Filing # 21110408 Electronically Filed 12/02/2014 09:56:42 AM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR COLLIER COUNTY, FLORIDA CIVIL DIVISION
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CITY OF NAPLES POLICE OFFICERS’ RETIREMENT TRUST FUND,
Plaintiff, v. CASE NO.: 14-2530-CA
NINA DIAZ-MONROIG, and IVETTE MONROIG,
Defendants. ______/
DEFENDANT IVETTE MONROIG’S ANSWER TO INTERPLEADER COMPLAINT
Defendant Ivette Monroig, by and through her undersigned attorneys, hereby files the following Answer and Affirmative Defenses/Claims in response to Plaintiff’s Interpleader
Complaint:
1. Admitted.
2. Admitted.
3. Admitted.
4. Admitted.
5. Admitted.
6. Admitted.
7. Admitted.
8. Defendant admits only that a lifetime monthly death benefit is payable from the
Fund to Defendant Ivette Monroig.
9. Admitted.
10. Admitted. 11. Defendant admits that the designation of Nina Diaz-Monroig as beneficiary was
voided upon Nina Diaz-Monroig’s divorce from Detective Monroig pursuant to § 732.703,
Florida Statutes.
12. Admitted.
13. Admitted.
14. Admitted.
15. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny this averment and
therefore denies same. Defendant is unable to identify an exhibit to the Complaint that is
identified as Exhibit F.
16. Admitted.
17. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny this averment and
therefore denies same.
18. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny this averment and
therefore denies same.
19. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny this averment and
therefore denies same.
20. Denied.
21. Defendant admits only that counsel for Defendant Ivette Monroig has agreed to
accept service of the pleading by email on behalf of Ivette Monroig.
22. Defendant admits only that counsel for Defendant has agreed to file a responsive
pleading within 20 days of the date of service.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND CLAIMS
23. As for her first affirmative defense and claim, Defendant Ivette Monroig asserts that the application of § 732.703(2), Florida Statutes, to the pre-divorce designation of Nina
- 2 - Diaz-Monroig as a beneficiary in the event of Detective Monroig’s death does not violate Article
1, §10 of the Florida Constitution. Section 732.703(9), Florida Statutes, expressly requires the retroactive application of § 732.703, Florida Statutes; to wit, subsection 9 of the Statute provides as follows: “This section applies to all designations made by or on behalf of decedents dying on or after July 1, 2012, regardless of when the designation was made.” § 732.703 (9), Florida
Statutes. Where the Legislature has expressly stated that a statute will have retroactive application, the trial court must follow the directive of the Legislature, unless it is demonstrated that such retroactive application of the statute impairs a vested right, creates a new obligation, or imposes a new penalty. See Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., Inc., 35 So. 3d 873 (Fla.
2010). Applied to the facts of this case, it is clear that § 732.703(2), Florida Statutes, does not impair a vested right belonging to Nina Diaz-Monroig. There are two reasons this is the case.
First, there can be no question that there is no unreasonable impairment of contractual obligations where the statute is not being retroactively applied.
A statute in place at the time of contracting cannot be in violation of this particular constitutional prohibition. This is so because the law imposes upon the marketplace a presumption that parties enter into contracts in contemplation of existing statutory and case law. That context becomes part of the bargain and thus cannot be relied on by either contracting party to avoid an obligation or enhance a remedy.
Cenvill Investors, Inc. v. Condominium Owners Organization of Century Village East, Inc., 556
So.2d 1197 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Here, § 732.703(2), Florida Statutes, became the law in
Florida on July 1, 2012; approximately eleven months before Nina Diaz-Monroig entered into a
Marital Settlement Agreement with Detective Monroig and approximately thirteen months before the Divorce Decree ending their marriage was entered. Since § 732.703(2), Florida
Statutes, pre-existed any and all putative agreements contained in the Marital Settlement
Agreement, the Statute is not being applied retroactively. Secondly, the provision in the Marital
Settlement Agreement wherein the parties agreed to split their respective pensions and fill out
- 3 - forms is in no way binding on the Plaintiff in this action since the only assignments of pension
benefits that would have been lawful were limited solely to alimony, and under the Divorce
Decree alimony was waived. See 29-326, City of Naples Code of Ordinances. Moreover, and
significantly, there was never any pension to split since Detective Monroig did not live long
enough to collect a pension. The fund that is object of this interpleader action is not a pension but rather a death benefit that does not belong to either Detective Monroig or to his estate.
