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Inquiries should be directed to: Paul Tiyambe Zeleza Center for African Studies-UIUC 210 International Studies Building 910 South 5th Street Champaign, IL 61820 (USA) African Labor and Intellectual Migrations to the North: Building New Transatlantic Bridges

Paul Tiyambe Zeleza Professor of History and African Studies Director, Center for African Studies University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Acknowledgments: Some sections of this paper were presented at the Symposium on African and African American Intellectuals, University of California, San Diego, May 22, 1998; and the SAPES Monthly Seminar, Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies, Harare, Zimbabwe, August 4, 1998. I wish to thank the participants at the symposium and seminar for their comments. Thanks also to my intellectual friends Thandika Mkandawire, Tade Aina, Cassandra Veney, and Dickson Eyoh for enlightening discussions on these issues, and to Bertin Kouadio for research assistance. 1

Introduction

In 1978, Ali Mazrui argued in his book, Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa , that Africa needed to domesticate, decolonize, and diversify the project of western modernity through what he called the strategy of counter-penetration, a multiple project of engagement and entry into the economic and cultural heartlands of the West. The heroic forces of economic counter- penetration would be financed by Arab petro-dollars and those of cultural counter-penetration fueled by the trans-Atlantic traffic in education. Migrant African intellectuals would speak for Africa in the West, seal relations with African Americans, and together, they would subvert western claims to the universal, to global hegemony. For Mazrui (1978), then, migrant African intellectuals were crusaders for African racial redemption and civilizational presence in the world concert of cultures. More extravagant claims for migrant intellectuals were made by Edward Said in 1993 in his book, Culture and Imperialism , in which he saw Third World intellectuals and writers exiled in the North as cosmopolitan combatants, upon whose hybrid shoulders rested the liberation of both the western and post-colonial worlds. “Liberation as an intellectual mission has now shifted,” he wrote, “from the settled, established, and domesticated dynamics of culture to its unhoused, decentered, and exilic energies, energies whose incarnation today is the migrant, and whose consciousness is that of the intellectual and artist in exile, the political figure between domains, between forms, between homes, between languages” (Said, 1993: 332-3). While for Mazrui the potency of the migrant intellectuals’ passions lies in creative social conversations, in forging alliances with historically oppressed populations in the North, specifically the African Americans, the “voyages in” of Said’s exiled intellectuals are confined to lonely textual readings, supplemented by professional contacts and perhaps the conference circuit. For Appadurai (1996) in his book, Modernity at Large , mass migration is one of the twin forces that characterizes the current age of globalization, the other being electronic mediation. In this new global cultural economy the imagined communities of nation-states are being transcended by the imagined worlds of various cultural-scapes, that is, mobile landscapes of people, images, ideas, technology, and finance. These massive, rapid, and disjunctive flows and relationships which he terms ethnoscapes, mediascapes, ideoscapes, technoscapes, and financescapes lead to deterritorialization: the fracturing of links between nation and state and the transnationalization of the primordial, albeit invented, identities of ethnicity, religion, and race, identities that can turn violently implosive or can constitute elements of a progressive postnational imaginary. Migration, from this perspective, therefore, is a product of, and produces, globalization as a constellation of cultural flows that create a transnational world configured around postnational networks of diasporas. This essay seeks to interrogate these three images of migration from the South to the North as civilizational counter-penetration, revolutionary cosmopolitanism, and cultural transnationalism. The culturalist biases of these perspectives tend to ignore a fundamental feature of migration, that more often than not people migrate to sell their labor power and that the patterns of migration, labor procurement and utilization are conditioned by the dynamics of capitalist development, expansion, and accumulation. The economic dimensions and role of migration in sending and receiving countries should not, therefore, be overlooked. Not only is international migration tied to the changing dynamics of capitalism as a world system, it constitutes a critical element of the international division of labor. The essay takes the view that the cultural and economic processes of international migration are intertwined; that African 2 migrations are as much a part of the complex mosaic of transnational cultural flows as they are of labor and other economic flows. The essay seeks to unravel the factors that influence Africans to migrate to the North and to assess the consequences of their migration particularly on the countries they leave behind. Is their migration motivated by individual self-indulgence, or can it contribute to Africa’s development? Are they following the old trails of Pan-Africanism or the newer tracks of transnationalism; not migrants, but transmigrants who develop and maintain multiple relations and locations, whose personal, political, cultural, economic, social, and organizational involvements span borders, linking their countries of origin in Africa and their countries of settlement in the North? The paper is interested in analyzing the trends of African migration to the North in general, and of skilled workers in particular, specifically the intellectuals. Is their migration a blessing or a curse for Africa and African scholarship? What is their role? What should be their role? The migrant African intellectuals, it will be argued, constitute the third community of African scholars, the other two being those located in the continent’s own universities and independent research centers that have mushroomed in recent years. If the condition of the migrants is to be productive and progressive for Africa, the essay argues, there is need for close and constant collaborations, contacts, and conversations between the three scholarly communities. Needless to say, the term community is not used to imply social and spatial homogeneity for each of the identified groups, for there are numerous and complex intersections that link them, which this essay in fact seeks to investigate. Rather, it serves as a heuristic device for identifying the different locations and contexts of scholarly production and reproduction among African intellectuals. The essay is divided into five parts. First, it examines the scale of contemporary global migrations, and second, of Africans’ migration to the North. Third, it analyzes the forces behind it, probing the various theories that have been advanced to explain international migration and the rise of transnationalism. Fourth, it surveys the production of African intellectuals on the continent and in the North and the extent of the “brain drain”. Finally, the essay explores ways of building new intellectual bridges across the Atlantic, of blackening the Atlantic, and the crucial role that can be played by Africa’s migrant intellectuals in this endeavor.

Dynamics and Directions of Global Mobility

The late twentieth century has been characterized as the age of globalization marked by the rapid movements of capital, commodities, and cultures, of images, ideas, and institutions. To what extent can it also be seen as “the age of migration,” to quote the title of Castles and Miller’s (1998) book? i Going by the hysterical pronouncements of politicians and the media, especially in the North, and the inflated rhetoric by the academic seers of globalization one would think the i They argue that contemporary migration is characterized by five tendencies: globalization of migration whereby more and more countries are affected by migration movements; acceleration of migration whereby migrations are growing in volume in all major regions; differentiation of migration whereby most countries have a whole range of types of migration, such as labor migration, refugees, and permanent settlement; feminization of migration whereby women are playing an increasing role in all regions in all types of migration; and politicization of migration whereby domestic politics, bilateral and regional relationships and national security policies are increasingly affected by international migration (Castles and Miller, 1998: Chapter 1). 3 world is undergoing massive and unprecedented waves of international migration. It is a subject that has increasingly attracted the interventionist proclivities of governments and the regulatory ambitions of international agencies, as well as the analytical interests of social scientists. The reality is far more complex than is apparent from much of the popular discourse and celebrations or condemnations of globalization and transnationalism. The available evidence points to two broad conclusions. First, while the number of international migrants has grown significantly in absolute numbers since the 1960s, the percentage of people who have left and remained outside their countries of origin has remained remarkably steady and small. Second, there have been significant changes in the character and direction of international migration. The flow of people at the global level has lagged behind the flows of capital and commodities. Accurate data for global population movements currently do not exist. The available estimates indicate that the number of foreign-born persons, including migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers, in 243 countries or territories constituting the world in 1985 increased from 75 million in 1965 to 120 million in 1990, implying an annual growth rate of 2.4 percent, which was only slightly above the global population growth rate of 1.8 percent, but far below the rate of international tourist arrivals estimated at 6.3 per cent per year during the same period, or the phenomenal growth in world trade and in capital flows. There was hardly any change in the proportion of migrants in the world population; their percentage remained at 2.3 percent between 1965 and 1990. The share of migrants in the population of the various regions saw a decline in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and increases in North America and Europe as can be seen in Table 1. As might be expected, there were sub-regional variations within each region. Also, less remarkable than often thought, has been the percentage of women among international immigrants; it rose from 46.6 percent to 47.7 percent between 1965 and 1990 (Zlotnik, 1999:23). While the quantitative magnitude of international migration is not as extensive as it is often assumed, the changes in the composition and direction of international migration have been quite profound. We can isolate two critical developments. First, there has been growing diversification of sending and receiving countries. Second, skilled migration has assumed greater importance both in terms of the actual flows and in the formulation of migration policies at national, regional, and international levels. The increase in the number of countries participating in the exchange of people can be seen from the fact that the number of countries accounting for 90 percent of international migrants grew from 44 to 55 between 1965 and 1990. In terms of regional destinations, the share of the developing countries declined from 59.6 percent in 1965 to 54.7 percent in 1990, while that of the developed countries rose from 40.4 percent to 45.3 percent. It is evident that despite the increase in the migrant populations of the North, the majority of international migrants still circulated among the countries of the South. How does Africa compare to the other regions? Between 1965 and 1990, Africa’s migrant population grew at a faster rate than any other region in the world, so that the continent increased its share of international migrants from 10.6 percent to 13.1 percent, although Asia remained the region with the largest number and percentage of global migrants, followed by Europe and North America. The growth of Africa’s migrant population continued in the 1990s. By 1995, African countries were only second to European countries in the numbers of economically active migrants they hosted, excluding refugees and asylum-seekers. There were between 36 and 42 million such people globally, according to International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates, and when their dependants are added, there were a total of 80 to 97 million migrants, as shown in Table 2. Clearly, a lot of Africans who migrate go to other African 4 countries. Intra-African migration is a large and fascinating subject on which much has been written, but it lies outside the scope of this essay. ii The proportion of Africans moving to the North has increased substantially in the last few decades. This essay seeks to examine the dynamics and conditions of African migrants who have gone to the industrialized countries of Western Europe and North America. While their numbers are difficult to estimate with precision, what is certain is the fact that African migrants have flocked mostly to the old European imperial metropoles, the United States and Canada. African immigration to these countries began to increase precisely at a moment when most of the Northern countries were adopting restrictive immigration policies. African migration patterns broadly mirror North-South trends. Over the last forty years, South-North migration flows have fluctuated and not maintained a consistent pattern. The Southern or developing countries have gradually come to dominate immigration to the developed or Northern countries. This has led to the racialization of immigrants in the North which, in turn, has shattered the assimilationist promises of previous intra-Northern migration flows (Bolaria and Bolaria, 1997). Immigrants become an alibi for national failings; their presence serves both as threads that tie together and threats that tear assunder the cherished but increasingly troubled marriage between nation and state. iii There are considerable temporal, national, and regional variations. The available data, outlined in Table 3, reveals that the rise in South-North migration has been more pronounced in the traditional countries of immigration, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, than in Europe. iv Thus, while the proportion of immigrants from the South between 1960-1964 and ii The literature on African migration is vast given the fact that migration has been a key feature of African political, economic, cultural, and political histories. In fact, at one time migration was the dominant theme in African historiography as historians chronicled the migrations of ethnic groups. Later economic migrations, whether that of “stranger farmers” in 19th century West Africa, or labor migrants in twentieth century Southern Africa received a lot of attention. For studies of contemporary migration trends, see the excellent books by Barker and Aina (1995) and Toure and Fadayomi (1992). Also see the survey by Adepoju (1994, 1995) and Adepoju and Appleyard (1996) on emigration dynamics in the so-called sub-Saharan African region; Oucho (1995) on the different types of migration and their consequences in Eastern Africa; Milanzi (1995) on emigration dynamics in Southern Africa; and Kotzé and Hill (1997) and Crush (1999) on emergent migration policy and discourses in post-apartheid South Africa. Equally large is the literature on refugees, a growing part of the African migration experience. For broad overviews see the books by Adelman and Sorenson (1994) and Kibreab (1985, 1996). iii See the fascinating essays in Social Text , especially those by Honig (1998), Derian (1998), Norton (1998), Pateman (1998), and Chatterjee (1998) on the role that myths about immigrants play in the politics of state renewal, national memory and forgeting, and social mobility and control. iv It is difficult to compare the data collected by the traditional immigration countries - the United States, Canada, and Australia - and the European countries because they use different criteria to identify migrants and the meanings of “origin.” Canada and the United States gather data only on persons admitted as permanent residents, while the European countries publish information on the number of incoming and outgoing migrants including citizens returning and emigrating. See, Kelly (1987), Kraly and Gnanasekaran (1987), Zlotnik (1991), and Willekens (1994). For a 5

1990-1994 increased from 41.1 percent of all immigrants to 79 percent in the United States, 12.3 percent to 78.4 percent in Canada, and 7.1 percent to 81.4 percent in Australia, the equivalent ratios for 1990-94 were 46.2 percent in Belgium, 15.5 percent in Germany, and 45.3 percent in Sweden. It is quite evident that in Europe, intra-regional and East-West migration was as important, and sometimes larger than, South-North migration (Fassman and Munz, 1994). This is especially true of Germany, which received 2.3 million ethnic Germans between 1988 and 1996, who were automatically entitled to naturalization and citizenship based on the country’s birthright principle of blood and kinship. In many West European countries the leading countries of origin of migrants were the West European countries themselves. For example, in 1985 European Union immigrants made up over 70 percent of the total number of migrants in Switzerland, over 50 percent in Belgium, Norway and Spain, over 40 percent in France and the United Kingdom, over 30 percent in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands, and over 25 percent in Portugal. By 1996, the European Union’s share of the immigrant population in these countries had fallen but it was still nearly two-thirds in Belgium and Switzerland, about half in Spain, over a third in Norway and the United Kingdom, over a quarter in Portugal, Germany, the Netherlands, and about a fifth in Denmark and Finland (OECD, 1998: 249-256). Data for seven European countries, tabulated in Table 4, indicates that the only Southern countries to feature among the top five sources of immigrants were Morocco in Belgium, France, Italy, and the Netherlands; Algeria in France; the Philippines and Tunisia in Italy; Iran in Sweden; and India and Pakistan in the United Kingdom. On the whole, Asian and Eastern European countries have contributed the largest flows of immigrants into Australasia, North America, and Western Europe in recent years. The scale of the Southern immigration gap between the North American settlement countries and the European countries can be gauged from the fact that 3.5 times more immigrants from the South entered the United States in 1995-96 alone than went to the United Kingdom for the entire period between 1960-64 and 1995-96. Not surprisingly, ratios of the foreign-born population were higher in the traditional immigration countries than elsewhere in the North. For example, in 1996 the foreign born-population ranged from 21.1 percent of the total population in Australia, 17.4 percent in Canada, and 9.3 percent in the United States, to 8.9 percent in Germany, 4.4 percent in the Netherlands, and 3.4 percent in the United Kingdom. It was 2 percent or less in such countries as Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Similarly the acquisition of nationality by the foreigners was quite low in Europe ranging from 0.7 percent of the foreign population in Italy to 11.4 percent in the Netherlands in 1996 (OECD, 1998: 224-5). Migration to the North in the 1990s is characterized by several new trends amidst the persistence of old ones v. According to the 1998 OECD (Organization of Economic Development discussion on new approaches to immigrant measurement in the United States and the continuing difficulties, see Kraly (1991) and Schmidley and Robinson (1998). v For an overview of international migration trends since the Second World War, see Salt (1987, 1989) and Werner (1986). Salt notes the following trends: continuing decline in permanent settlement; growing importance of temporary migration; the widening scope of international migration; the emergence of family reunion as a major element; the imposition of more restrictive immigration policies; the rise of refugees to the top of the international migration agenda; the growing importance of “brain exchanges”; visibility of institutions involved in international migration; and growing pressures for illegal migration. 6 and Cooperation) annual report on Trends in International Migration , there has been a reduction in legal immigration flows in the majority of OECD countries since 1993, although migration still plays a significant role in annual population growth as domestic fertility rates continue to fall and ageing of the native population accelerates. At current levels, however, immigration is unlikely to reverse the demographic decline in the Northern countries. Also, there has been a decrease in the number of asylum claims, but an increase in the relative importance of temporary and highly-skilled workers in the total flows, while immigration for family reunion continues to predominate. vi As a part of this, the relative share of family members accompanying foreign workers has risen, accounting for approximately half of family-related immigration in Canada. Not only has the foreign labor force grown in almost all the OECD countries, it has spread to more sectors, including the services and self-employment, although foreigners continue to be more vulnerable to unemployment than nationals particularly in Europe. In such countries as Australia, Canada, and Switzerland foreigners constituted between 14 and 18 percent of total employment in 1996; in the United States, Germany, Belgium, France, and Sweden their share was between 5 and 10 percent; and it was less than 5 percent in Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Italy, Spain and Portugal. The decline in legal immigration and asylum flows can partly be explained by the adoption of restrictive immigration policies among many of the OECD countries. Significant legislative changes have been made to stiffen rules governing family reunion and to establish more selective criteria for permanent immigration. Border controls have been tightened and entry requirements toughened. In addition to the implementation of new national legislation and regulations, there is more regional policy harmonization through the European Union in the case of Western Europe and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Area) in the case of North America. vii These associations, in turn, have sometimes signed agreements with some of the major sending countries in the South to regulate immigration and facilitate the voluntary return of immigrants. But the long-term efficacy of restrictive state policies in controlling the volume and composition of international migration remains unclear (Massey, 1999). Indicative of the confusion and challenges is the fact that contradictory efforts were being made at the same time to integrate immigrants. On the one hand, regularization programs were being promoted as immigrant rights were being eroded, on the other hand. Between 1995 and 1998 regularization drives of undocumented foreigners were launched in Italy, Portugal, Spain, France, and Greece, and limited amnesty measures were adopted for select groups of immigrants and asylum seekers in Germany and the United States in 1996 and 1997, respectively. But the rates of naturalizations remained low, except for the United States and in Germany for ethnic vi For the changing dynamics on entry of asylum-seekers and refugees from the South to the North, see Widgren (1989) and Gallagher (1989). vii The European Union signed the Convention of Schengen in 1985 to harmonize its members’ border and immigration policies. Guy de Lusignan (1999: 4) argues that the convention “has had no practical effect because the police forces of EU nations lack adequate computing information systems. Another explanation could be the difficulties in trying to apply the Convention in the context of differing national laws, traditions, and political concerns.” Others argue that the Convention is facilitating the creation of “Fortress Europe,” forcing countries especially those on the borders of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean to create secure frontiers as they enclose themselves in a new European space (Suárez-Navaz (1997). 7

Germans. Assistance programs for new immigrants were curtailed and immigrant civic and political rights reduced or threatened even in the United States. And the dreams of building multicultural societies were increasingly imperiled by the rising specter of racism, violence, and discrimination against foreigners, especially those from the South. The drift from multiculturalism was even evident in countries with official multicultural policies, such as Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, and Sweden (Castles and Miller, 1998: xii). Amidst all this, the formation of new ethnic communities and ethnic minorities continued, reshaping the political and cultural landscapes of both the receiving and sending countries. In fact, as Tomas Hammar (1989:636) has observed, a new category of aliens was emerging, “neither aliens nor full citizens, but something in between which we might call ‘denizens.’ Still foreign citizens, they now possess considerable rights also in the countries where they are domiciled,” including voting rights in local elections as is the case in Scandinavia and the Netherlands. The rise of the “denizens” raised fundamental questions about the interface between nation-state and citizenship. One can only agree with M. Silverman’s (1991: 333-4) argument that “the demands for a new citizenship based on residence rather than nationality and allowing for a pluralism of identifications rather than symbolic allegiance to a monolithic national identity, today constitute the basis for a re-definition of the social contract of the modern era.” In recognition of this emerging reality, some countries began to accept dual citizenship, a process that enabled migrants to participate in the politics of both their countries of origin and countries of settlement. This is a route African countries might want to consider as a way of limiting the losses of skilled migration to the North.

