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Peace Operations and Common Sense: Replacing Rhetoric with Realism

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Peace Operations and Common Sense: Replacing Rhetoric with Realism PEACE OPERATIONS AND COMMON SENSE Replacing Rhetoric with Realism Denis McLean UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE CONTENTS Summary v Preface ix 1 Introduction 1 2 What Is and What Ain’t So 5 3 Fixing What’s Broke 15 4 A Question of Leadership 24 Notes 28 About the Author 29 About the Institute 31 v ever, will depend on the character of the political, not the military, commitment. The starting point for any mission should be a widely shared sense of collective political responsibility. Once that is pre- sent, the aims and objectives of the mission must be clearly defined so that the military and financial dispositions necessary to accomplish the agreed goals can be made. SUMMARY With the ending of the era of global superpower confrontation, new questions arise about the man- agement of violence at the local level. The aim is still to promote stability and prevent local prob- lems from spreading. But when and in what cir- cumstances is multilateral intervention justified? What level of force should the international com- munity authorize its troops to employ? Who should take the lead in orchestrating action? And who should contribute what to which operations? Policymakers need to revamp thinking about the way that peace operations are conducted and regarded. What is it that national military forces should and should not be called to do in pursuit of he shortcomings of several recent peace international solutions to multinational problems? operations have led many people to con- Agreed international operational procedures must Tclude that the whole concept is flawed and be established and rehearsed. This will call for inte- has little bearing on U.S. interests. The record, grated training, agreed doctrine, and common however, suggests that peace operations have not rules of engagement. No less important are only reduced instability in many parts of the globe changes in the way that peace operations are but have also been something of a minor boon to perceived. U.S. foreign policy. It is necessary to confront this strange gulf between Washington perceptions and What Is and What Ain’t So reality. Since 1948 peacekeeping techniques have been Complaints about peace operations and about U.S. steadily developed and tested in many trouble- involvement in them have been based on several spots. As a consequence, today the international common misapprehensions. community can choose from a broad spectrum of multilateral activities designed to forestall, dimin- - “Peace operations are at best marginal to ish, or end outbreaks of violence around the U.S. interests.” In fact, they reflect the tradi- world. What are here termed peace operations tional U.S. preference for collective action and run the gamut through six more or less distinct have demonstrably served U.S. interests well. types of civilian, civilian-military, or just plain mili- tary programs: from peacemaking and peacekeep- - “U.S. interests are best advanced by clear- ing, through reconstruction and protective cut unilateral action, not muddled multilat- engagement or containment, to deterrence and eral efforts.” Obviously, the United States can peace enforcement. Peace operations are no project force around the world if it so deter- panacea for the problems of the planet, but they do mines. But national interests may often be bet- offer flexible, low-key, low-cost options for the pur- ter served by sharing the burdens of action suit of national security and foreign policy inter- and by piloting international coalitions. ests. Peace operations provide military means in sup- - “Peace operations are expensive and militar- port of diplomatic ends. Success or failure, how- ily inefficient.” Peace operations are unique vi military arrangements. Despite sharp in- launch a peace operation intended to foster a creases in costs in recent years, the sums in- solution without the aggressive use of force. volved are still very small when seen against - national defense expenditures. Carefully de- “The United Nations is ineffective, wasteful, fined, smaller operations have been efficiently hostile to U.S. interests, and a challenge to conducted for the most part; some of the U.S. sovereignty.” This complaint is strenu- larger, “expanded” operations have lacked the ously made but poorly supported by realistic military means necessary to fulfill their man- analysis. The United Nations is a small organi- dates. zation by U.S. standards; its many bureau- cratic weaknesses are not signs of a unique - “The United States does too much in peace inadequacy or venality. The United States has operations and U.S. casualties are too high.” ample opportunity to lead, given its position After being largely absent during the Cold as the dominant actor in the Security Council. War, U.S. forces do now figure more promi- nently in peace operations, but the roles are Fixing What’s Broke widely shared with other nations. U.S. forces rarely