statistics, February 2, 1972. 126The Hague Convention, Art. 6. 99

127 conditional on an extraditiontreaty. If a state in whicha hijacker is found does not extraditehim, that state isobligated "without exception whatsoever, andwhether or not theoffense was committed in its territory, to submitthe case to itscompetent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. "128These authoritiesare also required to make their decision whether or not to prosecute in thesame manner as for serious ordinary offensesunder their own laws. 129

It has been stated thatthese provisions ofthe Convention

taken together provide the basicdeterrent to hijackers.Now the hijacker must take the riskwhen he entersone of the contracting states that he will either beextradited to anotherstate or prosecuted where he is found.130

The Convention alsorequires the contractingstates to include hijackingas an extraditable offensein all extradition treaties concluded in the future betweencontracting states.131The United States is including hijackingas an extraditable offensein all new extradition treaties itnegotiates. 132

127Ibid., Art. 8. 128thia.,Art. 7.

129Ibid. 130Department of State Bulletin,July 19, 1971,p. 87.

131The HagueConvention, Art..:.

132Departmentof State Bulletin, July19, 1971,p. 87. 100

When a State has taken a hijacker into custody, itshall immediately notify certain States, 133 including theState of registration of the aircraft and the State of nationality of thehijacker.In addition, each State is required to reportto the Council of the Inter- national Civil Aviation Organization relevant informationconcerning a hijacking, the release of passengers, crew, cargo, and aircraft, and the results of any extradition or other legal proceedings. 134 The Convention applies to hijackings of all civil aircraft, wh.;_aer engaged in an internationalor a domestic flight.The Con- vention strengthens Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention regarding the obligation of States to release hijackedpassengers, crew, and aircraft.The prosecution obligations assumed by Statesare not based on reciprocal treaty relationships.The obligation to extradite or prosecute, together with universaljurisdiction, provide a framework within which the problem of hijackingcan be dealt with as forcefully as piracy.The Convention may be ratifiedor acceded to by all States.135

133The HagueConvention, Art, 6. 134Ibid., Art, 11, 135 U. S. Department of State, Department of StateBulletin, LXIV, May 17, 1971, p. 656. 101

In brief, the convention strives to deprive hijackers of asylum from prosecution. A hijacker will either be extradited or prosecuted where found.136 There is, however, no assurance that the convention will result in sufficiently severe penalties in all cases to serve as an effective deterrent.Diversity in national standards of severity may be reflected not only in the statutory provisions for penalties, but also in the relative ease of placing convicted offenders on probation or parole.137 There is, furthermore, no provision in the convention for its enforcement against delinquent states.Article 12 provides for the settlement of disputes arising under the Convention by arbitra- tion or the International Court of Justice, but it also specifies that any state may at the time of signature or ratification of the Conven- tion or accession thereto declare that it is not bound by this provision.Even if there should be a finding by an arbitral tribunal or the International Court that a state has violated the Convention, the question of enforcement of such a decision is left open.138

136U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, LXV, October 4, 1971, p. 371. 137Lissitzyn, "International Control," p. 84. 138Ibid. 102

Fearing that ratification of TheHague Convention would t-as long as ratification of the Tokyo Convention,the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) multi-phase political campaign to pressure governmentsinto early ratification.The program was called "T Plus" and ranged from informingpassengers of the Convention's provisions and thenations that participate, to threats of pilot boycotts of those nationsthat refuse to sign and ratify the Convention.139

However, it is important to keepin mind that no boycott can be effective unless it is total.The concept that every nation will commit itself to boycottingany other country, including close allies, is not very acceptableto most governments.140

This time, however, ratificationcame quickly.The United States adopted the Conventionon September 14, 1971, as did the Soviet Union, United Kingdomand Northern Ireland. Thereare 76 countries that have ratified thisConvention, including Japan, Bul- garia, Sweden, Costa Rica, Gabon,Hungary, Israel, Norway and Switzerland.141

139"PilotsSpur Anti-Hijacking Drive,"Aviation Week and Space "rechnology, January 18,1971, p. 19. 140 Dody, "White House, " AviationWeek and Space Tech- nology September 28, 1970,p. 25. 141Department of State Bulletin, October4, 1971, p. 371. 103

It must be concluded that the limitationson the effectiveness of the new Convention will probably prevent itfrom really solving 142 the hijacking problem. It is, nevertheless, a decisivestep toward the creation of conventional internationallaw governing the problems associated with unlawful seizure of civilaircraft.143

142Lissitzyn, "International Control,"p. 84. 143Rafat, "Control of Aircraft Hijacking,"p. 153. CHAPTER III

THE HIJACKER

Given the incidence ofhijacking, one must necessarily

inquire as to who the hijackersare and what their motivesmay be. This chapter will discussthis question andpresent two case histories of convicted hijackersin an attempt to providesome insight into the psychologicalnature of this individualwe call "skyjacker." Skyjackers have been describedas "psychopaths, fugitives from justice, disturbedhippies, unbalanced politicalextremists, losers, ex convicts, juveniledelinquents and mysterymen fleeing from we know not what. "1

Dr. David G. Hubbard,a Dallas, Texas, psychiatristhas conducted interviews withtwenty skyjackers and haswritten a book about his findings,The Skyjacker: HisFlights of Fantasy. 2 Nineteen of the subjectsinterviewed weremen. The youngest of the groupwas 16, and the oldest, 74.Deleting the

'Ronald L. Fick, Jon I. Gordonand John C. Patterson, "Aircraft Hijacking:Criminal and Civil Aspects," University of Florida Law Review,XXII (Summer, 1969),81. 2DavidG. Hubbard, The Skyjacker:His Flights of Fan- tasy (New York: MacmillanCo., 1971). 104 105 lone old man, the mean age was 29,Fifteen of the twenty were native-born American whites, fourwere native-born blacks and one was a white immigrant.Fifteen of the group acted alone, threewere accompanied by children and two bywomen. Sixteen of the twenty failed in their attempt.The other four reached Cuba, butwere returned to the U. S. through Canada. 3

From this small group of twenty skyjackersa composite profile of the "American skyjacker" hasbeen drawn. According to Dr. Hubbard, the Americanskyjacker is a twenty-nine year old, native-born whiteman on the lower rungs of the economic ladder. He is apolitical,emotionally unattached to public causes and intellectually uninterested inthe rhetoric and theories of either revolutionariesor establishments. He is a con- servative in dress, in ideas and in customs,tending to cringe at the prospect of change. He is weak, ineffectualand afraid.His many fears include a phobia about falling or jumpingfrom tall structures. He is a failure in business, insex, in marriage, in friendship. He has no close friends.4

Dr. John Daily, the Chief of the FederalAviation Adminis- tration's psychology staffagrees, "They have had a general pattern

3 Fletcher Knebel, "The Skyjacker," LooksFebruary 9, 1971, pp. 23-24. 106

of 'inadequacy' in theireducation, jobs and personallife." He uses for example Leon Bearden,a chronic malcontent who hada twenty year criminal record and also hadspent some time ina mental hospital.Bearden, whose case historywill be presented in thischap- ter, unsuccessfully attemptedto hijack a plane to Cuba.He believed Castro would give hima large reward for the plane. When captured he told police he hatedthe U. S. and plannedto renounce his citizenship and liveas a hero in Cuba.5

According to Dr. Hubbard'scomposite, the skyjacker has no criminal record, but he isprone to petty theft.Although he has fantasies of violent crime, heshies from the realityof violence. He knows little aboutguns or other weapons.6 Thereseems to be much disagreement about thisaspect of violence.

Dr. Leonard Olinger,who teaches abnormalpsychology at the University of SouthernCalifornia, places theskyjacker "in the same class as the assassin,the same sort of acting-out character. "7

Dr. Ralph Greenson,a Beverly Hills psychiatrist,agrees, "Skyjacking is a typical mechanismof people who resortto

5"Theywant a Moment of Power andGlory," Life, April 18, 1969, p. 27.

6Knebel,"Skyjacker," p. 24.

7"Whatcan be done about Skyjacking?"Time, January 31, 1969,p. 19. 107

irrational violence."8Dr. Dailey disagrees andsays "Their behavior resembles that of the suicide rather than of theassassin with whom some psychologists have compared them. 9 However, there does seem to beagreement that the skyjacker is a man in psychological turmoil, andthat he spends his tor- tured existence in anxiety, frustration andrage. He worries about possible impotence. 10 Dr. FrederickHacker, a professor of psy- chiatry at the University of Southern California,states that, "Behind [skyjacking] is the omnipotent fantasy.To steal an airplane has a lot to do with feelings of masculinity that needstrengthening. "11 If one word could characterize the feelingthat pervades his life, it would be "helplessness." He ispsychotic but not stupid.12

Dr. Dailey says, "Ifyou dig deeply enough you find seriousemo- tional instability in almost everycase. Some of them have been in mental hospitals; but most are borderlinecases, not hard-core psychotics.Those who fail in their effort--whoare disarmed or talked out of hijacking while actuallyon the plane--tend to be more

9Life, January 31,1969, p. 26. 10 Hubbard, Skyjacker,pp. 188-192. 11 Time, January 31,1969, p. 19. 12Knebel, "Skyjacker, "p. 24. 108

unstable than those who succeed.The successful ones act intelli- gently, almost with the deliberation of a computer. "13 Dr. Hubbard's composite finds that the skyjackerrealizes that skyjacking is a futile gesture, nevertheless he fastensupon it as his means of showing the world that for once in his miserable,

timid, failure-scarred existence, he can standup and display his manhood by ordering the captain of a multimillion dollar airliner to do his bidding.14

In 1969, Dr, Peter Siegel, the FAA's airsurgeon formulated what he called the "skyjacker syndrome. " This syndromewas reportedly formulated from limited data, it basicly states that the skyjacker believes that he can prove himselfa decisive, effective human being by taking control of a plane, itscrew and passengers, and commanding it to go to Cuba.There, in his fantasy, Castro will welcome him as a hero.But skyjacking is self-defeating,an example of what psychiatrists, according to Dr. Siegelcall "the Indian coup phenomenon; you scalp yourself.After that, what have you got?"15

13Life, January 31, 1969,p. 26. 14Knebel, "Skyjacker," p. 24. 15Time,January 31, 1969, p. 19. 109

Dr. Greenson says, "With thetemporarily omnipotent

feelings the skyjacker gets, he actuallyis in control of hisown destiny and the destinies of others.He's next to God, literally, flying to Cuba. With thisone grand gesture of power, the skyjacker showe his contempt for the establishment. "16 He is aware of thesevere penalties for skyjacking, including death, but far from deterringhim, these penalties increase the risk and therefore the challengeof the venture. He considers himself a lifelong loseranyway. He has contemplated suicide, and he is bent on destruction of theworthless creature he deemshim- self to be.With that forlorn view of hisempty self, he is eager to defy death in the electric chair byvaulting into the air inone grand glorious final fling.17

Case Histories

In order to provide a deeperinsight into the psychological nature of a skyjacker, two case historiesprepared by Dr. Hubbard, are presented.Dr. Hubbard gave hiscases code names, the man in the first case, Ted, is in actualityLeon Bearden, whowas discussed in the preceding chapters.

