DOCSLIB.ORG

Hong Kong Magazine

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Hong Kong Magazine SPECIAL EDITION I FEBRUARY 2021 CHINA US FOCUS DIGEST THE WAY FORWARD CHINA US FOCUS CONTENTS Tung Chee Hwa Tung Chee-hwa Chairman P. 5 China-United States Exchange Foundation ACKNOWLEDGEMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY P. 6 Editors Zhang Ping Hong Chang International Voices Special Advisor Zhu Yinghuang AT A CRITICAL CROSSROADS P. 10 Zeng Peiyan Assistant Editor Peng Hui TALKING ALONG THE PATH P. 15 China-US Focus Digest is a bi-monthly AHEAD magazine of exclusive commentaries on Jean Chretien China-US relations. The articles express views of influential opinion leaders and scholars in China and the US on the issues faced by the two nations. HOPEFUL RETURN TO P. 17 c China-United States GLOBAL DIALOGUE Romano Prodi Exchange Foundation, 2021 For comments, please send to [email protected] CHINA HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE P. 20 AS WORLD STRUGGLES Yasuo Fukuda www.chinausfocus.com TIME TO RENEW FRIENDSHIP P. 23 Follow us on Facebook and Twitter: @ChinaUSFocus Carlos Gutierrez With special thanks to Chatham Strategies and Shanghai Institutes for International Studies GOOD NEWS IN UNITED P. 26 for their supports to www.chinausfocus.com STATES and China-US Focus Digest Carla Hills 2 A TIME TO HEAL TIME TO SAY FAREWELL P. 29 P.61 TO NEGATIVES Chen Wenling Tung Chee-hwa NOTES FROM AMERICA’S P. 63 HEARTLAND Bob Holden Trade and the Economy HOPE, BUT NOT HASTE P. 65 DON’T EXPECT HIGH-SPEED P. 32 Wang Yiming CHANGE Michael Spence SUPPORT FOR A GOOD IDEA P. 67 Zhu Guangyao LOOKING AHEAD IN 2021 P. 36 Zhang Xiaoqiang Technology and Global Challenges WHAT TO DO FIRST P. 40 Myron Brilliant STANDARDS FOR SCIENCE COOPERATION P. 69 PRESS THE PAUSE BUTTON P. 44 Kishore Mahbubani Steven Chu PERCEPTIONS MATTER P. 47 CONVERTING RIVALRY INTO P. 73 Xu Bu WIN-WIN COOPERATION Xie Zhenhua A GOOD TIME TO ACT P. 49 Zhang Yuyan DEALING WITH HIGH-TECH P. 77 GLOBAL CHALLENGES KEY AREAS TO COOPERATE IN P. 51 He Yafei MACRO POLICY Zhu Min MUCH TO GAIN THROUGH P. 80 SMALL MOVES A NEW HISTORICAL STAGE P. 53 Miao Wei Bi Jingquan A TIME FOR TRUST P. 83 PICK THE LOW FRUIT. BUT THEN P. 56 Bill Owens WHAT? Stephen Roach A NUCLEAR POWER PROJECT P. 85 HOLDS ANSWERS WHICH PATH TO CHOOSE? P. 59 Wang Binghua Craig Allen WWW.CHINAUSFOCUS.COM SPECIAL EDITION I FEBRUARY 2021 3 People-to-People Exchange WHO ARE TODAY’S PING-PONG DIPLOMATS? P. 87 Stephen Orlins THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE P.90 Wang Chao ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS P. 93 Max Baucus PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE ENGAGEMENT IS POWERFUL P. 95 Neil Bush BUILD BACK BETTER P. 96 David Firestein THE OLD PATH OR THE NEW? P. 100 Lin Songtian THE ECONOMIC MAGIC OF TOURISM P. 103 Shao Qiwei EXERTING INFLUENCE AND BEING INFLUENCED P. 106 John Zhao Note: From January 26 to 28, China-United States Exchange Foundation partnered up with the China Center for International Economic Exchanges (CCIEE) for an online inter- national forum on China-U.S. relations. The conference brought together more than 40 global leaders and experts to examine key challenges and areas of cooperation fa- cing the United States and China. In this special issue of the Digest, we aim to capture the forum in its entirety, with the publication of the remarks by the keynote speakers and panelists. The transcripts have been lightly edited for clarity. This year’s webinar can also be found at www.chinausfocus.com/special/2021forum 4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Tung Chee-hwa Chairman of the China-United States Exchange Foundation; Vice Chairman of the 13th CPPCC National Committee; Former Chief Executive of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Second, I want to thank all the partici- pants for watching or listening in. I hope the discussions in the past few days have been helpful to you — in understanding the challenges and what should be done to put the China-U.S. relationship back on the road to progress. Indeed, our many speakers and panelists have pointed out what should be done. If I were to summarize the thoughts expres- sed in these three days, I’d say: Return to the dialogue table. Restore respect and trust. Allow competition and coopera- tion to coexist. Think about the deve- loping countries and low-income people that need help. Know that all mankind lives on this same planet and all share a common destiny. ACT now! The road is not easy, but together we’ll First of all, I want to thank all the spea- find a way. One discussion is never suffi- kers who joined us in this event. Do you cient. Changes of circumstances will re- know that our speakers were actually quire us to revisit the issues and rethink. spread out in nine different time zones? When the pandemic and travel restric- Our European