African Immigration in Western Europe and North America

It was in this complex maelstrom of rapidly changing international migration that African immigrants, including the intellectual elites among them, found themselves. African immigration to Europe has generally tended to follow the historical and linguistic trails of colonialism, so that Britain and France are the preferred destinations of migrants from the former British and French colonies, respectively. In recent years, African migration in Europe has become more diffuse and spread to the northern countries, principally Germany and the Netherlands, as well as the southern ones, including Italy, Spain, and Portugal, which had until the 1970s themselves been countries of emigration. The rise of the latter as countries of immigration reflects the complex transformations in the political economies of both Europe and Africa, and the construction of new transnational economic and political spaces and borders that recast patterns of migration and redefined regional and national identities. France boasts the longest history of immigration in modern Europe, dating back to the middle of the nineteenth century, thanks to the republican tradition stemming from the French Revolution and the exceptionally high demand for industrial labor because the country’s peasants were able to resist the pressures to force them out of the countryside as happened in Britain and Germany. After the Second World War, France pursued expansive immigration policies to sustain economic reconstruction and growth and boost its population. Moreover, there was widespread confidence in the country’s capacity to absorb and integrate the newcomers. The consensus for an open immigration regime crumbled as both the postwar boom and the self- assured Gaulist era came to an end at the turn of the 1970s (de Wenden, 1987; Hollifield, 1997). It was during this very period that African immigration began to expand, which ensured that immigrants would be at the center of painful debates about French identity and citizenship, 8 especially since, like in the other industrialized countries, it reflected important shifts in the composition of previous flows dominated by fellow Europeans and Christians. viii Immigration policy became increasingly restrictive as the traditional external control of borders and internal regulation of labor markets were reinforced by a new strategy of attacking and limiting the rights of established immigrants. While immigration flows stagnated in the 1970s and 1980s, so that the percentage share of the total immigrant population remained virtually unchanged from 1975 to 1990 as shown in Table 5, African immigration continued to rise both absolutely and relatively, dominated by the three North African countries of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. ix Altogether, African immigrants increased their share of the total immigrant population from 24.7 percent in 1975 to 33.0 percent in 1990. In the 1990s over half of the immigrants into France from non-European Economic Area countries came from Africa, roughly a quarter from Asia and the balance from the Americas (14 percent) and non-EEA Europe (11 percent). Similarly, in 1996 half of the 109,800 foreigners who acquired French nationality, half involved African nationals and around a quarter Europeans (OECD, 1998:101-7). Despite its massive exports of migrants, Britain’s immigrant population has historically been lower than that of France. Foreigners made up 3.2 percent of the total population between 1986 and 1990, 3.5 per cent between 1992 and 1993, and 3.4 per cent between 1994 and 1996. The Irish were the biggest contingent. As in France, the composition of immigration began to change noticeably from the 1960s as more immigrants started to flow in from the ex-colonies, especially the Caribbean, the Indian subcontinent, and Africa, although these were not the first “black” people to arrive and settle in Britain as several studies have amply demonstrated (Fryer, 1984; Ramdin, 1987; Killingray, 1994; Dummett and Nicol, 1990). This also triggered bitter debates about immigration, leading to stringent restrictions that culminated in a clamp down by viii African immigration to France, argues Garson (1992) constituted an integral part of a generalized system of bilateral relations. Immigration played an important role in the rise of the right-wing National Front whose electoral victories, in turn, facilitated the drift towards conservatism in French politics even during Francois Mitterrand’s ostensibly socialist era in the 1980s and early 1990s. Immigration was embroiled in concerns about French national identity being decomposed and reconfigured by the forces of European integration and globalization at a time of slow economic growth and massive cultural transformation. See Grillo (1985; Ogden (1991, 1993); Brubaker (1992); Hollifield (1997); Cohen (1997); Karanovic (1999). In 1996 Africa and the world witnessed the ugly fallout of this in the spectacle of a hunger strike by undocumented African immigrants, the so-called sans papiers , at a Paris church (Rosenblum, 1996). Less dramatic, but no less significant were the protests and strikes organized by African workers over inadequate housing and other social grievances, and against racism. For a chronology of this protest activity, see Fox (1995). For protests elsewhere across Europe by the African diaspora, see Ervin (1999). ix For a detailed analysis of migration flows from the Maghreb countries, the emigration pressures in these countries, the policies adopted by their governments and those of the receiving countries, and the developmental impact of emigration, see the study by ILO (1998). The migration flows are attributed to demographic pressures, the disparity between labor supply and demand, and the considerable socio-economic development that has been achieved in these countries, as well as the impact of structural adjustment programs and greater integration of these countries into the world economy. 9

Thatcher’s government in the early 1980s. x The racialization of the immigrants from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean, R. Miles (1991) has argued, evoked and reinforced the racialization of earlier European immigrants, especially the Irish and Jews, as well as the othering of the domestic working class, processes which were critical in the construction and reproduction of British national identity. Notwithstanding the restrictions, migrants from the so-called New Commonwealth increased their proportion of the immigrant population over those from the old white Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries. Specifically immigration from western and eastern Africa increased from 79,000 in 1984 to 127,000 in 1995, of whom 69,000 were women, as can be seen in Table 6. In the 1990s migrants from Africa and the Indian subcontinent accounted for the largest group undertaking naturalization. Between 1993 and 1996, 32,400 Africans were granted citizenship in the United Kingdom, out of a total of 173,400 citizenship grants. As for the labor force, in 1996 African immigrants comprised 10 percent of the total foreign labor force, estimated at a little over 2 million, as compared to 23 percent for those from Asia and 40 percent for migrants from the European Union (OECD, 1998: 175). Besides France and Britain, the other former colonial powers that have attracted immigrants from their former colonies are Belgium and Portugal. Belgium has been a popular destination for migrants from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Between 1991 and 1996 Belgium attracted 12,700 Congolese immigrants, which was, however, a tiny fraction - 2.7 percent - of the total number of immigrants. For its part, Portugal pulled immigrants from its former colonies of Cape Verde, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. By 1996 there were 72,900 immigrants from these countries, 54.3 percent of whom were from Cape Verde, out of a total immigrant population of 172,900. Thus, the share of African immigrants was 42.2 percent, up from 39.5 percent in 1988 when there was a total of 94,700 immigrants. As elsewhere in Europe, African immigrants in Portugal were increasingly met with racism, in response to which they organized protests (US Department of State, 1995; New African , March 1998). In the 1970s and 1980s noticeable numbers of immigrants from several African countries began flocking to other European countries with which they had no colonial ties. Among the most popular were Germany and the Netherlands. The leading African source of immigrants to these two countries was Morocco, whose inflows into Germany totaled 43,700 between 1988 and 1996, and into the Netherlands 72,200 between 1986 and 1996. In 1995 there were an estimated 138,700 Moroccans in the Netherlands, the largest group among the country’s foreign-born population. By 1996 Moroccans had become the leading immigrant group in two other countries, Italy and Spain, with 119,500 and 77,200 immigrants, representing 10.9 and 14.3 percent of the total foreign born population, respectively. Another African country to feature among the leading fifteen sources of immigrants into the Netherlands was Somalia, whose numbers rose from 3,600 in 1990 to 17,200 in 1995, the fastest growing immigrant population during this period. Somalia also featured among the leading sources of immigrants for Denmark, which saw the Somali x Some of the measures, such as virginity tests conducted on immigrant women at Heathrow Airport, were calculated to humiliate immigrants. They prompted the United Nations Human Rights Commission to pass a unanimous resolution in March, 1979 expressing concern at the indignities. Also, access to welfare rights, including to the National Health Service and Social Security benefits, was curtailed. And from 1983 the nationality of children born in the United Kingdom, who were previously automatically British, became dependent on the immigration status of their parents (Couper, 1984). 10 population rise from 600 in 1992 to 9,700 in 1996. Somalia became the fourth largest source of immigrants for Finland, although the numbers were small, 4,600 in 1996, out of a total of 73,800 immigrants. For its part, Sweden became an important destination for Ethiopians, whose numbers reached 13,200 in 1993. Clearly, African immigration to Europe was marked by increasing diversification both in the number of countries sending and receiving the immigrants. Particularly remarkable was the emergence of the southern European countries, such as Italy, Portugal and Spain, themselves emigration countries, as immigration countries. This is as much a product of the improving economic fortunes in these countries and their integration into the prosperity and political sphere of western Europe as it is of mounting immigration pressures on their borders to the east and the south. Enclosed in a new European transnational space, new identities of ethnicity and citizenship began to emerge that entailed creating both symbolic and material borders to keep away or distinguish the immigrants. The Europeanization of these countries and the rebordering of the Mediterranean that it implied required the separation and stigmatization of immigrants from the South as disruptive and threatening, a discourse that promoted their racialization, marginalization, pathologization, and even criminalization, which in turn bred popular antagonism, institutional discrimination, and sometimes racist violence. In a fascinating study on the reshaping of identities in Andalusian villages in Spain, Liliana Suárez-Navaz (1997: 8), shows that the African immigrants who arrived in the 1990s, despite their small numbers, became the quintessential “others” against whom the peasants began “redefining their location in the Spanish social structure, their notion of belonging to an ‘imagined community,’ and their ideological principles about people’s rights and status, along new criteria of European citizenship and ethnicity or culture.” Similar processes of rebordering and reshaping identities can be seen in the Eastern European countries, as far as Finland, aspiring to be a part of the Europeanization project, where discourses and institutional practices that sharply distinguish locals and nationals from immigrants and foreigners were borrowed and constructed. The racial violence and harassment that faced the new African immigrants in Finland bore resemblance to that experienced by the older immigrant communities in France, for example (Virtanen, 1999; Baumgart and Favell, 1995; Bjfrgo, 1996). xi Equally rapid has been the growth of African migration to North America, especially the xi The International Labor Organization has conducted several studies on discrimination and harassment of immigrants, especially in the labor market, in many countries. For Finland see, Vuori (1996, 1998); for the Netherlands, see Bovenkerk (1995) and Abell, et.al. (1997); for the United Kingdom, see Taylor, et.al. (1997); for Germany, see Goldberg, et.al. (1996); for Spain, see de Prada, et.al. (1996); for Canada, see Ventura (1995); and for the United States, see Bendick (1996). They show that in all these countries discrimination and harassment of foreign workers are indeed widely practiced at various stages of the employment process, especially during recruitment and selection, and including pay and promotion. The rise of racism and xenophobia against foreign workers, previously welcomed as quest workers, can partly be attributed to the demise of the welfare state, which has raised the social and ideological costs of integrating the domestic underclass and immigrants. As Hintjens (1992: 9) has perceptively noted, “the acceptance of the abuse of civil liberties of immigrants and citizens of foreign, non- European origin in recent decades, in the name of immigration control, has already weakened the moral ground for demanding the respect of human rights, and extending equal civil liberties for all citizens.” 11

United States. Prior to the twentieth century, African migrations to the Americas were dominated by slavery. After the staggered abolitions of the European and American slave trades and the end of African forced migration, only small numbers of Africans left the continent to settle in North America as compared to other immigrant groups. For example, Tibbett Speer (1995:36) reports that “INS records show that in 1820 the first year a count was kept only one person immigrated to U.S. from Africa. Sixteen more came throughout the entire decade. The numbers climbed slowly until the 1960s.” From 1820 to 1993, the United States only took in 418,000 African immigrants, while 345,425 Asians came in 1993 alone (Wynn, 1995:11-12). A systematic analysis of American census data covering the period 1850 to 1990 shows that the number of African born migrants in the US population rose from 551 in 1850 to 2,538 in 1900, climbing to 18,326 in 1930, 35,355 in 1960, 80,143 in 1970, 199,723 in 1980 and 363,819 in 1990. Thus more than three quarters of the African migrants in 1990 had entered the country since 1970. xii As rapid as this may seem, Africans accounted for a small proportion of immigrants to the United States as can be seen in Table 7. By 1990 African migrants constituted only 1.9 per cent of the total US foreign-born population, up from 0.4 per cent in 1960. The share of the African immigrants increased to 6 per cent in 1996. xiii The table also shows the precipitous fall in the proportion of European and North American, primarily Canadian, immigrants, and the sharp rise for Asian and Latin American immigrants, which has provoked an anti-immigrant backlash. xiv Notwithstanding the regional shifts in the sources of immigrants, the large-scale increase of the United States’ foreign-born population from 1970 mirrored trends a century earlier, when there was also massive immigration into the country, although the share of the immigrant population was still lower than the historic peak of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Between 1860 and 1920 the foreign-born population hovered between 13.2 percent and 14.8 percent, up from 7.9 percent in 1850. By 1970 immigrants accounted for 4.7 per cent of the US population, the lowest level since 1850, rising to 6.2 per cent in 1980, 7.9 per cent in 1990, and an estimated 9.7 per cent in 1997. Numerically this represented an increase in the size of the immigrant population from 9.6 million in 1970 to 14.1 million in 1981, 19.8 million in 1990, and 22 million in 1994. The last time the numbers of foreign-born people in the United States had topped 14 million was in 1930 when there were 14.2 million. The relatively low rates and levels of voluntary immigration from Africa to the US until the 1960s can be attributed both to restrictive US policies against non-European immigration and xii See the detailed statistical report by Gibson and Lennon (1999). Also see Passel and Fix (1999). xiii The Immigration and Naturalization Services reports that African immigration nearly doubled from 26,716 in 1994 to 52,889 in 1996 primarily due to the Diversity Program, which seeks to increase the diversity of the immigrant pool by expanding the intake from historically under- represented countries and regions, see INS Statistics (1999). xiv The backlash is not restricted to the white right-wing. Liberal opposition to immigration has also been rising. The liberals tend to focus on economic issues, the difficulties of integrating the immigrants, while the conservatives focus on cultural issues and see immigrants as a threat family values and other core American cultural characteristics. Some African Americans also resent immigrants for taking jobs and benefits away from them, see Fukuyama (1993). 12 the reluctance and inability of colonized African populations to migrate in any significant numbers outside the continent (Hawk, 1988). It is instructive to note that the largest numbers of African immigrants to the US in 1960 came from Egypt and South Africa, which supplied 8,316 and 5,394, respectively, of the 35,355 African immigrants. Both countries had relatively advanced economies, had been sovereign for many years, and their migrants were, in the case of South Africa, largely white, or in the case of Egypt considered as white under US immigration law. In the 1970s and 1980s significant changes took place in the regional and national distribution of African immigrants to the US as can be seen in Table 8. The table lists five African regions as designated by the US Census Bureau and within each a selection of the two leading immigrant countries, except for Southern Africa in which only South Africa is included. Between 1980 and 1990 Western Africa overtook Northern Africa, although Egypt remained in first place, followed by Nigeria, and Ethiopia, which surpassed South Africa, then Ghana, Morocco, and Kenya. The magnitude of the migration flows from Africa to the United States appears to be positively correlated, as Bernard Logan (1987:603) has argued, to population size, economic system and conditions, language policy, the development of higher education, and colonial legacy, so that the largest numbers of African migrants have tended to come from countries with “a large population; a pro-western, capitalist outlook; speakers of English, rather than any other European language; unstable economic conditions; a long history of well-established higher education; and a colonial legacy that had not been too culturally dominant.” It is important to note that many African immigrants to the United States are students who decide to stay, a subject we will examine in detail below. xv It is difficult to predict future flows of African immigrants to the United States. In so far as family migration constitutes the main component of permanent immigration into the country, accounting for 65 percent in 1996, more Africans are likely to enter as family members as their relations resident in the US adopt American citizenship. The number of Africans acquiring United States citizenship has grown steadily, rising from 7,122 in 1988 to 21,842 in 1996, which represented 2.9 and 2.1 percent, respectively, of the total acquisitions. Altogether, 108,441 Africans became naturalized Americans during this period. Also, Africans are likely to benefit from the program, introduced in 1995, to increase the diversity of countries sending migrants to the United States, under which 55,000 permanent permits are granted annually to nationals of countries which do not send many immigrants. Under this lottery it should be possible to grant more than 21,000 permits to nationals of African countries (OECD, 1998:179-80, 263). Canada has also become an increasingly attractive destination for African immigrants. Africa’s immigrant population in Canada increased from 101,700 in 1981 to 114,400 in 1986, and 166,200 in 1991, that is at an annual rate of 6.3 percent. As a percentage of the total immigrant population, the African share rose from 2.6 percent in 1981 to 3.8 percent in 1991, while the share of the immigrant population in the total population remained steady at 16.1 percent both in 1981 and 1991 (OECD, 1997:257). Women constituted a little over half the total immigrant population. The share of African women among African immigrants was slightly less than half. Specifically, they comprised 47.7 percent of African immigrants in 1981 and 46.6 percent in 1991. The growth of African immigration to Canada becomes clearer when we examine figures xv This comes out from many of the testimonies of 28 representatives of African Catholic communities across the United States who attended a meeting convened by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops on November 16, 1995. 13 for annual inflows of permanent settlers. The inflows of permanent settlers from Africa increased from 7,400 in 1985 to 36,100 in 1996, that is, from 8.8 percent to 16 percent of total inflows. All combined 294,100 Africans were admitted into Canada as permanent residents between 1985 and 1996. The number of Africans taking Canadian citizenship has grown accordingly, as more Africans pass the three year lag between receiving landed immigrant status, the term used for permanent residence status, and the ability to apply for citizenship. While migration under family sponsorship is important, Canada more than the United States has put growing emphasis on the migration of skilled workers and business people. In 1997, for example, only 28 percent of immigrants were in the family class, 49 percent were in the skilled worker class, 9 percent in the business class, and 11 percent were refugees (OECD, 1998:89).

