European Parliamentary #Futures After Eu Elections

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SPECIAL EDITION 2 (14) | 2019

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MaIn partner EuropEan parliamEntary #FuturEs after Eu Elections

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Fallout from Digital Disinformation is report lays out four major scenarios that could conceivably unfold after European Parliamentary Elections in May 2019. Prepared by the Visegrad/Insight in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Poland and a contribution from the ABTShield. is report lays out four major scenarios that could conceivably unfold after European Parliamentary Elections in May 2019. Prepared by the Visegrad/Insight in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Poland and a contribution from the ABTShield. European Parliamentary #Futures Four post-2019 options

Wojciech Przybylski Editor-in-chief

The EU is at a critical juncture. For the first time since the launching of European integration, doubts about the future of the EU have been raised by mainstream politicians and large swathes of the European public. Uncertainty as to the fate of Europe may demotivate voters and help disinformation campaigns often run by foreign powers hostile to the European project or sponsored by clandestine third parties.

Whilst many of these fears are often seen as exaggerated, it is difficult to dismiss the impact of Brexit; for the first time since its inception, a major state in a process of leaving the EU. Marcin Zaborowski Senior Associate Even worse – and like never before – the EU is no longer supported by the sitting US President.

In the 1950s, the United States was the sponsor and co-creator of European integration. All subsequent American administrations have supported the EU, a policy now discontinued by the current American President.

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Meanwhile, Russia is actively disrupting the European pro- There is a growing sense of value distinctiveness in the region, ject by financing parties pushing for the fragmentation of the which will most likely be reflected in the upcoming elections to union and sponsoring disinformation campaigns. Online arti- the European Parliament and which will have an impact on the ficial amplification has real offline results. It breeds social- sen future composition and balance of power in the Parliament. timents hostile to the EU project and lures domestic parties into a honey trap of easy populist solutions. Disinformation Visegrad/Insight prides itself on developing scenarios that fo- campaigns are taking their toll across the whole of Europe, cus on the region and show trajectories for potential social and but it is the most pronounced in Central and Eastern Europe political futures. This time, we have teamed up with the Kon- where global powers once again see an opportunity to deter- rad Adenauer Foundation in a partnership that resulted in a mine the fate of the continent. product sketching out four policy directions for Europe post- 2019 elections. The V4 nations remain staunchly opposed to migration, and the governments in Budapest, Bratislava and Warsaw have These elections are prone to large online disinformation cam- professed an attachment to more traditional social and fam- paigns. We have invited ABTSHIELD (Anti-Bots and Trolls ily values, vehemently running campaigns critical of LGBTQ online platform) to sketch out main lines of attack and coun- rights. The weaponisation of culture is also a tool of foreign termeasures that are likely to influence electoral campaigns influence mastered in offline and online disinformation cam- and amplify future policy directions. paigns by Russia. Our scenarios are based on the available polling that suggests that whilst pro-European parties will retain an overwhelming Now, a new element of majority in the future parliament, the eurosceptics will fare uncertainty may add to this stronger than in the past. There is a general consensus that the eurosceptic appeal has already tempestuous background; been boosted by the three following factors: the global economic crisis of 2008, the immigration crisis of 2015 and finally the results of the next European by a coordinated effort of third parties – mostly the Russians election could bring a strong but also by some right-wing elements originating from the US. showing for eurosceptic parties. This is an hour of truth for the EU, which – for the first time in its history – is on its own.

Importantly for this study, the Visegrad countries that joined the EU in 2004 are increasingly standing out in the larger Eu- ropean context. Three of the four members remain outside the eurozone; Slovakia being the sole Central European country to have adopted the single currency.

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Home of Eurosceptics

page6

Illiberal Fadeout

page 8

Grand Rule of Law Digital resilience page 10

Gang of nations

page

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Fear of disinformation

page14 False narratives

page 18

Digital resilience

20page

How to detect a troll?

24page 5 scenario 1 Home of Eurosceptics Kaczyński and Orbán join ranks

As a result of electoral dynamics, representatives from the V4 countries see their numbers grow in the European Conservatives and Reformists group. This retracts many ambitious reform plans for the EU and increases the spread of illiberal messages across Europe.

