Romanian Journal of History and International Studies
Vol. IV •No. 2 •2017
Faculty of History
Department of International Relations and World History
ISSN-L 2360-638X ISSN online 2559-544X ISSN print 2360-638X
2017 The Romanian Journal of History and International Studies is biannually published by the Literati Association in collaboration with the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies and the Department of International Relations and World History at the Faculty of History, University of Bucharest.
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Copyright © RJHIS 2017 All rights reserved. The publisher bears no responsibility for the editorial content. The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher.
ISSN-L 2360-638X ISSN online 2559-544X ISSN print 2360-638X
Academic Board
Bogdan Antoniu - University of Bucharest Ovidiu Bozgan - University of Bucharest Constantin Bușe - University of Bucharest Ioan Chiper - Nicolae Iorga Institute of History, Romanian Academy Adrian Cioroianu - University of Bucharest Marusia Cîrstea – University of Craiova Marian Cojoc – Ovidius University of Constanta Laurențiu Constantiniu - University of Bucharest Rudolf Dinu - University of Bucharest Manuela Dobre - University of Bucharest Mihail Dobre - University of Bucharest Matei Gheboianu - University of Bucharest Cosmin Ioniță - University of Bucharest Alexandru-Murad Mironov - University of Bucharest Christian Năsulea - University of Bucharest Remus Nica - University of Bucharest Florentina Nițu - University of Bucharest Ioan Opriș - University of Bucharest Daniela Osiac – University of Craiova Nicolae Panea – University of Craiova Marian Ștefănescu - University of Bucharest Dragoș Zaharia - University of Bucharest
Editorial Board
Alin Victor Matei PhD (Editor-in-chief) – Faculty of History, University of Bucharest Beatrice Crețu PhD student (Editor) – Faculty of History, University of Bucharest Dragoş Becheru PhD student (Editor) – Faculty of History, University of Bucharest Diana Năsulea PhD student (Editor) – Department of Economics and Economic Policies, Bucharest University of Economic Studies Mihnea Zigarov MA student (Associate Editor) – London School of Economics
Table of Contents
Vol. IV •No. 2 •2017
Hilda Sangwa Schwaiger Can Constructive Dialogue Alone Solve Zambia’s Problems? ...... 7
Aminul Islam Constructing Narratives through Storytelling: A Study of Refugees in Estonia ...... 37
Ariff Aizuddin Azlan Zulkanain Abdul Rahman Mohammad Tawfik Yaakub The 2014 Teluk Intan parliamentary by-election in Malaysia ...... 67
Cristian Culiciu Teohari Georgescu: a short biography of the minister who transformed Romania into a communist state ...... 99
Olukayode A. Faleye Housing ‘Lunatics’ in Nigeria: A Study in the History of Eco- Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology ...... 129
Adeniyi S. Basiru Olusesan A. Osunkoya The ECOWAS 2020 Transformational Vision: Content, Context, Issues and Prospects ...... 153
Andrew Maren Borok Paul-Kolade Tubi Toponyms in the Jos Plateau and the impact on intergroup relations: an ethno-historical perspective ...... 181
Book Reviews
Ionut Mircea Marcu Stephen Kotkin, Stalin. Volume I. Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928, New York, Penguin Press, 2014………………………………209
RJHIS 4 (2) 2017
Can Constructive Dialogue Alone Solve Zambia’s Problems? Hilda Sangwa Schwaiger*
Abstract: This paper examines the donor/partnership relationships of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID/Zambia) and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Zambia with local non-governmental organisations - the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) and the Southern Africa Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD) respectively on how the Western entities use public diplomacy and smart power as vehicles to alleviate electoral violence; the paper looks at what dialoguing efforts have been made by Zambian political parties and other actors in the period 2011 to 2016 to minimise political violence. The study was a case study of FODEP and SACCORD members. Primary data was gathered using semi-structured questionnaires; interviews with staff at the local NGOs and with USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia employees were done. Secondary research was also conducted; the data was analysed using triangulation method. The findings are that Zambia’s democratic credibility in Africa is regressing due to conflicting political parties inability to dialogue over differences; and that USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia, FODEP and SACCORD need to increase their efforts to eradicate electoral violence by sponsoring and carrying out more effective communications programs targeting poor, uneducated male-youths from shanty compounds. Keywords: Zambia, political dialogue, solutions, electoral violence, public diplomacy
* Hilda Sangwa Schwaiger is a doctoral student in history – public diplomacy and democratization processes at the University of Bucharest – Romania and the Academy of Cultural Diplomacy (ACD) – Berlin. She holds a Bachelor of Arts in Media Studies (University of Namibia) and a Master in Business Administration – MBA (Management College of Southern Africa – Mancosa). She is currently working on research concerning public diplomacy and smart power in eradicating electoral violence in Zambia.
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Introduction
When the head of the Zambian state, Edgar Chagwa Lungu, went on record admitting that it will be difficult to end political violence,1 many stakeholders agreed that there was a problem with political violence in the country – and that the efforts to eradicate it should be prioritised. Zambia is generally considered a peaceful nation, but this is changing particularly during the periods when by-elections and general elections are held — a phenomenon that has become more pronounced since 2011. This article examines the donor / partnership relationships of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID/Zambia) and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Zambia with local non-governmental organisations - the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) and the Southern Africa Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD) respectively - on how Western entities use public diplomacy and smart power as vehicles to alleviate electoral violence problems. In short, the utilization of USAID/Zambia’s and FES Zambia’s communication influence and financial strategies to curb electoral violence through sponsored programs was investigated. This paper also looks at what dialoguing efforts have been made by Zambian political parties and other actors in the period 2011 to 2016 to find solutions to minimise political violence. The area of research belongs to the history of public diplomacy and democratization processes. This field of study is interesting because amongst
1 Fridah Nkonde, “It won’t be easy to stop violence – Lungu”, The Post, 31st March 2016, available at http://www.postzambia.com/news.php?id=16939, accessed on 31st March 2016 (accessed through Facebook).
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other reasons it promotes peace-building through many avenues including states engaging communication strategies in foreign countries.
Electoral violence
Electoral violence actors are mostly impoverished, unemployed, and uneducated male youth cadres from shanty compounds in the Lusaka and Copperbelt provinces. They are transported from markets, streets and impoverished settlements to election areas in Zambia and paid paltry amounts of money to intimidate, harass, beat, injure, destroy private and public property and sometimes kill electorates. Political violence is not new in Zambia; however, with each president that the country elects into power, the frequency and the intensity of the level of violence increases. The five past presidents occasionally spoke against it but did not implement effective mechanisms to minimise or end it. The sixth president of Zambia, Edgar Chagwa Lungu, is also experiencing electoral violence in his tenure of office and has often spoken against it. Clearly, rhetoric is not enough, other stringent measures need to be put in place. Electoral violence nowadays is a controversy that is often associated with two political parties – the ruling Patriotic Front (PF) and the opposition United Party for National Development (UPND), with each blaming the other for its instigation. Zambia is the second largest producer of copper in Africa but this fact has not rescued the nation from abject poverty. A World Bank report claims that Zambia’s economic growth has not translated into significant poverty reduction:
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Sixty percent of the population lives below the poverty line and 42% are considered to be in extreme poverty. Moreover, the absolute number of poor has increased from about six million in 1991 to 7.9 million in 2010, primarily due to population growth.2
The poverty and social inequality that exists in Zambia provides an arena for opportunistic politicians to exploit poor youth into violent acts.3 Think Africa Press writes:
…the average “youth” member actually ranges between 20 and 35 years of age. They are believed to be recruited from Zambia’s large unemployment, urban, male population by the provincial chairmen of the parties, and paid around 25 Zambian Kwacha (approximately $5) for a day of activism. Cadres are usually provided with free beer and are sometimes armed with panga machetes. Some cadres are even known to switch parties from day-to-day, depending on who is hiring.4
Kapika reports that the instigators of violence, whom he identifies as Zambian politicians and party officials perceive violence:
as both an offensive weapon and as a component of personal security – as a necessary part of any political campaign, and elections too are connected to how much money you have put into your ability to intimidate others. And some politicians argue that they must maintain some capacity to unleash violence
2 ***, “Zambia Overview”, The World Bank, 2016, available at http://worldbank.org/en/country/zambia/overview, accessed on 31 March 2016. 3 Hope Nyambe, “A dissection of political violence in Zambia”, Zambian Eye, 3 October 2013, available at http://www.zambianeye.com/a-dissection-of-political-violence-in- zambia, accessed on 24 March 2016. 4 ***, “Zambia – threat of political violence from youth groups”, Africa Sustainable Conservation News, 30 November 2012, available at https://africasustainableconservation.com/tag/zambia-political-violence, accessed on 25 March 2016.
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as a measure of self-defence. And too it is not possible to have a campaign without your boys. If you are around, they too must be around.5
Some members of the international community have made efforts to denounce the escalating levels of violence in Zambia. The European Union head of delegation, Alessandro Mariani, and the heads of mission of EU member states called in March 2016 on law enforcement agencies to bring perpetrators of violence to book. A joint statement communicated that:
The EU delegation and heads of mission of EU member states are deeply concerned by the recent incidents of politically motivated violence in Zambia. (…) The absence of violence is required to guarantee the Zambian people their democratic rights to free, fair and peaceful elections. Moreover, preventing such incidences will strengthen Zambia’s international reputation as a peaceful, stable and tolerant country and its stance as a destination of choice for foreign investments and tourism.6
Within the African continent, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) is a body that has been vocal in advising Zambians to desist from electoral violence and the Union has spoken out against human rights violations in Zambia.7 Many sectors of Zambian society, apart from advocacy NGOs, have reacted and strongly condemned electoral violence in the nation. These include traditional chiefs, the Law Association of Zambia
5 Brown Kapika, “Zambia: Zambia political violence and the hell of political cadres”, Lusakatimes.com, 17 March 2016, available at http://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/03/17/zambia-political-violence-hell-political-cadres, accessed on 16 September 2016. 6 ***, “EU delegation in Zambia deeply concerned by incidents of political violence”, Lusakatimes.com, 16 March 2016, available at http://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/03/eu- delegation-zambia-deeply-concerned, accessed on 18 March 2016. 7 ***, “Numsa urges Zambian voters to ‘resist the slide into violence’”, Times Live, 10 August 2016, available at https://www.timeslive.co.za/africa/2016/08/10/Numsa-Zambian- voters-to, accessed on 20 March 2017.
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(LAZ), women’s organizations, church bodies, renowned scholars and citizens. FES Zambia’s role in the period 2011 to 2016 has been concerned with trade union capacity building; media and politics; producing state of the media reports; promoting the oversight role of the National Assembly; assisting in the understanding of constitutionalism and citizen participation; strengthening political parties; promoting the role of women in decision making and politics; promoting issue-based campaigns; as well as promoting conflict resolution and peaceful elections. The Foundation in Zambia momentarily generally concentrates on political governance.8 USAID Zambia’s functions deals with health, agriculture, climate change and improving environmental management, education, promoting civil society, governance, and human rights. Of these areas, health receives the largest chunk – 85 % of funding.9
Hypothesis and Research Questions
The central hypothesis of this study argues that past and present Public Diplomacy (PD) and Smart Power (SP) strategies utilized by USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia in relation to their funding / patterning of democratic and good governance programs with local Zambian NGOs – FODEP and SACCORD – gave insufficient priority or none at all to
8 Helmut Elischer, Resident Director, Friedrich Erbert Stiftung Zambia. Email to author, 29 August 2016, Personal communication. 9 Janet Deutsch, Public Affairs Officer, United States Agency for International Development Zambia. Email to author, 20 October 2016, personal communication.
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sponsoring non-violent activities, civic and voter programs; and that program funding priorities require re-strategizing and re-focusing on educating citizens on refraining from violent behaviour at election periods. It also argues that there is a growing need and urgency for specially tailored messages and programs that require formulation by NGOs for the purpose of targeting instigators and actors of electoral violence in Zambia. The following research questions informed this study: 1. What are the perceptions of FODEP and SACCORD staffers regarding USAID/Zambia and FES in Zambia?; What are the roles of USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia’s Public Diplomacy (PD) and Smart Power (SP) towards FODEP and SACCORD?; What is the relevancy of USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia for the finances and sustainability of FODEP and SACCORD? 2. What impact, if any, do USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia have on the agenda of FODEP’s and SACCORD’s programs? 3. What are the opinions of FODEP and SACCORD staffers on the ways to improve the effectiveness of programs combating political violence in Zambia?
Significance of the study
This study will not only benefit USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia but also other numerous funders that will in the future join in the fight against electoral violence in Africa. The research will also benefit local NGOs that need to engage in or need to improve their efforts at combating electoral
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violence; it will benefit scholars who would want to investigate other aspects such as the psychological well-being of harassed victims or the long-term effects. This observation is well articulated by Cyllah who argues that ‘preventing electoral violence does not begin or end on Election Day; it requires a phased, continual engagement’.10
Public Democracy and Smart Power
Melissen stresses that public diplomacy is part and parcel of world politics:
(...) NGOs and other non-state actors seek to project their message in the pursuit of policy goals. Image creation and management is a key resource and one where non-state actors may have an advantage, helping to explain why the more traditional, hierarchical concept of strategic public diplomacy often fails to achieve its goals.11
This definition, registers clearly the importance of NGOs in the deployment of public diplomacy. The model of public diplomacy that is practiced between the interaction of USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia with local NGOs FODEP and SACCORD is the network model. This model encourages building networks by means of international dialogue; these can be in the form of partnering with other organizations to fund and host conferences, seminars, programs, and training activities for specific causes.
10 Almami Cyllah (ed.), Elections worth dying for? A selection of case studies from Africa: IFES case studies, Washington DC, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2014, pp. 2 - 3. 11 Jan Melissen, The new public diplomacy: soft power in international relations, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 41.
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The network model also requires investing in communication research, which in turn enables well-strategized and tailor-made approaches which yield successful engagements with global partners.12 The concept of Smart Power was used in the study because local Zambian NGOs do not only operate on soft power influenced by funders / partners but also by financial assistance in the form of aid or grants (money). Smart Power (SP) involves the use of soft power and hard power in order to achieve effective results in varying interactions; soft power influences by means of ideas, policies, philosophies and ideals whereas hard power utilizes military or economic strategy to get things done. By eliciting and supporting NGO programs that champion democracy and promote human rights, USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia have set stage on what their preferences are. In short, the two entities fund programs and activities they deem important; local NGOs on the other side, have to get in line with these programs if they wish to coordinate with Western funders. Nye’s definition of soft power argues that soft power is ‘the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment’.13 Monetary clout gives hard power an upper hand as a means of strength and this is captured when Gallarotti argues that hard power relies on tangible power resources comprising of economic means or armed forces. Hard power therefore in this
12 Jamie Metzl, “Network diplomacy”, Carnegie Endowment International Peace, 1 April 2001, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2001/04/01/network-diplomacy-pub-681, accessed on 9 June 2017. 13 Joseph S. Nye, Soft power: The means to success in world politics, New York, Public Affairs, 2004, p. x.
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study was defined according to Gallarotti’s argument14 particularly with emphasis on ‘economic means’. Armitage and Nye define smart power as neither hard nor soft, but as ‘(...) developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American Objectives... It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels’.15 Investing heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions indeed does not rule out financing Zambian NGOs to achieve a funder’s / partner’s agenda. USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia with their use of public diplomacy and smart power have indeed entered into alliances and partnerships with FODEP and SACCORD; these NGOs are a mechanism of delivering donor’s / partner’s messages or principles of democracy and human rights values to the Zambian electorates through their civic and voter education programs. Nye (2008) writes that “Public Diplomacy is an important tool in the arsenal of smart power, but smart public diplomacy requires an understanding of the roles of credibility, self-criticism, and civil society in generating soft power”.16
14 Giulio Gallarotti, “Soft power: What it is, its importance, and the conditions for its effective use” in: Journal of Political Power, vol. 4, no. 1, 2011, pp. 25 - 47. 15 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye Jr., CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, more secure America, Washington DC, CSIS Press, 2007, p. 7. 16 Joseph S. Nye, “Public diplomacy and soft power”, in: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political Science and Social Science, vol. 616, no. 1, 2008, pp. 94 - 109.
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Theoretical Framework
Three sources of theoretical framework were used in this study; these are the argument of “Dead Aid: Why Aid is not working and How There is Another Way for Africa” by Dambisa Moyo (2009);17 International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) – “Elections Worth Dying For? A selection of case studies from Africa”;18 and John Keane’s Theory of the Emerging Monitory Democracy (2009).19 Moyo writes that government-to- government foreign aid has harmed Africa and should be discontinued as this is fuelling high poverty levels. She strongly disfavours systematic aid - the kind normally administered through the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other non-binding economic growth support which has not worked for Africa in over five decades.20 This study dealt with the aid that is received from USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia and directly made available through partnerships to FODEP and SACCORD – the type of aid Moyo does not, to greater extent, approve of. However, to call the funding the two local NGOs receive from USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia as charity-based aid is not the right terminology; this revenue is allocated with a more stringent partner- orientated and results-based understanding. Moyo’s critical discussion on
17 Dambisa Moyo, Dead aid: Why aid makes things worse and how there is another way for Africa, London, Penguin Books, 2009, pp. 1-188. 18 Almami Cyllah (ed.), op. cit., pp. 1-199. 19 John Keane, The life and death of democracy, London, Simon & Schuster, 2009, pp. 1- 958. 20 Dambisa Moyo, Dead aid: Why aid makes things worse and how there is another way for Africa, London, Penguin Books, 2009, p. 28.
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systematic aid, however, proved relevant as many of her arguments could be applied to the type of funding channelled to the NGOs under study. This study argues that funding given by foreign donors is indeed crucial for Africa’s development, democracy, human rights and basic freedoms. With the escalating levels of violence witnessed in Zambia, it is necessary that some of the funding be diverted to upholding peace by means of strategically designed programs carried out through the auspices of NGOs. After all, international NGOs and organizations cannot operate freely and effectively promote their programs if a nation is ravaged by war. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) case studies availed rich source of information, particularly the work of Almami Cyllah and Elizabeth Côté who examined women and youth perpetrating and mitigating electoral violence in the West African countries Guinea and Sierra Leone. The IFES working in these two countries deemed electoral violence a major theme on their agendas and funded projects to get rid of it. In Guinea IFES collaborated with 50 civil society networks and organizations, working closely with youth and women.21 What was important to note from these experiences was how the IFES actively engaged youthful communities in mitigating electoral violence. It is interesting to note the similarities between Zambia and the two West African countries – all three have youthful populations, bountiful natural resources, and yet are hard hit with unemployment problems and high poverty levels. The youths are desperate
21 Elizabeth Côté, and Almami Cyllah, “Women, youth and electoral violence” in: Almami Cyllah (ed.), Elections worth dying for? A selection of case studies from Africa: IFES case studies, Washington DC, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2014, pp. 109 - 122.
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and are in crisis and, as a result, prove to be easy targets for elite politicians to manipulate into violent acts around electoral periods. Keane published in 2009 a general global history of democracy. He writes that the history of democracy has had three distinct stages of evolution being the assembly democracy, the representative democracy and an emergent form which he has named ‘monitory democracy’.22 According to him, since 1945 the world has seen the vast introduction of power- scrutinizing mechanisms; he refers to these as ‘monitory bodies’. Their purpose is to act as gate-keepers, both within a state and internationally, keeping power-holders in check outside the conventional mechanism of periodic elections and parliamentary representation.23 Zambia has still to consolidate its representative democracy. I sought to explore what Keane says about a combination of a still weak representative democracy and an emerging network of agents of the monitory democracy. Keane also writes that monitory democracy is not a straightforward matter to comprehend and therefore many misconceptions about it exist ‘beginning with the hostile charge that monitory democracy, since it fudges with the vital role of ‘the people’ is in fact no democracy at all’.24 Zambian politics is still stuck in the old ways of thinking and dealing with national politics in the rules of democratic representation. The nation is a republican democratic nation; democracy is understood as a system whereby citizens freely and fairly choose representatives by majority rule.
22 John Keane, The life and death of democracy, London, Simon & Schuster, 2009, pp. xv - xxiii. 23 Ibidem, pp. 690 - 708. 24 Ibidem, p. 689.
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Keane argues that democracy is no longer simply a way of handling the power of elected governments by electoral and parliamentary means. He further states that democracy is larger than a nation and its reach operates way beyond territorial states. With the emergency of monitory democracy, a whole range of monitors have taken up the business of ensuring that all matters of human concern not just politics, are handled ethically and fairly.25 Keane writes that “gone are the days when democracy could be described as ‘government by the unrestricted will of the majority’.26 There is indeed a “blame game” going on between the two largest political parties in the nation as to who are the instigators and actors of violence. In December 2015, Zambia’s Republican President, Edgar Lungu, disclosed that he had received reports that the UPND party was planning to fuel violence in order to disrupt the 2016 general elections; he accused the opposition party of arming its cadres with machetes ahead of the election. President Lungu said he was running a democratic government that promoted dialogue but other citizens were abusing their rights.27 Hakainde Hichilema, the UPND president, called a press conference in August 2015 in which he denounced the use of violence in politics and boldly forbade the ruling party from engaging in what he termed ‘a culture of violence and intolerance’.28
25 John Keane, “Monitory democracy?”, ESRC Seminar Series Paper, Milton Keynes, Open University, 2008, pp. 8 - 14. 26 Ibidem, p. 3. 27 ***, “Zambia: UPND plot exposed”, Times of Zambia, 15 December 2015, available at http://www.allafrica.com/stories/201512160239.html, accessed on 17 December 2015. 28 ***, “HH’s speech at UPND conference”, Open Zambia, 14 August 2015, available at http://www.openzambia.com/2015/08/hhs-speech-at-upnd-conference, accessed on 15 March 2017.
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According to a Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD) statement released in January 2016, the NGO’s Executive Director, Boniface Cheembe, lamented that:
… The year 2015 witnessed a disturbing increase in the levels and intensity of political violence in the nation. The usage of guns became more pronounced as people were shot, injured and maimed as most stakeholders became concerned about the role of law enforcement agencies in preventing political violence... Furthermore, the year 2015 experienced some of the worst brutality witnessed by journalists, namely, the Post reporter and his Radio Feel colleague in the Eastern Province of Zambia. The humiliating reported violence of the journalists being beaten, urinated in the mouth, and almost burnt to death were disturbing and reminiscent of colonial style brutality.29
The electoral violence perpetuated during the 2016 general elections intensified, while election day was quite peaceful — the campaign period followed by the post-election period bore the highest record of violence- related incidences. Various reports of people being physically beaten,30 hacked with machetes or knifed, vehicles being attacked and stoned, women being stripped naked31 32, property being destroyed and burnt down and the defacing of campaign bill-boards picturing the PF and UPND presidents were captured in the media. A scholar admits “both PF and UPND cadres
29 ***, “2015 has been worst year for Zambia – SACCORD”, Allafrica.com, 1 January 2016, available at http://www.allafrica.com/stories/201601041826.html, accessed on 15 September 2016. 30 ***, “Sukwa recounts beating ordeal by PF cadres”, Facebook, 7 September 2016, available at https://www.facebook.com/postzambia/2084306701795167, accessed on 5 August 2017. 31 ***, “VIDEO: Woman stripped naked by PF cadres for wearing UPND attire”, Kitwe Times, 23 March 2016, available at http://www.kitwetimes.com/.../video-woman-stripped- naked-by-pf-cadres-for-wearing-upnd-attire, accessed on 23 March 2016. 32 ***, “Zambia: PF cadres strip woman naked in Mpulungu”, Allafrica.com, 6 January 2016, available at http://www.allafrica.com/stories/201601061212.html, accessed on 5 April 2017.
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perpetrated some gruesome violence in the run up to the election”.33 In the same year, two youths were shot by the police, an incident which left a young woman dead and a young man hospitalised - this transpired when a UPND rally was abruptly cancelled by the police.34 Supporters of an aspiring UPND Member of Parliament (MP) allegedly physically injured an aspiring Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) MP candidate in Namwala. These two incidences prompted the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) to suspend campaigns in Lusaka and Namwala for 10 days.
Attempts at Discussions and Internal Solutions to Political Violence
Before determining whether Zambia can look to the outside world for assistance to resolve its political violence problems, it was interesting to investigate if the two major political parties in Zambia have tried to curb violence internally and what some of the suggestions that have been tabled by various stakeholders with regard to the same are. SACCORD suggested setting up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). This suggestion came after President Lungu made his presidential inauguration speech on September 13, 2016 at Heroes Stadium in Lusaka, and announced that he would institute a commission of inquiry into the cause of the post-election
33 Phillan Zamchiya, “Humble, mother-loving and God-fearing? How Edgar Lungu won Zambia’s presidential elections”, African Arguments, 16 August 2016, available at http://africanarguments.org/2016/08/16/humble-mother-loving-and-god-fearing-how- edgar-lungu-won-zambias-presidential-elections/, accessed on 9 September 2016. 34 ***, “Police shoot dead female UPND supporter in Lusaka”, Lusakatimes.com, 9 July 2016, available at https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/07/09/police-shoot-dead-female- upnd-supporter-lusaka/, accessed on 24 September 2016.
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violence which occurred in Zambia. SACCORD argued that Zambia has in the past tried using a commission of inquiry such as the one that was used to resolve the Barotseland crisis; this, however, did not bring about trauma healing or reconciliation in the nation. A TRC approach was favoured because:
... [it] will be victim centred and also take into consideration the needs of the perpetrators. It will help us understand the following questions: Who are the victims? Where are the victims? What is their state? Have they received any help? Why did the perpetrators do what they did to their fellow citizens? How did they feel when they injured their fellow citizen? Are they better off now after engaging in political violence?35
Despite this advice, President Lungu in October 2016 appointed a commission of inquiry in accordance with the country’s Inquiries Act. The commission’s mandate was to:
...inquire into the voting patterns in the general elections conducted from 2006 to 2016 and the electoral violence that characterised the 2016 general elections, in order to come up with recommendations that will prevent the occurrence of violence in future elections and ensure that voting outcomes are reflective of the people’s free will.36
Some members of the public condemned the commission as unworkable. Forum for Democracy and Development’s (FDD) spokesperson
35 ***, “SACCORD has taken keen note of the pronouncement by President Lungu”, Facebook, 14 September 2016, available at https://www.facebook.com/saccord.zm/posts/982568068518232, accessed on 14 September 2016. 36 ***, “President Lungu appoints a Commission of Inquiry to examine the causes of the political violence”, Lusakatimes.com, 22 October 2016, available at https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/10/22/president-lungu-appoints-commission-inquiry- examine-causes-political-violence, accessed on 3 January 2017.
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Antonio Mwanza was reported as saying there is no need for the government to be wasting taxpayers’ money when everyone knew the causes of political violence. Mwanza wondered why political parties had not been included in the process. He referred to the commission as a mere academic exercise.37 Another means of curbing violence in Zambia is having political leaders constantly encouraging their own members to refrain from violent behaviour; yet another solution that can also contribute to ending political violence in Zambia rests on the country’s political parties sitting down to iron out their differences through political party talks—there is need for tolerance and dialogue. The former Minister of Home Affairs Davis Mwila gave valuable advice when he stressed that the creation of peace and unity must start with political parties—then only can others emulate that and, in so doing, build Zambia’s image as a peace haven.38 Both the Republican President Edgar Lungu and Hichilema, the opposition president for UPND have attempted to call on the other to engage in dialogue on the subject of electoral violence. Such attempts were snubbed by one of them (or their party members), citing one reason or another. In one incident, President Lungu requested a church-mediated meeting with UPND, but Guy Scott, who was Zambia’s vice-president under PF rule and, at this time, had decided to support the candidacy of opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema, was quoted
37 ***, “Commission of Inquiry is a waste of time and resources; causes are well known – FDD”, Lusakatimes.com, 22 October 2016, available at https://lusakatimes.com/2016/10/22/commission-of-inquiry-is-a-waste-of-time-and- resources-fdd, accessed on 3 January 2017. 38 Kelvin Chongo and Doris Kasote, “Political parties to blame for violence”, Zambia Daily Mail, 9 March 2016, available at https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/?p=61785, accessed on 25 March 2016.
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responding to President Lungu: “This is not something that needs a workshop. It is a matter of enforcing the rule of law”.39 An interparty indaba (meeting) on violence was held at the Anglican Cathedral of the Holy Cross in Lusaka on March 29, 2016, at which 18 political parties committed to end the vice using various strategies.40 The attendees included party presidents who unanimously agreed to utilize political leadership structures to fight violence from within their own parties and also to resolve issues amongst fellow political parties. Some important issues discussed were the discouragement of wearing military regalia and the use of machetes by political party supporters, a move that would eliminate fear and intimidation in society. However, despite the successful deliberations, reports of political violence did not abate. Seven months later in October 2016, Forum for Democracy and Development’s (FDD) spokesperson Antonio Mwanza remarked on the failure of the Cathedral of the Holy Cross meeting to live up to its agreed resolutions to curb electoral violence:
...We as leaders of political parties, President Lungu himself, President Nawakwi, President Hichilema, Presidents of all other political parties spent the whole day with leaders of the church, reverends, bishops of the Cathedral of Holy Cross discussing causes of political violence and what we ought to do to end violence. We came up with resolutions. What happened to those resolutions? Nada! They were thrown in the bin.41
39 ***, “Who’s to blame for violence?”, Zambian Weekly, 10 August 2016, available at http://www.zambia-weekly.com/article/who’s-to-blame-for-violence, accessed on 20 September 2016. 40 Fridah Nkonde, op. cit., accessed on 31 March 2016. 41 ***, “Commission of Inquiry is a waste of time and resources; causes are well known – FDD”, Lusakatimes.com, 22 October 2016, available at
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Shortly after the 11th August 2016 general election day, post-election violence broke out in some UPND Southern Province stronghold areas; Patriotic Front Deputy spokesperson Frank Bwalya and Patriotic Front former Secretary General Davies Chama (now defence minister) held a press briefing at the PF secretariat headquarters in Lusaka on August 23, 2016 during which they announced that “President Elect Edgar Lungu will not meet opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema for peace talks… that Mr Hichilema’s call for peace is not genuine and it’s only meant for window dressing”.42 Hichilema was told to stop the post-election violence in his strongholds first where UPND supporters were burning down property belonging to PF sympathizers. The signing of a peace accord is certainly another way electoral violence can be kept in check; this was tried just before the August 2016 general elections but proved to be a futile exercise. In July, the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) had organized a peace accord meeting and had presented a draft document called the ‘Pledge for Peace’. This gathering was meant to facilitate the possibility of presidential candidates making a firm commitment to end electoral violence; nine candidates participated. Only five of the participants signed it; three refused and one said he would sign later. They requested an addendum to provide for rights, sanctions, obligations and measures for the enforcement of the Accord; the addendum was promised to
https://lusakatimes.com/2016/10/22/commission-of-inquiry-is-a-waste-of-time-and- resources-fdd, accessed on 3 January 2017. 42 ***, “Lungu refuses to meet HH to talk peace, there shall be no government of national unity in Zambia”, Lusakatimes.com, 23 August 2016, available at https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/08/23/lungu-refuses-meet-hh-talk-peace-shall-no- government-national-unity-zambia, accessed on 4 September 2016.
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be circulated to all nine presidential candidates by the ECZ.43 It was later amended and made available to the political parties; despite this effort, political violence did not cease.
Methods
This study used phenomenological research that is qualitative in nature. It utilized case study research design on USAID/Zambia, FES Zambia, FODEP and SACCORD. The target population comprised the members of FODEP and SACCORD; non-probability sampling was used. Primary data was gathered from local NGOs FODEP and SACCORD using semi-structured questionnaires and several follow-up interviews were carried out with some full-time employees at the NGOs. Data was also gathered from key employees of USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia by means of semi- structures interviews. Further information was sought using secondary data sources. The data was analysed using the triangulation method of analysis which involves both quantitative and qualitative means in order to produce a more credible outcome. Whilst the research was designed to be qualitative in nature, it adopted a descriptive approach. To analyse the data using quantitative analysis I utilised the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software system in order to interpret the data further through statistical operations.
43 ***, “ECZ to amend Peace Accord after HH and others refused to sign it”, Lusakatimes.com, 16 July 2016, available at https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/07/16/ecz- amend-peace-accord, accessed on 18 July 2016.
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Findings and discussions
One of the main findings of this study is that local NGOs FODEP and SACCORD perceive that Germany and America uphold human rights and they try to promote democratic electoral practices in Zambia. FODEP respondents think this because their NGO has received funding from American entities which were given to promote democratic processes and human rights activities. SACCORD believe that Germany and America are indeed democratic because amongst other reasons, they have funded programs related to elections with the aim of peaceful and fair outcomes. Both local NGOs also believe that Germany and America uphold human rights because organizations belonging to them speak out when democracy is under threat in Zambia. FODEP and SACCORD believe that it is not possible for them to effectively carry out general programs on democracy and human rights issues including those aimed at minimizing electoral violence without financial assistance from international funders, of which USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia are a part. It was established that USAID had invested approximately US$7.5 million United States dollars in political processes programming in Zambia from 2011-2016 but only one program was sponsored to target the reduction of violent political behaviour; this program was not carried out with FODEP, the NGO under study. USAID/Zambia funded the National Democratic Institute (NDI) with US$5,225,000 United States dollars. This was used to conduct the Youth Ambassador’s Program as one of multiple components of the Zambia Elections and Political Processes (ZEPP) Activity
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for period 2015-2016. Of course, USAID is a larger organization, while FES Zambia is smaller in comparison; so, the one has greater financial muscle, while the other is more flexible to timely accommodate programs affecting the Zambian nation. FODEP never applied for funding from USAID/Zambia specially for the purpose of programs aimed at eradicating political violence at elections periods caused by poor, uneducated constituents (actors) or instigators (sponsors of violence) because they believed the NGO stood better chances at winning contracts already being advertised by USAID than if they submitted their own program proposals. USAID/Zambia does accept unsolicited proposals and applications but financing is given mainly through competitive contracts. USAID/Zambia however funded two programs on democratic processes with the local NGO and these cost a total of US$161,552 United States dollars. One of the programs was entitled “Undertaking domestic observation in Zambia’s 2015 presidential by- elections” and the second program was dubbed “Building confidence in the voter registration and voting process through youth participation”. USAID/Zambia was not FODEP’s largest donor. FES has in its coffers 100,000 Euros (US$117,400) dedicated to all its national projects in Zambia yearly. From 2011-2016, FES Zambia conducted 15 dialoguing programs on political violence eradication at a cost of around 45,000 Euros (US$52,830). The Foundation normally spends 3000 Euros (US$3,544) on a single project. FES Zambia’s funding policy is that it does not normally transfer money to a partner when agreement to carry out a specific program has been reached; it instead agrees to bear a certain aspect
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of the expenses that the activity will need. In the period 2011- 2016, FES Zambia partnered with SACCORD and coordinated on 12 discussion programs aimed at reducing / eradicating violent electoral political behaviour costing 36,000 Euros (US$42,530). The Foundation had also bought electronic office equipment and donated a vehicle to SACCORD, bringing the grand total to 54,000 Euros (US$63,703) in five years. FES is not SACCORD’s largest financial contributor. SACCORD is permitted to discuss with FES Zambia ideas of programs it would like to undertake but these must fall under the mandate of FES. One of FES Zambia’s duties is to coordinate with labour unions, however, the Foundation has not yet made the effort of targeting the eradication of political violence in Zambia by collaborating with the country’s various unions; it, however, dealt with political leaders and youths on the same. Despite these efforts by the two Western entities to provide funding generally for the two local NGOs under study, both FODEP and SACCORD felt there was need for donors to fund more civic and educational programmes that address the violent behaviour during Zambia’s electoral periods. FES Zambia has indeed done more programmes aimed at addressing the escalating political violence problem in Zambia compared to USAID/Zambia, but it is worth noting that despite USAID/Zambia only having funded one such program in the study’s timeframe (2011 - 2016), the Agency provides much larger sums of money for sponsored programs. The ‘donor-aid-syndrome’ that renders Zambian NGOs almost totally dependent on Western aid has made financial aid a relevancy in their relationship with international funders. This dependency is unhealthy and
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placed FODEP and SACCORD at the mercy of donors and partners in so much that they are unable to formulate and implement programs that target electoral violence on their own, on a large scale. There is need for innovative planning to generate own funds. Research on behavioural change also needs to be carried out by both FODEP and SACCORD so that programs on peaceful conduct can be evaluated to gauge successes and failures. Apart from leaders in higher political structures of political parties who actually instigate electoral violence, the youths who are the actors of political violence deserve increased deliberate attention when implementing programs / activities concerned with curbing election violence. Focus on youth programs should in the future target male youths living in shanty compounds and other peri-urban areas of Zambia where there is high social inequality and the standards of living are very low. Although FODEP claims that urban and rural youths form part of their target, little effort to provide programs concerning peaceful conduct at electoral periods was done in 2011 to 2016. SACCORD, on the other hand, has carried out 12 national dialoguing programs in partnership with FES Zambia in the period 2011 – 2016, which focused on democratization processes and also dealt with issues of youth and electoral violence. The Foundation and SACCORD identified youths as pawns manipulated by politicians in the game of power politics; their program outreach involved youths from political parties, churches and civil society. FODEP and SACCORD have plenty of suggestions on how future collaborations between their NGOs and USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia can be tremendously improved in order for the local NGOs to effectively deliver
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programs, and also the best way the Western organisations can assist the NGOs in financing issues. The biggest need was that of more funding, which appear to be the cry of local NGOs in third world nations. However, it is important that Western donors and partners allow more project proposals by FODEP and SACCORD to be submitted for consideration as projects to be undertaken. USAID’s bureaucratic nature was also mentioned as a snag in working with the Agency; the process of acquiring funding quite challenging and not straight forward. FES Zambia on the other hand was found more flexible but only works with its partners and its budgets is limited in- comparison to USAID.