16Ibid.

17Hubbard, Skyjacker,p. 230. 110

The Case of Ted Ted was forty-six, convictedfor skyjacking in 1961. He came from an intact familywith only one other child,a sister three and one-halfyears younger. He is divorced from his wife.They had four children, theoldest of whom accompanied him in his skyjacking. Ted's father was a constructionworker who brought in a steady income "until he starteddrinking, and ofcourse, nobody who drinks heavy isreally steady. He dranksome when I was a child, but itwas only for a short period of time as I recall.He got really hungup on booze after I got married. He became quitean alcoholic over a period of five or six years." Betweenthe early alcoholic period and the later one, he becamea church deacon at his wife's strong insistence.Ted and his father alwayshad a close relationship, whichwas being maintained during his term. prison The mother was a devoutBaptist.Ted said she was "very Baptist.I think religion has hada very definite influence on my mother. " Hereported that he and hissister attended Sunday School "ona regular basis.The whole family went together, andit was Sunday School andchurch and BYPU and the whole bit. "He often had to take his little sister. care of Ted had an exceptionalmemory."I can remember the first day I walked.I remember Iwas on the floor and I crawled up to a chairor something and pulled myselfup.I remember my motherwas in the next room; I think itwas the kitchen, but I'mnot positive.But I remember seeing her in the otherroom there and I remember I pulledmy- self up to my feet, and Iattempted to walk.I felt pretty good about it. " His only recollection ofrepetitive dreams from child- hood was of "a prehistoricsetting - -a mammal-typecrea- ture like a slug cameup out of the water and caughtseveral people, but it didn't catchme.I woke up. " From this dream he went on tosay that he was sure he also often dreamed of falling.On inquiry, he stated hewas sure he had never dreamed of flying. During the first severalyears of school, he wasa "straight A student.I think my grades definitelystarred deteriorating when I got intoabout the fifth grade.I wasn't interested forone thing, because it was becoming repetitious.I do remember somethingwe were studying, 111

I lost interest. " Hedropped out of schoolat the beginning of the ninth grade.At about the school declined, same time his gradesin something interestinghappened and thetwo are probably connected."I enjoyed art to the fourth. from the firstgrade Then they toldme that an artist isa sissy. I got that impressionand it stuck with didn't resume me for years. " He painting until hewas in prison.His work now sells widely andan art dealer is considering a major show. him for Ted reported havingspent a great deal of his bicycle. time riding "That wasmy wheels as a kid,as we say today.Took me everywhereI went, practically. rode paper routes I've that were twenty-eightmiles long. " He learned to drivea car at about age at age sixteen. fourteen and ownedone He els coveredsex at age five or six."A little girl introduced me to thesubject.I think shewas two or three years older thanme. As I recall, thefirst time she the subjectup it was just a matter brought of how little kidshappened to look, you know.Later she triedto have sexual This experiencearoused his curiosity, relations. " with other girls. and he experimented The girlswere older and theywere also the aggressors."There were twoor three of these but this continuedover a considerable girls, was between five and period of time.I six years old ardit continued until they were abouteleven years old." he was sixteen. He started datingwhen He developedhis first seriouscrush when he was seventeen.He was engagedfor two while he was in years.Then the Army, shemarried someoneelse and wrote him a "DearJolla" letter. He joined theNational Guard the inactive at eighteen andwas in reserve for about fourmonths. Henever went active because shortlyafter receiving letter, he became the "Dear John" so disturbed that hewent AWOL. While be and a buddywere AWOL, they hitchhiked. a ride with this "We caught young fellow drivinga Chevrolet, but his actions indicated thathe was on therun from the law. had also indicatedthat he might be He is, I slugged him armed. So whathappened with the intentionof knocking himout and taking him to jail.It was prettyphony, you man was obviously know--when a trying to stayaway from thecops.I just stunned him.So, anyhow, aftercalling the doctor everything, why, Ilet him off at the and the doctor had hospital and toldhim told me that he'dbe right thereand takecare 112

of him. And me and my partner leftwith the car... see? We didn't have any idea that we'd beinvolved in some kind of criminal activity with the automobile.The cops didn't catch us; we turned ourselves in to theArmy. " He pleaded guilty on the basis ofa deal with the District Attorney for a suspended sentence, butwas convicted and sentenced to fifteen months. He servedfive months before he was paroled. Shortly afterward, his old girlfriendturned to him while trying to get away from herhusband."I was still very much in love with this girl myself, and from allindi- cations she was still in love withme. She propositioned me to help her get a divorce and I wentso far as to take her to talk to an attorney.But her husband, ofcourse, I don't think he wanted to give herup at all, and I know that as a matter of fact he attempted to findme a couple of times when he was armed.I wasn't carrying a gun, but I hadone available if I needed it.But it did look like things couldget out of hand and develop into something realserious. And frankly, I just said to hell with it.And I didn't want to hurt the girl or see her get hurt.So I decided to pass a few checks and go back to prison. And that'sexactly what I did. " He was in prison on the forgery chargefor sixteen months. When he was twenty-oneyears old, he took flying lessons and qualified to flya light plane.This was in 1945, and it took him only seven hoursto fly solo.He flew only eleven or twelve hours in all becausehe could not afford it. He married when hewas twenty-one, after a two-week courtship.Their first child was born the firstyear, "I looked forward to it, I thought itwas going to be a pretty fine thing to be a daddy. " Thefirst child was a son, closely followed by another, then bya daughter.Several years later, they had anotherson.Neither Ted nor his wife smoked or drank. Prior to his marriage he had beenworking with his father in construction.Afterward, he became a truck driver. "We were kind of nomadic.We didn't stay too long in one place. Working conditionshad something to do with it, and we wasn't inany great big hurry to settle down. We didn't want any roots.We were just happy-go- lucky. We didn't take life too damnedserious, but we tried to enjoy ourself. " He and his wife movedto three different states, staying briefly at several places ineach. He quit the trucking business and becamea miner."In 1949, I went 113

to work for a powercompany, and I sayed with themnine whole months before I quit." This was the longesttime he held a job, except forone that he held for a littleover a year in 1954. After this long tenure, hehad somemoney saved and he was not working,so he decided to have himself committed to a mental hospital tosee whether conditions therewere as bad as people said theywere."I went to a certainamount of trouble to try toprepare myself to gain entrance.I have been an avid reader of the literature,publications, weeklies, monthlies, and so forth.The best I couldcome up with was to try to convince people that Iwas a little bit despondent. It seemed tome like an opportune time to satisfymy curiosity, so I did. " Hewas in the hospital for about twenty-eight days. He went into selling.In 1957, he moved andworked for a transportation company as a serviceman. While he was employed there, his cousin robbedthe company.It looked like an inside job. and Tedwas arrested."I didn't commit the crime, and I didn't executeit, and I didn't plan it.But I done time for it." Hewas in prison thirty-three months. "But these things don't happenin the United States, do they? " The Castro revolution occurredwhile he was in prison, and the patient watched it closely.He decided "while Iwas in prison, that I was going to leave theUnited States (because of his false imprisonment).I had't determinedat that time that it was necessarily goingto be to Cuba. " When he came out of prison,he began sellingcars. He found that while hewas in prison, his wife "became quite involved in religious matters andchurch activities andso forth.I didn't object to her goingto church and taking the kids to church.I've never done that.I don't think anybody can appreciate freedom more thansomeone who has been denied freedom.She told me that she wantedto become a missionary.I quoted some Scriptureat her that this wasn't the way it was supposed to bedone. A woman wasn'tsup- posed to--and her husband, either,for that matter--wasn't supposed to split up the home andhis family for sucha ridiculous thing as that." He further explained that hiswife was religious, but lax on discipline."There's something else thathappened during this period of confinementthat caused me to feel and resent this thing more than just the factthat I was not guilty of the damn crime to beginwith.It was the fact that the children wele going away from me. Therewas no discipline. " When he tried to establish order in the household,the children considered him a "big dictator. " "That causedmy resentment against the authorities to increase a lot.Even today, I hate the state with a passion.It's safe to say that I hate what they represent, law and justice.But I found in the last few months that I was locked up in prison, I could tell from thekids' manner of speech, little things, they showed disrespect,you know." Soon after his release from prison, Ted wentto Mexico City.He went to the Cuban Consulate there, and inquired about the school system, living conditions, and thepossibility of going to Cuba."I applied for citizenship and told them I wanted to request political asylum.I was granted residence. " He took the whole family down to Mexico, with theirconsent, and made plans to go to Cuba.Before he could leave, however, he had to return to the States to finishsome paper work or-. his car sales.He planned to return shortly and then leave for Cuba. He b&ieves that while hewas gone his wife wrote the authorities and claimed he was trying to force the familyto go to Cuba. He had broken parole by leaving the State,and before he could return to Mexico, "I geta call from the parole officer, telling me to remain there atmy father's house and wait for my parole officer.He gets there about two hours later and he tells me that the state is screaming formy arrest. He informed me that it might bea good thing if I'd hire an attorney.I told him, I said, I hadn't brokenany laws.I hadn't committed any crimes.I didn't say that I hadn't brokenmy parole. He said, "I thought maybe thatyou and your partner had been selling some hotcars in Mexico." I said, "The FBI is barking up the wrong tree if they're looking forsomething there." He then received a letter from his wifesaying the family was returning from Mexico and had decided not togo to Cuba. "So I tell'em that theycan either go back or whatever they damn well please, that I was still wanting togo to Cuba, because that's just the way it is.The Cuban government had given us citizenship, not onlyme, but my entire family, and that as soon as we decided we want togo to Cuba, the Cuban government would pay air transportation all theway for my entire family." At this point, his family desertedhim and he expected the federal authorities to arrest him."I didn't think I had any choice at the time. " He skyjacked."They had me in a place where I was crawling.I either had to do what I did, 115

or I had to split altogether, leave my family, andhead for MexicoI was prettyure when I boarded theaircraft that I wouldn't goany farther than El Paso.'Cause they could do what they damnedwell pleased, but Idone some research while I was beingresearched and it'sa well-known fact that these airlines, at thattime for economy at these intermediate reasons, were fueling stops.I knew this, I knewthe plane would never make itto Cuba without refueling." He had his oldestson with him. Hewas sixteen years old at the time and wentwith his father becausehe wanted to "Nobody forced him.My other oldest boywanted to go and I wouldn't take him.I wouldn't havetaken the oldest if it hadn't been for hismother and sister.They both, all the time during theyear before I was releasedon parole, why, they couldn't get along,always fighting." Theson told the authorities later that theywere stealing the aircraft andwere going to sell it in Cuba.Ted was perplexed be pretty damned over this."It'd ridiculous.It belongs to the airline."The son was held in juvenile authorityfor a while, then released. He has not contacted his father since heentered prison. 18 The Case of Elmer Elmer was thirty-fiveand came froma home where the father was an alcoholicand the mothera religious zealot (Church of God). "Myfather was drunk He used to beat Mother most of the time. and us kids. Heused to chaseus kids in his truck andtry to run overus. He was crazy. " His family was lowsocio-economically, and their pulses were more acted-out im- common. For example, duringone family fight, a brother olderthan Elmer stabbedhis father in the back in order toprotect his mother,who was being choked by his father.(It may be relevantthat this woind collapsed one of the father's lungs, subsequently contributingto his dying of pneumonia.) There were four children: and a younger sister. an older brother and sister, Here, too, the motherwon the identification of most of thechildren, and thefeminine domAnance of the homewas established,"The family split the middle with right down my older brother and Daddyon one side and the rest ofus on the other. " Thegirls, as children, volved the patient in in- all of theirgames of dolls, insome

