Logistics Support “Seams”

U.S. Air Force (Marc I. Lane) (Marc U.S. Air Force During Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector

By W.A. Brown and Brent Coryell

Here’s the complexity of this operation—you have kinetic effects in one Geographic Combatant Command (GCC), generated out of another GCC, partnered with a coalition, with resources from a third GCC, then NATO reinforced by interna- tional partners [that are] not a part of NATO. —USEUCOM Chief of Staff, April 12, 2011

Rear W.A. Brown, SC, USN, served as the Director of the Logistics Directorate (J4), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), during U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations. U.S. Airmen prepare B-1B Lancer in Lieutenant Colonel Brent Coryell, LG, USA, served as the Executive Officer of the Logistics Directorate (J4), support of Operation Odyssey Dawn USEUCOM, during U.S. and NATO Libya operations.

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he collective and collabora- and USAFRICOM operation centers carefully implications, leverage information-sharing tive efforts of U.S. European monitored events as international pressure technology with a broad array of organiza- Command (USEUCOM), U.S. mounted for action in support of the Libyan tions, and facilitate collaboration and full T Africa Command (USAF- insurgency. The decision to engage kinetically situational awareness of the activities of RICOM), and the North Atlantic Treaty took a relatively short time in political terms, logistics planners. One simple but key tool Organization (NATO) to support Operations particularly considering the complex political for efficient coordination among support Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector from equities involved as well as the daunting oper- organizations was the use of Defense Connect March to October 2011 represented a remark- ational considerations. Odyssey Dawn and Online (DCO), a virtual conferencing capa- able and challenging logistics undertaking for Unified Protector introduced USAFRICOM bility. Daily online collaboration sessions all of these organizations. Consequently, the for the first time as a geographic combatant synchronized lines of effort and information experience offers a number of insights that command that faced committing armed sharing not only between the two involved can enhance our ability to prepare for, plan, assets to a United Nations–sanctioned opera- combatant commands but also among the and manage future joint endeavors. Odyssey tion. Odyssey Dawn transitioned to Unified U.S. Transportation Command, USEUCOM, Dawn took off so fast that the operation Protector on March 31, 2011, and thus became and USAFRICOM Service components; started as a “come as you are event,” without a NATO- vice USAFRICOM-led operation. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA); and a major force deployments from the conti- Initial American forces included global multitude of other high-level agencies. The nental and rapidly evolving strike assets from U.S. bases and forces DCOs fostered constructive multidirectional staff structures and alignments. Most of the forward positioned in Europe, both ashore discussions that minimized redundancy of operational forces “belonged” to USEUCOM and afloat. The commander, U.S. Naval Forces effort, clarified roles and responsibilities, and but were employed in support of, and by, Europe and Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet, quickly resolved mission challenges. USAFRICOM. This is not unusual in terms amassed surface and subsurface capabilities One critical issue associated with crisis of how U.S. forces are assigned globally, but that operated primarily in the USEUCOM response or short “lead time” operations in this case, the forces also operated from AOR and within the boundaries set by the is the coordination of air routes including USEUCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR). Odyssey Dawn joint operating area, which diplomatic clearances, logistical deconflic- This ad hoc construct, compounded by the covered Libya and extended north into the tion with international partners, and other matters. One valuable enabler was use of Standard Theater Airlift Routes (STAR) in international waters, the Navy was not encumbered during initial resupply operations. Similar by restrictions on flying U.S. combat operations in concept to a local bus circuit, the STAR consists of several preplanned air routes established for Europe-based C-130 aircraft shift to a NATO-led operation, added to the Mediterranean Sea. The U.S. Navy immedi- to fly cargo to designated locations. A load complexity and created a number of logistics ately held an advantage over the Air Force is placed on a previously scheduled mission issues that required close coordination, flex- for initial strike options during the planning along the STAR and then removed at the ibility, and a pervasive cooperative spirit. phase. While in international waters, the required destination. A major advantage is This article is intended to share logistics Navy was not encumbered by restrictions on the time saved by not having to apply for dip- observations, insights, and lessons learned flying U.S. combat operations. U.S. Air Forces lomatic clearances because routes are preap- while supporting these operations. While Europe, through 3rd Air Force (Air Forces proved through each country of transit. Over many of the support concepts and creative Europe), supported 17th Air Force (Air Forces time, the frequency of intratheater, Unified “solutions” from Odyssey Dawn and Unified Africa) by flying missions with forward posi- Protector–related movements declined, Protector were tailored specifically for those tioned aircraft. Within short order, additional resulting in more capacity than require- efforts, this is likely how almost all future nations joined the operation and forward ments, and USEUCOM swiftly reverted to logistics operations will be conducted. The basing was required. Libya’s distance from requirement-based missions. major observations in this article revolve Central Europe dictated moving strike aircraft Setting the Theater. Access, basing, and around three major themes: the no-notice operations to locations further south and in bed down, and reception, staging, onward- nature of the initial efforts, complexity of the Mediterranean littorals. movement, and integration (RSO&I) are a few the logistics enterprise, and issues associated of the many key aspects of “setting the theater.” with USEUCOM-USAFRICOM-NATO coor- Setting the Theater and Transfer to Our nation’s ability to respond to global crises dination. Many of the logistics techniques NATO and sustain operations depends on access and procedures developed and used by Initial Phase. During the initial startup agreements, overseas basing, and global USEUCOM, USAFRICOM, and NATO can of the operations, USEUCOM and USAFRI- en route infrastructure. The United States offer insights for future logistics planning, COM were able to employ existing logistics must work closely with its European Allies doctrine, and execution. management capabilities at their command to support operations from European facili- headquarters. The close coordination between ties. The ports and bases where U.S. forces Background the commands and the well-integrated staff are assigned in European nations (except As events unfolded across Northern processes enabled leaders to monitor opera- Germany) are not sovereign U.S. territory, and Africa in 2010 and early 2011, USEUCOM tions and assess logistics requirements and thus all U.S. access, basing, and operations are

