SCR 7532

Soapbubbles by Asako Futemma seemg through 1srae1i state Efforts to mstrumenta1ize oeath &Heroism

Thesis bY: Ere11a Grassiam umversitY of Amsterdam 2001 Table of contents

Summery in English 1 Summery in Dutch 2

Introduction 4

Chapter 1: Theoretical orientations 11

Ruling elites and consensus building. 11 Public dissent. 17

Chapter 2: A fighting hero in a militarized society 21 Historical roots. 21 The status ofcontemporary fighting heroes: militarization ofIsraeli society. 32

Chapter 3: Yom Hazikaron: the sacred side ofdeath 40 Rituals and symbols: a discourse of commemoration. 43 The role of the military in Israeli commemoration and grief. 52

Chapter four: Other voices: daring to burst that bubble. 57

General conclusion 73

Literature 7 5 Summery (English) The active production of hegemony by the Israeli state achieves the existence of a public that will fight the state's battles. In this work I show how through ritual and myth making that glorify death and the fighter image, the Israeli public is drawn into a way of thinking that is uncritical of the state. With this hegemony, the state creates the possibility to naturalize unnatural military-related deaths of many young soldiers. By making these (combat) soldiers heroes and by glorifying their battlefield­ death, the message is sent out that dying for one's country is a good thing. It is the greatest donation any citizen can give to its nation. Through education and ritual this ideal is made natural in the minds of the Israeli citizens. Especially Yam Hazikaron, the national Memorial Day for the fallen soldiers in Israel, has a great influence on the public. Formal ceremonies bring out the message that the fallen that are commemorated there did not die in vain. Their death, so it is said at this occasion, is the reason the state of Israel still exists. These "boys" died for the nation, and therefore the nation should look at them in awe and see them as an example to follow. This discourse that I called the "heroic discourse" of the Israeli state thrives at these ceremonies, but also in more individual commemorating material for example of the bereaved families. This shows the strength of the hegemony; the public uses it without questioning. There is a part of the public, however, that chooses not to comply with this militaristic and nationalistic hegemony. This resistance movement that consists mostly of women, refuses to go along with the state's efforts to form the public's mental map in an indoctrinating way. Organizations like "New Profile" and "Women and Mothers for Peace" go out to "slaughter" some of the state's "sacred cows". These activists refuse to sacrifice their or their family members' lives for the sake of the state's policies that are many times seen as illegitimate. Furthermore the militaristic character of the Israeli state is questioned. Although this movement is small and seen as very "radical" by the Israeli public, it has an important function in bringing awareness and in making a start for real change. Summery (Dutch) Het actief produceren van een hegemonie door the Israelische staat brengt het bestaan van een publiek voort dat bereid is in de oorlogen van deze staat te vechten. In dit werk laat ik zien hoe door ritueel and mythe vorming, die de dood en de gevechtssoldaat verheerlijken, het Israelische publiek een bepaalde denkwijze wordt opgedrongen. Deze denkwijze bekritiseert de staat en haar acties niet. Door deze hegemonie, creeert de staat de mogelijkheid om onnatuurlijke militaire overlijdensgevallen van jonge soldaten te naturaliseren. Door van deze gevechtssoldaten helden te maken en door hun dood te verheerlijken, wordt de boodschap gegeven dat het goed is om voor je land te sterven. Het is de grootste donatie die een burger zijn staat kan geven. Door educatie en rituelen wordt dit ideaal beeld aan het publiek overgedragen en genaturaliseerd. Vooral Yom Hazikaron, de nationale herdenkingsdag van de gevallen soldaten in Israel, oefent een grote invloed uit op het publiek. Formele ceremonies brengen de boodschap over dat de gevallen soldaten niet voor niets zijn gestorven. Hun dood, zo wordt op deze dag gezegd, is de reden dat de staat van Israel nog steeds bestaat. Deze "jongens" stierven voor de natie en hierdoor moet de natie tegen hen op kijken en hun voorbeeld volgen. Dit vertoog dat ik het "hero'ische vertoog" heb genoemd, heeft een duidelijke opleving op deze dag, maar niet alleen aan de officiele staats kant. Ook in individuelere uitingen van de herdenking van de doden komen dezelfde thema's ter sprake. Dit laat de kracht van het vertoog zien; het publiek maakt er gebruik van zonder vragen te stellen. Er is echter een deel van het publiek dat de militaristische en nationalistische hegemonic van de staat niet klakkeloos accepteert. Deze protestbeweging, die grotendeels uit vrouwen bestaat, weigert mee te gaan met de pogingen van de staat om de publieke opinie te vormen. Organisaties als "New Profile" en "Women and Mothers for Peace" maken er werk van om de "heilige koeien" van de staat te "slachten". Deze activisten weigeren hun eigen leven ofhet leven van hun familie leden op te offeren voor het beleid van de staat, dat vaak als niet legitiem wordt gezien. Ook het militaristische karakter van de Israelische staat wordt bekritiseerd. Al is deze protestbeweging klein en wordt zij als erg radicaal beschouwd door het publiek, zij heeft een belangrijke functie om bewustzijn

2 te creeren en om een begin te maken voor echte verandering binnen de Israelische maatschappij.

3 Introduction

"Today, we can be proud ofour achievements. But we must remember the heavy price that has been paid by the lives ofso many thousands. With their lives they defended the country; the ground soaked up their blood. Without them, without their lives, without the sacrifice oftheir deaths, without your sacrifice, your losses, and your pain, dear family members, we would not have reached the point where we can dream that the country will be quiet and peace will prevail within its borders. " (Memorial Day speech 1994 by president Ezer W eizman.)

" ... and so I reached a decision, that you sir [Prime Minister Ehud Barak], decided that my sons life will be the additional price that our family has to pay. This price has to be paid according to standards that in my beliefs reduce the value ofhuman lives and according to a policy that goes against my democratic values. This policy states that our soldiers are expected to conduct actions that have a chance ofbeing defined as war crimes. I won't allow that my son will sacrifice his life for these goals". (Atalia Boimel, in Maariv 30-8-1998, the author's translation.)

These two quotations, one from the president and one from a soldier's mother, show ~wo completely different discourses on sacrifice of human lives in the face of the nation. The second quote is disputing themes that show up in the first one, like self-sacrifice for the good of the collective and the defense of the country. These themes are part of a highly militarized, nationalist and heroic discourse that is used by the Israeli State. First I will discuss this formal, hegemonic discourse with its climax the National Memorial Day

(fpm Hazikaron) and look at its; effect oµ sooi~ty. Seconqly, I will qjscuss resistant voices that chose to go against these highly consensual ideas. The second quote illustratps this focus.

4 Development of the research plans When I searched for the ways nationalism is manifested in Israel, I quickly came across "Yam Hazikaran le hallale tsahal" (National Memorial Day for the fallen soldiers). This day is loaded with emotions and rituals, with ceremonies, songs and most of all sorrow. It furthermore seems to have a big impact on the Jewish Israeli population. Once an Israeli girl, that lived in Holland told me that the holiday she missed most was Yam Hazikaran. An Israeli friend I spoke to after I already began my research, told me how she loved the music played on this day and how she had videotapes with stories of the helicopter disaster (1997, where 73 soldiers died at once) that she loved to watch. From these conversations I understood these girls were attracted to the atmosphere of communal grief, the nostalgic feeling of belonging to the Israeli community in the difficult situation it faces today. This was not totally strange for me. For me as an Israeli, Yam Hazikaran was a very emotional but quite natural event. I accepted the ceremonies and speeches as they were and felt sad with the rest of the nation when this was expected from me. So when I read about an Israeli mother that refused to participate in the sphere of this day and that wasn't prepared to sacrifice her son in the military service, I got intrigued. I began to see Yam Hazikaran from a different angle, the angle that sees another disguised function of this day in the nationalist quest of legitimizing certain unnatural "realities" in Israel.

Leading argument I decided to focus on Yam Hazikaron in this research, because here one can see a clear climax of the nationalist, heroic discourse I will discuss. Furthermore, because this day deals with death, it contains one of the heaviest taboos of the national discourse. It is very difficult to break through its myths and look at it from a different angle. It is important to note that I will not only discuss Yam Hazikaron and the language that is used during its ceremonies. This nationalist discourse of sacrifice for the nation is much wider and can also be heard at separate memorial services for soldiers, in schools or even during different holidays. I will address the way the myth of heroic sacrifice was built and how it is used in Israeli society. This will show the power of the discourse: you can find it almost everywhere.

5 While at first seeing Yorn Hazikaron solely as a means of holding together a very diverse society, I thus realized later on there is more at stake. In this work I will try to show that through the use of a militarized, nationalist discourse that glorifies death and the fighter image and has its peak in ceremonies on Yorn Hazikaron in Israel, the government is actively producing a hegemony in its quest for the continuation of generations that will be ready to fight and sacrifice for its objectives. To make things clearer I will use the term "heroic discourse" when speaking about this nationalist discourse. I will look at the heroism and self-sacrifice that is attributed to the fighting hero and at the glorification of his death. These ideas were, and still are, used in ways that make sure young people will be ready to serve the nation at any given time. When using the word hegemony, it would seem that there is no resistance whatsoever from the public's side and that it accepts anything that it is told. This is, however, not what I would want to argue. Especially in recent years a lot has changed in Israel and some people are not as patriotic as they used to be. The public doesn't silently accept anything the state tells it and the famous motto "it's good to die for our country"1 for example, is not taught uncritically anymore in schools. What I want to claim is that in spite of change and critical thought on the part of the Israeli citizens, a delicate state action is taking place that is forming the public's mental map. In stead of saying out loud that one has to die for his or her country, this ideal is made familiar and natural through a specific socialization that uses myth and ceremony. A young, secular boy won't declare today very easily that he is willing to die for his country when he joins the army, but he will look in awe at the soldier with an emblem of a prestigious combat unit on his arm. This fighter soldier role-model is directly linked to sacrifice for the nation. In spite of the state's efforts, there exists a movement of real resistance. In this study I will give voice to some of the people (especially women) that see through the state's production of this hegemony and choose to "burst the bubble" of the heroic myth of the dead soldier. This resistance, which is quite varied in its forms, is mostly directed against the repression of the public, the lies of education and the endangering of

1 The story goes that the army commander Tnunpcldor muttered these words just before he died. Later on I will elaborate on this famous tale.

6 young lives in the wars the government conducts. The activists I will speak of resist the existing consensus in the form of activity in grassroots organizations. I chose to show both sides of the story, the domination of the consensus and the resistance against it, because I think it is important to give voice to the small but courageous group that :fights for changes in a society that is extremely afraid of such ideas.

Methods ofresearch The methods ofresearch that I used to answer the questions I had relating to Yorn Hazikaron and grass-roots organizations were many. In line with this fact, I decided to divide the research into two parts. The :first was an analytical study of the nationalist discourse of Yorn Hazikaron, the second was a search for protests movements against this discourse. In the analytical part of my research, my methods consisted :first of all out of studying records in the "Archives of the Ministry of Defense". There I looked at hundreds of historical :files, mostly from the Office of the Chief of Staff of the IDF (Israeli Defense Forces), that were coded by terms like "fallen soldiers", "memorial", "commemoration" and more. While going over all the material I looked for the nationalist discourse I will discuss in this work, from the official side of the IDF, but also from the civilian side that wrote many letters to the IDF on the subject of fallen sons and their commemoration. Next I analyzed :films and documentaries. This material consisted mostly out of films I collected on earlier trips to Israel during Yorn Hazikaron itself and out of films I videotaped during other times in Israel and in the Netherlands. Most of the works I used, were the live-reports of ceremonies during Yorn Hazikaron and films about individual soldiers that died, usually made by their families. Furthermore I looked at reports of huge memorial events like the Memorial ofYizhak Rabin in Tel Aviv and "Songs on the Square", a musical show that is taking place every year on Rabin Square in Tel Aviv during Yorn Hazikaron. I also looked at newspapers and material on the Internet. Through these sources I had access to official press releases by the Ministry of Defense on Yorn Hazikaron and on

7 the influence the media coverage of certain events had on distributing the "heroic discourse". Finally I analyzed songs, letters and poems written by bereaved parents and published in the magazine "Siach Shakulim" or " Bereaved discourse" of Yad Labanim, an organization that supports Bereaved Families in Israel that lost their children in wars or while serving the IDF. Looking at this material gave me a clear view of the "heroic discourse" that is heard from the civilian side, the bereaved families in this case. The methods of the second part of my research where very different, I had to do with people. This time my goals were to locate different voices, to find out what kind of motivations people had to go into action. The first method I thus used was interviewing. I went to meet my informants in their homes or we would meet in a coffee house. I would tell each of them what my research was about and ask them quite generally how they came to be active and what their and their organization's ideas and goals where. Because I was dealing with women that were highly aware of the issues I touched upon, they all began telling me right away about their active lives and ideas. While leading them softly according a list of questions I always had with me, I gained all the information I needed. As I received a lot of written material from my informants, analyzing this material became an important part of my research. This material about their ideas, the organization and their activities, was written by themselves or by their colleagues. A lot of material that they published could also be found on several web sites. Another method I used was sending out questionnaires to people connected to the organizations. I send most of the questionnaires with open-ended questions by email. I used questionnaires, because it gave me the chance of getting several more voices on the subject then I would have if I only used personal interviews. In this part of my research I chose also to use the method of participant observer, in joining protests, a conference and vigils, either organized or supported by the women I interviewed.

8 Research population at large The Jewish Israelis, who form the biggest and most dominant group in Israel, constitute my research population. The Israeli population consists of Jews, a Palestinian/Arab 2 minority including a Druze community and there is a Bedouin community. These minorities are almost always excluded from national ceremonies, as they emphasize the Jewish character oflsrael. Yorn Hazikaron is an obvious example of this exclusion. Israeli Palestinians are excluded from the obligatory army service in Israel and are thus also from memorial rituals for fallen soldiers. Druze and Bedouin men have the opportunity to serve in the IDF and play a part in the ceremonies but merely as soldiers that fought bravely next "to us" (the Jewish majority). The general tone is that of the Jewish, national struggle for independence and freedom, without seeing or even mentioning the Israeli minorities as a real part of the Israeli state. This exclusion in it self gives a good insight to the nationalist discourse of the Memorial Day, as exclusion sometimes explains more then inclusion in collective action. In this case, though, I had to focus on the population that created, used and experienced the discourse of Yorn Hazikaron in order to find its role in forming people's view on the social reality of the Israeli state. The scope of this research was also not big enough to make a comparison between Jewish and Arab nationalist discourses that use heroism and martyrdom.

Arrangement of this work I will start with a theoretical orientation that will give my argument a frame of thought and bring understanding into the subjects I will be dealing with. I will single out the most important issues and discuss some theories on them. Then I will explain how my work fits into this frame. The second chapter will be searching for the roots of the "heroic discourse" and will furthermore look at ways it is found through the militarization of Israeli society today. I will look at ways the fighting hero's myth is glorified and used in persuading young men to become fighters themselves.

2 The use oflsraeli Palestinian or Israeli Arab or even other terms is mostly a question of how people chose to identify themselves or how they are defined. See Rouhana 1997 for interesting thoughts on this subject.

9 The third chapter will make the connection of this discourse to Yom Hazikaron and commemoration of the fallen in general. Here I will explain the holiday, look at its rituals and discuss the heroic discourse used. The fourth and last chapter will be dealing with resistance against the manipulation of people into a certain consensus. I will look at the roots of this kind of protest in Israeli society and will discuss the movement of resistance I studied.

10 Chapter 1 Theoretical orientations

For every researcher it is important to look at related material that has been published at an earlier point of time in order to make sense of his/her work. Here I will do just that, I will give my argument a frame of thought. By discussing other works that either support my ideas or deviate from them, I will hopefully give a clear insight. This theoretical orientation will be one of bringing understanding to the central subjects of my work and will follow the line of my argument from ruling elites, through rituals to consensus and from there to the phenomenon of dissent. This chapter will be divided in two parts. The first part will address the connections between ruling elites and mechanisms of consensus building, focussing especially on rituals. The second part will discuss theories on protest or public dissent within a sociopolitical context.