18Ibid., pp. 117-123. 116

instances using him as a doll himself. He had many memories of futile rage at being restrained by them for this play. He also reported dreams of paralysis."I was afraid a monster would get me.I was all slow motion, my hands and feet were made of lead. " Similarly, in sports he was "too clumsy, " and "besides, Mother and my sisters sort of had me on their team. " He felt the girls were "favored. " Elmer accepted the religious doctrine of his mother wholeheartedly."At home we prayed a lot and often talked about Hell and what would get us there; all kinds of little things were dangerous.I used to pray that I wouldn't die in my sleep or the monster get me. Heaven sounded pretty good." During his school years, he "frequently cu. out of class just to get outside where I could feel free. " He quit school during the tenth grade. He matured into a quiet "sissy" of such obvious rigidity and morality that, at the time he entered thearmy, he had never had a date.This innocence and naivete so offended his fellow recruits that they "bought me a prostitute, but I couldn't do anything.They seemed to think that I put on a lot of airs about not going with women.I didn't dare let them know what I was really feeling, so whenwe went to the whorehouse, I went up to the girl's room and stayed there awhile. When I came down, I told them I had done it, justas I had told my older brother many years before. " (When he had been five years old, his older brother used to try to force him into intercourse with girls. At that time, hewent behind the hay bales, only to come out later and report that he "had. " His brother wanted to "makeme like he was. " He meant that his brother wanted to make him "male. ") During rr.itary service, he had no dates because he "didn't know how to ask for one. " Hewas quiet, thrifty, and generally envious of the freedom of his bunkmates."I didn't make much rank during my stay in the service, but I didn't get in arty trouble.I knew how to keep my mouth shut." After discharge from the military, he wandered about alone, envious of the dating of other young men.Finally, he met a very retarded girl who did not frighten him. They went about together for a time "just like the other fellows did, " and at last sexual activity began between them. Almost immediately, he became certain that "people were following" him when he drove about.He was certain 117

that someone was after him, and that perhaps they had wired dynamite to his car.In his fear, he ran to the police and told them to lock him up for safety.Their reply that they weren't "running a hotel" left him depressed. A few hours later, he told them he was planning to bomb the station and shoot everyone in it.The police promptly arranged for his safety in the local state mental hospital. While in the hospital, he met a seriously ill pvychia;ric patient who also had epilepsy.She had been hospitalized for twelve years, and Elmer subsequently proposed to her.After both had been released from the hospital, they beganto live together, believing marriage to be impossible because ofa state law which stated that "an epileptic could not marry." He promptly began to experience thesame sort of delusions of being followed and of someone's being "after him," which had occurred after his first sexual experience. He kept his mouth shut about his suspicions, saved his money from work, and quietly did those prudent things suitable to his situation.He arranged defenses and checks against his enemies and ingratiated himself with his factorysuper- visor as much as he could.He treasured the belief that he was this man's favorite. All went along fine, other than the foct that hiscommon- law wife taunted him at home that his peniswas "tiny," that he knew nothing about how touse it, and that he didn't take care of her. He was humiliated by these taunts and began to suspect her of infidelity and to check her closely. He found a number of things which, to him,were at first highly suspicious and, finally, absolutely convincing, although in fact, they lacked all substance. For example,on one occa- sion he found the door unlocked when hecame home from work. On other occasions, hewas most concerned about cars parked on the block. During this time, his work apparently suffered. Soon thereafter, he was suddenly, sharply reprimanded bythe supervisor whom he believed to be his best friend.He was amazed by this further evidence of infidelity and beganto plot the murder of this man, as wellas shooting up "some of those people" who were following him. Hefirst bought a pistol to carry out his purpose, but later settledon a x.nife as being somehow more suitable, so he made one froman old file. Much disturbed by his feelings, he vacillatedfor weeks between the intention to kill and the wish to makeup. He 118

was dissatisfied with his plans for mass murder because it was "the good people" who were persecuting him for his sexual sins.He hated the thought of killing them, since there were so many of them.During this time, he and his common-law wife drove about a great deal in hiscar, and he watched the rear view mirror closely. He felt sure he had developed skincancer as a result of his sexual sin.His skin "stank," and he felt that the pores at the hair roots had opened into gapingspaces from which the evil odor came. He went toa physician, but since the doctor belonged to the "good people,"he wouldn't cure him.Also, the doctor began to hint to the patient that his problems were mental, and that he shouldgo to the hospital. He became even more fearfu' and decided thatonly Russia, which belonged to the Devil, would treat hisdisease.There- fore, he traveled to Washington and applied fora visa to Russia, in order to obtain treatment.Apparently, the Rus- sians were doubtful about him, and therewere inexplicable delays in his receiving thenecessary documents. He was far from home, stymied in his wish toescape from the United States, and faced with having to return homeonce again as a failure. He decided to go to Cuba without the formalities. He bought a return ticket to his hometown, and, using hisgun, demanded to be flown to Cuba. He wasvery puzzled by the amiability and compliance of thecrew, and he was soften- ing under their kindness, until they offeredto let him sit in a pilot's seat.Instantly, he figured that itwas "rigged to a trap door and that they would dump me." He stiffened and regained control of his feelings and the situation.Their continued kindness and affability, however, troubled him,and at last he put down his gun. Interestingly, he was miraculously "cured" of his skin cancer in Dade County Jail by a bowl of soup he received from the warden. During the interview, he madeno attempt to justify his crime. He obviously felt he had not sinned against God,but had committed only a secular crime. Hewas meek and ap- peared to be effeminate, both physically and inhis speech. He didn't smoke, drink, or curse. He used righteousplati- tudes and indicated his desire toserve in the ministry.19

"Ibid.,pp. 26-30. CHAPTER IV

CURRENT PREVENTIVEMEASURES

"The hijacking ofa United States airlineror other aircraft is becoming an increasinglydifficult and dangeroustask and people who try it are landing inprisons and other institutionsin accelerat- ing numbers. "1

The Federal Aviation Agencynoted that 1971was the first year in which there weremore unsuccessful hijacking of United States air carrier aircraftthan successfulones.Of twenty-five airline hijackings attemptedlast year, eleven metwith success. This compares withseventeen of twenty-six in 1970and thirty-three of forty in 1969.2 (SeeAppendix B)

FAA AdministratorJohn H. Shaffer recentlysaid that he was encouraged by the dramaticdrop in the number ofsuccessful hijackings last year butremained intensely concernedabout the total picture."This year's hijackingstatistics remind me of those good news /badnews stories making the rounds thesedays."

'SecuritySystems, Digest, February 2,1972, p. 2. 2Thid.

119 17.0

Shaffer added,

The good news, ofcourse, is that we have achieveda significant decline in therate of successful hijackings. The bad news,on the other hand, is thatwe did not manage a meaningful reduction lastyear in the total number of hijacking attempts.Obviously, we need to place even greater emphasison improving groundsecurity at airports in 1972than we ever have before.I firmly believe that thebest place to stop hijackersis at the aircraft boardinggate and until we achievesome- thing like 100per cent reliability in this regardI don't believe the Government,the airlines or the airportopera- tors shouli take toomany bows for our achievmentsto date.3 This chapter will discussthe securitymeasures that have been initiated to bringabout this 100per cent reliability, and those measures which are planned for thefuture.It will also discuss some of the past measures thatwere tried and found not to bevery effective.

Security measures initiatedby airlines andgovernment agencies in the United Stateswere slow in coming but theyare now being developed and appliedwith considerableurgency in response to the increasing boldness ofaircraft skyjackers. 4

The Sky Marshal Program

The series of hijackingswhich precipitated Congressional action on air piracy in 1961,also aroused publicconcern about

3lbid.

4"AirportSecurity Searches and theFourth Amendment," Columbia Law Review, LXXI (June 1971),1039. 121

methods of protection aboard aircraft in flight.At first members of the United States Border Patrolwere ordered to accompany flights along the southern borders; immigrationofficers also traveled on some of these :lights.5In March 1962, Attorney Gen- eral Kennedy swore inas Special United States Deputy Marshals a specially trained group of "sky marshals."These "sky marshals" were made available to the FAA and were stationed at key points

around the country for service aboard airlineaircraft.They were graduates of a special trainingcourse at the U. S. Border Patrol Academy in Port Isabel, Texas. 6

The "sky marshal"program was originally opposed by United States airlines and the Air Line PilotsAssociation (ALPA). 7 In Congress a considerable amount oftestimony was given re- specting the use of armed guardsor peace officers aboard aircraft. The limitations and dangers in theuse of such officers wer e pointed out by witnesses representing the FAA, the AirTransport Associa- tion, and ALPA. 8

5Evans, "Aircraft Hijacking,"p. 704. 6"FAAOutlines Actions Taken Against Crimes Aboard Aircraft, " FAA Information XLV, May12, 1964, p. 3. 7Aviation Weekand Space Technology, September 21, 1970, p. 26. 8U. S. Congress, House, Report, House Doc.91-33, 1969, P. 5. 122

As the FAA witnesses indicated, the danger exists that gunfire in the confined space of an aircraft could easily result in innocent passengers being killed or vital parts of the aircraft being hit.Subsequent to these hearings actions were taken to lessen some of these dangers. For example, presently each "sky marshal" is issued special ammunition for his 38 caliber handgun to prevent damage to the aircraft skin and critical control components should a gun battle take place aboard the aircraft.Bullets are special light-weight hollow-point models which expand at impact with rapid loss of velocity.One official described them as having good knock- down and poor penetration characteristics, they have minimal chance of penetrating the airplane skin, and if they do, there will be no severe decompression problems in the aircraft. 9 In addition, Eastern Airlines has gone as far as negotiating with a major weapon manu- facturer to evaluate, and possibly develop, a "defensive device" for use in the close, vulnerable environment of a cockpit.This device is believed to be of the "low lethality" type shooting some disabling projectile other than the conventional bullet or an electronic device.10 However, these devices do not by any means eliminate the dangers

9Aviation Week and SpaceTechnology, September 21, 1970, p. 29. ""Anti-Hijacking Plans Augmented, " Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 9, 1970, p. 32. 123

involved in a confrontation between an armed guard anda hijacker. There are cases where the hijacker has held agun to the head of a stewardess, any move by an armed guard in thesecases might have fatal consequences. Among the unknown factors involvedare the mental health of the hijacker and the number and possible behavior of accomplices who may be aboard.11 In view of these dangers, airline officials remained traditionally opposed to the use of forceon board airplanes.The policy, particularly when most of the hijackings involved trips to Cuba,was best described as passive.12 Some officials wavered from this passive policy when hijackers began threatening to destroy aircraft and their occupants. The risk balance was tipped substantially by the magnitude of the Arab terrorist action during Labor Day weekend in September 1970.13 Another factor in the change of policywas the success of the El Al Israel Airlines in preventing a fifth hijacking by the terrorists. During this incident the pilot banked his Boeing 707 sharplyto the

11U.S. Congress, House, Report, House Doc. 91-33, 1969, p. 5. 12Aviation Week and SpaceTechnology, September 21, 1970, p. 29. 13Ibid.

