Transatlantic Relations and Peace in Europe
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Transatlantic relations and peace in Europe DAVID S. YOST* What are the foundations of political order and peace in Europe? Various Euro- pean observers have argued that US leadership and protection have pacified and stabilized the region by constraining rivalry for primacy among the leading powers in NATO Europe. In 1992 Manfred Wörner, the former German minis- ter of defence then serving as NATO’s secretary-general, said, ‘If the United States disengages, I foresee a certain temptation for Western European nations to revert to past patterns of power politics.’1 Wörner’s apprehension has rarely been examined in depth. Besides being speculative and scenario-dependent, the topic appears distasteful and repellent. However, as a mental exercise, a Gedankenexperiment, it deserves attention. As a º starting point, this article critically examines a recent novel that explores what might happen in Europe without NATO and US security commitments. It then reviews various theories regarding the origins of peace among the member states of the European Union. It points out that, thanks in large part to the Atlantic alliance and US security policies, the European integration movement has advanced under comparatively propitious international circumstances. The EU’s ability to deal with major external security challenges and maintain its political cohesion without US military support is therefore debatable. Notwithstanding the EU’s achievements and other peace-promoting develop- ments in Europe, the challenges and uncertainties that would face Europe without NATO argue that the alliance remains an essential underpinning of political order in Europe. Indeed, NATO continues to serve as an indispensable basis for pursuing constructive policies throughout the Euro-Atlantic region, notably in relations with Russia and Ukraine. Moreover, the alliance can serve as a key element in the * The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not represent those of the Department of the Navy or any US government agency. Special thanks are owed to those who commented on earlier drafts of this article, though they naturally bear no responsibility for the views expressed: Jim Bergeron, Robert Chatterton Dickson, Pieter Cobelens, Thérèse Delpech, James de Waal, Michael Durnan, Pierre Hassner, Karl-Heinz Kamp, Sorin Lungu, Alexander Moens, Uwe Nerlich, Peter Pavilionis, Joseph Pilat, Douglas Porch, Michael Quinlan, Bruno Racine, Tjarck Roessler, Michael Rühle, Diego Ruiz Palmer, Paul Schulte, Robert Silano, Justin Vaïsse and Gabriele Wight. 1 Wörner, cited in Alan Riding, ‘At East–West crossroads, western Europe hesitates’, New York Times, 25 March 1992, p. A6. International Affairs 78, () ‒ 277 INTA78_2_04_Yost 277 1/3/02, 2:21 pm David S. Yost campaigns against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To revitalize the alliance, however, it is imperative that the Europeans improve their military capabilities and acquire the means necessary for a more balanced transatlantic partnership in maintaining international security. In this way the European allies can maintain their influence and ensure that NATO and Euro- pean political–military contributions remain highly valued by the United States. The novelist’s scenario A recently retired flag-rank armaments engineer, an ingénieur général de l’arme- ment who served in London, Washington and Brussels and who directed the French defence ministry’s Centre des Hautes Etudes de l’Armement, Alain Crémieux has written an absorbing and thought-provoking novel. The title, Quand les ‘Ricains’ repartiront, might be translated as ‘When the Yanks go home’.2 While the novel is not representative of the mainstream of contemporary French opinion, it provides an intriguing point of departure for thinking about the foundations of political order in Europe. Crémieux’s exercise in essai-fiction géopolitique (the name for this literary genre suggested on the book’s cover) explores a possible near-term future. Some dys- topian novels—such as 1984 and Brave New World—have conveyed impressions about prospective international political orders, but in the distant future.3 Crémieux’s novel has the exceptional quality of concocting an international political scenario in the immediate future, with many details and characters (including French president Jacques Chirac and British prime minister Tony Blair) drawn from the current political scene. Published in March 2000, the novel consists of fictional diary entries beginning in May 2000. The diary entries offer a window on the unfolding dark events. The story gains verisimilitude through the wealth of details, several of them plausible, notably about risks of strategic-scale terrorism. Beyond this narrative value, the novel raises