Ruling elites and consensus building Elites When one talks about influences that certain groups in society have on each other, one has to look first more closely at what these groups represent. In my work I'll do so by looking at the social group that wants support for the consensus of the "heroic discourse" with its fighter ideal that reaches its height on Memorial Day (Yom Hazikaron) and this group I will call the ruling elite. Elite is a word usually used for parts of society that either have most of the economic or the political power in their hands. I will look at the latter: the part of society that is politically in control, in a democracy usually called the government or more generally the State. In her work, The Rite ofRulers, on the rituals in the Soviet Union, Lane also looks at the state as the ruling elite: the Soviet rulers controlled the economic, political and social sides of society. She lets us understand how symbols and rituals were being used in the formation of people's frames of thought. Lane calls this elite that goes out to create a new culture through ceremony and symbolism, "ritual specialists". This elite

11 deliberately creates rituals and uses symbols to enhance solidarity and other national ideologies. The actions of these specialists she calls "Cultural Management" as opposed to "Cultural Revolution". Cultural management is much more silent and subtle. It focuses on creating a new type of society through ritual and cult (1981 :2). These ritual specialists as said before, control most if not all parts of society. They are elected by the people, but as Kertzer shows in the case of the Soviet Union this "ritual" does not effect who the rulers are and what they do (1988:49). In Israel the situation would seem different as this country at times is even called the only democracy in the Middle East. A lot of discussion has been taking place over the question whether Israel is a democracy or not and if it is, what kind of democracy. For now I will assume it is, as the point here is that Israel has a democratically elected Prime Minister that, with the Israeli Parlement, represents the Israeli people. This does not mean that this government is solely working towards achieving the public's goals. Again I look at Kertzer that calls free elections a "ritual oflegitimation". American elections, he claims, "foster the illusion that American government is the result of the free, informed choice of the entire citizenry and that all are equal in deciding questions of public policy" (Ibid). I think that in the case oflsrael this is also true. The government and especially the Prime Ministers, are almost all taken out of the social and ethnical elite, no matter what their political affiliations are. The ruling elite from the Yishuv (pre-state Jewish settlement in Palestine) years on, always consisted of the Ashkenazi, secular and leftist part of the Jewish immigrants to Palestine. Many enter politics after an extensive career in the IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) and thus arrive with a particular frame of thought. This group brought ideals and myths with it and was very active in building the myth of the "New Hebrew" that would have extensive influence on the fighter hero. These ideologies and myths they brought with them still are part of everyone's education and upbringing, they are the stories that formed the nation. Questioning them was and is still seen as a betrayal of the state and its people. They then stayed put, like power does, democratic elections or not. The ruling elite I will speak of is then the body of people and institutions that is in charge of law and decision making. It controls the nation's resources, education and more. This group is certainly not homogeneous, as different political parties and ideas

12 come together in the government and usually disagree with each other on all fronts. But as said before, power doesn't change it's ways easy and certain issues in society are sacred. One of the most sacred of all is the commemoration of the fallen of Israel's wars.

Rituals as mechanisms In Geertz' view rituals or cultural patterns can be seen as either "models for" or as "models of' reality (1973). In this case the rituals I will be looking at represent the first: they are "models for" a desired social reality. The Israeli society is highly complex and differentiated. It can be assumed that rulers would want to use rituals to install or strengthen values they view as vital for solidarity or for legitimizing a situation that could be viewed as questionable. It has to be said that this can either be done consciously or unconsciously under influence of deep-rooted ideologies that are "taken for granted". For Kerzter "ritual is important in all political systems" (1988:2). He claims that although ritual is used by power elites to hold on to the status quo, it is also used in efforts to break this power. One of the most important aspects of ritual in politics is symbolism. This is especially true because of the ability of symbolism to create political realities. The complicated world around us, especially its political side, becomes clearer and more orderly by using symbols. A famous example that Kerzter also uses is the national flag that in stead of a piece of cloth becomes "the nation". Furthermore there is the national anthem that in many countries can stimulate strong national emotions when hearing its sounds. "Creating a symbol or ... identifying oneself with a popular symbol can be a potent means of gaining and keeping power, for the hallmark of power is the construction ofreality" (1988:5). Many works on ritual like the famous work of Emile Durkheim, speak of the creation and maintenance of solidarity as a ritual's main goal. This is of course a very important point, as solidarity fosters legitimization for actions of the ruling elite that uses the ritual. Here, however, I will see ritual not only as a means of keeping people together or of giving society a sense of collectivity. I will regard it mostly as a mechanism that can form people's ideas or their mental map. By using the symbolic power of ritual, the state can make people see phenomena in a way they wouldn't have looked at it otherwise. The

13 state creates a situation that supports its own position and its actions in society, a hegemony. Before I go on, it is important to point out precisely how I intend to fill in the term "ritual". I want to suggest a very wide use for it. Lane uses it as "a stylized, repetitive social activity which, through the use of symbolism, expresses and defines social relations" (1981 :11). I would like to widen the definition by taking out the "stylized" part of it and replace "social activity" with "social and individual activity inside a certain national frame". It will then become a repetitive social and individual activity inside a certain national.frame which, through the use ofsymbolism, expresses and defines social relations. The phrase "stylized" would seem to exclude material written, sung or manually created that is part of a massive discourse, like that of commemoration of the death in Israel. The ruling elite or state does not produce this material necessarily itself: but it is rather made by citizens while looking "through a symbolic filter" of the state's ideology (Kerzer 1988:6). The elite, in its tum, makes use of this material to continue its consensus- building work. This is also the reason why I would like to include individual activity in the definition of ritual, as I see a lot of this activity as representing the language of the ruling elite. A very important feature of ritual is its use of drama and emotions. I will again use Kertzer who points out that "participation in ritual involves physiological stimuli, the arousal of emotions; ritual works through the senses to structure our sense of reality" (1988:10). Some rituals will sweep us of our feet, make us cry for no real reason and make us feel connected to the people around us. Music, candles, flags and words are all part of this emotional effect ofritual. Emotion, then, is a powerful tool in forming a person's opinion and his/her ideas. Ritual is thus of great importance in the politics of power. It gives citizens understanding of the world through the use of symbolism. Symbols in tum give life but also death its meaning. This will become especially true when looking at Memorial Day in Israel, a young state that uses historical myths and symbols to make its citizens into fighting heroes and to make sense of their unnatural death.

14 The ritual of commemorating the dead The actions of the state, individuals and social groups in commemorating the people they have lost in Israel's wars or in other military related events, can be seen as rituals. There have probably been rituals of commemoration for as long as man has been losing his fellow man. These rituals have a function of letting out grief, of giving the deceased a better place in the afterlife or for any other cultural objective. Commemoration can, however, also be very political. Politics comes into the picture once we speak about national related death and state organized commemoration. Connerton points out in his work How Societies Remember that what happens to us in the present, relies in great extend on what we know from our past. To understand what happens today, we use a context that we have obtained in the years that passed (1989). This idea is important because it shows us the importance of old myths and wars in the commemoration by the present society. The state uses its historical roots in making sense of its present situation. These roots are often "adjusted" to fit the objectives of today. These efforts influence, for example, the public on how it sees the theme of self­ sacrifice for the national cause. In the rites of commemoration of Israel, the public is made to feel continuity between ourselves and the dead who, it is claimed, "gave their lives so that the state of Israel could live" (Internet site of "Yom Hazikaron"). The state uses these emotions of cohesion in the face of the fallen, for purposes of its own. As I will make clear in this work, by stressing this connection between the dead soldiers and the living, the state makes sure it will be able to use its citizens for any political or military cause it thinks necessary in the future. Handelman and Shamgar-Handelman speak, in their work "The Presence of Absence" on the spatial relation between sacrificial death and the creation of collective memories, about the use of death by the public. They claim that by making use of death, different publics give it meaning and speak in its name (1997). In my work their ideas will be very useful, although I chose to specify the users of the theme of death. I will focus here on the role of the state in the usage of death for consensus-forming actions where unnatural self-sacrificial death is legitimized and propagated as an example to follow.

15 I do not want to underestimate the painfulness of loss and I want to clarify here that I don't criticize any expressions of grief or the need to commemorate the dead in any way. In my work I hope to make clear that in the Israeli case of very high numbers of unnatural, military related deaths, the state has a role in trying to legitimize this phenomenon. Through rituals of its own, through making use of the past, it persuades people in wanting to become fighters and thus risk their lives. The state furthermore influences people in the way they grief their deceased loved ones. It tries to neutralize any questions about the unnaturalness of this kind of death. In short, I am not criticizing any action of bereavement or commemoration. I'm only pointing out and criticizing the role of the state in these rituals and showing how great and how accepted this influence is, so that its ideology becomes the public consensus. In Connerton's words" .. .images of the past commonly legitimate a present social order" (1989:3).

Consensus After having spoken about the ruling elite and its use of ritual, it makes sense to look into public consensus, as in this case this is what the elite tries to retain. In his book Wars, Internal Conflicts, and Political Order, Barzilai gives a definition of consensus that I would like to use here. "Consensus", he writes, "is a condition in which the public does not reject a certain sociopolitical situation" (1996:14). Barzilai addresses in this book the wars Israel has been involved in and the reasons there were for public consensus and dissent. He gives as most important reasons for the existence of a consensus during war the following reasons: fear for Israel's survival and public's anxiety responses. Collective fear, he shows is a very strong means for solidarity among citizens and this is used by the government to legitimize its actions. In stead of seeing consensus as something positive, Barzilai sees danger in too much "thinking alike". I share his view and in this work I will show how, through the use of a particular discourse and through certain rituals, a consensus about the ruling elite's decisions in military actions is maintained. The focus will be on the high casualty toll that is legitimized by idealizing the heroic fighter and by commemorating his death as sacred on Yam Hazikaron. This consensus is dangerous in my view as it has the capability of

16 preparing generation after generation with a willingness to fight the government's battles that are often illegitimate. However, the consensus I will be discussing is not so much formed by direct danger in times of war as is the consensus Barzilai talks about. It is mostly formed by a continuing use by the state institutions of national symbols and heroic myths to remind people of their place on the national map. This is the reason the term "hegemony" fits in here, as it stands for a process not only an institution: "As the system of domination and inequality becomes so lodged in cultural belief it comes to appear natural an inviolate" (Ben-Ari and Lomsky-Feder 1999:11). The rituals that are used by the Israeli state aim especially to make the public forget anything that might de-legitimize the consensus. Lane supports this idea as she writes that within a conflictual social context, which means a complex, differentiated society, ritual has a consensus-building role. Values that are felt to be important by the ruling elite are being accentuated through the use of ritual.

Public dissent Resistance can be "everything from foot dragging to walking, from sit-ins to outings, from chaining oneself up in treetops to dancing the night away, from parody to passing, from bombs to hoaxes, from graffiti tags on New York trains to stealing pens from the employers, from not voting to releasing laboratory animals, from mugging yuppies to buying shares, from cheating to dropping out, form tattoos to body piercing, from pink hair to pink triangles, from loud music to loud T-shirts, from memories to dreams" (Pile 1997:14).

Resistance, dissent As is made clear by the quotation above, resistance can be found anywhere. It can be defined as defying a certain social or political situation in any kind of way. Dissent is a disagreement with a certain situation and should therefore be seen as a form of resistance or as the situation that precedes it. Pile shows a fairly new way of looking at resistance and dominance. In his work Geographies ofResistance, he and other authors see resistance as "a mode through which the symptoms of different power relations are diagnosed and ways are sought to get round them, or live through them, or to change them" (1997:3). This means that, as I have

17 argued earlier, resistance can be anything; also actions that use the very power relations that seem to repress them in order to benefit from them. What Pile stresses, is that you don't necessarily have to look at dominance if you're studying resistance, because resistance is a mode of its own, it creates its own space (1997). Hanagan, Page Moch and te Brake on the other hand don't agree with only looking at dominance and the actions of rulers or only at the actions and aspirations of resisting subjects. "To focus on just one or the other ... is to risk missing the essential drama of the political interaction" (1998:ix). While I agree with Pile that it is not always necessary to include the dominant mode while looking at certain kinds of resistance, for this work I tend more toward the second approach. My aspiration is to show just this "political interaction" between the state that attempt to produce hegemony and voices that resist. I think it is important at what case one looks and in my case, that is on a political/national level, the dynamics between the two different modes is important. De Certeau as used by Pile, claims that "the central strategy of authority is to force people to play its game, to make sure that the game is played by its rules, then people find innumerable ways round this ... they continually seek to find their own places: they rat run through the labyrinths of powers" (1997:15). This would mean that by resistance, people try to find their way within certain power structures also by just thinking in a certain way. More traditional ways of looking at resistance are the studies of peasant resistance like the work of Scott that speaks about everyday resistance in rural Malaysia (1985). Works like these focus on resistance that is almost unconscious and doesn't publicly challenge the dominating party. Resistance is to be found, according to these studies, in every day actions like "foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so on" (Scott 1985:16).

Resistance as used in this work Dissent with the sociopolitical order can be divided according to Barzilai into three categories: 1. Peripheral dissent with the ruling party 2. Fringes and secondary centers dissent with the ruling party 3. Peripheral, secondary centers and center dissent with the ruling party (1996:215). I would like to use the first category to explain the kind of

18 dissent I will be dealing with. By the periphery I mean organizations or parties that are ideologically far away from the party that is ruling. The organizations I will address conform to this definition. They are seen by the majority of the public as radicals and are sometimes even unknown because of their small size. In most studies of resistance, also in urban surroundings, the focus of the research in the "underdog", a group that because of its lack of political, economical and/or social power is being repressed and dominated. This social group that "revolts" does so because it wants, in one way or another, to overthrow or just "get back" at the elite that represses it. It is poor, powerless, repressed and it is presented as being seen by others or by itself as inferior. The members of the resistance group in my research certainly don't conform to this stereotype. They come from a social environment that has power and that is part of the Israeli social elite. The women that are the focus of the second part of this study, however, feel that although they have economical, social and political power, they are still being repressed. This repression is not physical but mental and emotional. It is a repression that uses national symbols and history distortions in educating people to think in certain ways and to avoid thinking for themselves on certain issues like political decisions, war and death. Furthermore their acts of resistance are pointed not only against their own personal repression, but also against the repression of their children and the rest of society. It is an ideological resistance that I will address in this study, that acts against certain policies and actions that are initiated by the government. Another important point is, to return to de Certeau, that this resistance is one that doesn't want to stay inside the "labyrinths of power" and that isn't looking for a way around it. It stands up and looks for manners to actively change the ways of the labyrinth and thus the ways of repression and dominance. This resistance is easier to file with student resistance, feminist protests and other social movements that confront the authorities straightforward. But besides being manifested in loud protest, the most important feature of the resistance I will discuss is the mental "click", the coming to awareness, as some of the women I spoke to described it. This means to see the oppression, the dominance, the

19 certain manipulation that goes on, in stead of submitting oneself. "Resistance, then, cannot simply address itself to changing external physical space, but must also engage the colonized spaces of people's inner worlds" (Pile 1997:17). In discussing the resistance of the activists I talked to I will come back to this important point. Now that we have looked at the phenomenon of resistance, it's important to look more closely at the form this "social group" can have. I see resistance not only as a social, collective movement, but as stated before, it can also be a personal development or individual action. So when an activist writes his/her thoughts down and maybe publicizes it, this is also resistance but not within a group. The social movement I will discuss, consists of different sub-groups and individuals that share most values and resist the same ideas, although are not necessarily identical in their action or focus. An important feature of this movement, is its grassroots nature. This means that the social groups that are addressed here, have been initiated by citizens that when they saw things they didn't like, decided to stand up and take action. Again, this "action" can vary from writing and standing in vigils, to certain ways of raising one's children.