Conclusions and recommendations
Political violence is alive and well in Zambia during electoral periods; it has been there for more than five decades. It has been passed on from one presidential era to another and its “weapon” of choice is mostly impoverished, unemployed and uneducated male youth from peri-urban areas known as compounds. These actors, hired by influential politicians, are becoming more daring and lethal, capable of inflicting pain on victims or causing death. As more citizens are faced with electoral intimidation, fear sets in. Most of the nation’s presidents have been vocal in denouncing the vice in one way or another; however, a firm hand is required by allowing the rule of law to take its course. In present day Zambia, the Patriotic Front (PF) and the United Party for National Development (UPND) need to seriously find ways to curb
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violence. Attempts at dialogue have so far indeed proved futile because Zambia’s political leaders have chosen to “close their doors” and find one excuse after another why they cannot convene and analyse together what fuels mostly pre-election and post-election violence and, when they do convene, resolutions are not converted into actions. Zambia can revert to its past-praised image of a non-violent nation if its head of state, who is also the commander-in-chief, adopts a zero tolerance to political violence for all countrymen and women. More definitely has to be done in the quest of eradicating political violence in Zambia. Besides international organisations like USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia, it is up to Zambian citizens, NGOs and especially political parties and public institutions to act in order to punish instigators and perpetrators and to provide rewards for political actors who cooperate in establishing a violence-free political scene in Zambia.
Bibliography
***, “2015 has been worst year for Zambia – SACCORD”, Allafrica.com, 1 January 2016, available at http://www.allafrica.com/stories/201601041826.html. ***, “Commission of Inquiry is a waste of time and resources; causes are well known – FDD”, Lusakatimes.com, 22 October 2016, available at https://lusakatimes.com/2016/10/22/commission-of-inquiry-is-a- waste-of-time-and-resources-fdd. ***, “ECZ to amend Peace Accord after HH and others refused to sign it”, Lusakatimes.com, 16 July 2016, available at https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/07/16/ecz-amend-peace-accord. ***, “EU delegation in Zambia deeply concerned by incidents of political violence”, Lusakatimes.com, 16 March 2016, available at
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http://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/03/eu-delegation-zambia-deeply- concerned. ***, “HH’s speech at UPND conference”, Open Zambia, 14 August 2015, available at http://www.openzambia.com/2015/08/hhs-speech-at- upnd-conference. ***, “Lungu refuses to meet HH to talk peace, there shall be no government of national unity in Zambia”, Lusakatimes.com, 23 August 2016, available at https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/08/23/lungu-refuses- meet-hh-talk-peace-shall-no-government-national-unity-zambia. ***, “Numsa urges Zambian voters to ‘resist the slide into violence’”, Times Live, 10 August 2016, available at https://www.timeslive.co.za/africa/2016/08/10/Numsa-Zambian- voters-to. ***, “Police shoot dead female UPND supporter in Lusaka”, Lusakatimes.com, 9 July 2016, available at https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/07/09/police-shoot-dead- female-upnd-supporter-lusaka/. ***, “President Lungu appoints a Commission of Inquiry to examine the causes of the political violence”, Lusakatimes.com, 22 October 2016, available at https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/10/22/president- lungu-appoints-commission-inquiry-examine-causes-political- violence. ***, “SACCORD has taken keen note of the pronouncement by President Lungu”, Facebook, 14 September 2016, available at https://www.facebook.com/saccord.zm/posts/982568068518232. ***, “Sukwa recounts beating ordeal by PF cadres”, Facebook, 7 September 2016, available at https://www.facebook.com/postzambia/2084306701795167. ***, “VIDEO: Woman stripped naked by PF cadres for wearing UPND attire”, Kitwe Times, 23 March 2016, available at http://www.kitwetimes.com/.../video-woman-stripped-naked-by-pf- cadres-for-wearing-upnd-attire. ***, “Who’s to blame for violence?”, Zambian Weekly, 10 August 2016, available at http://www.zambia-weekly.com/article/who’s-to-blame- for-violence. ***, “Zambia Overview”, The World Bank, 2016, available at http://worldbank.org/en/country/zambia/overview.
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***, “Zambia: PF cadres strip woman naked in Mpulungu”, Allafrica.com, 6 January 2016, available at http://www.allafrica.com/stories/201601061212.html. ***, “Zambia – threat of political violence from youth groups”, Africa Sustainable Conservation News, 30 November 2012, available at https://africasustainableconservation.com/tag/zambia-political- violence. ***, “Zambia: UPND plot exposed”, Times of Zambia, 15 December 2015, available at http://www.allafrica.com/stories/201512160239.html. Armitage, Richard L., Nye, Joseph S. Jr., CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, more secure America, Washington DC, CSIS Press, 2007. Chongo Kelvin and Kasote Doris, “Political parties to blame for violence”, Zambia Daily Mail, 9 March 2016, https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/?p=61785. Cyllah, Almami (ed.), Elections worth dying for? A selection of case studies from Africa: IFES case studies, Washington DC, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2014. Gallarotti, Giulio, “Soft power: What it is, its importance, and the conditions for its effective use”, in: Journal of Political Power, vol. 4, no. 1, 2011. Kapika, Brown, “Zambia: Zambia political violence and the hell of political cadres’, Lusakatimes.com, 17 March 2016, http://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/03/17/zambia-political-violence- hell-political-cadres. Keane, John, ‘Monitory democracy?’ ESRC Seminar Series Paper, Emergent Publics, Milton Keynes, Open University, 2008. Keane, John, The life and death of democracy, London, Simon & Schuster, 2009. Melissen, Jan (ed.), The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Metzl, Jamie, “Network diplomacy”, Carnegie Endowment International Peace, 1 April 2001, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2001/04/01/network-diplomacy-pub- 681. Moyo, Dambisa., Dead aid: Why aid makes things worse and how there is another way for Africa, London, Penguin Books, 2009. Nasulea, Christian, and Medintu, Daniela Nicoleta, "Testing adaptivity in negotiation support systems", in: Management Research and Practice, vol. 7, no. 1, 2015.
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Nkonde, Fridah, “It won’t be easy to stop violence – Lungu”, The Post, 31 March 2016, http://www.postzambia.com/news.php?id=16939. Nyambe, Hope, “A dissection of political violence in Zambia”, Zambian Eye, 3 October 2013, available at http://www.zambianeye.com/a- dissection-of-political-violence-in-zambia. Nye, Joseph S., “Public diplomacy and soft power”, in: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political Science and Social Science, vol. 616, no. 1, 2008. Nye, Joseph S., Soft power: The means to success in world politics, New York, Public Affairs, 2004. Zamchiya, Phillan, “Humble, mother-loving and God-fearing? How Edgar Lungu won Zambia’s presidential elections”, African Arguments, 16 August 2016, available at http://africanarguments.org/2016/08/16/humble-mother-loving-and- god-fearing-how-edgar-lungu-won-zambias-presidential-elections/.
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Constructing Narratives through Storytelling: A Study of Refugees in Estonia Aminul Islam*
Abstract: Very little investigation is done on refugees in Estonia and their construction of narratives in a new society. Refugees portray their memories of their own country while in exile in order to create their present individuality in a new land and to adapt to a new culture. This paper attempts to investigate refugees placed at a refugee accommodation centre and to analyze their present and past memories and stories to associating them with their coping mechanism. Using qualitative methods such as in-depth interviews, this paper brings out the argument that, in spite of being displaced from their homeland, refugees portray their country of origin via idyllic stories; family and community life are emphasized with the contrast of individualism. This paper argues that specific narratives can produce doubly-marginalized people, while at the same time, stories and memories from the past are significant for developing agency, so as to establish counter narratives.
Keywords: refugees, Estonia, narrative, storytelling, identity.
Introduction
We are living in an era where changes are constant and societies that remained unchanged are quickly turning diverse. Socio-economic and political aspects, global communication and conflicts are proof that we are
* Aminul Islam is a PhD candidate in Sociology at Tallinn University, Estonia. He works as the Head of the Curricula for the Program Creativity and Innovation at Estonian Entrepreneurship University of Applied Sciences. He has a Master Degree in Asian Studies from Lund University, Sweden and a Bachelor and Master degree in Sociology from Bangladesh. He has published several articles on Migration and Refugee issues.
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going through an era of diversification. Cooperation between countries, business organizations, intercultural communication and human migration are the features of today’s world, which signify the fact that countries and societies are changing and diversity is a part of it.1 From within these diverse societies, there are people who are forced to take part in this diversity. We are, however, living in an era that is the ‘age of the refugee, people who are displaced and mass migration’ and the number of refugees all across the world has been increasing over the past decades.2 European Union (EU) countries have received large numbers of refugees in recent years. More than 600,000 asylum seekers were received by EU countries in the year 2014; there were 400,000 in the year 2013.3 Therefore, the increase rate is quite high. Traditionally, Estonia has been viewed as a less attractive country for asylum seekers and refugees.4 Estonia joined in EU in 2004 and signed the Schengen treaty in 2007. The 1951 UN convention relating to the status of refugees was signed by the Estonian state in 1997. According to the Estonian State portal on refugees, “Estonia has received a relatively small number of
1 Aminul Islam, “A Study Of South Asian Refugees Settlement Experiences In Estonia”, in: Khazar Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, vol. 19, no. 2, 2016, p. 98. 2 Idem, “Refugee Quota: Is Estonia Ready To Receive Refugees? A Review Of The literature On Migration and Ethnic Minorities In Estonia”, in: International And Multidisciplinary Journal Of Social Sciences, vol. 53, no. 3, 2016, p. 290. 3 Vincent Bourgeais, Asylum in the EU. The number of asylum applicants in the EU jumped to more than 625 000 in 2014, Eurostat Press Office, 20 March 2015, available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/6751779/3-20032015-BP- EN.pdf/35e04263-2db5-4e75-b3d3-6b086b23ef2b, accessed on 3rd July 2017. 4 Aminul Islam, “A study of South Asian Refugees...“, p. 99.
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applications for international protection compared to other EU member states, but the number of applications has increased every year.”5 The number of applications Estonia received from 1997 until May 2015 was 709, out of which 114 were granted protection. However, this number is increasing, as in first five months of 2015, Estonia received 90 applications for international protection and it was expected that this number would be even higher for the next period.6Be that as it may, all these statistics were comprised before the 2015 summer crisis in Europe, when the President of the European Commission announced the proposal that “120000 additional asylum seekers will be distributed among EU nations with binding quotas.” According to the state portal of Estonia, Estonia’s positions on the refugee quota was that “Estonia does not intend to remain a bystander in the Mediterranean crisis; Estonia does not dispute the refugee distribution formula”.7Estonia received the first war refugees on March 29, 2016 as a relocation quota. Drawing on the existing literature on migration and ethnic minorities in Estonia, Islam,8 in his study, ‘Refugee Quota: is Estonia ready to receive refugees’, stated that “migration research in Estonia has mostly been built on four major categories and none of them particularly focused on refugees or immigrants having ethnic background outside Europe”. In the year 2009, in
5 ***, Refugee crisis, Republic of Estonia Government, available at https://valitsus.ee/en/refugees#statistics, accessed on 19 December 2016. 6 Aminul Islam, “Refugee Quota: Is Estonia Ready To Receive Refugees?...“, p. 292. 7 ***, Refugee crisis, Republic of Estonia Government, available at https://valitsus.ee/en/refugees#statistics, accessed on 19 December 2016. 8 Aminul Islam, “Refugee Quota: Is Estonia Ready To Receive Refugees?...“, p. 296.
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her research on the readiness to accept immigrants in Europe, Masso9 enquired about the willingness to receive people from outside Europe and of different races and ethnicities; Estonia ranked at the bottom of the table, scoring 22, right after Hungary (23), while Iceland and Sweden, respectively, were at the top. This research was done on a scale of 23, 1 being highest and 23 being lowest. Islam,10in his study on existing literature on migration studies in Estonia, posed the question whether Estonia is ready to accept quota refugees, who would probably have non-European ethnic backgrounds. In this study, Islam11 also pointed out that Estonia has very little experience in handling migrants with non-European backgrounds, as the existing literature is mostly on Russian minorities in Estonia and their integration aspect in different sectors. The Estonian State portal also suggests that the number of asylum seekers from Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Sudan has been increasing in Estonia, while previously they came mostly from Russia, Georgia and Ukraine.12 Islam13 pointed out that “policy makers, academics and researchers will have to address this aspect to tackle the challenges which are emerging from the migration crisis to build up a cohesive society.” With this background of asylum seekers and refugees in Estonia, this study would like to provide contributions to the literature by exploring
9 Anu Masso, “A Readiness To Accept Immigrants In Europe? Individual and Country-Level Characteristics”, in: Journal Of Ethnic And Migration Studies, vol. 3, no. 2, 2009, p. 269. 10 Aminul Islam, “A study of South Asian Refugees...“, p. 98. 11 Ibidem, p. 99. 12 ***, Refugee crisis, Republic of Estonia Government, available at https://valitsus.ee/en/refugees#statistics, accessed on 19 December 2016. 13 Aminul Islam, “Refugee Quota: Is Estonia Ready To Receive Refugees?...“, p. 297.
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asylum seekers and refugees in Estonia and their common memories of their experience at the refugee centre and their own country while being dislocated to a European country and to utilize their stories of present and past in order to construct their current and future self or identity.141516 To be precise, this study attempts to explore the role of memory and the narrative of the continuing process that the refugees and asylum seekers in Estonia are experiencing. The aim is to contribute to the literature that investigates the importance of storytelling and of the past and present memory of asylum seekers and refugees.
Asylum seekers and refugees in Estonia and their placement
Over the last 18 years, from 1997 to May 2015, Estonia has received a total of 709 applications and, among them, permission was granted to 114 people, including 74 refugees and 40 who received complementary protection. In the year 2012, the number of application was 77; in 2013, it went up to 97 and in 2014 it was 147. By mid-2015, in about six months, Estonia received 90 applications and it was expected that the total figures for that year would go past 250. Therefore, the number of asylum seekers and refugees is on the increase.
14 Mary Chamberlain, Selma Leydesdorff, “Transnational Families: Memories and Narratives”, in: Global Networks, vol. 4, no. 3, 2004, p. 231. 15 Robin Cohen, “Diasporas And The Nation State: From Victims To Challengers”, in: International Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, 1996, p. 508. 16 Rogers Brubaker , “The Diaspora Diaspora”, in: Ethnic And Racial Studies, vol. 28, no. 1, 2005, p. 15.
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The Ministry of Social Affairs is responsible for helping and finding residence for refugees. For families or individuals who seek asylum for protection, the state provides a housing centre which is located in a village called Vao, in the Laane-Virucounty. It takes around one and half hour by train to get to that village from the capital city of Tallinn and this is the only convenient way to communicate with the capital. At the moment, the Vao accommodation centre (by the end of December 2016) houses 73 persons. Out of those, 54 are asylum seekers and 19 are refugees with a residence permit. Once a person receives international protection, i.e. refugee status, he or she is not supposed to stay at the accommodation centre, but should be living in a home rented from any social housing or from the free market and the Ministry of Social Affairs should help them find it. The centre also houses 24 children at the moment and 15 women, which comprise 11 families. Currently, the asylum seekers and refugees are from 16 different countries. The largest numbers of residents are from Ukraine, Armenia, Iraq, Palestine, Syria, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Afghanistan and Georgia. The number of applicants from outside Europe is currently on the increase.17The village has a small shop selling very basic groceries, which is why the residents from the Vao centre usually go to the nearby town, 15 minutes away by bus, with two buses per day that go to and from the town to the village. “House rent, essential translation services and Estonian language instruction costs are covered by the state for up to two years once they get
17 ***, Refugee crisis, Republic of Estonia Government, available at https://valitsus.ee/en/refugees#statistics, accessed on 19 December 2016.
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the residence permit as refugees.”18 It is expected that refugees should learn the language and other social aspects so that they could adapt swiftly and find a job to become self-dependent. However, refugees (not asylum seekers) are allowed a state pension, family benefits, employment services and other benefits like any permanent resident of Estonia. Asylum seekers, who are waiting to gain refugee status, are not entitled to work at the moment but from 2017 it is expected that,after having waited six months after their application, they might be allowed to work. There is a firm distinction between asylum seekers and refugees. Asylum seekers are the ones who asked for protection and their application is being processed, while refugees are the ones who applied and got protection, therefore they have a residence permit and can enjoy all other benefits like any other permanent residents in Estonia. Asylum seekers also have a permit to stay, but on different grounds, which does not allow them many benefits, other than staying and waiting for their decision to come. In this waiting time, they are placed in an accommodation centre and are given 130 Euros per month for their living. They also have some medical services and language lessons.
Storyline
For the migrants, narratives are quite significant for the construction of meaning or to make sense. In a study of migrants, Farah19stated that
18 Ibidem. 19 Nuruddin Farah, Yesterday, Tomorrow: Voices From The Somali Diaspora, London and New York, Cassell, 2000, p. 37.
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“stories poured out, their memory flowing out of their mouth with a broken string”. By the means of narratives, humans swap their memories of incidents and produce accounts in order to build certain memories of a group. Assmann20 argued that stories have their plots and themes and that the way they tell the stories are certainly driven by their cultural narratives.21 We can find symbols from conveyed language and narrative, as Bruner22 pointed out: “our mind needs cultural symbols to express”. Therefore, however we try to make relations and whichever way we try to relate, we have these tools at our disposal. Hence, a society or a particular group tells its story by using narratives and via its cultural framework.23 Stories can be a problem-solving strategy and can make use of the present situation for the validation of experiences.2425 Therefore, it drove many researchers to investigate narratives and how we talk about current events and not just to focus on what is being said, to construct ‘an unmatched opening into opinions or subjective experience’.26
20 Jan Assmann, John Czaplicka, “Collective Memory And Cultural Identity”, in: New German Critique, vol. 65, no. 1, 1995, p. 133. 21 Luisa Passerini, Fascism In Popular Memory: The Cultural Experience Of The Turin Working Class, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 46. 22 Jerome Burner, “Life as Narrative”, in: Social Research,vol. 54, no. 1, 1987, p. 31. 23 Robyn Ramsden, Damien Ridge, “It Was The Most Beautifull Country I Have Ever Seen: The Role Of Somali Narratives In Adapting To A New Country”, in: Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 26, no. 2, 2012, p. 231. 24 Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 29. 25 P. Allotey, L. Manderson, “Storytelling, Marginality And Community In Australia: How immigrants position their Difference In Health Care Settings”, in: Medical Anthropology, vol. 21, no. 2, 2003, p. 21. 26 Richard Ocheberg, “Life, Stories and The Psychological Construction Of Cares”, in: Journal of Personality, vol. 56, no. 1, 1988, p. 175.
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By recalling experiences and making choices on narratives, individuals or people at times could retake control over their life after any major events like displacement or any kind of disaster; the term ‘survivorship’ is meant to interpret how people could take control of their life. Ramsden,27 in a study on narratives, came out with a proposition that what we exclude or include in narrativization, how we plot things and how they are interpreted depends on human agency and imagination. Among the immigrants, storytelling, at times, highlights their resettlement aspirations and their attempts to construct or reconstruct identity, which creates an opportunity to design a vision for the future. Hence, the focus of this study is to gather narratives in order to comprehend the experiences from the refugee centre and from their life in a new country and to gather memories of their own country so that it could resonate with asylum seekers and refugees in Estonia.
Narrativization and memory sharing
Existing literature regarding memory tends to indicate that individuals try to reconstruct and restore order by using memory, which helps
27 Robyn Ramsden, Damien Ridge, op. cit., p. 226.
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them integrate their past in a recent context.282930 Agnew31 stated that ‘our memories can generate new definition and sense of our understanding for our past and also for our present’. Refugees have complicated ways to explain their experiences and to assert a specific place as their homeland. Malkki,32 in a study on refugees, pointed out that ‘because of the mobile nature of people and because of being displaced, they continuously invent homes and homeland, while it is impossible to stay in their past land or territories. Transnational families reconstruct their identity while in search of a home and homeland and, at times, build a vessel for immigrant’s belongings and non-belongings when in search for a place which can be called as home.3334Levitt35 even wrote a report entitled ‘Transnational migrants: when home means more than one country”, where respondents stated their homeland is not just a place where they are being born, it has emotion and feeling of attachment in it.
28 Vijay Agnew, Diaspora, Memory And Identity: A Search For Home, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2005, p. 3. 29 Liisa Malkki, “National Geographic: The Rooting Of People And The Territorialization Of National Identity Among Scholars And Refugees”, in: Cultural Anthropology, vol. 7, no. 1, 1992, p. 37. 30 Paolo Jedlowski , “Memory And Sociology: Themes and Issues”, in: Time and Society, vol. 10, no. 1, 2001, p. 31. 31 Vijay Agnew, op. cit., p.20. 32 Liisa Malkki, op. cit., p. 41. 33Anastasi Christou , “Deciphering Diaspora-Translating Transnationalism: Family Dynamics, Identity Construction And The Legacy Of ‘Home’ In Second Generation Greek- American Return Migration”, in: Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 29, no. 6, 2006, p. 1046. 34 Constance Sutton, “Celebrating Ourselves: The Family Reunion Rituals Of African Caribbean Transnational Families”, in: Global Networks, vol. 3, 2004, no. 2 , p. 244. 35 Peggy Levit, “Transnational Migrants: When Home Means More Than One Country”, Migration Policy Institute, 1 October 2004, available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/transnational-migrants-when-home-means-more- one-country, accessed on 10 December 2016.
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The argument that Halbwachs36 put forward on the subject of memories is quite significant. Individuals tend to remember and locate their memories through their group memberships, religious identity or the class with which they are affiliated. Kinship is also another aspect through which an individual could gain and remember memories. Schwartz37 argued that memory is not something which is static; rather he argued that it comes out as a result of dynamic influences or interactions between and among members of a community. We, as an individual or group, tend to forget and reinterpret our past and invent new aspects of our life through shared common experiences.38 It is quite evident that much of what we remember or what comes out as memory is actually influenced by our membership or families, different social groups or societies, in what Zerubavel39 termed ‘mnemonic socialization’. When we remember something from our past, we try to recall it through what our parents and elderly people told us and, through enduring memories, we try to identify ourselves. In this study, I started with the premise that memory is a complicated matrix of narratives, in terms of current or present requisite both at collective and individual level.40 This study focused, on the one hand, on the narratives of asylum seekers and refugees (considering them a group of refugees) and, on the other hand, on their resettlement in Estonia. The focus is on the reconstruction of
36 Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, New York, Harper and Row, 1980, p. 18. 37 Barry Schwartz, “Post Modernity And Historical Reputation: Abraham Lincoln In Late Twentieth Century American Memory”, in: Social Forces, vol. 77, no. 1, 1998, p. 100. 38 David Middleton, Derek Edwards, Collective Remembering, London, Sage, 1990, p. 8. 39 Eviatar Zarubavel , “Social Memories: Steps To A Sociology Of The Past”, in: Qualitative Sociology, vol. 19, no. 3, 1996, p. 290. 40 Robyn Ramsden, Damien Ridge, op. cit., p. 228.
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memories and narratives so that they can be considered a vehicle of combined management issues in the present. Therefore, this study attempted to investigate how refugees in Estonia form connections with each other, as well as their experiences and sense of belonging in a new country, through storytelling and memories of past and present.
Methods
Selection of participants Field work was carried in two different periods: from March 2015 to May 2015 and from December 2016 to January 2017. The Vao centre, which is the house for asylum seekers and refugees in Estonia, was selected for field work. Police and border guards gave permission to carry out field work and afterwards good communication was established with the manager of the centre. The Vao centre currently houses 72 persons: out of those, 54 are asylum seekers and 19 are refugees with a residence permit, from different ethnic groups. At present, the centre accommodates persons from 16 different countries: Iraq, Ukraine, Palestine, Georgia, Armenia, Sri Lanka, India, Afghanistan, Albania, Sudan, Iran, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Somalia, Bangladesh and Syria. The centre houses 15 women, there are 24 children and 11 families. According to the UNHCR definition, “an asylum seeker is someone whose request for sanctuary has yet to be processed, while refugees are people fleeing conflict or persecution. They are defined and protected in
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international law and must not be expelled or returned to situations where their life and freedom are at risk”. However, according to Estonian law, an asylum seeker is someone who has applied for protection and a refugee is someone who gained protection and has been given a residence permit card with all other facilities that a permanent residence in Estonia receives. In this study, both asylum seekers and refugees are considered refugees,41 since they have common feelings of being displaced from their homeland and of living in an accommodation centre while in exile. The findings of this study are based on group interviews with 24 refugees. 19 were men and 5 were women. They originated from Sri Lanka (3), India (2), Iraq (3), Syria (4), Sudan (4), Afghanistan (2), Albania (4), Cameroon (1), Bangladesh (2), Ivory Coast (1) and Palestine (2). 18 of the 24 participants among the group interview agreed (16 men and 2 women from Sri Lanka, India, Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Syria) to be interviewed individually. Interviews that were carried individually were conducted with 8 key informants who were selected as a result of observation and also suggested by other fellow refugees. These 8 key informants originated from Bangladesh, India, Iraq, Sudan and Syria.
41 Annette A. M. Gerritsen, Inge Bramsen, Walter Deville, Loes H. M. van Willigen, Johannes E. Hovens, Henk M. van der Ploeg, “Physical And Mental Health Of Afghan, Iranian And Somali Asylum Seekers And Refugees Living In The Netherlands”, in: Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, vol. 41, no. 1, 2006, p. 20.
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Collection of Data It is difficult to access refugees and often they are termed ‘invisible actors’.42 In a country like Estonia, immigrants from third countries can be identified easily, as the number of immigrants from outside of Europe is very small.43 At the same time, refugees are very hard to access for research purposes, as Bond and Voutria44 proposed: ‘perhaps they are visible and can be identified but largely inaccessible for researcher for different reasons’. Refugees are given a support person in Estonia to help them get their primary information and support and to get settled in Estonia. I secured a connection with such a support person; through them, access to the Vao centre became possible and I also gained access to the participants. A two-month stay at the Vao centre and living like them helped build a relationship with them: “This assisted in creating bonds of trust and facilitated openness and engagement in the research process”.45 Throughout the study, notes were taken at all times and all the events that took place during the field work, as well as all the interactions among them were observed and have been included in the analysis. A semi-structured approach was taken to conduct both group and individual interviews,46 to be able to switch off to the story-line mood of communication; open-ended questions were utilized, which helps participants address certain aspects of their story
42 Voutira Bond, “In Research Of Invisible Actors: Barriers To Access In Refugee Research”, in: Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 20, no. 2, 2007, p. 283. 43 Aminul Islam , “Refugee Quota: Is Estonia Ready To Receive Refugees?...“, p. 285. 44 Voutira Bond, op. cit., p. 283. 45 Robyn Ramsden, Damien Ridge, op. cit., p. 242. 46 Norman Denzin, Yvonna Lincoln, Handbook Of Qualitative Research, London, Sage, 1994, p. 11.
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regarding the migration process, their settlement experiences and the set up they had been through. To elicit narratives of their past and presents situations, they were asked to envision their aspiration for the future. Participants had enough time to express their lives in their own way of speaking, so that whatever aspect significant for the study would come out. This also helped in collecting narratives on issues that concerned them. Since the participants were placed in a detention centre before they were sent to the Vao centre where this study was carried out, the stories had a starting point relevant to this study. Phenomena included communication, treatment, migration and settlement issues in a new country and views about detention, the current centre and the country where they currently live. Group interviews lasted around two hours; they were recorded in audio format and the permission was taken from both the centre manager and from the participants. All the interviews were conducted in English, except two individual interviews that were conducted in Bangla, the language this investigator speaks as well. All individual participants were fluent in English, which helped them express their narratives and give voice to their concern. All the notes were taken in Bangla and then translated and transcribed in English. Most of the individual interviews were around 40 minutes long and some of them even lasted for more than two hours while lunch or dinner was taken together with the participants. To collect narratives, individual interviews were very significant. These individual interviews not only helped highlight new insights, but also contributed to the validation of the data obtained from group interview.
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Analysis After transcribing the interviews, they were checked by the participants for any kind of misconceptions and for accuracy. All the names in the analysis are anonymous. Transcripts were checked and rechecked to inspect any common design of themes in order to create narratives47 and to highlight the differences in content. Transcripts were continuously reviewed and categorized to identify links between categories.48 The main analysis of narratives based on their present and past experiences was carried out from the final categorization.
Limitation Most of the participants were men and it might be the case that the findings of this analysis relate their views. While a diverse sample of participants were interviewed from different countries and different ethnic groups, this study did not set out to accentuate the difference between these participants, rather considered them a set group of refugees. Furthermore, this study did not intend to generalize the findings to all refugees in Estonia but to explore the situations of refugees’ lives in the Vao centre and to prioritize their own constructed narratives.
47 Janice Morse, Peggy-Anne Field, Nusing Research: The Application Of Qualitative Approaches, London, Chapman and Hall, 1995, p. 29. 48 Sullivan Browne, “Analyzing In Depth Interview Data Using Grounded Theory“, in: V. Minichiello, G. Sullivan, K. Greenwood and R. Axford (eds.), Handbook for research methods in health sciences, Sydney, New South Wales, Addison Wesley Longman Australia pty. Ltd, 1999, p. 49.
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Findings
Collective narratives have been evident in spite of the fact that they come from different backgrounds and because they mentioned idyllic interactions both in cultural and social dimensions with their own community before being displaced, which include support and strong family ties. Their country was rendered a place for joy and peace despite being displaced from its territory. Through observation, we can see that their memories of their former life are “attractive” and that they have a sense of belonging and safety when it comes to their country of origin:
When my country was stable and everything was running smoothly, it was very nice and lovely. The environment was nice and weather was so good that you could go anywhere by walking and could spend time on the street, talk with other people, even with strangers. You would find nice foods on the street and they would be fresh.49
All participants, despite their cultural and social diverseness, referred to strong family bonding and family support, involving unity and being part of an extended family. Family plays an important part of storytelling when it comes to their everyday life and, whenever they got the chance to express it, they mentioned it with joy. Supporting each other was, also, an obligation:
If you get married, you don’t get out of home, you rather stay at home. It’s our tradition. Sometimes only one member is working and the rest are enjoying their life being part of the family. We take care of each other. As a part of an extended family, you contribute to your family in many ways. If you have a job, you contribute financially; if you stay at home you cook, you clean the house
49 Sohan, 31, from Iraq.
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and sometimes we just offer company to others. There is no depression because we always discuss with each other and problems can be solved this way.50
Not only family interactions, but also activities taking place outside the home are considered socializing by the participants. The concept of ‘community’ is regarded as the sum of interactions with neighbours and relatives. Peaceful and happy interactions with the neighbours are, also, a central part of their memory.
You actually know everyone who is your neighbour. Children used to play with them outside. Elders gossip at home with other neighbours. It is a beautiful culture. If a new neighbour comes into the locality, we try to get to know them by inviting them and sometimes they also invite others. As the weather is good and warm, you do not need to stay at home all the time, so you know all other homes and their members while you are out in the street and spend time outside home. You can even sit under a lamppost together and talk.51
The participants spoke of their relationship with their neighbours in a way that emphasized social interaction as the central part of their everyday life:
While cooking something, if you discovered you don’t have salt at home, you do not go to the shop. You turn to your neighbour. We, at times, go to the market together and even exchange things with each other.52
The reasons for migration and their trajectories differ considerably; their narratives were linked to the memories of being displaced and positive relationships with family and community in their homeland. When pushed
50 Sahed, 28, from Sri Lanka. 51 Rahim, 35, Sudan. 52 Rahela, 28, Afghanistan.
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and asked about their displacement period and difficulties that they have been through, five participants explained elaborately how their situations changed during the difficult period in relations to safety. At the same time, they concentrate their focus on the period before the difficulties and on their memories of a beautiful country. Their way of describing their home then becomes a version of a past in which they could live.5354 The period of difficulties in their homeland highlights their longing for the past and all the memories they have to offer of their homeland are before the troubled times:
I have two kinds of stories or memories: the first kind is from before I was displaced and the other kind refers to when everything was running good in my country. My country was the most amazing country that I could ever find. I do not say that I do not like Estonia but your homeland is your homeland and you know every bit of it.55
Participants in this study focused on positive narratives of their country in opposition to some studies on migration.56 Participants did recognize their countries’ situations and how unsafe it is for them, but then turned to memories of their happiness:
53 David Field, “The Peaceful Past Of The Violent Present “, in: Howarth, D.R. and A. J. Norval (eds.), South Africa In Transition: New Theoretical Perspectives, New York, St Martin Press, 1998, p. 29. 54 Refslund Sorensen, “The Experience Of Displacement: Reconstructing Places And Identities In Sri Lanka”, in: K. F. Olwigand K. Hastrupo (eds.), Siting Culture: The Shifting Anthropological Object, London, Routledge, 1997, p. 9. 55 Saherfrom Albania. 56 Louise Ryan, “Family Matters: (E)migration, Familial Networks And Irish Women In Britain”, in: The Sociological Review, vol. 52, no. 1, 2004, p. 366.
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There is no proper government because of the war but still when I remember my country I can feel happiness. I was always laughing back home. I cannot remember the last time I laughed here in Estonia.57
Living in the detention centre Most participants had to stay in the detention centre, which they termed as ‘prison’, before they were placed at the Vao centre – their current accommodation. Hence, most participants had a starting point for their story on Estonia and for their narratives. Stories oftheir refugee status included mostly the period they spent in the detention centre, waiting to be transferred to the Vao centre where this research was carried out; this helps frame their narrative in Estonia:
Once you left your country without a passport and you are placed in a prison, being a refugee becomes your only identity. You are a refugee and spend your time with other people in the prison who do not have any option to go anywhere but to stay in a prison. So, you are in the middle of an ocean.58
A number of participants told stories about the treatment they received, about not feeling human in the detention centre and how it keeps haunting them, which makes it difficult to cope even when they are placed in a relatively nice place to stay.