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• The V4-ECR will be sceptical of The Czech ODS, set up by Vaclav Momentarily united in their goals, the future EU Commission and of Klaus, is already an ECR member but Fidesz and PiS increase their attacks the pro-European majority in the wins EP seats and extends their influence. on the liberal democratic model akin EP, but it will not become openly A similar situation plays out for the lib- to smear campaigns against George anti-European. ertarian Freedom and Solidarity party of Soros, moderate politicians in the EPP, • On fundamental issues of EU for- Richard Sulik in Slovakia.Together with the LGBTQ community as well as eign policy, the V4-ECR is likely the mildly-eurosceptic Ordinary People’s Islamophobic and nativist rhetoric. to vote together with the majority Party, the power of the ECR grows re- Contrastingly, the Czech ODS and of the EP. This list includes Rus- markably compared with the previous Slovak SaS see the liberal democracies sia sanctions, unified positions EP session. of Central Europe as not being liberal on China as well as human rights enough and edge towards libertarianism. violations in Cuba and Belarus. Home to eurosceptics Surprisingly, although for different rea- However, Fidesz later votes to end In this scenario, the ECR group becomes sons, all four parties share a similar dis- Russian sanctions. a natural home for eurosceptics in gener- satisfaction with the traditional western • The V4-ECR is vehemently an- al, but it specifically has a Visegrad-hue political model. ti-immigrant and resists attempts due to some distinct regional charac- from the Commission to pursue teristics. All these parties have scepti- Flirting with the far-right any unified approach towards cal – though not rejectionist – attitudes At the same time, the far-right Nations common immigration policy. On towards the EU. They question the scope and Freedom Group (ENF) and anti-Eu- this issue, the V4-ECR vote to- and extent of European integration but ropean Freedom and Direct Democracy gether with the ENF and EFDD. refrain (at least openly) from calling for Group (EFDD) both make gains in the • From the EU financial perspective, the withdrawal from the EU. election. there is disunity in the grouping. Moreover, both the Polish PiS and Talks are held between the three The Poles, Hungarians, Romani- Hungarian Fidesz are in fact portraying eurosceptic parties (including the ECR) ans, Croats and Latvians vote in themselves as true Europeans who call about uniting under a single banner, favour of a larger budget and more for the reform of the EU along Gaullist which would give this new grouping extensive transfers. The Czechs, lines. This echoes back to the idea of a around 25 – 27 per cent of seats and Slovaks and German libertarians Europe of the Nations and with the de- make them the biggest grouping in the vote against this proposal. sire to repatriate powers back to nations’ parliament, overtaking even the EPP. • On the appointments to the EU capitals. However, the ECR is not as far-right Commission, the grouping at All is not united in the ECR, how- as the ENF and is not as anti-European times abstains or unwillingly sup- ever. Both the Czech and Slovak parties as the EFDD. Moreover, the two latter ports EPP candidates. As regards are more eurosceptic than the other V4 groupings are evidently pro-Russian, the President of the European members, seeing the EU as a grand bu- which may be acceptable for Fidesz but Central Bank, the group has no reaucratic plot and often likening it to the not for PiS, which maintains a vehement- strong views since it is essentially former Soviet Union. ly anti-Russian stance. anti-euro. Even so, they still hold back from Therefore, the differences between calling for a withdrawal from the EU in the ENF, EFDD and ECR are too signifi- order to avoid the chaos exemplified by cant for the time being and the talks end Expulsion of Orban Brexit. with them divided. The ECR retains its The Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) separate status somewhere in the mid- wins the biggest V4 representation, gain- Domestic agenda first dle between the EPP and the radical ing 25 MEPS, in the EP and is likely to All these and many other parties are eurosceptics. become more dominant in the European anti-immigrant and strongly reject EU Inevitably, Brexit causes harm to the Conservatives and Reformist (ECR) fac- interference in the individual member ECR’s relative position and status in the tion. Additionally, the group becomes states’ immigration policies, for instance, EP. At the same time, the regional char- more V4-centric because of two unrelat- the governing ANO party in Czechia and acteristics of the grouping grows, turning ed developments. Smer in Slovakia. the party into a natural home for all scep- After being readmitted to the cen- The cases are similar for Fidesz and tics from Central Europe and beyond. tre-right European People’s Party, Victor PiS who have, to varying degrees, built This includes – on the one hand – Orbán’s Fidesz is finally expelled due to much of their recent popularity on their the far-right parties from Romania and their continued attacks on the rule of law anti-immigration stances. Overall this Croatia and – on the other – milder scep- in Hungary. Orbán, attempting to flex his attitude is genuinely popular in the V4 tics from Germany and Austria. muscles on both domestic and continen- and will be maintained for the foreseea- PiS, with varying degrees of success, tal fronts, decides to join the ECR. ble future. attempts to push the ECR to forge ahead with a more Visegrad-centric platform. 7 scenario 2 Illiberal Fadeout EPP expels Fidesz and takes over part of its agenda

Fidesz and the rest of the V4 become marginalised in their political narrative and lose their so-far uniting ideological platform. The EPP takes over its agenda by committing itself to defend a “European way of life”.