20 Chapter 2 A fighting hero in a militarized society

... This was no adventurer merely looking for new outlets for his boundless energy. A long dormant sentiment for his people was awakened in his heart with the outbreak ofwar on the Jude an hills .... Endowed with imagination, he could secretly cherish in his heart a dream ofa people yearning for independence and freedom. Then he suddenly realised that he had something to contribute to his people 's regenation3 in the historic fatherland. His imagination was enkindled with the past. He felt proud that he would be following in the footsteps ofJoshua, the son ofNun, Samson, David and Bar Chochba ( 1949, a speech in memory of the death of col. Marcus by the Chief of Staff of the IDF).

In this chapter I will search for the roots of the "fighter hero" ideal. I will begin my search in late 19th century Europe and follow the making of the hero through different stages. I will explore this theme thoroughly, as I feel that the understanding of the place and ideology that gave birth to this myth is of crucial importance for understanding the "hero's discourse". In the second part of this chapter, I will look at contemporary use and effect of the hero's myth. I will relate this to the militarization oflsraeli society and the position of the Israeli Defense Forces in Israeli society.

Historical roots Zionism's ideal man Zionism is usually defined as the quest for a homeland and the creation of a sovereign state for the Jewish people. At first Palestine wasn't the only homeland that was suggested. For example, there was also talk about Uganda and Argentina. But after some time, Palestine got a more and more prominent place in the Zionist discourse, as it was seen and also actively propagandized as the historical homeland of the Jews. Zionism originated in Austria. Jewish intellectuals started to look seriously at the "Jewish Problem" that appeared there. At this time, Europe was in the midst of the

3 Probably a spelling mistake meaning regeneration.

21 formation of nation-states that came with the great influence of the Enlightenment in Europe. Nation-states as we know them today were becoming something "real" and their inhabitants became national citizens. Anderson shows that with this movement that was greatly helped by the lexicographical revolution, groups got the right to an autonomous place within the brotherhood of equals (1991). The Jews formed a problem in this case, as they were never really seen as part of any collective. In many places Jews were forced to either drop their "backward" traditions and become national citizens or to be excluded from the state. Jews were expected to become less out of the ordinary and to adjust themselves to the life around them. This resulted in many West European Jews becoming full citizens and leaving their traditional Jewish lives behind them. These Jews were called assimilationists. As a reaction to this, a movement came up that was very critical of this assimilation and that wanted to restore a Jewish national independence after the example of the ideals of the Enlightenment movement. These were the first voices of Zionism (Wistrich 1995). Khazzoum has a very interesting look on this period and shows in her work that while assimilating to Western European life, there was a certain development in the way these Jews looked at other, unassimilated Jews, especially those in Eastern Europe. These Eastern Jews were seen as unenlightened and backwards, unhealthy, living in filthy dark ghetto's. In short they were regarded as living in the past. Khazzoum calls this a case of orientalization and traces this current through Northern Africa to modern Israel were respectively North-African Jews and Arabs are orientalized (1998). In this work the orientalization of especially the Eastern-Europe Jews is important, because I see here the very beginning of the formation of a "New Jew". This was an ideal man that personalized Zionist ideals. Even though the Zionist rejected full assimilation, they used the negative image of the ghetto in creating this new ideal man that was the total opposite of the "ghetto-Jew". He was to be strong, tall and healthy. He was emancipated, independent, worked the land and later on he would become a heroic fighter. Herzl played an important role in this creation of the "New Jew". As the founding father of modern Zionism he was disgusted with ghetto-life. Although what he called the ghetto was the assimilated, materialistic, anti-social, bourgeois Jewish life in the West

22 and not so much the Eastern Europe ghetto. He believed, however, that these emancipated Western Jews still had ghetto-characteristics and therefore "remained a foreign body among the nations" (Wistrich 1995:13). The ghetto thus continued to bring forth negative images of certain groups of Jews. Herzl' s ideal was "to create a new type of Jew, free from any taint of egoistic materialism" (Wistrich 1995:15). Wistrich shows that under the influence ofNietzsche, Herzl' s Zionism meant "the forging of "a noble ideal of a new Jew, a man living by the myth of chivalry", who will be the anti-thesis of the old ghetto culture" (Ibid.). Nietzsche's philosophy was very important in modern Jewish nationalism, especially because of his "superman" ideology. This idea was transformed to the "New Jew" or "New Hebrew". Ohana quotes Reuben Brainin's comment in this respect: "The future generation shall not be small and weak, beaten and sickly as is this dwarfish generation, rather shall a strong and mighty generation arise, a generation of giants, a generation which shall inculcate new physical strengths and new mental capacities which we never imagined, a generation of the 'Superman"' (1995:39). A very important point here is of course the fact that there is only talk of the "New Jew" as a man. All the characteristics that go with this ideal person like strength and big posture are masculine. This also becomes clear when one looks at the adversative of this image: the ghetto or later the Diaspora Jew. The characteristics of this stereotype where feminine, he was soft and his posture was small. These were the same characteristics anti-Semites had given to Jews over the years and in Zionism there is a clear effort to do away with this stereotype. In Ella Shohat's words "the mythological Sabra [the New Hebrew], posited in genderized language as the masculine rescuer of the passive Diaspora Jew, simultaneously signified the destruction of Diaspora Jewish entity" (1990). Boyarin notes that "Zionism was considered by many to be as much a cure for the disease of Jewish gendering as a solution to economic and political problems of the Jewish people" (1997:277). This masculine ideal was not developed in a vacuum or solely as a response to the negative stereotype of the Jews. It used the European "Aryan" as example. The blond and muscular ideal was in its turn taken from the classic Greek male images.

23 The first "New Jews": pioneers and Sabras The first Zionist pioneers came to Palestine in the eighties of the 19th century. They came with the ideology of a new land with a new people. This people was to be independent and was going to create its own reality instead of leaving it in the hands of God or another nation. They were European born Jews with great believe in their quest for a Jewish homeland. Of course there were already people living in Palestine in spite of the Zionist slogan "A land without people for a people without land". Most inhabitants were Arabs including the Druze community and there was also a minority of Jews that lived in cities like Hebron and Jerusalem. This was mostly a religious and bourgeois society. The pioneers' story is important as their generation gave form to the nation; they where the central makers of Israel's history and its myths. I am speaking mainly of the pioneers of the second Alyia (immigration gulf), as they were the ones that came with the revolutionary, secular ideology that created the national independence of the Jewish settlers. This Alyia "was also the source of Zionist national leadership" (Gorny 1987: 13) and it brought forth big names like David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharett and Levi Eshkol. The pioneers settled themselves mostly in kibbutzim, which were agricultural settlements. The agricultural aspect of the pioneer's life was very important; they came to work the land with their own hands and this emphasized their closeness to nature. It brings us back to the image of the strong, healthy and tanned "New Jew" of Zionist thought that in Palestine was going to make "the desert bloom". Henry Near points out in his comparison between North American and Zionist pioneers, that this connection to the land was influenced by the European Enlightenment with its concept of the nobility of the unspoiled peasant. He stresses three points that accentuated the Zionist case: the influence of Russian social thought, the myth of working the rough land next to the reality of uncultivated land in Palestine and the fact that Jews in Europe were forbidden to own land (1987:7-8). As Near shows in his first point, the Zionist movement was strongly influenced by socialistic thoughts. In socialist ideology, peasantry is idealized and seen as superior. The socialist influences are especially seen in the kibbutz movements that set up communal, agricultural settlements after Russian example. Furthermore this movement was anti­ religious which also influenced the secular character of Zionist thought.

24 If the pioneer was the founder of the myth of the "New Jew", the Sabra was the incarnation of this myth. This was the native born child of the European born pioneers. Sabras, seen as the ultimate "New Hebrews", were idealized by the older generation as well as by newer immigrants. They where seen as the "hope for Jewish salvation and universal values" and begot the "status of a kind of moral aristocracy" (Shohat 1990:253). The name "Sabra" stems from the prickly cactus fruit that can be found all over Israel/Palestine. It is said that these Israeli born youths were like the fruit prickly from the outside and sweet from within. They were seen as the children of the future.

The Jewish/Arab conflict At this point it is important to look at the relationship the Zionist Jews had with the Arab population of Palestine, because it will give us the background for the development of the "fighting soldier hero". With more and more Jews immigrating to Palestine, tensions between the Arab population and the newcomers became more and more fierce. The fact that most manual labor was done by the Palestinian Arabs was problematic for the Zionist labor ideal of the second Aliya. Furthermore the Zionist aspiration to gain sovereignty over Palestine provoked resistance. Tensions ran extremely high after WWI, when Arab nationalism began to blossom. In 1920-21 riots broke out in Palestine and 1929 is the year of the Hebron massacre when the Arab population of this city attacked the Jewish part of the community. Gorny describes two phases of this nationalism; the first phase is a "natural confrontation" between a settler people and the indigenous inhabitants of the land. The second phase is ideological. Arab nationalism is then seen as a struggle against the "hidden effort of the Jews to restore on a very large scale the ancient kingdom oflsrael" (Azouri as cited by Gorny 1987 :22). These ideological differences became the core of the Jewish/Arab conflict. The Zionists gave attention to the fact that there were other people living on the land of Palestine, but in they were convinced that their ideals would have no negative effect and would only benefit the indigenous people. There was a group that supported the assimilation plan; this plan would let the Arab population live amongst them in the Jewish State. The second group supported the "Iron Wall" ideology that believed that

25 only if one would cut off the Arab population from the Jewish settlement, there could be a creation of the Jewish State. In general there was an orientalist view towards the Arab population by the European Zionists. Their goal was to create a Jewish state after the example of the Western states and the "oriental" way of life that existed in Palestine didn't fit in. The leftist side was opposed to a policy of colonization and refused to "use" Arab labor, it wanted to do the work itself. This meant, however, the exclusion of the Arab population from the building of the new state. This is not the place to get any further into this complicated issue, but the main point is that with the immigration of Jews to Palestine who settled the land, Palestinian Arabs were more and more excluded and their nationalism became stronger and resistance more frequent. In the Zionist movement opinions differed. There was a group supporting more dialogue with the Arabs but also a group that wanted a total isolation from the Arab population. This latter group got more and more support as clashes flared up.

The fighting hero In the light of mounting tension between the Arab population and the Jewish settlers, the latter decided to build a defense force. This is also greatly related to the Zionist ideal of the strong New Jew and the ideals of fighting for your existence as contrasted against the passive martyrdom of the European Jewry. Goldstein shows it was especially the socialist-Marxist part of the Zionist movement that brought this element of armed defense into Zionist thought (Goldstein 1999). The first "fighting heroes" were the men of the Bar-Giora movement. A few years later another group was created which was called "Hashomer" (the guardsman). The settlers of the second Alyia created both these movements. The "Hashomer" pioneers "saw as their main task the defense of Jewish settlement, and to this end made up ... teams of guards who contracted with the farmers in a particular village to defend it against theft and violence" (Near 1987:12). The Bar-Giora group had as its goal "to protect the national enterprise in Eretz Israel" (Goldstein 1999: 174). They both wanted to show that Jews could and would defend themselves. In 1920 the "Haganah", the Jewish Defense

26 Forces, was created. This would be the fore bearer of the Israeli Defense Forces, as we know them today. The deeds of these men in the defense of the Jewish settlements were seen as extremely heroic. When I discuss the legend of Tel Hai with its hero Joseph Trumpeldor, this will become clearer. At this point the "New Jew" that would be strong and healthy, that would work the land with his own hands and that would create his own national independence, became a fighter. Next to the agricultural tools, he also began to hold a gun in his hands. The most important group of people that was central in the creation of the fighting hero's myth, were the fighters of the Palmach, or Palmachniks. This elite-unit was created in 1941 and most of its members were Israeli born Sabras. The rest of the Jewish community in Palestine idealized these young people and a lot is written about them. A few themes always show up: the dancing forelock (blorit) in the wind, the suntanned face, the tall and strong posture and the straightforwardness that was a very specific trade of the young Sabras. Furthermore the love of the country, its nature and the land was very important in the idealization of the Sabra-Palmachnik. Almog shows in his study of written material by this generation that motivation was very high and that the sacrifice for the land was an important ideal. Palmachniks would write their girlfriends and families that even when they had to be far away from their loved ones, they were doing the only good thing that was possible: defending the homeland and fighting for independence (Almog 2000).

Hero's myths The pioneers and Sabras had a big influence on the way the Israeli state created a certain kind of citizen that would take pride in being Israeli and that would want to fight for the motherland and would even give his life for this purpose. This was strongly related to the fact that the ruling elite of the new state drew its members from these generations of the second Alyia and the Palmach units. This shows the importance of their ideals for the nationalist discourse that is heard today in state ceremonies. I will discuss three myths that were very crucial in the making of the fighting, tough and rough Israeli (or New Jew). These myths are very famous and were part of

27 every school's curriculum in Israel for a long time. Although this has changed over the years, today you can still hear the names of the hero's that play leading roles in these mythologies in different contexts. I will use the phrase "myth" here as a historical episode that is not necessarily untrue but is ascribed great heroic momentum and used in other contexts by "ritual specialists" with the purpose of making an exemplary ideal. The first myth I'll discuss is the Warsaw ghetto revolt of 1943. This may seem contradictory as I showed how ghetto live was despised by the Zionists, but it isn't. What happened in this revolt during the German siege of Poland, was that Jewish men and women, who were living within the ghetto, revolted against the overwhelming Nazi army. This aspect of self-defense and the "few against many'; theme that will also be found in the other myths, made these European Jews heroic instead of "going as sheep to the slaughter". For a long time this was the Palestinian/Israeli Jews' way oflooking at the Jewish holocaust victims and survivors. They were seen as weak, not self-defensive and as passive martyrs. The opposite happened in the Warsaw ghetto, here the Jews did take their fate in their own hands, even though their battle was already decided before it begun. They would rather die in battle then be taken by the Germans without resisting. That is a central point in this myth, the heroic choice of self-sacrifice. This anti-Diaspora/holocaust theme was taken from the first Zionist and was used extensively in the Yishuv years, but also after the state formation. Almog shows in his book The Sabra: Creation ofa New Jew how this is also reflected in the way people spoke about death. To die in European concentration or destruction camps was to perish which has a very passive ring to it. Dying in Palestine though, in battle against the Arab enemies was to fall in battle, which sounds much more heroic (2000:84). The happenings of the Warsaw revolt were connected to the struggle of the Jews in Palestine in a successful attempt to use one heroic episode as an inspiration for the next. A booklet on the memorial statue in Y ad Mordechai for the men that fell at the Egyptian border, connect this "fighting spirit of hope, characteristic of the homeland" to the "last stand of the Warsaw Ghetto". One contributor of the booklet writes: "Before his death [Mordechai, commander of the Warsaw Ghetto rebellion], he sent forth, beyond the Ghetto walls, the clarion call of faith in the salvation of his people through enrootment on

28 the soil of their homeland". This extention of the heroism in Warsaw to the heroism in Palestine/Israel, indicates the influence myth had on the Jewish pioneers. The next myth I'll discuss is the Tel Hai story of the Yishuv period (1920). It is very central in the "heroic discourse" of self-sacrifice and death for the motherland. In this story, a few pioneers in the north of Israel engaged in a defensive battle against an Arab attack on their settlement Tel Hai. Here the "few against many" theme shows up again, as the pioneers were few and the Arabs were many. The leader of the pioneers was Joseph Trumpeldor, a figure that through this battle gained an immortal status in Israeli culture. It is said that Trumpeldor, an heroic commander of the Russian army, in the last moments before his death said: "it's good to die for our country". This last sentence was picked up by "ritual specialists" and used extensively to promote the self-sacrifice theme. He, like the ghetto fighters in Poland, refused to flee during the battle and stayed till his final breath. He was seen as the ultimate "New Hebrew", strong, heroic and willing to fight. After this event many people understood the impact it could have and started writing about these heroic deeds. Zerubavel, who has written a great deal about this legendary story, shows that the use of the words "legend" and "legendary" were used by the pioneers to make of this man, Trumpeldor, a figure that was larger-then-life (Zerubavel, year of publication unknown). He was connected to the ancient Hebrew heroes like the ones of the Masada-myth that I will explore later on. This, as Zerubavel shows, "indicated the appeal of the ancient Hebrews as direct inspiration for the Zionist national revival in the first half of the twentieth century" (Ibid). This sense of continuity in time of Hebrew heroism gives a legitimization of the Zionist cause and gives present happenings meaning. Zerubavel shows in her work on myth making through collective memory how the legend of Tel Hai became more and more contested in the seventies by a generation that refused to swallow such a story. She also points at the changes that occured in Israel in the fifties, when oriental Jews immigrated. These people didn't identify with the "New Hebrew" ideal of the European Zionists and so its image weakened (Ibid). The peak that this legend experienced was in the pre-state period of the Yishuv, when the people that needed to be influenced came from the same background as the "ritual specialists".