It is a nice place. You can go to the shop, buy things and eat. You are given money and you can sleep and talk with your family members back home. While I was in the prison, I was given the chance to talk with my family only once a week and that, too, only for five minutes with my own money. There was no internet, no communication tools. I felt trapped, like when a mouse gets caught in a box.59
57 Asfaq, 31, from Iraq. 58 Ruhan, 31, from Iran. 59 Viki, 38, from India.
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A number of participants continue to have those feelings of not fitting in and being trapped in the middle of nowhere. They did not refer to themselves as being victims of racism, but the participants’ stories generated narratives of racism overall. As part of research on Finnish immigrants, Alitolppa-Niitamo60 found out that, in Finland, Somali refugees are being treated more negatively than any other immigrant group. In spite of the Estonian government focusing on multiculturalism, it was evident from stories told by the participants that they had their own narratives on the local structure:
In the detention centre, even the amount of food was so low that you would feel hungry all the time. The same food was given to all kinds of people. Does not matter how big or small you are and how much need you have, you will get the same quantity. I was still relatively lucky as I am not black. I think black refugees from Africa were treated even worse and refugees from Europe who look like them were treated much better than us.61
Stories told by the participants indicated that their label of refugee will not vanish and that this identity might place them in a vulnerable situation to cope with and to adapt into a new society. Bhabha(1994)62 stated that attempts to change the status within ‘the border-line community migration’ would not be successful. Vulnerability might be influenced by their economic condition, cultural standpoint, religious belief and skin
60 Anne Alitolppa-Niitamo “Somali Youth And The Context Of Schooling In Metropolitan Helsinki: A Framework Accessing Variability In Educational Program”, in: Journal Of Ethnic And Migration Studies, vol. 30, no. 1, 2003, p. 86. 61 Srimohan, 26, from Sri Lanka. 62 Homi Bhabha, The location of culture, London, Routledge, 1994, p. 22.
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colour, as Fangene63 stated that refugees from Somalia might face a more vulnerable situation than others because of their dire financial condition and their poor standard of living.
I tried to find an apartment in town for my family after getting the permission and residence permit. But I could not find any. Initially house owners seemed willing to rent it out to me, but whenever I told them that I am a refugee, they switched off. I think it would be the same case when I will start looking for a job.64
Being classed as refugees and the memories from the detention centre became the centre narratives for some participants, which even influenced two of the participants to change their status. Treatment by the host societies and the prejudice that they receive might reinforce their ethnic identity.65 While two participants decided to change their residence status, narratives about their homeland continued:
In my opinion, it would be very hard to fit in this society as a refugee. My appearance is different in this country. Not all people are bad here. Some are very good but some just do not accept us. I cannot forget the treatment that I received in the detention centre. I do not think even in my country in a normal situation people will be treated as badly. I have decided to find work. I am educated. If a get a proper job, I will stay here as a worker not as a refugee I will then apply for different kind of residence permit.66
Feelings of anxiety and being ignored by society and by the human rights organizations was evident. Participants continued their narratives on
63 Katrin Fangene, “Humiliation Experienced By Somali Refugees In Norway”, in: Journal Of Refugee Studies, vol. 19, no. 1, 2006, p. 72. 64 Nish, 23, from Afghanistan. 65 Katrin Fangene, op. cit.,p. 88. 66 Sm, 21, from Afganistan.
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institution and related their memories regarding what they faced at the detention centre. One participant even asked this researcher to do field work in the detention centre: ‘since you are researching us, you better visit the prison to see the real scenario. We are far better here at the Vao centre’.67
Feeling lost and life in Estonia
Before arriving in Estonia, I imagined that it would be a very beautiful, nice European country. It is more difficult being away from my homeland than I anticipated. I have to accept it and will have to recognize that I am here and I have to get used to it but I miss my life back in my country.68
Their memories from the past in relation to their family and community drove their experiences of their current life in Estonia. In a migratory situation, identification and habituation takes place in sites, referred by Christou69 when he carried out research on Greek migrants. Trying to find their identity and their feelings of belonging are not restricted by the home or the host societies. One Sudanese participant stated that:
I have lost all my family members, my relatives and even my neighbourhood back home, but I had a beautiful life there. My memories are now my asset. They belong to me and I would live my life with all these memories.70
As participants are quite detached from their networks back home, they conveyed the message of being alone, feeling sad while living in Estonia
67 Meraj, 30, from Iraq. 68 Raihan, 22, from Palestine. 69Anastasi Christou , op. cit., p. 1045. 70 Johny, 24, from Sudan.
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and a sense of disconnection. Despite the fact that once they were placed in the accommodation centre after the detention period, they had the global communication system in the form of internet and other tools, they still felt disconnected from their former networks. Their sense of family and community still manifested:
The fact is: in our country, we live in an extended family, here we have to live like a nuclear family. I cannot have all my family members or neighbours here.71
Their sense of “self” and the culture of individualism was invented by most participants when they arrived in the accommodation centre in Estonia. Most participants told stories which focused on collectiveness, rather than individual self. Participants were informed that they had to focus on their own self, rather than others or any country mate:
Once I asked our accommodation centre’s manager to provide four pieces of bed sheets for the four of us from Sudan, I was told that I should only ask for myself. If the rest needed something, they should come and ask themselves. In our country, we do not feel this way. Even if you are not a family member, if you are just person they know, you could still do things collectively.72
In spite of the difficulties that the participants faced at the detention centre and their feelings of not fitting in, narratives indicate that many participants are trying to cope with their new atmosphere and are optimistic in the sense that they have to re-establish themselves in this new country and have to build a community feeling with other migrants or fellow refugees.
71 Rahima, 29, from Palestine. 72 Johny, 26, from Sudan.
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Their collective narratives from back home are significant here and build a network through which refugees in Estonia can cope in a new environment:
We need to come forward and, thankfully; we know each other there at the detention centre and, also, here at the accommodation centre. We have to work together and should help each other if any problems arise. We need to find a way to build a strong refugee community in Estonia, so we could help each other and could show the world that we are doing well.73
Respondents also focused on the language and the hope to gain better understanding of Estonian culture and system. This would help them have a better outlook for themselves and their children. Many participants had the idea that settling in this country depended on learning the language and forming relationships not only with their own refugee community members, but also with host community:
Going to school is important. There you learn the language and also you might have option to build up friendships with others. My children are going to school and I am hopeful they will have a better future in this country.74
Discussion
Participants conveyed their stories in connection to the nature of their detention centre and also the accommodation centre where they were placed afterwards. The argument can be made that their glamorized memories of their homeland could be an obstacle to adapting in Estonia. This analysis presents the role of memories and the narratives in explaining refugees.
73 Jetendro, 29, from India. 74 A mother from Albania.
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Refugees are presented as significant agents with their own capabilities and resources; at the same time, we should recognize that they have lost many things back home and that they have better experiences in the back of their mind. The outcome of this process of storytelling and creating narratives was not designed to prompt any policy making, but to provide an insight into the ways refugees in Estonia think of their country and construct narratives of adapting in Estonia; as Green75 pointed out, “a sense of coherent identity can be provided by composing our past”. This study also tried to identify how their social connections at the detention centre make them construct a certain narrative of the host country via their storytelling. The participants’ experiences in the past and present, along with their identity and the creation of narratives, are interconnected. The findings of this study suggest that the participants could be termed as doubly- marginalized people, if we take into consideration, on the one hand, their condition as refugees and of being displaced from their own country and, on the other hand, not being treated the way they expected in a European country and being forced to cope with living in a new country. This situation would be conducive to them creating narratives that enforce this feeling of marginalization, which is different from the findings of some other previous researchers.7677At the same time, many participants could create new narratives to help them combine past and current situations in order to cope in a new land.
75 Anna Green, “Individual Remembering and Collective Memory: Theoretical Presuppositions and Contemporary Debates”, in: Oral history, vol. 32, no. 2, 2004, p. 37. 76 Katrin Fangene, op. cit., p. 75. 77 Robyn Ramsden, Damien Ridge, op. cit., p. 229.
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This study analyzes how participants construct their past in an idealistic way. This might highlight the manner in which the construction is important for adapting to their present situation, where the narrative of their homeland becomes the basis on which they will re-establish themselves in a new country. These findings can be matched with findings that Eastmond,78 Chamberlain and Leydesdorff79 drew in their research, pointing out that resorting to familiarity is a means of coping. Understanding the participants’ present experiences surrounding the detention centre, how they tell their stories around it and how they frame it negatively were the key points of the investigation. The refugee status became the central point of their stories when asked about the experiences of being a refugee. This might be a healthy argument for researchers who deal with refugees and, also, for policy makers who are tasked with resolving these issues. Islam,80 in his study on Estonia, pointed out that little research has been carried out on refugees in Estonia, while Estonia is receiving quota refugees and that “the question that can be asked is whether Estonia is ready to receive quota refugees who will mostly have backgrounds from outside Europe”.
78 Drik Eastmond, “Reconstructing Life: Chilean Refugee Women and the Dilemmas of Exile”, in: G. Buijis (ed.), Migrant Women, Oxford, UK, Berg, 1993, p. 30. 79 Mary Chamberlain, Selma Leydesdorff, op. cit., p. 229. 80 Aminul Islam “Refugee Quota: Is Estonia Ready To Receive Refugees?...”, p. 287.
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***, Refugee crisis, Republic of Estonia Government, available at https://valitsus.ee/en/refugees#statistics. Alitolppa-Niitamo, Anne, “Somali Youth and The Context of Schooling in Metropolitan Helsinki: A Framework Accessing Variability in Educational Program”, in: Journal of ethnic and migration studies, vol. 30, no. 1, 2003. Assmann, Jan, Czaplicka, John, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity”, in: New German Critique, vol. 65, no. 1, 1995. Bhabha, Homi, The location of culture, London, Routledge, 1994. Bond, Voutira, “In Research of Invisible Actors: Barriers to Access in Refugee Research”, in: Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 20, no.2, 2007. Bourgeais, Vincent, Asylum in the EU. The number of asylum applicants in the EU jumped to more than 625 000 in 2014, Eurostat Press Office, 20 March 2015, available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/6751779/3- 20032015-BP-EN.pdf/35e04263-2db5-4e75-b3d3-6b086b23ef2b. Brubaker, Rogers. “The Diaspora Diaspora”, in: Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 28, no. 1, 2005. Buijis, G. (ed), Migrant women, Oxford, UK, Berg, 1993. Burner, Jerome, “Life as Narrative”, in: Social Research, vol.54, no. 1, 1987. Chamberlain, Mary, Leydesdorff, Selma, “Transnational Families: Memories and Narratives”, in: Global Networks, vol. 4, no.3, 2004. Christou, Anastasi, “(Re) collecting memories: (Re)constructing identities and recreating national national landscapes; Spatial belongingness, cultural dislocation and the search for home in narratives of diaspora journeys”, in: International journal of humanities, vol. 1, no 1, 2003. Christou, Anastasi, “Deciphering Diaspora-Translating Transnationalism: Family dynamics, identity construction and the legacy of ‘home’ in second generation Greek-American return migration”, in: Ethnic and Racial studies, vol. 29, no. 6, 2006. Cohen, Robin, “Diasporas and the Nation State: From Victims to Challengers”, in: International Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, 1996. Connerton, Paul, How Societies Remember, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989.
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Fangen, Katrine, “Humiliation Experienced by Somali Refugees in Norway”, in: Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 19, no. 1, 2006. Farah, Nuruddin, Yesterday, Tomorrow: Voices from the Somali Diaspora, London and New York,Cassell, 2000. Gerritsen, Annette AM; Bramsen, Inge; Deville, Walter; van Willigen, Loes HM; Hovens, Johannes E.; van der Ploeg, Henk M, “Physical and Mental Health of Afghan, Iranian and Somali Asylum Seekers and Refugees Living in the Netherlands”, in: Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, vol. 41, no. 1, 2006. Green, Anna, “Individual Remembering and Collective Memory: Theoretical Presuppositions and Contemporary Debates”, in: Oral History, vol. 32, no. 2, 2004. Halbwachs, Maurice, The collective memory, Ney York, Harper and Row, 1980. Howarth, D.R. and Norval, A.J. (eds), South Africa in transition: New theoretical perspectives, New York, St Martin Press, 1998. Islam, Aminul, “Refugee Quota: Is Estonia Ready to Receive Refugees? A Review of the Literature on Migration and Ethnic Minorities in Estonia”, in: International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, vol. 53, no. 3, 2016. Islam, Aminul, “A study of South Asian Refugees Settlement Experiences in Estonia”, in: Khazar Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, vol. 19, no. 2, 2016. Jedlowski, Paolo, “Memory and Sociology: Themes and Issues”, in: Time and Society, vol. 10, no. 1, 2001. Levit, Peggy, “Transnational Migrants: When Home Means More Than One Country”, Migration Policy Institute, 1 October 2004, available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/transnational-migrants- when-home-means-more-one-country. Malkki, Liisa, “National Geographic: The Rooting of People and The Territorialization of National Identity Among Scholars and Refugees”, in: Cultural Anthropology, vol. 7, no. 1, 1992. Manderson, L., Allotey, P., “Storytelling, Marginality and Community in Australia: How Immigrants Position Their Difference in Health Care Settings”, in: Medical Anthropology, vol. 21, no 1, 2003. Masso, Anu, “A Readiness to Accept Immigrants in Europe? Individual and Country-Level Characteristics”, in: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 3, no. 2, 2009.
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Middleton, David, Edwards, Derek, Collective Remembering, London, Sage, 1990. Minichiello, V., Sullivan, G., Greenwood, K. and Axford, R. (eds), Handbook for research methods in health sciences, Sydney, New South Wales, Addison-Wesley Longman Australia pty. Ltd, 1999. Morse, Janice, Field, Peggy-Anne, Nusing Research: The Application of Qualitative Approaches, London, Chapman and Hall, 1995. Norman, Denzin, Lincoln, Yvonna, Handbook of Qualitative research, London, Sage, 1994. Ocheberg, Richard, “Life, Stories and the Psychological Construction of Cares. Journal of Personality, vol. 56, no. 1, 1988. Olwig, K. F and Hastrupo, K. (eds.), Siting culture: The shifting Anthropological object, London, Routledge, 1997. Passerini, Luisa, Fascism in Popular Memory: The Cultural Experience of the Turin Working Class, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987. Ramsden, Robyn, Ridge, Damien, “It Was The Most Beautiful Country I Have Ever Seen: The Role of Somali Narratives in Adapting to a New Country”, in: Journal of Refugee studies, vol. 26, no. 2, 2012. Ryan Louise, “Family Matters: (E)migration, Familial Networks And Irish Women In Britain”, in: The Sociological Review, vol. 52, no. 1, 2004. Schwartz, Barry, “Post Modernity and Historical Reputation: Abraham Lincoln in Late Twentieth Century American Memory”, in: Social Forces, vol. 77, no. 1, 1998. Sutton, Constance, “Celebrating ourselves: The family reunion rituals of African Caribbean Transnational Families”, in: Global Networks, vol. 3, no. 2, 2004. Thompson, A and Perks, R. (eds.), The Oral History Reader, London, Routledge, 1998. Vijay, Agnew, Diaspora, Memory and Identity: A Search For Home, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2005. Zarubavel, Eviatar, “Social Memories: Steps to a Sociology of the Past”, in: Qualitative sociology, vol. 19, no. 3, 1996.
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The 2014 Teluk Intan parliamentary by-election in Malaysia Ariff Aizuddin Azlan* Zulkanain Abdul Rahman* Mohammad Tawfik Yaakub*
Abstract: Democracy, by definition, is fit to be perceived as the equality of political right. The 2014 Teluk Intan parliamentary by-election contributed towards improving the indicator of democracy. This by-election also witnessed a direct contest between GERAKAN, one of BN component parties, and DAP, a member of the opposition PR coalitions. This paper analyses that this by-election had posed serious formidable challenges for both competing parties. It also looks at the campaign strategies and issues during the ongoing campaign sessions. The result, however, did not reflect the expectations held by the DAP, as it thought that it could maintain the present status quo. The study concluded that, instead of achieving electoral victory, DAP was caught in its internal unexpected crisis, irrespective of the PR coalition members, and, thus, failed to retain its former seat within the context of parliamentary democracy.
Keywords: Pakatan Rakyat, by-election, Teluk Intan, Barisan Nasional, Malaysia
* Ariff Aizuddin Azlan is a PhD candidate in Malaysian Politics at the Department of History, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya (UM). E-mail: [email protected]. * Dr. Zulkanain Abdul Rahman is an Associate Professor in the Department of History, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya (UM). E-mail: [email protected]. * Mohammad Tawfik Yaakub is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the Institute of Graduate Studies (IGS), University of Malaya (UM). E-mail: [email protected].
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Introduction
A by-election is usually held whenever a seat is declared vacant due to certain inevitable reasons such as death, constitutional disqualification and many more. For Muhammad A. Hakim, a by-election is often treated as a barometer for testing an incumbent government’s degree of popularity, especially in a democratic parliamentary system.1 Within Malaysia’s political terrain, the conduct of elections has always been a source of struggle between the competing political parties, especially in the post-2008 general elections, where it had witnessed the tremendous shift of votes from the dominant ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) to a unified opposition Pakatan Rakyat (PR), consisting of Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and Democratic Action Party (DAP). The same episode was repeated again in the 2013 general elections, proving that the opposition, PR, could maintain their electoral grip even though they did not get the two-thirds majority in the Parliament. The by-election was called soon after Seah Long Peng, Teluk Intan Member of Parliament (MP) from the opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP), died of cancer. That same month, the state of Perak had witnessed its first by-election after the sensational May 2013 general election took place. The Teluk Intan by-election was the fourth by- election held since the general elections and it revealed a direct contest between the opposition Pakatan Rakyat’s (People’s Coalition / PR)
1 Muhammad A. Hakim, “The Mirpur Parliamentary By-Election In Bangladesh”, in: Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 8, 1994, pp. 738 - 747.
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component party, the Democratic Action Party (DAP), on the one hand, and, on the other, the Barisan Nasional (National Front / BN) component party, Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysia People’s Movement Party / GERAKAN). The purpose of this paper is to analyze the 2014 Teluk Intan by-election for the Parliament of Malaysia, held on May 31. The ruling BN was almost electorally wiped out from Malaysia’s politics when it achieved catastrophic results in two consecutive general elections (2008-2013).
The Teluk Intan By-Election
Malaysia practices parliamentary democracy as part of its political system. It consists of thirteen different states and Teluk Intan is a parliamentary constituency situated in the Malaysia’s state of Perak. Perak’s politics had been robustly dominated by the ruling BN government for a very long time, as recorded by any academic research. After the 2008 general elections concluded, a remarkable change in the nomenclature of Malaysian politics occurred, where the state of Perak fell into the hands of the opposition coalition, PR. The 2008 elections marked the end of the ruling government BN’s dominance within an embedded milieu of Malaysia’s political setting. Even though BN, as the most dominant coalition, had proven successful, based on its remarkable performance in the 2004 general elections, provided with its own sound electoral machineries utilized during the previous elections held, it was still vulnerable and could be defeated in terms of seats contested. BN unexpectedly secured the 2008 general elections by an uncanny reduced majority. The results indicated that the BN slightly grabbed
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133 out of 222 parliamentary seats, while the opposition coalition PR managed to garner a surprised total of 89 out of 222 parliamentary seats,2 compared to their electoral performance before the 2008 general elections. As observed by a political scientist, the outcome of 2008 general elections was perfectly referred to as a “political tsunami”.3 The reason behind the profound vista was that democracy was finally tested and survived, even though the opposition coalition PR did not fully capture the total of contested seats at the parliamentary level. The 2008 elections results indicated that the legitimacy of the ruling BN government was truly challenged. The situation somehow gave opportunities for the opposition- controlled states to amend or to approve any incoming constitutional amendments. The opposition coalition was actually formed when the top three opposition political parties, namely the DAP, PKR and PAS came to some sort of understanding by forming a political alliance known as Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Alliance) (PR) on 1 April 2008. As for the state of Perak, one of PR controlled-states, this was the only state that triggered a political crisis. The crisis was politically engineered and announced, on February 4, 2009, by Najib Tun Razak, then Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia and it took place two months before Najib became the Prime Minister. Three PR state assemblymen - Hee Yit Foong (Jelapang / DAP), Jamaluddin Mohd Radzi (Behrang / PKR), and Mohd Osman Jailu
2 M. Moniruzzaman, “The 13th Malaysian General Election: Uncertainties and Expectations”, in: Intellectual Discourse, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2013, pp. 55 - 70. 3 Abdul Rashid Moten, “Changing Political Culture and Electoral Behavior in Malaysia”, in: Asian Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2011, pp. 39 - 56.
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(Changkat Jering / PKR) - turned their back on BN and it resulted in a lack of numbers for PR to command the majority in the Perak’s state legislative assembly or (Dewan Undangan Negeri / DUN). The Perak state government had to deal with a total of 28 out of 59 seats in DUN. As a result of this sudden defection, the current PR Menteri Besar (Chief Minister / MB) Mohammad Nizar Jamaluddin immediately responded to this situation of political anathema by approaching the monarch of Perak, Sultan Azlan Shah, to have the state assemblies dissolved in order to organize a snap election, but the Sultan went against the wish of PR. Even worse, Nizar’s and the rest of his state cabinet were called to resign due to the insufficient majority in the DUN. In the middle of the crisis, the opportunity was immediately grabbed by the ruling BN government, where Najib and all 31 BN state assemblymen had a meeting with the Sultan. The meeting yielded an unremarkable result for the PR led-government when the Sultan appointed Zambry Abdul Kadir, BN assemblyman, for the state constituency of Pangkor, to lead a new line up the ruling BN state government.4
4 Kuek Ser Kuang Keng, “By-Election 4, P59 Bukit Gantang, Perak, March 29 - April 7, 2009”, in: Wong Chin Huat and Soon Li Tsin (eds.), Democracy at Stake?: Examining 16 By-Elections In Malaysia, 2008-2011, Petaling Jaya, Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, 2012, pp. 68 - 70.
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Figure 1: P76 Teluk Intan Parliamentary Constituency
Source: Malaysian Election Data, available at http://undi.info/perak/p/2008/P76. Note: P76 is a codename for the electoral parliamentary constituency of Teluk Intan.
Electoral Constituencies in the State of Perak
Electorally, the state of Perak has 24 parliamentary seats and 59 seats in DUN. Since the 2013 general elections, the ruling BN government dominated almost all parliamentary seats in the state of Perak. At DUN level, the dominance of ruling BN government had the same grip and it captured almost all state seats. Teluk Intan is a parliamentary constituency and it is comprised of two state constituencies: N55 Pasir Bedemar and N56 Changkat Jong. The Teluk Intan parliamentary seat has been under the grip of PR (DAP) twice since the 2008 and 2013 general elections with different
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candidates having contested it. In 2008, M. Manogaran from DAP managed to win the seat over from BN (GERAKAN) candidate, Mah Siew Keong, who is currently a president for the Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (GERAKAN). In 2013, another DAP candidate, Seah Leong Peng kept the seat by defeating the same candidate from BN (GERAKAN), Mah Siew Keong. In terms of eligible voters, the Teluk Intan parliamentary constituency has interestingly recorded that it has the highest number of woman voters (31,049) compared to men, (29,300).5 According to the Chairman of Election Commission (EC), Tan Sri Abdul Aziz, in terms of racial breakdown, Chinese voters recorded the highest number - 25,310 voters in total. The Malay positioned themselves as the second largest group, with 23,301 voters, and the Indians recorded the smallest number compared to Chinese and Malay, namely 11, 468.6 The ethnic distribution of votes was something that should have been given strong attention, especially when the 2013 general elections saw “Chinese” voters as a robust factor that led towards a reduced majority, hard-won by the ruling BN government. Teluk Intan had its own electoral significance due to a number of reasons. First, the ruling BN failed twice to secure this seat in the 2008 and 2013 general elections. Therefore, it appeared that the ruling BN had to wrestle back the seat from the opposition DAP. Secondly, the seat had helped the DAP in maintaining their status quo consecutively for two terms (2008 and 2013
5 ***, “PRK Teluk Intan: Pengundi Wanita Lebih Ramai”, Malaysiakini, 8 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/262233, accessed on 1 October 2014. 6 ***, “EC: Teluk Intan By-Election On May 31”, The Sun Daily, 8 May 2014, available at www.thesundaily.my/news/1039948, accessed on 1 October 2014.
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Ariff Aizuddin Azlan Zulkanain Abdul Rahman RJHIS 4 (2) 2017 Mohammad Tawfik Yaakub elections); the by-election was an important electoral strategy for them to keep their seats in Parliament.
The Candidates: Unintended Certainties
The EC announced that the nomination of candidates would take place on May 19. The announcement made by the EC attracted several possible candidates from parties intended to contest in the above-mentioned by-election. The announcement had caught the undivided attention of Perak DAP. Nga Kor Ming, Chairman of Perak DAP, said that the candidate would be revealed by Lim Guan Eng, the DAP secretary general after the Bukit Gelugor by-election nomination day.7 DAP, under the banner of PR, came to some sort of understanding and, together with PKR and PAS, plotting to organize a mammoth rally on May 18, which was the eve of nomination date, in order to make the possible candidate well-known to the people as part of PR strategies to gather the crowd, making it more identifiable to the mass. This by-election had set forth an open door for both sides, the ruling BN government and the opposition PR, particularly the DAP party, to fulfill the constitutional demand throughout the contestation of the above- mentioned by-election. The Teluk Intan parliamentary seat was known as the DAP stronghold since the 2008 general election and DAP succeeded in maintaining the seat twice in 2008 and 2013 by putting forth different
7 ***, “Perak DAP to submit shortlisted candidate for Teluk Intan By-Election”, The Sun Daily, 10 May 2014, available at www.thesundaily.my/news/1041768, accessed on 1 October 2014.
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candidates from DAP. At the onset, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), one of the BN component parties, did not intend to contest out of respect and, at the same time, they paved a way for GERAKAN to set an electoral footing in the Teluk Intan parliamentary constituency.8 The battle over the parliamentary constituency was inevitable and the most crucial part was the BN (GERAKAN). GERAKAN had lost twice since 2008 and this by-election, organized on reasonable grounds, was a genuine possibility to redeem what had been lost for all this time. This battle truly reflects the philosophy of redeeming the lost honor. As for the opposition PR (DAP), they became more aware, realizing that effort needed to be poured in order to defend the twice-won seat. It was reported initially that the party’s internal circulation suggested that a young candidate be fielded in the by-election.9 However, there were some speculated names: former Jalong assemblywoman Leong Mee Meng, DAP supremo leader Lim Kit Siang’s political secretary Dyana Sofya Mohd Daud, DAP member Hew Kuan Yau and one of Nga’s aides, Chong Zhe Min.10 Another speculation suggested that Dyana may be put forth as the candidate. Lim Kit Siang was asked regarding the confirmation of the candidature, to which he remained silent. It was publicly known that those who affiliated with Lim Kit Siang, either his political secretary or his aides, were all
8 ***, “Kami Pasti Akan Bertanding Di Teluk Intan, kata Gerakan”, The Malaysian Insider, 12 May 2014, available at www.themalaysianinsider.com/bahasa/article/kami-pasti-akan- bertanding-di-teluk-intan-kata-gerakan, accessed on 1 October 2014. 9 ***, “Teluk Intan By-Election: Perak DAP Has Submitted Four Names”, Free Malaysia Today, 14 May 2014, available at www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2014/05/14/teluk-intan-by-election-perak- dap-has-given-four-names/, accessed on 1 October 2014. 10 Ibidem.
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Ariff Aizuddin Azlan Zulkanain Abdul Rahman RJHIS 4 (2) 2017 Mohammad Tawfik Yaakub elevated to become people’s representatives (wakil rakyat), including Selangor’s senior executive official (EXCO) Datuk Teng Chang Kim, Penang’s EXCO Chow Kon Yeow, Members of Parliament (MPs) from Seputeh and Batu Kawan, Teresa Kok and Kashturiraani Patto.11 Before the candidature announcement was made, DAP had a minor internal crisis that slightly affected its electoral plan. On May 15, several NGOs staged a rally demanding that DAP top officials allow M. Manogaran to contest in the respective by-election.12 Manogaran used to be an MP for Teluk Intan, as a result of the 2008 general election. But the service offered by Manogaran did not last long and, up until the 2013 general election, he was transferred by top officials to contest the parliamentary seat of Cameron Highland in the state of Pahang. Unfortunately, Manogaran lost in the general elections to the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) candidate, Palanivel Govindasamy. The NGOs, represented by National Indian Action Team (NIAT) chairman Thasleem Mohamed Ibrahim, made a bold statement by declaring that Teluk Intan residents wanted Manogaran back and that he himself was quite impressed with Manogaran’s services from 2008 until 2013.13 Chairman K. Arumugam of Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM or People’s Voice), another local-based NGO, was in line with Thasleem and gave voice to his dissent by saying that Manogaran was also active as an
11 Kow Gah Chie, “Dyana Sofya mungkin calon DAP Teluk Intan”, Malaysiakini, 14 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/262785, accessed on 1 October 2014. 12 ***, “NGO’s lobby for Manogaran candidacy”, Free Malaysia Today, 15 May 2014, available at www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2014/05/15/teluk-intan-ngos- lobby-for-manogarans-candidacy/, accessed on 1 October 2014. 13 Ibidem.
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NGO leader and also the co-founder of the Group of Concerned Citizen movement. Arumugam came to some sort of belief that Manogaran should properly be positioned at the parliamentary level again. The issues on the Teluk Intan candidature continued to be tensely debated. This time, Manogaran received support from the Tamil Progressive Front (TPF), under the leadership of A. Kalaimugilan. DAP was reminded thoroughly by TPF leader of Manogaran’s loyalty and sacrifice, especially when DAP made an important decision by choosing Manogaran to contest against Palanivel for the parliamentary seat of Cameron Highland. On the eve of the announcement, another political interference made an unexpected inroad. Another party, known as Barisan Jemaah Islamiyah SeMalaysia (BERJASA), came out of nowhere demanding to field a candidate in the by-election. The current president, Mohd Yusuf Harun, said that a meeting would be held in Kuala Lumpur to decide their respective candidate for the by-election. On May 17, the conundrum over the candidature was finally put to end. Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin, the Deputy Prime Minister, announced the President of GERAKAN, Mah Siew Kong, as BN candidate for the Teluk Intan by-election. On the other hand, Lim Guan Eng, General-Secretary of DAP, publicly proclaimed Dyana Sofya as candidate. Removing the ostensible remarks, this was clearly a straight fight between BN (GERAKAN) and PR (DAP).14 Since its tremendous lost in 2008, BN had long awaited this electoral opportunity and it paved a the way for them to
14 Ram Anand, “Presiden Gerakan Akan Berdepan Dengan Dyana,” Malaysiakini, 17 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/263057, accessed on 1 October 2014.
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Ariff Aizuddin Azlan Zulkanain Abdul Rahman RJHIS 4 (2) 2017 Mohammad Tawfik Yaakub grab what was owned to them before 2008. Thus, it was truly seen as an opportunity for BN to topple down the PR by constitutional means. As for PR, especially DAP, they took this political electoral milieu as an inevitable surprise, since they had no other way around except to react from a “defensive” position. For almost a term, PR had been a sound alternative for the people to gain some fruitful advantages by having them as the lead- representatives, yet the situation did not go well as it intended. The BN candidate’s profile seemed to be more firm and fit compared to PR candidate. Mah Siew Kong, a party president for GERAKAN, who holds a Bachelor of Law degree, had written his own political track record. A local Teluk Intan resident by birth, Mah had served the constituency from 1999 until 2008 when he lost to the former DAP candidate, Manogaran.15 Based on numerous records as a well-experienced politician, Mah’s resume was truly incomparable at the very least as a Teluk Intan by-election candidate. Meanwhile, the DAP candidate, Dyana Sofya, a Law graduate from one of local institutions, began her political career when she joined DAP in 2012 and, at the same time, assisted the party’s campaign under Lim Kit Siang when Lim was the candidate for the Gelang Patah parliamentary constituency during the 2013 general election. After Lim won the constituency, Dyana was introduced as his political secretary. Lim himself
15 ***, “Mah Vs Dyana On The Cards”, The Star Online, 17 May 2014, available at www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2014/05/17/Mah-vs-Dyana-on-the-cards-BN-likely-to- field-former-Teluk-Intan-MP/, accessed on 1 October 2014.
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admitted that DAP would be facing a big challenge and, at the same time was confident that Dyana would win the by-election.16
Electoral Campaign and Issues
This by-election was a political test for the BN (GERAKAN), as well as for PR (DAP). The electoral campaign began soon after the nomination of candidates took place. Lim Kit Siang, on behalf of DAP, claimed that the party really took an audacious gamble making Dyana, his political secretary, the DAP candidate in the by-election.17 The BN (GERAKAN), in the early days of campaigning, made political promises, stating that Teluk Intan parliamentary constituency will be seized from PR (DAP). Mah also thanked the Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak for giving him this golden opportunity to contest on behalf of the BN. The onset of this by-election was characterized and perceived as psychological warfare. DAP’s candidate Dyana was first under attack psychologically when Shahrizat Abdul Jalil, UMNO’s woman chief, taunted Dyana’s credibility to become the Teluk Intan MP. Dyana was seriously accused to be DAP’s puppet and “cosmetic instrument”.18 In countering this serious political accusation, Lim Guan Eng backed Dyana’s candidature,
16 ***, “Teluk Intan: Kit Siang Admits Tough Fight For DAP”, New Straits Times, 17 May 2014, available at www.nst.com.my/latest/font-color-red-teluk-intan-font-kit-siang-admits- tough-fight-for-dap-1.599764, accessed on 1 October 2014. 17 See Bernama, Berita “DAP akui bukan mudah kekalkan kerusi Teluk Intan”, Malaysiakini, 18 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/263082, accessed 1 October 2014. 18 ***, “Guan Eng: Shahrizat pun main kotor”, Malaysiakini, 18 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/263081, accessed 1 October 2014.
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Ariff Aizuddin Azlan Zulkanain Abdul Rahman RJHIS 4 (2) 2017 Mohammad Tawfik Yaakub stating that Shahrizat’s statement was only meant to demoralize women, intending to persuade them not to participate in politics. Not only that, Dyana urged Shahrizat to learn from her mother. Surprisingly, Dyana’s mother Yammy Samat is currently a member of the UMNO.19 Generally, this by- election seemed to be “rare”. Yammy openly gave support to her daughter during the candidacy announcement, even though it was widely known to the public that both he daughter and mother were from different political parties; still, biological relationship dominated the dichotomy, irrespective of the two competing parties. Another UMNO member, Datuk Ahmad Maslan, in tandem with Shahrizat’s accusation, put forth a bold remark, claiming that DAP’s choice of candidate was obviously a “mind trap” for the voters.20 Ahmad further argued that DAP opted not only for a Malay candidate, but a candidate who was still green in politics and contributed nothing in terms of services to the folks of Teluk Intan. Using this line of thought, Ahmad was pretty confident that BN could retake the constituency by retracing the services that Mah had given when he used to be MP. The growing psychological heat increased and this time it was supported by UMNO’s official news Utusan Malaysia editor reasoned that DAP always resorted to the strategy of “manipulation” to cheat the Malay people, hoping to create the image that it was always a multi-racial
19 ***, “Shahrizat Perlu Belajar Dari Ibu Saya”, Malaysiakini, 18 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/263115, accessed 2 October 2014. 20 ***, “DAP Calon Dyana Untuk Perangkap Melayu”, Malaysiakini, 18 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/263144, accessed 2 October 2014.
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party.21 The word “manipulation” here implies the DAP’s process of candidate selection targeted Dyana, a Malay by ethnicity. Based on external predictions, political analysts saw DAP’s option of fielding Malay candidate as something different. Ibrahim Suffian, an executive director from the Merdeka Center, stated that DAP is trying to change its Chinese party image and, at the same time, trying to slowly gain the hearts and minds of Malays by fielding a Malay candidate.22 It was quite a serious attempt made by DAP and not the first time ethnic representation was debated. DAP, at the very least, has two Malay MPs - Zairil Khir Johari and Datuk Ariff Sabri - MPs for the Bukit Bendera and Raub constituencies and both of them represented Chinese-majority seats. Dr. Jayum Anak Jawan, a local-based political scientist, opined that the main convergent in this by- election was young Malay professional groups because they are more susceptible towards accepting change and that the arduous task is to influence old Malays. Pointing out that having Dyana as a Malay candidate was indeed the best strategy for DAP to attract more young supporters. As stated by DAP publicity Chief Tony Pua, having Dyana as a candidate was an “investment”.23 In line with his statement, Pua meant that a Malay candidate
21 ***, “DAP Guna Dyana Sofya Untuk Buang Imej Perkauman, kata Awang Selamat”, Malaysian Insider, 18 May 2014, available at www.themalaysianinsider.com/bahasa/article/dap-guna-dyana-sofya-untuk-buang-imej- perkauman-kata-awang-selamat, accessed on 2 October 2014. 22 ***, “DAP Cuba Tarik Pengundi Melayu Melalui Dyana Sofya, kata Penganalisis”, Malaysian Insider, 18 May 2014, available at www.themalaysianinsider.com/bahasa/article/dap-cuba-tarik-pengundi-melayu-melalui- dyana-sofya-kata-para-penganalisis, accessed on 2 October 2014. 23 ***, “Teluk Intan By-Election: Kit Siang’s aides Dyana Sofya Not An Experiment, says DAP”, The Star Online, 18 May 2014, available at www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2014/05/18/Teluk-Intan-byelection-Dyana-Sofya/, accessed on 2 October 2014.