74 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BROWN and CORYELL subject to host nation approval. There are gen- heavily on tourism, but all the hotels were and other nations on periodic conference erally bilateral agreements that stipulate limi- filled with Unified Protector personnel. The calls, but it lacked staff officers with specific tations on operations and other restrictions to hotel owners saw the operation as a one-time functional expertise, such as fuel coordina- how host nation territory may be used. event, and tour operators represent repeat tion specialists, to properly forecast, compile, As preparation to enforce the no-fly business. With hoteliers hesitant about evict- coordinate, and up-channel requirements zone gathered momentum, USEUCOM ing the military but concerned about their to a central fuels coordinator. Most of the became a lead for bed down and base support. economy, joint logistics planners made a support coordination efforts simply consisted This was no small task as there were 18 bases move to find additional billeting—and fast. of the development of logistics agreements in eight European countries involved in Navy Seabees and Air Force civil engineers and arrangements, with the United States Unified Protector. The simultaneous enhance- built a 500-person tent city literally from the routinely serving as the lead agent for most ment of 11 air bases for the large and quick ground up. The availability of prepositioned commodities and capabilities. Establishment influx of units and materiel required tremen- tents and the construction support (man- of routine logistics status reports required a dous coordination across U.S. and allied forces power and equipment) to build a tent city significant amount of staff coordination. throughout Europe. Of note was the extraor- ended up being a critical factor in sustaining dinary work done at Moron, Aviano, Souda the campaign. Beans, Bullets, Oil—Keep It Coming Bay, and Sigonella to prepare for the arrival of Transfer to NATO. NATO operations Food. The rapid buildup of naval units forces to include increasing billeting, aircraft are normally supported by a multinational in the Mediterranean was unprecedented in parking, and ammunition storage space. One logistics organization known as a Joint recent history. Due to the Sixth Fleet being primary example for the United States was Logistics Support Group (JLSG). These are primarily a transient theater for the past Naval Air Station Sigonella, on the Italian generally tailored to support specific opera- 10 years with only a minimal afloat pres- island of Sicily. With its ample runway, parking tions from a pool of voluntary on-call units ence, the deployment of several ships to this space, and logistics support, Sigonella became from NATO member nations. In the case of theater created an immediate need to build prime real estate supporting Unified Protector. Unified Protector, a JLSG was not deployed up subsistence inventories to a level that With seven nations operating from Sigonella, primarily due to the expected short duration could support the resulting increase of up to it truly became a multinational base. of the mission. In the absence of the JLSG, the 700 percent of their normal demand. DLA Logistics and operational planners United States stood up a coalition support cell Troop Support coordinated the procure- often fail to fully assess the impact of mili- (CSC) in Naples, Italy; however, it was clear to ment and receipt of an additional 80,000 tary operations on the environment around most senior leaders that more representation food shipments to keep ship provisions on them. For example, one significant hurdle was required from coalition partners. The cell hand, including 13 emergency airlifts from that surfaced in Sicily was the summer had members from three combatant com- the United States to Italy to supplement tourist season. The Sicilian economy relies mands, the Joint Staff, Department of State, the extraordinary spike in demands. The NATO