Causes, Courses, and Consequences of African Migration

African migration to the North is part of a much older story of African global migrations, going back in modern times to the tragic days of the European slave trade when millions of shackled African men and women were shipped to the Americas, at once a painful moment and a poignant metaphor that established the subsequent tapestry of African-European-American relations. A cruel reminder that for the victims and combatants of western barbarity, globalization - the dispersal of individuals, ideas, ideologies, and institutions - did not start yesterday with the Internet. Contemporary patterns of African overseas migration are woven in intricate and complex ways in the older processes, each successive wave creating new layers of memories and meanings, new braided histories of Africa and its diaspora xvi . The literature on the causes, courses, and consequences of international immigration is rich and controversial. Much of it is still trapped in the old “push-pull” model, while the newer perspectives of transnationalism tend to emphasize the novelty of contemporary patterns and processes of international migration. According to “push-pull” theory, people move because social, economic and political conditions either push them out of their countries or pull them to other countries. xvii Heyden (1991:286) attributes migratory movements to three principal push factors, namely, “wars and persecution, changes in social structures resulting from lack of freedom, and economic and ecological burdens.” Appleyard (1995:296) also puts emphasis on the push factors, arguing that while significant changes have occurred in the direction, volume and composition of migration, “the basic motivations for migration - search for better social and economic opportunities, flight from persecution, civil war, natural disaster and ecological deterioration - have remained constant.” Golini, et.al. (1991:253), argue that “until recently, flows have been almost exclusively regulated by the needs of countries of destination (i.e., by pull factors). In our opinion, push factors, linked to demographic, socio-economic and political- religious imbalances between LDCs and MDCs are assuming more importance.” Critiques of the “push-pull” theory “note its implicit assumption of immobility, its xvi For recent studies on the African diaspora, both the diaspora of enslavement and the diaspora of colonization, as Ali Mazrui calls them, see Okpewho, Davies, and Mazrui, eds. (1999) and Hine and McLeod, eds. (1999). xvii See, for example, the following special issues of International Migration , 29 (2) 1991, on “South-North Migration,” and 33, (3/4) 1995, on “Emigration Dynamics in Developing Countries.” Many of the papers explicitly use the push-pull model. 14 limited ability to predict the origin of flows and changes therein, and the emphasis on the movement of people as a result of rational calculation performed by individual actors... The origins and legitimacy of these criticisms lie in the vastly changing nature of migration from the 1960s on” (Boyd, 1989:640). Ever since the demise of the “push-pull” theory, several theories have emerged to fill the void, each employing radically different concepts, assumptions, and frames of reference, that seek to explain the factors that first, initiate, and second, perpetuate international migration, and third, that attempt to assess the effects of international migration on both the sending and receiving countries. Some emphasize economic factors and motivations, others offer political or sociological perspectives and propositions. The economic theories can be grouped into four. The first two, despite their differences in terms of units of analysis and assumptions about the motivations and contexts of migration decision-making, are essentially micro-level decision models, while the other two offer structural and global perspectives (Massey, et.al., 1993). In the neoclassical economic model, international migration is seen, at a macro level, as the result of wage differentials and employment conditions between countries which, at a micro level, propels individuals as rational actors making cost- benefit calculations to migrate in pursuit of income maximization (Lewis, 1954; Ranis and Fei, 1961; Sjaastad, 1962; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1976, 1989; Todaro and Maruszko, 1987). In contrast, the “new economics of migration” attributes migration decisions to households, not simply isolated individuals, seeking both to maximize income absolutely and relative to other households and to minimize risks associated with a variety of economic failures in addition to those in the labor market. In short, migration is seen both as an investment and consumption activity (Hunt, 1993; Stark, 1991; Wallace, et.al., 1997). According to this perspective, international immigration is used by households as a means of controlling risks to their economic well-being by diversifying the allocation of household resources, including labor, so that the existence or elimination of wage differentials across national boundaries need not induce it or end it. As is common in much neo-classical economics, these theories tend to reify migration, ignoring the historical, institutional, and structural contexts in which it occurs. Some research suggests, in fact, that absolute poverty is a barrier to migration, except for the “survival migration” induced by war or natural catastrophes, and that rising incomes in developing countries actually stimulate migration if it entails rising agricultural productivity which releases more labor from agriculture than can find employment in the nascent industries. Emigration persists for as long as economic development continues, which eventually leads to fertility decline and rising demand for labor, until a point of transition is reached from emigration to immigration (Lim, 1996; Castles, 1999). Often neglected in the neo-classical economics literature is the role of the state in regulating migration flows through its control over borders. In short, international migration, it should not be forgotten, is called such precisely because it involves crossing national boundaries; it is a process that entails, to quote Zolberg (1989:406), “not only physical relocation, but a change of jurisdiction and membership.” The dual market theory and world systems theory focus largely on broad structural forces operating in the world economy as keys to understanding migration flows, their size, direction and persistence. They emphasize the dynamic nature and interdependence and reciprocity of migration between sending and receiving countries (Lim, 1987; Salt, 1987). Proponents of the dual labor market theory argue that international migration is caused not by push factors in the sending countries but by pull factors in the receiving countries, by the structural requirements of the modern industrial economies for low wage and low status jobs in labor markets that are 15 segmented and where the traditional sources of entry-level workers - women and teenagers - have progressively shrunk because “of three fundamental socio-demographic trends: the rise in female labor force participation, which has transformed women’s work into a career pursued for social status as well as income; the rise in divorce rates, which has transformed women’s jobs into a source of primary income support; and the decline in birth rates and the extension of formal education, which have produced very small cohorts of teenagers entering the labor force. The imbalance between the structural demand for entry-level workers and the limited domestic supply of such workers has increased the underlying, long-run demand for immigrants” (Massey, et.al., 1993: 443; also see Piore, 1979). In contrast, the world system theorists, building on Wallerstein (1974), see international immigration, not as the result of recent processes of market segmentation in particular industrial economies, let alone wage rate or employment differentials between countries, but as the natural outcome of capitalist economic expansion that began in the sixteenth century. The penetration of capitalist market relations in peripheral, noncapitalist societies, the argument goes, creates disruptions and dislocations that produce mobile and migratory populations. Besides internal capitalist transformations and thickening external ties of trade, financial transactions, transportation and communications, globalization also generates ideological and cultural linkages, constantly reinforced by mass communication and advertizing campaigns, which foster popular and seductive consumerist images of the North that stoke the circuits of international migration. In short, the flow of people, despite the often stringent controls imposed by states, follows the well-trodden international flows of commodities, capital, services, and information, all spawned and reproduced by an expanding global market (Fawcett and Arnold, 1987; Sassen, 1988, 1991; Castells, 1989; Massey, 1989; Morawska, 1990; Hamilton and Chinchilla, 1996). These theories need not be mutually exclusive. A process as complex as international migration cannot but be the result of equally complex forces operating at various levels in space and time. Individuals and households make migration decisions in the context of structural and historical forces that they often do not control, that are defined by uneven development between countries and societies and unequal flows of capital, commodities, communication, and cultures, that create connections and networks which blur neat distinctions between sending and receiving countries. Much of the literature on African international migration tends to reproduce rather simplistic causal factors rooted in the facile pairings of the “push-pull” model. The litany of causal economic factors that lead to migration, including that of professionals and intellectuals, is repeated endlessly: poor economic performance; low and falling wages; lack of job satisfaction because of inadequate institutional infrastructures and professional networks; and disequilibrium between the educational system and the job market. Pushed by dismal economic conditions, popular theory goes, the potential migrants are pulled by the Northern lights of higher incomes, professional satisfaction and success. The reality that awaits the migrants, is of course often far more complex. As one obviously disgruntled exiled intellectual wrote in response to a grim article in West Africa magazine on “Africa’s Costly Human Export” (West Africa , 1995: 1424), “my experience suggests that the portrayal of the lives of Africans in intellectual exile as being redolent of the Biblical ‘promised land,’ brimming with milk and honey, is both untrue and unreal,” a sobering testimony to the dissonance in the “push-pull” equation between expectations and experiences. Anecdotes abound of African professionals swelling the ranks of cab drivers in London, janitors in Paris, and informal sector hawkers in New York. The intellectuals among them frequently end up joining the long lines of the lumpen professoriate, a floating faculty excluded from the gilded privileges of tenure, or trapped, in the 16 case of the United States, in third rate colleges or underfunded Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs). But the migration tide continues, showing that there is more to it than economics, that political factors may be more important explanatory factors behind international migration. Politics influences migration in that it often generates the pressures for exit and sets conditions for entry through the actions and controls of states. Despite the corrosive forces of globalization, the power of state action in structuring international migration flows remains formidable. Wars, conflicts, and political repression and persecution caused or condoned by states often provoke waves of migration. State sovereignty and restrictive notions of community and citizenship are used to deny or dilute substantive political, civil, cultural, and employment rights and procedural guarantees for due process and equal protection before the law for migrants and refugees. Notwithstanding the much-vaunted respect for individual rights in the North, arguments against the extension of rights to immigrants reflect the prioritization of collective rather than individual rights. Thus, international migration has yet to be accorded the protections of international law and human rights instruments (Goodwin-Gill, 1989; Hintjens, 1992). International migration is also intimately bound up with international relations, for it affects and serves the goals of national foreign policies, and domestic immigration laws and policies usually have international political repercussions (Zolberg, 1981; Zolberg, et.al., 1986; Teitelbaum, 1984; Weiner, 1985; Mitchell, 1989). In the African context, the evidence is overwhelming that political pressures produce large flows of refugees and other migrants, including otherwise patriotic professionals who are driven abroad to save their lives and serve the struggles against tyranny. It follows that unless and until the political conditions improve there can be no hope for stemming the emigration of workers, professionals, and intellectuals. According to research survey of African immigrant professionals in the United States by Kofi Apraku (1991), 52% of respondents ranked political dictatorship and lack of freedom in their home countries as being either very important or somewhat important in their decision to emigrate, compared to 66% who cited the economic situation in their country as the motivating factor behind their migration. As might be expected, there are significant differences in the causes of emigration across countries. For example, 81% of the Ghanaian respondents considered the economic situation prevailing in Ghana at the time of their emigration as being important in their migration decision, as compared to only 51% of the Nigerian emigrants (Apraku, 1991:12-14). Interestingly, the overwhelming majority of both the Ghanaian and Nigerian respondents, 96% and 88%, respectively, and of the respondents from all the African countries combined - 88% - placed the desire for further training and education as important in their decision to emigrate, thus demonstrating the importance of social factors. Another social factor, the need to escape family and cultural pressures, was however cited as important by only 16% of the respondents. Those stressing socio-cultural explanations tend to attribute migration and the “brain drain” to esoteric issues, such as, in the words of Kwaku Danso, “the prestige associated with foreign travel especially to the developed countries.” Tutored by colonialism to love things foreign, he concludes, “Africans have always had the desire ‘to go abroad’ to better themselves.” A more convoluted version of the argument is that Third World middle classes as islands of western modernity seek class fulfillment in the cosmopolitan cities of the North. But it is difficult to see how this can explain the actual trends in migration flows; in any case, international migration is not confined to the middle classes. International migration flows are determined by conditions in both the sending and 17 receiving countries, including the state of the economy, political stability and freedoms, and immigration law, all of which are affected by broader forces in the global political economy. The acceleration of African migration to the United States from the 1980s can be accounted for by the deteriorating economic and political conditions, which were exacerbated, some would say caused, by the imposition of draconian structural adjustment policies by the international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that entailed economic retrenchment and reinforced state authoritarianism. Also, American immigration law and policies became less restrictive for African immigrants. For example, as noted earlier from 1995 out of an annual immigration lottery of 55,000 offered by the US government, some 21,000 were reserved for Africans. Whatever might initiate immigration, the factors and forces that perpetuate it can be quite different. Several theories have been developed to account for the rise of new conditions that emerge in the course of international migration that sustain it and function as independent causes for further migration. The first is network theory, according to which the networks that arise in the course of migration and which link migrants, former migrants, and nonmigrants in sending and receiving countries through kinship, friendship, and community ties constitute an expanding pool of social and cultural capital that lower the costs and risks and raise the benefits of movement, and therefore increase the likelihood of international migration. As conduits of resources in the form of information and assistance including remittances, social networks mediate between individual actors and larger structural forces. Studying them permits understanding migration as a contingent social product and process conditioned by historically generated social, political, and economic structures of both sending and receiving countries. In short, social networks, mediated through households as units for sustenance and socialization, which also have the propensity to be spatially dispersed and migratory, provide the threads that weave the waves of migration together, turning individual migration into family migration, which as shown above currently predominates in many Northern countries (Massey, et.al., 1987, 1994; Portes, 1985, 1987, 1989; Yücel, 1987; Boyd, 1989; Gurak and Caces, 1992; Heisler, 1992). xviii The second is institutional theory, which argues that as migration expands profit-seeking and humanitarian institutions, organizations, and entrepreneurs develop to service both legal and illegal migrants, especially as restrictive immigration policies are adopted by the receiving countries, that serve to institutionalize and promote international migration irrespective of the causes that originally started it. In short, the “migration industry,” as Castles (1999:10) calls it, facilitates international legal migration flows, as well as illegal trafficking, which “form part of the burgeoning global criminal economy, which is an integral part of globalization.” The third theory, cumulative causation, maintains that migration brings about changed social, economic, and cultural contexts which affect subsequent migrations. In other words, each migration decision is influenced by previous migrations, which alter the regional distribution of income, land, and human capital, the organization of productive activities, and the culture and social meanings of migration and work. In the sending countries migration can become an esteemed xviii Fawcett (1989) proposes 12 types of linkages in migrations systems and discusses their applicability to various systems of international migration. The linkages are classified into four categories and three types. The four categories are: state-state relations; mass culture connections; family and personal connections; and migration agency activities. The three types are: tangible linkages, regulatory linkages, and relational linkages. 18 rite of passage, while in the receiving countries occupations dominated by immigrants can become culturally labeled “immigrant jobs,” and therefore shunned by native workers, thereby reinforcing the structural demand for immigrants (Massey, 1986, 1990; Massey, et.al., 1987, 1998; Alarcón, 1992; Stark, et.al., 1986; Taylor, 1992; Stark and Taylor, 1989; Stark, 1991; Greenwood, et.al., 1987). Once again, there is little that is intrinsically incompatible among the three theories. Each explains an important dynamic and dimension of the migration process. It stands to reason that migration involves both social networks and enabling institutions and is a cumulative process. The interplay between these factors obviously varies in specific contexts. Increasingly, international migration has come to be seen as an integral part of globalization, or the phenomenon known as “transnationalism,” a social process in which migrants establish social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders. Viewing international migration from the transnational perspective has serious implications on how immigrants should be viewed by both sending and receiving countries and how migration is analyzed (Glick Schiller, et.al., 1992; Guarnizo, 1993; Massey, et.al., 1994; Hamilton and Chinchilla, 1996; Castles, 1999). First, it means that migrants who settle permanently are not necessarily betraying their nation or are culturally alienated, for they develop and maintain familiar, economic, political, cultural, social, religious, and recreational contacts with their home countries. Second, they cannot be viewed in the host countries simply as visitors who have no rights and no right to demand rights and who should go “home” if they don’t like things as they are. Third, the absolute distinction between settlement and return migration becomes questionable. The settler migrants need not be seen as worse than the return migrants, for as long as the former maintain links with their areas of origin they can be as important as the latter for development in terms of making economic, political, and cultural contributions. The case for the multiplicity of immigrants’ involvements, concerns, actions, and decisions that span borders is quite compelling. Less so is the argument that this is new, that contemporary transnational migration differs significantly from previous migration experience, as Glick Schiller, et.al. (1992) and many others contend. Besides the development of rapid communications and transportation systems that facilitate contacts and connections between migrants, or what Glick Schiller et.al. call transmigrants, and their home societies, it is not clear what is really new about today’s migration experiences and processes in the North, except perhaps that they increasingly affect and are dominated by peoples from the South. Quantitatively, the current volumes of migration are not historically unprecedented. Nor is it useful to claim that transnationalism implies the demise of such bounded imaginary and material spatio-temporal constructions of ethnic groups and nations, let alone states. Certainly, transmigrants are not the first to “live a complex existence that forces them to confront, draw upon, and rework different identity constructs - national, ethnic, and racial,” or are they the only ones who have ever had to “deal with and confront a number of hegemonic contexts, both global and national” (Glick Schiller, et.al., 1992: 5). This raises a series of questions about the consequences of migration for the migrants themselves as well as for their countries of origin and their countries of immigration. How do African migrants fare and adapt in the North? What is the impact of their migration on their home and host countries? Much of the literature has focused on the economic dimensions of these questions. This essay does not discuss the economic effects of African immigrants on the receiving countries. xix Moreover, it seeks to underline the intellectual implications of African xix For a concise discussion of the theoretical models and empirical evidence on the economic 19 migrations, the impact of Africa’s “brain drain,” or what has also been referred to as “reverse transfer of technology,” on both Africa itself and the North. As might be expected, given the diverse social and national origins and profiles of African migrants to the North and of the countries they migrate to, it is not easy to generalize on how well or poorly they fair and adapt. The theoretical literature compounds the difficulties given the variety of models that seek to explain the performance of migrants. One is human capital theory, according to which education and training are important determinants of income and occupation. Some studies inspired by this theory make claims of immigrant superiority, that immigrants, even if they are not always composed of “the best and the brightest” of migration folklore, tend to be self-selective and highly motivated, qualities that are invaluable for adaptation and success. Others emphasize that immigrants arrive in the host country with many handicaps, including sometimes lack of language skills, knowledge of the job market, local customs, values, and the social structure, which impedes their assimilation or adaptation (Chiswick, 1978; Chiswick, et.al., 1985; Borjas, 1989). Human capital theory tends to assume that economic discrimination is irrational and exogenous. Other theories take labor market discrimination as a given and seek to explain it. One explanatory model sees it in terms of job segregation or closure by dominant groups who limit the eligibility of new members to high-rewarding occupations. The split labor market thesis postulates that the market is divided along racial, gender and other hierarchized lines along which rewards are unequally distributed. Immigrants are positioned accordingly. The succession model predicts that a group that arrives last occupies the bottom position in economic rankings as previous groups progressively move up the occupational hierarchy. A version of this model, the queue theory, suggests that employer preferences often determine rankings on the labor queue which may result in some groups being selected for jobs which may be high-paying. The rankings are often determined by ethnic and racial characteristics (Waldinger, 1996). Many studies show that there is a cost to being a racial or ethnic minority in the Northern countries (Amissah, 1994: 31-42). From these perspectives, African migrants can be expected to suffer triple subordination: as immigrants, as people who arrived recently, and as people many of whom are black. Not surprisingly, there is little agreement on the fate of African migrants in the North. Different samples, methods, and measures have yielded conflicting and confusing results. Tales abound of African immigrants suffering the indignities of racism, loneliness, and otherness, and the iniquities of unemployment and underemployment. Akomolafe’s (1994a, 1994b) bitter query: “What am I doing in Holland?” and his indignant demand for “Respect and Solidarity,” is a poignant and painful commentary on the deep psychic and political trauma that social alienation and racial molestation in the North can bring. But there are also numerous stories of African immigrants flourishing and prospering in their adopted countries. Many succeed in enjoying the comforts of their new citizenship. Apraku’s (1991: Chapter 2) study revealed that despite widespread resentment against racism and discrimination and nostalgia for their countries of origin among African immigrants in the United States, many of them decided to stay because they were satisfied with their jobs, remuneration, and prospects for professional development, as well as the personal freedoms and civil liberties they enjoyed. impact of immigration on host countries in Europe and the United States, see Ichino (1993). She argues that the impact is positive, a point echoed in some of the neo-classical economic literature (Money, 1998). 20