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Ariff Aizuddin Azlan Zulkanain Abdul Rahman RJHIS 4 (2) 2017 Mohammad Tawfik Yaakub like Dyana could cure the poison cast on DAP’s image as Chinese-based party and that DAP, at the same time, appealed to voters by urging them to create a historical moment: voting for DAP in order to break the racial circumvention. The main agenda was outlined by DAP during the campaigning session and it highlighted racial solidarity. Besides that, attention was given to issues concerning youth participation and women.24 On top of that, in her statement, Dyana vowed to oppose any efforts made to table or to implement Islamic law of hudud at parliamentary level.25 Even though she did not fully oppose the hudud, she reasoned that its implementation would not be carried out until and unless the socio-economic imbalances are to be fixed first. The Islamic law of hudud was the most critical component within PR circulation. PAS, an Islamic-based party, had been championing the cause and issue of its implementation at parliamentary and as well at state level. Deriving from this internal crackdown would have allowed more gaps available for PR’s party members. However, PAS’ response was a bit surprising. Salahuddin Ayub, PAS vice-president, openly proclaimed the party’s support for Dyana, despite her statement on hudud against the basic struggle of PAS.26 Salahuddin further stated that hudud will not be a major issue towards a mutual understanding within PR, especially in this by-election. MCA, on the
24 ***, “Dyana Utama Isu Perpaduan Kaum”, Malaysiakini, 18 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/263125, accessed on 2 October 2014. 25 ***, “Dyana Ikrar Tentang Usul Laksana Hudud”, Malaysiakini, 19 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/263157, accessed on 2 October 2014. 26 ***, “PAS Sokong Dyana Walau Tolak RUU Hudud”, Malaysiakini, 20 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/263276, accessed on 2 October 2014.
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other hand, as a Chinese-dominated party within BN coalition, pressured the DAP particularly on the issues of hudud.27 Compared to DAP, MCA held the strictest stance on hudud within the BN coalition. Whenever there was any debate on hudud, MCA stood as the most vocal critics of its implementation. Therefore, hudud served as a mutual cause of dislike for both DAP and MCA. Bringing hudud into the discourse of Malaysia within the framework of a pluralistic society was not something that easily achieved. Since 1993, when PAS first tabled its implementation plan at the state level of Kelantan, it had triggered inevitable dissenting voices that could disrupt the opposition’s political stability. At the time, DAP was stuck in the middle between protecting its PR relationship or sticking to its party principles. Seizing this ample opportunity, Datuk Ti Lian Ker, chairman of the MCA religious affairs and harmony bureau, stood up against DAP, claiming that it had failed to stop PAS abandon the enforcement of its hudud plan in Kelantan. In the midst of unsettled disputes (hudud), Fathul Bari Mat Jahya, young ulama’ of UMNO, boldly stated that both DAP and GERAKAN brought harm because they openly said no to the implementation of hudud.28 Speaking on hudud, Fathul opined that voters should choose the lesser evil. DAP and GERAKAN were both against the implementation of hudud in the country. Mah in his campaign warned the voters that there would
27 ***, “Punish DAP For Not Pressuring PAS, Voters Urged”, The Star Online, 20 May 2014, available at www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2014/05/20/Punish-DAP-for-not- pressuring-PAS-voters-urged/, accessed on 2 October 2014. 28 ***, “DAP dan Gerakan Bawa Mudarat: Pengundi Perlu Pilih Risiko Mininum, kata Ulama”, The Malaysian Insider, 21 May 2014, available at www.themalaysianinsider.com/bahasa/article/dap-dan-gerakan-bawa-mudarat-pengundi- perlu-pilih-risiko-minimum-kata-ulama, accessed on 2 October 2014.
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Ariff Aizuddin Azlan Zulkanain Abdul Rahman RJHIS 4 (2) 2017 Mohammad Tawfik Yaakub be no turning back if PAS’ hudud was to be implemented in the country.29 If truly implemented in Kelantan, other states will have the proclivity to follow, according to him. As meant by Fathul, the point stated was to be more careful in choosing the representative. PAS’ statement on hudud was brought up and questioned when they gave open support to DAP. The ongoing issue on hudud kept echoed and this time, the PAS Dewan Ulama (Council of Religious Scholars), its acting chief Datuk Ahmad Yakub, who was also a Kelantan MP, admonished the DAP candidate and said that she must know her limits when talking about hudud.30 Even though PAS was part of PR, during the campaign, it excluded the agenda of implementing the hudud law. Quoting from its party’s constitution, Ahmad Yakub clarified that the enforcement of laws based on Islamic tenets was clearly embedded in Clause 5 (1) of the PAS constitution. This internal dispute was once again brought forth. Muhyiddin called for both DAP and PAS to explain their positions to each other and not to blindside the voters.31 They (DAP and PAS) were confusing the public with the parties’ different stands on the hudud plan for Kelantan. As the debate was getting heated, there was a possibility for PR to
29 ***, “Teluk Intan by-election: No turning back if PAS’ hudud is implemented, says Mah”, The Star Online, 20 May 2014, available at www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2014/05/20/Teluk-Intan-byelection-Mah-on-hudud/, accessed on 2 October 2014. 30 ***, “Know Your Limits When Talking About Hudud, Dyana Told”, The Star Online, 23 May 2014, available at www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2014/05/23/Know-your-limits- when-talking-about-hudud-Dyana-told/, accessed on 2 October 2014. 31 ***, “DAP and PAS confusing public with different stands on hudud, says Muhyiddin”, The Star Online, 23 May 2014, available at www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2014/05/23/DAP-and-PAS-confusing-public-with- different-stands/, accessed on 2 October 2014.
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get trapped in the conundrum of hudud. PAS President, Datuk Seri Abdul Hadi Awang, clearly stated where PAS stood on the issues that constrained their relations with DAP. Abdul Hadi maintained that PAS is working together with DAP as a token of gratitude for standing by their side when the Kelantan government fell in 1978.32 The past historical crisis was considered by PAS a point of reference to give supports to DAP candidate in the by- election. Realizing that DAP was engaged in a very energetic campaign, UMNO resorted to a strategy more or less psychologically-based. Datuk Mustapha Yaakub, UMNO NGO veteran, called for Yammy’s resignation from UMNO.33 Mustapha was strongly addressing his concerns, calling for Yammy to be stripped of her membership from UMNO because of her public appearance associated with her daughter during the campaign period. As Yammy herself stated, she would not abandon her daughter in the by-election campaigns, even though her daughter contested under the DAP ticket.34 Yammy attempted to clarify that her daughter was a DAP candidate but her relationship with the rest of UMNO members remained as usual. From a racial perspective, having Dyana as a DAP candidate had attracted some inevitable critics. Due to those abnormal circumstances, Tun
32 ***, “Hadi: Only DAP defended PAS when Kelantan government fell in 1978”, The Star Online, 27 May 2014, available at www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2014/05/27/Support- a-show-of-gratitude-Hadi-Only-DAP-defended-PAS-when-Kelantan-govt-fell-in-1978/, accessed on 2 October 2014. 33 ***, “Veteran UMNO desak Ibu Dyana Dipecat”, Malaysiakini, 19 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/263164, accessed on 2 October 2014. 34 ***, “Teluk Intan By-Election: Dyana Sofya Has Family’s Support, Says Mum”, The Star Online, 19 May 2014, available at www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2014/05/19/teluk- intan-by-election-dyana-sofya-mother-gives-backing/, accessed on 2 October 2014.
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Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, the longest serving prime minister in Malaysia, vocalized his dissent. The action of DAP putting forth a Malay candidate was only ‘hiasan luaran’ (external decoration), the reason being to keep Malays from becoming blurred and ambiguous. Mahathir added his disappointment towards the DAP candidate as she was originally from the UMNO family. Lim Kit Siang came to refute Mahathir’s statement by stating that Mahathir was the one who deceived Malays for almost 22 years during his tenure as PM. Adding to this source of tension, through its vessel Dyana, DAP has openly called for public educational institution Universiti Teknologi Mara (UiTM) to open its membership to non-Bumiputera,35 similar to what Dato’ Onn did when he urged UMNO to open its membership to non-Malays. DAP was strongly criticized and associated with its questioning of Malay special rights within the root of Constitution. In response to Dyana’s statement, Tan Sri Dr. Abdul Rahman Arshad, UiTM pro chancellor, defended UiTM as an institution that provided education to the Malays at the highest level.36 Quoting from Article 153 of the Malaysian Constitution, in regards to the special right of Malays, Abdul Rahman mentioned that if UiTM’s membership is open to all, it inclines to lose its special status.
35 ***, “Dyana Bidas Razali Dakwa UMNO Hanya Mainkan Api Perkauman”, The Malaysian Insider, 19 May 2014, available at www.themalaysianinsider.com/bahasa/article/dyana-bidas-razali-dakwa-umno-hanya- mainkan-api-perkauman, accessed on 2 October 2014. 36 ***, “Menjawab Dyana: UiTM Perlu Dipertahan Sebagai Institusi Pendidikan Pro- Melayu, kata Pro-Canselor”, The Malaysian Insider, 21 May 2014, available at www.themalaysianinsider.com/bahasa/article/uitm-perlu-dipertahan-sebagai-institusi- pendidikan-untuk-melayu-kata-pro-ca, accessed on 2 October 2014.
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During the midst of campaigning, BN was found to have conducted their campaigns in schools. It was confirmed that the EC had granted permission to the Teluk Intan UMNO and allowed them to do so because there was no other place suited to conducting campaigns.37 They were aware that regulations dictated that places like schools are off-limits for campaigning, but BN did regardless. In response to this, Tony Pua, on behalf of DAP, requested that the same facilities be granted to the party for the campaign purposes. In justifying the action, Ahmad Maslan came to defend BN, stating that there was nothing wrong in using schools as part of the electoral campaign. The argument offered was that schools are government assets and that using schools as part of campaigning process was in tandem with regulations set by the EC. Speaking on the issues of material development, the ruling BN has been championing the cause in each of the elections occurred at the parliamentary and state level. With power and money at the level of the ruling government, it seemed easy to grab the voters’ attention undividedly. This by-election also witnessed the aggressiveness of BN in offering material things in order to keep the voters preoccupied. Considered a golden opportunity for Teluk Intan folks, at the very least the by-election held in the constituency had opened up a new phase of material development. The ruling BN, in their manifesto, aiming for development, revealed that they would set up a new university in Teluk Intan if their sole candidate secured the by-
37 ***, “DAP: Kami Sanggup Bayar RM 1,000 Untuk Kempen di Sekolah Seperti BN”, The Malaysian Insider, 21 May 2014, available at www.themalaysianinsider.com/bahasa/article/dap-kami-sanggup-bayar-rm1000-untuk- kempen-di-sekolah-seperti-bn, accessed on 2 October 2014.
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Ariff Aizuddin Azlan Zulkanain Abdul Rahman RJHIS 4 (2) 2017 Mohammad Tawfik Yaakub election.38 Adding to that, BN politically offered to direct their electoral efforts towards having the menara condong (lean tower) Teluk Intan, the famous lean tower in Perak, listed under the world heritage site of United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) - ostensibly, something to which DAP could not afford to commit. On the very last day of campaign, thousands attended a ceramah (political sermon) organized by DAP at Teluk Intan city,39 making the final appeal to voters. Anthony Loke, MP for Seremban parliamentary constituency, appealed to all people who attended to vote for the DAP.
The Result
On May 31, the official result of the Teluk Intan by-election revealed that the ruling BN government, with its candidate Mah Siew Keong from GERAKAN, won the by-election. As shown in Figure 2. Mah’s defeated PR candidate, Dyana Sofya, from DAP with a slim-majority of 238 votes, pointing to the electoral facts the Teluk Intan voters favored upon BN’s candidate. Mah’s managed to secure at least 20,157 total of votes and Dyana obtained only 19,919 total of votes (see Figure 2).
38 ***, “BN Tawar Universiti, Pengiktirafan UNESCO”, Malaysiakini, 26 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/263876, accessed on 2 October 2014. 39 ***, “Ribuan banjiri ceramah kemuncak DAP”, Malaysiakini, 30 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/264339, accessed on 2 October 2014.
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Figure 2: The Result of 2014 Teluk Intan By-Election
Source: Election Commission of Malaysia, www.spr.gov.my. According to the Election Commission (EC), the total of eligible voters was 60,483. The number of people who cast ballots amounted to 40,236, equal to 67.4%. In terms of spoilt votes, the number recorded was 543 in total. The result told a completely different story. Compared to the previous general elections in 2008 and 2013, where DAP could maintain its candidate consecutively for two terms, when Teluk Intan suddenly called for a by-election, the result yielded totally against the logic of maintaining the seat. In 2008, Mah contested in the Teluk Intan parliamentary constituency and was defeated with a majority of 1,470 votes; in 2013 when Mah once again contested in the same constituency, he was defeated with an increased majority of 7,313 of total votes. Looking at Mah’s performance in the previous two elections, 2008 and 2013, there was a steady increase in terms of votes. In 2008, Mah secured at least 17,016 total of votes, whereas in 2013, Mah obtained 20,086 votes. This demonstrates a steady increase in terms of
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Ariff Aizuddin Azlan Zulkanain Abdul Rahman RJHIS 4 (2) 2017 Mohammad Tawfik Yaakub votes secured by Mah (see Table 1). In the 2014 Teluk Intan by-election, Mah once again recorded an increased number of votes by obtaining 20,157 in total. On the other hand, DAP candidates recorded a remarkable number of votes obtained in 2008 and 2013. Even though different candidates contested in the elections, DAP could retain the Teluk Intan constituency for two consecutive terms. In 2008, M. Manogaran from DAP, defeated BN with a sizeable number of votes - 1,470 in total. In 2013, with a different candidate, Seah Leong Peng, DAP maintained the constituency by defeating the BN candidate with a majority of 7,313 votes. Seah marked the biggest number of votes ever obtained by DAP for the past two terms.
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Table 1: The 2008 and 2013 Teluk Intan Parliamentary Elections Result
Source: Malaysian Election Data, available at http://undi.info/perak/p/P76.
The result, however, was portrayed in different ways and it crucially marked the disappointment of DAP, as it did not conform with the past two elections, where DAP has secured the seat. DAP’s reduced numbers were significant: the 2013 elections recorded that DAP won with a majority of 27,399 total of votes but in the 2014 by-election, DAP could only gather 19,919 votes; the difference amounted to 7,480. As the electoral event passed, Lim Guan Eng, in his statement, concluded that the reduction of Chinese voters towards DAP could be the
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Ariff Aizuddin Azlan Zulkanain Abdul Rahman RJHIS 4 (2) 2017 Mohammad Tawfik Yaakub reason for putting forth Dyana as the Malay candidate.40 Lim indeed believed that the reduction of 10% occurred. The underlying interpretation of the reduction may have its roots based on racial statistics in the constituency. Chinese voters recorded the highest number which is (25,310), followed by Malays (23,301) and Indians (11,468). According to DAP director of strategy Dr. Ong Kian Ming, Malay votes towards DAP comprised 3% only.41 Unfortunately, supports gained from the Chinese community, which traditionally opts for DAP, decreased around 15% and a similar phenomenon was registered with Indian voters, where it decreased around 10%. Alternatively, political analysts saw the defeat of DAP in a different light. Dr. Oh Ei Sun, from the Rajaratnam School of International Studies Singapore, believed that the percentage of voters decreased due to DAP’s over-confidence in winning the by-election, but unfortunately it went south.42 Oh further added that the defeat of DAP was due to BN’s robust electoral machinery. Dr. James Chin, political analyst from Monash University Malaysian campus, in his statement on the unexpected defeat of DAP, was of the opinion that there must be some valid grounds for the voters living outside Teluk Intan to get back to their hometown for the purposes of casting a vote, but in this by-election, voters failed to do so. Meaning to say that, the situation represented by this by-election may not be same as the situation in
40 ***, “Penurunan undi Cina mungkin kerana Dyana Melayu”, Malaysiakini, 31 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/264421, accessed on 2 October 2014. 41 ***, “DAP Tumbang di Teluk Intan: Di Mana Silapnya?”, Malaysiakini,, 1 June 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/264428, accessed on 2 October 2014. 42 ***, “DAP kalah di Teluk Intan kerana terlalu yakin, kata penganalisis”, The Malaysian Insider, 2 June 2014, available at www.themalaysianinsider.com/bahasa/article/dap-kalah- di-teluk-intan-kerana-terlalu-yakin-kata-penganalisis, accessed on 2 October 2014.
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general elections, because voters do know that general elections require a change in government. By this logic, voters simply do not take the by- election seriously, as it only consists in changing a sole parliamentary representative, but not the whole government, including federal and state. Other analysts made their own stand. Dr. Arnold Puyok from the Malaysia University of Sarawak (UNIMAS), came to the conclusion that DAP put too much focus on its candidate Dyana at the expense of local issues, which contributed to people’s anxiety. Party member statements revealed that the issue of hudud played a major role in the unexpected defeat.43 Gobind Singh Deo, MP for Puchong constituency, stated that the plan of implementing the hudud proposed by a coalition in PR, PAS, was regarded as a factor which led to DAP’s failure in retaining the by-election. The issue of hudud as the main contributing factor may need to be revisited. A study conducted by Dr. Ngreng Miang Hong from UCSI Poll Research Center found that 12% of Chinese voter respondents cared about the issue of implementing the hudud law introduced by Kelantan state government.
Conclusion
The 2014 Teluk Intan parliamentary by-election ended the inevitable uncertainties held by both competing parties and, at the same time, it marked a new dawn for the DAP, a component party of the opposition PR. DAP’s
43 ***, “Hudud PAS penyumbang kekalahan Dyana Sofya, kata pemimpin DAP”, The Malaysian Insider, 3 June 2014, available at www.themalaysianinsider.com/bahasa/article/hudud-pas-penyumbang-kekalahan-dyana- sofya-kata-pemimpin-dap, accessed on 2 October 2014.
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Ariff Aizuddin Azlan Zulkanain Abdul Rahman RJHIS 4 (2) 2017 Mohammad Tawfik Yaakub defeat in the said by-election was caused by several reasons, that had not been given attention they required. The ruling BN, through GERAKAN, succeeded in retaking the seat from DAP, but it won only with a slight majority. As for DAP, compared to its previous electoral attempts, it could have performed better, but the issue was the ethnic candidate that haunted the electoral formula. Internal differences which occurred between the component parties of the opposition PR were centered on the idea of mutual cooperation when it came to issues like the implementation of hudud; some had opted to be in favour of the policy, while some had opted to object, which created instability under the embedded framework agreed upon together. Even though the respective by-election did not incur major of political change within the framework of Malaysia’s political system compared to previous general elections, at the parliamentary level it caused a minor decrease in the numbers of the opposition.
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***, “NGO’s lobby for Manogaran candidacy”, Free Malaysia Today, 15 May 2014, available at www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2014/05/15/teluk- intan-ngos-lobby-for-manogarans-candidacy/, accessed on 1 October 2014. ***, “PAS Sokong Dyana Walau Tolak RUU Hudud”, Malaysiakini, 20 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/263276, accessed on 2 October 2014. ***, “Penurunan undi Cina mungkin kerana Dyana Melayu”, Malaysiakini, 31 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/264421, accessed on 2 October 2014. ***, “Perak DAP to submit shortlisted candidate for Teluk Intan By- Election”, The Sun Daily, 10 May 2014, available at www.thesundaily.my/news/1041768, accessed on 1 October 2014. ***, “PRK Teluk Intan: Pengundi Wanita Lebih Ramai”, Malaysiakini, 8 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/262233, accessed on 1 October 2014. ***, “Punish DAP For Not Pressuring PAS, Voters Urged”, The Star Online, 20 May 2014, available at www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2014/05/20/Punish-DAP-for- not-pressuring-PAS-voters-urged/, accessed on 2 October 2014. ***, “Ribuan banjiri ceramah kemuncak DAP”, Malaysiakini, 30 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/264339, accessed on 2 October 2014. ***, “Shahrizat Perlu Belajar Dari Ibu Saya”, Malaysiakini, 18 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/263115, accessed 2 October 2014. ***, “Teluk Intan By-Election: Dyana Sofya Has Family’s Support, Says Mum”, The Star Online, 19 May 2014, available at www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2014/05/19/teluk-intan-by- election-dyana-sofya-mother-gives-backing/, accessed on 2 October 2014. ***, “Teluk Intan by-election: No turning back if PAS’ hudud is implemented, says Mah”, The Star Online, 20 May 2014, available at www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2014/05/20/Teluk-Intan- byelection-Mah-on-hudud/, accessed on 2 October 2014. ***, “Teluk Intan By-Election: Kit Siang’s aides Dyana Sofya Not An Experiment, says DAP”, The Star Online, 18 May 2014, available at
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www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2014/05/18/Teluk-Intan- byelection-Dyana-Sofya/, accessed on 2 October 2014. ***, “Teluk Intan By-Election: Perak DAP Has Submitted Four Names”, Free Malaysia Today, 14 May 2014, available www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2014/05/14/teluk- intan-by-election-perak-dap-has-given-four-names/, accessed on 1 October 2014. ***, “Teluk Intan: Kit Siang Admits Tough Fight For DAP”, New Straits Times, 17 May 2014, available at www.nst.com.my/latest/font-color- red-teluk-intan-font-kit-siang-admits-tough-fight-for-dap-1.599764, accessed on 1 October 2014. ***, “Veteran UMNO desak Ibu Dyana Dipecat”, Malaysiakini, 19 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/263164, accessed on 2 October 2014. Anand, Ram, “Presiden Gerakan Akan Berdepan Dengan Dyana,” Malaysiakini, 17 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/263057, accessed on 1 October 2014. Bernama, Berita, “DAP akui bukan mudah kekalkan kerusi Teluk Intan”, Malaysiakini, 18 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/263082, accessed 1 October 2014. Chie, Kow Gah, “Dyana Sofya mungkin calon DAP Teluk Intan”, Malaysiakini, 14 May 2014, available at www.malaysiakini.com/news/262785, accessed on 1 October 2014. Hakim, Muhammad A., “The Mirpur Parliamentary By-Election In Bangladesh”, in: Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 8, 1994. Huat, Wong Chin and Tsin, Soon Li (eds), Democracy at Stake?: Examining 16 By-Elections In Malaysia, 2008-2011, Petaling Jaya, Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, 2012. Khor, Khor Jin Kheong and Peng, Khoo Kay, Non-Sectarian Politics In Malaysia: The Case of Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Trafalgar Publishing, 2008. Moniruzzaman, M., “The 13th Malaysian General Election: Uncertainties and Expectations,” Intellectual Discourse, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2013. Moten, Abdul Rashid, “Changing Political Culture and Electoral Behavior in Malaysia”, in: Asian Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2011.
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Teohari Georgescu: a short biography of the minister who transformed Romania into a communist state Cristian Culiciu*
Abstract: One of the first communists who received a portfolio in the Romanian Government was Teohari Georgescu. Working as a printer, as well as being a dedicated communist, he managed to become, in a few years, the Minister of Interior Affairs in Petru Groza’s Cabinet. In this paper, we were able to mark a few of the most important moments in Teohari Georgescu’s life and career, also revealing information on his purge, after being in charge of the Ministry of Interior Affairs for a few years.
Keywords: history of Romania, communism, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Teohari Georgescu, Petru Groza Government
Introduction
One of the most important leaders of the Romanian Communist Party (R.C.P. – between 1948 and 1965 it was called the Romanian Workers’ Party – R.W.P.) was Teohari Georgescu, responsible for numerous actions at national level planned by the party or the Soviet Union and completed with the help of the institutions that he had in subordination. In this regard, T. Georgescu has distinguished himself from other members, even those from
* University of Oradea, PhD student, third year; research interests in the history of communism in Romania, interwar Romanian history, wooden language, urban history, social history, press history, local history. In the last years, he has published a series of articles on these themes, including a book about some aspects of Oradea’s higher education during 1963 and 2013, mostly as it was perceived in the local printed press. His current PhD research is about Romanian urbanism and the urban systematization phenomenon, with a case study on the city of Oradea. E-mail: [email protected].
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the Central Committee (C.C.) of the Communist Party, concentrating the repression exerted throughout the country since the spring of 1945. He detached himself in the party by his typology, always proving himself loyal to the demands of the communists in Romania and beyond.
Romanian or Jew?
Teohari Georgescu was born in Chitila (near Bucharest) on January 31, 1908, in the family of a grocer, being the third child out of a total of seven. There have been several discussions among the historians on the subject of his origins, in which his Jewish ancestry was highlighted and his supposed real name of (Samuel) Bureh Tescovici was discussed.1 That he was indeed Romanian was argued by Horia Nestorescu-Bălcești: besides the fact that his parents were Romanian, there is a cross at his tomb in the Sf. Vineri cemetery. Moreover, at an interrogation in 1952, T. Georgescu remembered an exchange of phrases between him and the head of the Security, Nicolae Turcu: “You are Romanian. What are you looking for in this movement where there are only strangers?”2 However, the style of his discourse, especially that about national minorities, would not place him among Romanians, as he was a politician who encouraged the granting of minority rights. He went to school only for a few years, finishing fourth grade at the
1 Dennis Deletant, Teroarea comunistă în România: Gheorghiu-Dej și statul polițienesc 1948-1965, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2001, p. 34; George Manu, În spatele Cortinei de Fier. România sub ocupație rusească, Bucharest, Editura Mica Valahie, 2011, p. 161. 2 Horia Nestorescu-Bălcești, “Teohari Georgescu 1908-1976”, in: Arhivele totalitarismului, Bucharest, no. 1, year III, 1995, p. 210.
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“Sfinții Voievozi” school in Bucharest in 1920 and then completing only two high school years at “Saint Sava”.3 In the booklet on his biography, we can discover some aspects of Georgescu's youth. Published in 1951, it contrasts his youth in a poor family with the society affected by the consequences of the First World War (poverty generated by the “imperialist and capitalist plunder”, according to communist proselytes)4. Hunger, “exploitation” and other problems caused by the “Anglo-American imperialists” plus the Great Socialist Revolution of October, all that took place when he was just 10 years old, seemed to serve not only as a stimulus to the Romanian workers' movement, but also to Georgescu's personality. The unsigned authors of the biography suggest that the public demonstrations held in Bucharest in 1917-1918 would have led young Teohari Georgescu to embrace the principle of “class struggle”.5
The young revolutionary
His political activity can be divided into three major periods, namely the years of illegality, corresponding to the interwar years, until the act of 23 August 1944, then the period in which he worked with the Romanian Ministry of Interior Affairs (December 1944 - May 1952) and, finally, the period in which he remained a printer, not deprived of any function at the time, but stripped of any political decision-making power. Like other
3 Laurențiu Ungureanu, Radu Eremia, ”Teohari Georgescu, comunistul care a prescris crimele torționarilor”, Adevărul weekend, no. 181, 9 – 11 January 2015, p. 27. 4 ***, Teohari Georgescu, Kiadja a Román Munkáspárt, 1951, p. 7. 5 Ibidem, pp. 8 - 9.
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Communist leaders, after a difficult period of unlawfulness, he managed to enjoy his great prestige and increased power, before being eliminated from all his dignities. At the age of 15 he was hired at the “Cartea Românească” printing house as a manual picker6 for a fairly long period: 1923 - 1933. In his apprenticeship, he learned to organize the pages of newspapers like “Universul” and the “Official Monitor”.7 Regarding his political orientation or preferences,8 we know that his interest in the communist movement led him to read ideological texts in secret and later to participate in Communist Party meetings. In 1927, during a protest, he entered as a member of the strike committee of the publishing house; following his political principles, in the same year he became a communist agitator.9 In the next two years, this activity was somewhat professional, enrolling in the workers’ syndicate of the Guntenberg printing house10, but also the national Siguranța (the state secret service). T. Georgescu made his first political step in 1929 by joining the Romanian Communist Party (functioning illegally at the time).11 Regarding his adherence to the R.C.P., the sources offer two variants: 1929 and 1933.
6 Florica Dobre (coordinator), Membrii CC al PCR 1945-1989 – Dicționar, Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedică, 2004, p. 287. 7 Stelian Tănase, Clienții lu´ tanti Varvara, Bucharest, Editura Humanitas, 2008, p. 459. 8 ***, Teohari Georgescu, Kiadja a Román Munkáspárt, 1951, pp. 10-11. 9 Stelian Tănase, Clienții lu´ tanti Varvara..., p. 459. 10 Dennis Deletant, op. cit., p. 34. 11 Ghiță Ionescu, Comunismul în România, Bucharest, Editura Litera, 1994, p. 391; Horia Nestorescu-Bălcești, “Epurarea lui Teohari Georgescu, 1952”, in: Arhivele totalitarismului, no. 4, Bucharest, 1998, p. 200; Laurențiu Ungureanu, Radu Eremia, ”Teohari Georgescu, comunistul care a prescris crimele torționarilor”, Adevărul weekend, no. 181, January 9-11, 2015, p. 27.
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T. Georgescu, during the interrogations he underwent after his purge, mentions his entry into the party in the spring of 1933 at the suggestion of Avram Zighelboim and with the support Nicolae Goldberger. But his political acts led him to several prison sentences, as he was considered an “illegitimate communist”. During the same period (1929 - 1930), he attended military training at a military school in Oradea.12 His hatred for the “opulent businessmen” was the main reason for joining the Communist movement13, as well as getting involved in illegal political activity during the 1930s. In this sense, in 1933, at a time when he was also a member of the Local Commission of Syndicates in Bucharest, respectively of the General Council of Unitary Syndicates of Romania,14 we find him spreading communist propaganda flyers in the capital, which is why he was arrested and kept for two months at Văcăreşti prison, then released for lack of evidence.15 Actually, this was the beginning of a series of arrests. Only a few months later, in June 1934, he was arrested again for communist activity and jailed at Jilava, with Ștefan Mladin (the head of the team that arrested Ion Antonescu at the Royal Palace on the night of August 22 to August 23, 1944), Constantin Pârvulescu and Vasile Vâlcu,16 but, once more, only for a short time, being released on bail. One year later, he was imprisoned again, this time at Ploieşti prison, because he did not appear at the trial17 or because of compromising
12 Horia Nestorescu-Bălcești, “Teohari Georgescu 1908-1976...”, p. 211. 13 Florica Dobre (coordinator), Membrii CC al PCR 1945-1989..., p. 287. 14 Ibidem, p. 287 15 Dennis Deletant, op. cit., p. 34. 16 Stelian Tănase, Clienții lu´ tanti Varvara..., p. 459. 17 Dennis Deletant, op. cit., p. 34.
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statements made for the Siguranța.18 His short periods of detention would come to raise suspicions about working for the national secret service, this constituting one of the reasons why he was cleansed in 1952. However, his political activity continued, in 1937 becoming secretary of Bucharest’s Third Sector, in 1938 becoming a member of the Bucharest local PCdR committee, and, the next year, becoming a member and later (starting from 1941) secretary of CC of PCdR. In those years, his job was still in the printing house, at the “Adevărul” newspaper and at the National Printing Office.19 Between 1936 and 1937 he worked in a clandestine printing house owned by the Communist Party, which functioned in a conspiratorial house in the capital.20
Teohari Georgescu, the politician
For him, the year 1940 was an important milestone, because it was the year when he became a member of the Party Secretariat and also when he received his training in Moscow. Together with Ștefan Foriș, he went in the USSR for several months to be trained by Georghi Dimitrov, secretary of the Comintern, in coding and decoding messages, namely clandestine work. He had to acquire a cipher to keep in touch with the Comintern, without Foriș's knowledge, his purpose being to coordinate the special operations of the PCdR, parallel with Foriș (who was dealing with political issues).
18 Stelian Tănase, Clienții lu´ tanti Varvara..., p. 459. 19 Dennis Deletant, op. cit., p. 34. 20 Horia Nestorescu-Bălcești, “Teohari Georgescu 1908 - 1976...”, p. 211.
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But Foriș and Georgescu’s journey to Moscow must also be seen from the perspective of finding the right leader for the party, in the context of the dismantling of Great Romania in 1940 and the loss of a large number of adherents from Northern Transylvania and Bessarabia. As such, Foriș was appointed general secretary of the party, and Georgescu understood that he would be his successor. It is important to point out that at that moment he was not in friendly relations with Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and that the perspective of Teohari as the leader of the party will haunt Dej for many years after the war. Some sources, however, say that the proposal would have been rejected by T. Georgescu. At the end of 1940, when Foriș was still in Moscow, Georgescu returned to Romania (with the help of Dumitru Coliu - aka Dimitri Kolev)21 and met with Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, the future minister of justice, who was seeking at that time to join the R.C.P. The meeting between the two ended with a warning from Pătrășcanu that Georgescu's life was in danger and recommended that he should leave the country, relying on information that dangerous people from the Siguranță had sneaked at the top of the party.22 During these years, in which he illegally served the R.C.P. and the Comintern, T. Georgescu had several conspiratorial names: Ionescu (1934- 1935), Andrei (1936-1937), Mihai (1940-1941) and Popov (during his stay in the USSR in 1940).23 General Ion Mihai Pacepa presented some data, quoted then by the historian Lavinia Betea, regarding the activity of
21 Stelian Tănase, Clienții lu´ tanti Varvara..., p. 460. 22 Ibidem, p. 411. 23 Horia Nestorescu-Bălcești, “Teohari Georgescu 1908-1976...”, p. 212.
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Georgescu and Vasile Luca (Luca László), Ana Pauker and Emil Bodnăraș (Panteli Bodnarenko) within a so-called underground army sought by Stalin in every communist state, to guarantee the success of Sovietization. The Comintern, for which Georgescu worked, would have been in the service of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Soviet Union (I.N.U.) at the request of the Kremlin leader.24 However, in 1941, a few months after his return to the country, Teohari Georgescu was arrested from the conspiracy dwelling in Bucharest, now with Iosif Chişinevski, and received a ten-year prison sentence, switched to hard labor. He was detained in the prisons of Caransebeș, Văcăreşti and Târgu Jiu. At Caransebeș, he became a close friend to Gheorghe Gheorghiu- Dej. He stayed there for a year, and in 1942 he was moved to Văcărești Prison, a place where he was able to continue to carry out the printing job in the typographic workshop. The last part of the sentence was also carried out in Caransebeş,25 and he refused to adhere to a general escape plan set up by Belu Zilber's group.26 In 1944, according to some estimates, about 150 Communists and Soviet spies were imprisoned in Caransebeș. The party cell was led by T. Georgescu, who was seconded by E. Bodnăraș, the new leader of the party and who, in his adventurous spirit, wanted to escape from the penitentiary and flee to Yugoslavia.27 However, the conditions of detention were not harsh, and Georgescu would have enjoyed a semi-open regime, for the same
24 Lavinia Betea, Maurer și lumea de ieri, Cluj-Napoca, Editura Dacia, 2001, p. 128. 25 Ibidem, p. 128. Also see: Dennis Deletant, op. cit., p. 28. 26 Lavinia Betea, op. cit., p. 17. 27 Stelian Tănase, Clienții lu´ tanti Varvara..., pp. 155 - 156.