29 Furthermore Zerubavel speaks about the questioning of the famous phrase "it's good to die for our country". As the national consensus on the way to handle the Jewish­ Arab conflict was shaken especially during the Lebanon War, many people began to see that to die for one's country wasn't necessarily a good thing to do. I see this crack in the national consensus as the beginning of the public resistance against certain national ideals, although I will show that through the use of heroic commemoration the state today upholds a strong consensus on this su~ject. The third story I will discuss is the Masada-myth. This tale tells the heroic last stand 2000 years ago of a group of Jews, Zealots, on the Masada hilltop near the Dead Sea. These Jews, so the storZionist youth movement and Yigal Y adin, a chief of staff in the IDF turned archeologist. Ben-Yehuda (1995) shows through comparison with the only historical record on this episode, the writings of Josephus Flavus how its Zionist version distorts the historical facts. The heroic Zealots turned out to be thieves and thugs that raided the near by settlement of Ein Gedi and murdered its inhabitants. These elements of the story are not mentioned by Guttman and Y adin who together managed to create a mythological tale that would be central in the education of the Jewish youth during and after the Yishuv period. Again heroism is very central in this story but what is most interesting here, is the way Masada and its surroundings together with the heroic story of the Zealots were used for "cultural management". Thousands of youths were to be formed into brave, strong soldiers that would be ready to do the same as the Zealots did two thousand years ago, as the Warsaw fighters did during WWII and as Trumpeldor did in 1920: fight until the end. Difficult hikes to Masada through the dessert were organized by individuals but also by youth organizations. These hikes together with the diflicult climb to the top of the rock,

30 stood for endurance, the deep connection to the land and again the new and strong Hebrew.

The individual versus the collective: a discussion ofBen-Gurion 's thoughts At this point it is desirable to look in greater detail at the notion of placing the collective above the individual. This ideal is yet another aspect the "New Jew" had to make his own. He or she was to put his/her self behind the screen of collectivity. This is clearly seen in the way the pioneers and the next generations were willing to sacrifice for the good of the collective. The "heroic discourse" then is very dependent on this aspect of Zionist thought. This thought is influenced by the socialist ideology that was taken over by the Zionist Labor movement, where the community is very important. The effect can be seen in the kibbutzim where private owning of any object was taboo for many years. In Ben-Gurion' s ideology this surfaces in his concept of citizenship. As Yanai shows, in this line of thought civil rights were connected to civil obligation. He describes Ben-Gurion's thoughts as saying "every effort should be made to avoid causing injury to individuals in the course of the nation's struggle for its future; however, the overriding consideration was to do justice to the Jewish people as a deprived nation-in sum, the supremacy of the collective interest" (Yanai 1996: 130). The ideal of self-sacrifice for the collective goals of the nation is obvious here. Furthermore Ben-Gurion used the "pioneering" ideal for describing the ideal citizen. This pioneer he says "does not bear any special rights, but voluntarily undertakes special obligations" (Yanai 1996:137). The citizen's duty is thus to strive to be a person that will sacrifice and that readily will follow any obligation put on him by the government.

31 The status of contemporary fighting heroes: militarization of Israeli society4 Every year around Hanuka, the Jewish holiday of light and heroism, Israeli schoolchildren are busy preparing packages with sweets, drawings and letters. These packages are brought to "dangerous places" were soldiers of the IDF receive them. This small gesture of the pupils hides a strong current in Israeli society: the connection that is constantly made between citizens on one hand, children in this case, and combat-soldiers on the other. It is "the first seed for the relation between our Israeli child and a soldier, and it's the start of his education to also become an Israeli soldier when he grows up" (From a letter by New Profile activists to the teachers of their children, the author's translation). One of my informants remembered her own youth and drew this cynical picture: "Every girl "adopted" a soldier in the Six Days war. I made a package; wow what a package did I make for one ofthe soldiers that were fighting. I wanted to give and give. Was this soldier hungry, didn't he have anything to eat? He did, but it was for identifYing with him. He was there for us, to protect us. For me as a little girl this was a way to say "thank you". Ofcourse, later this continues. A 17-year-old girl that has a soldier boyfriend. If he is a fighter, it's even more beautiful. She donates her weekends (when he comes home from the army) to the nation; this is the best! Yes he can be a terrible person, but that doesn't matter ... Everything is good (even ifyour life is hell) and later on you become the wife that takes care ofher husband who is a reservist. You iron his uniform and after that you become the mother who brings up her son to be a soldier" (my emphasis). The point so beautifully made here is that from the moment an Israeli child is born, the image of the fighting hero is forced into its mind. The child is taught that this soldier fights for him/her. If it is a boy, it should strive to be like him, and if it is a girl she should take care of him. This message is brought to the child through education and continues in everyday life, with its climax on Yam Hazikaron. Next I will look at the status of the "fighter" in Israeli society and at the ways the state persuades young men to

4 For this part of the chapter, I used many insights given to me by Michal and Vered ofNew Profile. I hereby want to thank them.

32 become such a hero. The militarization oflsraeli society as a whole has a crucial role in this process.

Militarized education Friday morning, I'm invited to the "Gunner's Home" which is "The artillery memorial and educational center ". While I'm getting the grand tour, I notice small children running around the numerous cannons and other field artillery on an "educational" playful excursion, where they have to answer questions written on cards hidden inside the artillery. Soldiers ofthe battalion, who explain and help them, also guide them around the site. Their teacher watches from the side and tells us: "I think this is such a good initiative (meaning the excursions organized on the site), now the children are familiar with the site so they will be better prepared for Yorn Hazikaron (a memorial service is held at that site, probably the children will attend it)". This event struck me as peculiar, why did those children have to be confronted with war material, with material that is designed to kill? There is one reason for this and that is that these children are made familiar with the IDF and with battle so they will identify with it. The children are also taught about the structure of the battalion, the heroic deeds of its soldiers and most important of all, they are confronted with the fallen soldiers of the battalion. They get a chance to talk to "a real soldier"; an older man that has a great chance of being idealized by these small children. Stories like this are numerous, as trips to military sites or military museums are very common for Israeli schools. These places are visited as if this is just another educational experience young children should have. Another important facet of education that gives militarized heroism central importance, is the celebration of national holidays. As shown above, on Hanuka presents are sent to soldiers. Furthermore, this holiday tells the children a story about the heroism of the Maccabees that struggled against the Greek enemy that wanted them to lose their Jewish religion. The myth goes that in a fierce battle these Maccabees with the leadership of Jehuda won their freedom of religion. This is in fact a deviation from the story that tells that two Jewish groups fought each other, as one group was assimilating with the Greek and the other wasn't. The turning of this story to a tale of victory over a foreign

33 enemy shows a strong tendency to idealize war and one's own heroic deeds. A song that is taught children in school goes: Let us rise the miracle torch, together we sing here, a song for Hanuka, we were Maccabees, our flag is high and willing, the Greek we fought, and victory is ours, let us rise ... Fighting and winning is emphasized here as a higher goal in life. Purirn is another celebration that illustrates this point. Although it is a very cheerful and happy feast, people celebrate the bloody victory over another people. The story goes that Harnan the Persian plans to kill the all Jews. Mordechai and Queen Esther (both Jews) think of a plan to avoid this.The "bad guy", a Persian this time, is hanged and so are his children. "Harnan' s ears" Is the pretty bloody Hebrew name for the cookies that are eaten during this holiday. One informant recalled: "I remember how happy I was that they hanged him, Harnan, and all his children. I ask myself now, how was I raised to be happy with the hanging of these poor children. Why were they to blame?". Another aspect in children's education is the teaching of the "book ofYoshua". This book speaks of the invasion of Jericho teaches that occupation or surpression is "a 5 goal that sanctifies its rneans" • In a letter to the Minister of Education, New Profile makes a strong case that teaching this book "makes children ready to accept military concepts of war and armed struggles"(author's translation). When Independence Day is celebrated in school, the heroism of"our soldiers" becomes very clear. It is really a military occasion that celebrates Israeli independence and thus its victory over "the enemy". The children are told heroic stories about the Independence War and flags with military symbols are hung in the kindergarten. Haggith Gur-Ziv of New Profile stresses that "in stead of celebrating the foundation oflsrael as a democratic state, that promises in her declaration of independence equal rights without a distinction of religion, race or sex, freedom of religion and ritual, etc ... they idolize power [and] admire the soldiers that the boys should identify with"( details publication unknown, author's translation). Besides the stories of the heroic figures of Joshua and the Maccabees also the story ofMasada and Tel Hai are taught to the children. Maybe Trurnpeldor's line "it's

5 In 1999 New Profile wrote a letter to Minister ofEducation Yossi Sarid to stop the teaching of this books in Israeli schools.

34 good to die for our country" is not propagated anymore but ideas that are very close to it are being naturalized through emphasizing heroic myths. These ideas about the common nature of war and battle, of war heroism and sacrifice, serve as examples these children should follow.

The ID F and its position in society "Hereby I swear and oblige to honestly keep faith to the State ofIsrael, to its constitution oflaws and to its competent authorities, to take upon myself, unconditionally and unreservedly the burden ofdiscipline ofthe Israeli Defense Forces, to obey any order and instruction given by the authorized commanders, and to devote all my strength and even to sacrifice my life for the defense ofthe motherland and the liberty ofIsrael" (The oath all IDF soldiers have to swear to. Order of the Day, 16-07-1948, by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, the author's translation).

Following my analysis of the ways small children are made familiar with the myth of the heroic fighter, I will now address this process in the IDF itself. How is this idea being used for the purposes of the state? Firstly I'll have to look at the central position in Israeli society that is assigned to the IDF. The majority oflsraeli citizens was or is still part of this institution. Civilians sometimes proudly say they are soldiers, meaning their reserve status and readiness to "serve the nation". Every 18-year-old youth is called up for service and many men continue serving in the reserves for a big part of their lives. This applies only to men, women are not called upon for reserve duty. As it is a central, collective experience in a country with a small population, the army is the place where people meet and where people make their friends for life. It is a source of nostalgic feelings of many Israelis, especially for men that meet each other every year in their reserve units. Gal describes these units as extended families, as these men spend so much of their lifetime together (1986:40). This collective feeling does not only develop naturally, it is also promoted by the state. Important here is the "equality" theme of the IDF. Using this term serves the state by using the IDF as a "melting pot" of people that produces similar feelings of collectivity and comradeship. The state and army deliberately contribute to these

35 collective feelings. From the first days of the IDF, the army was called a "people's army" that provided a place for all kinds of people to meet and form one nation. Its actions were directly linked to historical episodes, like the ones I discussed in the first part of this chapter. It can be said that collective feelings of belonging were necessary in the case of risky situations, when army units had to function smoothly and needed to trust each other. It is obvious then that this feeling would be much stronger in combat units then in others. Soldiers in combat depend on each other more and their bonding is much stronger. These units created special songs, codes and other traditions and ceremonies that made an individual belong to a bigger entity and made him ready to fight for this unit and his comrades within it. An example of this can be taken from the "Golani" unit, whose symbol can be found on many car stickers as a sign of respect for the unit or a demonstration that one has served in it. These collective feelings are also used for another purpose. They produce a legitimation for the military and its actions. If you're part of a family, you will not easily notice its faults or criticize it. You will most likely defend it in all possible ways. This is in my opinion an important point in the motivation of Israeli fighters. Gal describes the combat soldier as a person that has the idea that "the whole world is against us". Furthermore he has the Palmach characteristics of wit and courage. In Gal's eyes this is an "effective combatant who clearly knows what he is fighting for" (1986: 146). This draws on the idea that the Israeli fighter fights for his home, not for some distant ideal or against a distant enemy like the American soldiers in the Vietnam War. Making battle legitimate by giving clear reasons for fighting is very important in keeping up support for military actions. A very important theme that is used here is the one of "ein brera" or no alternative. This means that "we have to fight this war for our survival, we have no other options". A strong connection is often made with historical heroic stories, like the ones I discussed before. The battle of Tel Hai is used to give example of heroic men, sacrificing for the defense of the state, that knew what they were fighting for. Another use of historical heroic myths by the IDF is the use of the Masada as a place were IDF soldiers of the armored units took their oath. The connection was made between the heroic Zealots that fought the Romans bravely and the new soldiers that were

36 expected to do the same against the contemporary enemy. The suicide part of the story was usually muffled away at these occasions (Ben-Y ehuda 1995). Even though the IDF proudly calls its soldiers equal, this equality is sometimes hard to be found. First of all it makes a great difference (for a man) in what kind of unit he serves. If it's a combat or an elite unit, he will be regarded with much more respect then when he works as a cook for example. Being a fighter means you are giving the nation as much as possible. You are risking your life on a daily basis and for this you are awarded by society with prestige and opportunities. This point is very important. The connection between being a fighter and being the ideal citizen, shows that sacrificing your life , which is what fighters do, becomes something that young men voluntarily get themselves into. Through the disguise of the sturdy, manly fighter this ideal is propagated. The bumper sticker that reads "kravi ze hagi, achi" (combat is the best my brother), illustrates this. If we look closely at the question of equality between men and women within the IDF, we also get a good indication of the superior status that men, especially fighters, enjoy. Fighters are men, almost without exceptions. Women can't enter combat positions and because of this they don't receive the high status that goes with it. The fact that Israeli women serve in the IDF appears to be a demonstration of gender equality. However, because their service is never as highly appreciated as the men's service, especially in combat, there is almost no institution in Israel that produces a greater inequality between men and women. As the ID F is such a central institution in Israeli society and the political and economical elites are drawn from its combat ranks, women do not get a fair chance to develop in the same ways as man do. The fighter's myth and its classic examples Masada and Tel Hai, then are used to keep the motivation for fighting high and to create a sense of collectivity between soldiers. To feel that one is fighting for something bigger, that other heroic figures for centuries have been fighting for, gives a sense of continuity and belonging. This is especially true for combat units, whose soldiers are treated with much respect. Myths about being a fighter promote young men into joining these units and into sacrificing their lives. Although in some cases it is necessary to engage in battle and therefore one would need competent fighters, many recent and not so recent actions by the IDF, like the

37 Lebanon war, the South Lebanese occupation and the actions in the Occupied Territories today are no "ein breira" situations. This is the reason that I am criticizing the efforts of the state to persuade young people into sacrificing their lives in battle. They are at many times supposed to sacrifice for political goals they sometimes don't even know about.

Day to day life Even when you are not in school or in the army, the military will creep into your life. When you turn on the radio there is a big chance you will hear the broadcast of the very popular "Galei Zahal", the IDF radio channel. If you walk through the streets, you will see soldiers everywhere. If you turn on your television you will see soldiers star in commercials for food and banks. Army-green is everywhere in Israeli society. This makes the existence of an army appear to be so natural, something that is part of everyday life. Besides these confrontations in the media or in the streets with the army there are more personal confrontations with the IDF for civilians. Because almost everyone is drafted, children will become soldiers and husbands will turn into reservists once or twice a year. Vered Shomron of New Profile said on a television show that when her husband went into "miluim" (the reserve duty), she felt "drafted" too, as she had to take over her husbands tasks in the household (Mabat Nashi 19-01-01). This shows that everyone is included into this huge institution. Furthermore, serving in the army influences one's civilian life after one's release. If you served in a combat unit, you are the ideal citizen. If you didn't serve in the army, you are looked upon as an outsider. People that refuse to serve are seen as weak or even as traitors. Having such a great impact on people's lives makes the IDF very powerful and gives them a reason to support it continuously. Again this creates a feeling of belonging to the "nation of fighters" and gives the military an appearance of legitimacy.