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• The EPP shifts to the right and In the end, Orbán’s calming gestures ing a European way of life”. There are sev- adopts the anti-immigration agen- – once effective in mollifying EU critics – eral dimensions of this policy. da with a slight mix of anti-EU and proves inadequate and the EPP formally Firstly, the EU invests in creating anti-migrant sentiments. expels Fidesz from the group. hard borders and returning migrants • Central European eurosceptics are Adding insult to injury, the EPP co- to their ports of exit. The extent of this deprived of a major part of their opts a few of Orbán’s positions and the task requires a tandem effort from both European platform. group shifts to the right on numerous is- Frontex as well as EU reinforcements for • Fidesz is expelled from the EPP sues including the widespread embracing Italian and Greek border guards. and becomes an insignificant of an anti-immigration position. Secondly, in a controversial turn, voice in the EU. This move by the EPP reflects the idea of re-immigration, which has Fidesz’s own shift to the right when it was been debated in France and Germany, being challenged by Jobbik in the domes- is taken on by the EP and it passes by a Eurosceptic influence tic Hungarian elections; successfully tak- narrow majority. Consequently, hardline, The popularity of the eurosceptic agen- ing over the platform and political space nationalist parties across Europe lose a da has been boosted by the fallout from of the then-far-right party. crucial talking point. both the economic crisis of 2008 and the Thirdly, the EU adopts elements immigration crisis of 2015. Fidesz and ECR lose ground of economic protectionism, mirroring The mainstream European parties – The homeless Fidesz looks to join the Donald Trump’s revamping of the US’s the centre-right (EPP) and the centre-left ECR, but the situation quickly becomes economic policy and hitting first and (S&D) – have not adequately responded complicated as these new positions by foremost at Chinese imports. to these developments, which has led to the EPP have considerable implications Lastly, after seeing their popularity the emergence and legitimisation of an- for the ECR. increase among the polarised electorate, ti-systemic discourse and eventually to The ECR is deprived of its major, the EPP continues to usurp policies from the questioning of the liberal-democrat- defining arguments; in order to survive, the far-right which leads to an increase ic model by large sections of European the ECR begins reaching out to the EPP. in confidence for geopolitical robustness. societies. Poland’s Europe Minister, Konrad In turn, it ushers in plans for a more The emergence of the eurosceptic Szymański, becomes one of the idea’s autonomous ESDP and strategic inde- parties and their increasing popularity is largest proponents. pendence from the United States. seen as the major consequence of these In an attempt to placate some of the However, the EPP does not adopt a developments. hardliners in their base, PiS also holds friendlier stance on Russia. On the con- On the centre-right, we have seen discussions with the existing eurosceptic trary, it decides to flex its muscles further a clear shift towards an anti-immigrant alliances (ENF or ENPP) and even flirts diversifying energy sources and halting stance in Austria, which has delivered a with the idea of forming their own, new the Nord Stream 2 pipeline while push- victory for the Christian-Democrats un- eurosceptic group. ing aggressively for European-based and der the leadership of Sebastian Kurz. Specifically, Jarosław Kaczyński sustainable energy production, defend- In Germany, there is a growing an- explores forming a new group with ing the stance as critical for maintaining ti-immigration sentiment within the gov- the leaders of the Italian Lega and the security. erning CDU, which is seen as the main Spanish Vox. reason for the change of the party lead- However, there is no doubt that the Game of Seats ership and the stepping down of Angela shift of the EPP to the right would deprive This leaves the parties of the ECR rudder- Merkel. milder eurosceptics – the ECR – of much less. Whilst a possibility of co-operation The CDU’s sister party, the Bavarian of their platform. with the EPP is technically still an option, CSU, has always been more to the right it does not materialise. on social issues and never embraced The aftermath of EPP’s turn This is due to domestic political Merkel’s pro-immigration stance, exem- right reasons, and the fact that PiS’s opposi- plified by Manfred Weber. EPP members, following the Austri- tion – Civic Platform (PO) and the Polish In the past, Weber has staunchly an OVP’s example, shift to the right on Popular Alliance (PSL) are established defended Viktor Orbán. Recently, Weber immigration and “civilise” the language EPP members and have a major influence has joined the mainstream EPP in criti- aiming at pragmatic policies including on the faction’s line. cising Orbán and eventually opting for more effective and stringent control of Therefore, the EPP’s shift to the right the suspension of Fidesz in the faction. the borders and the development of the ends up producing a radicalisation of the However, he retains Orbán’s support EU’s institutional framework. ECR’s positions, which will be competing in running for the President of the EU Responding to public sentiments, for votes of the right-wing electorate. Commission. the EPP chose to run a policy of “defend-

9 scenario 3 Grand Rule of Law Socialists and Liberals set the game

The S&D and ALDE link the rule of law condition to the next multiannual financial framework with the purpose of changing the budgetary mechanism and redirecting some of the funds away from Central Europe to Southern and other member states.

This divide boosts the move towards the emancipation of the eurozone, including the setting up of a separate eurozone budget and even its own distinct parliament.