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year he was seen on the streets of the city, dressed in a suit and selling objects made in prison.28 At that time, both he and other important members of the party took note of Dej’s hypothesis that Foriș was a traitor, considered the author of several arrests among the communists.29 This will later cause Georgescu to act against Foriș. After the act of August 23, 1944 (when Romania joined The Allies), all Communists came out of prison, which for the R.C.P. meant the revival of its activity. Teohari Georgescu was released from the Caransebeş penitentiary with the support of Leontin Sălăjan30 and began his ascension to office. Some authors do not hesitate to link his political rise with the restoration of the clandestine typography of the Communists in Bucharest.31 However, like the other representatives of the communist elite, he did not have any experience in the democratic institutions and no idea how they functioned. The R.C.P. leaders, including Georgescu, saw a society exclusively designed to fight the bourgeoisie. For them, the Romanian society was a totally foreign environment.32 Quickly becoming an opponent of the political power installed after the removal of Marshal Antonescu from the head of the Government, Georgescu constantly criticized the executives led by Generals Sănătescu and Rădescu, in the second one even taking part. His stronger rapprochement
28 Ibidem, p. 156. 29 Ibidem, p. 346. 30 Marius Oprea, ”Cum a ajuns zețarul Teohari directorul tipografiei”, Dilema, no. 167, March 1996, p. 8. 31 Victor Frunză, Istoria stalinismului în România, Buchsrest, Editura Humanitas, 1990, p. 242. 32 Stelian Tănase, Elite și societate. Guvernarea Gheorghiu-Dej 1948-1965, Bucharest, Editura Humanitas, 2006, pp. 46 - 47.
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with the Gheorghiu-Dej – Vasile Luca – Ana Pauker group amounted to some support received from the party at the end of that year when, on November 4th, he entered the governing structure of the Interior Ministry as a sub- secretary of State for Administrative Affairs.33 The Interior Minister was Nicolae Penescu.
In the Rădescu Cabinet
As sub-secretary, T. Georgescu had his own contribution to the communists’ seizure of state power, by installing some of the party's loyalists in nine of the 16 prefectures in the country. His activity corresponded to the actions inside the party and the most significant frictions were those with the prime-minister, Gen. Rădescu. Georgescu attacked him in several ways, from different accusations made by him or the National Democratic Front, to violent protests such as the one at the end of February 1945. He ignored Rădescu’s request to abolish the communist militia, and, moreover, he acted to convince the prefects in the country not to listen to his orders. One of the communists’ attacks on the government was related to the failure of the agrarian reform.34 The communists’ most important desire was to gain as much power as possible in decisions regarding Romania’s actions during the war, but also in the administrative apparatus, a significant contribution being made by General Andrei I. Vîșinsky, Deputy Commissary of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., the man designated to impose upon King Michael I the
33 Florica Dobre (coordinator), Membrii CC al PCR 1945-1989..., p. 287. 34 Dennis Deletant, op. cit., p. 57.
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appointment of a far-left government. Keeping close ties with the head of the K.G.B. agency in Romania, General Fedicikin, Georgescu began to infiltrate the communists in the national secret service, Securitate, in the Gendarmerie and the Special Intelligence Service.35 Teohari Georgescu served as Undersecretary of State until February 28, 1945, accusing General Rădescu the next day of crimes against civilians following the bloody repression of the meeting held in front of the Royal Palace (where, in fact, the Communists opened fire, staging a police and security attack), also recommending to the authorities to bring him in front of the People’s Court.36
As the Interior Minister
By appointing Petru Groza as Prime Minister, on March 6, 1945, Teohari Georgescu became the Interior minister, holding office from that day until May 27, 1952. In January 1950, he, along with sixteen others, became a member of the Organizational Office, a section dealing with organizational work, party life, controlling the implementation of party directives on organizational issues, and choosing and redeploying cadres. T. Georgescu had a post in the Organizational Office, along with other members of the Secretary and Political Boureau: Gheorghe Apostol, Iosif Chișinevschi, Chivu Stoica,
35 Marius Oprea, ”Cum a ajuns zețarul Teohari directorul tipografiei”, Dilema, no. 167, March 1996, p. 8. 36 Stelian Neagoe, Istoria politică a României între anii 1944-1947, Bucharest, Editura Noua Alternativă, 1996, p. 258.
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Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Vasile Luca, Ana Pauker and others.37 From 17 March 17 1950, he was also the vice-president of the Council of Ministers (the Government), along with Chivu Stoica and Iosif Chişinevski. As the Minister of Interior Affairs, T. Georgescu subordinated the entire police apparatus, all order and administration structures, so that from the time of his appointment in the head of the Ministry, the communists held the entire control of the central administration and the local administrations, allowing for the gross falsification of the 1946 parliamentary elections. Moreover, after the abolition of the kingdom and the proclamation of the Romanian People's Republic on December 30, 1947, the repressive system constituted after the Soviet model (in this case the General Directorate of People's Security) was also placed under his subordination. During his term in office, he remained faithful both to Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, the head of state, and to the rest of the Central Committee: Vasile Luca (the Finance Minister), Ana Pauker (the Minister of Foreign Affairs) and so on. Having so much power in his hand, he committed regular abuses. At the end of his mandate, T. Georgescu was characterized in particularly tough terms for a man who had quasi-total control over a country for seven years: “...he entered the workers’ movement because he hated the overpowering patrons, determined to reach and outrun them. His intimate life, after achieving success, exceeded the turpitude of the patrons. He left his wife (...) and committed adultery, taking advantage of the wife of a subordinate (...). Teohari has never grasped the concept of mercy towards his neighbour.
37 Nicoleta Ionescu-Gură, Nomenclatura Comitetului Central al Partidului Muncitoresc Român, Bucharest, Editura Humanitas, 2006, p. 14.
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Teohari understands theft, embezzlement, falsity and scam. He has always «walked» across the criminal code, he hated and lived opulently and shamelessly, understood and lived on the dark, criminal side of man. (...) The one named T.G. (...) is not a communist, but a cupid printer, he has printed subversive manifestations for unknown people, for money”.38 Teohari Georgescu was responsible for the purge of two characters: Ştefan Foriş and Lucreţiu Pătrășcanu. In Foriș’s case, we are talking about Georgescu’s desire to eliminate competition,39 for he had been the leader of the party between 1940 and 1944, being eliminated by blackmail by Emil Bodnăraș. T. Georgescu, like his other colleagues, considered that his arrest in 1941 was due to Foriș, who would probably have pursued the unruly retention of power.40 The way in which Foriș was eliminated arises from a later statement by Georgescu: “In the spring of 1946 (...) General Nicolschi came to me and asked me: what shall we do with Foriș? He has been kept in this state for a long time already. (...) A few days later, I went to the party's general secretary and asked, “What shall we do with Foriș, we have been keeping him for a long time now, should we suppress him?” As for my proposal, Gheorghiu told me he agreed to suppress him. After that, I searched for Vasile Luca and Ana Pauker (...). I asked them, what do we do with Foriș? - in the sense of suppressing him. They both agreed.”41
38 Stelian Tănase, Clienții lu´ tanti Varvara..., p. 461. 39 Vladimir Tismăneanu, Arheologia terorii, Bucharest, Editura Eminescu, 1992, pp. 97 - 99. 40 Ibidem, pp. 372 - 373. 41 Marius Oprea, Bastionul cruzimii (o istorie a Securității 1948-1964), Iași, Editura Polirom, 2008, p. 208.
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Pătrăşcanu, the Minister of Justice and promoter of Stalinist cleansing in Romania, had placed into the minds of the R.C.P. leaders the idea of belonging to a possible Romanian communism, after which he was accused of bourgeois chauvinism and nationalism. Pătrășcanu’s purge appeared in the context of the lack of a unitary leadership of the party, on the leaders permanently planning a substitution by competition to “nationalize” the R.C.P. The first to attack Pătrășcanu directly and openly was T. Georgescu in February 1948 at the First Congress of the Romanian Workers’ Party (R.W.P.), bringing into discussion some of his thoughts on the disputes between Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania.42 He denounced Pătrășcanu as “an exponent of the bourgeois ideology”, because he “underestimated the enemy's force (...) probably helped by the Western imperialist powers”.43 At the same time, he stigmatized him for being a coward and a traitor, accusing him of protecting former war criminals, allowing even the fleeing of capitalists from the country.44 Georgescu, although initially opposed to Pătrășcanu’s investigation,45 stood at the head of his investigative commission, together with Iosif Rangheţ (party secretary responsible for cadres) and Alexandru Drăghici (Deputy Chief of the Political and Administrative Section). Interestingly, at the time of his indictment, T.
42 Comisia Prezidențială pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din România, Raport final, Bucharest, Editura Humanitas, 2006, pp. 70 – 71. 43 Marius Oprea, Banalitatea răului. O istorie a Securității în documente 1949-1989, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2002, p. 27. 44 Marius Oprea, Bastionul cruzimii…, p. 178. 45 Dennis Deletant, op. cit., p. 144.
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Georgescu reproached the slowness with which the investigation had taken place, insinuating he deliberately delayed the case.46 From 1950, Georgescu became an exponent of the nomenklatura, a privileged communist, indulging in, at least immoral, if not illegal acts to satisfy his personal and professional desires, a propagator of Stalin's cult and Stalinism in general.47
Removal from the Ministry and purge
In the early 1950s, T. Georgescu reported in his personal diary that there were more problems within the R.W.P. and discussed possible future sanctions and eliminations from the party.48 Apparently, the Soviet counselors had a significant role in the process of his and other colleagues’ purge from the Central Committee. The head of the Soviet advisers in Romania, A. M. Saharovski, sent, in early 1952, a series of negative reports on the work of the Luca-Pauker-Gerogescu group, blamed for putting obstacles before Dej.49 Officially, the main reason behind the purge of the Luca-Pauker- Georgescu group was the reluctance of the Minister of Finance (V. Luca) to implement monetary reform.50 But a more convincing reason is the
46 Ibidem, p. 145. 47Stelian Tănase, Elite și societate. Guvernarea Gheorghiu-Dej…, pp. 133 - 136, 204 - 205. 48 Gheorghe Onișoru, „Arestarea și anchetarea lui Teohari Georgescu”, in: Analele Sighet 7: Anii 1949-1953: mecanismele terorii, Fundația Academia Civică, 1999, pp. 435 - 436. 49 Comisia Prezidențială pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din România, op. cit., p. 157.
50 Gheorghe Onișoru, Pecetea lui Stalin – cazul Vasile Luca, Târgoviște, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2014, p. 98.
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elimination of competition, stemming from Gheorghiu-Dej’s obsession with preventing the appearance of any fractious groups in the party, namely the emergence of one or more competitors for the head of the party. Purification will prove to be nothing more than a continuation of the cleansing process in the party, whose victims were already Foriș and Pătrășcanu. Teohari Georgescu is placed by the historian Vladimir Tismăneanu in the factional group, respectively in Ana Pauker’s area of personal ambition in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Dej also copied Stalin's obsession with the “imperialist- Zionist conspiracy” where Pauker could easily be included.51 The first problems began to appear on February 19, 1952, when a controversy over the Report on the Preparation and Implementation of the Money Reform appeared in the Political Bureau. The misunderstandings between Vasile Luca, supported by T. Georgescu and Miron Constantinescu, and also by Iosif Chişinevski and Alexandru Moghioroș, were linked to the drafting of the document by the Party Committee, which was responsible for the preparation of the reform.52 At another meeting of the Political Bureau, Emil Bodnăraș expressed the intention to set up a party committee, tasked with checking the work of the Ministry of Finance and the State Bank, in order to find the reasons for the failure of the monetary reform. It was when Al. Moghioroș proposed the dismissal of V. Luca as Finance Minister.53 The involvement of the Soviets in the whole process was total. In April, a meeting of decision-makers, with a team composed of Gheorghe
51 Vladimir Tismăneanu, op. cit., pp. 202 – 204. 52 Ibidem, p. 99. 53 Ibidem, p. 104.
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Gheorghiu-Dej, Miron Constantinescu, Iosif Chişinevski and Gheorghe Apostol took place at Kremlin, where the purging problem was decided.54 From that moment on, the path was open for the works of the Plenary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers’ Party, on May 26-27, 1952. Historian Dennis Deletant sees in the process of purification the beginning of the period of imposing dejist supremacy, masked, as Victor Funză completes, in the Stalinist principle of “exterminating the outsiders”.55 It is not surprising that immediately after the purification of the three, Gheorghiu-Dej considered that “we must now prepare for Groza’s change. Let’s unify the functions of the state and the party in one hand”.56 So Dej had not forgotten the proposal of 1940 to appoint Teohari Georgescu as Foriș’s successor to the Communist Party leadership and wanted to definitively eliminate any competition. The Minister of Interior’s performance was considered “good” regarding the results of the purification efforts of the “people’s democratic” society he coordinated, as he himself talked about 100,000 people removed. The situation of the “fractious group” had therefore been “resolved” for several months. Political scientist Stelian Tănase speaks of the Plenary of the Central Committee of the R.W.P., held on May 26-27, 1952, as “a obloquy ceremony, a political execution” carried out “by the rules of the political sect in which the party remained”, in which Vasile Luca, Ana Pauker and Teohari Georgescu were subjected to “a concentric attack, orchestrated
54 Comisia Prezidențială pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din România, op. cit., p. 157. 55 Victor Frunză, op. cit., p. 403. 56 Marius Oprea, Bastionul cruzimii…, p. 191.
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behind the scenes, being accused of all the known underground diseases”.57 The main accusation was the “deviation to the right” (a sort of deviation from communist principles), very serious for a member of the Communist movement. The press release published after the plenary, concluded that it “unmasked and crushed the anti-partisan and anti-state group Ana Pauker - Vasile Luca”.58 The main reason for which Georgescu was removed was, officially, the fraternization with V. Luca. Georgescu had previously agreed with A. Pauker to defend Luca, so he was accused of having had a “compassionate attitude” toward Luca's “deviation”. They supposedly had been working for a long time, “weakening the spirit of leadership and endangering the party’s unity itself”. In fact, the report stated, Luca's position would have been the result of the permissive attitude of the two colleagues, Pauker and Georgescu.59 Besides this major and general allegation, there would have been other, particular ones. Thus, Georgescu was accused that, during his years of running the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he did not “intransigently introduce, with revolutionary and communist conviction, the party’s line of destroying the counterrevolution”. In other words, he was accused of a small number of victims of repression. Another accusation was a settlement with a legionary leader, Nicolae Pătraşcu,60 who, in November 1944, returned in Romania from Germany leading a group of legionnaires, was arrested and then
57 Stelian Tănase Clienții lu´ tanti Varvara..., p. 473. 58 Dinu C. Giurescu (coord.), Istoria Românilor, vol. X, Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedică, 2013, p. 150. 59 Gheorghe Onișoru, op. cit., p. 437. 60 Ibidem, p. 149.
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investigated by the Interior Minister. Their agreement would have been advantageous for both sides, as it offered the Communists a small maneuver (shock troops) in case of problems.61 T. Georgescu was also accused of the appointment of Șraer as Secretary General of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, although he was a former agent of the Siguranța, but also for the delay in the investigation of Pătrășcanu and Remus Kofler. Another accusation referred to not taking serious measures in eliminating the representatives of the old bourgeois landowners’ structures. Thus, some people such as General Rădescu, General Vişoianu, Grigore Niculescu-Buzeşti (former Foreign Minister in the Sănătescu Cabinet) remained free, although they should have been arrested, thus allowing them the possibility of organizing events to destabilize the regime in Romania. Ultimately, the head of the Interior Ministry was accused of failing to channel his efforts in the fight against the “Zionists” and the “Titoists”, also regarded as disruptive factors of the regime,62 and that, together with V. Luca and A. Pauker, he would have sabotaged the start of the cooperative process in agriculture.63 In other words, Teohari Georgescu became a “working class enemy”.64 The consequence was his dismissal from all positions, namely minister of Internal Affairs, vice-president of the Council of Ministers, secretary of the Central Committee and member of the Political Bureau and
61 Dumitru Șandru, Comunizarea societății românești în anii 1944-1947, Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedică, 2007, pp. 94 - 95. 62 Gheorghe Onișoru, op. cit., p. 150. 63 Ibidem, p. 437. 64 Radu Tudorancea, „Elita comunistă din România la începutul anilor 1950. Surse inedite americane”, in: Studii și Materiale de Istorie Contemporană, vol. 11, 2012, Bucharest, p. 77.
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of the Organizational Office. The decree containing the dismissal of Teohari Georgescu from Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs was signed by C. I. Parhon and issued on May 27, 1952.65 T. Georgescu expected such an evolution, because, in his diary, he wrote: “After the meeting held in March 13, I considered that everything was over”.66 The loss of all the functions held in the party and state apparatus meant sending him to “the bottom labour”, but only after a lengthy investigation. One month after his dismissal, he sent the Political Bureau of the C.C. of the R.W.P. a “self-critical” memorandum in which he tried to explain the facts and shortcomings of which he had been accused. In it, Georgescu acknowledged the error of supporting Luca in the sense of diminishing his guilt, as he didn’t understand who was responsible for the “right-wing deviation” of the Romanian finances. Thus, he considered that the “governing organisms” were guilty of the situation and not one person. He claimed he was not guilty of any “deviation from the line of the party”, for he had finally accepted both the accusations addressed to the Minister of Finance and his proposed dismissal. The accusations brought to him in the plenary held in May had surprised him even more so, since nothing had been brought to his attention beforehand: “I did not stand up against the party, I did not infringe upon the party's decisions, and that's why I did not expect to be accused and
65 Florica Dobre (coord.), Securitatea. Structuri – cadre. Obiective și metode, vol. I 1948- 1967, Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității, Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedică, 2006, p. 60, document 13. 66 Gheorghe Onișoru, op. cit., p. 151.
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sanctioned so severely, with no debate in the Political Bureau.”67 The former Interior Minister was also dissatisfied with the fact that the accusations were imposed on him in front of everyone, without being able to fight them in any way. The only offense he recognized was the closed-door discussion with Luca and Pauker of the content of the closed letter in March 1952, when the charges against the finance minister were made.68 In another part of the memorandum, T. Georgescu listed some facts and shortcomings of which he was considered guilty. In essence, “the lack of combativeness against the class enemy” was due to the “drunkenness of success” (referring to the consequences of repressive measures) in the last years. His mistakes related to the peaceful attitude towards V. Luca during the meetings of the Political Bureau in February-March 1952, as well as his support for discussing the closed letter with Luca and Pauker, the mentioned “lack of combativeness against class enemy”, the maintenance of some “inadequate elements” in the Ministry for Internal Affairs, but also the fact that it did not “raise his ideological level”. When drawing the line, Georgescu saw the decision of the Political Bureau as correct, but he still demanded a new chance so that he could show his loyalty.69 In October, he addressed a letter to Dej in which he reminded him that during the May plenary, he had said he would rehabilitate himself, asking Dej to receive him in an audience, as was the case with Alexandru Moghioroș.70 The way the text is written
67 Horia Nestorescu-Bălcești, “Epurarea lui Teohari Georgescu, 1952...”, p. 193. 68 Ibidem, pp. 194 – 196. 69 Ibidem, pp. 196 – 197. 70 Ibidem, pp. 197 - 198.
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denotes a precarious state of mood, proof that even after half a year after the destitution, he had failed to overcome the storm of the moment.
Arrest and interrogations
Even so, on February 18, 1953, Teohari Georgescu was arrested. The stakeout made by the Securitate lasted several months, from June 1952. The former Minister of Interior Affairs had a follow-up file opened and his home was permanently supervised. An argument for the fact that Communist leaders did not even trust their colleagues is that their phones have been intercepted since 1948.71 According to some sources, the very day after his arrest, his wife (Maria Gh. Oprișescu - his third wife, the daughter of a priest from Oltenia) had thrown out the family gold from their home in Snagov Lake and destroyed a sum of money in foreign currency.72 In fact, both his wife and his two children, one only a few months old, had been used as a stimulating factor for obtaining statements from him.73 Interrogations lasted for a total of three years, during which a number of serious deeds of the accused were revealed, both professional and personal. Just the day after the arrest, Major Lieutenant General Petre Socol accused him of “crimes against the Romanian people”. To begin with, Georgescu’s illegal activity was analyzed. In the interrogation report dated March 5, 1953,74 we can retain that his entry into the party, mentioned above,
71 Dennis Deletant, op. cit., p. 102. 72 Ibidem, p. 204. 73 Marius Oprea, Banalitatea răului…, p. 556. 74 Horia Nestorescu-Bălcești, “Epurarea lui Teohari Georgescu, 1952...”, pp. 199 - 204.
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would have been done with the support of Nicolae Goldberger (a member of the Political Bureau of R.C.P. in the 1930s and a future official of the Communist International movement) and that the workers’ demonstrations he attended were mostly anti-fascist. Regarding the advancement in political and administrative functions, we remember that Georgescu was promoted into the Secretariat of the C.C. of the R.C.P. in 1940 by Ștefan Foriș, the one whom he proposed to be eliminated six years later. It is also important how his interrogations were conducted by the Siguranța in the interwar period, when several methods were used to make him speak, from intimidation, to violence; one of the persons in charge of investigating him even was the chief of the secret service, Nicolae Turcu. At the end of the first stage of the investigation, in June 1953, Georgescu was accused of “provocative activity within the labor movement”, including his bonds to the Siguranța. At the same time, after his release from prison in August 1944, he had ran “counter-revolutionary actions”, in partnership with V. Luca and A. Pauker.75 Another report, dated September 3, 1953, reveals some of T. Georgescu’s visit to Moscow, in 1940. Thus, the investigator received a description of the method of coding and decoding texts taught in Moscow and also received a list of people who knew Georgescu's conspiracy actions in addition to him. Although theoretically he didn’t know anything, Stefan Foriș had knowledge of the cipher in question, as well as Iosif Chişinevski. These methods of message encryption and
75 Gheorghe Onișoru, op. cit., p. 439.
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transmission have not been often used, both because of his arrest in 1941 and because they have not been forwarded to other people.76
Georgescu’s personal life, “towed” by his professional one
Teohari Georgescu’s intimate life turned out to be extremely agitated. He was married three times. Some problems that occurred during his job time were solved in exchange for intimate favors. During the interrogations in the summer of 1953, he recalled several women whom he helped in the previous years, with various services and for various reasons. But he had not shown that, in fact, for part of these supporting acts, he had asked them to have sexual relations.77 Based on the interrogation minutes, Adrian Pop, historian, shows that during his years in the Interior Ministry, Georgescu received intimate favors from 30 women, from simple hosts of conspiracy houses in the years of illegality, singers, teachers, to Ministry civil servants, the wife of the former governor of the National Bank, Moşoiu, the wife of the Deputy Interior Minister, Stelian Tănăsescu, an official from the Billionaires Club, even some relatives.78 The nature of these favors was diverse: the release of legionary spouses from prison, hiring or re-employing them or their husbands in some places of work, especially in the Ministry, housing assignments, passports for Israel or the German Democratic Republic (Jewish and German
76 Horia Nestorescu-Bălcești, “Epurarea lui Teohari Georgescu, 1952...”, pp. 207-208. 77 Gheorghe Onișoru, op. cit., interrogation report no. 23, dated June 2, 1953, pp. 445 - 446. 78 Adrian Pop, „Iubirile lui Teohari Georgescu”, in: Dosarele istoriei, 1997, no. 7(12), p. 12.
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minorities that intended to leave Romania, but they did not have the financial or legal possibility or they were simply fugitives), cancellation of elimination decisions from the party or even money (currency) and gold. He usually had sex in his office with women coming in audience, or at home, taking advantage of the fact that they lived alone. We can interpret these customs not only as an exchange of services, but also as a weakness of T. Georgescu, who behaved in such a manner even if he couldn’t solve the problems invoked by these women or even for no particular reason. In one of the interrogation minutes, T. Georgescu spoke of a life of “deep immorality”, something he had hidden for years, this being incompatible with party life.79 Besides, some of his relationships were not isolated, but had been constant for several years, especially in the case of the wives of former legionaries arrested several times (the Elena Popescu - Lascăr Popescu80 or Zizi Dâmboviceanu - Alexis Dâmboviceanu81 cases). In general, the former Interior minister had requested and approved, under various pretexts, the release of several former legionnaires, former Siguranță officers and police officers from prison. He may also have favorably intervened in releasing Nicolae Turcu, the former head of the Siguranță, in 1946.82 In fact, according to the statements, he would have suggested, as per his own interpretation, entering the structures of the Siguranță as an informant after his release from prison. Although we can infer from his narrative that he would never have accepted such a proposal,
79 Ibidem, p. 13. 80 Ibidem, pp. 13 - 14. 81 Ibidem, p. 15. 82 Gheorghe Onișoru, op. cit., pp. 447 – 448.
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in the 1956 report he appears to have recognized the destruction, in 1951, of the incriminating files of Turcu’s work from the Ploiești Siguranță HQ around 1935. Georgescu also asked Turcu not to talk to anyone about his bonds with the Siguranță. Although the former minister was proven to be an agent, no incriminating evidence of his work could be presented.83
From remorse to rehabilitation
Referring to his party colleagues with whom he had been cleansed, T. Georgescu reverted to older opinions in 1955 and, this time, revealed Ana Pauker’s anti-party activity, which succeeded, with Vasile Luca’s support, in removing some party members from their administrative posts and favoring others at the same time. It is the case of Constantin Pârvulescu, general secretary after Foriș (1944) and of Alexandru Drăghici, removed from his post as prime secretary of the party in Bucharest.84 In February 1956, based on a charge of indictment, Securitate officers proposed the trial and conviction of Teohari Georgescu, but at Gheorghiu- Dej’s intervention,85 this did not happen, so in March the former head of the Interior Ministry was released. The report drawn up by Alexandru Drăghici and Augustin Alexa says that, although the former minister intentionally made mistakes in his declarations, making incomplete and contradictory statements, it was considered that these actions, presented above, did not have
83 Horia Nestorescu-Bălcești, “Epurarea lui Teohari Georgescu, 1952...”, pp. 209-210. 84 Gheorghe Onișoru, op. cit., p. 442. 85 Gheorghe Buzatu, Mircea Chirițoiu (eds.), Agresiunea comunismului în România, vol. II, Bucharest Editura Paideia, 1998, p. 113.
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a counterrevolutionary character. In some cases there was no sufficient evidence for his imprisonment, so the authorities proposed to release him, with the retention of his acts for a subsequent investigation.86 In the years during the investigation, some very acute views were expressed in the upper echelons of the party referring to the three communist leaders removed in 1952. Thus, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, in his report presented at the Second Congress of the R.W.P., accused the “fractional group deviators” of “politically injuring” the State by opposing the leaders of the party and that they would have tried to prevent the exercise of political power over the institutions in their fields of activity. Such an attitude would have created obstacles in the development of the “decisive branches of the economy” and, finally, in raising the standard of living. More specifically, the factionalists, implicitly Teohari Georgescu, were responsible for supporting the wealthy peasants (known as “chiaburime”) and preventing economical “bonds between the peasants and the townspeople”. “Crushing the deviation was a brilliant manifestation of the party's unwavering unity”, said Dej at the same Congress, confirming his tactic of intimidating and eliminating any form of opposition and fractional cores in the party87. After his return to his job as a printer, later director of the Romanian Book Printing House, Teohari Georgescu was able to take advantage of the changes in Romanian politics with the coming of Nicolae Ceaușescu to power. In the plenary session of the C.C. of the R.W.P. held between May 31
86 Horia Nestorescu-Bălcești, “Epurarea lui Teohari Georgescu, 1952...”, p. 213. 87 ***, Congresul al II-lea al Partidului Muncitoresc Român – 23-28 decembrie 1955, Bucharest, Editura de Stat pentru literatură politică, 1956, pp. 129 – 130.
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and June 2, 1965, the new Prime-Secretary advanced the idea of revising the political processes from the Dejist period. Ceaușescu said that “sanctions [were given] as an educational measure, and they should not impose on party members who were sanctioned or excluded for the rest of their lives, to the extent that, through their work, they have shown that they have learned their lesson and are determined to fight for implementing the party’s lineage”.88 Thus, in later years, several communist activists, including Teohari Georgescu, were rehabilitated. According to a note dated April 14, 1968, the former minister of Internal Affairs was forgiven for eliminating Ștefan Foriș, but also by the issue of cooperating with the Siguranță in the years of illegality. In general, the document reiterates the conclusions of the 1956 release, stating that the Securitate’s investigation had been abusively commenced before any decision of the Political Bureau was taken in this respect. Following the rehabilitation (1968), T. Georgescu also became an alternate member of the C.C. of the Communist Party between 1972 and 1974. He died on January 30, 1976, in Bucharest. Central press did not mention anything about his death. Socialist historiography followed, in the 1980s, the political idea of rehabilitating former political leaders. We identify such a case in 1988: “Between 1952 and 1954, numerous state officials and cadres from the Communist Party were sentenced to private custodial sentences, under the false accusation of undermining the national economy
88 Florica Dobre (coordinator), op. cit., p. 41.
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and activity against the working class”.89 It is the case of Teohari Georgescu, but also of other Communist leaders such as Vasile Luca and Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu. Therefore, Teohari Georgescu remains an interesting character for the contemporary history of Romania, a controversial one, who has accumulated colossal power. He stepped up the political hierarchy relatively easy, knowing how to get in charge of his bosses, but fell with a much higher speed, proving that a man can easily be stripped of everything he has accumulated. Mild and perverse, he took advantage of any opportunity to win. He also had the great luck of being interrogated by the Securitate after Stalin's death. He died anonymously but still rehabilitated.
Bibliography
***, Congresul al II-lea al Partidului Muncitoresc Român – 23-28 decembrie 1955, Bucharest, Editura de Stat pentru literatură politică, 1956. ***, Teohari Georgescu, Kiadja a Román Munkáspárt, 1951. Betea, Lavinia, Maurer și lumea de ieri, Cluj-Napoca, Editura Dacia, 2001. Buzatu, Gheorghe; Chirițoiu, Mircea (eds.), Agresiunea comunismului în România, vol. II, Bucharest Editura Paideia, 1998. Comisia Prezidențială pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din România, Raport final, Bucharest, Editura Humanitas, 2006. Deletant, Dennis, Teroarea comunistă în România: Gheorghiu-Dej și statul polițienesc 1948-1965, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2001. Dobre, Florica (coord.), Membrii CC al PCR 1945-1989 – Dicționar, Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedică, 2004.
89 Gh. Z. Ionescu, „Transformări în structura de stat a României în anii 1948 - 1952”, in: Studii și articole de istorie, vol. LVII-LVIII, Bucharest, 1988, p. 65.
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Dobre, Florica (coord.), Securitatea. Structuri – cadre. Obiective și metode, vol. I, 1948 - 1967, Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității, Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedică, 2006. Frunză, Victor, Istoria stalinismului în România, Bucharest, Editura Humanitas, 1990. Giurescu, Dinu C., (coord.), Istoria Românilor, vol. X, Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedică, 2013. Ionescu, Gh. Z., “Transformări în structura de stat a României în anii 1948 - 1952”, in: Studii și articole de istorie, vol. LVII-LVIII, Bucharest, 1988. Ionescu, Ghiță, Comunismul în România, Bucharest, Editura Litera, 1994. Ionescu-Gură, Nicoleta, Nomenclatura Comitetului Central al Partidului Muncitoresc Român, Bucharest, Editura Humanitas, 2006. Manu, George, În spatele Cortinei de Fier. România sub ocupație rusească, Bucharest, Editura Mica Valahie, 2011. Neagoe, Stelian, Istoria politică a României între anii 1944-1947, Bucharest, Editura Noua Alternativă, 1996. Nestorescu-Bălcești, Horia, “Epurarea lui Teohari Georgescu, 1952”, in: Arhivele totalitarismului, no. 4, Bucharest, 1998. Nestorescu-Bălcești, Horia, “Teohari Georgescu 1908-1976”, in: Arhivele totalitarismului, Bucharest, no. 1, year III, 1995. Onișoru, Gheorghe, “Arestarea și anchetarea lui Teohari Georgescu”, in: Analele Sighet 7: Anii 1949-1953: mecanismele terorii, Fundația Academia Civică, 1999. Onișoru, Gheorghe, Pecetea lui Stalin – cazul Vasile Luca, Târgoviște, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2014. Oprea, Marius, Banalitatea răului. O istorie a Securității în documente 1949- 1989, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2002. Oprea, Marius, Bastionul cruzimii (o istorie a Securității 1948-1964), Iași, Editura Polirom, 2008. Oprea, Marius, “Cum a ajuns zețarul Teohari directorul tipografiei”, Dilema, no. 167, March 1996. Pop, Adrian, “Iubirile lui Teohari Georgescu”, in: Dosarele istoriei, no. 7(12), 1997. Șandru, Dumitru, Comunizarea societății românești în anii 1944-1947, Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedică, 2007.
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Tănase, Stelian, Clienții lu´ tanti Varvara, Bucharest, Editura Humanitas, 2008. Tănase, Stelian, Elite și societate. Guvernarea Gheorghiu-Dej 1948-1965, Bucharest, Editura Humanitas, 2006. Tismăneanu, Vladimir, Arheologia terorii, Bucharest, Editura Eminescu, 1992. Tudorancea, Radu, “Elita comunistă din România la începutul anilor 1950. Surse inedite americane”, in: Studii și Materiale de Istorie Contemporană, vol. 11, 2012, Bucharest. Ungureanu, Laurențiu; Eremia, Radu, ”Teohari Georgescu, comunistul care a prescris crimele torționarilor”, Adevărul weekend, no. 181, 9 – 11 January 2015.
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Housing ‘Lunatics’ in Nigeria: A Study in the History of Eco-Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology Olukayode A. Faleye*
Abstract: Housing people with mental disorders has been a long-standing problem in Nigeria since the colonial era. Whereas biomedical and social analysis of psychiatric administration in Nigeria exists, these studies are lacking in historical, ecological and epidemiological perspectives. Thus, this paper discusses the trend of accommodating the mentally ill in Nigeria in the context of eco-psychiatry and psychiatric epidemiology. Underpinned by the historical analysis of colonial administrative and medical records, personal observations, interviews, newspaper reports and the literature, this work concludes that the contemporary challenges to mental health management in Nigeria are rooted in the colonial transformation and intervention that focuses solely on confinement as a tool of psychiatric epidemic control. Hence, the provision of social security schemes and the establishment of appropriate up-to-date psychiatric facilities in Nigeria are important in the face of the socioeconomic pressure of modern life.
Keywords: housing, lunatics, mental healthcare, prison-asylum, Nigeria.
* Olukayode A. Faleye studied History at the University of Ilorin where he received his B.A, (Hons.) and at the University of Ibadan where he obtained his M.A. African History. He is a Lecturer in the Department of History and International Studies, Joseph Ayo Babalola University. Faleye is a doctoral researcher at the Department of History and International Studies, University of Ilorin. His most recent publication is entitled ‘Regional Integration from “Below” in West Africa: A Study of Transboundary Town-Twinning of Idiroko (Nigeria) and Igolo (Benin)’ published in the RISC Journal - Regions & Cohesion, vol. 6, no.3, winter 2016, pp. 1-18.
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Introduction
The ecological dynamics of psychiatric health provide a rich template for the understanding of the mental disorder outbreak that began in Nigeria since the colonial era. The colonial imprint of modern life characterized by the transformation of the traditional way of life was accompanied by environmental, political, economic, cultural, and social changes with implications for mental health.1 It has been observed that ‘once the sociocultural system becomes fragmented, people lose their bearings, symptoms of anxiety, depression, apathy and non-rational hostility set in, the deleterious effects of disintegration are compounded and downward spirals are set in motion in which social pathology and psychopathology reinforce each other’.2 In this light, the reassessment of the nexus between mental health and industrialization, deforestation, migration and globalization among others necessitated the shift in focus from “biological hypotheses” to a “psychosocial” perspective in the study of psychiatry. This perceptiveness is enrooted in the implications of environmental change (both natural and social) on mental health – an eco- psychiatric perspective.3
1 T. Lergo, “Patterns of Psychiatric Illness: A Study In Kaduna Psychiatric Facilities”, in: Journal of Social Development in Africa, vol. 4, no. 1, 1989, pp. 47 - 59. 2 A. H. Leighton, T. A. Lambo, C. C. Hughes, D. C. Leighton, J. M. Murphy and D. B. Macklin, “Psychiatric Disorder in West Africa”, in: American Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 120, issue 6, 1963, p. 521. 3 A. J. McMichael, Human frontiers, environments and disease: past patterns, uncertain futures, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 261-264; A. N. Chowdhury,
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Historically, the etiology of mental illness has been traced to environmental elements such as climatic change and the eclipse of the moon. While astrologers of the early Middle Ages had used the term ‘lunacy’ to mean neurological and psychiatric diseases, philosophers such as Aristotle posited that the full moon stimulates insanity due to insomnia.4 Thus, in the history of psychiatry, a relationship has been drawn between the conditions of the natural environment and insanity. While the problem of mental illness is a long-standing social problem, its environmental and epidemiological dynamics have been undermined in Nigerian historiography and biomedical research. This paper addresses the oversight in the literature by bridging the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial historical realities in this regard.