friends dialed in at 2 am in tions are over, I’d be happy to host this the morning. My great appreciation to all, forum again. We can then meet, face to for your sacrifice and your contributions. face, in this wonderful city of Hong Kong. WWW.CHINAUSFOCUS.COM SPECIAL EDITION I FEBRUARY 2021 5 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY After a challenging year in which the Asia-Pacific countries. They came to- world was tested by the impacts of CO- gether to address the current challenges VID-19, global leaders and experts re- facing bilateral relations. The discussi- cognized the unprecedented changes on focused on how China and the U.S. facing the United States-China relati- should move forward in light of the new onship and urged the two countries to U.S. administration and used the oppor- work together to usher stability and se- tunity to identify areas of cooperation curity back into the international com- between the two countries to tackle glo- munity. Following the inauguration of bal challenges, including climate chan- President Joe Biden in the United States, ge, the environment, food security, cy- distinguished experts gathered virtually bersecurity and COVID-19. over three days, Jan. 26 to 28, 2021, to assess the future of bilateral relations. Former prime minister of Japan Yasuo They examined key issues and areas Fukuda stressed that less division and of cooperation in the CUSEF’s second instability is something all nations are international forum themed “The Way seeking, given the risks and problems Forward,” co-hosted by the China Cen- that need to be resolved immediately ter for International Economic Exchan- and which cannot be solved without the ges (CCIEE). support of the U.S. and its leadership, especially in international trade and Last year was a year of unprecedented finance. However, he noted, “The U.S. turmoil in which the pandemic sent hu- must first contain its biggest issue — manity a message: The world is funda- COVID-19 — before it can help the rest mentally changing, and the U.S.-China of the world.” relationship remains crucial. The “Hong Kong Forum on U.S.-China Relations” Aside from the pandemic, speakers con- featured more than 40 past and current veyed their desire for progress through major stakeholders and influencers, in- continued dialogue between U.S. and cluding former prime minister of Japan Chinese officials. Although there was a Yasuo Fukuda, CCIEE Chairman and general sense of optimism around the former vice premier of the People’s new U.S. administration, speakers also Republic of China Zeng Peiyan, former spoke candidly about the challenges prime minister of Italy and former pre- that will remain on both sides, while sident of the European Commission Ro- emphasizing the importance of global mano Prodi, former Prime Minister of governance during an era of heighte- Canada Jean Chretien, former U.S. se- ned risk. “I don’t think there will be a cretary of commerce Carlos Gutierrez, major change in China-U.S. relations current government officials, senior despite the new administration. Howe- business leaders and renowned scholars ver, there will be more dialogue,” said from the United States, China and other Romano Prodi, former prime minister 6 of Italy and former president of the Euro- my, they become your enemy,” he said. pean Commission. “The tensions within “We are not an enemy of China, and I don’t the U.S. and competition with China are think China is an enemy of us. Words mat- prevalent among both the Republicans ter.” Former U.S. Trade Representative and Democrats. Thus, there will be a ne- Carla Hills expressed a similar sentiment, cessity for deeper dialogue and exchange predicting that there will be significant of views.” changes in how the U.S. handles its inter- national relationships. Under Biden, she This exchange of views must happen “not said, “The tone in which we deal with all just by words but by deeds,” said former international governments, including Chi- U.S senator and former. ambassador to na, will be more diplomatic.” China Max Baucus. Although the futu- re of the relationship remains uncertain, Both President Xi Jinping and President President of the Chinese People’s Institu- Joe Biden were the topic of several discus- te of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA) Wang Chao sions during the forum. Tung Chee-hwa, expressed confidence in the foundation founder and chairman of the CUSEF, out- of U.S.-China relations, which has been lined how the two countries share mutu- “built through our joint efforts over gene- al goals and underscored the need for all rations.” He added that goodwill remains nations to abide by the same rules-based unchanged and that cooperation will pre- system. He noted that China will work to vail.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Bretton Woods II and the Emerging Economies: Lazarus, Phoenix, Or Humpty Dumpty?
    DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS Working Paper Bretton Woods II and the Emerging Economies: Lazarus, Phoenix, or Humpty Dumpty? by Arslan Razmi Working Paper 2009-02 Revised version, April 2009 UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST Bretton Woods II and the Emerging Economies: Lazarus, Phoenix, or Humpty Dumpty? Arslan Razmi 824 Thompson Hall, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003 April 8, 2009 Abstract Several studies have commented on the emergence of a new inter- national monetary system in the post-Asian crisis years. The current international …nancial crisis has, however, put Bretton Woods II under considerable strain. This paper analyzes the sustainability of the pre- crisis order from an emerging country perspective. A simple framework in which agents have a choice between …nancial and real assets is constructed in order to explore possible consequences of the shocks that emerging economies are currently experiencing. Stock and ‡ow implications are analyzed. Assuming that recent events would have reinforced monetary authorities’desire to maintain an adequate cushion of reserves while pre- venting exchange rate volatility, we …nd that the response to most shocks would involve running continuous current account surpluses, that is, a continuation of a crucial aspect of Bretton Woods II. Given political and economic constraints, is such a continuation feasible? A preliminary ex- ploration raises serious doubts and skims alternatives. JEL Codes: F02, F32, G01, F55 Keywords: Bretton Woods II, emerging economies, reserve accumulation, precautionary motives, mercantilism. 1 Bretton Woods II and the Emerging Economies: Lazarus, Phoenix, or Humpty Dumpty? 1 Introduction The ongoing …nancial - and now increasingly, real - sector crisis that originated in the United States is presently the center of much academic and policy discussion.
    [Show full text]
  • Hong Kong SAR
    China Data Supplement November 2006 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC 30 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership 37 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries 47 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations 50 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR 54 Political, Social and Economic Data LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR 61 Political, Social and Economic Data LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan 65 Political, Social and Economic Data LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Affairs Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 November 2006 The Main National Leadership of the PRC LIU Jen-Kai Abbreviations and Explanatory Notes CCP CC Chinese Communist Party Central Committee CCa Central Committee, alternate member CCm Central Committee, member CCSm Central Committee Secretariat, member PBa Politburo, alternate member PBm Politburo, member Cdr. Commander Chp. Chairperson CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference CYL Communist Youth League Dep. P.C. Deputy Political Commissar Dir. Director exec. executive f female Gen.Man. General Manager Gen.Sec. General Secretary Hon.Chp. Honorary Chairperson H.V.-Chp. Honorary Vice-Chairperson MPC Municipal People’s Congress NPC National People’s Congress PCC Political Consultative Conference PLA People’s Liberation Army Pol.Com.