Disagreement has mostly centered on the educational and income differentials between African immigrants and other immigrants and the host populations. In the United States, for example, one school argues that the African immigrants compare extremely well with those of the host American population and other immigrant populations. Tibbett Speer (1994: 9) writes: “Nearly 88 percent of adults who immigrate from Africa to the United States have a high-school education or higher. The national average for native borns is 77 percent. Only 76 per cent of Asian immigrants and 46 percent of Central Americans are high school graduates.” The Africans were also better educated than other immigrant black groups: 58 percent of them had college degrees compared to 14.6 percent of Caribbean immigrants (Dodoo, 1997: 533). As for salaries, they also compared favorably with the host population and other immigrants. According to Apraku (1991: 2-9) while in the late 1980s only about 29% of Americans made between $32,000 and $59,999 and a smaller proportion of 2.9% made over $100,000 annually, 53% of the African respondents in Apraku’s survey made between $30,000 and $59,999 annually and a little over 14% made annual salaries in excess of $100,000. As compared to other immigrants, Speer (1994: 10) notes, the Africans’ “per capita income is $20,100, much higher than the $16,700 for Asian immigrants or $9,400 for Central-American immigrants.” But there are studies which give a different picture. Using data from the 1980 United States Population Census, Amissah (1994) shows that despite their relatively high levels of education - with about 90 percent having at least some college education - the mean earnings of African immigrants were less than those of African Americans and Caribbean immigrants. xx Among the African immigrants themselves, blacks earned 60 percent of the mean earnings of the non-black African immigrants, although they had 1.5 more years of schooling, 18.4 years as compared to 16.9 years. The non-black African immigrants, in turn, earned almost as much as American whites. Thus non-black Africans did almost as well as the American whites, while the black Africans did poorer than the other two black groups, the African Americans and Caribbean immigrants. He attributes the poorer economic performance of the African blacks to several factors: race, immigrant status, and recency of arrival, as well as the level of development in their country of origin and region of residence in the United States. But race takes pride of place: African “blacks are in much lower occupational statuses than expected from their human capital characteristics... If blacks were rewarded like non-black African immigrants, their status would exceed that of the latter group by nearly 5 points. But they actually attain over 4 points less than non-blacks... In terms of earnings, the cost of being black is about $2000” (Amissah, 1994: 149). Using data from the 1990 US Census, Nii-Amoo Dodoo (1997) paints a slightly different picture but arrives at the same conclusion that African migrants have not been able to translate high education and professional occupations into commensurate levels of income. He argues that although the data shows “African immigrants earn more than their Caribbean counterparts, who in turn outearn African Americans, the earnings variations noted here are, to a large extent, explained by the favorable characteristics of the immigrants. Controlling for these dramatically reduces the observed gap between African American earnings and those of black immigrants, and results in an earnings hierarchy in which Africans and African Americans are at par, and Caribbean immigrants earn 8% more. The fact that the selected characteristics explain the entire gap between African American and African immigrants suggests that the latter are better selected xx The mean earnings are listed as follows: $13,904.27 for African American males, $12,257.41 for Caribbean males, and $11,231.88 for black African males. For the “white” African males their mean earnings were $19,850.73 compared to $20,779.59 for American whites. 21 on the measured characteristics. Second, African immigrants, despite high levels of schooling, are rewarded least for their college education. This is not simply a result of a smaller proportion of Africans’ degrees being foreign or non-American.xxi Africans with American degrees also encounter a penalty; however, the disadvantage is even harsher for those with terminal degrees earned outside the United States” (Dodoo, 1997: 541). xxii This would seem to suggest that in addition to a racial tax, African immigrants pay a cultural tax, the devaluation of their human capital in a society where things African are routinely negatively stereotyped and despised. One more reason why the African immigrants cannot escape Africa and have to be concerned about its development: its shadows of underdevelopment cast a pall over how they are perceived and perform in the North. Clearly, the odyssey of African immigrants in the North seems to be filled with both triumph and tragedy, fulfillment and frustration, impressive successes and ignominious failures. No less difficult to determine is the relative economic impact of immigration on the sending and receiving countries. One school of thought argues that migration contributes to underdevelopment in that it drains sending areas of their human labor and capital that took enormous resources to nurture and produce. UNCTAD, for example, has estimated that one xxi Portes and Zhou (1992) attribute the low earnings of Nigerian and Iranian immigrants in the United States, among the most highly educated immigrants, “to their recency in the country, outside discrimination, and small numbers that, by 1980 at least, precluded the emergence of a protective ethnic community.” The creation of ethnic enclaves is seen as necessary for the emergence of vibrant entrepreneurial communities and beneficial for the immigrants. xxii The comparisons between African Americans and immigrant Africans and Afro-Caribbeans can be insidious and are sometimes used to support rightwing attacks against African Americans and to claim that their problems have less to do with racism than cultural pathology. For example, Thomas Sowell (1978: 41) used the positive income gap between Caribbean immigrants and African Americans as evidence that “color alone, or racism alone, is clearly not a sufficient explanation of the disparities within the black population or between the black and white populations.” Yanyi Djamba (1999: 211) continues this dangerous assault: “Compared to native blacks, black and white African immigrants are more educated, less likely to be on welfare ... more likely to be married, and more employable.” The reality is far more complex. Employers sometimes show preference for foreign-born blacks because not only are they free from the baggage of “historical victims of discrimination, their numbers can be used to fill Affirmative Action quotas leaving many victims of historical discrimination in America unassisted by the Affirmative Action system” (Hawk, 1988: 30). Kristin Butcher (1994: 267) shows that the income differentials between the American population and immigrants are not confined to blacks: “native-born white men also earn less than the corresponding group of white immigrants.” More importantly, when African and Caribbean immigrants are compared to what she calls “native black movers”, that is African Americans who reside in a state other than their state of birth, who therefore have the allegedly positive characteristics of migrants, albeit as internal migrants, the picture is different: “Native movers earn 35% higher wages than native non-movers... Even black immigrants in the highest income earnings group earn substantially less than the native black movers.” The fact remains that all these groups, “the native black movers, native black non-movers, and all black immigrant groups are worse off than both native whites and immigrant whites” (Butcher, 1994: 272). 22 highly trained African migrant between 25 and 35 - the age group into which most of the Africans going abroad fall - represents a cash value of $184, 000 at 1979 prices. Not only are remittances insufficient to compensate for such losses, they increase dependency, contribute to political instability, engender economic distortions, and hinder development because they are unpredictable and undependable and encourage the consumption of goods with high import content. Those who contend that migration promotes development argue that remittances improve income distribution and quality of life by loosening production and investment constraints faced by households in the sending countries; after all, migration decisions are part of family strategies to raise income, obtain funds to invest in new activities, and insure against income and production risks (Keely, 1989; Arnold, 1992). “The reality,” J. Edward Taylor (1999:64), correctly points out, “lies somewhere between these two extremes.” It all depends on the context, countries, and communities involved. In short, the relationship between migration and development is multidimensional and complex. The exact magnitude of international migrant remittances is unknown since a large portion is not channeled through formal banking systems or made up of cash-transfers. Nevertheless, available estimates indicate that there has been rapid growth in the volume of global remittances in recent decades, from less than $2 billion in 1970 to $70 billion in 1995, surpassing official development assistance. xxiii The top five countries in combined remittances during this period were France, Mexico, Portugal, Egypt, and the Philippines. By 1994 Egypt actually ranked first in the world with just over $5 billion, followed by India with nearly $5 billion, and Mexico with $3.7 billion. Another African country with significant remittances was Morocco with $2.1 billion (Farrag, 1997: 317). Data offered by Keely (1989) indicates that the volume of private unrequited transfers for so-called sub-Saharan Africa increased from $7 million in 1964 to $46 million in 1974 and $329 million in 1984. North Africa is listed with Western Asia, and together their private unrequited transfers rose from $128 million in 1964 to $2,788 million in 1974 and $9,733 million in 1994. In an even stranger coupling South Africa is combined with East Asia from 1980; their combined remittances rose from $5,870 in 1980 to $6,243 in 1984. The remittances for select African countries between 1965 and 1985 is shown in Table 9. It can be seen that the leading countries in remittances receipts during this period were the North African countries of Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, in that order, followed by Sudan. xxiv Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal had the largest negative remittance transfers, reflecting their relatively large immigrant populations from France and neighboring African countries. xxiii These are IMF estimates. The IMF divides remittances into three categories, worker remittances, or the value of monetary transfers sent home from workers abroad for more than one year; compensation of employees, or the gross earnings of foreigners residing abroad for fewer than 12 months, including the value of in-kind benefits such as housing and payroll taxes; and migrant transfers, or the networth of migrants who move from one country to another, see Taylor (1999:67-68). xxiv An estimated 1 million Sudanese emigrants are said to have entered the Gulf countries by the end of the 1980s, many of them professionals and only a small fraction (5.8 percent) were believed to hold unskilled occupations. The Gulf War, and the Sudanese government’s support of Iraq, led to the expulsion of many Sudanese migrants from Kuwait and other Gulf countries. Some of them found their way to Canada and the United States, see Abusharaf (1997). 23

Not many economy-wide studies have been conducted on the effects of migrant remittances on African countries, except for Egypt and a few others. Much of Egypt’s remittances came from the oil-rich Gulf countries. An estimated 3.5 million Egyptians are said to have emigrated between 1973 and 1985. As a result of the Gulf War, an estimated 600,000 Egyptian workers returned home. On the one hand, migration has been credited with being a major source of foreign exchange for the Egyptian economy, improving wages and living standards, while on the other it has been blamed for shortages of skilled workers, inflationary pressures, a high demand for imports, external dependency, conspicuous consumption, and a diminishing work ethic (Adams, 1989; Looney, 1990; Kandil, 1990; Aly and Shields, 1996). Studies done elsewhere present the same contradictory conclusions, that remittances can have both negative and positive impacts. They may reduce or reverse the lost-labor-and-capital effects of migration if their size exceed the value of production lost as a result of emigration, and if they enable economic agents in the sending areas to overcome capital and other constraints on production activities. For example, one study found that for every dollar of migrant remittances sent or brought into Mexico, the country’s “gross national product increased (GNP) increased by somewhere between $2.69 and $3.17, depending on which household group in Mexico received the remittances. Remittances produced the largest income multipliers when they flowed into rural households, whose consumption and expenditure patterns favor goods produced domestically, with relatively labor-intensive production technologies and few imports. When migrant remittances go to urban households, more of the money leaks out of the country in the form of import demand” (Taylor, 1999:70). Remittance-use studies have shortcomings that limit their ability to determine conclusively the positive or negative developmental impact of remittances. To begin with, most remittance use surveys tend to assume a naive model of how remittances influence the expenditures of receiving households because they do not provide information on remittances’ contribution to total household income and how expenditures change as a result. Second, they ignore the impact on the wider community whose production may be influenced by the remittances even if the receiving households use them primarily for consumption as most remittance-use studies seem to indicate (Appleyard, 1989; Papademetriu and Martin, 1991; Durand and Massey, 1986; Taylor, et.al., 1996a, 1996b). Furthermore, it is often not appreciated that the locales across which the impact of remittances can be determined vary in terms of the migrants’ own remittance behavior, resource endowments, and market and economic policy contexts, so that the remittances can contribute to development in some sending areas, but not in others. Finally, often left undefined is the whole question of what constitutes “development” and the benchmarks that should be used in assessing the developmental impact of migrant remittances. But even those who hold positive views of the developmental effects of remittances concede, to quote one such author, “the volume of remittances between 1965 and 1985 is a fraction of the debt burden of developing countries... Remittances have not declined precipitously nor led to other dire results to be expected from the pessimistic framework used by some to analyze and evaluate their functions. Nor have they generally been the transition to sustained economic growth that resulted in narrowing the North-South economic gaps” (Keeley, 1989: 524). Such realities have kept alive the debate about “the appropriateness and feasibility, both in terms of economics and legality, of the so-called Bhagwati proposal which calls for income transfers via taxation from the emigrant professionals to those left behind” (Miyagiwa, 1991: 744). 24

Impatient governments of sending countries and guilt-ridden international development agencies have sought to stem the tide of emigration in three main ways, through regulatory or restrictive policies, delinking policies, and incentive policies. The first involves the imposition of stringent passport regulations and foreign exchange allocations, requiring students to sign bonding agreements, and devising taxation and compensation schemes. Until the early 1970s, for example, Egyptians working abroad were obliged to transfer to Egypt up to 25% of their foreign incomes. There is little evidence that such policies act as much of a deterrent to determined emigrants. Under the so-called “de-linking” policies, a nation seeks to domesticate and divorce its educational systems from international standards that facilitate the migration of professionals. The incentive policies attempt to induce skilled people to stay at home or to return from abroad either permanently or periodically. These include the assistance programs financed by the International Organization for Migration and the UNDP’s Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals. By the end of 1994 IOM’s program had assisted 1,2000 African migrants to return to six target countries: Ghana, Kenya, Somalia (until 1991), Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Ghana recently granted its expatriate nationals the right to dual citizenship. According to Nazih Ayubi (1983:442), from the turn of the 1980s Egypt began to recognize “the migrant’s right to maintain his Egyptian nationality forever, and his right to re-employment in his previous post if he decides to return to Egypt within a certain period.”