1 124

left and put the aircraft into a steep dive.This knocked the hijacker off balance and he was subdued by a steward. 14 At the time of these hijackings by Arab terrorists the FAA, which had been and still is the central agency in the anti-hijacking program, was in the process of reorganizing its staff.The original nine-man task force established to d ,velop an effective anti-hijacking e program had been disbanded.It was replaced by the Office of Air Transportation Security with broadened authority also to deal with aircraft sabotage and theft problems.15 The new organization was hardly established sufficiently to administer the existing program when the four Arab terrorist hi-

jackings created pressure to accelerate the program and addnew ones. President Nixon asked Congress for a special appropriation amounting to $28 million to cover the cost of security guards, which would be funded by increasedpassenger taxes.16 President Nixon also appointed retired Air Force Lieutenant General Benjamin 0. Davis, Jr.as Director of the Transportation

14AviationWeek and Space Technology, September 14, 1970, p. 37. 15iation Week and Space Technology, September 21, 1970, p. 30. 16Ibid.,p. 27. 125

Department's Civil Aviation Security Program. 17 Thisprogram is administered by the FAA. When the program first went into action it involved personnel from severaljagencies. The initial plainclothes guards assigned mostly to international flights were FAA sky marshals who had been mostly used in the past to protect valuable cargoes on aircraft. Others were drawn from the Secret Service, Federal Bureau of In- vestigation, U. S. Customs Bureau and the Defense Department.18 The military men from the Department of Defensewere sworn in as deputy United States marshals and were granted the power of arrest.19

In January of 1971, the first class of new sky marshalswas graduated.These sky marshals belong to the Treasury Department's Customs Security.They have initial civil service ratings from GS-4 to GS-7 depending on their experience. Each Customs Security Of- ficer is sworn in as a federal marshal and has authority to make arrests under federal hijacking laws.These arrest powers apply

17James P. Woolsey, "Davis to Lead Hijacking Prevention Drive, " Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 28, 1970, p. 26. 18Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 21, 1970, p. 29.

19"Military Men Riding as Airline Guards, " Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 12, 1970, p. 28. 126

both on board aircraft and on the ground in conjunctionwith pre- board screening programs.20 All the new sky marshalsare specially trained to operate within the airplane with special consideration to vulnerablecompo-

nents.In each assignment, they operate in teams of at leasttwo. They are always under the command of the airline captain. 21 They are given courses in reaction ofpassengers to numerous aircraft maneuvers, this is to aid in coordinated flight-crew/ guard actions in overcominga hijacker.They also receive indoc- trination in the hijacker behavioral profile system to assistin spotting potential hijackers. 22

The Screening Process Noting that there were actual or attempted hijackings of twenty-eight United States aircraft ina six-month period during 1968 and 1969, the U. S. Department of Transportationestablished a task force to study and develo practical answers to the problem.23

20"Sky Marshal Program Graduates First Class," Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 4, 1971,p. 22. 21Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 21, 1970, p. 29. 22Aviation Weekand Space Technology, September 28, 1970, p. 26.

23Columbia Law Review (June 1971), 1039. 127

The principal product of this task forcewas the "hijacker personality profile," developed by Dr. H.L. Reighard of the Medi- cal Branch of the Federal AviationAdministration and Dr. John T. Dailey, an FAA psychologist.24

The factors employed in the personalityprofile are of necessity confidential.The director of the government's efforts in this area, General Davis, explained,however, the manner in which it is employed:

When the passenger presents histicket, the airline employee applies the FAA criteria.Increased Efforts in intelligence collection activities anddetailed studies of case histories of previous hijackers and incidentshave given us definite ideas about thenature of the potential hijacker.This profile, or behavioral pattern, isnot static.It is being constantly updated and refinedwith the introduction of new information.In addition, we can increase or reduce at will the number of factorswe ac- tively use in the profile. 25

The FAA reportedmore than 2,250 arrests in 1971 by U. S. Marshals and CustomsSecurity Officers involved in the screening of passengers asa part of the anti-hijacking program. Included were some 350 arrestsfor carriage of firearmsor other weapons and 575 for possession of narcotics.More than 700 firearms and $14.5 million in narcoticswere seized as a result of the screening process. There alsowere 18 arrests by Sky Marshals

24Ibid.

25Ibid., pp. 1039-1040. 128 aboard aircraft last year, of which six were in response to an announced or threatened hijacking.26

Legality of Airport Searches These arrests by Sky Marshals, especially for crimes not associated with hijacking brings up the question of whether the anti- hijacking system used at our airports is constitutional. The Fourth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution assures that: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirm- ation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.27 Inasmuch as airport searches are not authorized through the issuance of a warrant following detached judicial scrutiny of the basis of official suspicion, such security practices may involve constitutional infirmities.28 In United States v. Lopez (Crim. No. 70-813 E. D. N. Y. May 7, 1971) the District Court for the Eastern District of New York concluded that the Fourth Amendment "does not render inadmissible

26SecuritylystemsDigest, February 2, 1972, p. 3. 27U. S. Constitution,Amendment IV. 28ColumbiaLaw Review (June 1971), 1041.

1 129 non-weapon evidence found in federal marshals' frisk of would-be airline passengers based on Federal Government's hijacker- detection system. "29 In this case Lopez was singled out by airline employees and frisked by the marshals. A small, hard metal package carried by Lopez, which felt like a gun but actually contained heroin, was seized.In the hearing addressed to suppression of the seized heroin, a psychologist involved in devising the currently used anti- hijacking system explained it in great detail.It involves a magnetometer, which detects about 50 pe.: cent of all boarding passengers as metal carriers, and the profile of individual characteristics.30 Masses of metal on a person may trigger a green light as thepas- senger walks between the poles of the magnetometer. However, unless the individual exhibits a characteristic which sets him off from the other passengers as a potentiaL hijacker, he will not be asked to step aside for further investigation. 31 John H. Steele, Trans-World Airline security chief, stated that, "Under normal circumstances the passenger would be cleared immediately. "

29"New CourtDecision," The United States Law Weeks XXXIX (June 1, 1971), 2677. 30Ibid.

31"Anti-HijackingSystem Being Used by TWA," Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 22, 1969,p. 32. 110

However, if the passenger becomesuncooperative a search is conducted by a deputy U. S. Marshal stationednearby.In most cases, Steele said, passengers detected carrying "sufficientmasses of metals" are not asked to step aside becausethe visual observations of the passenger did not reveal thetell-tale traits.3% Statistically only .05 per cent ofa sampling of 500,000 passengers actually ended up being searched.Of these, only 1 in 15 was armed. 33

The court also found that the screeningsystem was accu- rate enough to establish, if not probablecause, sufficient proba- bility of illegal conduct to warrant thetype of temporary investiga- tive detention, or search, deemed valid by theSupreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).34

In Terry, a policeman,upon observing the defendant and two acquaintances loitering suspiciously in thevicinity of a store, approached in order to investigate them. Whenthe defendant "mum- bled something" in response to the officer'sinquiries, the policeman, fearing the imminent use ofa weapon, "spun him around so they were facing the other two... and patted down the outside of his

32Ibid. 33 The United States :Jaw Week (June 1, 1971),2677. 34Ibid. 131 clothing." The defendant sought to exclude from evidence a pistol uncovered by this search.The Supreme Court held the search proper; [W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dan- vrous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquir' -s; and where nothing in the initial stages of the en- counte., nerves to dispel his reasonable fear for his or other& safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to dis- cover weapons which might be used to assault him.Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourteenth Amend- ment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken. 35 In U. S. v. Felton Chinn, Jr., Judge Leonard Garth found that there "is a relationship and I feel a reasonable relationship, cer- tainly one that :ias been proved between the characteristics presented in the established profile and the evil which the profile wishes to seek to avoid. "36 Judge Garth also found that the characteristics oi the profile are such that they are not so completely general that they would be meaningless. He also found a very high relationship as to individuals who have in fact been found to have either had contraband of one sort or another and their conformity to the profile.For these

35Columbia Law Review (June 1971), 1053. 36United Statesv. Felton Chinn, Jr. , 320-70 (Newark District,3 9 7 1 ). 132

reasons he found that the profile enablesthe marshals to meet the Terry test when it is usedto justify further investigation,i. e., a search.37

Therefore as the issue standstoday the anti-hijacking system used at our airports isconstitutional.The Justice Depart- ment has informed the FAA thatthe use of the two techniques of

ferrous metal detectors andbehavior pattern observations usedin

combination provide adequate legalgrounds for asking to searcha suspicious passenger who iscarrying sufficient ferrous metalto trigger the magnetic detectionequipment.38

Electronic Devices

The magnetometers hada large number of false alarms at first.The detectors reactedto any ferrous metal objectand gave positive readings forpassengers carrying cameras, women'scom- pacts and even handbag hinges. 39However, now themagnetometers have been greatly improved.The new systems not onlylessen the number of false alarms theyalso point out thearea of the body where

37Ibid.

38"HijackDetector Tested by FAA,"Aviation Week and Space Technology, September22, 1969, p. 53. 39AviationWeek and Space Technology, p. 30. September 21, 1970, 133 the metal is located." The magnetic detection device used by Eastern Airlines is manufactured by Infinetics, Inc., Wilmington, Delaware at a cost of about $600.41

Funding for the Security Program The funding for the initial screening programswas a major problem.In New Orleans the magnetometers were purchased by the local airport authority and were operated by airline personnel at the carrier's expense.42 General Davis has emphasized that the Transportation Department expects the preboarding security systems to be purchased and maintained by the airlines.The bulk of the Federal money is spent on the sky marshalprogram. General Davis said that he considered the government's rolein the anti- hijack program one of "guidance, advice and catalytic leadership. 1,43 Even the federal money spent on the sky marshalprogram is being reduced.General Davis who is now assistant secretary

40Marcus Wright, Chief, FAA Security, Houston Area, private interview, February 17, 1972. 41Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 23, 1970, p. 27.

42AviationWeek and Space Technology, September 21, 1970, p. 30.