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A Triumvirate and Czechia – will lose out both econom- The eurozone countries – led by Over the last three years, the rule-of-law ically and strategically. The budget based France – will resist the current situation debate has become the new dividing line on leftovers for non-eurozone members in which non-eurozone states retain between ex-communist Europe and the will be considerably less generous with an influence on the eurozone matters rest of the EU. major implications for the modernisation through the existing institutions. Poland and Hungary have both been resources for these countries. We have seen an early indication of subjected to the Article 7 procedure (in- Even more painful will be their rel- this trend in some of President Macron’s vestigation of rule of law violation) by the egation to the periphery of Europe, with existing and proposed initiatives. France’s European Commission. Shortly after the limited to no ability to influence the de- support for the European defence initi- election, the procedure is enacted against cision-making process at the core of the atives was always conditioned by Paris’s Romania as well. EU. For these countries, this amounts to preference for an exclusive nature of this Whilst the other ex-communist nothing short of reversing their “return policy. countries are safe for the time being, to Europe”. most of them show solidarity with those French connection that are under scrutiny. There is a growing Preying on the illiberals In the past, France had a preference for perception in Central Europe that the rule An aggressive position on the issue is like- creating an exclusive club based on ca- of law procedure and its consequences ly to be adopted by liberal ALDE, which is pabilities, which would have included may be used as an instrument to stigma- expected to be reinforced by Emmanuel the UK and Poland. President Macron is tise newer member states and draw new Macron’s En Marche. Macron has posi- clearly also favouring an exclusive meth- lines of division. tioned himself as the key critic of the rule od of European integration but his bench- In the new EP, the issue is picked up of law violations in Poland and Hungary. marks are different: capabilities remain on by the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), Adopting a critical position towards important but they are augmented by val- who were expected to lose heavily in the Central European members of the EU has ue-based elements. election but suffer less than anticipated. also been helpful for Macron domestically. Hence France has successful- Still, they see their overall result dropping French public opinion has always ly pushed for the establishment of the below 20 per cent. This will mean that been sceptical of enlarging the EU to the European Intervention Initiative that ex- S&D will lose their ability to form a grand East, and the prospect of a “Polish plumb- cludes both Poland and Hungary (which coalition with the EPP, diminishing their er” was one of the main factors why the Macron had criticised for departing status as co-owner of the majority. French voters rejected European consti- from European values) whilst it includes Subsequently, ALDE is invited to tution in the referendum in 2005 (even Estonia, which is considered both capa- join the coalition promoting the party to though the constitution had nothing to ble in the defence field and comprised of one of the three co-deciders in setting the do with the prospect of labour migration “good” Europeans. EP agenda. from the new entrants to the EU). Macron’s recent proposal, in which Macron played the populist card of he calls for a European Renaissance, is Hard times for Central targeting industrial relocation to Central again focused on creating new insti- Europe Europe and an EU directive on temporary tutions, such as the European Agency ALDE’s inclusion pushes the fraction workers from other EU countries (mostly for the Protection of Democracy or the towards an even more aggressive stance Poland) during the presidential elections Council of Internal Security. against rule of law violations. Hans Tim- and shortly after. Macron has also proposed to devel- mermans leading the S&D faction re- With ALDE and S&D taking on a op a Defence and Security Treaty, which mains the standard-bearer of the rule more robust stance against the govern- would contain a mutual defence clause. If of law procedure against the Polish and ments of Poland, Hungary and Romania, these and other proposed by the French Hungarian governments and the key tar- the EPP will be pushed to follow suit. President were ever to come into being, get of smear campaigns from Warsaw and Several implications are likely to emerge it is most likely that he would seek to Budapest. from this scenario, of which the following exclude Poland and Hungary – and per- Nevertheless, Timmermans propos- are most important. haps other Central European states – that es to tie the disbursement of EU structural have had breaches to the rule of law and and cohesion funds to the observance of A crack in the foundations European values. the rule of law and the independence of ju- In response, those marginalised unite Pointedly, Macron’s proposal also diciary calling for the withdrawal of judges or become tactically united on specific includes provisions for the European placed in the Constitutional Courts and votes aiming at blocking EU processes, minimum wage and tax harmonisation other courts as the result of the politicisa- like the new EU Commission and budget; – both of which are clear disadvantages tion of the judicial system in Hungary and as a result, the eurozone countries con- for lower-wage based Central European Poland. solidate politically within the EU and economies. It would seem therefore that Warsaw and Budapest refuse and push towards establishing new eurozone Macron would use the value argument to frame the decision as blackmail. This institutions. undermine economic competition from would escalate the conflict further and This leads to a separation of budgets Central Europe and score some points do- Timmermans would become to be seen and eventually the creation of a separate mestically. It is likely that other Western across the region as an EU bully. eurozone commission and a Parliament European states would see the same logic Under this scenario, non-eurozone that has a scrutinising role on budgetary and embrace Macron’s ideas. Central Europeans – Poland, Hungary matters. 11 scenario 4 Gang of nations Governments micromanage the EU

The lack of a grand coalition leaves political factions more divided. Anti-EU and exit-parties score higher than ever before. As a result, the EU is paralysed and Europe has to be managed through unstable coalitions of national governments prone to external powers’ influence.