The Production and Mobility of African Intellectuals

None of these measures seems to have done much to curb the steadily rising rates of African international migration. The migrants included highly skilled professionals, among them intellectuals. To use Apraku’s (1991: 5) data again, 58% of the respondents in his study held Ph.D. or M.D. degrees and an additional 19% had master’s degrees; 20.2% were university professors in their home country prior to emigration to the United States; 11.3% were economists; 8.1% were medical officers; 7.3% were engineers; 6.4% were researchers; and the rest belonged to other professions. Politicians were a paltry 2.4%. Whatever the cause of their emigration or their specific status, the migrant professionals, including the intellectuals, were widely seen as traitors against the developmentalist mission of independence. Perhaps Mazrui and Said were reacting to this in their attempts to emphasize the liberatory possibilities of the migrant intellectual. Recent estimates show that the African “brain drain” to the North has accelerated. A World Bank report estimated that in the 1980s an average 23,000 qualified academic staff were emigrating from Africa each year. A report by the Economic Commission for Africa calculated that between 1986 and 1990, 50,000-60,000 middle and high-level African managers emigrated. Bemoaned West Africa magazine in 1995 (1433): “Africa excluding the North, is estimated to have lost 30 per cent of its highly skilled manpower mainly to the EC, between 1960 and 1987.” The cruel irony was that, the magazine continued, while there were “an estimated 100,000 highly qualified educated Africans working in Western Europe and North America,” there were “about 100,000 expatriates from the developed countries employed in sub-Saharan Africa,” who cost $4 billion annually to maintain, or about 35 percent of the region’s official development assistance. A tragic testimony to the asymmetries of global migration flows. The African intellectual migrants are a part of the rising tide of skilled migration, a category that is not well defined, but is assumed to take many forms, including “brain drain”, 25 professional transients, skilled permanent migrants, and business transfers. xxv “The geographical circulation of intellectual elites and the resulting de- or multi-nationalization of knowledge,” Iredale (1990: 90) notes, “is a phenomenon of the twentieth century... A global labor market now exists in some occupations where a person’s skill is his/her greatest asset to be bought and sold.” Predictably, the attention paid to skilled migration has increased both in sending and receiving countries. The former seek to devise policies to curb the outflow of skilled emigrants, encourage their return, and pursue compensation from the industrialized countries, while the latter are concerned with developing migration selection policies that facilitate the entry of temporary or permanent skilled immigrants and ensure their successful labor market integration. Theoretical explanations for skilled migration echo many of the migration theories examined above. The first is the micro-level human capital approach which contends that individuals move to maximize gains from the investment in their education and training. The second is the macro-level structuralist neo-Marxist perspective which emphasizes the operations of unequal development between core and periphery countries. Finally, there is the “structuration” approach which stresses the important role of international agents, regional policies, and global networks. Skilled migration can be examined in terms of its motivation, spatiality, mechanisms, and temporality (Iredale, 1999: 91-95). Skilled migrants are motivated to move for various reasons, such as fleeing from oppressive regimes, or through direct and indirect inducements from foreign governments, industries, or agencies (Appleyard, 1991; Simanovsky, et.al., 1996). Spatially, they move from South to North, North to South, or within each zone. The mechanisms or channels of migration include personal networks, the internal labor markets of multinational corporations, or movements with the assistance of international recruitment agencies (Findlay, 1995; Findlay, et.al., 1996). And the stay of the skilled migrants may be permanent, temporary, or circulatory. In addition, skilled migration flows are affected by the nature of the migrants’ reception and integration into the host countries. The migration of African intellectuals is a product of conditions in both Africa and the North. Economic, social, political, and educational developments in Africa have conspired to generate emigration pressures, while the skill-selective and wealth-selective immigration policies of the Northern countries have offered opportunities for highly skilled Africans to migrate. The migration flows have been sustained by the intricate and intense educational networks that link universities in Africa and those in the North, the recruitment drives and inducements of various institutions and organizations, and the cumulative traditions of migration that have emerged as skilled migration has expanded. Like international migrants from other regions, African professional migrants have increasingly become part of transitional communities involved directly and indirectly in both home and host countries, in ways that have an impact on, to quote Hamilton and Chinchilla’s (1996:198), “economic and political processes in the sending and receiving countries and relations between them which may reinforce or challenge existing relations of power within and between countries.” African intellectual migration to the North is an outgrowth of complex movements of African intellectuals in the continent itself within and between countries. Therefore, in order to xxv Phillipe Garnier (1998) argues that the fastest growing component of skilled migration consists of temporary migrant service providers, that is, migrants who perform services abroad without the intention or right to settle or seek employment in the host country. They are made up of inter-company transfers; individual service providers and specialists on specific assignments; short term or business visitors; diplomatic and international personnel. 26 fully understand the North-bound migration, it is important to examine the structures of knowledge production and mobility within Africa itself, and the linkages and networks that have been established between African and Northern educational institutions and scholars, which facilitate and reproduce African intellectual migration. African intellectuals are members of complex networks linking universities and independent research centers in Africa to those in the North through training, publications, and research funding. Mazrui’s (1978) suggestion made in the 1970s that African universities functioned as branches of multinational corporations remains apt despite strenuous efforts to nationalize and indigenize the universities. In other words, African universities still derive their organizational and scholarly models from the North. Large numbers of students continue to be sent to the North for graduate training; research themes are not only influenced by Northern fads but a lot of African research is funded by foundations and agencies from the North; and Northern media dominate scholarly publications and set the standards. It is this complex web of dependent institutional, intellectual, and ideological linkages between Africa and the North that facilitates and sustains the flows of migrant African intellectuals. The situation in Africa is not entirely peculiar. Almost everywhere the four major institutional sites of scholarly production, namely, state bureaus, private corporations, the universities, and independent think tanks are often connected, at home and abroad, in complex ways through funding, networks of personnel, and shared research inquiries and interests. In the United States, for example, the major universities undertake research jointly with, or on behalf of, government agencies, private companies and foundations. Research and development is seen as vital to the ability of American companies and the American economy to compete in the ferocious global market. These universities, in turn, are often part of elaborate global networks involving the exchange of faculty and students, research agendas and findings with other universities and research institutions all over the world. Similarly, transnational corporations use their vast resources to set up research infrastructures and systems that mobilize and merge the intellectual capital of diverse countries and scholarly communities. It is a cliche of our times that we live in an age of globalization. It would not be an exaggeration to argue that research has helped produce globalization as a constellation of material and imaginary, spatial and symbolic processes, while globalization, simultaneously, is producing new contexts and imperatives for intellectual communities. The difference between Africa and the United States is that one is a dependent and the other a dominant social formation in the global division of labor in general and in the intellectual division of labor in particular. The question of intellectual or scholarly production can be approached from many angles; in terms of its spatiality, disciplinarity, and instrumentality. What are the major sites where African scholarly knowledge is produced? What are the dominant disciplinary frameworks for producing the knowledge? What are the intended results of the knowledge produced? Obviously, we cannot discuss all these questions in any detail in a single essay, and certainly not for a whole continent. My observations will, therefore, largely be general, spared of the messy complexities, contradictions, and confusions of the actual realities. Only scholarly knowledge in the social sciences and humanities is discussed. This leaves out research networks in the sciences which are relatively more developed in some countries than in the social sciences and humanities. Also ignored is the broader question of knowledge production within the state and private business sectors. Three sites of scholarly knowledge production can be examined. First, are the continent’s universities; second, the independent research centers; and third, the migrant African 27 intellectuals located in the North. These sites as spaces and centers of scholarly knowledge production are, of course, not mutually exclusive either as spatio-temporal formations or as discursive systems. They are all marked by differentiations, especially linked, although not limited, to gender, ethnicity, nationality, race, location, institutional affiliation, discipline, and ideology. Thematically, for example, developmentalism, as an ideology of modernization and as a research agenda, has predominated among African intellectuals located in all three sites. But there are some organizational differences. National universities have been dependent on state funding and direction and their research has tended to focus on national developmentalist needs and goals. Independent research centers have more eclectic sources of funding and research inspiration and they have often sought to promote regional scholarly collaboration. African immigrant scholarly production and research networking in the North is perhaps the least understood of the three, and needs to be carefully cultivated for it offers African scholarship a unique entry and insertion into global research networks and engagement with historic African diaspora communities. It is, in my view, a crucial link in the chain of activities and agencies essential for Pan-African solidarity and struggle. Taking Africa as a whole, university education, a critical site for the production of intellectuals and scholarly knowledge, long antedated the establishment of the European colonial empires. xxvi This was certainly true of the ancient Islamic universities of northern and western Africa. From the nineteenth century, following European colonization, new universities, usually Christian in inspiration and outlook, were established in the recaptive and European settler colonies of Sierra Leone and South Africa, respectively. But it was not until the twilight years of colonial rule, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, that the colonial powers belatedly began setting up universities as a means of producing skilled professionals to serve a maturing colonial capitalism and save it from the dangerous agitation of the nationalist masses. Small in size, dominated by expatriates, and created in the curricula image of Oxbridge or the Sorbonne, the colonial universities had a limited impact on the development of organically African scholarly traditions and communities. That was to come after independence. There was not only an explosion of education at all levels, including the universities, but educational structures, syllabuses, standards, and staff were increasingly domesticated and nationalized. But what was not changed was the fundamental utilitarian ethos of African university education. Teaching was far more important than research. In other words, African universities were conceived, before and after independence, as brick towers for churning out professional elites, not as industrial parks of research, as symbols of national prestige, rather than as centers of academic progress. In the international intellectual division of labor they were expected to import appropriate packages of universal theory and export empirical data, to be consumers of advanced research conducted in the metropolitan universities. Consequently, their research budgets were often as puny as the research offices were petty in the administrative hierarchy. To be sure, research had some currency in the reward structures and reputational status of academic staff, and many African scholars were quite prolific in writing their nations into the empirical and theoretical corpus of their specific disciplines. But more often than not institutional and wider political considerations, rather than research, determined the possibilities of appointments and promotion. The devaluation of research was exacerbated by the reorganization of universities after xxvi For histories of African universities and intellectuals, see Ajayi, et.al., 1996; Mazrui, 1978; Mamdani and Diouf, 1994; Ngara, 1995. 28 independence. The pre-independence regional universities were broken up into national units and together with the newly created universities they were charged with the mission of producing trained labor power for the nation, of analyzing and solving its problems, of promoting the dreams of uhuru : development and nation-building. African academics generally bought the developmentalist mission, not simply because the universities were fiscally dependent on the state, or that the postcolonial leviathan could whip them into submission, rather they, too, were intoxicated by the immense possibilities of national independence, whatever tongue they chose to speak in, whether of the capitalist right, the socialist left, or the slippery middle. The consequences for scholarly research and knowledge production were profound. Three can be singled out. First, developmentalism became the central paradigm in African research. Each social science discipline, from anthropology and history, to economics and political science sought to chronicle the teleological march of African cultures, societies, economies, and polities from “tradition” to “modernity”, from the pitfalls of underdevelopment to the possibilities of development, from colonial lack to postcolonial fulfilment, from the stasis of being to the agency of becoming. Developmentalist research was characterized by economism, reductionism, and instrumentalism, by the privileging of utilitarian knowledge, of “applied” versus “basic” research. Second, the nation-state set the spatial boundaries of research. Rare was the African scholar who studied other African countries. Such research became almost the exclusive preserve of European and North American Africanists. The growth of, and need for, comparative regional research was thereby undermined. Thus, the “second generation” of African scholars, those trained in the first decade after independence, became less Panafricanist than their predecessors trained in the regional colonial universities. The developmentalist and nationalist thrusts of post- independence research facilitated, thirdly, the growth of state interventionism. In other words, African scholars, whether wittingly or unwittingly, conceded space and authority to the state in the intellectual and institutional organization of the scholarly enterprise. The mediation of research projects and contacts by the state through restrictive research clearance procedures, travel restrictions, surveillance of teaching, and censorship of publications undermined both local research and research cooperation across the hallowed, but hollow, national boundaries. The dilemmas of this scholarly model became more evident as the nationalist dreams of development, democracy, and self-determination evaporated in the face of the mounting recessions of economic growth and political governance. As the social contract of independence crumbled, a process exacerbated by draconian and deflationary structural adjustment programs, struggles for new conditions of living, for the “second independence,” gathered momentum. Increasingly persecuted and pauperized, academics left the splendid isolation of their brick towers and joined the entrepreneurial and restive world of the informal sector and the marching masses. In the meantime, new sites for scholarly production began to emerge. The funding crisis of the universities created both the need and the space for the creation of new sites of intellectual production and reproduction. Most visibly there was the proliferation of independent research centers; the emergence of what can be called an academic NGO sector. Much has been written about NGOs either as reservoirs of entrepreneurial energies from which a truly developmental bourgeoisie will emerge or as arenas where the democratic civilities of associational life are learned. The reality is of course far more complicated than such wishful analyses might suggest. As with the other NGOs, the academic NGOs have had complex and often contradictory relations with the state and foreign capital. Their aspirations for, and rhetoric of, independence and indigeneity have often been compromised by the realities of financing. A 29 few can be characterized as FONGOs (Foreign-Organized NGOs), many are FFONGO’s (Foreign-Financed NGOs), and some are suspect GONGOs (Government-Organized NGOs). This is not meant to deny or dismiss the enormous work performed by these organizations. It is merely to point out the dependent relationship between the research centers that mushroomed in several African countries from the 1980s and foreign funding agencies, sometimes mediated by the state itself. In short, while the centers’ establishment expanded intellectual and ideological spaces, this did not automatically entail the decolonization of African scholarship. Indeed, the opposite may have been the case. It is not uncommon for the donor agencies to impose research themes that reflect the policy and paradigmatic fads of their home countries and scholarly communities rather than the perceived priorities and problems of the African researchers themselves. This is to suggest that the need for transparency, accountability, and mutual respect in relations between African research centers and external donors should be paramount. In terms of spatial organization we can identify three types of research centers: national, sub-regional, and continental. Regardless of such differences, most of the centers are organized along interdisciplinary lines, and only a few appear to operate within more traditional disciplinary boundaries. Largely founded by prematurely retired or part-time university academics, these centers provide crucial spaces for both basic and applied research, much of it conducted by, or sub-contracted to university lecturers and graduate students. With proliferation has come unevenness in quality. Some of these centers are no more than glorified consultancy agencies happy to collude with their clients in confirming policy decisions already made. Others, often against great odds, seek to maintain high standards of scholarly research and networking. Among the most impressive of these one can mention the Organization of Social Science Research in Eastern Africa (OSSREA), Southern African Research Institute for Policy Studies (SARIPS), and the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), founded and run by some of the continent’s most brilliant and productive minds. The three organizations have become oases of intellectual production, probity, and inspiring possibilities. Constantly replenished by the intellectual energies and ambitions of scholars exiled from their repressive countries or impoverished universities, they seek to transcend the debilitating limitations of research narrowly focused on the bounded fictions of specific disciplines and nation-states, in an era when intellectual understanding and effective policy formulation demands interdisciplinarity and regional cooperation. Thus, the regional and continental research institutions have become central players on the African research landscape and in the production, dissemination, and consumption of scholarly knowledge. They are products of both the successes and failures of African universities. In these days of Afropessimism it is often forgotten that while there were universities during the colonial period, the bulk of the educated class in contemporary Africa, including the majority of the academics and researchers, were trained in the universities that were established or expanded after independence. Independence, therefore, set the basis for the rise of African scholarly communities capable of developing their own intellectual trajectories. But the fiscal and intellectual crises of the universities from the 1980s created propitious conditions for the formation and growth of independent research centers which took their research themes and theoretical cues less from the ideological predilections of the postcolonial state and more from the seductive dreams of Panafricanism and the stubborn demands of globalization. For these centers, regional cooperation became an important research paradigm and paradigm of research. They represented the pluralization of African intellectual life, which is 30 a thoroughly good thing. Gone are the days when universities monopolized intellectual labor and production. The “brain drain” from the universities was not confined to the independent research centers, or other socioeconomic sectors for that matter, within and between African countries. African academics and professionals traversed the Atlantic and the Mediterranean in search of safer and greener pastures overseas. As might be expected the motivations and morality of their migrations are in serious dispute. Whatever one’s position, they represented an intellectual reality and resource that needed to be acknowledged and used. Even if they were not the advance armies of Edward Said’s Third World “voyagers into” the belly of the North, or Ali Mazrui’s Panafrican forces of “counter-penetration”, Africa’s migrant intellectuals constituted a presence that could facilitate the globalization of African scholarship and the Africanization of global scholarship. Much of what is known about African intellectuals in the North is anecdotal. Little systematic research has been conducted on their demographic composition, nationality, areas of specialization, institutional affiliation, location, and stated intentions. Comprehensive data and analyses of African migrant intellectuals in the North is essential in order to understand the full magnitude of Africa’s “brain drain” to the North and devise meaningful policies to deal with it. A good beginning in collecting this data has been made in the recent study conducted by the US Social Science Research Council on the rates of return of African Ph.Ds trained in North America between 1986 and 1996 (Pires, et.al., 1999). Despite its limitations xxvii , the study yields invaluable information on the trends in the production and distribution of African intellectuals in North America in the 1980s and 1990s. The data revealed that 57 percent returned to their countries of origin, a further 5 percent to other African countries, for a total return rate to Africa of 62 percent. Altogether, 36 percent stayed in North America, and the remaining 2 percent went to Europe and elsewhere. Despite annual fluctuations, there was no well-defined trend in the return and stay rates of African graduates during this period. Interestingly, the rate of return was almost the inverse of the stated intentions of the Ph.D. recipients: in an NSF Survey of Earned Doctorates for the 1986-1996 period only 35 percent had expressed an intention to return to their home countries and 1 percent to another African country. The authors speculate that some graduates only return temporarily, while many others “who initially intend to stay encounter difficulties (financial, legal, familiar) in actually doing so, and ultimately return to their home countries” (Pires, et.al., 1999:11). It could also reflect changes in employment opportunities and other circumstances in the home countries of the recipients in the course of their training. xxvii The study covers only Ph.D. recipients from 219 American universities and a couple dozen Canadian universities between 1986 and 1996. Also, only citizens of sub-Saharan African countries at the time of graduation were considered. The rate of return survey was restricted to 54 US schools graduating 30 or more Ph.Ds and 15 Canadian universities. Completed surveys were received from only 27 of the 54 US universities and 3 of the 15 Canadian universities. Altogether, the researchers were able to gather adequate data for 1,708 cases, out of an estimated population of 5,537 sub-Saharan African graduates from the selected American and Canadian universities. The authors concede: “Given this situation, a more complete picture of actual career trajectories over time would be of enormous value, as would follow-up interviews with or the distribution of questionnaires to a sample of African Ph.D. recipients in both the Return and Stay categories” (Pires, 1999:9). 31