43James P. Woolsey, "Cost ofAnti-Hijacking Measures to be Borne Mainly by Airlines, " Aviation Week and Space Tech- nology, November 9, 1970, p. 29. 134

of Transportition forSecurity and ConsumerAffairs toldnewsmen that spending in the skymarshal program isto be cut from $37 million this year to $27million for the nextfiscal year, starting July 1. This involves reductionof the 1,500man sky marshal staff to about 500. This will be accomplishedat the rate of about 60a month for the next year. 44

In a letter to theauthor, dated 7 February,1972, V. L. Krohn, Chief, OperationsLaison Staff, Office ofAir Transportation Security, stated that,

The Sky MarshalProgram was designedto be a stop- gap measure to allow theair carriers andairports time to develop and implementeffective ground securitymeasures. These are progressingwell and are designedto prevent potential hijackersfrom ever boarding theplanes. As those groundsecurity programsare progressively put into effect, the airsecurity aspectscan and are being de- creased. 45

The Effectiveness ofthe Security Program

The effectiveness ofthe ground screeningcan be seen in the case of Eastern Airlines who has not hada hijacking of any flight where groundscreening was employed.The airline had seven hijackings from February, 1969, when it beganfield-testing

44 Security Systems Digest,February 2, 1972,p. 2. 45 Krohn, Letter, February7, 1972, p. 2.

1 135

screening procedures to May 4,1970.None of these flightswere screened.46

Eastern Airline in 1969and 1970 screened 75per cent of the more than 2 millionpassengers it carried monthly.In a twelve-

month period, Eastern haddenied boarding to 112persons.This included a total of 40persons who were arrested.Of these, 36 were apprehended on federal lawviolations by U. S. Marshals fora

variety of charges includingtransporting narcotics, carryingguns and knives, and being AWOLfrom the military services. 47 Another measure of theeffectiveness of Eastern's system

is the number ofweapons found in flower pots and shrubberyin boarding areas where screeninghas be:en effectedor where carry- on luggage spot checks have beenannounced.Pistols, knives and bullets are some of the itemsleft behind. 48

Until February, 1972,the use of weapons detectionsystems and behavioral profilesto thwart hijackers wason a voluntary basis and usually a random basis.However, in view of therecent wave of airline hijackings, fivesince the first of theyear, an "emergency

46Aviation Week and Space Technology,May 4, 1970, p. 34. 47Aviation Week and Space Technology,November 9, 1970,

48 Aviation Week and Space Technology,May 4, 1970, P. 34. situation" has been declared.The federalgovernment has ordered the nation's airlinesto set up mandatorypassenger screening systems at all airports.Under the original mandatoryscreening rule, airlines would have hadto put into effecta system which included use of at least one of the following:a weapons detection device, the psychological profile, "a bodysearch" ofpassengers, if the need is indicated, or a system ofrequiring passengers identificationon de- 49 mand. However, this rule has beentightened to require that all passengers be subjected to the behavioralscreening test.In addition, the FAA hinted thatit may also requireelectronic metal de-

In a second action,the FAA urged theFederal Communi- cation Commission to blockradio and televisionstations from broad- casting radio transmissionsfrom an airliner whilea hijacking is in progress. During the course of threerecent hijackings,a number of "broadcasters andprint mc.dia monitoredradio transmissions between the crew ofa hijacked airliner and thepolice and tower officials. These transmissions couldcontain instructionsto the crew on how to thwart the hijacker.The disclosure ofany details

50 Ray Waldrep, "Nearlyall Airline PassengersUnder Some Kind of Surveillance,"Houston Chronicle February Sec. 4, p. 5. 6, 1972, 137

of the techniques used to abort thistype of crime could seriously hinder law enforcement activities, therebyendangering the lives of the passengers and crew.51

Additional Measures Rewards:

Additional measures that have beeninstituted to prevent hijackings include rewards. The AirTransport Association and the Air Line Pilots Associationare offering a reward of $25, 000 for information leading to thearrest and conviction of hijackers. Industry groups have been concernedthat the size and scope of a reward program not become over-ambitious.They have not offered a larger reward, nor made the reward applicableto the apprehension of a hijacker while an aircraft is in flight,partly because of their concern that such action might induce would-be recipientsof the reward to take extrememeasures aboard the aircraft and jeopardize its safety. 52

The Department of State hasalso given consideration to the proposal that a cash reward bemade to the Cuban Government for the return of hijackers.No such offer has been made, however.

51Security Systems Digest, February 2, 1972,p. 3. 52U. S. Congress, House, Report, House Doc.91-33, 1969, p. 6. 138

The Department of Statefeels that thismeasure would not be effective.53

ICAO Actions:

The ICAO has urgedthat the following security measures 1 be adopted in orderto lessen the dangers ofskyjacking: (1) The protectionof aircrafton the ground--all airports should be fenced andboundaries subjectedto periodic surveillance. (2) Crew should beable to lock the cockpitdoor, a closed circuit television system should be installedto enable thecrew to monitor the passengercompartment, anda discreet alarm system should be used forattendants towarn the flight crew. (3) When a hijacked aircraft lands,recommendations of the pilot in command should be followed,with the overridingcon- sideration in such cases being the safety ofpassengers and crew.54

Codes:

In September of1970, Secor D. Browne,Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board proposed thattraining programs be adopted for flight crews in thecontainment of a hijackeronce he reaches

53Ibid.

54 Edward Kolcum, "IATAChief Spurs Anti-HijackPro- gram," Aviation Week andSpace Technology, December p. 32. 7, 1970, 139

the cockpit. Browne believes thata well briefed crew, acting ina coordinated mannercan help prevent a hijacker ftom attaining full success. He also proposed thecreation of special groundcrews, consisting of carrier andgovernment personnel whoare trained specifically to takeover the ground control ofa hijacked aircraft. These crews would use specially developed codes incommunicating with the crew whilea hijack is in progress.55There is evidence that these codes arenow in use.In 1970, Eastern Airlineswas working with the FAAon the development of specialsignal codes, without voice communication, so that a hijacked pilot could tellthe ground crew how he wantsthe situation handled.Such codes have been reported to includethe message "fuelus and let us continue.,,56 Mr. Browne alsosuggested that a task forceof specialists, experts in aviation law andinternational relations,should be formed to insure that a hijacker is prosecuted to thefullest under thevary- ing laws covering airpiracy throughout theworld.57

55AviationW.tek and Space Technolojy, p. 32. September 14, 1970,

56AviationWeek and Space p. 32. Technology, November9, 1970, 57Aviation Week and Space p. 32. Technology, September14, 1970, 140

Public Recommendations

The public has madenumerous suggestions to the FAA concerning methods of controlling hijacking.The ten most frequently submitted suggestionsare: 1.Provide free transportation to Cuba for thosepersons desiring to leave the United States. 2.Have armed guards stationed aboard eachU. S. air carrier passenger flight.

3.Offer a substantial reward to the CubanGovernment for the return of hijackers to the UnitedStates. 4.Build a simulated Havana airport inFlorida, man it with U. S. military personnel disguisedas Cuban militiamen to deceive and apprehend hijackers.

5.Bulletproof the pilot's compartment andonly have com- munications one way--from the cockpitto the cabin. 6.Search every passenger eitherphysically by X-ray or fluoroscope or through theuse of metal detectors. 7. -Have the pilots depressurizethe aircraft until everyone goes to sleep or expel a sleeping gas throughout the cabinto put everyone to sleep.The crew would go on oxygen and laterdisarm the hijacker.

8.Equip all crewmembers with Mace which wouldbe used to immobilize the hijacker. 141

9.Equip guards or crewmembers witha tranquilizer dart gun similar to that used on "Daktari" to put animals to sleep so that they can be captured.

10.Require an identification cardor air passport of people that wish to buy tickets on U. S. scheduledair carriers.Applica- tions for identification cards would be thoroughlyscreened prior to being issued the ca:-d.58 The important point that must be stressedis that little can be done or indeed, in the interests of safety, shouldbe done while a hijacking is in progress. What measures might be attempted will be discussed in the following chapter.

58 John A. Volpe and John T. Stewart,"Aircraft Hijacking: Some Domestic and International Responses, "Kentucky Law Journal LIX (Winter, 1970), 283-284. CHAPTER V

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter will present the author'scomments and recommendations along witha discussion of the most recent hijacking incidents.It shuuld be evident thata panacea for skyjackings has not and probably will not be found.This chapter is not an atterrto establish one, rather it isan attempt to encourage those respons.ble for airline policyto develop and administer a more consistent security program basedon existing FAA guide- lines.Perhaps with such a program the problemof skyjacking can be reduced.

"Hijackings mostly for politicalpurposes appears to be fading. We're now confronted with somethingelse, probably even more dangerousextortion. We're in anew and very dangerous phase, " this ominous and prescientprediction by FAA Administra- tor John Shaffer came all too true in March 1972.1

1"Holdingup an Industry," Time, March 20, 1972,p.17.

142 143

The Evolution of AircraftHijacking

The crime of skyjackinghas slowly evolved throughfour phases.Originally, it began in Europewhen individuals from Communist bloc nations hijackedaircraft in order to fleeto the West. The policy of theUnited States was togrant political asylum to these "freedom fighters"who were generally treatedas heroes. When Castrocame to power, these incidentsspread to Cuba. Again when theseindividuals entered the U.S. they were treated well and grantedpolitical asylum.

Then much to the dismayof the United States thetraffic reversed itself and individualsbegan fleeing to Castro.In the second phase of this evolution these individuals included"homesick Cubans, fleeing felons andpolitical terrorists. "2Phase three quickly followed this trendand involved thosepersons who did not have a "cause" butwere rather the mentallydisturbed, who were attracted by the publicitygiven the others. At this time inresponse to a rash of hijackingsthe U. S. fell into theerrors of reasoning sometimesknown as "response ambiguity" and "legislativeremoval of a problem. "That is, Con- gress, in order to solve this complex problem of skyjacking,enacted Public Law 87-197 thatauthorized the deathpenalty for skyjacking.

2RobertJ. Samuelson, "StopHijacking Campaign Flounders in Conflict, "Houston Chronicle March12, 1972, p. 8. 144

Granted, at the time, there was a lack of national law regardir,g jurisdiction in this type of crime. However, it seems that the more pressing problem was one of prevention rather than punishment. How could we prevent hijackers from gaining control of our aircraft? The argument tnat the death penalty would serve as a deterrent is not upheld by the sharp increase in the crime in 1968 and 1969.In fact, some individuals like Dr. Hubbard propose that the "elimination of the death penalty and the certainty of protracted in- carceration" would decrease the number of hijackings because it would deflate the notion that one was "gambling with fate. "3

The latest phase of the problem is the criminal phaseor extortion phase predicted by John Shaffer.This phase had its com- mencement on November 24,t c,71, when "D. B. Cooper" successfully extorted $200, 000 from an airlines and parachuted to freedom. This incident was quickly followed by six more attempts at hijack extortion, however they all proved unsuccessful. It is too early to determine if because of these hijack fail- ures this phase will evolve into an even more dangerous phase of extortion bombings of aircraft that occurred during March 1972.4 However, the most recent hijack attempts in the U. S. seem to have

3Hubbard, Skyjacker,p. 231. 4Time, March 20,1972, p. 17. 145

regressed to the standard phasetwo and three types.These hijackings occurred in the wake of the successfulextortion of $5 million by Palestinian guerrillas from the WestGerman government for the release of a hijacked plane andits passengers, including the

eldest son of the late Senator Robert F.Kennedy.5

The Role of the Media

The International Air Transport Associationon March 6, 1972, warned its 120 member airlinesthat more hijackings may happen following that successful hijacking. 6Two days later, in Miami, two rn:n armed with shotgunsand revolvers shot and wounded a pilot and an airline mechanicand hijacked a two-engine 7 seaplane to Cuba. The same day U. S. Marshals apprehendeda 14 year old youth at Tampa InternationalAirport after he allegedly tried to hijack a National Airlines 727jetliner to Sweden. 8 These latest incidentsseem to validate the position that epidemics of hijackings feedon the inordinate publicity which accompanies nearly every incident.Normally, the foreign incident would not have received extensive publicityin the U. S.However,

5"Skyjackinga Kennedy," Newsweek, March 6, 1972,p. 42. 6Houston Post, March 7, 1972, Sec. A,p. 6. ?Houston Post,March 8, 1972, Sec. A,p. 8.