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• A new pro-European temporary ments of this confederation, which steers After the eurosceptic coalition fails, majority will be less internally co- them towards positions contradicting the PiS emerges to organise a new grouping herent and its centre of gravity is mainstream views in the EPP – including in addition to those parties that already likely to move rightwards. migration and social policies. are in ECR – such as the Czech ODS and • The central European intake In short, the adoption of these par- Slovak SaS and Ordinary People parties – into the ruling group will be ties with non-centrists views makes this reach out to the Italian Lega and Spanish prone to strengthening internal ruling confederation more prone to inter- Vox, as well. co-operation. nal conflicts and disagreements. Initially, Fidesz is invited to join the • Polish PiS emerges as a major el- group, but they make a more radical turn ement on the eurosceptic scene in Rise and fall of the far- and decide to forge their own alliance, the EP and seeks cooperation with right unsuccessfully courting members from the EPP, though the Polish domes- The loose coalition barely has time to the ENP and ENPP. tic context prevents this from be- contend with their own issues when a Sensing their weak position, Orbán coming a reality. larger problem emerges from outside the invites Steve Bannon and attempts to • Fidesz makes an even more radi- majority, in particular from the euroscep- foster stronger bilateral ties between cal turn in search of a new alliance tic parties. Hungary and the Trump administration but is unsuccessful and becomes The eurosceptics secure 26 per cent to boost their international recognition. sidelined. of the vote, gaining a considerable num- This is a misstep that leads to Fidesz’s rel- • These situations lead to a frag- ber of seats in the parliament. Sensing egation to the sidelines of the European mentation of the EU exposing it to their potential power, the three euroscep- debate. influence from foreign powers. tic groupings – the far-right ENP, the anti-European ENPP and the more-mildly Exposed and abused Diverging promises eurosceptic ECR – unite forming the big- The risk of Chinese influence on Europe Opinion polls – forecasting heavy losses gest faction of the European Parliament. rises and Beijing doubles up on its efforts for the EPP and S&D – turn out to be true. They become the most obvious al- to get their foot in the door while the op- This spells the end of the grand co- ternative to those who will be dissatisfied portunity lasts. alition and a necessity to co-opt other with the mainstream parties. It materialises with Chinese com- pro-European groupings, such as ALDE However, the ties holding this group panies being selected by Hungary in calls and the Greens into a new, albeit tenuous, together are even more tenuous than for tenders funded by the EU. majority. those linking together the majority, due With weak and tardy opposition This presents a challenging environ- to the ideological differences between the from the EU institutions, other countries ment since the EPP and S&D have been radicals. The ENPP advocate for a with- follow suit exposing Europe to a new wave ruling the EP ever since the direct elec- drawal from the EU while others – like of Chinese business on the continent. tions were introduced in 1979. the ECR – are in favour of reform centred Russia finally gets sanctions lifted The mixture of socialisation and co- on the repatriation of powers back to na- through its successful lobbying in many operation between these two parties over tional capitals. EU capitals. the past 40 years cannot be overestimat- Thus, shortly after uniting, the eu- Due to the nature of intergovern- ed, and their difficulties are exemplified rosceptic group falls apart in dramatic mental negotiations, the lifting of sanc- by two related issues they have to con- fashion. tions is pushed through Slovakia and tend with simultaneously. Hungary and backed up by Austrians, Firstly, the declining popularity of New Europe, old divisions Italians and Greeks. the two mainstream parties pushes them The role of the Central European intake This even generates a split in the to adopt more radical positions, which in the EP and its impact on the fragmen- Visegrad Group as Poland, closely tied to affects their prospects for cooperation. tation will be two-fold. Those Central Eu- the U.S. position, tries to force through a Secondly, co-opting other factions ropean parties that join the EPP and S&D unified V4 position but the move is coun- into this loose confederation endangers will be prone to co-operation within the terproductive and partners turn their the delicate ideological balance between context of a pro-European coalition. backs on Warsaw. the EPP and S&D. In fact, in Poland, the pro-Euro- Turkey decides to get a better deal However, taking in the Liberals pean parties are already running under from European countries and new groups from ALDE strengthens the pro-market one banner as a European Coalition of migrants, allowed to pass through dimension of the majority. It also encour- which includes Civic Platform (EPP), the country by Erdogan, start flooding ages the EPP to adopt stronger pro-in- Popular Alliance (EPP), Alliance of the through the Balkan route. dustrial positions, which have been often Democratic Left (S&D), Modern PL Clashes on the Hungarian border tempered by the need to satisfy the views (ALDE) and the Greens (Greens-EFA). It leave many dead and wounded, but there and interests of the S&D. will be natural for them to work in this is no EU-response in an effort to avoid At the same time, taking in the ruling confederation. undermining trust in the European pro- Greens strengthen the progressive ele- ject across the continent.

13 Fear of disinformation Virtual incentives, real emotions

By nature, we seek facts and trustworthy information. However, in the competition for power, lies are often used to discredit the opponents and improve one’s competitive advantage. The digital age has brought this clash to a new level. In this post-truth setting, facts have become enemies, and democracy may fall victim.

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t would be of little surprise to anyone Social media users worldwide that disinformation campaigns are 3,5 both aggressively active in Europe 3,02 3 2,9 and effective in their pursuits. How- 2,77 I 2,62 ever, the sheer number of false accounts 2,46 and bots disseminating “fake news” is 2,5 2,28 2,14 staggering and, according to recent data, 1,91 on the rise. 2 Nevertheless, there are new tools 1,59 1,5 1,4 for fighting disinformation which will be 1,22 made available not only for the political 0,97 sphere but also for the general public and 1 business sector. 0,5 Takeaways: • The criminal use of bots has an 0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 economic toll second only to the international drug trade. • Almost ¾ of Europeans fear they could be affected by disinformation. • Innovative online tools, already Under cyberattack dergo the first major test during 2019 being trialled, will be able to an- The Internet and the tools it provides electoral campaigns. alyse and block in real-time disin- have revolutionised the way electoral We are using the plural form be- formation campaigns and posts. campaigns are run, which is why political cause if we were to count elections in parties are earmarking ever larger funds each EU member state separately and for online electoral campaigns. add to them to all the national elections Big numbers With the introduction of new reg- taking place in Europe, then we can talk In 2018, 66% of links shared on Twitter ulations on social media platforms and of more than fifty electoral campaigns on came from automated accounts. Of those, their potential liability as an accesso- the continent, in which disinformation 44% of the links were from conservative ry to intentional disinformation, the and cyber defence tools alike will be used. political websites/news while 41% were largest platforms are introducing new Attempts to influence the way po- focused on a liberal agenda. self-regulatory mechanisms. litical decisions are taken outside of one’s Last year, about one million Twitter At the same time, the so-called political sphere is not a new phenome- accounts were checked every month due Robotrolling is flourishing, mainly in non, and the recent years have shown that to questionable content, and roughly, the Baltic states and in Poland, while even the largest Western democracies are 75% of them were deleted. in social media fake accounts represent not impervious to this type of attack. Today, about 15% of Twitter ac- 54% of all Russian-language news about counts are bots; compared to previous NATO. This poses a great threat be- years, the number of fake accounts is on cause anonymous accounts using new the rise (e.g., in 2013 they accounted for technologies are especially predomi- only 5%). nant on Twitter despite the efforts taken The first report published by to delete fake accounts. Facebook reveals that in the first quar- Content amplification in elector- ter of last year, 583 million fake accounts al campaigns is a dangerous weapon were deleted, which accounted for 837 against democratic decision-making million spam posts. mechanisms, but there are three types Nevertheless, Facebook estimates of effective tools to counter their impact. that roughly 4% of its accounts are still The first one is information and fake. Moreover, the criminal use of bots education while the second is high jour- in cyberspace is such a serious problem nalistic standards supported by regula- that the World Federation of Advertisers tions fostering freedom and financial estimates that the damages will soon outlays. reach nearly 50 billion USD and become The third, the most important second only to the drugs trade as a source component, are the innovative digital of income for organised crime globally. tools to detect and counteract real-time This shows the scale of the phenomenon automated campaigns, the preparation that already affects all internet users, in- and implementation of which will un- cluding voters. 15 Fears if disinformation