    [Show full text]
  • Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
    China Data Supplement May 2007 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC .......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 30 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 37 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 42 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 44 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR ................................................................................................................ 45 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR ....................................................................................................................... 52 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 56 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 May 2007 The Main National Leadership of the PRC
    [Show full text]
  • The Mishu Phenomenon: Patron-Client Ties and Coalition-Building Tactics
    Li, China Leadership Monitor No.4 The Mishu Phenomenon: Patron-Client Ties and Coalition-Building Tactics Cheng Li China’s ongoing political succession has been filled with paradoxes. Jockeying for power among various factions has been fervent and protracted, but the power struggle has not led to a systemic crisis as it did during the reigns of Mao and Deng. While nepotism and favoritism in elite recruitment have become prevalent, educational credentials and technical expertise are also essential. Regional representation has gained importance in the selection of Central Committee members, but leaders who come from coastal regions will likely dominate the new Politburo. Regulations such as term limits and an age requirement for retirement have been implemented at various levels of the Chinese leadership, but these rules and norms will perhaps not restrain the power of Jiang Zemin, the 76-year-old “new paramount leader.” While the military’s influence on political succession has declined during the past decade, the Central Military Commission is still very powerful. Not surprisingly, these paradoxical developments have led students of Chinese politics to reach contrasting assessments of the nature of this political succession, the competence of the new leadership, and the implications of these factors for China’s future. This diversity of views is particularly evident regarding the ubiquitous role of mishu in the Chinese leadership. The term mishu, which literally means “secretary” in Chinese, refers to a range of people who differ significantly from each other in terms of the functions they fulfill, the leadership bodies they serve, and the responsibilities given to them.
    [Show full text]
  • Responses to Agrarian Transition in Central Asia Reaktionen Auf Die Agrartransformation in Zentralasien
    Responses to Agrarian Transition in Central Asia Reaktionen auf die Agrartransformation in Zentralasien Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Agrarwissenschaften (Dr. agr.) der Naturwissenschaftlichen Fakultät III Agrar und Ernährungswissenschaften, Geowissenschaften und Informatik der Martin Luther Universität Halle Wittenberg vorgelegt von Frau Nozilakhon Mukhamedova Geb. am 05.08.1982 in Moskau (Russland) Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Martin Petrick Prof. Dr. Kristof Van Assche Eröffnung: 25.03.2019 Verteidigung: 15.07.2019 Halle 2019 Abstract For nearly three decades, the Central Asian countries have been undergoing transition. The common goal of diversion from the Soviet political and economic system has been less prominent recently. The new challenge is how to build further a development path which depends not only on decisions of speed or content of reforms, but also on how these reforms were accepted and responded to by rural actors, what were the consequences and how they interacted with other socio- economic, historical and cultural factors. It is important to consider not only whether reforms reached their direct recipients, but also how other actors, institutions or contexts influenced, interacted and produced changes. The motivation of the dissertation is driven by various responses of rural societies to agrarian transition, which we find carry common institutional patterns. The research presented in this dissertation aims at understanding whether agrarian reforms rely on formal institutions or were adversely/positively affected by informal ones or rule of power. We address this question through describing and comparing cases of institutional changes in the agrarian sector of three economies in transition: Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. We assume that historical experiences, policy and power legacies can frame agrarian institutions and actions as well as behaviors of rural dwellers.
    [Show full text]
  • Chinese Politics in the Xi Jingping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership
    CHAPTER 1 Governance Collective Leadership Revisited Th ings don’t have to be or look identical in order to be balanced or equal. ⃺ڄ Maya Lin — his book examines how the structure and dynamics of the leadership of Tthe Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have evolved in response to the chal- lenges the party has confronted since the late 1990s. Th is study pays special attention to the issue of leadership se lection and composition, which is a per- petual concern in Chinese politics. Using both quantitative and qualitative analyses, this volume assesses the changing nature of elite recruitment, the generational attributes of the leadership, the checks and balances between competing po liti cal co ali tions or factions, the behavioral patterns and insti- tutional constraints of heavyweight politicians in the collective leadership, and the interplay between elite politics and broad changes in Chinese society. Th is study also links new trends in elite politics to emerging currents within the Chinese intellectual discourse on the tension between strongman politics and collective leadership and its implications for po liti cal reforms. A systematic analy sis of these developments— and some seeming contradictions— will help shed valuable light on how the world’s most populous country will be governed in the remaining years of the Xi Jinping era and beyond. Th is study argues that the survival of the CCP regime in the wake of major po liti cal crises such as the Bo Xilai episode and rampant offi cial cor- ruption is not due to “authoritarian resilience”— the capacity of the Chinese communist system to resist po liti cal and institutional changes—as some foreign China analysts have theorized.