Conclusion "A wind ofcourage and willingness blows through our young army, a wind that doesn 't know dread or fear, a wind that doesn't recoil from any enemy and any instrument of destruction that is in his hand" (Order of the Day, July 1948).

38 In this chapter, I have tried to trace the roots of the "heroic fighter" in Jewish and Israeli history. I have come to the conclusion that this fighter began as the "New Jew" that Zionism brought with it to Palestine at the end of the 19th century. The strong, healthy, tanned and land-working male was incarnated by the Sabra generation that also made use of the heroic myths of Warsaw, Masada and Tel Hai. These myths were used as living examples to be seen as models to follow. The Jewish/Arab conflict that flared up accelerated the development of Jewish defense units. These units promoted the fighting side of the "New Jew" and were another example of rejection of the ghetto or Diaspora Jew. Furthermore, as for the casualties of these battles, dying for the "moledet" (motherland) was regarded as the best way to die. In the second part of this chapter, I looked at the present time and the promotion of this fighting hero in education and in the army itself. By teaching children stories of fighter's heroism, by taking them on trips to military sights and by making them identify with fighting soldiers, militarized education makes a connection between young children and fighting role models. In the military, the ideal of being a fighter in a combat unit is very important. The promotion of the collective feeling of fighting for a common purpose, the awards given to combat fighters and their high status, shows how the state persuades young people to join these units and to sacrifice their lives. I do not intend to claim that Israel shouldn't have an army at all. It is important to realize, however, that persuading young men into becoming fighters and into sacrificing their lives is dangerous. Sacrifice for decisions made by the ruling elite in situations that are not life threatening for the public (only for the fighters) is then to be severely criticized. By using myths of heroic episodes in Jewish history and by connecting these myths to the situation in Israel today, the state has strong mechanisms in its hands to make men into fighters. Until now I have only talked about these fighting heroes alive. In the next chapter their death will be given a central place.

39 Chapter 3 Yorn Hazikaron: the sacred side of death

The Silver Platter Nathan Alterman6

The Earth grows still. The lurid sky slowly pales Over smoking borders. Heartsick, but still living, a people stand by To greet the uniqueness Ofthe miracle.

Readied, they wait beneath the moon, Wrapped in awesome joy, before the light. -- Then, soon, A girl and boy step forward, And slowly walk before the waiting nation;

In work garb and heavy-shod They climb In stillness. Wearing yet the dress ofbattle, the grime Ofaching day and fire-filled night

Unwashed, weary unto death, not knowing rest, But wearing youth like dewdrops in their hair. -- Silently the two approach And stand.

6 Alterman is one of the most famous poets oflsrael. This poem is read out loud at many Yorn Hazikaron ceremonies around the country. The two youths who symbolize all fallen soldiers are portrayed as the dish the state is served on for the nation.

40 Are they ofthe quick or ofthe dead?

Through wondering tears, the people stare. "Who are you, the silent two?" And they reply: "We are the silver platter Upon which the Jewish State was served to you. "

And speaking, fall in shadow at the nation's feet. Let the rest in Israel's chronicles be told

Yizkor7 May God remember the valiant men and women who braved mortal danger in the days ofstruggle prior to the establishment ofthe State ofIsrael and the soldiers who fell in the wars ofIsrael. May the people ofIsrael cherish them in their memory; let them mourn the splendor ofyouth, the altruism ofvalor, the dedication ofwill and the dignity ofself-sacrifice which came to an end on the battlefield

May the loyal and courageous heroes offreedom and victory be sealed forever within the hearts of all Israel, in this generation and forevermore.

Introduction The National Memorial Day for the Fallen Soldiers usually takes place around the end of April or the beginning of May. It is the day that the Israeli State and its citizens commemorate their dead that fell during the wars of Israel or during other military related

7 Yizkor is a memorial prayer that is part of every memorial ceremony in Israel.

41 events. After the War of Independence with all its casualties, it became clear the state and military had to arrange a memorial for the dead. At first this event was part of the Day of Independence, but from 1951 a special day was dedicated to it. Yam Hazikaran is a day that fits neatly in the national calendar of state ceremonies. It is preceded by "Yam Hashoa", which commemorates the victims of the holocaust. Furthermore it precedes the most important national holiday of Israel: the Day of Independence or "Yam Ha'atsmaut", which is opened during the same ceremony that closes Yam Hazikaran. This sharp transition is not incidental but of deliberate nature. It is done because "these ceremonies are a semiotic set: they make meaning together" (Handelman 1990:194). The idea behind scheduling these two days in such a manner is that the Day of Independence follows the Memorial Day, as independence and freedom followed the battles Israeli fighters had to engage and where they ultimately found their deaths. This does not only count for the famous War of Independence, but also for battles in the present time. Many people today see the battles that are fought and the casualties that come with them, as a "necessary evil" for a free and safe Israel. In this manner the dead of today still stand in a straight line with the celebrations of the state on the Day of Independence. The state gives out the message loud and clear that "with their death they bequeathed us life". A massive communal mourning takes place on Yam Hazikaran. It is a day of bereavement and sorrow and this is felt everywhere. Yam Hazikaron is a not a national holy-day, but bars, restaurant and clubs are closed in the evening when Memorial Day takes effect. Israeli citizens are expected to spend the day with respect for the dead and for the meaning their death receives. Recently the victims of terror have been included in the commemoration. The fact there were many protests against this decision, is the first clue that shows the high status heroic and military death receives in Israel. On Memorial Day, the public gets the feeling it belongs to a bigger entity, that it forms one unity amongst itself in mourning its dead. Death, as argued by Handelman and Shamgar-Handelman "transforms presence into absence". Memorialism then, makes "this absence present so that it serves the agency of the living" (1997:86-7). I will follow their ideas in this chapter in showing how the unnatural death, of young men in this case, serves the state. An almost "sacred" feeling is aroused on Yam Hazikaron through the use

42 of rituals and symbolism. I will continue my argument from the last chapter and follow the heroism that is contributed to fighters, in their death this time. On Memorial Day, people's moods and thoughts are molded through the memory of the dead. The fallen soldiers are portrayed as being sacred. Commemorating them makes the public part of a continuing movement of people that are ready to sacrifice for anything the nation needs them for.

Rituals and symbols: a discourse of commemoration I will firstly discuss the opening ceremony of Yam Hazikaron at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem and the memorial ceremony on the next day at the military cemetery on Mount Herzl. I chose these two ceremonies, because I think they represent the official discourse of Yom Hazikaron. Members of the government and prominent army figures, including the Prime Minister, make their speeches on these occasions. Furthermore, as these events are broadcasted on national TV, they have the ability to influence the majority of the public. Secondly, I will look at Yom Hazikaron from the public's side. Here I will for example address the discourse of the bereaved. I will show that even though there are differences between the official and "the people's" discourse, many of the state's ideas are echoed in the language of the latter. I see this as a result of the "symbolic filter" provided by the state, that forms the way people see the reality around them. In the last chapter I have shown how certain ways of educating people and the use of heroic myths create such a filter in all stages of life.

Opening ceremony at the Western Wall The choice to open Yom Hazikaron in front of the Western Wall in Jerusalem shows a strong use of symbolism. The Wall stands for the return of the Jewish people to the land of Israel, for the Jewish revival on this land and is thus of great importance for the Jews. On Yom Hazikaron, this place is related to the soldiers that sacrificed their lives for the existence of Jewish life on this "Holy Land". "It is a powerful synthesizer of sentiment and symbol, of the present making the past" (Handelman 1990:203).

43 When the first star appears in the sky, Yorn Hazikaron is opened. The ceremony is full of symbolism and ritual. Every person that participates in the ceremony has a distinct place and a specific function. First of all the President of the state stands in the middle of the patio, in front of the national flag and the memorial beacon that has an honor guard. Next to him stand the Chief of Staff of the IDF and another high-ranking officer. At the scene are also members of bereaved families. A loud siren is heard and when it stops the ceremony begins. Two women come to join the three men; one is a bereaved mother or widow, one a female soldier. Via the soldier and the bereaved mother the president receives a torch and lights the memorial beacon in front of the wall. He then addresses the bereaved families. An example of such words can be found in the introductory chapter of this study. Basic themes here are the sacrifice of the fallen family members of the bereaved for the nation and for its independence. The Chief of Staff also addresses the families after which there is a short reading. Then the Chief Rabbi of the IDF reads from the Book of Psalms and a bereaved father says the "Kaddish" or the mourner's prayer. Finally the cantor of the IDF sings "God, full of compassion" (El malei rahamim). This ceremony has a clear message to the bereaved families of Israel. Bereavement is portrayed as "part of our daily lives and of our national experience as a people, which has returned to its Land after almost 2000 years in exile" (Memorial Day speech by Weizrnan 1994). In other words, this loss is given a meaning by the state with the purpose of legitimizing it. This is the basic theme during the whole ceremony. Handelman notes in his description of this opening ceremony that four symbols are central: the President, the memorial flame, the flag and the Wailing Wall. The President is the head of the nation-state and represents the citizenry. The flag stands for the nation-state itself, the Wall stands for the peoplehood and its history and the flame symbolizes the sacrifice of the dead for the nation-state. In this interesting analysis, the flag, flame and Wall all stand for eternity. The flame that stands in front of the flag and the Wall "separates the eternal from the transiency of the living" (1990:208). With the use of national symbols like the flag, the flame, the Wailing Wall and of a specific spatial arrangement of the ceremony, people present and those who watch the TV-broadcast are influenced emotionally. In Handelman' sword it is " ... the stillness and

44 darkness, the vacant spaces, the constrained and restricted movement. These aspects reflect and reinforce one another, and are echoed in rhetoric to evoke a focused cast of mind, mood and sentiment" (1990:208). A collective feeling is aroused that brings forth solidarity and awe for the dead. The rituals create a sense of belonging among the participants at the scene and the people at home. An "imagined community" of commemoration is formed (Anderson 1991).

Mount Herz! On the next day memorial ceremonies are held at all military cemeteries in Israel. Mount Herzl is one of the places this takes place and in this respect doesn't differ from other ceremonies. I chose to describe this site and its ceremony on Yam Hazikaron, because prominent figures in Israeli politics come to address the public and because the "heroic discourse" thrives at this occasion. Furthermore the Mount itself is a sanctified site for state heroism. Mount Herzl is the most important cemetery in Israel, where "the heroes of the nation" are buried. The first one buried here was Theodor Herzl, he lays on the highest part of the hill. Around him lay other Zionist leaders and in recent years also Yiz,hak and Lea Rabin were buried on this mount. Furthermore, a military cemetery was constructed on the mount to bury the soldiers fallen during Israel's wars. This became necessary after the War oflndependence left many dead. Their sacrifice was to be celebrated in special memorials and cemeteries (Azaryahu 1997). In 1949 Herzl's remains that were buried in Vienna, were reentered in Israel. As Azaryahu shows, this event was besides being the first state funeral also constructive for "the sanctification of the burial site" (1997:50). After this ceremony a tomb was built on the grave, while masses of people made pilgrimages to the site. From 1949 there was an official Hanukah celebration on the site and from the year 1950 the opening of Independence Day was celebrated on the mount. This changed after 1967, when Israel gained access to the Wailing Wall. These events, however, show how important this site is for national-heroic celebrations in Israel. At the ceremony at mount Herzl on Memorial Day, activities of the participants are short and traditional. The ceremonies at military graveyards all over the country start

45 after a siren is heard that signals two minutes of silence. Everywhere the public stands still to pay its respect. After the 2 minutes of silence the chief rabbi of the IDF brings a prayer. He calls the soldiers heroes and sanctifies their names. Like at the Western Wall, the Kaddish prayer is spoken by a bereaved male family member. At the service of 2000, this was for example the brother of a fallen soldier from the Y om Kippur War whose body was brought back to Israel for burial only 24 years later. Again like on the night before the "hazan" or cantor sings "God is full of compassion ... ".

The language ofloss: the official discourse After having described the two main ceremonies that involve the state at Yom Hazikaron, I will address the ideas that they bring to the fore. An important feature of especially the opening ceremony, is that a clear message is directed to the bereaved families. The government officials seek to comfort these families while giving the death of their loved ones meaning.

A strong emphasis is put on the fact that at this occasion the whole nation is "one big family" together with the bereaved. Not only out of sympathy for fellow nationals, but also because, as is sometimes almost proudly said, "In this country there is no family that didn't experience grief and loss" (Memorial Day 1999, letter by PM Benyamin Netanyahu in "Siach Shekulim", the author's translation). It is felt that the "bond of blood" holds this people together. If the nation feels it suffers as a whole it is more likely to stay within the collective and as a result accept its goals and ideas. A theme that is often used in strengthening these collective emotions is the "mishpachat h 'sekol" or "family of bereavement". Emphasis is put on the sharing of grief and on the collectivity of the Israeli nation at moments of hardship. Mourning and loss create a deep connection between individuals and private grief begets a national undertone. I'll give some examples for clarification:

"The people ofIsrael will be forever united by the memory ofits sons and daughters, whose death has bequeathed us life ... On this Memorial Day when all Israel is united, we

46 will remember and we will preserve the sacrifice ofour dear ones ... " (Memorial Day speech by Weizman 1994).

"On Memorial Day the whole nation unites as one family with you, the bereaved families ... " (Memorial Day 1999 letter by Weizman in "Siach Shekulim", the author's 8 translation) .

By giving bereaved family members reasons for the early passing of their children, fathers or husbands, death is linked to the state in sacrifice. Letters and speeches from the early years of the state put the emphasis on sacrifice for the independence of the Jewish state. In later years, however, Israel's independence was a reality and although still threatened, it was not likely to be harmed. Death was still linked to the existence of the nation-state but other themes for which soldiers supposedly sacrificed themselves were added. These themes included freedom, security of nation and of the state, and most importantly the theme of peace. Furthermore fighting for the "moledet" or motherland and for "our historic right to live as a free nation on our land in security and peace" (Memorial Day 2000, letter by PM Ehud Barak in "Siach Shekulim") are important themes in these texts. In Shimon Peres' words: "The sons that fell, are the same ones that founded this state"(Memorial Day 1975, letter to the bereaved families by minister of defense Shimon Peres, the author's translation). Important to note is that by the use of these themes, fighters become the focus of the memorial discourse. Many other soldiers that served in the army as non-combatants and that died during an exercise or car accident are also commemorated on this day, although they are excluded from the discourse. This shows the superior status fighters and their heroic deaths receive from the state, as these themes are the focus of the discourse. Death in battle is the highest price anyone can pay for the nation. As Rabin noted in a letter to the bereaved families: " ... it is precisely the fighters, precisely those who have seen the inferno with their own eyes, and who have personally felt the horrors of war including the families, who have paid the most terrible price of all that are

8 All the material taken from "Siach Shekulim", published by Yad Labanim is translated by the author from Hebrew.

47 steadfast in believing in the dream of peace ... "(Memorial Day 1994, letter to the bereaved families by PM Yizhak Rabin). Rabin includes the families as they stay behind and pay the real price. He makes a connection between their loss and the hope for peace, which makes the families even more heroic as they continue to belief in the ways of this government. These fallen fighters have several "nicknames" that contribute to the feeling that their death is the whole nation's loss, as they were part of the extended "national family". They are for example called "our boys", "the sons" or "the heroes". An emphasis is put on their youth, on their short lives. This makes their death more tragic, but also more heroic. These fighters, as a famous Israeli song says, stay forever young (tsair la 'netsach ). Besides emphasizing the role of the fighter, this discourse of commemoration also highlights his Jewish background. Although the Druze and Bedouin casualties are included in the speeches, they stay "they" and never become part of the "us". They cannot become a real part of the "family of bereavement" because this family is Jewish and is based on the Zionist goals of the Jewish national state. Inclusion and exclusion then turns out to be important in the "heroic discourse" that is spoken by the state. "We", the Jews commemorate "our" dead that sacrificed their life in battle for heroic causes like independence, freedom and peace. Casualties of ethnic minorities and "unheroic" deaths are greatly excluded from the discourse.