As revealed by the survey conducted in September 2018, the amount of fake news disseminated by internet users is the main problem for European citizens. Among others, the European Commission asked in the survey: 1 How concerned are you with disinformation and misinformation on the internet? (% of respondents)

very somewhat not very

concerned concerned concerned not concerned don’t know 30 43 17 6 4

2 How concerned are you that the personal data people leave on the internet is used to target the political messages they see, undermining free and fair competition between all political parties? (% of respondents)

26 41 21 7 5

3 How concerned are you with restrictions and censorship of political debates on online social media? (% of respondents)

19 36 29 10 6

Overall, 73% respondents declared to have a fear of disinformation, and 30% are very concerned about disinformation. This issue should be clearly high on top of priorities for the future European Parliament and the Commission.

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17 False narratives Hacking voters’ brains

The susceptibility of the general public to the multifaceted and interwoven tales of disinformation will spell doom for the mainstream political parties of the EU and encourage a more radical agenda to emerge.

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• Russia is actively supporting eu- This will consist of support for par- In the 2019 EP campaign, the main rosceptic parties with the hope to ties and candidates proffering nationalist effect stemming from a lack of coordi- stir up discord within the EU. and pro-Russia views and opposing the nated action against online disinforma- • Automated bot traffic and trolls EU through a sudden increase in follow- tion will be political fragmentation with are spurring on anti-European ers, shares, likes and comments of sup- an increase of support for parties on the and nationalist movements. port – completed by bots – as well as extreme sides of the political spectrum. • This will end in electoral successes generating growth and traffic – by trolls. As a result, the main centre parties for radical parties, with the more Another theme that will be raised will be weakened and forced to adapt centrist parties losing ground. in this year’s campaign is the fuelling their agendas to the issues promoted by of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim radicals, diminishing the capacity for de- sentiments. This has been exemplified cision-making and efficient adoption of n the upcoming European elections, by the billboard campaign initiated by legislative initiatives. Russia will wish to exert an impact Viktor Orbán (featuring the photos of on the electoral campaign, focusing Jean-Claude Juncker and George Soros) Ion the largest EU member states and denouncing the Brussels elites and which have an influence on the shape and Brussels immigration policy as threaten- functioning of the EU and have the most ing the Hungarian state. The campaign representatives at the European Parlia- has been condemned by the European ment: Germany, France and Italy. Commission as false and manipulative. It is from Russians that we should These harmful narratives are effec- expect the greatest disinformation tive in that they exacerbate party con- threats through which they will attempt flicts, increase divisions and disrupt the to help pro-Russian and eurosceptic EP debate by spreading false political com- candidates. ments or quote comments out of context, Many mainstream political parties and in general distort the truth. which already are in the EP and will put The way this is materialising in up candidates in this year’s EP election Poland can be shown through the contro- have an agreement with Russian authori- versy surrounding an LGBTQ+ declara- ties for support in their activities. tion signed by the Mayor of Warsaw. The For example, there has been critical news being widely disseminated is Kremlin support for the populist Five inconsistent with the content of the actu- Star Movement proffering eurosceptic al declaration signed. Nevertheless, these views that undermine European unity, comments have reached 10.5 million on- with whom Poland’s Kukiz15 has joined line accounts and garnered 43 thousand forces in the EP electoral campaign. mentions. Also, the head of the French This also fits squarely into the narra- National Rally, Marine Le Pen, has begun tive promoted in the Russian media, which collaborating with the Italian Deputy presents the West as “morally rotten” and Prime Minister Matteo Salvini, thus cre- describing the alleged “moral migration” ating an ever increasing anti-European from the West to Russia – “Europeans are front in the parliamentary election, which seeking refuge in Russia from aggressive is gaining strength in Europe with the es- sexual education, homosexual dictatorship” tablishment of new Eurosceptic parties. reports Life, a Russian online news service. In Poland, the PolExit party has been registered by the current MEP Stanisław Żółtek, who says outright (as one might infer) that he wants Poland to leave the EU. In short, the results from disinformation Hence the mobilisation of anti-Eu- ropean and eurosceptic electorates in campaigns are intended to demobilise the respective countries will be one of the topics of disinformation activities. moderate electorate and mobilise the radicals.

19 Digital resilience Top Ten Tools

The EU has begun to address the very serious problem of online disinformation campaigns. However, the extent of the problem is vast and will require a concerted effort to maintain free elections on the continent.

