DOCSLIB.ORG

CANDIDATE SELECTION METHODS an Analytical Framework

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

03 Rahat & Hazan (JB/D) 18/4/01 10:02 am Page 297 PA R T Y P O L I T I C S V O L 7 . N o . 3 pp. 297–322 Copyright © 2001 SAGE Publications London Thousand Oaks New Delhi CANDIDATE SELECTION METHODS An Analytical Framework Gideon Rahat and Reuven Y. Hazan A B S T R A C T The framework presented in this article supplies tools for delineating candidate selection methods, defines what is meant by their democra- tization and offers an analytical framework for cross-national compari- son. The first section of this article raises the problems of classifying candidate selection methods and suggests solutions for them. Each of the next four sections offers a dimension for the classification of candidate selection methods: candidacy; party selectorates; decentral- ization; and voting/appointment systems. The sixth section defines the process of democratizing candidate selection, and demonstrates its implementation in the three largest political parties in Israel prior to the 1996 elections, via the dimensions of the analytical framework. The subsequent section assesses the repercussions of this democratizing phenomenon in general and provides empirical evidence drawn from the Israeli experience in the 1990s. The article concludes by examining the ability of political parties to comprehend and to overcome the conse- quences of democratizing candidate selection. KEY WORDS Ⅲ candidate selection Ⅲ democratization Ⅲ Israel Ⅲ party organization Ⅲ primaries Developing tools for the study of candidate selection methods is important in two respects. First, when we study party politics, appropriate tools enable us to draw a map of a major element in the party’s internal power structure. Second, if we claim that the behavior of parties is affected by the nature of the electoral system, then the behavior of individual politicians must be affected by the nature of the selection method. This means that without ana- lytical tools such as those supplied by electoral systems researchers (for example, Rae, 1967; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989), we lack an important factor for analyzing party politics. In light of the personification of politics and changes in party organization that lead to increased autonomy for the 1354-0688(200105)7:3;297–322;016987 03 Rahat & Hazan (JB/D) 18/4/01 10:02 am Page 298 PA R T Y P O L I T I C S 7 ( 3 ) individual politicians at the top (Katz and Mair, 1995; Katz, in this issue), this gap needs to be filled through further research. On the one hand, candidate selection methods are less stable mechanisms than state institutional mechanisms (such as electoral systems), and are rela- tively more prone to change. As such, they should be seen as reflecting party politics. On the other hand, these changes are not frequent enough to justify an inclusive treatment of them as only a mirror. Thus, candidate selection methods should be treated as institutional mechanisms that both reflect the nature of the parties and affect party politics. Until now, only a few studies of candidate selection methods have offered tools for comparative analysis (Gallagher, 1988a, 1988c; Ranney, 1981). The framework presented in this article sets out to achieve two goals: first, to supply tools for delineating candidate selection methods and for defining what is meant by their democratization; second, to offer an analytical frame- work that will enable a cross-national comparison of candidate selection methods. Candidate selection methods are only one aspect in the more compre- hensive analysis of candidate recruitment. As Norris (1997) points out in her study of legislative recruitment, a broad range of selection actors and processes outside the party arena should be addressed when one answers questions regarding who becomes a candidate, and how and why this happens. This study is not about candidate recruitment in general, but rather about a particular and important aspect of it inside the party arena. While the broader context of selection is certainly important, parties are critical to the process. Thus, this article offers an institutional anchor for the study of candidate selection methods. As an analogy, electoral systems are also but one aspect in the more comprehensive study of electoral politics, yet they still supply us with useful tools for their analysis.1 The unit of analysis is the single party, in a particular country, at a specific time. Only in cases where several parties in a particular country use similar candidate selection methods (usually due to legal requirements), where a single party uses a similar candidate selection method more than once, or when both similarities occur, will we make generalizations about the selec- tion system at the first stage of the analysis. The first section of this article raises the problems of classifying candidate selection methods – problems that stem from having to deal with a number of complex features – and offers solutions for