Revisiting Pre-Colonial Mental Healthcare in Nigeria
In pre-colonial Nigeria, the administration of mental health was dependent on ethno-medicine. The mental disease etiology at this time featured the traditional belief of spiritual and natural determinants of illness. Thus, witches, bad spell, deities, gods, as well as bad substances were seen
“Ecopsychiatry: A new horizon of Cultural Psychiatry”, in: TPSIG Newsletter of the College of Psychiatrists, 1 March 2016, p. 1. 4 H. Arkowitz and S. O. Lilienfeld, “Lunacy and the Full Moon: Does a full moon really trigger strange behavior?”, in: Scientific America, 1 February 2009, available at https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/lunacy-and-the-full-moon/, accessed on 27th August 2017.
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as the cause of mental disorder in the society. In this way, the multiple causes of mental illness are seen as emanating from natural and supernatural origins. The natural causes include heredity, bad diet, high fever and toxic drugs and the supernatural are evil spells, witchcraft manipulations, and ancestral disciplinary actions.5 The general perception of the mentally ill in Nigeria appears to have a common ground across culture areas. For instance, people suffering from mental disorders are called ‘Were’ in Yoruba land. The mentally challenged otherwise known as ‘lunatics’ in colonial times were differentiated by the Yoruba people. For example, were alaso are mentally ill people, who, even though unreasonable, can still manage a normal life in society. The other category is were-abugije – a fully blown wild lunatic.6 The Yoruba people see lunatics as mentally ill patients suffering from spiritual, pathological, and social instability. As observed by A.S. Jegede, the Yoruba people interpret every departure from the approved behaviour and culture as mental illness.7 In this respect, were are further classified by the Yoruba into three groups – ‘were amutorunwa (mental illness that one is born with), were iran (hereditary mental illness), and were afise (mental illness due to affliction)’. In this respect, mental illness is considered incurable but only
5 R. O. A. Makanjuola and A.A. Jaiyeola, “Yoruba Healers in Psychiatry II: Management of Psychiatry Disorders”, in: African Journal of Medicine and Medical Sciences, vol. 16, no. 2, 1987, pp. 61-73. 6 Oral Interview, Pa Ayobami Adeoya, aged 79, Akure, 9th July 2017; Mr Felix Abodede, aged 67, Akure, 11th July /2017. 7 A. S Jegede, “The Notion of ‘Were’ in Yoruba Conception of Mental Illness”, in: Nordic Journal of African Studies, vol. 14, no. 1, 2005, pp. 117–126.
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manageable through spiritual intervention and the application of herbal remedies. Hence, an ‘alawoku’ refers to a mentally ill patient under treatment. 8 Similarly, P.E. Iroegbu noted that among the Igbo of South Eastern Nigeria, the ‘aetiology and treatment of the insane involve many diverse rituals, as well as medicinal root and herbal treatment’.9 Among the Hausa of northern Nigeria, ‘aggression/destructiveness, talkativeness, and eccentric behaviours were the most frequently mentioned perceived symptoms of mental illness… one has to display behaviour that attracts public attention and is therefore socially disruptive to be recognized as having a mental disorder.’ Belief in drugs and demons as causes of mental health problems is prevalent among the Hausa people.10 Whereas the poor social status and perception of lunatics in pre-colonial Nigeria enhance their marginalization in society, the commensurate population distribution across settlements as well as moderate cases of psychiatric disorder during this era ensured the accommodation of the mentally-ill in primordial ethno-medical centres.11
8 Ibidem, pp. 121 - 123. 9 P. E. Iroegbu, Healing Insanity: A Study of Igbo Medicine in Contemporary Nigeria, Bloomington, Xlibris Corporation, 2010, p. 439. 10 M. Kabir, Z. Iliyasu, I. S. Abubakar and M. H. Aliyu, “Perception and beliefs about mental illness among adults in Karfi village, northern Nigeria”, in: BMC International Health and Human Rights, vol. 4, no. 3, 2004, pp. 4-5. 11 Oral interview, Awode Oladimeji, aged 76, traditional healer, Ibadan, 4th September 2017.
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Outbreak of Mental Disorder and Colonial Interventions in Nigeria
The socioeconomic pressure of modern living that began in the colonial era seems to have led to a geometric progression of the number of people suffering from mental illness in Nigeria.12 As observed by T. Lergo, the modernisation and urbanisation processes in Nigeria have led to socioeconomic insecurities that have found expression in social disharmony with deleterious implications for the mental health of many Nigerians.13 J.H. Sadowsky14 showcases the anti-thesis to Lambo’s and Home’s theory of an epidemic of insanity created by civilization and culture shock in the urban sphere of colonial Nigeria. This proposition was based on the assumption that unregistered mentally sick people were also prevalent in rural areas. The local scenario accounting for an estimated official case- ratio of 20/100,000 of the population in colonial Nigeria (excluding rural areas) compared with 365/100,000 in England and Wales was considered ‘mild’.15 Nevertheless, speculations about the prevalence of mental disorder in rural areas were not substantiated, therefore rendering the official estimates unreliable. The obvious truth is that the unprecedented cases of mental disorder made the colonial authorities consult psychiatric experts such as Homes with his 1928 report entitled ‘Insanity in Nigeria’ and R. C.
12 T. Lergo, op. cit., pp. 47 - 59. 13 Ibidem, pp.47-48. 14 J. H. Sadowsky, Imperial Bedlam: Institutions of Madness in Colonial Southwest Nigeria, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1999, pp. 97 - 104. 15 Ibidem, p. 101.
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Brown’s 1936 report on the ‘care and treatment of Lunatics’. This was the colonial approach to epidemic diseases such as plague in the 1920s. Indeed, Plague control in Lagos during the 1920s witnessed the consultation of medical expatriates and epidemiologists such as Sir Edward Thornston.16 The advent of colonialism and its attendant modernisation movement showcases new approaches to psychiatric health management in Nigeria. The colonial intervention in the unusual outbreak of mental disorder in Nigeria can be traced to the Lunacy Ordinance of 1907.17 The subjects of this pioneer legislation include ‘the constitution of lunatic asylum’. The Lunatic Asylum Ordinance was passed for the purpose of managing lunatics in the colony. It provides for the ‘establishment of asylums, the appointment of officers and visitors, the adjudication of persons as lunatics, the discharge of lunatics and the disposal of lunatic properties’. This earlier Ordinance of 1907 was upheld in the Lunacy Ordinance of 1916 which stipulates that “Asylum” means a lunatic asylum appointed under this Ordinance. “Community” includes house, family, town, village, and quarter of a town or village. “Lunatic” includes an idiot and any other person of unsound mind. “Visiting Committee” includes any two members of the visiting committee of an asylum sitting together.18
16 National Archives Ibadan. CSO 26/2. 17222. Vol I. ‘Sir Edward Thornton’s Report on Plague in Nigeria’. From E.Thornston to the Chief Secretary to the Government, Lagos, 12 July, 1926, p. 18. 17 ***, Annual Report, Southern Nigeria, 1907, no. 583. London: HIS Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1908, p. 16. 18 National Archives Ibadan, CSO 26. 01153, vol. I, “Lunacy Ordinance”, No. LVI. 1916, pp. 1 - 5.
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All places declared to be lunatic asylums before the commencement of this Ordinance were deemed to have been appointed under this Ordinance. This Act made provisions for the incorporation of Asylums in public health service of colonial Nigeria. Medical officers in charge of the District in which any asylum was situated were in charge of the management of asylums and were termed the superintendent of such an asylum. The members of the executive council, all medical and sanitary officers and magistrates and such as other persons as the Governor may nominate were often visitors of any asylum within the colony. As a visitor, he or she was empowered to inspect an asylum at any hour of day or night, see and examine any inmate and entertain complaints thereof.19 The Lunacy Act empowered the medical officer to seize any suspected lunatic person and place him or her under observation in an asylum for not more than seven days, except with the authority of a magistrate. The continued detention of suspected lunatics was justified whenever it appeared to the magistrate that the person in question is a lunatic and a proper subject for confinement. However, the governor could have ordered the discharge from any asylum of any person detained therein under the ordinance whether recovered or not, and could have allowed any lunatic to be absent on trial for such a period as he thought fit and could have, at any time, granted the extension of such period. In respect of any lunatic absent on trial, the governor could have ordered the payment of any
19 Ibidem, pp. 2-5.
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sum not exceeding the sum of two pounds per month to the person taking charge of such lunatic. No person was allowed to be absent on trial under this section unless some other person entered into agreement to take charge of such a person. If any lunatic allowed to be absent on trial did not return on or before the expiration of the allowed period of absence, such lunatic may at any time after the expiration of such period be retaken as if he had escaped from the asylum.20 According to the colonial regulation, the community was liable to pay for maintenance of lunatics - when the lunatic is a native of Nigeria, any community bound by native law or custom to support such a lunatic paid a prescribed amount to the treasury every month during the detention of the lunatic in an asylum. Also, the colonial government made provisions for a foreign citizen suffering from mental illness in Nigeria to be deported to the United Kingdom, a British colony or protectorate.21 The colonial heritage of mental healthcare in Nigeria focuses mainly on confinement as a tool of controlling the public nuisance that may arise from mental disorder. For instance, cases abound in which the police were called in to arrest suspected ‘lunatics’ in colonial Nigeria. For example, a police report from the Ilesha police station dated 30 December 1953, reads as follows:
20 Ibidem, pp. 5-6. 21 Ibidem, pp. 7-8.
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As per your verbal instruction of 29.12.53 that I should follow one Laleye Anjorin (m) of Idasa street Ilesha to his house to watch and see to the demeanor of one John Oni (m) of the same address a “termed Lunatic”. On 30.12.53 at about 17.00hrs I left together with the said (Lay) Laleye a brother to the Lunatic and three other constables getting to the scene of crime, the attention of the man in question was consulted and found to be normal, but this behaviour found “eccentric childish idiot”, and I gave him a pamphlet to read, and he read it thoroughly, no mistake in his reading. In my own view, his behaviour shows no harmful action because the position we found him is well dignified, warm neat trouser with a Christian book and talked normally.22
In other cases, criminal lunatics were imprisoned to avert potential danger to the society. For example, a colonial report of 4 August 1955 reads:
Joshua Ojo (m), a native of Erinmo in the Ilesha District, was found guilty of murder but insane by the Supreme Court at Akure on the 23rd of November 1948. He was then aged 40 years. At the time of the offence he was working as a bricklayer at Ile-Oluji in the Ondo Province…for a number of years, Joshua Ojo has behaved normally. He is at present confined in the Lagos Prison where the Alienist recently reported on him as follows: “In my opinion there would be no risk in releasing him, always provided that he is not received with hostility in his home town… In order that consideration may be given to the possibility of his discharge under section 233 of the criminal procedure Ordinance, Cap. 43, I am directed to ask if you will please advise whether or not, in the event of his release, this man would be received with hostility in his home town, Erimo.23
22 National Archives Ibadan, Ile Div1/1, “Lunatic Interview Police Report of’ from Afashorin”, N. H. Police Station, Ilesha to the Sgt. Ile N.A. Police Ilesha, 22nd December 1954. 23 National Archives Ibadan, Ile Div 1/1, “Criminal Lunatic No. M.W. 192. Joshua Ojo”, from Ag. Deputy Governor to The District Officer, Ilesha Division, Ilesha, Ref No. 1189/72 of 4th August 1955.
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The un-popular social-status of the insane undermined resource allocation for psychiatric treatment in the colonial era. Thus, there was a chronic lack of public support for the mentally sick in colonial Nigeria. Consequently, many ‘lunatics’ were housed in prison yards (Table 1).24 Earlier attempts to stem this debacle can be traced to the establishment of psychiatric Asylum in Calabar in 1904 and Yaba Lagos in 1907. The facility in Lagos initially admitted 8 female and 6 male patients. By 17 June 1912, there were 18 females and 17 males and until 1949 the hospital also functioned as a leper asylum. However, inadequate facilities in the asylums made the trend of imprisoning lunatics persist throughout the colonial era. This colonial reality was noted in a memorandum from the Medical Department to the Director of Medical and Sanitary Service dated 20th April 1931: ‘as regards detention in a prison elsewhere than Lagos, there are a few criminals lunatics who could be as well detained in prison as in Yaba Asylum, but I understand that the prisons have under detention as many lunatics as they can deal with’.25 The problem of this scenario surfaced when three prisoners were murdered by imprisoned lunatics in 1937. As observed by colonial officials on 30 August 1941, such killings should be stemmed by establishing purely lunatic asylums in Abeokuta and Lokoja.26
24 National Archives Ibadan, CSO 26/1. 01507/s1/t1, “Lunatics – Treatment of”, Prison Head Quarters File No. 773, Ref. No. 217/iv of 27th February 1936. 25 National Archives Ibadan, CSO 26/ 01507/S.3., “Accommodation for Lunatics”, from W. B. Johnson, Director of Medical and Sanitary Service to the Administrator of the Colony, Lagos, Ref. No. 624/484/21 dated 20th April 1931. 26 National Archives Ibadan, CSO 26/ 01507/S.3., “Notes of Sir Bernard Bourdillon”, Ref. No. 12752/ 30 dated 30 August 1941.
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Table 1: Statistics of Lunatic facilities in Nigerian Prisons, 1924 – 1935
Prisons Section of Prisons Accommodation Notice Gazette No. No. Calabar B Block (males) 68 150 41 Female Ward - 155 46 20/08/1931 Enugu Solitary Cells 1-4 4 61 15 Ikoyi F Block (females) - 103 41 Lagos F Block 40 15 6 I ward - 150 45 13/08/1931 Onitsha Ward No. 1 (Solitary) 6 95 47 Port Harcourt Wards 1 and 2B 2 61 15 M Ward & Solitary Cells Nos 10 - - 3 & 4 in Female 2 199 12 10/3/1932 H ward 20 46 3 12/1/1933 I ward 18 4 1 4/1/1934 No. 1 Cell European 1 - -
Ward & J Ward 45 1071 52 4/10/1934 Single Cells Nos. 1& 2 2 352 24 13/4/1933 Female Ward
Sapele The Prison 6 155 46 Warri The Prison 12 155 46
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Kumba Cells D & E in course of - 89 7 construction
Source: National Archives Ibadan. CSO 26/1. 01507/s1/t1. ‘Lunatics – Treatment of’. Prison Head Quarters File No. 773, Ref. No. 217/iv of 27 February 1936.
Inadequate funding and the attendant poor facilities in mental institutions have consistently been a major challenge to managing lunatics in Nigeria. The practice of imprisoning people suffering from mental disorders has been challenged since the colonial era. As observed by E .L. Salier (the Director of Prisons) in 1922, ‘I believe in (or about) 1917 it was stated that Zungeru Prison was to be transformed into a Lunatic Asylum and I understand that it was the intention to send all lunatics there... It is obviously wrong that those suffering from a disease of the mind should be kept within prison walls and treated similarly to criminals. Also, there is no extra staff allowed to look after these people and it simply means that the efficiency of the prison staff is affected. There are at the present moment 27 lunatics – 24 males, 3 females… I would press for early transfer of these lunatics to more suitable surroundings for them and then relieve the prison officials from duties outside their proper sphere’.27 In a similar note, the
27 National Archives Ibadan, CSO 26/1. 01507/S.3, from the Director of Prisons to the Secretary, Southern Provinces, Lagos. Correspondennce Ref. Conf: 2/ 1922 of 26th January 1922, p. 1.
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Director of Prisons asserted in 1922 that ‘I have to report that Lagos Prison is now overcrowded and cannot take any more lunatics’.28 Thus, the question of housing lunatics in the prison was discussed amidst the desire that other arrangements be made during the colonial era. This call for psychiatric reform did not yield any positive result for the most part of the colonial era. Dr. R. Cunnygham-Brown’s report on the care and treatment of lunatics affirmed the status quo in 1936. As observed by this report, ‘it is doubtful whether under the conditions of society obtaining in West Africa the establishment of large institutions for the detention of lunatics is desirable and that, in any event, funds could not at present be provided for the construction of large mental hospitals. On the other hand, I would deplore the indefinite perpetuation of the system under which, in certain dependencies, lunatics for whom room is not available in the existing asylums are detained in the prisons’.29 This practice of imprisoning lunatics seems to have been the standard in British African colonies. For instance, in the Tanganyika territory, a suspected lunatic may be detained in a prison for the purposes of medical observation for a period not exceeding 30 days. In Kenya, certain prisons are marked as lunatic asylums. In Nigeria, lunatics for whom there
28 National Archives Ibadan, CSO 26/1. 01507/S.3, “Lunatics in the Lagos Prison”, from the Secretary, Southern Provinces to the Chief Secretary to the Government, Lagos. Memo Ref. No. B. 763/1922 of 2nd December 1922, p. 1. 29 National Archives Ibadan, CSO 26/1. 01507/ SI/ T.1, Dr. R. Cunnygham-Brown’s report on the care and treatment of Lunatics, 1936, p. 1.
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is not enough room in the two existing asylums are detained in the prisons.30 The colonial authority argued that the undesirability of associating lunatics with prisoners is fully recognised, but the many demands on Government’s resources have hitherto impeded the provision of further asylums.31 However, it was suggested in 1939 that mental clinics with psychiatrists be established in Nigeria.32 Notwithstanding, the colonial authorities affirm that ‘if detention is accepted as the main function of asylums, it is not illogical that the Prisons Department should take the chief share in the custody of lunatics’.33 The 1950s witnessed a transition from a strict confinement of lunatics without psychiatric treatment to the establishment of mental hospitals such as Aro in Abeokuta.34
Accommodating Nigeria’s mentally ill: The Postcolonial Experience
Despite the emerging globalization of pharmacological psychotherapies, other non-western psycho-remedies exists side by side
30 Ibidem, p. 3. 31 Ibidem, p. 3. 32 National Archives Ibadan, CSO 26/1. 01507/S1/T1, “Dr. R. Cunyngham Brown’s Report on the Care and Treatment of Lunatics in Nigeria”, from the Director of Medical Services to the Chief Secretary to the Government, Lagos, Ref. No. 3000/17, 2nd February 1939, pp. 1 - 2. 33 Ibidem, p. 3. 34 O. Ayorinde, O. Gureye and R. Lawal, “Psychiatric research in Nigeria: bridging tradition and modernization”, in: British Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 1842004, p. 536.
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orthodox medical care in the Global South.35 For instance, the pre-colonial perception of mental illness as both a spiritual and natural phenomenon endures into the post-colonial era. It has been noted that the home of traditional healers remains the first point of call for most of the people seeking mental health intervention in Nigeria. Thus, in spite of the spiritual inclination of traditional medicine, there is a need to bridge the gap between the traditional and orthodox healthcare systems.36 The colonial legacy of asylums metamorphosed into mental hospital with a double purpose of detention and psychiatric treatment. The imprisonment of lunatics continued into the contemporary times. Victoria Uzamaka, the Controller of Enugu Prison, noted in 2009 that ‘Civil lunatics are people that society doesn't want roaming around causing problems, unfortunately, they are dumped in our prisons’.37 Furthermore, population growth and the increasing numbers of criminals incarcerated meant less space for lunatics in the prison yard. Consequently, it is no longer obscene seeing lunatics roaming the streets.38 As observed by a commentator:
These lunatics that walk haplessly on our streets often in their heart wrestle with us for abandoning them to the fate over which they have no power.
35 S. Fernando, “Globalization of psychiatry – A barrier to mental health development”, in: International Review of Psychiatry, vol. 26, issue 5, 2014, pp. 551 - 553. 36 O. Ayorinde, O. Gureye and R. Lawal, op. cit., , p. 537. 37 Victoria Uzamaka, quoted in BBC News, “Locking up Nigeria's 'civil lunatics'”, 29 April 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8023067.stm, accessed on 23rd July 2017. 38 This information was derived from my personal observation of the increasing number of lunatics roaming the streets in Southwestern Nigeria.
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Some of these lunatics look so hale and agile that if government were concerned in looking after the entire citizenry irrespective of their state of health, they could be cured. But instead of stretching a helping hand, we leave them to parade the streets, sleep in the cold, walk naked in the open, having no home, absorbing the heat of the scorching sun. Beaten by the rains, they feed from the gutters and from the heaps of garbage, they drink from muddy water and wear shreds and rags; worst still, people curse them when they go amiss, and most times, you see them with deep and glaring bruises.39
In 2012, the National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria reported that many mentally ill persons were incarcerated in the Nigerian Prisons. Whereas their imprisonment was facilitated by the justice ministries and prosecutorial institutions working for the various states, human right activists have clamoured for the release of such categories of people to psychiatric hospitals.40 Discoveries in the field of psychiatry have shown the relationship between human genetic composition and the potent interference of the natural environment in psychopathology. These factors have been implicated in schizophrenia, bipolar and other depressive mental
39 Abiodun Badejo, “Whether insane, mad or lunatic, they are Nigerians too!”, Daily Post, 10 June 2012, available at http://dailypost.ng/2012/06/10/whether-insane-mad-or-lunatic- they-are-nigerians-too/, accessed on 28th July 2017. 40 Emmanuel Onwubiko, “Lunatics in Nigerian prisons?”, Daily Trust Newspaper, 13th May 2013, available at https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/sunday/index.php/comment- debate/13059-, accessed on 8th July 2017; Emmanuel Onwubiko, “Lunatics in Nigerian Prisons”, Modern Ghana, 17th May 2013, available at https://www.modernghana.com/news/464404/1/lunatics-in-nigerian-prisons.html, accessed on 8th July 2017.
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disorders.41 These studies affirm the Nigerian traditional belief of hereditary or inheritance in mental illness. As noted by R. Uher and A. Zwicker:
All types of mental illness have a tendency to run in families and the risk of developing an illness is associated with the degree of biological relatedness to the affected individual... Twin Studies consistently show that monozygotic twins who share 100% of their nuclear DNA are more likely to be concordant on each disorder than dizygotic twins who share 50% of their genetic material. This difference suggests that the causation of mental illness is to a large degree attributable to genetic factors… [In addition,] a synthesis of current knowledge on environmental causation of mental illness suggests a complex picture with a multitude of social, physical and chemical exposures occurring at different stages of life, affecting the risk for a range of mental disorders. 42
In this light, the environmental determinants of mental illness refer to both the natural and the sociocultural factors, including ‘everything that isn’t an inherited gene’. This advances the ‘historically viewed environmental threats in the context of infectious agents, pollutants, and other exogenous factors that influence the individual’s physical surroundings’.43 Thus, apart from a genetic susceptibility of an individual, unfavourable environmental conditions provide the necessary stimulus for the activation of mental illness. While climatic changes such as drought, cyclones, storms, may translate to socioeconomic challenges with
41 R. Uher and A. Zwicker, “Etiology in psychiatry: embracing the reality of poly-gene- environmental causation of mental illness”, in: World Psychiatry, vol. 16, no. 2, 2017, p. 121. 42 Ibidem, pp. 121 - 123. 43 C. W. Schmidt, “Environmental Connections: A Deeper Look into Mental Illness”, in: Environmental Health Perspectives, vol. 115, no. 8, 2007, pp. A404 - A405.
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deleterious effects on mental health,44 other unfavourable environmental factors include socioeconomic and cultural challenges such as poverty, slavery, maltreatment and injustice, which often increases the risk for people who are genetically susceptible to mental illness.
Concluding Remarks
This paper reveals that the outbreak of mental disorder in Nigeria occurred amidst the environmental and social changes that began with the modernisation movement since the colonial era. The colonial intervention in this regard was preoccupied with the imprisonment of the mentally challenged without the provision of psychiatric treatment. This was a social control measure geared towards the prevention of public nuisance in the West African British colony. The endurance of this trend in the postcolonial era despite the existence of some mental hospitals showcases the colonial inclination in contemporary times. The fundamental human right born out of the human instinct for space and territoriality berates the detention of the mentally ill in dilapidated facilities such as the Nigerian prison asylums. Whereas imprisoning ‘lunatics’ was a colonial practice permissible under an imperial administration, the establishment of conducive up-to-date psychiatric facilities in the country is important in the face of the
44 M. Moran, “Psychiatry Needs Eyes Wide Open About Environmental Issues”, Psychiatric News, 4th March 2011, available at http://psychnews.psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/pn.46.5.psychnews_46_5_17_1, accessed on 3rd August 2017.
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socioeconomic pressure of modern life. Nevertheless, the provision of socio-economic security and the amelioration of the culture shock that comes with modernisation would help abate the widespread incidences of mental disorder in Nigeria.
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Onwubiko, Emmanuel, “Lunatics in Nigerian prisons?”, Daily Trust Newspaper, 13th May 2013, available at https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/sunday/index.php/comment- debate/13059. Schmidt, C. W., “Environmental Connections: A Deeper Look into Mental Illness”, in: Environmental Health Perspectives, vol. 115, no. 8, 2007. Uher, R. and Zwicker, A., “Etiology in psychiatry: embracing the reality of poly-gene-environmental causation of mental illness”, in: World Psychiatry, vol. 16, no. 2, 2017. Victoria Uzamaka, quoted in BBC News, “Locking up Nigeria's 'civil lunatics'”, 29th April 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8023067.stm.
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The ECOWAS 2020 Transformational Vision: Content, Context, Issues and Prospects Adeniyi S. Basiru* Olusesan A. Osunkoya**
Abstract: This article examines the content, contexts and issues in the ECOWAS 2020 Transformational Vision with the goal of outlining the prospects for its actualization. Following an extensive review of extant literature on regional integration as well as relevant studies on regional integration in West Africa, the article argues that that as long as the structures that, in the last four decades, have worked to frustrate the ECOWAS’ goal of an integrated community are still alive and active, the 2020 Transformational Vision, though an ambitious agenda, going by the philosophical ideas undergirding it, like similar ideas and visions of the distant and recent past, is likely to be unrealizable. It concludes that the 2020 Vision should be viewed as another ‘development tokenism’ by the sub- region’s statesmen and policymakers to appease radical voices in the sub- region and not really as an attempt to democratize regional development.
Keywords: development, regional integration, transformational vision, sub- region, ECOWAS
Introduction
In the 1960s, Africa joined the rest of the Third World to key into the global wave of regionalization which had emerged in Europe in May 1951. Resultantly, what developed across the different sub-regions of the continent, especially in the 1970s, were myriads of regional integrative outfits, initiated and promoted by leaders, to surmount the numerous challenges confronting
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Adeniyi S. Basiru RJHIS 4 (2) 2017 Olusesan A. Osunkoya their countries.1 In the West African sub-region, after three years of meticulous planning and diplomatic activities, an all-embracing regional integrative outfit, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), was established on 28 May 1975 with the grand objective of promoting co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity.2 During the first decade of its existence, several activities were embarked upon by the institutions of ECOWAS, as well as the member states, to achieve the objective of regional integration; yet, the performance of the organization seemed to have fallen short of expectations, leading to calls for its reinvigoration in the globalizing era.3 The revised ECOWAS Treaty of 1993 did not only recommend the jettisoning of the intergovernmental system enshrined in the 1975 treaty for a supranational system, but designated the establishment of a common market and a single currency as a matter of urgency.4Interestingly, with this institutional transformation, the major stake-holders were, perhaps, optimistic that, within the shortest possible time, the dividends of regional
* Adeniyi S. Basiru is an independent researcher and PhD candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos, Nigeria. ** Olusesan A. Osunkoya is a lecturer at the Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Tai Solarin University of Education, Ijagun, Ogun State, Nigeria. 1Michael Kehinde, “African Regional Integration: Lessons from the European Union”, in: The Constitution, vol. 14, no.1, 2014, p.55. 2Adebayo Adedeji, “Collective Self-reliance in Developing Africa: Scope, Prospects and Problems”, in: Bolaji Akinyemi, Samuel Falegan, Isaac Aluko (eds.), Reading and Documents on ECOWAS, Lagos, NIIA/ Macmillan, 1984, p. xxi. 3 See Kwesi Kufuor, The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community of West African States, Ashgate, Surrey, 2006. 4 Babatunde Ajulor, “The Revised ECOWAS Treaty (1993): A Synopsis”, in: Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, vol.21, no.1, 1995, p.91.
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integration would begin to accrue to the member-states and their citizens. Disappointingly, however, in spite of these renewed drives and commitments by the stakeholders to ‘fast track’ regional economic integration, it would appear that the vision of an integrated community where people and goods could move freely without official restrictions still remains a pipe dream as some of the objectives of ECOWAS set forth in the founding and revised treaties such as trade liberalization, common external tariff and single currency have not been achieved.5 Perhaps this state of affairs might have compelled the sub-region’s statesmen to craft a new transformational vision for the organization in the first decade of the 21st century. The promoters hope that the new vision, adopted by a resolution of the Highest Authority of the organization in June 2007 and mandated by the same body, to be given the necessary fillip by the President of the ECOWAS Commission, if domesticated and implemented by the member states, would launch the sub-region on the path of an integrated economic community. However, as it is today, barely three years to 2020, there are no convincing indicators that the much-publicized vision is likely to be a reality. Why? This is the core problem of this article. Specifically, this article engages the issues and contentions in the ECOWAS 2020 Transformational Vision. Following this introduction, which presents the article’s significance and purpose, is section two which provides the
5 Charles Ukeje, “From Economic Co-operation to Collective Security: ECOWAS and the Changing Imperatives of sub-Regionalism in West Africa”, in: Williams Fawole, Charles Ukeje (eds.),The Crisis of the State and Regionalism In West Africa: Identity, Citizenship and Conflict, Dakar, CODESRIA, 2005, p.142; See ECOWAS Executive Secretary’s Annual Report, Abuja, ECOWAS, 2009, p. 3.
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Adeniyi S. Basiru RJHIS 4 (2) 2017 Olusesan A. Osunkoya theoretical framework for the discourse. This is followed by an examination and discussion of the background to and content of the ECOWAS 2020 Transformational Vision. It goes on to highlight the seeming achievements and challenges of ECOWAS. The article also undertakes a prognosis of the prospects of achieving Vision2020 and concludes with a number of submissions.
Theoretical Framework of Analysis
The starting question of our theoretical discourse in this article is: which model of regional integration does the ECOWAS Transformation Vision 2020 seek to promote? This is against the backdrop of the fact that the discourses on regional integration in international relations has been framed by divergent theoretical perspectives. However, it has to be stressed that, not until recently when the issue of bringing the support of the “people” into the regional integration project gained currency, debates about regional integration, since the end of the Second World War, have been shaped by two States-centred theoretical perspectives: the federalist and functionalist.6 The federalist (supra-nationalist) perspective celebrates the superintendent of states’ sovereignties, in the long run, i.e. common supranational institutions that could co-ordinate the co-operative efforts of
6 Sean Dosenrode “Federalism Theory and Neo-Functionalism: Elements for an Analytical Framework”, in: Perspectives on Federalism, vol. 2, issue 3, 2010, pp. 1–28.
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all.7 The assumption of this perspective is that collective action problems that often confront an anarchical society in the absence of a common power could be better managed in a condition where sovereignties, albeit, voluntarily, are surrendered to a central institution.8 Specifically, the contention of this perspective is that regional integration would be better fast tracked and brought to almost a logical conclusion, if sovereignty and nationalism, the twin obstacles to regional development, are supplanted by supra-national institutions. The second perspective, on the other hand, favours incremental approach, to regional integration. According to Mitrany, the pioneer of functionalism,
Sovereignty cannot in fact be transferred effectively through a formula, only through a function. By entrusting an authority with a certain task, carrying with it command over the requisite powers and means, a slice of sovereignty is transferred from the old authority to the new, and the accumulation of such partial transfers in time brings about a translation of the true seat of authority.9
Mitrany’score thesis is that regional integration is better effected through the creation of a transnational complex of economic and social organization rather than through surrendering of sovereignties. Arguing within the same school, Haas posits that the creation of ‘limited’
7 See Daniel Elazar, Exploring federalism, Alabama, The University of Alabama Press, 1987; Daniel Elazar, Covenant and Civil Society, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1998. 8 Sharkdam Wapmuk, “In Search of Greater Unity: African States and the Quest for an African Union Government”, in: Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, vol. 1, no. 3, 2009, p.648. 9David Mitrany, A Working Peace System. An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943, p. 31.
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Adeniyi S. Basiru RJHIS 4 (2) 2017 Olusesan A. Osunkoya supranational institutions would gradually bring political elites and interest groups of the country involved to supporting further integration ventures because they see benefit in it for themselves.10 At this juncture, it instructive to note that though these two broad perspectives view regional integration through different lenses, nevertheless, both agree that regional integration, rather than the sovereignty-oriented framework of development, is the best option for managing the socio- economic problems confronting a group of States within a region. Instructively, both have, for decades, framed the discourses, on regional integration among African statesmen and policy makers. Again, it has to be stressed that, in some studies on regional integration in Africa, in the last few years, another perspective which is a contradiction to the age-long State- centered perspectives, has gained popularity. To be sure, this emerging perspective would seem to have framed the discourse on regional integration through the prism of the peoples, the supposed end of regional integration project.11As a matter of fact, the advocates of this perspective blame the problems of ECOWAS and other regional outfits in Africa on faulty theoretical premises drawn from the experience of Europe. Bourenane,12 for instance, contends that the idea of copying institutions found in Europe is not only a delusion but an obstacle to building a regional community in West
10 Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe, Standard, Standard University Press, 1958, p. 13. 11See Stanislas Adotevi, “Cultural Dimension of Economic and Political Integration in Africa”, in: Real Lavergne (ed.), Regional Integration and Cooperation in West Africa: A Multidimensional Perspective, Ottawa, Africa World Press International, 1995, pp. 16 - 31. 12 Naceur Bourenane, “Theoretical and Strategic Approaches”, in: Real Lavergne, (ed.) Regional Integration and Cooperation in West Africa: A Multidimensional Perspective, Ottawa, Africa World Press International, 1995, pp. 33-47.
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Africa, as the conditions that promoted integration in Europe are obviously not present in West Africa. Against this background, he posits that efforts by the policymakers to integrate a region should not be blinded to the needs and aspirations of the people of the region in the light of its social and economic reality, history and culture. In the light of the foregoing, it might be plausible to ask: which perspective does theECOWAS Transformation Vision 2020 mirrors? We will come to this soon; however, it is imperative to put the content and context of the Transformation Vision 2020 in clear perspective.
ECOWAS Transformation Vision 2020: Navigating the Context and Content
It must be noted from the onset that the process leading to the adoption of the ECOWAS Transformation Vision 2020could, in its remote origin, be traced to the late 1980s, when failures in service delivery, spurred by the contradictions in the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme, led to fundamental rethinking of Africa’s development by leaders of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). This culminated in the UNECA’s sponsored International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process, in Arusha, Tanzania, in February 1990.13 The conference deliberated, on the relationship between development policy, popular participation and decentralization of the State.14 At end of the
13 See Said Adejumobi, “The African Experience of Popular Participation in Development”, in: Said Adejumobi, Adebayo Olukoshi (eds.), African Union and the New Strategy for African Development, Dakar/Addis Ababa, CODESRIA/ DPMF, 2009, pp. 64 – 81. 14Ibidem, p. 70.
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Adeniyi S. Basiru RJHIS 4 (2) 2017 Olusesan A. Osunkoya conference, the participants called for the full and effective participation of the people and civil society organizations in charting their development policies, programmes and processes.15 Indeed, in a forceful tone, the delegates declared that ‘Africa has no alternative but to empower its people urgently and immediately and failure to do so would cause Africa to become further marginalized in world affairs, both geo-politically and economically’.16Perhaps, it was against this background that the idea of popular participation became a key feature of the continent’s development discourse. Unfortunately, and disappointingly, too, African statesmen and the donor community rather than situating the developmental crisis that confronted the continent in the failure of the centralized states and the centrist developmental policies that have defined them, insisted on implicating external debts and other exogenous factors.17 But, with the newly-found awareness, in African governmental circles, in the first decade of the 21st century, that development must be centred on the people, efforts began to be exerted at multilateral levels to bring back into the regional integration discourse the issue of democratic regionalism. In the words of Sesay and Omotosho,18
15UNECA, African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, Arusha, Tanzania, UNECA, 1990, p. 6. 16Ibidem, p. 5. 17Adeniyi Basiru, “The African ‘Developmental State’ In The Age Of GlobalAccumulation Crisis”, in: Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, vol. 13, no.7, 2011, p. 179. 18Amadu Sesay, Moshood Omotosho, “The Politics of Regional Integration in West Africa”, in: WACSERIES, vol. 2, no. 2, 2011, p. 16.