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• The limitations on fact-check- • improving the effectiveness of Union whose specialised employees will train ing can be erased with emerging institutions in detecting and analys- civil servants. technologies. ing fake news In Poland, the Ministry of Digitisation • The fate of European democracy • introducing a rapid alert system to is considering the implementation of tech- could be in the hands of bots and expedite coordinated responses to nical solutions to combat disinformation, trolls. disinformation but as yet, there has been no announce- • Tools for fighting disinformation • engaging with online platform com- ment of establishing a specific institution. online already exist and need to panies to tackle disinformation The ministry wishes to rely main- be used more readily. • establishing multidisciplinary expert ly on the so-called soft measures such teams and holding seminars, con- as education, enhanced transparency of ferences and public debates, etc., in the content’s origin and sources of fund- Electoral Climate Change order to raise the digital literacy of ing though they are to offer support for Compared to 2014, this year’s European members of the media and the gen- self-regulatory measures, e.g. by online elections will be held in a very different eral public platforms, news distributors or journal- political and legal environment. Europe- Free and fair elections are the cor- ist and writing communities promot- ans need to assume a particular responsi- nerstone of the European democratic ing reliable and high-quality sources of bility in the area of defending democratic system, which is why ensuring protection information. procedures against foreign interference against disinformation is one of our key In many countries, private com- and illegal manipulation.The European tasks. panies and NGOs such as foundations Commission has prepared a set of meas- and think tanks are involved in combat- ures to protect free and fair European V4 response ing disinformation. And here is a set of election. In Czechia, a Centre Against Terrorism online tools to help you defend yourself Moreover, the December 2018 re- and Hybrid Threats has been established from the effects of disinformation. port added an action plan based on the as part of the Ministry of the Interior, following four pillars:

21 Top Here is a list of ten best tools and organisations committed to the10 fight against digitally amplified disinformation

Catch and Kill Exposing Authoritarianism

ABT SHIELD – A humble self-promotion, well-deserved. GMF – Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD) – a bipar- ABT Shield developed a functional, commercially available tisan, transatlantic initiative housed at The German Marshall service enabling every publisher and social medium to quick- Fund of the United States (GMF), develops comprehen- ly identify sources of disinformation, trolling and bot traffic. sive strategies to defend against, deter and raise the costs of The unique component of ABT Shield is that it singles out Russian and other state actors’ efforts to undermine democra- machines rather than users, the first of its kind. cy and democratic institutions. The Alliance works to publicly document and expose the ongoing efforts by Vladimir Putin and other authoritarian regimes to subvert democracy in the Fact-checking and Verification United States, in Europe, and globally.

AFP Fact Check – carried out by fact-checking editors and a worldwide network of journalists, following the editorial Crushing the Kremlin standards and key guiding principles of the AFP global news agency. They share tips and tools to help others carry out StopFake – a fact-checking website. The main goal of this fact-checking and verification. community was to monitor the media to check and debunk distorted news and propaganda related to the developments in Ukraine. After some time, the project became a news service, Worldwide Consortium where all forms of Kremlin propaganda are subject to in-depth scrutiny. Atlantic Council – DRFLab – Digital Forensic Research Lab. Catalysing a global network of digital forensic researchers, following conflicts in real time. Solutions based Journalism

Truly Media – is a unique web-based collaboration platform. The Spin-free Zone It has been designed to support the verification of digital (user-generated) content residing in social networks and else- BBC Reality Check – here the emphasis is on cutting through where. Truly Media was developed in very close collaboration the spin and concentrating on the facts. with journalists and human rights investigators, taking their demands and requirements fully into account. A Review of Disinformation Collaborating Platform EU vs DISinfo – This website is part of a campaign to better forecast, address and respond to pro-Kremlin disinformation University of Oxford – Computational Propaganda – inves- tigating the use of algorithms, automation, and computational propaganda in public life, studying both the bot scripts and the Swiping left on Disinfo people making such bots, and then work with computer sci- entists to improve the ways we catch and stop the bot activity. Le Monde Decodex – is a tool that helps check news circu- lating on the web and searches for falsities, manipulated and distorted news.

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23 How to detect a troll? Science behind trolls and bots hunting

An informative look at the world and tactics of those –– Long or even uninterrupted operation spreading disinformation and discontent as well as the –– Extraordinary performance or effectiveness institutional and private resources fighting against these –– Incredible rapidity of action disruptive forces. –– Surprising randomness • Trolls and botnets are constantly evolving their tech- –– Abnormal variability niques, so the fight against this activity must also use –– Specificity of human behaviour. the most cutting edge technologies. • Topics used by bots and trolls in the V4 range from Trolls – individuals engaging in trolling, which can be defined disparaging comments about EU elites to disinforma- as making comments intended to provoke conflict. In psycho- tion about the war in Ukraine. logical research, trolling is described as a psychological dys- • Civil society and online platforms are crucially impor- function related to personality traits. tant in the fight against disinformation. In a hybrid and state-sponsored war, one can distinguish between “classic trolls”, which pursue their own interest solely to sow discord and instigate conflict within the online com- he following article acts as a guide to understand more munity, and “hybrid trolls”, which are used as an information about the elements of trolling and use of bots – for bet- warfare tool by state entities. ter or worse – in the digital space. Both bot and normal ad activities are based on algo- T rithms which use online platforms to strengthen and facilitate Internet bot is an automated computer program intended to online content distribution. perform certain tasks online instead of a human being. Bot- or troll-based activities can be run by state or private entities, or by third countries and can be combined to Good bots Bad bots achieve shared goals. search engine bots impersonators In addition, they are amplified by botnets (a number of connected devices all running several bots for specified, commercial crawlers scrapers harmful purposes such as Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, feed fetchers spammers phishing, spam messages, ransomware, click fraud, etc.) and monitoring bots hacker tools collective trolling activity.