Discourse ofthe bereaved Because I believe it is important to look at the "heroic discourse" from two ways, I analyzed texts and videos produced by bereaved families or friends. Of course they speak from a more emotional point of view then the state does, but I still found a strong nationalist undertone in this material. Poems and letters that were written after the War of Independence and after the Yorn Kippur War, but also more recent work, include such themes. The themes of loss and grief are, as expected, very visible. Pain is obvious in all the works. I decided however, to concentrate on the nationalist and military themes. Language that I have found in the speeches and letters of the government is heard here

48 from the side of the bereaved. A bereaved brother for example wrote: "He fought till his last drop of blood, the last heroic battle" (Doron Abrotski Almog "Siach Shekulim" 1999). The inclusion of the term "heroic" in describing his brother's death shows a sense of national pride. A father wrote: "For every young man that is buried there, only because of them we walk on our land for the next generations" ("Siach Shekulim" 1999). I argue that ideas like these show the influence of the state in thinking about death. They are implemented through education and militarization of society in a process that continues a lifetime. After the death of the loved one, the military will confront the family with such ideas to comfort it. In a time of such vulnerability, it becomes easy for the family to accept these answers to their question "Why?". Another theme that is remarkable in the work of the bereaved families is the specific manner the person that died is described. I have noticed that these descriptions are very similar to the "Sabra" descriptions that I have discussed before. The youth of these men is emphasized, their love for nature, their smiles and their good hearts. Sometimes these young people are even compared to nature as in the following poem line: "Fly, my butterfly, between the flower children that aren't here anymore" (Gadi Efrat "Siach Shekulim" 1999). Furthermore their connection and love for the land are pointed out, as in one documentary about a soldier that was very active in the Israeli scout movement. His family built a center for the scouts in his name. Furthermore, the young men's sense ofhumor is emphasized, as is their lust for life and their modesty. These positive, lively characteristics make death more tragic but also beautify it. Just as the word "fallen" de-horrifies the reality of death, the comparison with nature gives death a romantic twist. This helps the process of naturalization of death and makes it all the more heroic. The fallen soldiers become part of the heroic community of "Jewish fighters" with roots in the Palmach and other elite fighting units that were ready to give their lives for the nation. They are compared with fighters like this fallen Palmachnick that is described by his parents: "Boaz was a honest man, pure of soul, loving, devoted to his fellow man, modest in everything he did. He was very handsome, robust, of beautiful height, his hair was golden and his eyes blue ... " (Letter to IDF by bereaved parents 1949 (Ministry ofDefense archives), the author's translation).

49 By analyzing themes used by the bereaved families, it becomes clear that even in the private sphere, after death the heroic fighter continues to stands on a pedestal. One father recently said about his soldier son that died in a car accident that it shouldn't matter how a child died but somehow he was bothered. This death was regarded as "less important". No one wrote about it in the paper and the President, for example, didn't come to visit him as he did with families of soldiers that died in battle. It can be assumed that for families the fact that their deceased child wasn't a fighter is not important, the loss is just as great. Under the surface, however, a division is made between heroic and unheroic death. If the child that was lost was a fighter this is almost always mentioned after its death. If the child was "merely" a cook, this is usually left outside his life story.

The use of music on Yom Hazikaron In Israel's memorial culture music is of great importance. During the whole day, sad songs are played on the radio. On television there are programs about fallen soldiers that use the same songs that are known under the name of "Yam Hazikaron-songs". These songs form part of a repertoire that everyone knows. Whole generations where brought up with the Hebrew lyrics and the specific sound that stems from the period of the "Sabra generation". They bring about nostalgia and feelings of solidarity. These same songs and some newcomers are sung in present time on Memorial Day. Also at the massive memorial gathering in Tel Aviv on Rabin Square famous Israeli artists perform from the same repertoire of songs. The words include descriptions of fallen soldiers, that tell about their beauty and heroism. An important element of the televion broadcasts on Yam Hazikaron are the songs and music written by soldiers that died. The themes typically include love, friendship, sadness and loss. By emphasizing the emotions and thoughts these soldiers had before their death, they become more real and their death more tragic. The songs are often performed by soldier-bands. These musician soldiers play a big role in the ceremonies of Yom Hazikaron where they bring about famous songs of commemoration.

50 The role ofreligion in Israeli commemoration You would expect that in the case of death and mourning, religion plays a big role, especially in a state like Israel that has religion as one of the most important pillars of existence. Israel's central ideology of Zionism, however, is secular and focuses on national symbols and myths. Mosse shows in his influential work Fallen Soldiers, that in Germany after the Second World War, national symbols almost disappeared and Christian symbols took over. They symbolized victims instead of heroes. This was the result of the defeat the Germans experienced in this war; they couldn't emphasize heroism as they lost the war (1990). In Israel the dead are still seen as heroes and not as victims. National symbols are found anywhere when the fallen are discussed, as their faith is linked to the faith of the nation. Although national and religious symbols are intertwined in Israel, I noticed that religion as a whole does not play a big role in the "heroic discourse". Religion, as it is part of Israeli nationalism, is always present when one speaks about the dead, but it is not something one dies for. The sole reason for sacrifice is the nation and because it is a Jewish nation, religion will play a role but this is a background one. The nation is the star-player. Burying a soldier is done in the religious Jewish way (if the soldier is a Jew) and the "Kaddish" or mourning prayer, is said over his grave. But because Israel is a Jewish state without a constitution and only the Jewish laws to adhere to, this is the way all Jewish citizens are buried. The relation religion-state-death is made here with the state having the most important role. Again religion is present, but exclusively linked to nationalism and not on its own. In the discourse used by bereaved family members religion is used, but not excessively. I only came upon religious themes in letters of these families that asked God why he took these young men. I'll give a few examples:

" ... my god, why did you choose us from all the nations? to pay (till when and how much),

51 the price ... ofblood" (Ami Shachar, "Siach Shekulim" 1999).

" .. . Wh y mme.. ? Wh y now.? Wh y at a ff?. What do you want from us God in Heaven?" (Avraham burg, "Siach Shekulim" 1999).

These questions to God about death and the fact that people tum to religion are not exceptional, as we see this in many cases of loss and grief But in this case of unnatural military-related death it seems that by looking at God for answers, people don't look at the situation they live in that would lead their questions towards the state or the military. The role of the IDF is being naturalized and its role in the death of the son or daughter is not criticized.

The role of the military in commemoration and grief Until now I have not brought the military into the picture of Yorn Hazikaron, although it has an important role. During the ceremonies the military is highly visible. Because we speak about military related death, the IDF also bears responsibility for dealing with the bereaved families and for example arranging the military burials. I will discuss what exactly the role of the military is in the commemoration of the dead and how the bereaved families react to the military after the death of a loved one. I will argue that the military participates greatly in the legitimization of state and military actions that contributed to these deaths.

The attitude of the military to the bereaved families It is the nightmare of any family with a child in the army: three officers knock on the door to announce its death. This is the first contact between the family and the military after the death of their soldier-child. Many times comrades-in-arms of the fallen soldier will also come to console the family and tell stories about their friend that died. This turns out to be of great importance for the family. The support from the army friends and

52 commanders of the fallen soldier gives the family a sense of continuity, a feeling that through this contact, the son or daughter is still present in a way. Bereaved families in Israeli society are a group with a lot of prestige, as they have paid the highest price to the nation. This is for example seen in the services they receive from the army and the state. The IDF has a separate office for dealing with bereaved families and it is responsible for the financial and psychological support that the military offers the bereaved. This includes a monthly financial donation, reduced rates for the purchase of certain items and financial help with purchasing devices like wheelchairs for elderly parents. Army units all have different ways of dealing with the families of their fallen comrades, but I often came upon a strong bond between the two. The units often invite family members to ceremonies and special memorial days and make house calls too. This can go on for years and years after the soldier has died. A bereaved couple, for example, invited me for a trip to the memorial and educational center of the battalion where their son served when he died 28 years ago. The commander of the site personally came to pick us up and after showing us around, he also brought us home. Gestures like these tie the families to the units of their children. One mother, for example, wrote that from the moment her son fell she "belonged to the family of "my Golani"". She became tied to "the battalion, to the communion ceremonies, the commemoration and the memory" (Hannah Sharon, "Siach Shekulim" 1999). This woman tells in her letter how proud she is of belonging to this commando unit, that helped her after the death of her son. There is a paradox here. When a child dies in battle it seems contradictory that the family would want to remain in contact with the institution that was responsible for him at the time of death. Here, however, the military gives the families, through its services, visits and care, a feeling of belonging to that institution that was the last their loved one belonged to. Often it is also emphasized that the soldier loved the unit he served in; it was his "extended family". This is an extra reason for parents to become involved in the army units of their children. Furthermore many families are overwhelmed by this care and I can't help but think that this influences their way of thought. One bereaved family I spoke to that lost their son in the Y om Kippur War of 1973, didn't stop telling me how great the army was for them, how they were taken care of and in what ways the IDF had

53 supported them over the years. The father even noted that he didn't believe that in any other country the nation took such good care of the dead and their families. Maybe that is because there aren't that many states that have to naturalize unnatural deaths almost on a daily basis.

Families' military discourse I have already shown that families can be overwhelmed by care from the army. Here I want to look at the ways bereaved families use language that is connected to the army in their personal expressions of commemoration. I was quite surprised to find mentioning of the battle the soldier fell in and the exact unit that he served in when dying, in many writings. Giving these elements of their loved ones death attention indicates the importance that is given to the reason of death. The mentioning of the place and battle someone died in echoes the relation between sacrificial death and the land. Families in their letters, poems and films, often also mention the unit the soldier served in. There is often talk about his comrades-in-arms and of his love for the unit. It is as if the fallen soldier lives on through his army unit. One father writes: "I want to hear the stories of his friends and commanders again and again about the days when he was far away from me and about which he didn't have time yet to tell me .... Nir felt that he fulfilled an important task, that he loved the tank, the course, loved his friends, his commanders and his orders and trusted them ... " ("Siach Shekulim" 2000). The use of such themes is not only a socialized phenomenon but it is also bluntly encouraged. For example after the War of Independence the military started collecting biographical material on the young men that had died. It asked the bereaved parents to supply it with this material but made sure that this included "his attitude toward Israel ... memoirs and appreciation by his comrades, descriptions of his participation in combat ... " (Standard letter to bereaved parents from the Ministry of Defense). These were then seen as crucial details that had to be emphasized after the death of the fighter to show his nationalist intentions and heroic actions.

54 Military burials Israeli soldiers are buried, almost without exception, with a military funeral in a military graveyard. This can be a graveyard that is exclusively for soldiers or a part of a civilian graveyard that is reserved for military casualties. The most important one in Israel is the military graveyard on Mount Herzl. Handelman and Shamgar-Handelman note that as in sacrificial death the soldier gives his life for the land, "in death the land takes him in" (1997:90). This is the essence of the military cemetery. The military burial ceremony is one full of national symbolism. Firstly the casket is wrapped in the Israeli national flag. When the deceased is ofDruze or Bedouin descent this is sometimes, on the family's request, omitted, as the flag is a Jewish symbol. Soldiers in uniform carry the casket to the place of burial. Like in memorial ceremonies, a candle or fire is present. That these symbols are important for the families and give them consolation becomes clear in a letter a bereaved parent wrote to a newspaper after his son died. He complains that his son, after he gave his life for the nation, does not get the respect he deserves in the hospital where his body is kept: "there was no sign or symbol, no lightened candles, no national flag or the symbol of the highly praised regiment you fought in" (In "Davar" 1948, copy Ministry of Defense Archives, the author's translation). These symbols of respect are related to the idea of the high donation a fighter makes for his motherland. His heroism is shown through a post-mortal sign of respect. Military graveyards in Israel are very homogeneous like in many places in the world. The graves look exactly the same, a tomb-stone made of a local kind of stone and a small pillow-like piece of stone at the head side of the grave. Next to every grave there is place for a memorial candle. The epitaph is always one of the following, according to the circumstances of death and thus "the degree of sacrifice of the dead" (Handelman and Sharngar-handelrnan 1997:93). "Fell in battle", if the person died during an actual act of fighting, "fell while doing his duty" if the soldier died in another kind of active military duty or "died during military service", which "covers all other instances of death while in uniform" (Ibid). Note that in the first two instances the soldier is active and when he dies he falls. In the third case the death is totally unheroic and the soldier merely dies. After

55 death the military thus keeps on idealizing its heroes and with this categorization of death it maintains the hierarchy that it created in life. The choice of details of the soldier that are written on the stone also reveal the objectives of the state. Following an IDF order, the writings on the tombstone are the following: the symbol of the IDF, the personal number and rank, the full name and the names of the parents, the date of birth and death following the Jewish calendar, place of birth or year of immigration and most importantly the context of death and the place of death (Internal note by the Unit of Commemoration of the Soldier 1951 ). The fact that the details like rank, context and place of death are inscribed on the tomb-stone again show the importance that is given to the place of the soldier on the military hierarchical ladder.

Conclusion In this chapter I have discussed military heroism after death. On Yom Hazikaron, through ceremonies filled with ritual and symbolism, a certain public feeling is constructed. This feeling naturalizes the fact that so many young men died an unnatural death. Death is made sacred, especially when it is the result of a military battle. It is the highest price someone can pay for his/her nation, because it points to a self-sacrificial death. Heroic death of this kind is glorified and this glorification is reproduced through several mechanisms. Important is the way of dealing with the bereaved families by the military. I have shown that this can be financial help and personal attention, but the main thing is that through this support the bereaved families refrain from looking at the military as cause­ factor in the death of their loved one. In the discourse of the bereaved, I noticed the mentioning of the army unit the soldier was serving in, the place he died and very specific personal descriptions. These themes show a continuation of the "heroic discourse" and the importance of linking these military deaths to the nation. Like the symbolism used in the military burial and the text on the tomb-stone, this discourse supports the high status of the fighter especially after death. This high status fighter­ heroes get in tum, provides young people with role models. When they go into the army they will want to be like those heroes that gave their lives for them and for the nation.

56 Chapter 4 Other voices: daring to burst that bubble

"The Israeli public is too concerned with the price ofpeace, they don't realize the price ofwar, ofnot having peace. They've paid that price with their children" (A bereaved father quoted in Jewish Bulletin of Northern California).

"The State ofIsrael sends our children to die in Lebanon in an unjust war ... because death is irreversible and prayers, keeping your fingers crossed, belief in destiny and in God and sticking your head in the sand, don't protect you from it, I will do everything to protect the life ofmy son" (Atalia Boimel in a letter to the Chief of Staff of the IDF in 1999. Emphasis in original, the author's translation).

In the last few chapters I have tried to show how the Israeli public is delicately pushed into believing being a fighter and thus sacrificing ones life, is the highest contribution one can make for the state. If a fighter dies, his death is being glorified and he will serve as an example for next generations. But there is resistance against these ideas. The first voice I heard within this context was that of a mother who wrote in a national Israeli newspaper that she wouldn't participate in the ceremonies of Yorn Hazikaron as she felt ashamed for all these young men that died in vain. She was certainly not going to sacrifice her own son. In this chapter I will discuss such grassroots protests against the sacrifice of young people for "unjust wars" as some call them. Although this movement of thought is still peripheral and not so well known, it is a clear sign of another voice in Israeli society that doesn't accept the state's military hegemony.