NATO E3A AWACS at Trapani-Birgi, Italy

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Airmen load C-5M Super Galaxy at Dover Air Force Base bound for Italy in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn U.S. Air Force (Jason Minto) U.S. Air Force response by DLA Troop Support demon- To manage the liaison and expediting Fuel. From the onset of Unified Protec- strated its ability to assist quickly and effec- work, USEUCOM J4 established a Munitions tor, it became immediately clear that sustain- tively in challenging operations. Coordination Cell to ensure all nations had ing the coalition with fuel would be one of Ammunition. USEUCOM headquar- the weapons required to fulfill their NATO the top logistics priorities and challenges. ters directed the staff to support USAFRI- taskings. Such close oversight helped ensure To accomplish this, the USEUCOM/USAF- COM in Odyssey Dawn “to the maximum that no missions were cancelled due to lack of RICOM combined Joint Petroleum Office amount possible,” and the Joint Munitions on-hand munitions. During the course of the synchronized all fuel requirements through- Office (JMO) began by providing theater operation, PGMs valued at over $100 million out the Combined Joint Operating Area. A asset postures for combat air and naval were sold in over 50 FMS transactions to number of issues and challenges emerged forces, advice on munitions infrastructure to seven participating nations. Expediting the during the course of operations including support the many basing decisions needed, FMS purchases, the sourcing of specific vari- limited visibility of coalition requirements and additional staff assistance to USAFRI- ants from stocks in USEUCOM when pos- and resources, equipment maintenance COM and NATO nations. sible and expediting their transportation to problems, and specialized fuel requirements. Early in Unified Protector, it was appar- the applicable bases was essential to warfight- For example, the fuel required by the MQ-1 ent that precision-guided missile (PGM) ers executing the air tasking orders. Predator unmanned aerial vehicles was expenditure rates would exceed the capacity USEUCOM’s experience with Unified not readily available. USEUCOM had to of several participating nations. As support Protector made it clear that future European arrange spot purchases of the fuel through requirements were identified for our allied air-to-ground combat operations would DLA-Energy and reposition fuel handling partners, the USEUCOM J4 JMO built the be heavily reliant on PGMs. In almost any equipment packages from other locations at a necessary coordinating mechanisms with combat support scenario, it is apparent that significant cost to cover this shortfall. USEUCOM J5, the Joint Staff, the Defense on-hand stocks for most nations and for The bottom line to the above discussion Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), forward deployed U.S. units will quickly is that all of the support required by the U.S. and U.S. Service Headquarters to facilitate become depleted. USEUCOM immediately military and its NATO partners was provided expedited Foreign Military Sales (FMS) issued command guidance to establish on time and as needed to accomplish the deliveries. As it became evident that Unified minimum stockage levels of PGMs to mission. Many of the most challenging issues Protector would be a longer operation than support NATO operations, engaged with resulted from the unusual structure of the anticipated, it was clear that a more robust the Joint Staff on various means by which to combined force that executed the operations ammunition management and forecasting preposition PGMs in-theater in anticipation and the short planning and coordination capability would be needed. USEUCOM of possible contingency FMS requirements timeframes that will likely be the hallmark was directed to manage PGM forecasting similar to the expedited sales needed, and of future operations. Hard work, close coor- and resupply operations for all operation requested that DSCA include PGMs in its dination, and robust lines of communication partners, with commitments from individual newly restarted Special Defense Acquisition will enable logisticians to support future participating nations to provide forecasts of Fund to reduce the lead time for normal FMS operations effectively and efficiently despite their requirements. deliveries needed for NATO nation resupply.