8Ibid., Sec. A, p.1.

1 the fact that a Kennedy was aboard the plane resulted in sensational and disproportionate publicity, along with the usual coverage, spot bulletins interrupted television programs to keep the American people up to date.These bulletins may have also encouraged the two gunmen who escaped to Cuba as well as the 14 year old youth who was persuaded by the Airline pilot to give up his attempt to hijack a plane to Sweden. The impression the news media often gives is that these skyjackers are modern day Robin Hoods. However, evidence seems to indicate that these individuals arc often times mentally disturbed criminal types. The media also fails to give equal space or time to the consequences involved in these hijackings, i. e., the court sentences or the poor treatment afforded hijackers in Cuba.It is therefore strongly recommended that in the future the news media demon- strate a high degree of journalistic responsibility in their handling of air hijacking incidents. However, it is not only the news media that has a great influence upon the public.The motion picture industry is currently filming a full length feature entitled "Skyjacked. "9 One can only wait and see what repercusions this film will have.

9Spotlight, Houston Post, March 12, 1972,p. 22. 147

The International Situation

The international law situation despite the Tokyo andThe Hague Conventions remains unsatisfactory. Therecent incident involving Joseph P. Kennedy III is proof of this fact,inasmuch as the leftist government of South Yemen, where thehijacked plane was diverted to, let the five skyjackers off scotfree. 10 The situation will not be satisfactory until the crime ofair piracy is "ex- punged from the airways by thesame combination of economic self-interest and moral abhorrence codified ininternational law that swept piracy from the highseas."11 To bring about this combination it is recommendedthat the International Air Transport Associationor other such international airline organizations err the tactic of total air service boycotts.The employment of this tacticmay bring countries such as South Yemen to their "economicsenses. " Any boycott by a single airline or nation is useless, theboycott to be effective must be total and this is best accomplishedon an international level. This recommendation is made in view of the factthat this measure might create undesirable precedents for the future.This, at least, seems to have been the view of members of the"Institut de

10Newsweek, March 6, 1972, p. 42. 11Robert Hotz, "Murder on the Airlines," Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 23, 1970,p. 9. 148

Droit International" who considered the application of suchmeasures recently and who preferred, instead, recourse to more traditional legal forms of social control.12

The National Situation On the national scene recent extortion events have caused the President to instruct the FAA to set forthnew security guide- lines.13 FAA Administrator JohnShaffer said that each of the 521 U. S. airports served by a scheduled airline must provide for FAA approval a master security plan.This plan, which must be submitted by June 6, 1972, must include concrete measures for the tighter guarding of airport areas and provisions for a more thorough screening of passengers.Officials of the FAA and the ALPA agree that a universal use of the behavioral profile should significantly reduce hijackings.14 As for the new wave of extortions it is recommended that the airlines adopt a public policy of not paying anyransoms. The facts seem to indicate that the payment of ransoms onlyencourages others to attempt the same crime.In fact, it seems that if the

12Edward McWhinney, "New Developments in the Law of International Aviation: The Control of Aerial Hijacking, " American Journal of International Law, LXV (September 1971), 73. 13Houston Post, March 11, 1972, Sec. A, p. 11. 14Houston Chronicle March 12,1972, p. 8. airlines do not take this action it is quite possible that the Congress might enact legislation prohibiting the airlines from paying ransom to hijackers. 15 In conclusion, it should be said that the government and the airline industry have made substantial progress in their fight against aircraft hijacking. As General Davis stated in a recent speech, "We are winning the battle.Potential hijackers are getting the word that it is not easy for them to get on board an airplane and--should they get on board--most likely, they will wind up arrested rather than safe in a place of refuge.1116

15Houston Post, March 11, 1972,Sec. A,p. 11. 16Benjamin 0. Davis, "DOT Security, " Industrial Security, February 1972, p. 34. APPENDIX A

HIJACKING CASES INVOLVING U. S. AIRCRAFT 1 MAY 1961- 1 MARCH 1972

TOTAL NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS- 171 CONVICTIONS - 35 Aircraft Piracy - 1 Bendicks, Leonard S.(7/12/68)- 10 years (3/4/71)

Aircraft Piracy and Interference with FlightCrewmember- 1 Riggs, Glen E.(6/4/71)- 2 concurrent 20-year sentences (1/7/72)

Attempted Aircraft Piracy-1 Funjek, Anton (1/6/70)- 25 years (7/31/70) Aircraft Piracy and Kidnapping- 5 Healy, David Thomas (4/13/62)- 20 yrs + 1 yr (11/12/64) Oeth, Leonard Malcolm (4/13/62)- 20 yrs + 1 yr (11/12/64) Truitt, Alben Wm. Barkley (10/23/68)- 20 yrs + 20 yrs (8/13/69) Ervin, Lorenzo Edward, Jr. (2/25/69)- Life (7/7/70) Crawford, J. C. (7/27/69)- 50 yrs (9/14/70) Kidnapping - 2 Boynton, Thomas J. (2/17/68)- 20 yrs (5/12/70) Jessie, Willis (8/4/68)- 10 yrs (6/26/69) Interference with Flight Crewmember- 8 Washington, Thomas George (12/19/68)- 2 yrs (3/24/70) Mc Peek, Kenneth Carl (1/12/69)- 15 yrs (7/31/69) Fergerstrom, Harry F. (8/31/65)- Juvenile, correctional institution Peparo, Michael A. (2/3/69)- Custody of Attorney General under Youth Correction Act

150 151

Fitzgerald, Tasmin R. (2/3/69) - Custody of Attorney General under Youth Correction Act Anthony, Ray (6/28/69) - 15 yrs (9/70) Paterson, Chappin S. (2/26/71) - 10 yrs (6/11/71) Marston, Thomas K. (3/8/71) - Sentenced 11/8/71 to in- definite custody of Attorney General under Youth Cor- rection Act. Attempted Kidnapping - 1 Irwin, Donald B. (9/15/70) - 12-1/2 yrs (11/23/71) Assault - 1 Robinson, Thomas H. (11/17/65) - Juvenile, correctional institution.Currently on probation. Conveying False Information Concerning an Attempt to Commit Air Piracy - 2 Denis, Carlos (12/19/70) - 5 yrs (2/9/71), subject to mental examination *White, Bobby (6/18/71) - 5 yrs (9/14/71)

Armed Assault and Illegal Possession of Firearms- 1 Britt, Bruce McRae (7/31/61) - 20 yrs (1961) Interruption of Air Commerce on Threat of Violence - 2 Bearden, Leon (8/3/61) - 20 yrs (1961) Bearden, Cody (8/3/61) - Juvenile, committed to correctional institution, released (date unknown) Escape - 1 Morris, John Hamilton (7/4/68) - 5 yrs (6/16/69) Court Martial iTJSN) - 2 Heisler, Laurence D. (10/11/65) - 4 yrs confinement, dishonorable discharge.(Sentence completed. ) Boyd, Richard K. (10/11/65) - 4 yrs confinement, dishonorable discharge.(Sentence completed. ) Carrying Weapon Aboard Aircraft - 2 Pastorrich, Roger C. (11/2/68) - Juvenile delinquent. Probation. Mathews, John M., Jr. (3/31/71) - Suspended sentence. Three years probation (6/7/71). 152

Foreign - 5 Cadon, Albert C. (8/9/61)- Mexico - Robbery and illegal possession of firearms- 8 yrs. 9 mos. sentence - released on completion of sentence. Minicheillo, Raphael (10/31/69)- Italy - 7-1/2 yrs, reduced to 2-1/2 yrs- released 5/1/71. Be lon, Christian R. (1/8/70)- Lebanon - 9 mos - released. Jackson, Robert L. (7/2/71)- Argentina - 5 yrs (12/16/71) Sanchez-Archilla, Ligia (7/2/71)- Argentina - 3 yrs (12/16/71) PENDING CASES- 16 Trial Pending - 4 Hurst, Billy E., Jr. (1/12/72)- indicted for aircraft piracy Donovan, David W. (9/22/70)- indicted for aircraft piracy - custody Bohle, Ronald T. (1/9/69)- original sentence (25 years) reversed Holt, Everett L. (12/24/71)- indicted for aircraft piracy, kidnapping, intimidation of flight crew and assault with intent to commit murder. Charged - 2 Wallace, Bobby W. (10/9/71)- aircraft piracy Coleman, Donald L. (12/26/71)- aircraft piracy Custody, Mental Examinations- 3 Sand lin, Robert (3/17/69)- indicted for aircraft piracy Bennett, James (5/28/71)- indicted for aircraft piracy and kidnapping White, Gregory L. (6/12/71)- found incompetent to stand trial for murder in State Court 10/7/71 Custody - 5 Thomas, Dal L. (10/18/71) Borges-Guerra, Juan (9/3/71) Pliskow, Barbara (9/24/71) Jackson, Brenda (9/24/71) Co-conspirator with B. Pliskow McAlroy, Patrick H. (1/26/72) Trapnell, Garrett B. (1/29/72) Released on Bond- 2 Anile, Francisco (4/21/71)- Charged with aircraft piracy. Released on bond 5/25/71 153

La Point, Richard C. (1/2) /72)- Charged with aircraft piracy.Released on bond 1/25/72. DROPPED CASES- 17 Acquittal - 3 Medina-Perez, Luis (10/26/65)- aircraft piracy and assault (insanity) Helmey, Robert M. (1/11/69)- aircraft piracy (insanity) Pinkney, James (2/11/69)- aircraft piracy and interference with flight crewmember. NOTE:Non-U. S. aircraft engaged in U. S. aircommerce. Dismissed, Committed to MentalInstitutions- 10 Lopez-Morales, Victor (12/21/70) Labadie, Robert Y. (/24/70) Richards, Oran D. (7/12/68)- released 1/10/70 McCreery, John S. (8/5/69) **Little, Lynn (4/6/70) Rhodes, Lawrence M. (2/21/68 Dickery, Douglas A. (3/19/69) Niemeyer, Torrence (5/30/69) Gonzalez-Medina, Jose L. (9/10/69)- released 12/71 Barkley, Arthur (6/4/70) Dismissed, Death- 2 Divivo, John (3/17/70) Shorr, Larry (10/21/69)

Dismissed, Other- 1 Clark, William L. (2/9/68)- aircraft not engaged in U. S. air commerce.