Real-world applications A great majority of bot-generated internet traffic comes from Examples of disinformation against Europe using the afore- those meant to mimic human behaviour. This enables them mentioned tools and focusing on the most topical political to assume a fake identity and influence real human beings’ developments and social issues are readily available. opinions and decisions. We can detect them based on their A good example would be the so-called “yellow vests” simple limitations: protests in France where an analysis of developments and on- 24 VIsegrad insight special edition 2 (14) | 2019 European Parliamentary #Futures

line activities shows classic disinformation measures in the –– the threat of Islamisation of Europe; social media consisting in promoting content from Russian –– support for extreme political views; language media with the hashtags #giletsjaunes #yellowvestes –– the attack on liberal values and NGOs that promote them; from fake Twitter accounts, which, according to French law –– promotion of xenophobic behaviours towards ethnic, na- enforcement services, sent 20 thousand fake news accounts tional and sexual minorities. about the protests. The purpose was to amplify the message In Czechia, disinformation campaigns are forcing false of the prevailing chaos and to show the West in a bad light. narratives about refugees, the Islamisation of Europe, crimes Similarly, during the Bundestag election in Germany, a committed by refugees, the war in Ukraine and showing EU country characterised by political stability, heightened activ- political elites and institutions as weak and divided. ity was observed from AFD’s network where anti-immigrant In Slovakia, disinformation efforts can be also found with content grew in quantity in social media using Russian lan- respect to the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East – especial- guage bots. In addition, the Russian platform Vkontakte (VK) ly operations in Syria – with more general falsehoods being got involved in the process, supporting the AFD message, and spread about the European Union, EU elites and institutions. attacking Chancellor Merkel for her attitude towards refugees In Hungary, these involve mainly anti-immigrant, an- and showing them as a threat to Germany. ti-European, anti-NATO, anti-American and anti-Ukrainian The attempts to exert pressure on the German election content that also shows Ukraine as a weak and badly governed were less pronounced than those focused on the French pres- country in turmoil. Moreover, one can also find attacks on idential election. There, bots were used on a large scale in pro- liberal values and NGOs that promote them. moting #MacronLeaks and the related content, which on the In Poland, a narrative about Polish-Ukrainian relations is eve of the election engaged nearly 100 thousand users. mainly spun, heating up the conflict over historical issues as Evidence indicates that during the referendum in well as a concerted attack against the EU and its institutions, Catalonia 87% of the 65 accounts that shared the most RT and with additional emphasis on denigrating Western values. Sputnik content about the independence of Catalonia were As evidenced by the above, there are topics shared by automated. More than 78% of the news items defended the the entire region, which are subject to disinformation efforts: independence of Catalonia and presented the Spanish state as European Union, EU institutions, EU political elites and war repressive and using brutal police behaviour. in Ukraine. The disinformation efforts undertaken may vary depend- ing on the country, but they mainly involve interference with Fighting back democratic processes and are aimed to: The set of measures aimed to counteract manipulation and –– create destabilisation; disinformation during the electoral processes (national and –– generate and amplify a sense of threat; European elections) have been the object of many discussions –– cause distrust in democratic institutions; with member states. –– promote extreme behaviours, opinions and emotions; In its efforts, the EU has also taken into account coop- –– ridicule, humiliate and discredit a political opponent; eration with NATO and the G7. A key role in the process of –– downplay a topic; counteracting disinformation to defend democratic systems –– force a narrative; is to be played by civil society and by online platforms – espe- –– influence public opinion; cially social media – which have become the major channels –– demobilise an opponent; for spreading disinformation. –– discourage public decisions; This phenomenon has reached a global dimension dur- –– attack ethnic, national and sexual minorities. ing the presidential campaign in the US, where fake news gar- Disinformation campaigns carried out by third countries nered the highest user engagement on Facebook. However, the are an element of hybrid warfare, which consists in combining largest online platforms – Facebook, Twitter, Google, YouTube the spreading of fake news and media spin with cyber attacks – have developed and adopted self-regulatory measures. and hacking of networks. Under the rather straightlaced moniker, this Code of Practice on Disinformation in effect in the EU deals with on- Trolls in the V4 line transparency: labelling advertisements sponsored by po- In our part of Europe, efforts to disinform are undertaken litical parties, identifying and closing down fake accounts and mainly by means of websites and on social media. We can find protecting citizens’ data, especially in the context of European shared topics and narratives for the entire region, which are Parliament election. subject to disinformation efforts. These include: Disinformation uses cutting-edge technologies and –– criticism of the European unity by attacking the EU elites tools which change fast and that is why institutional measures and institutions; adopted by the EU and member states must evolve just as rap- –– the war in Ukraine, where Ukraine is presented as a coun- idly while using the latest technologies. These measures must try in turmoil with weak political leadership; be also based on close collaboration between member states –– undermining of the trans-Atlantic relations; and EU institutions. –– stirring of anti-immigrant sentiment;

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Published by Res Publica Foundation Partner: Konrad Adenauer Foundation Supported by: ABTSHIELD

authors: Wojciech Przybylski, Editor-in-Chief rEAd MOrE AT Marcin Zaborowski, Senior Associate

team: Magda Jakubowska, Director of Operations Galan Dall, Managing Editor Anhelina Pryimak, Editorial Assistant visegradinsight.eu/EP2019 Anna Kulikowska-Kasper, Contributor Paweł Kuczyński, Illustrations Graphic Design

The Visegrad/Insight is the main platform of debate and analysis on Central Europe, that generates future policy directions for Europe from the region. It has been established in 2012 by the Res Publica Foundation – an independent think tank in Warsaw with its flagship Polish language publication Res Publica Nowa and the New Europe 100, a network of leaders of tomorrow.

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