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failure by the states in West Africa to significantly improve the lives of their peoples after more than 50 years of independence has led to the increasing advocacy by development partners, local and international civil society organizations, CSOs, to get the citizens fully involved in national development processes as countervailing forces to the state.
Perhaps this new thinking might have spurred the arrival of the latest ECOWAS blueprint – the Transformation Vision 2020 – adopted by the ECOWAS Heads of State in June 2007.19 It might also have influenced the decisions of the ECOWAS Commission to prepare the ECOWAS 2020 Vision Document in 2010.20Specifically, the 2020 agenda is aimed at setting a clear direction and goal to significantly raise the standard of living of people through conscious and inclusive programmes that will guarantee a bright future for West Africa and shape the destiny of the region for many years to come.21To achieve this objective by the year 2020, the ECOWAS leaders, in 2007, based on the experience of the past, in which regional developmental efforts were dominated by the states and their agents, were, perhaps, convinced that the erstwhile ECOWAS of States paradigm needed to be supplanted with a new framework which is people-oriented.22Putting the seeming rationale behind the adoption of the new paradigm in perspective, Abbey23 remarks,
19 ECOWAS, Vision 2020 ECOWAS of the People: Towards a Democratic and Community, Abuja, ECOWAS Commission, 2009, p.1. 20Ibidem, p.2. 21Ibidem, pp. 3 – 4. 22Ibidem, p.2. 23Joseph Abbey, “Regional Integration in West Africa”, in: Modern Ghana News, 7 May 2011, available at http://www.modernghana.com/print/274624/west-african-regional- integration-process/, accessed on 4th August 2017.
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since regional integration is a process rather than a single occurrence, moving it in the right direction requires that ―politicians should not prescribe and impose issues on the people; rather, people should be part of the decision- making process to enable them help in the implementation of its policies, since neither the region nor its constituent member states are homogenous.
To be sure, the overall objective of the 2020 agenda is captured in the Vision mission statement which reads inter alia: ‘to create a borderless, peaceful, prosperous and cohesive region, built on good governance and where people have the capacity to access and harness its enormous resources through the creation of opportunities for sustainable development and environmental preservation’.24 Here, it is instructive to note that virtually all the major provisions in the 2020 Vision Document frame the structural and institutional transformation of the sub-region, economically and socially, around the people. To be sure, at the level of community, the document projects that by 2020 the citizens of the sub-region, among other things, will: • be living in a developed and integrated West Africa; • have a dynamic regional economy driven by a regionally-inclined business community; • have a highly skilled, flexible and mobile workforce; • have affordable and accessible health and educational systems.25
24Ibidem, p.2. 25Ibidem, p.2.
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Beyond all of these, the Vision Document also imposes some obligations on the member-states at national level in order to realize the 2020 Vision. These are: • Each Member State will have a national development policy with a strong regional orientation; • All ECOWAS countries will show credible evidence of judicial, institutional and policy efforts that internalize regional integration in their national development strategy; • Every country would demonstrably have undertaken the required constitutional and administrative measures to entrench regional approach; • All Member States and their key institutional agencies demonstrate the spirit of “ownership” and provide conducive policy space in which national development agenda and strategies are designed; • All Member State view the region individually and collectively as a mutually dependent economic space.26 A critical look at the whole document shows that, aside from the general objectives, scope and values, the outlined issues of subsidiarity, equity, inclusion, representation, participation, accountability etc, the Vision Document contains many provisions, running through the many paragraphs, that if implemented by the concerned parties, could provide the dividends associated with people-centered regional integration. All these cannot be comprehensively reviewed within the confines of this article, but the key
26Ibidem, pp.2 – 3.
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Adeniyi S. Basiru RJHIS 4 (2) 2017 Olusesan A. Osunkoya provisions that are germane for the purpose of understanding the issues in discourse are highlighted. These are deemed to constitute the five Transformational building blocks of the Integrative Development of West Africa.27 Specifically, it is envisioned that, by 2020, the following targets would have been achieved: • an inclusive society achieved through human capital development and empowerment; • a secure and socially cohesive West Africa devoid of conflicts; • a unified region that is integrated into the continental and global economic space and governed using the principles of good political and economic governance; • a single unified regional market with a common currency supported by an integrated and efficient financial market and payment settlement system; • an ECOWAS of people where trade and commerce are conducted efficiently and with ease; • an ECOWAS of people with a conducive policy environment in which the private sector will be the primary engine of growth and development.28 Instructively, the afore-highlighted provisions and others were expected, if domesticated and operationalized by state parties and other concerned stakeholders, to be the spring board for achieving people-oriented
27Ibidem, pp.8 – 9. 28Ibidem, pp. 9 – 10.
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regional community by 2020. In the light of the foregoing, a question is apt: how far have these actors journeyed in this project? Answering this question is the focus of the next section.
Towards 2020 Transformational Vision: The Bumpy Road
Unarguably, West African statesmen, diplomats and other stakeholders, like their counterparts in other regions of Africa, have a good record in expressing strong and open commitments to implementing developmental visions. As such, the ECOWAS 2020 Transformation Vision was therefore no exception. Indeed, since its adoption by the Authority of Heads of States of the community in 2007 and the subsequent presentation of the base document by the ECOWAS Commission in 2010,29 there has been a flurry of socio-economic and diplomatic activities on the parts of the State parties, ECOWAS institutions, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and other major stakeholders, to move the sub-region towards achieving the objective of a borderless region by 2020.30 To be sure, state parties and the institutions of the organization, unarguably, even though marginal, have made good progress and have established a solid base for improved regional-co- operation.31 Firstly, and ironically, ECOWAS which was primarily established as an economic union has achieved most in the area of conflict
29Ibidem, p.1. 30Amadu Sesay, Moshood Omotosho, op. cit., pp.17 – 18. 31J. O. Lokulo-Sodipe and A.J Osuntogun, “The Quest for a Supranational Entity in West Africa: Can The Economic Community of West African States Attain The Status?”, in: PER / PELJ, vol. 16, no.3, 2013, pp.260 – 261.
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Adeniyi S. Basiru RJHIS 4 (2) 2017 Olusesan A. Osunkoya management. ECOWAS, through ECOMOG, aside from its efforts in restoring peace to Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, in the last few years, deployed diplomacy to deal with recalcitrant sit-tight leaders in the sub-region. For instance, recently, the organization successfully resolved the Gambian post-election crisis that perhaps would have launched the sub- region into another round crisis. Also, the organization has undergone major transformations and establishment of various institutions and mechanisms covering the broad range of social, economic and political area of co-operation. The Community Court of Justice, established in 2001, has undergone a tremendous transformation thereby creating opportunities for easy access to the community Court by the citizens. In the words of Bapah,32 ‘ECOWAS is today the only organization in Africa that has maintained a regional stance on the possibility of arbitration by its Court involving a citizen and a state without recourse to exhaustion of national remedies’. Beyond these, in the sphere of infrastructural provisions, the organization had made a bit of progress. For instance, it established a $500m cross-border pipeline project (WAGP) that will transport natural gas from Nigeria to three other ECOWAS countries-Ghana, Togo and Benin.33 It has to be stressed, however, thatin spite of all of these, some of the age-long monumental challenges that led to the re-invigoration of the
32Yaya Bappah, “ECOWAS and the Promotion of Democratic Governance in West Africa”, in: Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy, vol. 2, no. 1, 2014, pp. 86 – 102. 33See Emmanuel Bensah, “Thirty Years of ECOWAS: An Appraisal”, Modern Ghana, 24th April 2012, available at https://www.modernghana.com/news/391065/from-the-archives- thirty-years-of-ecowas-anappraisal.html,accessed 16th July 2017.
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organization in 1993,as well as the launching of the Vision 2020 agenda are still daunting as ever thus raising the fear and concerns that the 2020 Vision may be another unrealizable dream. Putting this scenario in perspective, with an assessment of the balance sheet of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement, which came into force in 1981, Sesay and Omotoshosay,
the protocol on free movement of people adopted more than two decades ago, and which could have had direct impact on the common citizens if it were faithfully implemented by member states, has not had the desired effect of facilitating easy movement of peoples, goods and services across the region, and that generally, the objective politico-economic situation in West Africa has not changed significantly since 1975 when ECOWAS was set up.34
Unarguably, the challenges confronting ECOWAS are legion and their elaboration have been object of a wide range of studies35 and as such should not detain us here. Notwithstanding these, however, Hammed- Hammed36 sums up the key challenges, as following: • Political instability and bad governance that have plagued many of the countries; • Weakness of the national economies and their insufficient diversification; • Insufficient political will exhibited by some member states;
34Ahmadu Sesay and Moshood Omotosho, op. cit., p. 21. 35See Samuel Asante, The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa: A Decade of ECOWAS, Boulder, Westview Press, 1989; Victor Adetula, “The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Challenges of Integration in West Africa”, in: Joy Ogwu, WarisuAlli (eds.),ECOWAS: Mile Stones in Regional Integration, Lagos, Printserve Ltd, 2009. 36Aliyu Hammed-Hammed, “The development of ECOWAS Administration, 1975-2005”, in: Joy Ogwu, Warisu Alli (eds.), ECOWAS: Mile Stones in Regional Integration, Lagos, Printserve Ltd, 2009, pp.113 – 114.
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• Bad economic policies in certain cases; • Failure to involve the civil society, the private sector and mass movements in the process of integration; • Defective nature of the international machinery in certain cases.
ECOWAS 2020 Transformational Vision: Issues and Prospects
As briefly remarked in the previous sections, West Africa, like other regions in Africa, has not been bereft of regional integrative ideas and strategies. However, in spite of these and the numerous development strategies that have been put in place, since the launch of ECOWAS in 1975, as well as the formation of other regional integrative bodies, by the sub- region’s leaders, the socio-economic statistics of the area have been devastatingly debilitating. In comparative terms, the sub-region is not only the poorest region in Africa; it is also among the regions of the world with the highest poverty prevalence rate.37 In 2009, for instance, an estimated 60% of the sub-region’s 300 million inhabitants lived on less than $1 a day.38 Even more worrisome is the quantum of national income devoted by virtually all the fifteen members of ECOWAS to import food in order to feed their ever- growing population, due to their lack of capacities to produce enough food to feed their people in spite of fertile soil for agriculture.39
37Ahmadu Sesay, Moshood Omotosho, op. cit., p. 22. 38 ECOWAS, Vision 2020 ECOWAS of the People, op. cit., p. 4. 39Ahmadu Sesay, Moshood Omotosho, op. cit., p. 22.
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In the light of the forgoing, a question is apt: any prospect for the realization of the 2020 Transformation Vision against the background of the foregoing realities? We will examine this in the paragraphs below. However, it has to be stressed that foretelling any developmental programmes is often a daunting task. This is more so for regional blocs like ECOWAS, which, as remarked earlier, is yet to make any significant impact on the lives of the ordinary citizens in the sub-region. These notwithstanding, our thesis is that, given the socio-economic and political realities on ground in virtually all the countries in the sub-region, coupled with the subpar performance of ECOWAS, its institutions and the member-states, with regard to meeting targets, achieving the goal of a borderless, peaceful, prosperous and cohesive region, built on good governance, as envisioned in the ECOWAS2020 Transformation Vision, like other numerous visions and projects of the not- distant past, might be unrealizable. Specifically, this may not be unconnected with the fact and realities that some of the factors and forces that have individually and collectively worked against previous efforts at achieving the goal of an integrated sub-region are not only still at play but are not likely to disappear in the near future. The first of such factor pertains to continual lack of commitment by the sub-region’s political leadership to the overall objective of the ECOWAS.40 Reinforcing this viewpoint, Sesay and Omotosho remark, ‘many regional leaders profess open support for economic integration under the auspices of ECOWAS, very often it is so mainly at the level of rhetoric
40 See Oji Umozurike, Introduction to International Law, Ibadan, Spectrum Books Limited, 2006, p. 231.
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Adeniyi S. Basiru RJHIS 4 (2) 2017 Olusesan A. Osunkoya as their actions sometimes betray their true commitment to the regional integration ideal’.41Instructively, this tendency often manifests at three levels. In the first instance, member states often fail to make a contribution to the organization as scheduled. Indeed, this situation became so critical that the organization had to devise a way out by adopting a Protocol instituting 5% of tax on all products imported from non-ECOWAS countries.42 Even at that, the responses of the members to the Protocol has not been very impressive, just as there have been problems with the collection and remittances of the levy by some member states to ECOWAS’ account.43 Interestingly, apart from the low appetite of member States to contribute to the organization’s purse to support its projects, the lack of commitment to the ideals of ECOWAS manifests through the lackluster attitude in ratifying and implementing decisions reached by the highest decision-making organ of the organization, its member states. Most times, decisions reached on behalf of the community are often seen as constituting threats to national sovereignty and as such, reneged upon by member States. The ratification of the Protocol Relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment (A/P.1/5/79) is a case in point here. After the agreement had been officially signed by all countries, abolishing visas and other entry permit requirements, the citizens of the community, thereafter, are still subjected to harassment at the various borders within the sub-region.
41Ahmadu Sesay, Moshood Omotosho, op. cit., p. 9. 42 J. O. Lokulo-Sodipe, A. J. Osuntogun, op. cit., p. 258. 43Aliyu Hammed-Hammed, op. cit., p. 116.
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Also connected to lack of commitment to overall goal of ECOWAS by the leaders is the issue of divided loyalty of member states which are also loyal to other organizations within the sub-region. To be sure, multiple memberships of the rival organizations in the last few decades had raised issues of primary allegiance and conflicting loyalties not to mention the problems of overlapping, incompatible and potentially conflicting objectives.44More so, multiple sub-regional groupings also add to the work of harmonization and coordination and thus, complicate the eventual fusion of regional economic communities into larger regional groupings.45 Reinforcing the above contention, Adedeji, situates the rivalry between ECOWAS and UEMOA thus:
So successful has UEMOA check-mated and undermined ECOWAS that all that the latter now spends a great deal of its time doing is to harmonize its programmes with those of the former hold joint ministerial meetings, seek the convergence of the economic and financial policies and the harmonization of the legal framework, accounting procedure and statistics of both ECOWAS and UEMOA. In any case, such convergence will for long remain a pipedream since UEMOA countries now constitute a majority of ECOWAS member countries and as such can play both judge and jury. In spite of the apparent unity that exists, ECOWAS is a home divided against itself.46
The second factor is, perhaps, hinged on the fact that ECOWAS lacks the requisite supra-national institutions, like the EU, to achieve its
44Adebayo Adedeji, “ECOWAS: A Retrospective Journey”, in: A. Adebajo, and I. Rashid (eds.), West African Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled, Region, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, p. 40. 45UNECA, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa I, Addis Ababa, UNECA, 2003, p.18. 46 Adebayo Adedeji, The Role of the Private sector in the Economic integration of the West African sub-region, keynote address at the 40th anniversary of the Nigeria Association of Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mine and Agriculture, 16 August 2000, p.13.
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Adeniyi S. Basiru RJHIS 4 (2) 2017 Olusesan A. Osunkoya objectives.47As regional integration is, really, beyond the realm of nation- states, it requires robust supra-national institutions to provide the framework for efficiency. More so, the international system within which integration takes place is devoid of the institutions of government available within nation-states. To this end, state-like institutions are needed to drive the integration processes internationally. Putting this in context, Cheong48 avers that ‘supranational institutions represent a community of nations that could develop into federal systems or confederations and be great facilitators of integration’. Unfortunately, ECOWAS, beyond the formalism of supra- nationalism, enshrined in the 1993 revised Treaty, has no supra-national institution that could effectively implement decisions, particularly those relating to some of the provisions enshrined in the Vision 2020 document. Till date, infrastructural challenges are as real within the West African sub-region as they were about four decades ago. To be sure, road, railways and civil aviation systems, the key drivers of regional integration in Europe and North America, are still too rudimentary to support integration objectives. Specifically, the transport and communication systems are still so disjointed that it is often difficult to move goods and persons between countries. For instance, it is, perhaps, easier to connect Accra and London or Abidjan and Paris by air than it is to connect Accra with neighbouring Abidjan.49Again, it is observed that countries in the sub-region have different
47J. O. Lokulo-Sodipe, A. J. Osuntogun, op. cit., p. 266. 48Sam C. Cheong, “Establishing Supranational Institutions: European Lessons for a Unified Korea”, in: East Asian Review, vol. 1, no. 2, 2004, p. 73. 49J. O. Lokulo-Sodipe, A.J. Osuntogun, op. cit., p. 270.
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rail gauges making it impossible for trains to move from one country to another. Furthermore, the current pattern of water transportation favours trans-continental trade. The combination of these continues to hamper intra- community trade within the sub-region.50 Another significant factor which has impinged on the regional integration process in West Africa and has continued to persist is the continued dependent orientation of the economies of ECOWAS member states towards the developed countries of the North. As Sesay and Omotosho note, ‘West Africa‘s trade and aid dependence on the traditional Northern development partners have remained virtually the same since the achievement of independence more than five decades ago’.51 More worrisomely, virtually all countries are still dependent on budgetary augmentation from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in order to meet their development needs. The implication of this state of affairs, in the last four decades, is that West African countries are unable to exploit the complementarities of big and strong economies and are equally incapable of competing effectively within the global economy.52 Equally important to be stressed is the fact that the democratic space in West Africa, in spite of the on-going democratization processes, is constricted, making the prospect of institutionalizing people-oriented
50 Daniel Omoweh, “ECOWAS, Infrastructural Development and the NEPAD Initiative”, in: Joy Ogwu, Warisu Alli (eds.), op. cit., pp. 207 – 224. 51Ahmadu Sesay, Moshood Omotosho, op. cit., p. 7. 52Adeniyi Basiru, “Extra-African Powers and the Crisis of Regionalism in Africa: Background to and Reflections on France’s Engagement with Africa”, in: Africa Review, vol.8, no.2, 2016, pp. 96 – 107.
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Adeniyi S. Basiru RJHIS 4 (2) 2017 Olusesan A. Osunkoya regionalism somehow bleak. Indeed, in spite of the adoption and ratification of the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance by member states, there have been, in these countries, though in different degrees, documented cases of democratic infractions – human rights abuses, executive lawlessness, press censorships, electoral manipulation, exclusionary practices; all of which tend to threaten peace not only within the countries concerned but the entire sub region.53 For instance, the cancer of tenure elongation of incumbent presidents beyond the constitutionally- mandated two terms, which started in 2001, when the Guinean President, Lansana Conte, stage-managed a referendum that extended his tenure beyond two terms, has spread to other countries – Togo (2002), Burkina Faso (2008) and Gambia (2009). The end of this practice might not be in sight, as the 2013 and 2015 episodes in Senegal and Togo clearly suggest. To be sure, one sector in which the antithesis in the practice of liberal democracy in the sub-region has been more manifest is the electoral processes. Indeed, the situation appeared so grave that many observers, even doubt if elections could, ever, be mechanism for power transitions.54 Every stage of the electoral cycle, especially when the incumbent President is an interested party, as was the case in the early period of independence, is usually characterized by electoral fraud and massive violence perpetuated by the incumbents against the oppositions. Most times, such state of affairs often
53 Alexander Frempong, Monitoring Democratic Governance within ECOWAS: The Theory and Practice, in: Joy Ogwu, Warisu Alli (eds.), op. cit., pp. 124 – 125. 54 Adigun Agbaje, Said Adejumobi, “Do Votes Count? The Travails of Electoral Politics in Nigeria”, in: Africa Development, vol. XXXI, no. 3, 2006, p.32.
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threaten the positive peace of the countries concerned. For example, the violence that characterized the 2010 presidential election in Cote D’Ivoire was so massive that the international community has to intervene to save the country from implosion. Even where the pre-election process was not marked by violence, there were still, given the illiberal environments in which elections are held, high expectations of monumental violence that may arise from incumbents’ manipulations of the electoral process in order to hang on to power. The ECA report in 2009 notes that, ‘the quality of elections remains suspect in many countries. Often, they are less a peaceful means of transferring power than a trigger of conflict’.55 At this juncture, it must be stressed that while the foregoing issues are no doubt real and offer explanatory frameworks for why the goal of real regional integration continues to be illusive, our contention is that they cannot be divorced from the character of the post-colonial African states.56Though structurally and territorially weak, the African post-colonial states offer almost limitless opportunities for their custodians to deploy the states’ awesome powers for the purpose of primitive accumulation within their territories.57Framed this way, it may then be posited that preserving the existing West African territorial state structures, from internal threats and external surrendering of sovereignties is of core value to the West African
55 UNECA, African Governance Report (AGR) II, New York, UNECA/ Oxford University, 2009, p.3. 56See Sina Kawonishe, “Metamorphosis of the OAU to AU: Problems and Prospects”, in: African Journal of International Affairs and Development, vol. 7, no.1, 2002. 57Claude Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa, Ibadan, Spectrum book Ltd, 2001, pp.5 – 7.
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Adeniyi S. Basiru RJHIS 4 (2) 2017 Olusesan A. Osunkoya ruling elites. Given this reality, it might be safe to posit that as long the states in Africa remain the central actors in the processes of capitalist accumulation; their custodians are likely to continue safeguarding them from being supplanted. Consequently, it may be argued that, beyond the rhetoric of occasional declarations and pronouncements by African statesmen at summits envisioning a borderless region, lie the hidden force of elites’ self- preservation.
Concluding Remarks
This article has examinedthe content, contexts and issues in the ECOWAS 2020 Transformational Vision with the goal of outlining the prospects for its actualization. In furtherance of this objective, it presented the theoretical framework, reviewed extant literature on regional integration in West Africa. Most importantly, it analyzed the key provisions in the2020 Transformational Vision that are germane to this study. Based on these reviews and analyses, the article noted that irrespective of the perspective that one deploys to assess the performance of ECOWAS in the last four decades, the goal of an integrated West Africa, accepted first in principle at Lagos in 1975 is far from being achieved. However, this is not a given, but has been nurtured by legions of factors and forces, the chief one being West African statesmen’ aversion for any arrangement that would supplant the existing state structures because of the almost limitless opportunities they offer them in the capital accumulation sector. In the light of these, the article argues that
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as long as the structures that, in the last four decades, have worked to frustrate the ECOWAS’ goal of an integrated community are still alive and active, the 2020 Transformational Vision, though an ambitious agenda, going by the philosophical ideas undergirding it, like similar ideas and visions, of the distant and recent past, is likely to be unrealizable. Perhaps, it is another ‘development tokenism’ by the sub-region’s statesmen and policy makers to appease radical voices in the sub-region.
Bibliography
Abbey, Joseph, “Regional Integration in West Africa”, Modern Ghana News, 7 May 2011, available at http://www.modernghana.com/print/274624/west-african-regional- integration-process/accessed. Adebajo, Adekeye; Rashid, Ismail (eds.), West African Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled, Region, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004. Adejumobi, Said, Olukoshi, Adebayo (eds.), African Union and the New Strategy for African Development, Dakar/Addis Ababa, CODESRIA/ DPMF, 2009. Akinyemi, Bolaji; Falegan, Samuel; Aluko, Isaac (eds.), Reading and Documents on ECOWAS, Lagos, NIIA/ Macmillan, 1984. Agbaje, Adigun, Adejumobi, Said, “Do Votes Count? The Travails of Electoral Politics in Nigeria”, in: Africa Development, vol. XXXI, no. 3, 2006. Ajulor, Babatunde, “The Revised ECOWAS Treaty (1993): A Synopsis”, in: Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 21, no. 1, 1995. Ake, Claude, Democracy and Development in Africa, Ibadan, Spectrum Book Ltd, 2001. Asante, Samuel, The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa: A Decade of ECOWAS, Boulder, Westview Press, 1989.
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Bapah, Yaya, “ECOWAS and the Promotion of Democratic Governance in West Africa”, in: Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy, vol.2, no.1, 2014. Basiru, Adeniyi, “Extra-African Powers and the Crisis of Regionalism in Africa: Background to and Reflections on France’s Engagement with Africa”, in: Africa Review, vol. 8, no. 2, 2016. Basiru, Adeniyi, “The African ‘Developmental State’ In The Age of Global Accumulation Crisis”,in: Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, vol.13, no. 7, 2011. Bensah, Emmanuel, “Thirty Years of ECOWAS: An Appraisal”, Modern Ghana, 24th April 2012, available athttps://www.modernghana.com/news/391065/from-the-archives-thirty- years- of ecowasanappraisal.html, accessed 16th July 2017. Cheong, Sam. C., “Establishing Supranational Institutions: European Lessons for a Unified Korea”, in: East Asian Review, vol.1, no.2, 2004. Dosenrode, Sean, “Federalism Theory and Neo-Functionalism: Elements for an Analytical Framework”, in: Perspectives on Federalism, vol. 2, issue 3, 2010. Elazar, Daniel, Covenant and Civil Society, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1998. Elazar, Daniel, Exploring federalism, Alabama, The University of Alabama Press, 1987. Haas Ernst, The Uniting of Europe, Standard, Standard University Press, 1958. Kawonishe, Sina, “Metamorphosis of the OAU to AU: Problems and Prospects”, in: African Journal of International Affairs and Development, vol. 7, no. 1, 2002. Kehinde, Michael, “African Regional Integration: Lessons from the European Union”, in: The Constitution, vol.14, no.1, March 2014. Kufuor, Kwesi, The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community of West African States, Ashgate, Surrey, 2006. Lavergne, Real (ed.), Regional Integration and Cooperation in West Africa: A Multidimensional Perspective, Ottawa, Africa World Press International, 1995.
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Lokulo-Sodipe, J. O., Osuntogun, A. J., “The Quest for a Supranational Entity in West Africa: Can the Economic Community of West African States Attain the Status?”, PER / PELJ, vol.16, no. 3, 2013. Martin, Guy, Africa Regional Integration: Lessons from the West and Central African Experiences, Lagos, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1989. Mitrany, David, AWorking Peace System. An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs,1943. Ogwu, Joy; Alli, Warisu (eds.),ECOWAS: Mile Stones in Regional Integration, Lagos, Printserve Ltd, 2009. Sesay, Amadu; Omotosho, Moshood, “The Politics of Regional Integration in West Africa”, in: WACSERIES, vol.2, no. 2, 2011. Umozurike, Oji, Introduction to International Law, Ibadan, Spectrum Books Limited, 2006. UNECA, African Governance Report (AGR) II, New York, UNECA/Oxford University, 2009. UNECA, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa I, Addis Ababa, UNECA, 2003. Wapmuk, Sharkdam, “In Search of Greater Unity: African States and the Quest for an African Union Government”, in: Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, vol.1, no. 3, 2009. Williams, Fawole; Ukeje, Charles (eds.), The Crisis of the State and Regionalism in West Africa: Identity, Citizenship and Conflict, Dakar, CODESRIA, 2005.
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Toponyms in the Jos Plateau and the impact on intergroup relations: an ethno-historical perspective
Andrew Maren Borok* Paul-Kolade Tubi**
Abstract: The history of the Jos Plateau area in the past two decades has been characterized by irresolvable crises and conflicts. These conflicts have multifactorial reasons like politics, religion, and economy. To this list the toponymic factor can be added. Indeed, for the past fifteen years since September 2001, intergroup relationships especially between the Hausa and “indigenes” or, what others erroneously see as Muslims versus Christians, have been marred by internecine crises. The result has been the destruction of lives and property, mutual suspicion, migrations, relocation of settlements, change in settlement patterns and re-naming of settlements. In light of this, the paper looks at one of the manifestations of this conflict, which is the counter-naming or renaming of some settlements in Jos Plateau area in order to claim historical ownership of settlements. This paper aims to prove that the current situation portends danger to national cohesion, development, free movements and association of people in the Jos Plateau.
* Andrew Maren Borok Ph.D, recently had a PhD from the University of Port-Harcourt; Rivers State, Nigeria. He received his B.A. and M.A. at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, in 2000 and 2011 respectively. Among others, he taught history in secondary school for eight years, taught History and Philosophy of Science in the Ahmadu Bello University Zaria from 2006-2008. Presently, he teaches History and International Studies at Federal University Lokoja, Nigeria. His research interests are in intergroup relations, conflict and peace studies, and religion studies, social and political studies. Contact: Department of History and International Studies. Federal University Lokoja, [email protected] ** Paul-Kolade Tubi, PhD, received professional training in Archaeology and Anthropology. He has carried out extensive fieldwork in the Rivers Niger-Benue Confluence area of Nigeria. He participated in the 2017 Fieldwork of the Zinnman Institute of Archaeology, University of Haifa, Israel. He lectures at Federal University Lokoja, Nigeria, where he also pastors the Catholic Chaplaincy as an ordained priest. His papers have appeared in reputable journals and he has published several books. Email: [email protected]
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Key Words: toponym, counter- naming, intergroup relations
Introduction
The paper is an ethno-historical study of toponyms and their socio- political implications on the Jos Plateau. Toponym or place-name is a geographical reference system that has been adopted since antiquity and is still used among peoples of all cultures and climates. The paper examines the historical development of settlements and how the names they are now identified with evolved in Jos and it also studies the nexus between intergroup relations and place names in the Jos Plateau. The research also discovered that most of the names used for the settlements evolved during the colonial period, when settlements or camps sprang up from the activities of mining corporations in the plateau. The paper discusses how the “indigenous” plateau people, who claim to be the landowners, have been uncomfortable with the names given to their landscape by immigrants who are co-domiciled on the land for more than hundred years. This feeling became tense with the outbreak of the Jos Plateau civil unrest in 2001. Since then, efforts by individuals, groups, communities and even the government were made to rename these areas; this has been one of the issues marring intergroup relations and thus creating mutual mistrust among groups.
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Location of Jos Plateau and its People
Jos is located in the middle belt of Nigeria. Geographically, the Jos Plateau lies between latitude 9 and 10 N and longitude 9 and 10 E and is in the central part of Nigeria. The geographers Buchanan and Pugh1 were one of the earliest to identify it with the topographical description “the Jos Plateau”. Because of its excess cold, the people were said to keep themselves warm at night by burning charcoal under their constructed mud beds. The Jos Plateau has different geographical and climatic features, which give it a different outlook from the immediate regions to the east, west, south and north of it. It is a high plateau bounded on all sides by sharp escarpments, 450 – 600 metres high above the surrounding plains of the Bauchi Plateau and former Gongola. It has an average height of 1,142 metre above sea level with the highest peak of 1,828 metres on the Shere hills. The lowest point varies from 600 - 900 metres above sea level. The topographical features made it difficult to climb the plateau, except for a few passes via the escarpments to the east, west and north. The geological formation consists basically of a Cambrian basement complex with granite rocks which have cassiterised mineral and tin. The plains of the plateau are dotted with laterised basalt flat-topped hills, which add scenic beauty to the plateau. Jos and its environs were important sites for tin mining.2
1 K. M. Buchanan and J. C. Pugh, Land and People in Nigeria. The Human Geography of Nigeria and its Environmental Background, London, London University Press, 1955, p. 15. 2 H. J. Morrison, “Early Tin Production and Nigerian Labour on the Jos Plateau 1906-1921”, in: Canadian Journal of African Studies, vol. II, no. 2, 1977, pp. 205-216.
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Scholars like Magvwat have pointed out the autochthonous nature of the various indigenous communities on the Plateau. Jos Plateau falls under the influence of the ancient Nok culture. Since antiquity, it has been known for cultural diversity in which anthropologists and historians have identified over sixty (60) ethno-linguistic groups on the Plateau like the Berom, Angas, Anaguta, Ron, Afizere, Aten, and Irigwe amongst others.3
Conceptual Clarifications: Onomastic and Toponomastics
Scholars have identified the usefulness of toponymy / toponomastics (the study of place-names) to historical and cultural studies. It has historical, social and anthropological relevance within the African milieu. it “uses, enriches and tests the discoveries of archaeology and history and the rules of philologists”; this opines that there are inherent anthropological underpinnings in place-naming. What is in a name? Brutus asks,
What should be in that Caesar? Why should that name be sounded more than yours? Write them together: Yours is as fair a name. Sound them: it doth become the moth as well (Julius Caesar, Act 1 Scene II, pp. 141 -145)4
What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by another name will smell as sweet (Romeo and Juliet, Act 1, Scene V, pp .43-44)5
3 A. M. Borok, Colonial Tin Mining and Intergroup Relation in South Western Jos Division 1900- 1960, unpublished M.A. thesis submitted to the Department of History, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 2011 p. 10. 4 William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, England, Simon and Chuster, 1623, pp. 141-145 5 William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet Quarto, England, 1599, pp. 43-44.
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William Shakespeare, thus, demonstrates that there is more to a name than its sounds and its usage for identification. In Africa, names serve what Erikson calls an “ingrouper”.6 This paper defines names as markers, which distinguish persons and places. From a given name, it is possible to determine not only the ethnic groupings and linguistic affinity, but it also reveals a lot about the name bearer. African names also designate personality, status, occupation or destiny. For Africans, there is an ontological relevance of names because they portray the interconnectedness of persons to the family and community. Scholars like Ehusani (1991),7 Idowu (1973),8 Mbit (1990)9 and Tubi (2015)10 opine that names have both temporal and spiritual meanings in Africa.11 Among many African peoples, the identification of a person’s name with his or her status is perhaps more seriously affirmed at various rites of passage. Ehusani (1991)12 and Tubi (2015) observe that an individual normally gets a new name at traditional naming rites, puberty initiation or initiation into chieftaincy, priestly function, secret societies and even, as in the case of the Babu-Kusu of Kenya, at marriage. Thus, change of names implies a change of personality or status. To Africans, to confer a name is to
6 George O. Ehusani, An Afro-Christian Vision OZOVEHE: Towards a more Humanitarian World, Boston, University Press of America, 1991, p. 5. 7 Ibidem p. 5. 8 Idowu Bolaji, African Traditional Religion, New York, Orbis Mary Knoll, 1973, p. 8. 9 P. K. Tubi, Ethnography of Traditional Religion and Politics of the Okun-Yoruba, unpublished doctoral thesis submitted to the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, 2015, p. 31. 10. Ibidem p. 31. 11 Ibidem p. 31. 12 George O. Ehusani, op. cit., p. 5.
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confer a personality, an identity and a destiny. In Africa and among the Ebira, for instance, a child is not considered a member of the community until the naming ceremony, at which occasion he or she is formally brought out.13 The above reasons could explain why the issues of toponyms have become a protracted problem in Jos and its environs.
Toponyms and their Implication
Africans attach great importance to the names of settlements much as they do to human names. The topography of an area includes physical elements like hills, water bodies, vegetation and buildings. Archaeologists, geographers and historians have opined that landscape plays a significant role in human lives. Hood 14 underlines the close nexus between social relations and cultural landscape, while Branton underscores the importance of landscape in historical archaeology. In the work of landscape is a way of ideology [meaning? Rephrase] and one of the main functions of landscape is summarily to control meaning and to guide its particular directions.15 Toponyms, the naming of landscapes, are a universal phenomenon. The works of scholars like Berg, Voulteenaho and Cabilitz examine the
13 George O. Ehusani op. cit., p. 5. 14 E. Hood, “Social Relations and Cultural Landscape”, in: Rebecca Yamin, Karen Bescherer Metheny (eds.), Landscape Archaeology: Reading and Interpreting the American Historical Landscape, Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1996, p. 51. 15 Nicole Branton, “Landscape Approaches in Historical Archaeology: The Archaeology of Places”, in: Teresita Majeivski, David Gaimster (eds.), International Handbook of Historic Archaeology, New York, Springer, 2009, p. 49.