Prosecution Declined-1 Booth, David L. (11/10/69)- remanded to custody of local juvenile authorities. STATUS UNKNOWN- 3 *Wagstaff, Joseph A. (4/23/70) *Huber, Johan (8/3/70)- aircraft not engaged in U. S. air commerce Xhaferi, Hexhi H. (6/22/70)- originally in custody in Egypt; possibly released. 154

KILLED/SUICIDE - 4 Austin, Tyronne (1/2/69)- killed during bank holdup 4/22/71 Obergfell, Richard (7/23/71)- Killed during hijacking. Giffe, George (10/4/71)- apparent suicide during hijacking. Von George, Heindrick (1/26/72)- killed during hijacking. FUGITIVES - 100

RECAPITULATION

Convictions 351/ Pending 16 Dropped 17 Fugitives 102 Unknown 3 Killed 4 TOTAL 177 1/ Five (5) foreign convictions * Not considered as hijacker by Departmentof Justice ** Not considered as hijacker by FAA APPENDIX B

A SUMMARY OF AVERTED ANDINCOMPLETE HIJACKING ATTEMPTS 1 MAY 1961- 1 MARCH 1972

Date

7/31/61 Subdued by co-pilot andpassengers prior to take-off after shooting pilot andpassenger agent; also shot at passengers. 8/3/61 Border Patrol Officers shotout tires and engines Incompleteprior to take-off; hijackerswere eventually disarmed. 10/11/65 Captain used flare pistol to disarmone man; a ramp agent using a shotgun apprehendedthe second man; aircraft not in flight.

10/26/65 Captain knocked gun from hijackerwith fire axe (during flight).Captain and Flight Engineer subduedindividual. 11/17/65 Sixteen year old high school studentafter firing nine shots was disarmed and subduedby crew; aircraft was in flight.

2/9/68 Details not known. Marine Privateattempted to hijack Pan Am Flight from Saigonto Hong Kong; aircraft did not depart.

7/4/68 Convict in custody of U. S.Marshals threatened stewardess and ordered pilotto fly to Mexico; pilot pretended compliance but landedat Las Vegas, Nevada. 7/12/68 Flight crew engagedgunman in conversation; persuaded Incompletehim to give up hijackingattempt. 11/2/68 Co-pilot diverted gunman'sattention; Captain wrested shotgun from would-be hijacker;aircraft not in flight. 155 156

1/13/69 Stewardess ran into the cockpit and locked the door after being confronted by a hijacker with a shotgun. Plane was on final approach and landing was completed.Hijacker was taken into custody while sitting quietly in his seat with the unloaded shotgun at his feet.

2/3/69 Crew convinced21year old hijacker and his18year old female accomplice that refueling was necessary at Miami.Flight originated in New York.Ground crew became suspicious at Miami and alerted police. Pilot persuaded very sensitive and disturbed hijacker to relinquish the knife and aerosol spray type can which he was carrying.

3/19/69 Hijacker was conviced of the necessity for refueling Incompletein New Orleans.While on the ground, he was persuaded to allow passengers to deplane. An FBI Special Agent (passenger) wrestled the gun from the hijacker and placed him under arrest.One shot was fired from the hijacker's gun, but no injuries resulted. 5/30/69 Two prisoners who were being transported by law enforcement officers handed a note to the stewardess indicating that they had a hand grenade, and unless the plane was flown to Cuba, they would explode the grenade.The aircraft was on final approach and the pilot landed without incident.The prisoners were taken off the plane after landing by law enforcement officers.The prisoners did not have a hand grenade or any other type of weapon.

8/5/69 Seventy-four year old man attempted to hijack aircraft while in flight.He was armed with a five inch straight razor and a pocketknife.Pilot convinced him refueling was necessary in order to fly to Cuba.Hi- jacker commented he would be apprehended if arefueling stop was necessary and returned to his seat. He was taken into custody at original destination.

9/10/69 Subject grabbed a stewardess and said "I want togo to Cuba." He returned to his seat after failing to unlock the cockpit door with keys provided by the stewardess. He was then subdued by passengers and taken into custody at San Juan.

1 157

11/10/69 Fourteen year old boy boardedaircraft without ticket using an 18 year old girlas a hostage. He held a butcher knife against thegirl's back and demanded to be taken to Sweden. Whentold the plane was not capable of such a long flight(DC-9) he requested it be flown to Mexico. Theyouth was persuaded to surrender as the plane taxiedabout the runways. 1/6/70 A male passenger,armed with a knife, attempted to hijack the aircraft whileholding a stewardess as a hostage.The incident occurred shortlybefore a scheduled landing. The hijackerlost his balance, after the landing, when thepilot made a tight turn and reversed theengines.The hijacker wasover- powered by passengers andcrew members. 3/17/70 Armed male enteredcockpit and demanded that air- Incompletecraft be flown out tosea.Stated he wanted to be notified when only 2 minutesof fuel remained. When captain turned aircraftin the direction of U. S. mainland, hijackerbegan shooting at the captain and co-pilot.Co-pilot, although mortally wounded, succeeded inshooting the hijacker twice with hijacker's revolver.Captain, who had been shot in both arms, landedplane at original destination.Hijacker recovered.

4/23/70 An armed male adult hijackeda bus and forced the driver to take him to the airport.He then proceeded to use the driver as a hostage,as he boarded an air carrier aircraft whichwas boarding passengers. Michigan State Policeoverpowered the individual after responding toa call for assistance from the crew.

6/4/70 - Gun-wielding male entered cockpit and demandedto Incompletebe flown to Washington, D.C., and that 100 million dollars be ready and fuel truckmeet the aircraft upon landing at Dulles Airport.Later further requested that an internationallyqualified pilot also meet the aircraft at Dulles. Theaircraft landed at Dulles.The new pilot pickedup the bag of money ($100,000) and boarded thehijacked aircraft. It took off and flew aroundwith no destination imposed by the hijacker, whoWAS dissatisfied with 158

the amount of money. The aircraft returnedto Dulles to supposedly pick up moremoney. Fake money bags had been placed on the landing field. As the aircraft rolled to a stop, its tireswere shot out.Vehicles blocked any further movement of the aircraft.The passengers deplaned via emergency doors and chutes.The FBI and crew overpowered and captured the hijacker in thepro- cess of which the hijacker was wounded slightly and the original pilot was wounded in the abdomen. 8/3/70 Male armed with starter pistol shoutedto stewardess to have aircraft diverted from Munich/West Berlin to Budapest.Pilot dissuaded him from hijacking aircraft.Met by police as he deplaned at Berlin. 9/15/70 Hijacker armed with pistol handeda note to the chief Incompletestewardess stating he wished to go to North Korea. Hijacker remained in his seat.Aircraft landed at San Francisco for refueling at which time35women, children, and military were allowedto evacuate. Hijacker was then shot by a Brinks guard who had been a passenger on the aircraft. 9/22/70 A Federal prisoner, whowas being transported from Boston, Massachusetts to San Juan, P.R., locked himself in lavatory and threatenedto burn airplane if plane was not diverted to hisdestination of choice. He was overpowered and forciL3vsub- dued by two escorting U. S. Marshals.

12/19/70 Hijacker handed a note to a stewardessstating th...t Incompletehe had a gun and directing flight to Cuba.Hijacker permitted landing at Tulsa to allowpassengers to deplane.Crew deplaned with thepassengers, strand- ing the hijacker in the aircraft.Police boarded the aircraft and arrested the unarmed hijackerwho was hiding in a washroom.

12/21/70 Hijacker stated he had bomb and wantedto go to IncompleteMexico. Crew convinced him of necessityto return to San Juan (Point of departure) to refuel.Hijacker was overpowered by the crew after landing at San Juan. 159

3/8/71 Hijacker armed with.38cal. pistol.Initiated hijack Incompleteattempt while aircraft on gound loading for departure to New Orleans.Other passengers deplaned and flight departed for Montreal, Canada. When in vicinity of Knoxville, Tenn., crew persuaded hijacker to abandon hijack attempt and divert to Miami. FBI agents surrounded the aircraft as it stopped on the ramp and took the hijacker into custody.

3/31/71 Fourteen year old hijacker enplaned without t'cket at Birmingham airport. Armed with pistol, held hostess as hostage. Demanded to go to Cuba. Allowed passengers and other hostesses to deplane.Hostess convinced him to abandon the hijacking.

4/21/71 Hijacker searched prior to boarding.Prior to arrival at Miami, hijacker claimed he had a gun and grenade, would permit aircraft to land Miami, but wanted to go to Italy.Pilot called bluff.Aircraft landed Miami. Hijacker arrested. He carried no weapons.

5/28/71 Hijacker who boarded at Miami threatened stewardess Incompletewith fake acid, threatened to blow up aircraft with fake explosives, ordered the aircraft to fly to LaGuardia Airport, N. Y. (original destination), and that his wife and son be at the airport.Upon arrival he permitted the passengers and stewardesses to deplane. His wife and son did not arrive. After 1-1/2 hours the hijacker ordered the plane to take off.Once aloft he demanded to be flown to Nassau, that 1/2 million dollars be placed on the runway there and that he be met by the N. Y. representative of the Irish Republican Army. Upon deplaning at Nassau, the hijacker was captured.

6/4/71 Hijacker armed with pistol commandeered aircraft Incomplete10 minutes after take-off and demanded to be flown to Israel. When told the aircraft did not have enough fuel for trip, hijacker allowed landing at Dulles and permitted passengers and stewardesses to deplane.After3hours on the ground, hijacker went to get a drink of water leaving pistol on seat. Hijacker taken into custody. 160

6/12/71 Twenty-three year old Negro, armed with pistol, Incompleteforced his way on board aircraft, held stewardess hostage and demanded to be flown to North Vietnam. He killed one passenger who got in theway, then allowed passengers, body and hostess (except hostage) to deplane.During this pause, a deputy U. S. Marshal sneaked aboard the aircraft.The aircraft took off for New York, ostensibly to change toan aircraft with longer range.During the flight, several shots were exchanged between the crew, marshal and hijacker. When plane landed at JFK, thecrew and marshal escaped. The hijacker was wcunded and captured by the FBI.

6/18/71 Hijacker boarded aircraft after termination of flight.Claimed to have explosive and acid.De- manded to go to Cuba.Captain informed would-be hijacker that aircraft needed fuel and additional crew. While second pilot was enplaning, he overpowered hijacker.

7/2-3/71 Hijacker boarded at Mexico City accompanied by Incompletegirlfriend.Near San Antonio he passed a note to the pilot threatening harm unless his demandswere met. He diverted the flight to Monterey, Mexico to pick up $100, 000 he extorted from the airline. There he allowed the passengers to deplane. He then, over the next24hours, directed the plane to Lima (Peru), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), and Buenos Aires (Argentina), seeking an Algerian representative to arrange political asylum. He surrendered to authorities at Buenos Aires.

7/23/71 Hijacker held stewardess as hostage and demanded Incompleteto be flown to Milan, Italy.Crew informed him that aircraft did not have the necessary range and convinced him to return to origin to switch to longer- range aircraft.While waiting to board new aircraft, hijacker was shot and killed by FBI.