them. The next four sections offer four dimensions, or continua, for the classification of candidate selec- tion methods, and elaborate how these dimensions correspond to the phenomenon of democratizing candidate selection. The analytical frame- work is, therefore, built around four major questions: 1 Who can be selected? Are there any restrictions on presenting candidacy in a given party? If so, how strict are these limitations? How much do they affect the size and nature of the potential candidate pool? 298 03 Rahat & Hazan (JB/D) 18/4/01 10:02 am Page 299 R A H AT & H A Z A N : C A N D I D AT E S E L E C T I O N M E T H O D S 2 Who selects candidates? Are there any restrictions on participating in a given party’s candidate selection process? If so, what is their impact on the size and nature of the selectorate? 3 Where are the candidates selected? Are candidates selected by a national or a sub-national selectorate? If candidates are selected by a sub-national selectorate, is it a regional or a local one? Does the party allocate pos- itions for functional representation, i.e., are candidates selected formally as representatives of social groups or sectors? 4 How are candidates nominated? Is candidacy determined by a voting pro- cedure or are candidates simply appointed? The sixth part of this article defines the process of democratizing candi- date selection, and demonstrates its implementation in the three largest political parties in Israel prior to the 1996 elections, via the dimensions of the analytical framework. The subsequent section assesses the repercussions of this democratizing phenomenon in general, and provides empirical evi- dence drawn from the Israeli experience in the 1990s. The article concludes by examining the ability of political parties to comprehend and overcome the consequences of democratizing candidate selection. Problems of Classification and their Solutions The concept of safe positions on the candidate list, or safe seats when dealing with majoritarian systems, is used quite freely in the research litera- ture. Since we also use this concept, we define it according to the following parameters. Although the size of the party’s legislative representation is not known in advance – intra-party selection is made before the general elec- tions – parties and politicians tend to relate to their party’s actual represen- tation as the one that distinguishes ‘safe’ list positions from ‘unsafe’ positions. As for new parties that did not compete previously, and thus cannot relate to any existing size, we are forced to estimate according to their projected size, through the use of opinion polls.2 The tools offered in the following sections can be easily used when ana- lyzing a simple, one stage, uniform candidate selection method. Such a simple method is one in which all potential candidates face similar restric- tions, and the selection of all candidates is made by the same selectorate, at the same level, using the same nomination method. Empirically, however, we face complex candidate selection methods – methods in which, simultaneously, different requirements are set for candi- dacy for different positions on the list; selection is made by different selec- torates; these selectorates use different nomination systems; and some candidates are selected at different types of locations, defined territorially and/or functionally. We distinguish between two kinds of such complexities. First is the mixed 299 03 Rahat & Hazan (JB/D) 18/4/01 10:02 am Page 300 PA R T Y P O L I T I C S 7 ( 3 ) candidate selection system. This is a method in which different potential candidates face different restrictions; or different candidates are selected by different selectorates, in different locations, or according to different nomi- nation systems. Second is the multi-stage candidate selection method. This is a method in which the same candidates have to face more than one selectorate during the selection process. These selectorates may be defined differently in terri- torial and functional terms, and may also use different nomination systems. In this kind of process, screening happens through the candidate selection process, and not only by candidacy requirements.3 In cases of both mixed and multi-stage candidate selection methods, classification becomes more complex. As our goal here is to offer a cross- party and cross-national analytical framework, we must try to offer a way to integrate one-stage, uniform candidate selection methods and different complex cases, such as mixed and multi-stage methods, into the same frame- work. The difficulty with mixed candidate selection methods can be addressed in two steps. First, there should be a separate analysis of each selectorate – its location and its nomination system. Second, toward the goal of ‘summing up’ the system, the relative impact of each procedure should be weighted by calculating the ratio of safe positions that are filled by the particular selec- torates.
Recommended publications
  • The Role of Ultra-Orthodox Political Parties in Israeli Democracy