    [Show full text]
  • The Wen Jiabao Administration and Macroeconomic Recontrol
    Hunkering Down: The Wen Jiabao Administration and Macroeconomic Recontrol Barry Naughton Introduction On April 26, 2004, the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) convened and agreed to strengthen macroeconomic contractionary policies dramatically. A blizzard of meetings and activities ensued, which included the imposition of significant administrative controls over investment and land use. Within four days, the State Development and Reform Commission (SDRC)—the former State Planning Commission—issued an urgent directive ordering the suspension and reinspection of thousands of investment projects. These steps represent a dramatic reorientation of Chinese macroeconomic policy. They have a significant political impact, bringing new leaders into the core of the economic decision-making process and shifting overall economic policy in a slightly more conservative direction. Of course, these measures also have a very important economic impact. If they do not represent a step backward, they at least indicate that existing approaches to economic policy, those in place through the first year of the Wen administration, have failed to achieve their objectives. In this piece I first describe the most important policy measures instituted; then I trace these measures’ political implications and conclude by discussing their economic implications. Background During its first year in power from March 2003 to March 2004, the Wen Jiabao administration had a relatively smooth experience in economic policymaking. Economic growth was strong and accelerating, powered by rapid export growth and the brisk development of new domestic markets. It is true that the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) crisis thoroughly disrupted the economy and government in spring 2003, and worries about economic overheating have been present from the first day of the new administration.
    [Show full text]
  • The CCP Central Committee's Leading Small Groups Alice Miller
    Miller, China Leadership Monitor, No. 26 The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups Alice Miller For several decades, the Chinese leadership has used informal bodies called “leading small groups” to advise the Party Politburo on policy and to coordinate implementation of policy decisions made by the Politburo and supervised by the Secretariat. Because these groups deal with sensitive leadership processes, PRC media refer to them very rarely, and almost never publicize lists of their members on a current basis. Even the limited accessible view of these groups and their evolution, however, offers insight into the structure of power and working relationships of the top Party leadership under Hu Jintao. A listing of the Central Committee “leading groups” (lingdao xiaozu 领导小组), or just “small groups” (xiaozu 小组), that are directly subordinate to the Party Secretariat and report to the Politburo and its Standing Committee and their members is appended to this article. First created in 1958, these groups are never incorporated into publicly available charts or explanations of Party institutions on a current basis. PRC media occasionally refer to them in the course of reporting on leadership policy processes, and they sometimes mention a leader’s membership in one of them. The only instance in the entire post-Mao era in which PRC media listed the current members of any of these groups was on 2003, when the PRC-controlled Hong Kong newspaper Wen Wei Po publicized a membership list of the Central Committee Taiwan Work Leading Small Group. (Wen Wei Po, 26 December 2003) This has meant that even basic insight into these groups’ current roles and their membership requires painstaking compilation of the occasional references to them in PRC media.
    [Show full text]
  • China Data Supplement January 2007
    China Data Supplement January 2007 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC 30 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership 37 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries 55 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations 57 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR 62 Political, Social and Economic Data LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR 69 Political, Social and Economic Data LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan 73 Political, Social and Economic Data LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 January 2007 The Main National Leadership of the PRC LIU Jen-Kai Abbreviations and Explanatory Notes CCP CC Chinese Communist Party Central Committee CCa Central Committee, alternate member CCm Central Committee, member CCSm Central Committee Secretariat, member PBa Politburo, alternate member PBm Politburo, member BoD Board of Directors Cdr. Commander CEO Chief Executive Officer Chp. Chairperson COO Chief Operating Officer CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference CYL Communist Youth League Dep.Cdr. Deputy Commander Dep. P.C. Deputy Political Commissar Dir. Director exec. executive f female Gen.Man. General Manager Hon.Chp. Honorary Chairperson Hon.V.-Chp. Honorary Vice-Chairperson MPC Municipal People’s Congress NPC National People’s Congress PCC Political Consultative Conference PLA People’s Liberation Army Pol.Com.