9/3/71 Hijacker threatened stewardess with ice pickand demanded to be flown to Cuba.Dead heading crew sensed somethin amiss, intervened, and with passenger assistance, overpowered hijacker. 161

9/24/71 Hijacker, armed with pistol and high explosives, planned to threaten to blow up aircraft to effect the release of two Black Panthers from prison and then fly them to Algeria in hijacked aircraft. Authorities tipped off.Passengers, including hijacker, deplaned prior to take off under pretext of mechanical difficulties.Hijacker apprehended in terminal following threat to shoot arresting officer and to blow up explosives. 10/4/71 Chartered aircraft en route Nashville-Atlanta Incompletediverted by 2 armed men to Jacksonville for refuel and supplies and further flight to Bahama. FBI agent shot out tires at Jacksonville. One hijacker, his wife and pilot killed.Co-pilot safe.One hijacker captured. 10/18/71 Scheduled B-727 flight from Anchorage to Bethel, IncompleteAlaska, was hijacked by a lone armed man shortly after departure.The stewardess convinced the hijacker to return to Anchorage to discharge the passengers. The hijacker then ordered the flight to Vancouver, B. C., where the aircraft was re- fueled for an onward flight to Mexico City and Cuba. An hour or so out of Vancouver, B. C., the hijacker ordered the aircraft to return in order to switch to a larger aircraft. A Royal Canadian Mounted Police Inspector boarded the B-727 when it landed. An hour later, the hijacker permitted the crew to deplane, and he surrendered to the RCMP. 12/24/71 Scheduled B-707 flight from Minneapolis/St. Paul Incompleteto Chicago was hijacked by a lone armed man shortly after departure. He fired revolver shots into the bulkhead and ordered the stewardess to inform the captain that he had :lust killed a man and that he wanted $300, 000 ransom. The flight landed at Chicago and the money was delivered. The hijacker allowed all but two passengers to deplane. While the hijacker was counting the money, the cockpit crew escaped.While the hijacker went to the lavatory, one of the three stewardesses escaped. The aircraft was surrounded and spot-lighted.The two remaining stewardesses and one of the passengers 162

jumped from the aircraft.The hijacker then threw out the money and surrendered. 12/26/71 Scheduled B-707 flight from Chicagoto San Francisco Unsuccess-diverted to Salt Lake City when intoxicatedmale fu: brandished a plastic replica ofa pistol.Hijacker stated he had a pressure type bombon his person set to explode if aircraft descended through 2,500 feet.He was subdued by a stewardess anda passenger.Personal effects and statements made following his arrest indicated that he wantedto prove that any person could hijack an air carrier. 1/12/72 Scheduled B-727 flight from Houstonto Dallas hi- Incompletejacked 30 miles south of Dallas by lonearmed male claiming to have dynamite in briefcase.Flight continued to Dallas and made normal landing.Hijacker permitted all (94) passengers to deplane, butkept all (7) crew onboard. Hijacker demandedsurvival gear, 10 parachutes, 1 million dollars anda .357 magnum pistol.Simulated problems delayed departure.Hijacker traded his .22 cal. pistolto crew for inoperative .357 magnum at whichtime the crew evacuated the aircraft.The hijacker was then taken into custody.Briefcase did not contain a bomb. 1/20/72 Scheduled DC-9 flight from Las Vegasto Reno hi- Incompletejacked on the ground at Las Vegasby a lone male armed with an alleged bomb. Hijacker demanded and received $50K extortionmoney, two parachutes and a crash helmet. Hijacker allowedthe passengers and two stewardesses to deplane.He then directed the flight to the vicinity of Denver wherehe parachuted from the aircraft carryingthe $50K. He was captured on the ground by law enforcementofficials directed and guided to the droparea by USAF and FAA aircraft.

1/26/72 Scheduled F-27 flight from Albanyto New York Incomplete(LaGuardia) hijacked en route bylone male armed with pistol (which turned outto be a starter pistol) and an alleged bomb. Flight divertedto West- chester Airport wherepassengers allowed to deplane. Hijacker demanded and received $200Kransom. 163

Flight then directed to Pittsfield, Mass,, where it circled, then to Poughkeepsie, N. Y., where it landed.Hijacker demanded an automobile and police escort off the airport.Hijacker, with stewardess hostage, transferred to automobile when he was shot and killed by the FBI. 1/26/72 Lone armed male attempted to commandeera heli- Unsuccess- copter from the Berkeley, Calif., helipad to San ful Francisco. He demanded that a fully equippedjet be ready at San Francisco to transport himto Cuba. Berkeley P. D. waved off all incoming helicopters and surrounded hijacker who surrendered.

1/29/72 Scheduled B-707 flight from Los Angelesto New IncompleteYork (JFK) hijacked en route bya lone male armed with a pistol.Flight landed at JFK wherepassengers allowed to deplane.Hijacker demanded $306, 800 in recomepnse for a yacht allegedly taken away from him by court action.Also demanded the release of Angela Davis from prison, to talk withPresident Nixon, the release of a prisoner from the Dallas County Jail and to be flown to Europe. Hijacker forced the pilot to take off and circle JFK foran hour. He then permitted a change ofcrew. An FBI agent masqueradingas a crewmember shot the hijacker twice, ending the incident. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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"Airlines Demand StifferHijack Penalties. " AviationWeek and Space Technology, July 6,1970, p. 32.

"Anti-Hijacking PlansAugmented. " Aviation Week andSpace Technology, November 9,1970, p. 32.

"Anti-Hijacking System BeingUsed by TWA." AviationWeek and Space Technology, December22, 1969, P. 32.

"Arab Guerrillas AdoptAir Piracy as Tactic. "Aviation Week and Space Technology,September 14, 1970,pp. 32-38. Aviation Week and SpaceTechnology, September 8, 1969,p. 13. Aviation Week and SpaceTechnology, February 23, 1970,p. 27. Aviation Week and SpaceTechnology, September 21, 1970,pp. 26-30. Coleman, Herbert J."Hijack Policy ReflectsConservative View." Aviation Week and SpaceTechnology, April 13, 1970,p. 43. Davis, Benjamin 0."DOT Security. " Industrial 1972, pp. 34-36. Securth, February

Dody, Laurence."White House Drive Gainsto Unify International Laws on Air Piracy. "Aviation Week and SpaceTechnology, September 28, 1970,p. 25.

Dody, Laurence."Stiffer Measures Rejectedin Nixon Hijacking Plans." Aviation Weekand Space Technology,October 5, 1970, p. 30.

Dody, Laurence."Anti-Hijacking Drive GainsAdded Impetus. " Aviation Week and Space p. 27. Technology, October 19, 1970, 164 165

"Eastern Accelerates Anti-Hijack Preboarding Screening Program." Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 4, 1970,p. 34. "Hijack Detector Tested by FAA. " Aviation Week and Space Tech- nology, September 22, 1969, p. 53. "Holding up an Industry. " Time, March 20, 1972,p. 17. Hotz, Robert."Murder on the Airlines. " Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 23, 1970, p. 9. "IATA, Official of Munich Airport Debate Over Anti-Hijacking Roles. " Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 16, 1970, p. 29. "ICAO Actions May Reduce Aircraft Civil Violence Threat." Aviation Week and Space Technology, July 13, 1970,p. 24. Knebel, Fletcher."The Skyjacker, " Look, February 9, 1971, pp. 22-26.

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"Masefield Traces Hijackings to Cuba Congress. "Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 6, 1971,p. 22. "Military Men Riding as Airline Guards. " AviationWeek and Space Technology, October 12, 1970,p. 28. "Pilots Spur Anti-Hijacking Drive." AviationWeek and Space Tech- nology, January 18, 1971,p. 19. Security Systems Digest, February 2, 1972,pp. 2-4.

"Sky Marshal Program Graduates First Class."Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 4, 1971,p. 22. "Skyjacking a Kennedy." Newsweek, March 6, 1972,p. 42. "They Want a Moment of Power and Glory. "Life, April 18, 1969, pp. 26-27. 166

Time. September 21, 1970,pp. 20-27. Watkins, Harold D."Relations of U. S., Airlines Altered. " Aviation Week and Space. Technology,September 28, 1970,pp. 23-24. "What can be Done AboutSkyjacking?" Time, January 31, pp. 19-20. 1969.

Woolsey, James P."Davis to Lead HijackingPrevention Drive. " Aviation Week and Space p. 26. Technology, September 28, 1970,

Woolsey, James P."Cost of Anti-HijackingMeasures to be Borne Mainly by Airlines. "Aviation Week and SpaceTechnology, November 9, 1970,p. 29.

Woolsey, James P."U. S. Sees Anti-HijackingSupport in Soviet's Membership in ICAO."Aviation Week and SpaceTechnology, November 23, 1970,p. 26.

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Burkhardt, Robert.The Federal AviationAdministration. New York: Frederick A.Praeger, 1967. Hubbard, David G.The Skyjacker: His Flightsof Fantasy. New York: Macmillan Co.,1971.

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"Airport SecuritySearches and the FourthAmendment." Columbia Law Review, LXXI(June 1971), 1039-1058. 167

Cheng, Bin."Crimes on Board Aircraft." Current LegalProblems XII (1959), 177-207. Evans, Alona E."Aircraft Hijacking: Its Cause and Cure." The American Journal of International Law, LXIII(October, 1969), 695-710.

Fick, Ronald L., Gordon, Jon I. and Patterson,John C."Aircraft Hijacking: Criminal and Civil Aspects."University of Florida Law Review, XXII (Summer 1969)72-100. Horlick, Gary N."The Developing Law of Air Hijacking," Harvard International Law Journal, XII (Winter, 1971),33-70. Hursch, Arthur I., and Fuller, David."Aircraft Piracy and Ex- tradition," New York Law Forum, XVI (Spring1970), 392-419.

Lissitzyn, Oliver J."International Control of Aerial Hijacking: The Role of Values and Interests."American Journal of International Law, LXV (September, 1971),80-86. Loy, Frank E."Some International Approaches to Dealingwith Hijacking of Aircraft." InternationalLawyer_s IV (1970), 444-452.

Malmorg, K. E. "New Developmentsin the Law of International Aviation: The Control of Aerial Hijacking."American Journal of International Laws LXV(September, 1971), 75-80.

Martin, Peter."The Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft."The Law So- ciety's Gazette, LXVI (July, 1969), 714-716. McKeithen, R. L. Smith."Prospects for the Prevention of Air- craft Hijacking Through Law." ColumbiaJournal of Transnational Law, IX (Spring, 1970),60-80. McWhinney, Edward. "New Developmentsin the Law of Inter- national Aviation: The Control of AerialHijacking." American Journal of InternationalLaw, LXV (September, 1971), 71-75. 168

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"Halaby Proposes Amendmentsto FAA Act to Guard AgainstHi- jacking of Aircraft. " FAA News,XCVII, July 28, 1961. Houston Post.March 7, 1972. Houston Post.March 8, 1972. Houston Post.March 11, 1972. Houston Post.Spotlight, March 12, 1972. New York Times. May 2, 1961.

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Samuelson, Robert J."Stop-Hijacking Campaign Flounders in Con- flict." Houston Chronicle March12, 1972. U. S. Constitution, AmendmentIV. U. S. Federal AviationAgency."Hijacking of Civil Aircraft." Notice AT 7500.4.(Washington, D. C.: FAA, January 14, 1964).

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U. S. Congrest. House.Reilo,rt, from the House Committeeon Foreign Affairs, Subcommitteeon Inter-American Affairs. House Doc. 9-19, 90th Cong.2nd Sess., 1968.

So 171

U. S. Congress. House. Report fromthe Committeeon Interstate and Foreign Commerce.House Doc. 91-33, let Sess., 1969. 91st Cong.,