Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics Military commitments and political bargaining in ancient Greece Version 1.0 November 2005 Walter Scheidel Stanford University Abstract: This paper explores the relationship between military commitments and political bargaining in Greek poleis and beyond. While it is possible to document a number of instances of concurrent political and military mobilization, comparative evidence suggests that state type may be a more important determinant of military mobilization levels than regime type. © Walter Scheidel. [email protected] I concentrate on several elements of the bargaining hypothesis, especially the relationships between military commitments and political regimes, and between military inducements and political change. I argue that military activity had a critical impact on the development of political institutions. I also hope to show that a broader cross-cultural perspective is required to understand the nature of bargaining processes in ancient Greece.1 Naval mobilization and political regime The memo asks if places that extended citizenship to adult males were more likely to establish navies, or if poleis with navies were more likely to have inclusive citizenship rules. Before we can address these questions, we need to determine if there is a consistent positive correlation between extended citizenship and naval strength. The ‘Old Oligarch’ thought so (with reference to Athens), but the case is by no means clear-cut. Ionia provides two probable matches. Chios was endowed with an unusually large navy, contributing 100 ships at the battle of Lade (494 BCE), more than any other Ionian polis (Hdt. 6.8, 15). It appears to have been a democracy in the second half of the sixth century BCE (Robinson 1997:90-101). On Naxos in the second half of the sixth century BCE, an anti-oligarchic regime mobilized ‘8,000 shields’ and many warships to defend itself against expelled oligarchs (Hdt. 5.30). Given the limited size of this polity, this indicates massive mobilization: Robinson 1997:118 thinks that this may well be a reference to a “full levy from all classes”, and observes that “a large, unevenly equipped citizen levy would be consistent with a newly democratic state under arms. The great number of warships mentioned (ploia makra polla) bespeaks the active service of the poorer members of the populace, also consonant with a state permitting broad political participation.” However, other major naval powers may not fit this pattern. Corinth is credited with the first big naval battle in Greek history (Thuc. 13), under a tyranny (a form of government that generally may well have entailed considerable levels of popular military mobilization and participation). In the Persian Wars, Corinth contributed 40 triremes to the war effort, far fewer than the Athenians but more than any other polis (Hdt. 8.1, 43). The status of Corinth’s constitution at that time is unclear, but it was apparently fairly oligarchic. Land forces amounted to 5,000 hoplites at Plataea (Hdt. 9.28.3), with up to 3,000 on later occasions, but perhaps out of a continuing total of closer to 5,000 (Salmon 1984:166-7). 40 triremes require 8,000 crew. Salmon 1984:168 reckons with a maximum of 15,000 adult men, for a total of population of 70,000 including slaves etc. What was the Athenian ratio? Around 490/480 BCE, we hear of 9,000 hoplites and (allegedly) 180 warships. Did the Athenian population contain a larger thetic component, or was Athens able to mobilize a larger percentage of poorer citizens? If we knew, we could establish a correlation between political participation and naval mobilization. It would also be helpful to know more about the political system of Aegina. A small island endowed with unusually strong naval assets (up to 70 warships in the fifth century BCE: Figueira 1981:29-31), it would be a suitable test case for the nexus between political regime and (naval) mobilization levels. Vague hints all point to some form of oligarchic regime (Figueira 1981:299- 300), unsuccessfully challenged by an Athenian-backed (‘democratic’?) coup attempt c.490 BCE (Hdt. 6.88-92; Figueira 1981:306-10). In 479 BCE, a state that may have been able to marshal up to 10,000 naval crew members contributed only 500 hoplites to the all-out battle of Plataea (Hdt. 1 This paper was prepared for the workshop on ‘Military organization and political regimes in classical Greece’ organized by Frances Rosenbluth and John Ferejohn at Yale University on December 5, 2004. I wish to thank my colleague Ian Morris for his comments. 