Roots ofprotest The first public sounds of resistance against decisions and wars the government chose to make or conduct are found with the beginning of the Lebanon War in 1982. This war, ironically called the "War of Galilee Peace", was supposedly started to ensure the security of the northern part of Israel. Very soon it became clear that the goals of the government were different then what the public was told. After always being a defensive

57 army, the IDF became the aggressor. With this change ofroles, the important ideal of the IDF of only fighting for the defense of the land and its citizens was betrayed and many felt they were lied to. The war was seen as one of choice (milchemet breira) as opposed to the "ein breira" or no choice ideal of the IDF. This issue was a very important turning point, because it raised the question of just and unjust battles and the meaning of death that came with them. For the first time in the history of the IDF that was known for its high motivation factor, a group of (reserve) soldiers refused to serve because they didn't agree with the sort of war that was going on in Lebanon. A big movement that developed in those years was Peace Now. This movement called for withdrawal out of Lebanon and blamed PM Begin and Defense Minister Sharon for misleading the public and for the many casualties that came along with the war. A few years earlier Peace Now had published the famous "officers'letter" were Israeli reserve officers stated that they accused the Israeli government of not doing enough to gain peace. Still today this is one of the biggest peace movements in Israel. Twenty years ago it was quite daring, but today it is seen as quite mainstream. Feige shows in his analysis of this organization how it uses highly militarized symbolism in its activism, like the use of the status of officers to make its point ( 1998). This non-critical outlook towards the military hierarchy is criticized by more radical organizations. Another movement that came up was "Parents against silence". This was an organization of parents that was no longer ready to keep its mouth shut about the situation in Lebanon as their sons were fighting and dying in this war. Because the majority of participants were women, the organization was quickly called "Mothers against Silence". The fact that women came out as mothers was very controversial in the Israeli political sphere. This organization however did not survive for long, because with the withdrawal of the IDF out of Lebanon in 1985 the objectives had been achieved. Further political struggle was not seen as necessary (Gillath 1991). Organizations like "Peace Now" and "Mothers against Silence" together with protest movements like "Yesh Gvul" (There is a Limit) that supports soldiers that refuse to serve in certain areas, fall under the denominator of the "Israeli peace camp". These are the organizations on the left side of the political spectrum. They typically consist of members of Ashkenazi descent that are fairly high educated: in short the Israeli middle

58 class. The fact that there are hardly any members with an oriental background or new immigrants from the former Soviet Union or Ethiopia points to the overall dominating status of the Ashkenazi population in Israeli society. This peace camp Furthermore supports Zionist ideals and is in general supportive of the Israeli military. The first roots of action against the security and military policies stem then from the early eighties. After the Peace Process was started in 1992/93, people were filled with hope and activities died down as peace really seemed close by. The events that got another wave of resistance starting were those of 1995/96 when PM Rabin was murdered, Benyamin N etanyahu came to power and when he opened a tunnle in Jerusalem that led to Islamic sacred places. One of my informants called this the "beginning of the revolution". After Rabin had started the Peace Process and the air was filled with hope, suddenly everything turned around when for the first time in years Israel got a Likud leader as Prime Minister. People got the feeling that the peace process would be broken off for good and that the wars Benyamin Netanyahu wanted to fight were not theirs. Many that already walked around with certain ideas, decided that this was the moment to come into action. Voices were raised against the. ongoing occupation of South Lebanon and the presence of the IDF in occupied territories. The strong criticism of the government and its policies or choices, shows a different side of peace activities then of organizations as Peace Now. This more main stream organization seeks ways for peace by looking outwards at the situation between both parties and not within society at the situation there. An organization like New Profile that I will discuss, doesn't take the existence of the IDF as it is today for granted and questions many more governmental policies.

Kinds ofresistance The core of the resistance I want to focus on, is the refusal of citizens to fight and loose their lives in the battles the government chooses to conduct and that are seen as illegitimate. The state keeps on reassuring its citizens that its battles and the casualties that come with them are necessary in order to survive and that it is an honor to serve the nation. Many have begun to wonder if this is really true. Resistance can surface in many forms, some people just think in a certain way and others choose to take action.

59 Rela Mazali notices one important movement of such resistance; the "lack of motivation" or "profile 21" as it is called, which stands for the young people that due to a lack of willingness to join the army are dismissed on grounds of medical unfitness. This movements of young people shows, according to Mazali, a growing current of people that are not willing and are not proud to join the IDF. With these ideas, they show a resistance against the state's ideals. These young people don't believe in the "ein breira" option the state gives them and they don't believe that "their government endangers their lives solely out of necessity" ( 1997: 17). Another movement that stands very close to this one, but that is in general more self-conscious, is the small but growing group of conscientious objectors and partly objectors. These people either refuse to serve the army completely or refuse to serve in occupied areas or in battles that in their eyes are illegitimate. It would have been easier for them to go along the military path and get dismissed on physical grounds for example. But the important issue here is that these objectors see their position as a legitimate one and are ready to fight the difficult battle against the (military) system to gain equality for them and for others. Because the IDF doesn't recognize conscious objection of secular men, these young people usually go through several periods of imprisonment in military pnsons. These movements of young people that in their actions resist the state are very important in the struggle for change. I chose to focus here on the organizations that stand behind them or that share the same thoughts on the Israeli military and its position in society. These organizations actively reject the decision -making and manipulation by the Israeli State to sacrifice its children in illegitimate wars.

Who are they? All the people I approached were active in organizations or individually and their actions were directed against one or more state policies and ideologies. They were also all women. This was not intended from the beginning but the fact is that mostly women are active within this arena of critique and protest against consensual ideas, especially in Israel. I will get into this later on.

60 The women I spoke to were active under the name of two grassroots organizations: "New Profile" and "Women and Mothers for Peace". I also used material of other organizations that I thought represented the same sort of ideas. All these organizations, I chose on the basis of their activities against unnecessary wars and unnecessary sacrifice of soldiers. They form a frame of though for the protest I want to map out, either within an organization or on an individual basis. I realized that the organizations I approached like "New Profile" and "Women and Mothers for Peace" are quite "fluid". Members sometimes belong to several organizations at once or use the name of an organization to give their ideas backing, something that is easier if one connects oneself to a name that is well known. This was especially true for the "Women and Mothers for Peace", that was initiated by Y ona Rochlin. She told me that this organization actually did not exist. It is today more or less an organization on paper and not so much a group of people coming together. It does support activities and protests, however, and has an extensive and updated website. "Women and Mothers for Peace" was once the legendary "Four Mothers" organization. This group of activists gained fame with their actions as mothers of combat soldiers in Lebanon, for the withdrawal of the IDF out of South Lebanon. After a few years of activities the IDF actually withdrew and many say the "Four Mothers" are to thank for that. The goals of "Women and Mothers for Peace" are well described with one of their famous slogans: "We don't have children for superfluous wars". These activists refuse to sacrifice their children for governmental goals they don't support. Today the focus lies on the aggressive and unjust activities of the IDF in the Occupied Territories. But again, the organization exists as a sort of umbrella organization for individual activists. "New Profile" is a more "real" organization that has collective roots with the "Women and Mothers for Peace". By real I mean that it has many members that come together for meetings, that organize protests and even conferences. The organization is as it were more formally "organized". New Profile" is a "movement for civil-ization of the Israeli society". It is a feminist organization that rejects the strong militarization oflsraeli society and one of its main goals today is the support of conscientious objectors of the IDF. Through study groups it explores social and personal processes that contributed to

61 the existence of a highly militarized state. The organization does not work within a hierarchy of members and gives everyone opportunity to speak and act. Both organizations joined the "Coalition of Women for a Just Peace" that supports actions in protest against the occupation, against the demolition of Palestinian houses and other actions that strive for a more humane policy of the Israeli State. I found the women I interviewed through web sites on the Internet and through the "snowball" method. All the women, even when not active in the same organization, knew each other because the amount of these activists is very small. They would meet up every time there was a protest or hear about each other through publications. Also they would help other activists in gathering material and inform them of important news.

Bursting a mythical bubble The public, as said before, sees this resistance, as very radical in its approach. It has daring slogans and "slaughters" many "holy cows". These "holy cows" are the myths I discussed before, like the idea that to be a fighter makes you a man, that the wars Israel is fighting are really "no choice" and that death in battle is a necessity to continue living as a free people. Breaking such myths down is not easy because they sit so deep in the collective mind that it seems they were never invented but are a natural part of society. The resistance movement I speak about is part of the "Israeli peace camp" even though their approach is more radical. The members, however, are Ashkenazi middle class Israeli's. They are in fact part of the elite they fight against. In this part of the study, I want to emphasize the specific ideas the activists have about the military and the sacrifice oflsraeli soldiers. That means that I won't be looking too much at their efforts for peace in the region, but more at their focus on Israeli society itself and the wrongs within it. This is not to say they are not involved in actions for regional peace. In fact they are all part of the movement that fights for withdrawal out of the occupied territories and for the ending of inhuman actions against Palestinian citizens within and outside the Green Line. Because of my specific subject, however, I will not address this further. One of the most important collective ideas of the activists is that they are not ready to sacrifice their and their children's lives for unjust wars and decisions the government makes. The idea behind it is that if the state conducts wars that are

62 aggressive, that repress another people or that are not necessary for self-defense, these wars are seen as illegitimate and unjust. The activities then are pointing towards a great change in governmental policy and most of all towards informing other citizens about the movement's ideas, to make them aware. The activists are refusing to "play the game along" and let their children or themselves get involved in such a war or such illegitimate actions. Furthermore, the "saneness" of themselves or their children is at stake. As one activist told me when she remembered a story of a soldier that fought during the Y om Kippur War: "he doesn't sleep because when he does, the 3 Egyptians that he killed come to him. I say if they come to him, who will come to my son in his dream: 10 year old children". She is pointing here to the military actions in the Occupied Territories and at roadblocks. The "enemy" the IDF has to deal with is no longer an other army, but consists of children. Military actions today can consist of stopping severely sick people at roadblocks so they can't get to the hospital and other traumatizing happenings. Some activists, especially from New Profile, take the idea of the legitimacy of military actions further and refuse to serve themselves or have their children serve in the army, no matter what battles are fought. It is the militarization of the society they object to. They refuse to cooperate with it and to get involved in the system that expects them to raise a child to be a soldier and care for a husband as a reserve soldier. The care that is expected from the home front involves them and with this cooperation they don't agree. Another point that is related to the question of just and unjust wars is the actual reason for fighting and dying. The question then goes deeper then whether the conducted war is of "no choice" or not, but it actually asks what specific piece ofland or people we have to die for? Like Yona Rochlin said in 1997, "I don't want my son to die on my grandfather's grave in Hebron" in her struggle for the withdrawal of the IDF out of the city of Hebron, which was present there for the defense of Jewish settlers. This slogan shows that she values the life of her son over the "sacred" value the settlers put on the old Jewish part of the city. Uri Avnery asks the public in an article: "Do you want your son to die for Ras-al-Amud, Silwan, Sheikh-Jarakh and other Arab quarters of Jerusalem?" (Article on "Gush Shalom" Website). He asks people to realize that the claim of "one Jerusalem" is an illusion as it is not a united city but has been divided for a long time. So

63 why would Israeli's want to fight and die for a part of the city that they would never even think to visit or live in? Apart from places to die for, there are also people that soldiers are expected to directly protect with their lives. These are the religious settlers that decide out of religious ideology to build their home on occupied land. As their presence on this land his highly disputable and the government fears for their lives, IDF soldiers are sent to protect them. It has happened more then once that in such situations secular soldiers died for the fanaticism of the settlers. This is a situation that is untenable, activists say.

Women's and mothers' identity Mothers you know, a long time ago Have been wisely decreed By diverse human creeds and needs­ Goddesses ofpeace-in-the-home, Lavishly giving life, love and healing through their wombs and life-blood [. ..}So what about making mothers the guardians ofpeace on earth? (Ada Aharoni, International Peace Research Association)

I mentioned before that the activists I was in contact with, were all women. This was not because the organizations I approached excluded men, but because of the simple reason that most activists, with such ideas as I was looking for, were women. It is commonly held that because women are naturally mothers and caretakers, they fit more easily in the picture of peace. It is believed they instinctively are more prone to care for another human being as they care for their families. Men on the other hand are identified with battle as they are physically stronger and because the myths tell us so. This would mean that naturally women are more peace loving then men. As these roles of care-taker and war-maker are socially determined and not biologically, this explanation seems far too easy. There is of course a difference between men and women, but a lot of differences we see today are the products of "invention". Recently, research has shown that the sex of people is not a factor in determining attitudes towards peace or war (Research by Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at TAU). This would mean that the fact that women

64 are more visible in organizations that resist the state's policy, is not related to the fact they are biologically women. I would say it is related to the inclusion and exclusion of women in certain arenas of society and to the roles this society ascribes them. One reason that is given for the fact so many women are active in protest movements, is that women are greatly excluded from formal politics and this is the only way they can bring out their voice. Another reason is that they are "freer emotionally and practically to criticize the military than men for whom their military service is a pivotal mechanism upon which their identity as well as social status hinge" (Lemish and Barzel 2000: 149-150).9 When asked about the visible role women play in today's peace and protest movements, the women I interviewed were of the opinion that the sex of a person does not matter. They criticized the opinion that women are more prone to struggle for peace "because they are naturally or instinctively more peace loving and care taking". They emphasized the equality between both sexes and their roles but felt that they were socialized, as opposed to genetically formed, to be care takers and to be closer to their children and less close to the militaristic "brainwashing" as most called it. Some felt this was why they could see certain things in society clearer and that they were more likely to come out as worried parents, then their male partners. The status of women as a political identity is socially attributed and in stead of dismissing it, women chose to take its positive sides and use this in their actions. The specific mother role became an important identity for many women peace organizations that chose to be of a single-gender. As mothers taking care of their children these women came into public action, using their identity as mothers to legitimate their participation in this national discourse. It were their children that were fighting the war and they felt they had the right to get involved. This use of the women's role as mother of caretaker however, is often criticized for not questioning the inferiority of this status in Israeli society (See Helman 1999). Because usage is made of an inferior role, this is seen as a legitimation of the situation. For example, when the "Four Mothers" started with their actions they became a media-hype. Dafna Lemish and Inbal Barzel analyzed this media coverage of the "Four

9 The authors are analyzing ideas of Sasson-Levy (1995).

65 Mothers" and noticed the overemphasizing of the "maternal". This seemed more important then the organization's ideas. They claim, however, that this is a way to include the women's voice into the national security discourse. In the role of mothers this participation is legitimized (2000). The women I talked to, often identify themselves as parents or mothers. This usually comes as something natural, because being a parent is a big part of one's identity. They make use of their feelings of protecting their children that are not instinctively female but more a parental characteristic. Their children, furthermore, make them more directly aware of the situation. They bring militarized society closer to home as one day they will be called up for conscription. Its not because they are women that they are active but because of and thanks to their role as parents, they are more prone to see problems in the state politics. In Israeli society where the mother is still seen as the main care-taker, the women that were brought up in this society will get into action faster. This indeed is related to the unequal division of roles in society, but gives women an opportunity to act. Debby Birnbaum from New Profile writes in her essay "the wisdom of fear" about the reasons she has as a mother, to be fearful as her son is about to be drafted. "Mothers who are fearful (men are never fearful) are defined as "over-anxious"­ irrational, and unable to think clearly", she writes, while "fear [is] an emotion that is rational and essential for survival" (unpublished essay). She then turns the idea that women are over emotional and hysterical around and shows that fear is a unisex emotion that is very wise to have. A mother that is becoming famous through her frantic letter writing to national and local newspapers is Atalia Boimel. Atalia's theory is that it is a parents' plight to protect their child in stead of letting the child protect them as a combat soldier. When her son served in the South of Lebanon Atalia went to the extreme to save him and get him out of combat service. She feels that no one speaks up for the children that are sent to war and that she has to take this task upon her. The blame for the casualties among young fighters, Atalia greatly puts at the parents. She is of the opinion, like many other activists, that after caring for your child 18 years and worrying about its wellbeing, it is amazing that parents send their 18-year-olds

66 to battlefields to die for the nation. Atalia often quotes an Indian wise man that said: "if mothers would love their children there would be no wars". While she was trying to be a good citizen, sending her children to the army, she looks back and says she was a bad mother. Coming out as a mother can also just be a very good strategy to gain the attention of the media as the "Four Mothers" have shown. One of my informants, Y ona Rochlin, that was part of this organization, actually said she "uses" her status as a mother of a 17 year old boy to achieve her objectives. Her son will soon be drafted and she uses this fact in her struggle. As she said, she is the first to open her mouth as a mother when she came out with the slogan I quoted above. Y ona thus uses the status as mother in an effective way to achieve her goals. All women assured me that the fact they were biologically women wasn't the reason they were active for peace issues. The remark of Helman and Rapoport that "the protest of the mothers and wives of male warriors ... does little more than extend traditional female roles beyond the domestic realm"(l997:696) then is not necessarily true. In their essay they see "Women in Black" as portraying an alternative way of involving in politics. This is a good point, but to dismiss any action by mothers and wives as non-critical is something else. The mothers I spoke to are not about to extend the traditional roles of society and even refused to take the role upon them that society expects from them. But they are still mothers, also in their political actions. That a mother doesn't even have to be a women Atalia told me: "my husband thinks like me, he is very maternal". So the maternal feelings that are being related to women are very socially adjustable. Living in the society they live in, these women are less "militarized" then men and have more space to see the situation for what it really is. They are absolutely not blind to the unjust hierarchical composition of society.