Variations in rates of return were conditioned by a complex set of factors. Politics was one. Thus, while the Tanzanian economy was not stronger than that of Nigeria, more Tanzanians (79 percent) returned home than Nigerians (34 percent), partly due to Tanzania’s relative political stability as compared to Nigeria’s political turbulence. Economic and institutional factors also played a role. Kenya was no less politically unstable than Cameroon, but more Kenyans (65 percent) returned home as compared to Cameroonians (33 percent), no doubt because of “Kenya’s stronger economy, the relative strength and number of universities and independent research centers, and the presence of many international organizations that provide employment opportunities” (Pires, et.al., 1999:14). Return rates also appear to have been affected by the relative size of immigrant populations, which might explain why more than twice as many Ugandans (79 percent) returned as did Ghanaians (34 percent), despite the fact that the two countries had similar levels of political stability, types of political regimes, and rates of economic growth. Ghana’s immigrant population in the United States was larger than Uganda’s which provided the networks and social capital for the graduates to study and stay as shown by the fact that the vast majority of Ugandans studied using funding from international agencies, unlike many Ghanaians who sponsored themselves or received funding from the North American universities. This suggests that rates of return were relatively higher for those who were sponsored by governments, official agencies, and private foundations: 73 percent (68 percent home and 5 percent Africa) for those funded by their home governments; 75 percent for those funded by private foundations; and 90 percent (82 percent home and 8 percent Africa) for those funded by U.S. government agencies. Perhaps reflecting its tighter employment market return rates were even higher in Canada: 89 percent for those funded by CIDA, 95 percent (91 percent home and 4 percent Africa) for IDRC, and 100 percent for the Canadian Commonwealth. In contrast, only 28 percent (24 percent home and 4 percent Africa) of those who sponsored themselves and 50 percent (40 percent home and 10 percent Africa) of those who received North American university returned. The reasons for this are not far to seek. Recipients of government or foundation sponsorship are usually admitted into Canada and the United States on temporary non-immigrant visas, and they also tend to be well-established professionals in their home countries. Conversely, those who receive university funding or fund themselves are under no obligation to return. Moreover, the latter tend to take longer to complete their studies and they acquire the experience and develop the social networks, often through teaching and research assistantships, that facilitate their employment in North American universities and colleges after graduation. Return rates were also affected by age at graduation. Only 36 percent of those who graduated in the 20-29 year-old age group returned home as compared to 58 percent for those in the 40-49 age group. Older recipients are more likely than the younger ones to have more established careers and family responsibilities to return to at home. There were no demonstrable differences in return rates according to gender, although only 19 percent of the Ph.D. recipients in the survey sample were female. The graduates’ field of study also had an impact on return. Rates of return to Africa (home country or other country) was highest (70 percent) for the Life Sciences (agricultural, biological, and health sciences); followed by Social Sciences (anthropology, economics, political science, psychology, sociology, and others) (65 percent); Education (62 percent); the Physical Sciences (chemistry, physics, mathematics, atmospheric, computer, geological, and other physical sciences) (56 percent); the Humanities (foreign language and literature, history, letters, and others) (54 percent); Professional Services (business 32 management, communication, and other fields) (also 54 percent); and Engineering (45 percent). The relatively low return rate for Engineering, the Physical Sciences, and Professional Services might be attributed to high demand in North America, while for the Humanities it might be attributed to the low demand in Africa. The converse may help explain the high return rates for the Life Sciences, Social Sciences, and Education, namely, “a relatively low demand in North America and a relatively high demand in the region [Africa]... those fields with high return rates in our survey do loosely correlate with those fields prioritized by funding programs. Moreover, these programs frequently select for advanced training those Africans working on projects they are funding, and often hold open their jobs (or better ones) until their return” (Pires, et.al., 1999: 19-21). Clearly, rates of return were positively correlated with levels of political stability and rates of economic growth at home, previous patterns of immigration to North America, the age and career trajectory of the graduates, their field of study, and sources of funding. Not surprisingly, as can be seen from Table 10, Botswana with its political stability, buoyant economy, and low levels of Northern migration, had a high rate of return (94 percent), in contrast to the low rates recorded for Sierra Leone (22 percent) and Liberia (21 percent), countries wrecked by civil war and with relatively large immigrant populations in North America. It is also more likely that Ph.D. recipients from Botswana were sponsored by their government and other agencies and foundations than those from Sierra Leone and Liberia. But rates of return do not tell us everything about the dynamics and impact of the “brain drain” in this age of growing transnational skilled migrations and improved communication technologies. “We must be cognizant,” Piers, et.al. (1999: 36) argue, “of the possibility that ‘return’ does not, by definition, accomplish the goals of capacity-building programs, while ‘stay’ does not, by definition, vitiate the possibility of contributing to at least some of the goals.” In other words, not all those who return home contribute to Africa’s “development” in their areas of specialization, nor do all those who stay in North America contribute nothing to the developmentalist mission.

Bridging the Black Atlantic It is easy to see African intellectual migration to the North as an unmitigated economic, political, and cultural disaster for Africa. Remittances from them and other migrants, while important for the families and communities of the migrants and sometimes for some countries in their national balance of payments, do not seem to compensate for the net losses of their productivity and potential contributions to national development. It has also been argued that the intellectual migrations deprive civil society of the organizational political skills of middle class professionals. That explains, according to the critics, why while African governments publicly decry the migration of their intellectuals, they do little to create conditions that would stem it. All this may be true, but it forecloses the possibility that the migrants can also be turned into assets for Africa. In so far as many of the migrants may not return, despite the proverbial wishes of migrants to return home “someday,” African countries and the migrants themselves need to devise creative strategies that exploit and enhance the potential benefits of African skilled emigration. Demands on the Northern countries to compensate African countries and others in the South for the emigration of their skilled personnel and lost human capital, which have been made, are not likely to go far given the fact that the Northern countries can deny “causing” the migration flows and point to the stringent immigration measures they have taken. It might be more fruitful to concentrate on how African migrants in the North can constitute 33 themselves into an effective political and economic lobby for Africa, by actively campaigning for African causes, cultivating old and new alliances and constituencies for Africa, and forming new linkages with their counterparts on the continent. Africa and its diaspora have not always effectively mobilized to serve and advance each other’s interests as has been the case, for example, between the Jewish diaspora and Israel, or increasingly the Chinese diaspora and China. Israel’s clout in Washington has less to do with the economic importance of Israel to the United States than with the political clout of the Jewish lobby, which others such as Randall Robinson’s TransAfrica have sought to replicate for Africa and the Caribbean, although not always reciprocated from the African side (Robinson, 1998). Similarly, China’s rapid economic development in recent decades has been fueled to some extent by investment from the overseas Chinese. The new African diaspora and their offspring in the United States who Mazrui calls the American Africans, can help invigorate the re-awakened interest in Africa among the historic African American diaspora and serve as a trans-Atlantic bridge, as cultural mediators between Africa and Africa America, whose communication and knowledge of each other have largely been through the distorted lenses and prejudices of imperialist and racist media. Immigrant African intellectuals, as cultural producers, have an important and specific role to play in brokering relations between Africa and the North, in blackening the Atlantic. They must resist the seductions of the Northern academies to become native ventriloquists, complicit authentic others who validate narratives that seek to marginalize Africa. Nor should they let themselves be manipulated as a fifth column in the North’s eternal racial wars by disavowing the protracted struggles of historic African diaspora communities for the full citizenship of racial equality, economic empowerment, and political power. Sometimes immigrants from Africa or the Caribbean tend to forget that the roads they ride on to their jobs in industry or the academy were paved by those who proceeded them. Solidarity requires respect for each other’s struggles and recognition of our splendid diversities anchored on a strategic racial essentialism, in so far as it is the historical racialization of our humanity that has produced and continues to reproduce our collective exploitation and denigration whether in Africa or the North. Migrant African intellectuals should not be seen solely in the magisterial role of Edward Said’s cosmopolitan revolutionaries or the ministerial role of Ali Mazrui’s teachers subverting the North through counter-penetration. They are both students and teachers of African and Northern societies, cultural workers and producers who should, in solidarity with historic African diaspora communities, construct knowledges of their multiple worlds that demystify the roots of Africa’s and diaspora Africa’s oppression and exploitation; knowledges that seek to empower their communities; that expose and confront the tyrannies of Northern imperial power and Africa’s dictators; that promote respectful conversation between Africa and the North. Scholarly production and conversation are conducted through publications, conferences, classrooms, and increasingly through the Internet. What ought to be the role of migrant African intellectuals in African and Africanist scholarly production and discourse? Let me make a few proposals that suggest the possibilities of turning migrant African intellectuals from liabilities into assets for African intellectual development based on the recognition that while many may not be able or want to return permanently to their native countries they, like most migrants, often suffer from abandonment guilt which they seek to alleviate by continued participation in developments at home. In days gone by, global migration often entailed permanent relocation or long separation and infrequent encounters with one’s native home through mail and the occasional visit. The contemporary revolution in telecommunications and travel has compressed 34 the spatial and temporal distances between home and abroad, thus offering migrants unprecedented opportunities to be transnational, to be people of two worlds, perpetually translocated, physically and culturally, between several countries or several continents. Thus, globalization is not simply facilitating the rapid flows of capital and commodities, but also revitalizing old cultural and community networks, thus strengthening transnational ethnic, racial, and national identities. It is in this context that the possible contributions of migrant African intellectuals need to be examined. There is need to develop innovative and cost-effective exchange programs that facilitate the periodic flow of migrant African intellectuals from the North to Africa. To date exchange programs have largely focused on Northern scholars coming to Africa, and occasionally African scholars visiting Northern institutions. Too often, the linkages have been one-sided, used by Africanists in the North to underwrite their academic careers, leaving little intellectual benefits for African scholarship. We need to devise programs that specifically target migrant African intellectuals, who constitute, I believe, an important, but under-utilized, link in the transfer of technology and intellectual capital from the North to the continent. They have a responsibility to be Africa’s intellectual eyes and ears. As we all know Africa is routinely defamed and denigrated in the popular media and in scholarly publications in the North. Migrant African intellectuals ought to continuously challenge such misrepresentations, particularly among Africanists and other scholars, and to raise the intellectual costs of maligning and misrepresenting Africa. Let us explore more concretely how new linkages and forms of collaboration can be established between migrant African intellectuals and intellectual communities on the continent around each of the three critical areas of scholarly pursuit: teaching, research, and public service. Migrant intellectuals can contribute to teaching and training in Africa in five ways. First, through joint appointments in African and Northern universities, which could enable them to teach in Africa during a designated period in an academic year or over several years when they are, say, on sabbatical or leave of absence. Upon their return to the North they could continue supervising graduate and advanced undergraduate students and provide them with access to research materials from the North that may not be locally available. In this way, periodic teaching visits by the migrant intellectuals would foster continuous interaction with students. This could be a far more effective method of “transferring technology” from the North to Africa than can be expected from expatriate workers, transnational corporations, and foreign aid. Second, the Internet offers unprecedented opportunities for collaborative distance teaching between African scholars in the North and their counterparts on the continent. The delivery systems can range from simple E-mail communication, to using list serves and chat rooms, to setting up technically more complex video conferencing facilities that would allow for lectures, seminars, and conferences to be held among various sites on the continent and in the North. The establishment of virtual universities offers a unique opportunity to utilize African intellectuals in the North and link them to students and colleagues on the continent. In this context the Virtual University established by the World Bank linking twelve African universities needs to be expanded and migrant African intellectuals need to be more actively involve in such initiatives. Third, migrant African intellectuals need to take advantage of study abroad programs sponsored by their institutions and various consortia by not only encouraging the development of more such programs in Africa, but by ensuring that they are designed in such a way that they actively participate in them and that they involve African students and are not restricted to, or are glorified tourist junkets for, students from the North. 35