funda- mental questions about the role of the United States and transatlantic security commitments in maintaining peace in Europe. While some leaders of major powers are familiar, the diarist reports some changes. Gerhard Schröder, the German chancellor, is succeeded in the fall of 2000 by a leader with the remarkable name of Faust. George W. Bush drops out of the US presidential race and another Republican, Howard Cabot Lodge, wins the November 2000 election. Terrorists strike major blows against the United States on 1 January 2001. They even hit the Pentagon, and ‘commentators are astonished that the capital 2 Alain Crémieux, Quand les ‘Ricains’ repartiront: Le journal imaginaire du nouveau millénaire (Boofzheim, France: ACM Edition, 2000). 193pp. FFr100. ISBN 2–84087–108–4. 3 George Orwell considered The Last Man in Europe as a title, but chose to switch the final digits of the year in which he finished writing the book—1948. Michael Shelden, Orwell: the authorized biography (London: Heinemann, 1991), p. 473. When Aldous Huxley wrote Brave New World in 1931, he forecast circumstances in what he termed ‘the sixth or seventh century A.F. (After Ford)’. Huxley, Brave New World revisited (New York: Bantam, 1960), p. 1. 278 INTA78_2_04_Yost 278 1/3/02, 2:21 pm Transatlantic relations and peace in Europe of the United States was not better protected against aerial attack.’4 The Thousand Soldiers of God, a home-grown and heavily armed religious sect obsessed with numerological interpretations of the Bible, operated from remote locations in West- ern states and struck on what they considered the first day of the new millennium. President Lodge announces on 2 March 2001 that the United States has since 1945 been too preoccupied with external affairs, to the neglect of its internal order. As a result, Lodge declares, America will disengage from most foreign security commitments, and will maintain close relations with only eight countries: Canada, Ireland, Israel, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the United Kingdom. Lodge orders all US forces deployed overseas to return home, except for those at Guantanamo Bay and possibly the United Kingdom. This means the end of NATO. ‘The epoch when one could call the Americans to the rescue when Europe did not succeed in resolving its problems in Bosnia or Kosovo is over. If something goes wrong tomorrow, somewhere between the Atlantic and the Urals, we Europeans will have to deal with it ourselves.’5 Numerous tensions arise quickly.6 Greek–Turkish disputes involve not only Cyprus, but also Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia. Ethnic Hungarian minorities draw Budapest into confrontations with Romania and Slovakia. Germany, Lithuania, Poland and Russia quarrel about Kaliningrad, with crowds in front of the German Embassy in Warsaw shouting ‘slogans worthy of the 1930s’.7 Spain demands that London settle the Gibraltar question, but Madrid itself faces terri- torial demands from Morocco and internal order challenges from Basques and Catalans. Serbia annexes the Serb portion of Bosnia, with ‘ethnic cleansing’ operations reminiscent of the early 1990s, but no effective opposition. The creation of a Greater Serbia provokes the establishment of a Greater Croatia and tensions with Albania and Hungary. Northern Italy sees independence riots and ethnic minority disputes with Slovenia, while Sicily seeks ‘semi-independence’. Russian and Turkish forces clash in the Black Sea. Walloons in Belgium, the ‘Rattachistes’, demand the return of Wallonia to the ‘mother-country’—France. Coalitions comparable to those in past centuries begin to form. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland conclude a mutual defence pact. France and England renew the Entente Cordiale. France, Italy and Spain form an alliance with Bosnia, perhaps to protect the rump state from complete annihilation. Lisbon chooses to renew its ancient alliance with London, to the annoyance of Madrid. Austria, Germany and Switzerland sign the Treaty of Vaduz, with mutual defence commitments. This treaty leads to francophone secession movements in Switzerland and anti-German sentiments in France. 4 Crémieux, Quand les ‘Ricains’ repartiront, p. 42. 5 Ibid., p. 75. 6 The relationship between the US disengagement and the sudden outbreak of minority and border conflicts is implicit. The narrative implies that the end of the NATO-centred security order prompts various groups, movements and governments to try taking steps to advance their agendas on an experimental basis—to see whether anyone stops them. It is not clear whether fear of EU responses restrains any revisionists, but the evident failure of the EU to take effective action against certain irredentists (for example, Serbia) seems to encourage others to pursue their objectives. 7 Crémieux, Quand les