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Wolfssl FAQ Q: How Do I Find the Correct CA Certificate to Load Into A

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Wolfssl FAQ Q: How Do I Find the Correct CA Certificate to Load Into A wolfSSL FAQ Top Questions / Problems Q: How do I find the correct CA certificate to load into a client for authenticating a SSL/TLS server? Category: Certificates How to find and load the correct CA (root) certificate into a client application or device can be tricky at first. First, users need to understand how wolfSSL verifies certificate chains. Section ​ 7.3 of the wolfSSL Manual explains wolfSSL’s certificate validation process: ​ ​ ​ wolfSSL requires that only the top or “root” certificate in a chain to be loaded as a trusted ​ ​ certificate in order to verify a certificate chain. This means that if you have a certificate chain (A ​ -> B -> C), where C is signed by B, and B is signed by A, wolfSSL only requires that certificate ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ A be loaded as a trusted certificate in order to verify the entire chain (A->B->C). ​ Let’s look at a simple example. If a server certificate chain looks like this: A | ---- > B | ---- > C The wolfSSL client should already have at least root cert “A” loaded as a trusted root. When ​ ​ the client receives the server cert chain, it uses the signature of A to verify B, and if B has not been previously loaded into wolfSSL as a trusted root, B gets stored in wolfSSL's internal cert chain (wolfSSL just stores what is necessary to verify a certificate: common name hash, public key and key type, etc.). If B is valid, then it is used to verify C. Following this model, as long as root cert "A" has been loaded as a trusted root into the wolfSSL server, the server certificate chain will still be able to be verified if the server sends (A->B->C), or (B->C). If the server just sends (C), and not the intermediate certificate, the chain will not be able to be verified unless the wolfSSL client has already loaded B as a trusted root. Q: How do I put my certificate into a buffer? Category: Certificates To generate a certificate buffer you will find a perl script <wolfssl-root>/gencertbuf.pl (short for generate certificate buffers) #1 You would want to acquire your own certificate and place it in a location that suites your ​ needs. (We keep our test ones in <wolfssl-root>/certs/ directory, feel free to also place your valid ones there also). #2 Modify the above mentioned perl script and add your new certificate(s) to the appropriate ​ @fileList (1024 for 1024 bit RSA certs, 256 for ECC 256-bit certs... etc) #3 Re-run that script to re-generate the header file <wolfssl-root>/wolfssl/certs_test.h ​ You have to run this file manually IE: perl gencertbuf.pl OR ./gencertbuf.pl ​ ​ ​ Q: How much Flash/RAM does wolfSSL use? Category: Memory Usage wolfSSL memory usage depends on how the library is configured when it is compiled and what features you plan on using. Many options exist to control the amount of memory the library uses. Resource usage is detailed in our wolfSSL Resource Use guide. ​ ​ The primary factors in peak resource usage are key size and the math library used. Fast math and a larger key size increases resource utilization. Q: Is it possible to use no dynamic memory with wolfSSL and/or wolfCrypt? Category: Memory Usage wolfSSL provides two options to control the usage of dynamic memory. You can configure wolfSSL with --enable-static-memory however this is limited to basic TLS connections ​ ​ and currently is not supported in wolfCrypt. You can also define the macro USER_MALLOC to ​ ​ have wolfSSL use your own malloc function. Q: How do I build wolfSSL on… (*NIX, Windows, Embedded device)? Category: Operating Systems Please see section 2 of the wolfSSL Manual located HERE which covers building wolfSSL ​ ​ Q: How do I pull wolfSSL into my IDE project? What files and headers do I need? Category: IDE / Compilers wolfSSL provides the necessary project files for many popular IDEs. You can find instructions for these IDEs in the /IDE/ directory of the wolfSSL source. src\*.c wolfcrypt\src\*.c wolfssl\*.h Include path wolfssl root. Further documentation on building wolfSSL on various platforms can be found in Section 2.4 ​ wolfSSL Manual. ​ Q: Do you have benchmarks for my specific platform? Category: Benchmarks wolfSSL provides a benchmark application that can be compiled for any platform wolfSSL supports. The benchmark application will run benchmarks on enabled algorithms. The application source is located in wolfcrypt/benchmark/benchmark.c. For *nix platforms, the benchmark can be ran using ./wolfcrypt/benchmark/benchmark. The benchmark is compiled by default. If benchmarking on an embedded platform, define BENCH_EMBEDDED . ​ ​ For more details regarding benchmarking wolfSSL, please reference the wolfSSL and wolfCrypt ​ Benchmarks webpage. ​ Q: Why are there no common cipher suites found between my client/server when connecting? Category: Connection Details Ensure that wolfSSL was configured and built with common cipher suites on both the client and server. You can add additional cipher suites with configure options. You can view configure options on *nix systems with ./configure --help ​ To view default cipher suite on *nix system use this command from <wolfssl-root> directory: ./examples/client/client -e To view default cipher suites on windows system use this command from the directory where client.exe is located: ./client.exe -e nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 www.google.com Q: Can I use a smaller maximum I/O record size than 16kB? Category: Connection Details TLS specifies a fixed maximum record length of 2^14 bytes (~16kB). wolfSSL provides two options to use a smaller maximum record size. The first option is to configure wolfSSL with --enable-maxfragment . This requires the client to make an additional call when connecting ​ to a server. The client needs to use either wolfSSL_CTX_UseMaxFragment or ​ ​ wolfSSL_UseMaxFragment. The client should use the CTX method if they plan on making ​ multiple connections to the same server. The other option is to define MAX_RECORD_SIZE. In order to use this, however, both the ​ ​ client and server needs to have the option set. If the client is connecting to servers outside of your control, this is not an option to use. Q: How do I extract a public key from a X.509 certificate? Category: Certificates wolfSSL provides this functionality in its public API. You can call wolfssl_x509_get_pubkey() to return a WOLFSSL_EVP_PKEY pointer. ​ WOLFSSL_EVP_PKEY is a struct with several data members related to the key. You can access the key directly from this pointer. The declaration of the struct can be found in <wolfssl/ssl.h> . ​ Q: Do you have examples of using SSL/TLS or cryptography? Category: Examples wolfSSL maintains several examples for using the library on the official wolfSSL GitHub repository. You can download the examples by cloning the repository at https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl-examples. ​ There are currently examples of using algorithms (3DES, AES, and Camellia), examples of using TLS client and server, wolfSSL CertManager, and signatures and verification. Q: Why won’t my application connect to a server, I have enabled required ciphers and protocol version…? Category: Extensions Some servers require specific TLS extensions and specific ECC curves to be enabled or they will ignore any connection attempt outright regardless of supported ciphers and protocol version. If you are building wolfSSL without the configure script (Makefile project, IDE project, etc), please make sure you have defined HAVE_TLS_EXTENSIONS and ​ ​ HAVE_SUPPORTED_CURVES Document Revision Log Version Date Notes Person 1.0 12/09/2015 Document Created Chris Conlon 1.1 08/07/2016 Content Update Michael Shihrer 1.2 07/02/2017 Added new questions Kaleb Himes 1.3 03/02/2017 Refactor for first distribution Kaleb and Chris .
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