Fourth, migrant African intellectuals ought to participate in existing, or in establishing new, national and regional specialized institutes. Such institutes offer unique opportunities for concentrated and short-term teaching and training. Each of the major independent research centers mentioned above - CODESRIA, SARIPS, and OSSREA - and many others, as well as some universities, have set up specialized training institutes, whose structure allows for participation by scholars based in different countries, including those from the North as trainers and resource persons. Finally, it is possible for migrant African intellectuals to contribute to curriculum development in African institutions through informal and formal communications with their colleagues on the continent. Informally through personal contacts, and formally through linkages between their institutions in the North and African institutions. There are already many such inter-university linkages, but migrant African intellectuals have not always been as actively involved as they could be. Each of these linkages in the teaching domain can foster more fruitful research linkages between African intellectuals within and outside the continent and contribute to the advancement of research and development in Africa. Specifically, in the realm of research there are four ways in which migrant African intellectuals can play a productive role. First, joint research projects ought to be pursued more vigorously in a manner that maximizes the “comparative advantage” of each group in terms of access to data, research funds and materials, and theoretical formulations. All too often, researchers from the North, equipped with fistfuls of dollars and theoretical conceit, descend upon Africa to test their latest pet theories and use their African colleagues as research assistants to collect data. Northern-based African scholars could help in changing the dynamics of such a research culture and promote more equitable relations by openly criticizing exploitative practices and sensitizing universities and foundations that fund African research to promote research that is truly collaborative, from the conception of research problems, to collection and interpretation of data, to writing and publication of research results. The appointment of increasing numbers of Africans as program officers and directors in some of the large foundations, such as the Ford Foundation, offers African intellectuals on the continent and in the diaspora an opportunity to promote new North-South research linkages and practices. Similarly, the appointment of Africans in senior administrative positions in African studies programs provides a basis for building new Africanist research cultures and practices. The establishment of mutually beneficial institutional linkages and support between African researchers across the Atlantic constitutes the second area in which migrant African intellectuals could advance research in and on Africa. The third area centers on publication. Co-authorship and co-publishing between African scholars and publishers based on the continent and their counterparts in the North should be encouraged. It offers the former wider markets for their ideas and products, and helps the latter to focus their research on fundamental questions confronting Africa thus saving them from the sterile seductions of post-something theorizing beloved among many Northern scholars. As has been stressed by Zeleza (1997, 1998), African scholars based in the North should try as much as possible to publish in Africa-based journals and monograph series as a way of building African intellectual capacities and communities and of promoting intellectual conversation across the Atlantic in so far as it will be in their interest to see to it that such publications are marketed and read in the North. The reciprocal responsibility on the part of continentally-based scholars and publishers is that they must export well-produced texts of impeccable scholarship. They are unlikely to attract their compatriots based in the North seeking to ascend the slippery poles of tenure and promotion if their publications are shoddy and reinforce the perceived inferiority and 36 marginality of African scholarship. In short, co-authorship and co-publication offer possibilities to promote and mainstream African scholarship. Besides the migration of people, a few African scholarly journals have also migrated to the North. The principal example is Transition , founded in Uganda in the 1960s, now relocated to Harvard University in the United States. Such journals have a special responsibility to act as a medium of serious, two-way intellectual conversation between Africa and the North. They must avoid the dangers of developing historical amnesia and falling easy prey to the seductions of the post-something sophistries parading in many a Northern academy, which many African intellectuals on the continent find at best amusing, and at worst dangerous. They must address the fundamental processes, issues, and questions that have shaped, connected, and differentiated Africa and the North. Through them we must remember and reconfigure the Middle Passage and the numerous ties that bind Africa and the North. In addition to collaborative research, migrant African intellectuals could contribute to the development of respectful intellectual conversations across the Atlantic through the establishment of extensive general and specialized review periodicals, edited and published jointly in the North and Africa, in which African and Africanist publications would be routinely reviewed. The review periodicals could also assist in advertizing African books in the North and vice-versa, and in breaking the cycle of self-referential solitude that currently characterizes Africanist scholarship. Such scholarly media would help promote more accountability and respectful communication between African and Africanist and other Northern scholarly communities. Today Northern scholars writing on African countries do not need to worry about what their African colleagues think or say, especially if the latter are based on the continent, because they are unlikely to review their work. This promotes intellectual indifference and misconduct, which sometimes includes outright fraud and the falsification of data. Migrant African intellectuals have, I believe, a special responsibility and role to mainstream African scholarship in global scholarship by promoting the consumption of African scholarly texts in the North. This often requires nothing more than simple commitment in so far as university professors have considerable freedom in designing courses and setting reading materials. That African intellectuals in the North must inform themselves of scholarly publications by their colleagues on the continent which could be used as class texts cannot be overemphasized. More challenging is to ensure that African publications are ordered by libraries with dwindling acquisition budgets and that they are included in index and citation systems that increasingly act as gateways to research products and inquiries as publications and information explode. Not to be cited by the major indexing services often spells intellectual invisibility and death. Migrant African intellectuals, working in collaboration with Africana librarians, need to push for the inclusion of African publications in these indexes which filter and legitimate scholarly products. As for public service, migrant African intellectuals can also play several roles. First, there is advocacy. Together with other migrant Africans, and working with groups interested in Africa, they can contribute to the formation of active lobbies for Africa with key public and private constituencies, ranging from governments and the corporate sector, to the increasingly influential NGO movement and the media. As intellectuals, they have the capacity, or should develop the capacity, to provide coherent analyses and chart the contours of fruitful and mutually beneficial relations between Africa and the North. At the very least, African governments and institutions ought to use them as interpreters of the North. Their work is also essential to minimizing media misrepresentation and marginalization of Africa. This is connected to the second public service 37 function that migrant African intellectuals can perform: being actively engaged in outreach either through existing institutions they belong to or new institutions that they can form. Outreach aims at promoting informed knowledge and public discourse on Africa. The constituencies for outreach include the institutions and sectors mentioned above, as well as educational institutions, movements with potential international scope, such as labor unions and religious organizations, and various cultural communities, especially those among the historic African diaspora xxviii . Finally, wherever possible migrant Africans need to actively participate in the politics of both their countries of origin and countries of settlement. Generally migrant Africans tend to be more preoccupied with politics back home than in their new countries, in which they participate through fund raising activities, formation of exile political parties, and lobbying in Northern capitals against dictatorships and governments they disprove of. It is important to balance this with engagement in the electoral politics of the North, which often requires taking up citizenship. As their numbers and political voices rise in specific locations, and through coalition building with groups and constituencies favorably disposed towards Africa, migrant Africans could begin to influence the foreign policies of their adopted countries towards Africa. The role of migrant intellectuals in this endeavor is to map out the trajectories of African political participation in the North and to interrogate the current constructions of citizenship and to articulate new ones that resonate with their transnationalism and the positive possibilities of globalization. Clearly, effecting these changes and developments requires a lot more than personal commitment by individuals. Institutional anchors are required to navigate the demanding rigors and rituals of academic life and migrancy. The institutional mechanisms can include both old and new institutions. Better use could be made of existing academic associations and NGOs, such as the African Studies Association in the United States and CODESRIA in Senegal, to coordinate and develop some of the activities outlined above. Official university associations, such as the Association of African universities also have a role to play. So do international organizations such as UNESCO and UNRISD (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development). But the way forward might require setting up separate organizations, linked to all these entities, that specifically focus on promoting the utilization of migrant African intellectuals in the development of teaching, research, and public service in and on Africa along some of the lines suggested in this essay. Such organizations could put to much better use some of the funds currently allocated to programs promoting the permanent return and relocation of migrant Africans, or the huge sums spent on technical assistance by often ill-informed or indifferent non- African expatriates. These suggestions are based on the recognition that the challenge for Africa is not simply one of capacity building, but also of capacity utilization, of finding the most effective ways to fully exploit the intellectual and technical capacity that has already been built, xxviii In the United States these include such important political organizations as the NAACP, the Urban League, Operation PUSH, the Congressional Black Caucus, and TransAfrica, to mention the prominent ones at the national level; the influential African American churches and other religious organizations; and the Historically Black Colleges and Universities where the majority of African Americans and large numbers of African students receive their higher education and where many migrant African intellectuals teach. Too often, linkages between US and African educational institutions are confined to the historically white institutions. There is need to fully incorporate the HBCUs in these linkages. The award of the multi-million dollar USAID-funded linkage program between US and South African institutions of higher education is encouraging in this regard. 38 which for various reasons, is now scattered all over the world.

Conclusion

Obviously, these suggestions do no exhaust the possible contributions that migrant African intellectuals can make to African intellectual development. I hope these reflections do not sound like self-indulgent rantings of a disaffected migrant intellectual, but that they demonstrate the question of Africa’s brain drain and hemorrhage is serious enough to require sober contemplation by all of us, for it presents African countries with both dangers and opportunities. The emergence of a migrant African intellectual community in the North is part of the complex processes of transformation in African and global scholarly cultures, political economies, and migrations. The essay has shown that the dynamics and directions of global mobility have shifted, and African participation in international migration, particularly in Western Europe and North America, has become more pronounced, notwithstanding the imposition of stringent immigration controls by these countries. It has been argued that the causes, courses, and consequences of contemporary international migration systems have less to do with the conventional postulates of the “push-pull” model and other simplistic neo-classical economic theories, and more with complex social networks that have arisen as a result of the long processes of globalization and transnationalization in which Africa, including its educational institutions and cultures, have been involved and implicated. The essay then proceeded to examine specifically the production and mobility of African intellectuals, and to outline the impact that changes in the spatial and social contexts and conditions of scholarly production on the continent have had on patterns of intellectual labor migration. The argument has been made that migrant African intellectuals constitute a “community” linked in intricate ways to scholarly communities on the continent - those located in the universities and the independent research centers that have mushroomed in recent years. Mutually beneficial networks among these communities must be developed, while simultaneously reinforcing the productive capacities of each. The revitalization of African universities is essential if the continent’s human resources are to be developed and the dangerous slide towards decline or continued dependency is to be reversed. This requires the restoration of adequate funding levels to the universities, and the reorientation of internal expenditure patterns and reward structures to put higher premium on research. Research centers in universities need greater financial support, administrative visibility, and outreach capacities. For their part, the independent research centers need to diversify their sources of financing and strengthen their capabilities for both basic and applied, short-term and long-term research. Finally, African intellectuals in Northern universities can support and promote African scholarly research and production through the establishment of active collaborative linkages with their colleagues and publishers on the continent. Contemporary migrant African intellectuals, together with intellectuals from the historic African diaspora in the North, have a responsibility to universalize African scholarship and provincialize Northern scholarship as part of the struggle to create a truly global concert of cultures. The rising migration of Africa’s professional elites and intellectuals may, indeed, be a curse if dismissed and ignored, but it can be turned into a blessing if embraced and utilized. It is 39 generated by, and inserts Africa into, contemporary processes of transnationalization and globalization, which follow and reinforce the old trails of Pan-Africanism. The challenge for Africa, then, is how to rebuild the historic Pan-African project, spawned by the global dispersal and exploitation of African peoples over the centuries, by creatively using the current migratory flows of African peoples, cultures, capacities, and visions. It is an old issue in a new age that requires responses and solutions that are both old and new, that entail and transcend the possibilities of Mazrui’s counter-penetration, Said’s cosmopolitanism, and Appadurai’s cultural- scapes.

40

Table 1: Migrant Stock By Region

Region Estimated Foreign-Born Population Thousands % As % of Total As % of migrant Growth population of region stock world total 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 World Total 75,214 119,761 2.3 2.3 100 100 Developed countries 2.4 3.1 4.5 40.4 45.3 Developing countries 30,401 54,231 1.9 1.6 59.6 54.7 3.1 44,813 65,530 1.8 Africa 7,952 15,631 6.5 2.5 10.6 13.1 Northern Africa 3.9 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.7 Sub-Saharan Africa 1,016 1,982 2.9 2.8 9.2 11.4 3.8 6,936 13,649 3.9 Asia 31,429 43,018 1.7 1.4 41.8 35.9 Eastern and S-Eastern 1.5 0.7 0.4 10.8 6.6 Asia 8,136 7,931 - 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.3 China 0.1 1.9 1.2 10.5 6.3 Other East and S-E Asia 266 346 2.8 1.8 24.7 17.4 South-central Asia 1.2 7.8 10.9 6.2 11.9 Western Asia 7,870 7,586 - 0.1 18,610 20,782 0.5 4,663 14,304 8.3 Latin America and 5,907 7,475 2.4 1.7 7.9 6.2 Caribbean 1.1 2.4 2.9 0.7 0.8 Caribbean 532 959 0.8 1.8 0.6 1.7 Central America 3.2 3.0 1.5 6.6 3.7 South America 445 2,047 14.4 4,930 4,469 - 0.4 Northern America 12,695 23,895 6.0 8.6 16.9 20.0 3.5 41

Europe and former Soviet 14,728 25,068 2.2 3.2 19.6 20.9 Union 2.8 2.4 1.7 3.8 1.7 Eastern Europe 2,835 2,055 - 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 Former Soviet Union 1.1 3.6 6.1 15.6 19.1 Western Europe 140 159 0.5 11,753 22,853 3.8 Oceania 2,502 4,675 14.4 17.8 3.3 3.9 3.4

Source: adapted from Zlotnik, 1999:47-8.

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Table 2. Estimate of the Number of Non-Nationals by Major Region of Migration in 1995 (excluding asylum seekers and refugees) In Millions*

Region Economically Active Dependents Total Africa 6-7 12-14 18-21 North America 8 8-10 16-18 Central and South America 3-5 4-7 7-12 South, South-East and East Asia 2-3 3-4 5-7 West Asia (Arab States) 6 2-3 8-9 Europe** 11-12 15-17 26-30 Overall Totals 36-42 44-55 80-97

* The estimate refers to foreign passport-holders, not to foreign-born persons because the latter include an unknown proportion of naturalized persons who no longer hold the nationality of their country of origin.

** The numbers for western Europe would be about 9 million economically active foreigners along with 13 million dependants.

Source: ILO, 1997.

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Table 3: Origins of Migrants to Select Northern Countries, 1960-1996. Thousands and Percentage.

Country 1960- 1965- 1970- 1975- 1980- 1985- 1990- 1995- 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1996 Immigrants to US 283,80 358,94 384,68 459,54 565,00 605,67 769,83 813,730 Percent From 3 7 3 1 7 4 2 Developing 80.3 Countries 41.9 55.9 70.6 80.9 85.2 86.4 79.0 19.7 Developed 58.1 44.1 29.4 19.1 14.8 13.6 21.0 12.0 Countries 7.4 5.9 4.7 3.5 3.9 3.7 11.0 Of which En. Europe Immigrants to 181,97 158,85 130,12 114,05 137,91 235,50 212,504 Canada 88,008 6 7 7 6 0 9 Percent From 78.6 Developing 12.3 20.9 42.5 55.6 62.1 70.8 78.4 21.4 Countries 87.7 79.1 57.5 44.4 37.9 29.2 21.6 12.4 Developed 8.1 7.3 5.2 4.7 8.5 10.1 11.0 Countries Of which En. Europe Australia* 103,13 134,21 101,55 102,030 Percent From 2 4 94,521 54,473 79,385 0 64,004 Developing 72.7 Countries 7.1 12.7 27.6 53.7 47.5 62.6 81.4 27.3 Developed 92.9 87.3 72.4 46.3 52.5 37.4 18.6 6.8 Countries 6.9 10.9 11.5 5.6 7.7 5.9 12.0 Of which E. Europe Belgium** - Percent From 33,917 27,600 20,741 9,501 130 7,598 29,269 30,707 Developing Countries 35.7 28.2 42.8 94.5 57.9 46.2 39.9 Developed 64.3 71.8 57.2 5.5 4,390 42.1 53.8 60.1 Countries 5.8 7.7 7.7 5.5 - 10.2 10.7 12.9 Of which En. 4,519 Europe 300 44

Germany* 197,44 306,22 6,352 373,61 646,07 397,935 Percent From 9 1 3,040 0 2 Developing 533.7 17.6 Countries 25.2 44.2 -516.5 -77.0 18.3 15.5 39.0 Developed 76.2 52.8 -733.5 -694.0 31.1 40.8 29.6 Countries 35.2 20.7 609.6 435.4 25.4 35.9 43.4 Of which En. 1.4 3.0 1060.3 50.6 43.6 Europe German Citizens Netherlands* 11,777 16,828 24,011 34,390 59,003 50,036 Percent From 4,352 22,638 Developing 45.5 63.4 56.4 75.7 68.2 78.5 Countries 54.5 36.6 43.6 253.7 82.8 24.3 31.8 21.5 Developed 0.0 3.9 8.5 -53.7 17.2 6.1 16.4 12.4 Countries 6.3 2.1 Of which En. Europe Sweden 15,321 27,821 11,874 18,929 8,126 27,291 38,275 17,764 Percent From Developing 1.8 3.1 13.2 36.4 87.7 65.9 45.3 38.4 Countries 98.2 96.9 86.8 63.6 -26.6 34.1 54.7 61.6 Developed 2.6 16.6 30.4 8.8 27.3 10.7 41.5 30.3 Countries Of which En. Europe United - - - - 24,160 22,380 53,900 Kingdom*** 77,520 50,400 21,100 27,580 Percent From 156.3 125.6 68.8 Developing 15040 1600 -56.7 -25.5 30.6 Countries 28860 -65460 21920 -39220 28.6 45.2 39.7 Developed - -5140 - 2160 Countries 10646 43120 Of which Europe 0 - 10880 8680 * Net migration to these countries. ** Net migration to Belgium. For years 1980-84 denotes actual numbers not percentages. *** Net migration to the United Kingdom. For years 1960-64, 1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-80, and 1980-84 denotes actual numbers, not percentages.

Source: adapted from Zlotnik, 1999: 50-51.

45

Table 4: Stock of Foreign Born Population by Nationality for Select European Countries

Country 1985 1990 1996 Belgium Total 846.5 904.5 911.9 Italy 252.9 241.2 138.3 Morocco 123.6 94.3 101.7 France 92.3 94.3 101.7 Netherlands 59.6 65.3 80.6 Turkey 74.2 84.9 78.5 France** 3714.2 3596.0 Total 767.3 649.7 Portugal 805.1 614.2 Algeria 441.3 572.7 Morocco 340.3 252.8 Italy 327.2 216.0 Spain Germany Total 4 378.9 5 342.5 7 341.0 Turkey 1 401.9 1 694.6 2 049.1 Former Yugoslavia 591.0 662.7 754.3 Italy 531.3 552.4 599.4 Greece 280.6 320.2 362.5 Poland 104.8 242.0 283.4 Italy Total 423.0 781.1 1 095.6 Morocco 7.6 34.3 119.5 Philippines 51.1 58.1 57.1 United States 13.9 29.8 54.7 Former Yugoslavia 4.4 41.2 48.3 Tunisia 37.2 41.6 44.8 Netherlands Total 552.5 692.4 679.9 Morocco 116.4 156.9 138.7 Turkey 156.4 203.5 127.0 Germany 41.0 44.3 53.5 United Kingdom 38.5 39.0 39.3 Former Yugoslavia 11.7 13.5 32.8 Sweden Total 388.6 483.7 526.6 Finland 138.6 119.7 103.1 Former Yugoslavia 38.4 41.1 36.6 Norway 26.4 38.2 31.7 Iran 8.3 39.0 27.2 Denmark 25.1 28.6 26.0 46

United Kingdom* 1 731 1 723 2 066 Total 569 478 446 Ireland 138 156 110 India 86 102 104 United States 83 75 77 Italy 49 56 68 Pakistan

* For the United Kingdom the last entry for 1997 ** For France the first entry is for 1982

Source: OECD, 1998:249-256.

Table 5: Immigrant Population into France by Region, 1975-1990

Region 1975 % 1982 % 1990 % Southern Europe* 2,043,570 52.3 1,845,872 45.3 1,700,758 40.5 Africa 967,995 24.7 1,277,225 31.4 1,383,826 33.0

Algeria 571,925 14.6 617,993 15.2 571,997 13.6

Morocco 244,945 6.4 358,296 8.8 446,872 10.7

Tunisia 151,125 3.9 177,544 4.4 182,478 4.3

Sub-Saharan Africa N/A 123,392 3.0 182,479 4.3 Indochina N/A 124,420 3.1 158,075 3.8 Other 908,865 23.2 823,592 20.2 953,293 22.7 Total 3,920,430 100.0 4,071,109 100.0 4,195,952 100.0 % of Total French 7.5 7.5 7.4

Population

* includes Spanish, Italians, Portuguese, and Turks.

Source: adapted from Hollifield, 1997:23-24.