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cultural practice of naming and how people desire to control and complete the meaning process as they are involved in many economic, social and political struggles.16 Meanwhile, Ojo, in his study of African toponyms of the Yoruba posits that names are a constitutive part of the landscape rather than simply being entities in (and on) the landscape.17 Based on the foregoing, it can be asserted that the making of place names is done through the pronunciation of geographical names as well as their inscription into signs, documents and maps.18 Whether written or spoken, it is now comprehended that place- naming are a means of claiming the landscape materially and symbolically and using it to achieve domination over what is named. As part of the landscape, toponyms are not simply evidences of history, as suggested by traditional place-names research, but part of the ideologically driven process of visibly grounding the past into the present and framing these historical meanings as legitimate. Place-naming can be conceptualized as a form of symbolic possession of a place, a means of associating places with a given people or an expression of an exclusive historicity of the past. Identification with these naming patterns serves as a source of social distinction for some people while bringing social marginalization to others. Thus, it has been
16 Gabriele H. Cabilitz, “When “what” is “where”: A linguistic analysis of landscape terms, place names and body part terms in Marquesan (Oceanic French Polynesia)”, in: Language Sciences, vol. 30, issues 2 - 3, 2008, pp. 200-226. 17 G. J. Afolabi Ojo, Yoruba Culture. A Geographical Analysis, London, University of London Press Ltd, 1966, p. 16. 18 Derek H. Alderman, “Placing, Naming and the Interpretation of Cultural Landscape”, in: Brian Graham, Peter Howard, The Ashgate Research Companion to Heritage and Identity, Aldershot, Hampshire, UK, Ashgate Press, 2008, pp. 195 – 199.
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observed that symbolic names can take many forms, but the naming of built- up environment is a powerful device for creating social distinction.19
The Evolution and the Naming of Settlements in the Jos Plateau 1900 - 1960
Data from the white paper of the government’s Commission of Inquiry into the Jos crisis of 1994 reported that a British colonial administrator, Ames, asserted that the original settlers of the area called it Gwosh which was corrupted by the British and Hausa immigrants to Jos. It grew very rapidly due to mining from 1900 - 1960 when prospecting activities were at the peak. Mining brought in immigrants from across Nigeria, making Jos one of the most cosmopolitan centres in Nigeria.20 In the field work conducted in respect to this research, the naming of settlements and streets in Jos Plateau was identified as a means or way of identifying settlements. The period of the evolution of place names under consideration marked the peak of tin production in Nigeria.21 The naming and numbering of residential and commercial structures in the tin city and its environs has historical relevance which this paper seeks to underscore. Place naming in the Jos Plateau is premised on several factors: indigenous place-names, individual place names and commercial place-names.
19 Ibidem, pp. 195-199. 20 Bill Freund, Capital and Labour in the Nigerian Tin Mines, London, Longman, 1981, p. 41. 21 A. M. Borok, op. cit., p. 101.
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Apart from the above, there are also sundry reasons that can be adduced for place-naming in the Jos Plateau. One of the means of naming places on the plateau is to bestow recognition to the morphological features. This explains names like Gangare. Gangare is one of the settlements in the area of study. The word, Gangare, in Hausa means the lowest point of an area’s topography. The Gangare settlement is located at the downstream area of Jos town at the bank of the Dalimi River. Labour camp is another place- name. It was used to refer to settlement of labourers who were engaged in mining activities on the Dilimi River. The Gangare settlement in Jos town was not the only such settlement that evolved in the area, as there were Gangares in Barkin Ladi and Bukuru and all had a similar historical evolution.22
Ethno-Historical analysis
It became necessary to employ an ethno-historical paradigm in this study so as to bring out the salient anthropological and historical underpinnings of place-naming in the Jos Plateau. Barkin Ladi is one of the major towns in the Jos Plateau. It is the headquarters of the Barkin Ladi Local Government area. The National Population Census (2006) put its total population at 175,267. Barkin Ladi is a Hausa word that literally means Ladi’s town. Barkin Ladi was a name that came out of the exigencies of the owners of the tin mining companies and their strategy for forming labour camps. As
22 Ibidem, p. 102.
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mining activities stabilised by 1914 more prospecting of tin fields flourished. The discovery of new fields of tin deposits inspired people and led to drawing and maintaining regular labour in these areas by the mining companies. The strategy they used was to employ beautiful women, mostly of Hausa origin. These women were known as magagiya. A magagiya was a lady who was saddled with the responsibility of gathering young beautiful girls, cooking food, and brewing local liquor amongst others. All these were to attract young able men to the new labour camps. This strategy worked for them. To enjoy all these, the young men were required to come into the tin field to work for money. Also, the relationship established with these women would hardly make them run away from the labour camps.23 It was out of this historical development that the town Barkin Ladi (Ladi’s town) came to bear its name. The Ladi was a Magagiya (woman) in town who was so important to the labourers because she provided almost all the necessities of a grown-up man which includes women, drinks, and food with the exception of shelter and clothing. Her importance became so eminent that her name dominated the discourse of the labourers especially during idle talks. With this importance attached to her, labourers thus saw her as the “owner” of the town. Hence, they named the settlement “Barkin Ladi” (Hausa language) meaning “Ladi’s town”.24
23 Field notes taken in Barkin Ladi town, the headquarters of the Barkin Ladi Local Government Area in Plateau state, 6 April 2016. 24 Ibidem.
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An alternative source indicates another reason for the town’s name. The mining companies had many fields and sites under their management. These sites were located in Bisichi, Sabon Gidan Foron, Dorowa Babuje and Gana Ropp. Whenever the finance department of the company began payment, they usually moved on horses from one mining camp to another. Before they could finish touring the mining camps, it was always late and Barkin Ladi, which was the last mining camp, was always the last to be paid. The workers would therefore be paid on Sundays. For sociological and economic reasons, pay days were usually the market days in all the mining camps. For Barkin Ladi, Sundays became its market days since it turned out to be the pay day. “Ladi” in Hausa means “Sundays”. Due to this fact, Sundays became the revelry days, and consequently the town now became Sunday’s town, which is translated as Barkin Ladi in the Hausa language.25 Another town with a symbolic name is Gindin-Akwati. Gindin- Akwati means “the button of a box”. Gindin-Akwati was the area where Ex- Lands Nigeria Ltd established its mining industry. It was a vast land where no one was domiciled and, during mining activities, the owner of the company was always seen with a stool which resembled a box. The box-stool served dual purposes; it was a sitting object and a save, a container where money was conveyed to pay salaries to workers. The labourers who always saw him coming to the mining site with stool-box and always sitting on it, thus, nicknamed him Mai Gindin-Akwati (a person whose buttocks sits on a stool box). Since he owned the mining field and the labour force in the area
25 Ibidem.
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was dependent on him, the labourers now considered the whole town as his camp, hence, the nomenclature.26 Mai Idon Toro was also one of the settlements that emerged due to tin mining activities in the Jos Plateau. The colonial miner that established the mining site was said to have a shining or sparkling eye that normally shone like the colour of a penny (coin) so the town became known as “the town of the man whose eye ball resembles a penny (coin)”.27 Toponomastics in Jos orature equally furnish data on another site. Kafi Abu in Hausa means “you are better than Abu”. At the peak of tin mining activities in Gana Ropp, a particular field in the western part of the Gana tin field was discovered to have a large deposit of tin. One Mallam Abu was appointed as a labour contractor and was taxed with the responsibility of seeking and helping the company employ labourers so that they can start mining on the new site. He did this and it subsequently led to the emergence of a new town known as Yelwan Gana which means “the wealth of Gana”. After some time, another tin field was discovered further west and another labour contractor was asked to help in the formation of a labour camp. The camp developed to a big town with more population and eventually supplied more tin tonnage than the labour camp formed by Abu. According to an informant, it was the decision of the labourers in the attempt to hail the great
26 Interview: Alhaji Baba Aliyu, age 85, 11 July 2006. 27 Interview: Alhaji Isa Haruna, 90, 9 June 2006.
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work by the new contractor that made them say “Kafi Abu” (you are better than Abu). The place is now known as Kafi Abu.28 Sabon Gidan Kanar in Hausa means “the new town of the Colonel”. Ethno historical informants have it that the colonial miner that opened the mining field was said to be an officer of the West African Frontier Force. Having seen the opportunity in the growing mining activities, he decided to get a prospecting license. He got a lease to start the Sabon Gidan Kanar mining field. Immigrant labourers were recruited to supply the new mining site with labour. The camp grew and employed many people as labourers, after which they named it after the Colonel who was the manager of the mining site. Consequently, the area was named Sabon Gidan Kanar, meaning “the new town of the Colonel” in Hausa.29 Sabon Gidan Kanar was not the only one of its sort; there were many Sabon Gidajes that also came up in the area of study. They include Barki in Bukuru area, Sabon Gidan Foron, and Sabon Barki that emerged in the border area of Bokkos and Barkin Ladi LGAs. Adjacently, another mining camp sprang up and it was named Gero, which is the Hausa word for millet. The crop is grown by most farming communities of North-Western Nigeria. There is another type of millet grown by the indigenes in the Jos Plateau which is called angai but the Hausa call it dauro. This species has a white- ish colour, while gero is yellowish in colour. With the economic recession after the WWI, there was a massive lay- off of labourers, creating an atmosphere of uncertainty. To stave off hunger,
28 Interview: Alhaji Mohammadu Kurra, 83, 9 September 2006. 29 Interview: Da Kandi Bitrus, 75, 30 March 2016.
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some of the disengaged labourers resorted to petty trading and subsistence agriculture. The fertile lands around the tin fields were cultivated for the production of gero (millet). The area around the mining camp during the rains was always covered by this cereal. In time, the area came to be called Gero.30 Toponymic study in the Plateau is enriched by Dadin Kowa, a settlement that sprang up in an area between Bukuru and Jos. The formation of this settlement was also aligned with tin mining. A tin mining company contracted someone named Dadin Kowa, who hailed from Dadin Kowa in present day Gombe State, to source for labour and to form a labour camp. As the town grew, the early labourers named it Dadin Kowa town after the contractor’s village.31 Toponomastic comparative studies can also be expanded by examining the emergence of towns in the Jos Plateau area and comparing the concept of Tudun Wada and Sabon Gari. The concept, Tudun Wada, in the Jos Plateau can be juxtaposed with the general development of Sabon Gari in the colonial urbanization period in Northern Nigeria, which was marked by the emergence of modern trade centres, mining towns and railway terminals. The Sabon Garis in northern Nigeria during the colonial period were aimed at housing immigrants mostly from southern part of Nigeria, while the Tudun Wada was meant to house people from the northern part of Nigeria that were not indigenous to the local area. This was in tune with the general
30 Interview: Da Gwom Rwei, the paramount chief of Jos South Local Government Area, age 82, 6 April 2016. 31 Ibidem.
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development in the emerging urban centres in Northern Nigeria, especially in major cities like Kaduna, Kano and Zaria. Linguistically speaking, the phrase Tudun Wada means “the hill of a dwarf” or “dwarf hill”.32
The Politicization of Toponyms in Jos and Its Environs
The counter-naming or renaming of these settlements and the objections to their renaming were means of social, political and economic projections. The independence of Nigeria in 1960 brought many buried primordial sentiments to the fore, which eventually led to major socio- religious and political upheavals. Among the Jos people, these sentiments became manifest quite early. This development resulted in the intense opposition against the place-names of streets and settlements in Jos and its environs. The year 1967 saw the emergence of General Yakubu Gowon, an indigene of Plateau, as the Head of State after the coup that led to the death of General Aguyi Ironsi. The coming of Gowon into power led to the creation of twelve (12) states out of the four regions. This single development meant that the Plateau people were now politically and administratively independent of Kaduna politics. Jos now took the place of Kaduna as the centre of political and administrative decisions. By this development, the Plateau people were now brought closer to the government and political activities. A major effect of this was the overhaul of the hitherto Hausa-driven traditional political system in Jos and its environs. The office of Magaji Garin Jos, a traditional, political office which was created by the government for
32 Ibidem.
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the Hausa in 1969, was abrogated in 1976 when the Berom agitated against the office of the Magaji Garin Jos. This brought an abrupt end to the existence of the office and it marked the formal abolition of any form of Hausa traditional leadership in Jos metropolis.33 Toponymic maneuverings continued in the Plateau in the Second Republic. During the political campaigns that brought in the Second Republic, Chief Solomon Lar, one of the gubernatorial candidates tagged his campaign as “The Liberation”. This was a bold attempt to de-hausalize the Plateau. However, the lingering political simmering exploded in 1994 when the Military Administrator of Plateau State, Colonel Aliyu Kama, appointed a Hausa man, Alhaji Inusa Mato, as the Care Taker Chairman of Jos LGA. This development ignited serious agitation from the indigenes.34 There have been series of violent episodes in Jos, the notable ones occurring in 2001, 2004, 2008, 2011 and 2014. These crises altered the entire political, social, economic and geographical configurations of the entire Jos Plateau and its environs. Consequently, the indigenous people of Jos decided to overhaul all the toponyms of the area. It started with changing the traditional titles and traditional kingship regalia from turban to red caps and animal skins, mostly leopard skin.35
33 S. G. Egwu, Ethnicity and Citizenship in Urban Nigeria: The Case of Jos, a PhD Thesis in the Department of Political Science, University of Jos, 2001, p. 116. 34 Ibidem, p. 117. 35 Field notes taken in Gyel, one of the Berom ethnic group districts in the south of Jos, 3 - 5 April 2016.
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The Hausa names given to settlements in the Jos Plateau became a source of discomfort to the indigenous people of Jos and its environs. The new generations began to ask why most of the settlements in Jos and its surroundings have Hausa names. Several groups in forms of cultural organizations, youth organizations and Christian organizations mounted intense pressure on traditional chiefs, constituency representatives and the government to restore the original names or to give indigenous nomenclature to communities with Hausa names. The Hausa also intensely resisted the change of place names that was imposed on settlements allegedly founded by their forebears over a century ago in the Jos Plateau. In 2013, the Hausa population of Jos published a one hundred page paper claiming to be indigenes and explained how they helped in nurturing Jos. In one of their claims, they said,
…the Hausa therefore named both the place and it is common sense that you cannot name places where you are not the owner and the first settler. These Hausa names survived colonial period as all their records refer to such important Jos landmarks like the river in their Hausa names: Dilimi and Rafin Jaki.36
The above contentious issues and counter-accusations between the Indigenous Berom and Hausas triggered the need for total counter-naming or renaming of settlements bearing Hausa names in the Jos Plateau area.
36 JASSAWA, The Truth About Jos, 2013, p. 34.
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The Counter-naming or Renaming of Settlements
With constant crises in Jos and its environs, citizenship, ownership and leadership became issues that dominated the discourse of the area. Because of that, the indigenes embarked on counter-naming of the settlements that evolved with Hausa names. The resultant effect is that what originally was called Layin Suma is now called Sarkin Mangu Street and Ali Kazaure Street is now called Dalyop Street. In the case of Angwan Rogo, another community in the Jos Plateau, the indigenes refer to it as Gura Lo Manjei which means “the hill of the house of Manjei” in the Berom language. For Barkin Ladi, the indigenes wanted the name to be changed to Gwol.37 Recent political events have exacerbated tension in the area, one of the most prominent being the creation and naming of the new Local Government Area. The Barkin Ladi Local Government was one of the most contentious, polarising the citizens of Plateau State. It was first created as Barkin Ladi, but the indigenes wanted the name to be re-gazetted as Gwol Local Government. The present member of the House of Representatives representing the Barkin Ladi / Riyom Federal Constituency has sponsored a bill asking for the change of nomenclature from Barkin Ladi to Gwol. Several extremists even dismissed the name Barkin Ladi as that of a prostitute,
37 Field notes taken in Barkin Ladi, town the centre of the Barkin Ladi Local Government Area in Plateau state, 6 April, 2016
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therefore, making it morally wrong for their Local Government to bear a prostitute’s name, they contended.38 The crisis has also drawn the ire of religious circles. Religious institutions in the area do not always link their institutions with Barkin Ladi; instead they prefer using other names like Ropp and Gwol. For instance, the COCIN Regional Church Council Headquarters situated in Barkin Ladi has jettisoned the place-name and instead chose Ropp, while the Local Church Council (L.C.C) in Barkin Ladi now bears the name LCC Gwol. The historical implication of this is that the gazetted names of these communities do not enjoy the patronage of the indigenes and that they always dissociate themselves from the Hausa names.39 The counter-naming of settlements in the Plateau is on-going. Gindin Akwati was renamed Nekan while Mai Idon Toro, which is one of the oldest mining settlements, has now been given the name Rot Nafok. This settlement is close to Dogo Nahawa, where a human massacre took place in 2010, but the indigenes have renamed it Rot Nafok. In the case of Kafi Abu, the indigenes have changed the name to Rakok. Rakok in Berom refers to the southern part of Kwok, while the northern part of it is called Takwok. Following this decision, all Churches in the area have altered their names to reflect the new realities.40 Another community which has experienced name-change is Sabon Gidan Kanar which is now referred to as Kwul by the Berom Gyel villages.
38 Ibidem. 39 Ibidem. 40 Ibidem.
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It was a landscape that was used as a farm land before the establishment of the mines. The Gero town that was located adjacent Sabon Gidan Kanar is now referred to as Hei Vum which means “a dusty farm land” in the native language. Also, the Dadin Kowa settlement is now called Diye Ji in the native tongue. Diye Ji means mashy area.41 The toponym of Tudun Wada has rich historical relevance. Tudun Wada is one of the early colonial settlements in the Jos suburb. Its founding as a human settlement was linked with the Hausa migrants that came after the formation of the Native Town Authority. The name has been changed to Jishe by the immediate past State Governement which was headed by a Berom. “Jishe” means “bamboo plants”. The area was known for the abundance of jishe (bamboo plants) in the past, which the indigenes used for the roofing of their hut houses. The Gangare settlement is located on the river bank of the Dilimi River where early mining took place. All the settlements around the area were called either Dilimi or Gangare but when the Church of Christ in Nations established a Church in the area, they changed the place- name to Chulnyelp, which means “a thick forest infested with wild animals”. The intriguing part of the whole process of place-naming might be psychological fulfilment without epistemological reasons behind it. For example, both the Hausa word Dilimi and the Berom word, Chulnyelp, mean the same thing.42
41 Interview: Da Gwom Rwei age 82. the paramount ruler of Jos South Local Government Area, April 2016. 42 Ibidem.
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For a succinct overview of the present toponymic controversy in Jos and its environs, a tabulation of some settlements is given below:
Hausa/English Native Zaria Road Behwol Rukuba Road Kabong Kasuwan Katako Laranto Dogon Dutse Fwa-Gachik Tudun Naira Ji-Giring Dogon Karfe Giring Mai-Idiko Topp Wild Life Park Mado Gold and Base Yinggi Anglo Jos Dashonong Dorowa Karama Rahwol Danggwong Tim Tim Ret State Low Cost Rantya Dorowa Gindin Dutse Kang’abe Kuru Jenta III Gakok Kuru Baba Bado Kuru Station Werreng Sabon Pegi (Trade Center) Dahwak Kaduna Vom Zank Kwom; Dagwol
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Sabon Gidan Danyaya (Bischi) Kara Sabon Gidan Foron (Korot) Rahwol Pwatti, Rahwol Dung Ja’an Barkin Bako Dang’ah Barkin Kogi Rebet Tsohon Foron Nkan (Kapwis) Buka da Gindi Ratt Mai Idontoro Tsofo Rebung Barkin Ladi Gwol Gana Ropp Kufang Kurra Falls Kurak Dorowa Tsofo Gwakim Bawan Dodo Gashet Werram Camp Wereng43
Impacts of Toponyms on Intergroup Relations in the Jos Plateau
The arguments surrounding the naming and counter naming of settlements in Jos and its environs have marred intergroup relations in the area. The exercise has caused internecine wars and caused political and religious conflagrations in the Plateau. As the indigenes strive to reassert their
43 Field notes taken in Jos and its environs Jan - April 2016.
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indigenous names, the migrant Hausa see it a deft move by the indigenes to alienate them from the Commonwealth of the Plateau. Meanwhile, the indigenes insisted on renaming these settlements to portray them as the original owners of the landscape. This particular development has caused mistrust among the people of Jos. The government’s position on the issue has not solved the problem completely. There are still primordial sentiments across the different strata of the population. The report of the Commission of Inquiry on the 1985 Jos crisis states,
…an “indigene” of Jos is one whose ancestors were natives of Jos, beyond living memory. This does not include any person who may remember from where his father or grandfather left his native home for Jos as a fixed home, domiciled there as of choice; or who is ignorant about from where his family moved to Jos permanently in quest of better living or in the process of his business. But to a “citizen” of Jos may be ascribed the status of an inhabitant of Jos who is entitled to qualified enjoyment of rights enjoyed by an “individual” of Jos. In the light of the above consideration or careful thought, we concede to the claim of the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta tribes, and to declare that they are ‘indigenes” of Jos. But as to the Hausa-Fulani people’s assumption, we make bold on the evidence at our disposal to advise them that they can qualify only as “citizens” of Jos.44
This government’s position seems to have split the population of Jos into two irreconcilable groups of indigenes and citizens. With the renaming of places by the indigenes, the Hausa felt that they were stripped of a homeland, and that they were also at the verge of political extinction; therefore, they resolved to resist the trend.
44 S. G. Egwu, Ethnicity and Citizenship in Urban Nigeria: The Case of Jos, a PhD Thesis in the Department of Political Science, University of Jos, 2001, p. 315.
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Ethnic prejudices, segregation and religious extremism have flourished on the plateau due to multifactorial reasons. These have been heightened with toponymic changes, which are now going on in Jos and its environs. An important issue which needs to be taken into consideration is the point that most of these towns emerged or evolved on the farm lands of the local plateau people. These lands had indigenous owners. However, due to the jihadists’ activities of the 1800s, manifested by the means of security challenges and slave raiding, they were forced to move up to the rocky hills of the plateau. However, they still came down to the plains to cultivate the land for crop production. All the plains that were under or not under cultivation had names and these names were largely influenced by the geographical features, location and historical experiences of the people. These lands that later became Hausa settlements due to the colonial establishment of camps now came to be Hausa-ized due to the influence of their historical experiences in the evolutions of these settlements. Moreover, part of the problems came from the colonial administrations. The colonial governments gazette them with the Hausa names and subsequently the state used the new names that evolved during the colonial formation of the settlements. More so, the presence of multiple ethnic groups and languages on the plateau made the colonial Government adopt the Hausa language as the lingua franca for the area. In fact, understanding the Hausa language became a prerequisite for all job seekers in the colonial establishments in the Plateau Province, both for the indigenes and the non-Hausa immigrant population.
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According to informants, one would have to pass the Hausa colloquial test before being considered for employment. The missionaries and their activities in the Jos Plateau were another factor. The missionaries also adopted the Hausa language in their preaching and publications. Hausa was even taught in the mission training institutes. As early as 1932, the first Hausa Bible was printed by J. F. Schon of the Church Missionary Society (CMS).45 The publication of the Littafi Mai Tsarki [Holy Bible] implied the hausalization of Christianity in the North, irrespective of linguistic differences. It also has anthropological and sociological implications, thus, the historical evolutions of streets, settlements, mining camps, amongst others, were captured, described, suggested, interpreted and documented in Hausa. This did not however mean that the Hausa were entitled to the ownership of the land, but it gave the Hausa a psychological advantage over others despite the fact that the names emerged out of the natural unfolding of human activities in the colonial formation of urban and mining settlements in the area. Today, most of these Hausa names are recognized by statutes, scholars and researchers. Psychologically, the Hausa were at an advantage over others since the names are in Hausa. As Franz Fanon says, “Mastery of language affords remarkable power. A man who has a language consequently possesses the world expressed and implied by that language”.46 Also, William Shakespeare opines thus, “what should be in that name “Caesar”47? Why should that
45 A. M. Borok, op. cit., p. 120. 46 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Charles Lam Markmann, New York, Grove Press, 1967, pp. 20 – 31. 47William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, England, Simon and Chuster, 1623, p. 141.
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name sound more than yours?”48 For the ‘indigenes’ of Jos Plateau and its environs, they are experiencing cultural, psychological and symbolic detachment from their lands and communities because they have Hausa place names. Comparative studies show that similar issues are found elsewhere across the globe. For example, the Red Indians in the Americas and the Canadian regions are now challenging the adoption of the English names given to the landscape as a result of British colonization of the area.
Conclusion
Who owns Jos? This is an ethnic ideological question that is playing out in the Nigerian urban politics. Landscape toponyms are not simply evidence of history as suggested by traditional name-placing; this research establishes that it is part of the ideologically driven process of visibly grounding the past into the present and framing these historical meanings as legitimate. This paper surmises that the counter-naming and the desperate agitation for the changing of the Hausa names that evolved in the course of the colonial urbanization and creation of mining settlements in the area are reflections of the yearnings of the indigenes of Jos Plateau. Also, the Hausa and other ethnic communities had a place in the historical evolution of settlements in the Jos Plateau and this should be acknowledged. The Hausa settlements in the Plateau are over 100 years old. This historical reality
48 William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet Quarto, England, 1599, pp. 43-44.
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cannot be annulled. The annals of Jos and its environs have the stamp of Hausa influence. As pointed out by Borok, now that the activities of commercial tin mining on the plateau have waned, it is necessary for the government to engineer a re-awakening of moribund industries that will provide jobs for youths who are highly pliable as agents of crises.49 It is envisaged by this paper that good employment will keep the people away from inconsequential factors that readily ignite crises in the plateau. If the necessity of the indigenization of place-names is to be held as sacrosanct, then many African countries might be in need of a serious task ahead. If Upper Volta became Burkina Faso, then, one would imagine what the Nigeria of Flora Shaw would be.
Bibliography
Borok, A. M., Colonial Tin Mining and Intergroup Relation in South Western Jos Division 1900 - 1960, unpublished M.A. thesis submitted to the Department of History, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 2011. Buchanan, K. M. & Pugh, J. C., Land and People in Nigeria. The Human Geography of Nigeria and its Environmental Background, London, London University Press, 1955. Cabilitz, Gabriele H., “When “what” is “where”: A linguistic analysis of landscape terms, place names and body part terms in Marquesan (Oceanic French Polynesia)”, in: Language Sciences, vol. 30, issues 2 -3, 2008. Egwu, S. G., Ethnicity and Citizenship in Urban Nigeria: The Case of Jos, a PhD thesis in the Department of Political Science, University of Jos, 2001.
49A. M. Borok, op. cit., p. 180.
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Ehusani, O. George, An Afro-Christian Vision OZOVEHE: Towards a more Humanitarian World, Boston, University Press of America, 1991. Fanon, Frantz, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Charles Lam Markmann, New York, Grove Press, 1967. Freund, B., Capital and Labour in the Nigerian Tin Mines, London, Longman, 1981. Graham, Brian & Howard, Peter, The Ashgate Research Companion to Heritage and Identity, Aldershot, Hampshire, UK, Ashgate Press, 2008. Idowu, B., African Traditional Religion, New York, Orbis Mary Knoll, 1973. JASSAWA, The Truth About Jos, 2013. Majeivski, Teresita & Gaimster, David (eds.), International Handbook of Historic Archaeology, New York, Springer, 2009. Morrison, H. J., “Early Tin Production and Nigerian Labour on the Jos Plateau 1906-1921”, in: Canadian Journal of African Studies, vol. II, no. 2, 1977. Ojo, G. J. Afolabi, Yoruba Culture. A Geographical Analysis, London, University of London Press Ltd, 1966. Tubi, P. K., Ethnography of Traditional Religion and Politics of the Okun- Yoruba, unpublished doctoral thesis submitted to the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, 2015. Shakespeare, William, Julius Caesar, England, Simon and Chuster, 1623. Shakespeare, William, Romeo and Juliet Quarto, England, 1599. Yamin, Rebecca & Bescherer Metheny, Karen (eds.), Landscape Archaeology: Reading and Interpreting the American Historical Landscape, University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville, 1996.
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Book Reviews
Stephen Kotkin, Stalin. Volume I. Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928, New York, Penguin Press, 2014. Ionuț Mircea Marcu*
Stephen Kotkin is one of the few historians who are well known even outside academia. And for good reasons, indeed. His contributions, especially Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization or Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000, generated important debates on the Soviet regime and are regarded as very influential in promoting a new paradigm for Soviet studies: post-revisionism. The main paradigm-shift (using Thomas Kuhn`s concept) made was to include into historical inquire all the various ways in which individuals adapted to the political regime, as Kotkin himself defined socialism not only as a political arrangement of institutions and practices, but as an experience, lived differently by different actors, in various contexts. His most recent academic project is a biography of Stalin in three volumes. His choice of Stalin for this research is easy to understand, given
* Ionuț Mircea Marcu is a PhD student at the Faculty of History, University of Bucharest. He holds an M.A. in History and a B.A. in History from the same institution and a B.A. in Political Sciences from the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Bucharest. He was a scholar of Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and works at the Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes and the Memory of the Romanian Exile. Contact: [email protected]
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the fact that Kotkin`s most important contributions have been about Stalinism. One could argue that too many biographies of Stalin have been written. This is somehow true, but a book about Stalin, in the way Kotkin intends to do it is still very compelling. The first book in this trilogy is limited, chronologically, to the years 1878 – 1928, so it covers topics such as: the family and childhood of Stalin, the Bolshevik Revolution, the relationship with Lenin and the struggle for power. Writing a biography is no easy task for any historian. The biographical genre has been, until recently, considered not a scientific and systematic way of doing historical research. The problem of the biography as a historical narrative is that it is centered around one person (or a group of people, in the case of collective biography) and events are explained only from that point of view. As Pierre Bourdieu would say: the biography is an illusion. Still, historians have always written biographies one way or another. In Antiquity, historians used comparative biography (see the examples of Plutarch's Parallel Lives or Suetonius`s The Twelve Caesars) for educational purposes. In the Middle Ages, court historians wrote biographies of kings and emperors in order to create a certain image about those political figures. The first major change came with Ranke and his school (still, focusing almost exclusively on politics), but the main argument against biography as a historical method was made in the 20th century. The Annales School proposed a different way of doing history: one that is concerned more with long-term economic, social and cultural developments, and less with political
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leaders. If, as the members of the Annales School believed, what actually matters in history are those long-term phenomona, the biography of any individual is too limited (in time and scope) to be of any use. For this reason, even though historians wrote books about lives of individuals (from political leaders to ordinary people), the biography as a method was considered somehow a lesser way of doing history. Recently, this approach is more and more contested. Without any doubt, the book at hand is indeed impressively well- researched. The author managed to achieve an amazingly deep understanding not only of Stalin`s life, but of the entire history of the 20th century. Using documents and literature gathered during his entire career, Kotkin does debate with many authors who have previously wrote about Stalinism and his punctual contributions are very numerous. For this reasons, Kotkin`s main difficulty, I would say, is a methodological one: how to apply the biographical perspective in such a way that is systematically providing historical knowledge. I would argue that the most important contribution of this book is related more to the methodology used. What I am trying to propose is to read Kotkin`s book about Stalin using a different perspective, one that is more concerned with the broader conceptual issue: how can a historian use a biographical approach in order to better understand complex historical developments? Because of this, apart from being a very well-documented story about Stalin and his life, the first book in this trilogy is, I would say, an attempt by the author to propose a new way of writing a biography.
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While reading the book, the impression is that Kotkin changes his point of view quite often. In the first chapters, he presents the history of Russia during the first years of Stalin`s life and in some places he seems to forget completely about his main character. The author suitably explains the situation of the Russian Empire at the end of the 19th century and the first years of the 20th century, but his historical narrative is not centered on Stalin and his experience. The second part of the book changes the focus: Kotkin explains in detail Lenin’s role and the relation(s) between three main- characters: Lenin, Trotki and Stalin. Only in the last part of the book, Stalin becomes the main character of the story and everything revolves around him. I believe that Kotkin uses these different lenses for a reason, one that is linked to the way he understands the role of biography. I would say that the author is using, in different parts of the book, different methods of biographical narrative. His long, sometimes too long, digressions about Russian history could be explained by the fact that he is writing, in those parts, a biography of Russia, in which Stalin is only a small actor (a part of a large collective). In the second part, the author uses comparative biography (mainly between Lenin, Trotki and Stalin), explicitly or implicitly. Sometimes he does it in a very subtle way, and sometimes he actually compares two characters in order to make his point. The last part of the book, centred around Stalin, is much closer to the classic way of writing a biography.
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For Kotkin, the biography (as a method of historical research) is not something rigid or inflexible. By using all these different approaches to the genre, he is trying to overcome all the inherent methodological shortcomings or limits. His definition and usage of biography makes the reader believe that, actually, the life of Stalin is only a narrative device, used in order to explain broader, more complex issues about the history of Russia and, then, the Soviet Union. Because of this, it makes sense that Kotkin creates a transition, from a general perspective on Russia, in the first chapters, to a closer perspective, focused more on Stalin`s point of view. This process is linked to the rise of the main character himself. In the beginning, Stalin is not yet able to influence events, but by the end of the book he becomes more and more powerful. He turns from someone who is made by circumstances into someone who makes circumstances. But the bigger issue is much more complex. As I have already said, historians have long debated about what matters: long-term evolutions or individuals. At the end of the book, Kotkin tries to answer these difficult questions: Who created who? Was Stalin simply a result of context or did he created the context? The fact that he references E. H. Carr is the key to understand the author`s point of view:
If Stalin had died, the likelihood of forced wholesale collectivization—the only kind—would have been near zero, and the likelihood that the Soviet regime would have been transformed into something else or fallen apart would have been high. “More than almost any other great man in history,” wrote the historian E. H. Carr, “Stalin illustrates the thesis that circumstances make the man, not the man the circumstances.” Utterly, eternally wrong. Stalin made history, rearranging the entire socioeconomic landscape of one sixth of the earth. Right through mass rebellion, mass starvation, cannibalism, the
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destruction of the country’s livestock, and unprecedented political destabilization, Stalin did not flinch. Feints in the form of tactical retreats notwithstanding, he would keep going even when told to his face by officials in the inner regime that a catastrophe was unfolding—full speed ahead to socialism. This required extraordinary maneuvering, browbeating, and violence on his part. It also required deep conviction that it had to be done. Stalin was uncommonly skillful in building an awesome personal dictatorship, but also a bungler, getting fascism wrong, stumbling in foreign policy. But he had will. He went to Siberia in January 1928 and did not look back. History, for better and for worse, is made by those who never give up.1
E. H. Carr argued, using the example of Stalin, that long-term structures are more important than individuals. Kotkin, on the other hand, believes that Stalin is one of the very few historical figures who changed the development of events so much, that he could be regarded as more than simply a consequence of a set of phenomena. Still, it would be wrong to assume that Kotkin has a simplistic approach to this problem (I argued that he uses more than one perspective, which of course is far from a simple approach). Actually, in different parts of the book, he points out how close Stalin (or Russia) was to moving in a very different direction that he / it did. This seems to be a contradiction. If Stalin, as Kotkin argues, was the one who made history (not someone who was made by history) then why highlight all those moments which show how close his life was to turning out very differently? I believe this is not a contradiction, but a paradox. There are many reasons why the author used Paradoxes of Power as a title for this
1 Stephen Kotkin, Stalin. Volume I. Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928, New York, Penguin Press, 2014, p. 739.
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volume. One of those, I believe, is because any biography is full of paradoxes, as there is not any single univocal explanation for historical events. Stephen Kotkin`s Stalin. Volume I. Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928 is not only a very important contribution on the life of Joseph Stalin or on Russia / the Soviet Union in the 20th century. This volume is a very important argument in favour of biography as a historical method, not in a way that does assume there is a red line that can explain everything, but by including the paradoxical nature of any life. The second volume of the trilogy (Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941), published on 31st October 2017, deals with many difficult questions. Judging by the first book, the answers provided by Kotkin should be taken into consideration.
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Submission of Manuscripts
RJHIS invites students, early-career researchers, and professionals to submit papers for its forthcoming issues. RJHIS welcomes articles and book reviews from a broad range of disciplines, including international history, international law, diplomacy, theory of international relations, European studies, among others.
RJHIS is published biannually in May and November. The next issue of RJHIS will be published in May 2018.
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Romanian Journal of History and International Studies is biannually published by the Department of International Relations and World History in collaboration with the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies at the Faculty of History, University of Bucharest.
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