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PEPPER Governance Corporate Italian and Stability Institutional muove si non Eppure, 2007 September 802, – 784 4, No. 30, Vol. Politics, European West O:10.1080/01402380701500306 DOI: Online Print/1743-9655 0140-2382 ISSN hti tiigaottepteno ocnrtdsaeonrhpin ownership share concentrated of pattern the about striking is What [email protected] : ª 07Tyo Francis & Taylor 2007 pue imuove si Eppure, ea Change, Legal : Adyt tstill it yet, (And ’ Downloaded By: [Culpepper, Pepper D.] At: 20:12 4 September 2007 a edt eons httefiueo hi hoiso institutional of theories their of to failure measures the such scientists that use political recognise to change, their to able mandated maintain need are to politically they that may instruments from If extent alternative themselves companies. the seek insulate blockholders, over To to large power thing. of them of voting power same expect direct ways the the would dilute do alternative we shocks to the other seek and or companies to privatisation companies, would these their we situation of of changes, law this control managers the disproportionate in that they continued extent them, shareowners exercising the for To works financial large system it. existing change regulate expect the to that that reason their is no perception laws maintain blockholders. have their and new to as managers long disempower making want So automatically not and and does of control shares apparatus disclosure Seizing blockholders. of legislative as known group blocks the a economy, large the in own influence actually who making. pushes objectives partisan Ho by and (Cioffi driven system existing government and the disrupt (Gourevitch new to system legislation a existing through the 2005); disrupt to Shinn legislation through pushes hnefrsseso nneadcroaegovernance. of corporate theories and construct finance to of stories systems fallen explanatory for state- have that change complementary resist scientists the three to Political of of support on change. institutional they back underestimation Part promote managers systematic to the explanation. attempts the and led shareholders in an large lies of requires contend, power will itself I economy explanation, political in Italian political storm theories. that by those weathered did endorsed than shareholding currently health stable theories better Italian domestic much the correct. destabilise if should are economy capital, that scientists political factors patient of Italian the of the character of systems decade storm the last perfect a the on experienced During 2005; 2007). influence (Deeg process Tiberghien privatisation significant cf. large-scale a Ho exert through ownership and to corporate (Cioffi leaders that 2001 coalition Porta and bureaucratic La 1996 centre-left cf. between laws a 2004; of continuously by quality Italy the enacted 2005; in governed shareholders, (Deeg changes drastic minority technocrats despite protecting 2005); government coalition Shinn and transparency and Italian Gourevitch shareowners, strong a and of workers, of stability Gourevitch the emergence among shows the 2003; that despite evidence system clear (Roe review this will capitalism article This advanced 2005). 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Privatisation most in shareholding instruments of of practice impact the actual those examines the Draghi then on 1998 on It changes the Regulation. those and Governance especially privatisation Corporate on literature: of focusing Law theoretical structure the the deployed government, in on tools policy emphasised had the it the reviews effect briefly section what by This know as Italy. to well in need the capital as we of patient did 1996, accession government in the that Prodi by Romano what wrought by capitalism headed Italian government in centre-left changes the assess Capitalism? 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CIWrigPpr1,March. 17, Paper Working ECGI htcdn asgv eibecosntoa esr ftedge fminority of degree the of measure cross-national reliable investors. a minority Porta give of (La assumes protection protection protection shareholder laws shareholder real minority of the coding index piece LLSV with the that law) a for of protections existence Draghi In legal very the in the change. changes Similarly, in equating legal by (as economy in investors the in coalitions minority change and of politics partisanship the modelled of role the in the published emphasise of to 2002). absence prone Trento the and been in Pagano traditionally (cf. exist has ownership capital may concentrated patient capital highly (Netherlands) though, through patient case, takeover exercised Italian cases, hostile con- the these In a on In concentration. block ownership special 2005). depend to or Shinn not (Japan) management and do cross-shareholding empower (Gourevitch of that that networks shareholding defences on takeover stable rather but of shareholdings, patterns 55–62). centrated 2006: developed (Melis Preda have 2002 the in code, countries revised voluntary and a 1999 through in addressed issued was this was – in directors which Law of Code, (2001). 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(2005), the Deeg drafted on that draws paragraph commission the led 2005). who (Quaglia ‘social 1990s to the argument. during forces general institutions more those state his influential of of two importance reduction the his to which disservice and in a way inaccurate forces, does particular actually empirically market a democracy’ about is constrain is though, protection polities argument, employee capitalist Roe’s 2005). favouring Shinn and context high (Gourevitch political as general such 24). – more to 2003: low-risk capital (Roe acculturation invested weak’ for and is of firm accounting, – favour norms transparent the in maximization takeovers, the work shareholder-wealth on and hostile to substantial, pressure compensation, is managers the change induce incentive organizational which would risky avoid that in to tools pressure nations the high, Those . is . expansion . strong ownership are higher and pressures Porta protection (La shareholder systems legal lower other much with countries had those law than concentration civil French on based rdc aktcmeiini hsae mn tla nnilcmais(inh and (Bianchi companies financial Italian low very among is 23–4). area there 2001: Though this that Enriques clients. over in argue their oversight they competition also effects, strong market are these exercise product attenuate who to could companies role competition those fund market alienating product mutual avoid their to using companies avoid owned may so and 2005). services, the Culpepper think (cf. they about how it question and value institution, a also existing becomes an shareholders this of major value because other the aspect, both coordinative perceive actors a several acquire how to potential the has oiia cetsshv eosrtdta o’ oflto fsca eorc ihthe with democracy social of conflation Roe’s that demonstrated have scientists Political .D Culpepper D. 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