76 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BROWN and CORYELL challenging environments and rapidly chang- own logistical support, but such an organiza- agreements to facilitate the rapid exchange of ing requirements. tion will clearly facilitate improved ability to goods and services among coalition partners. support the combined joint task force com- One of our major efforts in future years should Future Implications for Cross mander’s priorities—and offer better visibility be to ensure that we do as much coordination Logistics Operations of logistics challenges. and planning in advance as possible for opera- Communication. One of our biggest Planning. Short notice, “come as you are” tions involving multiple combatant commands, seams was communication between events, and the increasing number of simulta- nations, coalitions, alliances, and non–Depart- USEUCOM, USAFRICOM, and our coali- neous small to medium actions, have dramatic ment of Defense entities—which is to say tion partners. Despite NATO being our logistics planning implications. Typically, almost all future operations. longest-lived alliance, U.S. capabilities to under normal operating conditions, military share information are often limited, many logisticians receive well-defined materiel Conclusion times in ways that directly affect operations. requirements and are often given adequate lead From a logistics perspective, Operations The U.S. SIPRNET (Secret Internet Protocol time to fill those requirements. The United Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector were Router Network) system worked well with States and NATO did not know how long remarkably successful, and at no time were USEUCOM and the Joint Staff, but it was Unified Protector would last, and due to this the operations constrained by logistics short- challenging for our NATO partners to work uncertainty the longer range logistics planning falls. At its conclusion, Unified Protector had with. During Unified Protector, the combined required to sustain the operation was challeng- 15 nations contributing air and naval forces headquarters set up a classified email system ing. In building sustainment plans, especially operating from 18 locations throughout using laptop computers in the USEUCOM for PGM munitions, U.S. logistics planners Europe. At the same time, the complexity of and USAFRICOM Joint Operations Centers attempt to work with expenditure projections the operations and required coordination for to communicate with NATO counterparts. for up to 90 days out. It greatly assisted the sustainment presented significant challenges. Unfortunately, obtaining approval for trans- logistics planners when NATO authorized Given the certainty that we will operate in ferring classified/sensitive information to our operations for up to 90 days and approved organizations that will form in response to allies kept our Foreign Disclosure Officer extensions in 90-day increments. This took the requirements, it is essential that we plan for extremely busy. This is an area where the logis- logistics planning requirement from a risky 4 and practice so that organizing and working tics community in particular must develop to 5 days out to 3 months. as a cohesive team on short notice becomes information-sharing protocols and practice them both in exercises and in day-to-day operations to ensure that required information the U.S. Government should carefully consider anticipated sharing is second nature to all concerned. requirements across a variety of scenarios before reducing Coordination and Synchronization of stocks based on resourcing constraints Logistics. One of the most consistent lessons to emerge from every recent multinational Prepositioning and Access Agreements. second nature for all participants. The military operation is the crucial role of a In the case of Unified Protector, the use of professionalism and can-do attitude of all capability to synchronize and harmonize preexisting bases provided fast ramp-up the players produced the highly successful logistics efforts among all the participants. of facilities and personnel during RSO&I. outcomes we experienced, but we must do This includes other nations, coalitions, inter- Robust airports and seaports with sufficient better. The ability to sustain “come as you agency partners, nongovernmental organiza- operational capacity, adequate fuel storage are” military operations with nontraditional tions, and in essence almost anyone involved and distribution systems, and maintenance command relationships and continuously in support operations. In Odyssey Dawn capability will always be critical enablers for shifting members of the coalition is critical. and Unified Protector, coordinating support military operations. During the operation, a While the team of USEUCOM, USAFRI- across geographic combatant commands number of European facilities were revalidated COM, and NATO was collectively able to certainly posed challenges but also offered as having enduring strategic importance, plan, source, and deliver, we must continue opportunities to think about how we will including Sigonella, Souda Bay, and Moron. to reinforce the fact that “synchronization undertake such efforts in the future. Opera- These installations and others will likely be of logistics” is not just a catch phrase but an tions of this nature are much more likely in needed again, yet there will be continued operational imperative. JFQ the years ahead. Coordination with NATO for pressure in a reduced funding environment to integrated and synchronized support across not maintain them. Operations in support of national lines is another area where we must Libya also made use of prepositioned assets in increase our collective proficiency. In terms Europe, and the U.S. Government should care- of a NATO support organization, whether it fully consider anticipated requirements across is called a CSC or a JLSG, a “scalable” over- a variety of scenarios before reducing stocks arching logistics organization is critical at the based on resourcing constraints. Just as impor- outset of any NATO operation to help plan, tant as preexisting facilities and real estate are coordinate, and synchronize coalition logis- prearranged access agreements, fuel exchange tics efforts. Member nations are always going agreements, expedited FMS procedures, diplo- to provide a significant proportion of their matic clearances, and acquisition cross-service ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 77