2 8.131.1).2 It appears that an oligarchic form of government could go hand in hand with substantial naval mobilization. It may be more profitable to explain sea power as a function of strong concentration of population and capital in certain poleis: Chios, Corinth and Aegina are all noteworthy examples of early commercial development. Military crises and democratization The archaic period The data on pre-classical democracies in Robinson 1997 suggest a frequent link between democratization and military mobilization. Unfortunately, all these events are very poorly documented, and any modern interpretations suffer from considerable uncertainties. Democratization followed by military success When Megara established what (hostile) sources call ‘unbridled democracy’ (somewhere around 600 BCE), major naval operations ensued, such as an (unsuccessful) foray into the Propontis (Sea of Marmara) to fight the Samians, and an initially successful operation against Athens to gain control over Salamis (Legon 1981:89, 120ff). Military success followed by democratization The Samian fleet, having defeated the Megarian force, returned to Samos, overthrew the oligarchic geomoroi, thereby ‘freeing’ the city (Plut. QG 57), which may well be code for the creation of some kind of democratic system (e.g. Gehrke 1986:119-20; Robinson 1997:118-9).3 Military failure followed by democratization There are several examples of democratization in the wake of massive defeats. In Syracuse shortly after its defeat at the Helarus river in 492 BCE, the demos revolted and with the help of freed serfs (?) overthrew the gamoroi oligarchs (Hdt 7.55). This movement was however short-lived. In Acragas, the tyrant Thrasydaeus was overthrown after his defeat by Hieron of Syracuse in 472 BCE, and replaced by a democratic regime (Diod. 11.48.6-8; Robinson 1997:78-80). In Argos, the catastrophic defeat at Sepea (c.494 BCE) caused violent disturbances, with ‘slaves’ taking over; the precise character of this regime change is obscure (Robinson 1997:84-8). In Cyrene, a defeat by the Libyans around 550 BCE led to the temporary replacement of the monarchy by what appears to have been a democratic regime (Hdt 4.159-62; Robinson 1997:105-8). In 473 BCE, a disastrous war against the Iapygians undermined the aristocratic regime of Taras and ushered in a democracy (Aristot. Pol. 1303a3-6; Berger 1992:53). 2 The use of hired foreigners and domestic slaves as rowers is a possibility, albeit downplayed by Figueira 1981:33-37); cf. now Hunt 1998 for Athens. Aegina was reputedly a particularly slave-rich polis (Athen. 272d). 3 The ‘radical’ democratic regime of 412 BCE in Syracuse is closely linked to the victory over the mighty Athenian invaders and appears to have been a consequence of significant popular military participation in this success (Aristot. Pol. 1304a27). 3 The classical period It would surely be unwise to generalize from a few cases. Moreover, it is only the archaic period that is poorly documented. The classical period provides us with an abundance of examples of regime change: Gehrke 1985 discusses no fewer than 283 instances of stasis in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. In up to 70 cases, an oligarchy was replaced by a democracy, compared to up to 63 instances in which a democracy became an oligarchy (ibid. 205). However, unaided regime change in the wake of military defeats is only very rarely attested in this period (ibid. 283).4 Foreign intervention (to install or help install or remove an existing regime) occurred much more frequently: in 204 cases, external forces played a role (ibid. 268). It appears that few poleis were sufficiently powerful to determine their regime type free from outside influence. This fact alone makes it difficult to establish any meaningful correlation between political regime and popular participation in Greece overall, especially for the vast majority of Greek states that were considerably less powerful than Athens or Sparta and therefore much more susceptible to direct or indirect foreign intervention in their domestic political affairs. The case of Athens Thanks to its unusually powerful position, Athens affords a rare opportunity to observe political change in the absence of overt outside intervention. Military events and political change were closely intertwined. ‘Democratizing’ events in Athenian history may be plotted as a series of responses to military inducements. Thanks to the superior quality and quantity of the pertinent evidence, we are able to trace the self-reinforcing sequence of military challenge followed by democratization and subsequent military mobilization, and so forth. To further debate, the following argument is presented in a fairly reductive and partial (in both senses of the term) manner, in order to highlight the proposed nexus between military and political processes. Proper consideration of real- life complexities and confounding variables would require a book-length study. Phase 1: The