Table 6. Stock of Foreign Population by Nationality in the United Kingdom, 1984-1995 Thousands

47

Region 1984 1990 1995 Of which Females 1995 Ireland 491 478 443 241 European Union 701 731 902 490 South Asia* 232 250 248 134 Caribbean and Guyana 131 82 128 46 Africa

Western Africa 51 45 87 48

Eastern Africa 28 39 40 21 Other Countries 458 572 655 350 Total 1 601 1 723 2 060 1 089

* South Asia includes India, Pakistan and Bangladesh

Source: OECD, 1997: 200, 1997: 236

Table 7: Distribution by Region of the US Foreign-Born Population: 1960-1990 Percentage

Region 1960 1970 1980 1990 Europe 75.0 61.7 39.0 22.9 Asia 5.1 8.9 19.3 26.3 Africa 0.4 0.9 1.5 1.9 Oceania 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.5 Latin America 9.4 19.4 33.1 44.0 North America 9.8 8.7 6.5 4.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, March, 1999.

48

Table 8: Region and Country of Birth of the US African-Born Population: 1980-1990 Select Countries

Region/Country 1990 1980 Total 363,819 % 199,723 % Eastern Africa 72,300 19.9 26,036 13.0 Ethiopia 34,805 9.6 7,516 3.8 Kenya 14,371 4.0 6,250 3.1 Middle Africa 8,880 2.4 3,719 1.9 Cameroon 3,161 0.9 1,214 0.6 Zaire 3,387 0.9 1,411 0.7 Northern Africa 99,044 27.2 69,777 34.9 Egypt 66,313 18.2 43,424 21.7 Morocco 15,541 4.3 9,896 5.0 Southern Africa 34,707 9.5 16,103 8.1 South Africa 34,707 9.5 16,103 8.1 Western Africa 111,566 30.7 50,002 25.1 Ghana 20,889 5.7 7,564 3.8 Nigeria 55,350 15.2 25,528 12.8

Source: Gibson and Lennon, 1999.

49

Table 9: Remittances From Labor Migration, 1970-1985 : For World Regions and Select African Countries (Millions of U. S. Dollars)

Region/Country 1965 1975 1985 Total 1,617 10,159 22,277 Europe 1,121 5,365 5,635 L.A. and Caribbean 69 285 1,136 S. and E. Asia 234 1,071 6,250* N. Africa and W. 184 3,346 8,948 Asia Sub-Saharan Africa 9 92 308 Algeria 195 355 191 Benin 0 15 - Botswana - -7 -3 Burkina Faso 16 33 - Cote d’Ivoire -56 -184 -265 Egypt 33 455 3,216 Ghana -10 24 33 Lesotho - 1 2 Liberia - -22 -28 Malawi -2 3 - Mali 0 12 21 Morocco 36 482 965 Senegal -17 -10 - Sierra Leone 1 2 3 Sudan -1 2 249 Togo -2 -1 0 Tunisia 23 131 259

Source: Adapted From Keely (1989). 50

Table 10: Return Status By Country of African Ph.D. Recipients in North America, 1986- 1996*

50% Or Greater Return Return Rates (%) “Home” Total Ph.Ds Home Africa Stay Other Benin 4 50 50 Botswana 19 94 6 Burkina Faso 25 79 13 8 Burundi 14 57 43 Cape Verde 2 100 Chad 2 100 Congo-Brazzaville 5 67 33 Guinea 11 70 20 10 Ivory Coast 42 59 4 37 Kenya 155 65 5 28 2 Lesotho 12 90 10 Madagascar 18 67 11 11 11 Malawi 39 81 8 11 Mali 17 77 23 Mauritania 7 50 25 25 Mozambique 6 80 20 Namibia 2 100 Niger 21 62 38 Senegal 16 62 38 South Africa 223 67 30 Swaziland 31 80 10 10 Tanzania 58 79 2 19 Togo 24 68 5 26 Uganda 54 79 3 17 Zambia 38 79 4 18 Zimbabwe 51 83 7 10 51

50% or Greater Stay Return Status (%) Angola 1 100 Cameroon 62 33 5 60 3 Gambia 7 33 17 50 Ghana 166 34 5 61 Liberia 23 21 21 58 Mauritius 8 40 60 Nigeria 261 34 3 62 2 Sierra Leone 30 22 6 72 Somalia 17 33 11 56 Dispersed Location Return Status (%) Ethiopia 89 47 4 47 2 Rwanda 16 36 14 43 7 Sudan 92 48 5 35 11 Congo Dem Rep 33 42 17 42 Other Return Status (%) Guinea-Bissau 4 100

Source: Pires, et.al. (1999: 55-57). * The survey sample involved 1,708 cases. See Endnote 27 for details.

52

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ENDNOTES

1. They argue that contemporary migration is characterized by five tendencies: globalization of migration whereby more and more countries are affected by migration movements; acceleration of migration whereby migrations are growing in volume in all major regions; differentiation of migration whereby most countries have a whole range of types of migration, such as labor migration, refugees, and permanent settlement; feminization of migration whereby women are playing an increasing role in all regions in all types of migration; and politicization of migration whereby domestic politics, bilateral and regional relationships and national security policies are increasingly affected by international migration (Castles and Miller, 1998: Chapter 1).

2. The literature on African migration is vast given the fact that migration has been a key feature of African political, economic, cultural, and political histories. In fact, at one time migration was the dominant theme in African historiography as historians chronicled the migrations of ethnic groups. Later economic migrations, whether that of "stranger farmers" in 19th century West Africa, or labor migrants in twentieth century Southern Africa received a lot of attention. For studies of contemporary migration trends, see the excellent books by Barker and Aina (1995) and Toure and Fadayomi (1992). Also see the survey by Adepoju (1994, 1995) and Adepoju and Appleyard (1996) on emigration dynamics in the so-called sub-Saharan African region; Oucho (1995) on the different types of migration and their consequences in Eastern Africa; Milanzi (1995) on emigration dynamics in Southern Africa; and Kotzé and Hill (1997) and Crush (1999) on emergent migration policy and discourses in post-apartheid South Africa. Equally large is the literature on refugees, a growing part of the African migration experience. For broad overviews see the books by Adelman and Sorenson (1994) and Kibreab (1985, 1996).

3. See the fascinating essays in Social Text, especially those by Honig (1998), Derian (1998), Norton (1998), Pateman (1998), and Chatterjee (1998) on the role that myths about immigrants play in the politics of state renewal, national memory and forgeting, and social mobility and control.

4. It is difficult to compare the data collected by the traditional immigration countries - the United States, Canada, and Australia - and the European countries because they use different criteria to identify migrants and the meanings of "origin." Canada and the United States gather data only on persons admitted as permanent residents, while the European countries publish information on the number of incoming and outgoing migrants including citizens returning and emigrating. See, Kelly (1987), Kraly and Gnanasekaran (1987), Zlotnik (1991), and Willekens (1994). For a discussion on new approaches to immigrant measurement in the United States and the continuing difficulties, see Kraly (1991) and Schmidley and Robinson (1998). 5. For an overview of international migration trends since the Second World War, see Salt (1987, 1989) and Werner (1986). Salt notes the following trends: continuing decline in permanent settlement; growing importance of temporary migration; the widening scope of international migration; the emergence of family reunion as a major element; the imposition of more restrictive immigration policies; the rise of refugees to the top of the international migration agenda; the growing importance of "brain exchanges"; visibility of institutions involved in international migration; and growing pressures for illegal migration.

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6. For the changing dynamics on entry of asylum-seekers and refugees from the South to the North, see Widgren (1989) and Gallagher (1989).

7. The European Union signed the Convention of Schengen in 1985 to harmonize its members' border and immigration policies. Guy de Lusignan (1999: 4) argues that the convention "has had no practical effect because the police forces of EU nations lack adequate computing information systems. Another explanation could be the difficulties in trying to apply the Convention in the context of differing national laws, traditions, and political concerns." Others argue that the Convention is facilitating the creation of "Fortress Europe," forcing countries especially those on the borders of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean to create secure frontiers as they enclose themselves in a new European space (Suárez-Navaz (1997).

8. African immigration to France, argues Garson (1992) constituted an integral part of a generalized system of bilateral relations. Immigration played an important role in the rise of the right-wing National Front whose electoral victories, in turn, facilitated the drift towards conservatism in French politics even during Francois Mitterrand's ostensibly socialist era in the 1980s and early 1990s. Immigration was embroiled in concerns about French national identity being decomposed and reconfigured by the forces of European integration and globalization at a time of slow economic growth and massive cultural transformation. See Grillo (1985; Ogden (1991, 1993); Brubaker (1992); Hollifield (1997); Cohen (1997); Karanovic (1999). In 1996 Africa and the world witnessed the ugly fallout of this in the spectacle of a hunger strike by undocumented African immigrants, the so-called sans papiers, at a Paris church (Rosenblum, 1996). Less dramatic, but no less significant were the protests and strikes organized by African workers over inadequate housing and other social grievances, and against racism. For a chronology of this protest activity, see Fox (1995). For protests elsewhere across Europe by the African diaspora, see Ervin (1999).

9. For a detailed analysis of migration flows from the Maghreb countries, the emigration pressures in these countries, the policies adopted by their governments and those of the receiving countries, and the developmental impact of emigration, see the study by ILO (1998). The migration flows are attributed to demographic pressures, the disparity between labor supply and demand, and the considerable socio-economic development that has been achieved in these countries, as well as the impact of structural adjustment programs and greater integration of these countries into the world economy.

10. Some of the measures, such as virginity tests conducted on immigrant women at Heathrow Airport, were calculated to humiliate immigrants. They prompted the United Nations Human Rights Commission to pass a unanimous resolution in March, 1979 expressing concern at the indignities. Also, access to welfare rights, including to the National Health Service and Social Security benefits, was curtailed. And from 1983 the nationality of children born in the United Kingdom, who were previously automatically British, became dependent on the immigration status of their parents (Couper, 1984).

11. The International Labor Organization has conducted several studies on discrimination and harassment of immigrants, especially in the labor market, in many countries. For Finland see, Vuori (1996, 1998); for the Netherlands, see Bovenkerk (1995) and Abell, et.al. (1997); for the 63

United Kingdom, see Taylor, et.al. (1997); for Germany, see Goldberg, et.al. (1996); for Spain, see de Prada, et.al. (1996); for Canada, see Ventura (1995); and for the United States, see Bendick (1996). They show that in all these countries discrimination and harassment of foreign workers are indeed widely practiced at various stages of the employment process, especially during recruitment and selection, and including pay and promotion. The rise of racism and xenophobia against foreign workers, previously welcomed as quest workers, can partly be attributed to the demise of the welfare state, which has raised the social and ideological costs of integrating the domestic underclass and immigrants. As Hintjens (1992: 9) has perceptively noted, "the acceptance of the abuse of civil liberties of immigrants and citizens of foreign, non- European origin in recent decades, in the name of immigration control, has already weakened the moral ground for demanding the respect of human rights, and extending equal civil liberties for all citizens."

12. See the detailed statistical report by Gibson and Lennon (1999). Also see Passel and Fix (1999).

13. The Immigration and Naturalization Services reports that African immigration nearly doubled from 26,716 in 1994 to 52,889 in 1996 primarily due to the Diversity Program, which seeks to increase the diversity of the immigrant pool by expanding the intake from historically under-represented countries and regions, see INS Statistics (1999).

14. The backlash is not restricted to the white right-wing. Liberal opposition to immigration has also been rising. The liberals tend to focus on economic issues, the difficulties of integrating the immigrants, while the conservatives focus on cultural issues and see immigrants as a threat family values and other core American cultural characteristics. Some African Americans also resent immigrants for taking jobs and benefits away from them, see Fukuyama (1993).

15. This comes out from many of the testimonies of 28 representatives of African Catholic communities across the United States who attended a meeting convened by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops on November 16, 1995.

16. For recent studies on the African diaspora, both the diaspora of enslavement and the diaspora of colonization, as Ali Mazrui calls them, see Okpewho, Davies, and Mazrui, eds. (1999) and Hine and McLeod, eds. (1999).

17. See, for example, the following special issues of International Migration, 29 (2) 1991, on "South-North Migration," and 33, (3/4) 1995, on "Emigration Dynamics in Developing Countries." Many of the papers explicitly use the push-pull model.

18. Fawcett (1989) proposes 12 types of linkages in migrations systems and discusses their applicability to various systems of international migration. The linkages are classified into four categories and three types. The four categories are: state-state relations; mass culture connections; family and personal connections; and migration agency activities. The three types are: tangible linkages, regulatory linkages, and relational linkages.

19. For a concise discussion of the theoretical models and empirical evidence on the economic 64 impact of immigration on host countries in Europe and the United States, see Ichino (1993). She argues that the impact is positive, a point echoed in some of the neo-classical economic literature (Money, 1998).

20. The mean earnings are listed as follows: $13,904.27 for African American males, $12,257.41 for Caribbean males, and $11,231.88 for black African males. For the "white" African males their mean earnings were $19,850.73 compared to $20,779.59 for American whites.

21. Portes and Zhou (1992) attribute the low earnings of Nigerian and Iranian immigrants in the United States, among the most highly educated immigrants, "to their recency in the country, outside discrimination, and small numbers that, by 1980 at least, precluded the emergence of a protective ethnic community." The creation of ethnic enclaves is seen as necessary for the emergence of vibrant entrepreneurial communities and beneficial for the immigrants.

22. The comparisons between African Americans and immigrant Africans and Afro-Caribbeans can be insidious and are sometimes used to support rightwing attacks against African Americans and to claim that their problems have less to do with racism than cultural pathology. For example, Thomas Sowell (1978: 41) used the positive income gap between Caribbean immigrants and African Americans as evidence that "color alone, or racism alone, is clearly not a sufficient explanation of the disparities within the black population or between the black and white populations." Yanyi Djamba (1999: 211) continues this dangerous assault: "Compared to native blacks, black and white African immigrants are more educated, less likely to be on welfare ... more likely to be married, and more employable." The reality is far more complex. Employers sometimes show preference for foreign-born blacks because not only are they free from the baggage of "historical victims of discrimination, their numbers can be used to fill Affirmative Action quotas leaving many victims of historical discrimination in America unassisted by the Affirmative Action system" (Hawk, 1988: 30). Kristin Butcher (1994: 267) shows that the income differentials between the American population and immigrants are not confined to blacks: "native-born white men also earn less than the corresponding group of white immigrants." More importantly, when African and Caribbean immigrants are compared to what she calls "native black movers", that is African Americans who reside in a state other than their state of birth, who therefore have the allegedly positive characteristics of migrants, albeit as internal migrants, the picture is different: "Native movers earn 35% higher wages than native non-movers... Even black immigrants in the highest income earnings group earn substantially less than the native black movers." The fact remains that all these groups, "the native black movers, native black non-movers, and all black immigrant groups are worse off than both native whites and immigrant whites" (Butcher, 1994: 272).

23. These are IMF estimates. The IMF divides remittances into three categories, worker remittances, or the value of monetary transfers sent home from workers abroad for more than one year; compensation of employees, or the gross earnings of foreigners residing abroad for fewer than 12 months, including the value of in-kind benefits such as housing and payroll taxes; and migrant transfers, or the networth of migrants who move from one country to another, see Taylor (1999:67-68).

24. An estimated 1 million Sudanese emigrants are said to have entered the Gulf countries by the 65 end of the 1980s, many of them professionals and only a small fraction (5.8 percent) were believed to hold unskilled occupations. The Gulf War, and the Sudanese government's support of Iraq, led to the expulsion of many Sudanese migrants from Kuwait and other Gulf countries. Some of them found their way to Canada and the United States, see Abusharaf (1997).

25. Phillipe Garnier (1998) argues that the fastest growing component of skilled migration consists of temporary migrant service providers, that is, migrants who perform services abroad without the intention or right to settle or seek employment in the host country. They are made up of inter-company transfers; individual service providers and specialists on specific assignments; short term or business visitors; diplomatic and international personnel.

26. For histories of African universities and intellectuals, see Ajayi, et.al., 1996; Mazrui, 1978; Mamdani and Diouf, 1994; Ngara, 1995.

27. The study covers only Ph.D. recipients from 219 American universities and a couple dozen Canadian universities between 1986 and 1996. Also, only citizens of sub-Saharan African countries at the time of graduation were considered. The rate of return survey was restricted to 54 US schools graduating 30 or more Ph.Ds and 15 Canadian universities. Completed surveys were received from only 27 of the 54 US universities and 3 of the 15 Canadian universities. Altogether, the researchers were able to gather adequate data for 1,708 cases, out of an estimated population of 5,537 sub-Saharan African graduates from the selected American and Canadian universities. The authors concede: "Given this situation, a more complete picture of actual career trajectories over time would be of enormous value, as would follow-up interviews with or the distribution of questionnaires to a sample of African Ph.D. recipients in both the Return and Stay categories" (Pires, 1999:9).

28. In the United States these include such important political organizations as the NAACP, the Urban League, Operation PUSH, the Congressional Black Caucus, and TransAfrica, to mention the prominent ones at the national level; the influential African American churches and other religious organizations; and the Historically Black Colleges and Universities where the majority of African Americans and large numbers of African students receive their higher education and where many migrant African intellectuals teach. Too often, linkages between US and African educational institutions are confined to the historically white institutions. There is need to fully incorporate the HBCUs in these linkages. The award of the multi-million dollar USAID-funded linkage program between US and South African institutions of higher education is encouraging in this regard.