    [Show full text]
  • 10Th European Country of Origin Information Seminar 1-2 December 2005, Budapest
    10th European Country of Origin Information Seminar 1-2 December 2005, Budapest China The views and opinions stated in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the organisers of the workshop. This paper is not, and does not purport to be, fully exhaustive with regard to conditions in the country surveyed, or conclusive as to the merits of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. The statements in the report do not represent an opinion of the Austrian Red Cross on the political situation in the country. page I. China Country Profile 2 II. Important Aspects on Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China 5 III. Selected documents 27 IV. Maps 29 Report published: 17 March 2006 organised by ACCORD, HHC & UNHCR co-financed by the ERF 2004 1 10th COI Seminar 2005 1-2 Dec Budapest I. China Country Profile Country name: conventional long form: People’s Republic of China conventional short form: China local long form: Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo local short form: Zhong Guo abbreviation: PRC Capital: Beijing Area: 9’596’960 sq km Population: 1’306’313’812 (July 2005 est.) Ethnic Groups: The largest ethnic group is the Han Chinese, who constitute about 91.9% of the total population. The remaining 8.1% are Zhuang (16 million), Manchu (10 million), Hui (9 million), Miao (8 million), Uygur (7 million), Yi (7 million), Mongolian (5 million), Tibetan (5 million), Buyi (3 million), Korean (2 million), and other ethnic minorities. Religions: Daoist (Taoist), Buddhist, Muslim 1%-2%, Christian 3%-4% note: officially atheist (2002 est.)
    [Show full text]
  • Projecting the Next Politburo Standing Committee
    Projecting the Next Politburo Standing Committee Alice Miller1 Analysis of appointments to the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party shows that over the past two decades three simple rules have been followed. These rules offer a means to project appointments to the Standing Committee at the upcoming 19th Party Congress in 2017. Whether in fact the Xi leadership follows the precedents set down in past appointments or instead sets them aside offers a key benchmark against which to assess Xi Jinping’s strength as party leader. The Politburo Standing Committee has been the party’s key decision-making body since the beginning of the reform era in the late 1970s. Appointments to the body are routinely made at the party’s national congress, held every five years, and the subsequent first plenum of the new Central Committee appointed by the party congress. The party has never publicly explained how it makes decisions as to whom it appoints to the Politburo Standing Committee. Observers outside the party in China, Hong Kong, and elsewhere have filled this information vacuum with speculation based on presumptions of factional competition, bargaining among factional chieftains, and intense jockeying among potential candidates in the run-up to a party congress. Three Rules Close analysis of Standing Committee appointments over the past four party congresses, however, sheds different light on leadership procedures in this highly sensitive area. Specifically, examination of Standing Committee leader retirements and appointments at the 1997 15th, 2002 16th, 2007 17th, and 2012 18th Party Congresses shows that three basic rules have been followed: • First, retirement of both Standing Committee and regular members of the Politburo has followed a defined age limit.
    [Show full text]
  • Xi Jinping's Inner Circle (Part 2: Friends from Xi's Formative Years)
    Xi Jinping’s Inner Circle (Part 2: Friends from Xi’s Formative Years) Cheng Li The dominance of Jiang Zemin’s political allies in the current Politburo Standing Committee has enabled Xi Jinping, who is a protégé of Jiang, to pursue an ambitious reform agenda during his first term. The effectiveness of Xi’s policies and the political legacy of his leadership, however, will depend significantly on the political positioning of Xi’s own protégés, both now and during his second term. The second article in this series examines Xi’s longtime friends—the political confidants Xi met during his formative years, and to whom he has remained close over the past several decades. For Xi, these friends are more trustworthy than political allies whose bonds with Xi were built primarily on shared factional association. Some of these confidants will likely play crucial roles in helping Xi handle the daunting challenges of the future (and may already be helping him now). An analysis of Xi’s most trusted associates will not only identify some of the rising stars in the next round of leadership turnover in China, but will also help characterize the political orientation and worldview of the influential figures in Xi’s most trusted inner circle. “Who are our enemies? Who are our friends?” In the early years of the Chinese Communist movement, Mao Zedong considered this “a question of first importance for the revolution.” 1 This question may be even more consequential today, for Xi Jinping, China’s new top leader, than at any other time in the past three decades.
    [Show full text]