come under direct UN command. Several recent peace operations have been marred Losses sustained in peacetime training acci- by conspicuous failures and shortcomings. Fixing dents are far higher than casualties during what’s broken will call for leadership and a new peace operations. sense of realism about the art of the possible in in- ternational intervention. Six requirements stand - “Peace operations are not a job for highly out. trained military people.” The military skills re- - To learn the lessons of Somalia and Bosnia. quired for peace operations may not be high- tech, but they are of the very essence of Clear-sighted and unequivocal political com- soldiering: discipline, effective command and mitment is the essential underpinning to mili- control, good communications, and restraint tary effectiveness. Only rarely will the in the use of force. international community wish to make war to solve a problem. Where there is a lesser level - “Resources allocated to peace operations of commitment, the military limitations must will detract from the overall readiness of the be seen and accepted. U.S. armed forces.” U.S. capabilities to project - To continue with reforms already under way. power around the world are a global strategic Restructuring of the UN Department of Peace- asset and should not be compromised. At the keeping Operations, codification of peace- same time, many military people maintain that keeping doctrine, and elaboration of new active engagement with a real-life set of prob- logistics procedures have introduced a new lems in peace operations is invaluable training purposefulness. Efforts in this direction in itself. The key is to make peace operations should be stepped up. and overall force development mutually sup- portive. - To establish a UN Military Coordination Committee. International military advice - “Because peace operations can’t punish the needs to be more closely coordinated and bet- aggressors or restore order they are not ter communicated to the Security Council. worth undertaking.” The question is one of will. When the international community - To face the problem of the “Mogadishu line.” wishes to respond to aggression, it can and Where hostile, well-armed opposition may try will do so, especially if there is decisive leader- to obstruct a peace operation, its forces must ship—as Desert Storm demonstrated. Most be so equipped and authorized as to be able to times the only feasible response will be to defend themselves and their mandate. vii - To further an international division of labor in A Question of Leadership peace operations. The best use must be made of the capabilities of the largest number of The chance exists to demonstrate—to the satisfac- countries. tion of politicians and public alike—that peace operations can be both a subtle and a cost-effective - To reallocate financial responsibilities. For the national security option. By building in procedures U.S. share of UN peacekeeping costs to be for a graduated response to violence, peace opera- scaled back to the more realistic and appropri- tions can be made more effective than in the past. ate level of 25 percent, as Congress intends, it The United States cannot and should not be ex- is necessary to adjust levies across the board in pected to police the world. The United States can, conformity with new levels of national wealth. however, be expected to provide the necessary leadership and impetus to shape peace operations into an increasingly useful international instru- ment. Multilateral peace operations can only deal with a part of the plague of terrorism, violence, and ix t times during the past year it has seemed that peace operations are more at risk in AWashington than in the field. “Peacekeep- ing” is widely dismissed as a broken reed: ineffec- tive and with little bearing on U.S. interests. The record, in fact, suggests otherwise. The progressive instability around the world. But only development of the concept of peace operations through collective action can the interna- has been something of a minor boon to U.S. for- tional community give resolute backing to eign policy. The strange gulf between Washington its commitments to international law and perceptions and reality is examined in this study. uphold civilized norms and standards. Where do peace operations fit on the national security canvas? It is suggested here that, far from being marginal to U.S. concerns, peace opera- tions—representing pragmatic, casualty-averse, controlled responses to seemingly endemic vio- lence in the world—have the potential to become the primary institutional vehicle for collective se- curity initiatives. At a time of widespread fragmen- tation, it is well to ponder the inherent risks if political support for collective action is lost. Clearly, some recent peace operations have PREFACE come badly unstuck; equally plainly, intervention under UN direction and control is fraught with dif- ficulty. Why, then, bother to participate in peace operations? What, bluntly, is in it for us? Peace op- erations, to be sure, will not solve the great strate- gic issues of the day.
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