67 Motivations for action As stated before, the happenings of 1996 in Israel got many people into action. This was a trigger and an atmosphere close to despair was created that pushed people further. Another aspect that worked motivating to come into action was the role as a parent. It was almost never the only motivator but people became more aware of the situation because of their children. One of the activists told me, that in the situation of 1996 she started thinking about what to tell her children, how to educate them for peace if the reality was so violent. Older children that approach the age of conscription often bring the situation even closer. When your own child is going to be part of the military and state mechanisms, this is much more frightening then when a soldier is just a soldier. Now he becomes your child. Some women only had very young children and didn't experience a child in the army yet. They wanted to prevent this from happening or prevent their child from becoming a fighter. Others had children of the age of conscription and in some cases this made them open their eyes to see the dangerous situation around them. One New Profile activists has a son that is a conscious objector and this threw her headfirst into activity. Atalia Boimel started her activity after her son started to serve in the South of Lebanon. She realized the immense life-danger he was in and wanted only one thing: to save his life. After this personal struggle, she became more and more aware of the situation in Israel where young people are being sent to die for the nation and came into action through writing to every newspaper she could find. Another motivating aspect is the personal upbringing someone had. If a child grows up in a house were political issues are debated and where "radical" ideas come to the fore, the child will later on be familiar with such ideas. Many times the "difference" of this upbringing was partly because of the foreign background of the activists or of their parents. If they themselves or their parents grew up abroad, without the manipulative education that can be found in Israel, it was much easier to see the situation from a different angle. Several women I spoke to, told me about the feeling they walked around with for a long time without really knowing what it was. It was as it where an awareness but there wasn't any space in their social surroundings to speak out. When such surroundings were

68 found, this came with a feeling of recognition and relief. The "New Profile" organization was organized after several women met each other at an art exhibition. When they realized their ideas found a "sounding-board" they began meeting each other. Organizing in a group works very motivational, I have noticed. People with vague ideas have the ability to understand them better within a group. Furthermore people motivate and inspire each other to think and explore new ideas. Another factor in realizing one has to act, is the feeling of living in a society that is doing you wrong. One woman spoke about repression. She was aware that she, like many other activists, was part of the social elite, but her repression was an emotional and mental one. This is an important aspect here. People not only resist certain governmental ideas but they resist the all over repression of their thoughts through the myths and lies they have been fed from a very early age.

Modes of action This goal of making a change in society as a whole and especially in the priorities the state sets for itself, is achieved through making oneself heard, by drawing attention to one's cause. One activist said of activities like hers: ''We women ... we try to get the power, we are like "Don Quichot" [trying] to break through the wall ... because they don't want to hear it, they want the consensus. "They" is the media in this case that chooses to portray only consensual ideas in stead of taking the chance of beginning a real discussion that could make a change. Getting the media to listen is then a very important way for these activists to make their ideas public. All where active writers of letters to local and national newspapers, they were interviewed on television shows that touched upon the subject and also wrote letters to the government. Getting attention is a matter of timing, catchy slogans and being controversial. This was very important for the "Four Mothers" as them speaking out politically as mothers of fighters was out of the ordinary. In her battle for the withdrawal of the IDF out of Hebron, Y ona Rochlin got a lot of media attention when she used her identity as descendant of the original Jewish inhabitants of the city. Her main goal was to stop the endangering of IDF soldiers that

69 were in Hebron to protect religious settlers. But the way she used her background in this battle was not ordinary and this drew a lot of press to her. Vigils, protest marches and other political gatherings also help getting through to the press and the public. During the time of my research, many protests were being conducted in front of the Ministry ofDefense in Tel Aviv. This place is seen as representing the government's security and military policies and is therefore a very popular "protesting spot". But apart from public action there is also a private matter. When people come into action after a personal experience like the drafting of a child or even the losing of a child that served in the army, the personal becomes political and public. This was repeated to me time and again. The lives of the women I spoke to are soaked with their political outlooks. They make a place in their daily lives for their ideas and with this start a change that hopefully will become broader. Like one informant told me: "the part of me as a mother is very political. I use my motherhood for making political change. I look at every letter I send to the schools [letters to protest certain militaristic aspects] as a political act". Almost everything that is private becomes political and the political becomes personal.

Resisting the resistance Because this resistance is quite "radical" and dares to speak out loud about "sacred" issues, it receives quite some negative reactions. Most informants said the toughest battle for them was at the home front. Many activists are married to men that were raised with totally different ideas and the activity of the spouse many times became a source of trouble. The reason this can be so problematic is that activism and the way of thought of these activists I'm talking about overwhelms one's life and gets into every nook and cranny. It has an effect on the way the children are raised and on other important decisions within family life. It has even happened that because of the activity of the woman, marriages broke up. Other resistance comes often from the side of the military. When the "Four Mothers" became active, they were blamed for de-motivating the fighters in Lebanon and also partly for the casualties. Much criticism was voiced through the use of the stereotypical sexist name-calling, calling these women to get back into their kitchens and

70 leave security issues to the people that understand: men. Talk about the occupation of South Lebanon was regarded as off limits for women and mothers. They were expected to sit at home, wait for their sons to come home on the weekends, cook them diner and iron their uniforms. A famous line that is used by people who reject the ideas of these activists is "we're in the Middle East, this is not Switzerland", pointing to the fact that Israel is in a continuous situation of war and any actions is necessary to defend it. Again the "ein breira" ideal is brought up and this just shows how deep this idea sits in the minds of people. Without thinking, it is assumed any battle has a cause and any death thus is meaningful. Other ideas then the ones people have been hearing all their lives are difficult to be confronted with. Accepting them would mean turning a whole way of thought up side down and many are not ready and not willing to do this. It's easier to stick to what one knows and not to ask any questions. The activist that chose to the other way, the hard way, I see as very brave. They turned their lives in a whole different direction, opposite of the direction of the rest of society and they chose to dedicate a big part of their lives to spread awareness in their society and fight for change.

Conclusion On the other side of consensual ideas about war heroism and glorified death there is activism that dares to burst the bubble. The first resistance of this kind came up during the Lebanon War. The resistance I discussed came up around 1996 and questions internal issues in Israeli society like the legitimacy of military actions and death that come with them. Most of the activists are women as they are socialized in a society like Israel's to become mothers and care-takers. Grassroots activism then gives them an opportunity to voice their resistance. They use their identity of being a mother and a woman to gain legitimacy for their involvement in the security discourse. Through the media, protests but also through a way ofraising one's children, people are trying to get their ideas across and to make a change in the society they live in.

71 This is in order to keep themselves and family members alive and out of the war zone, but also to make life in Israel more peaceful and more tolerant.

72 General conclusion

In answering my questions about the heroic, nationalist discourse of death and heroism in Israeli society, I chose to address the national Memorial Day "Yam Hazikaron". In the first chapter I have tried to give my study a theoretical frame of thought. This led me to ideas on elites, consensus and resistance. In my study I addressed a political elite, the state and looked at the use it made of death and heroism to maintain a particular consensus. The mechanisms used in this quest, I called ritual. As I used this term in a broad sense, it encompassed ceremony, the use of myth in education and in individual creations of commemoration. I furthermore addressed resistance as a social movement that is peripheral and resists the ruling elite's policy. In the second chapter I searched for the roots of Israeli, masculine heroism. In discussing several of the myths that arose and their use in the creation of a stereotypical Israeli fighter, I tried to clarify his glorification in Israeli society. I furthermore gave some insights on the contemporary use of heroism and militarization. In Israeli education, daily life and military system, fighters' heroism turned out to be an important driving force. People are socialized all their lives to become either fighters themselves or their care-takers. To be a fighter is to be an ideal citizen, as risking one's life for the nation is the highest donation to the state. In the following chapter I discussed fighters' heroism from another point of view: after the fighter's death. I discussed "Yorn Hazikaron" with its ceremonies and nationalist, militaristic discourse to show how death is being given meaning by the state. Especially bereaved families are being addressed at these events. Looking at their commemorating discourse showed that they often use the language given to them by the state. This language turns death into a higher goal in life. Especially self-sacrificial death is glorified and seen as an example. I have tried to show that in Israel the state actively produces a hegemony that makes its citizens idealize combat-fighters and consequently glorify death. Death is being raised to a level above life. By doing this, the state makes sure it will have generation after generation of citizens ready to fight its battles.

73 That there is a different voice in Israeli society, I have showed in the last chapter. By discussing a movement of especially women that resists the sacrifice of young men in unjust wars, I tried to make visible a peripheral but brave part of grassroots resistance in Israel. Through raising their voices these people try to change a very strong and dangerous consensus about death and military heroism. I hope I have in some way contributed to this important movement. I see my work as an extension of the actions of organizations like "New Profile", "Women and Mothers for Peace" and individual activists like Atalia Boimel. I thank them for their courage and together with them I wish for Israel and its citizens less unnecessary loss of young people, more awareness, a less militaristic society and a real peace in its future.

74 Literature

Almog, Oz 2000 The Sabra: The Creation ofthe New Jew. Berkeley: University of California Press. Anderson, Benedict 1991 Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. London: Verso. Azaryahu, Maoz 1995 State Cults: Celebrating Independence and Commemorating the Fallen in Israel 1948-1956. Ben-Gurion University Press (Hebrew). Azmon, Yael 1997 "War, Mothers, and a Girl with Braids: Involvement of Mothers' Peace Movements in the National Discourse in Israel", in Israel Social Science Research, vol.12(1): 109-128. Bar-On, Dan 1998 "Israeli Society between the Culture of Death and the Culture of Life", in Israel Studies, vol.2: 88-112. Barzilai, Gad 1996 Wars, Internal Conflicts, and Political Order. Albany: State University of New York Press. Ben-Amos, Avner & Ilana Bet-El 1999 "Holocaust Day and Memorial Day in Israeli Schools: Ceremonies, Education and History", in Israel Studies, vol.4: 258-284. Ben-Ari, Eyal & Edna Lomsky-Feder (editors) 1999 The Military and Militarism in Israeli Society. Albany: State University of New York Press. Ben-Yehuda, Nachman 1995 The Masada Myth: Collective Memory and Mythmaking in Israel. Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press.

75 Boyarin, Daniel 1997 Unheroic Conduct: the rise ofheterosexuality and the invention ofthe Jewish man. Berkely: University of California Press. Cockburn, Cynthia 1998 The Space Between Us: Negotiating Gender and National Identities in Conflict. London: Zed books. Connerton, Paul 1989 How Societies Remember. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Feige, Michael 1998 "Peace Now and the Legitimation Crisis of "Civil Militarism'"' in Israel Studies, vol.3(1 ): 85-111. Gal, Reuven 1986 A Portrait ofthe Israeli soldier. New York: Greenwood Press. Geertz, Clifford 1973 The Interpretation ofCultures: selected essays. New York: Basic Books. Gillath, Nurit 1991 "Women Against War: "Parents Against Silence"" in Swirsky and Safir (eds).Calling the Equality Bluff: Women in Israel. New York: Pergamon Press. Goldstein, Yaacov N. 1999 "The Ideological and Political Background of the Israeli Defence Forces" in Israel Affairs, vol. 5(4 ): 172-178. Gorny, Yosef 1987 Zionism and the Arabs 1882-1948: A Study ofIdeology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hanagan, Michael P, Leslie Page Moch & Wayne te Brake (editors) 1998 Challenging Authority: the Historical Study of Contentious politics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Handelman, Don 1990 Models and Mirrors: towards an Anthropology ofPublic Events. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

76 Handelman, Don & Lea Shamgar-Handelman 1997 "The Presence of Absence: The Memorialism of National Death in Israel", in Ben-Ari & Bilu (Eds.) Grasping Land: Space and Place in Contemporary Israeli Discourse and Experience. New York: State University of New York Press. Helman, Sara 1999 "From Soldiering and Motherhood to Citizenship: A study of Four Israeli Peace Protest Movements", in Social Politics, vol.6(3): 292-313. Helman, Sara & Tamar Rapoport 1997 "Women in Black: Challenging Israel's Gender and Socio-political Orders", in British Journal ofSociology, no.4: 681-700. Karsh, Efraim 2000 (1997) Fabricating Israeli history: the New Historians. Portland: Frank Cass. Kertzer, David I. 1988 Ritual, Politics and Power. New Haven: Yale University Press. Khazzoum, Aziza 1998 "Orientalism, Ethnic Identity, and social Closure: The Origins of Ethnic Inequality Among Jews in Israel". Unpublished dissertation, UC Berkely Sociology Department. Lane, Christel 1981 The Rites ofRulers: ritual in industrial society: the Soviet Case. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lemish, Dafna & lnbal Barze[ 2000 "Four Mothers: The Womb in the Public Sphere", in European Journal of communication, vol. 15(2): 147-169. Levinger, Esther 1993 Memorials for the Fallen in Israel. Tel Aviv: HaKibbutz Hameuchad (Hebrew).

77 Lustick, Ian (editor) 1994 Arab-Israeli Relations: Historical Background and Origins ofthe Conflict. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. Mazali, Rela 1995 "Serving the Service: Soldiers Forming their Parents", in Nogah: Feminist Magazine, vol. 29: 40-43 (Hebrew). 1997 "I refuse: One Woman Taking Three Looks at Militarism and the Military", inNogah: Feminist Magazine, vol.32:17-20 (Hebrew). Mosse, George 1990 Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory ofthe World Wars. New York: Oxford University Press. 1996 The Image ofMan: the creation ofModern Masculinity. New York: Oxford University Press. Near, Henry 1987 Frontiermen and Halutzim: the Image ofPioneer in North America and Pre-State Jewish Palestine. Discussion paper by the University of Haifa, the Kibbutz University Center. Ohana, David 1995 "Zarathusa in Jerusalem: Nietzche and the "New Hebrews"" in Israeli Affairs, vol.1(3): 38-60. Pile, Steve & Michael Keith (editors) 1997 Geographies ofResistance. London: Routledge. Rubin, Nissan 1985 "Unofficial Memorial Rites in an Army Unit", in Social Forces, vol.63: 795-809. Scott, James C. 1985 Weapons ofthe Weak: Everyday Forms ofResistance. New Haven: Yale University Press.

78 Shohat, Ella 1990 "Master Narrative/Counter Readings: The Politics of Israeli Cinema" in Sklar and Musser (eds) Resisting Images: Essays on Cinema and History. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Shomron, Vered 2000 "'Commemoration of Life' or 'Commemoration of Death'? Art Museums and Galleries in Y ad Labanim Houses, as a Reflection of Militaristic Culture in Israel." MA dissertation, University of Liverpool. Spillman, Lyn 1997 Nation and Commemoration: Creating National Identities in the United States and Australia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wistrich, Robert S. 1995 "Theodor Herzl: Zionist Icon, Myth-Maker and Social Utopian" in Israeli Affairs, vol.1(3): 1-37. Yanai, Nathan 1996 "The Citizen As Pioneer: Ben-Gurion' s Concept of Citizenship" in Israel Studies, vol.1(1): 127-143. Yuval-Davis, Nira 1997 Gender & Nation. London: Sage Publications. Zerubavel, Yael 1995 Recovered Roots. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Unknown. "The Historic, The Legendary, and the Incredible: Invented Tradition and Collective Memory in Israel", in (unknown). Zartal, Idit 1994 "The Tortured and the Saints" in Zmanim vol.48 26-45. (Hebrew)

79