Lastly, the decedent’s pre-divorce designation of beneficiary can in no way be characterized as a
contractual obligation or vested right that is impaired by § 732.703(2), Florida Statutes, as the
decedent was at all times during his marriage free to designate whoever he wished as his death
benefit beneficiary. Since § 732.703(2), Florida Statutes, does not violate Article 1, §10 of the
Florida Constitution, Nina Diaz-Monroig’s designation as a beneficiary is properly and lawfully
deemed to be void, thereby entitling Ivette Monroig to the interpleaded fund.
24. As for her second affirmative defense and claim, Defendant Ivette Monroig
asserts that even assuming, arguendo, Nina Diaz-Monroig had a vested right, any impairment of that right is constitutionally tolerable and does not unreasonably intrude into the parties’ bargain
to a degree greater than is necessary to achieve the statutory objective. See Pomponio v.
Claridge of Pompano Condominium, Inc., 378 So.2d 774 (Fla.1979) (to determine how much
impairment is tolerable, the court must conduct a balancing test). Since § 732.703(2), Florida
Statutes, does not violate Article 1, §10 of the Florida Constitution, Nina Diaz-Monroig’s
designation as a beneficiary is properly and lawfully deemed to be void, thereby entitling Ivette
Monroig to the interpleaded fund.
25. As for her third affirmative defense and claim, Defendant Ivette Monroig asserts
that the statutory identified events or circumstances under which the pre-divorce designation of a
spouse as beneficiary would not be rendered void under § 732.703(2), Florida Statutes, are
- 4 - inapplicable in this case and do not exempt Nina Diaz-Monroig’s designation from the express dictates of § 732.703(2), Florida Statutes. That is, the exceptions under § 732.703(4), Florida
Statutes, are simply not applicable in this case. Specifically, Detective Monroig never executed a designation of beneficiary after the divorce decree was entered; Detective Monroig died intestate, and the divorce decree did not require Detective Monroig to designate his former spouse as his death benefit beneficiary. Since the statutory exceptions to § 732.703(2), Florida
Statutes, are inapplicable Nina Diaz-Monroig’s designation as a beneficiary is properly and lawfully deemed to be void, thereby entitling Ivette Monroig to the interpleaded fund.
26. As for her fourth affirmative defense and claim, Defendant Ivette Monroig asserts that Ivette Monroig alone is lawfully entitled to the interpleaded fund because she was duly named as the contingent death benefit beneficiary whose entitlement to the fund proceeds vested precisely because the decedent’s interest in the fund passes as if the decedent’s former spouse predeceased the decedent. § 732.703(2), Florida Statutes.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Ivette Monroig respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter a judgment awarding Ivette Monroig the interpleaded death benefit fund, together with any other or further relief this Court deems proper.
DESIGNATION OF EMAIL ADDRESSES
Pursuant to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516 Defendant hereby files this
Designation of E-Mail Addresses for service of pleadings and documents in the instant action:
Primary E-mail: [email protected] Secondary E-mail: [email protected]
- 5 - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on December 2, 2014, I filed the foregoing Answer to Interpleader Complaint through the Florida Courts e-filing portal and served same on the following counsel via email: Michael A. Gillman, Esq. ([email protected]) and Raymond L. Bass Jr., Esq. ([email protected]).
Respectfully submitted, IVETTE MONROIG By her attorneys,
By: /s/ Richard J. Inglis Richard J. Inglis, FL Bar #618020 [email protected] FREIDIN & INGLIS, P.A. 2245 McGregor Boulevard Fort Myers, FL 33901 Tele: (239) 337-1918 Fax: (239) 322-1637
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