    The Role of Ultra-Orthodox Political Parties in Israeli Democracy

    Luke Howson University of Liverpool The Role of Ultra-Orthodox Political Parties in Israeli Democracy Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy By Luke Howson July 2014 Committee: Clive Jones, BA (Hons) MA, PhD Prof Jon Tonge, PhD 1 Luke Howson University of Liverpool © 2014 Luke Howson All Rights Reserved 2 Luke Howson University of Liverpool Abstract This thesis focuses on the role of ultra-orthodox party Shas within the Israeli state as a means to explore wider themes and divisions in Israeli society. Without underestimating the significance of security and conflict within the structure of the Israeli state, in this thesis the Arab–Jewish relationship is viewed as just one important cleavage within the Israeli state. Instead of focusing on this single cleavage, this thesis explores the complex structure of cleavages at the heart of the Israeli political system. It introduces the concept of a ‘cleavage pyramid’, whereby divisions are of different saliency to different groups. At the top of the pyramid is division between Arabs and Jews, but one rung down from this are the intra-Jewish divisions, be they religious, ethnic or political in nature. In the case of Shas, the religious and ethnic elements are the most salient. The secular–religious divide is a key fault line in Israel and one in which ultra-orthodox parties like Shas are at the forefront. They and their politically secular counterparts form a key division in Israel, and an exploration of Shas is an insightful means of exploring this division further, its history and causes, and how these groups interact politically.
  • The Labor Party and the Peace Camp

    The Labor Party and the Peace Camp

    The Labor Party and the Peace Camp By Uzi Baram In contemporary Israeli public discourse, the preoccupation with ideology has died down markedly, to the point that even releasing a political platform as part of elections campaigns has become superfluous. Politicians from across the political spectrum are focused on distinguishing themselves from other contenders by labeling themselves and their rivals as right, left and center, while floating around in the air are slogans such as “political left,” social left,” “soft right,” “new right,” and “mainstream right.” Yet what do “left” and “right” mean in Israel, and to what extent do these slogans as well as the political division in today’s Israel correlate with the political traditions of the various parties? Is the Labor Party the obvious and natural heir of The Workers Party of the Land of Israel (Mapai)? Did the historical Mapai under the stewardship of Ben Gurion view itself as a left-wing party? Did Menachem Begin’s Herut Party see itself as a right-wing party? The Zionist Left and the Soviet Union As far-fetched as it may seem in the eyes of today’s onlooker, during the first years after the establishment of the state, the position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was the litmus test of the left camp, which was then called “the workers’ camp.” This camp viewed the centrist liberal “General Zionists” party, which was identified with European liberal and middle-class beliefs in private property and capitalism, as its chief ideological rival (and with which the heads of major cities such as Tel Aviv and Ramat Gan were affiliated)­.
  • A Detailed Proposal for a Feasible Electoral Reform

    A Detailed Proposal for a Feasible Electoral Reform

    Improving the Accountability and Stability of Israel’s Political System: A Detailed Proposal for a Feasible Electoral Reform Abraham Diskin & Emmanuel Navon August 2015 Page 1 of 58 Table of Contents Executive Summary Page 3 Part 1: Purpose and Goals of Electoral Reform Page 5 Part 2: Mechanism for the Implementation of the Proposed Reforms Page 7 Part 3: Means for Achieving the Goals of Electoral Reform Page 10 Appendix 1: History of Israel’s Voting System and Electoral Reforms Page 15 Appendix 2: Example of Voting Ballot for Election-day Primaries Page 19 Appendix 3: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Page 20 Appendix 4: Regional Elections Page 23 Appendix 5: Mechanisms for Appointing a Government Page 30 Appendix 6: Duration of Israeli Governments Page 33 Appendix 7: Correlation of the Number of Parties and Political Stability Page 39 Appendix 8: Results of Knesset Elections, 1949-2015 Page 42 Appendix 9: Opinion Poll on the Proposed Reforms Page 53 Bibliography Page 56 Page 2 of 58 Executive Summary This paper is a detailed proposal for the reform of Israel’s electoral system. The changes proposed here are the result of years of research, of data analysis, and of comparative studies. We believe that the reforms outlined in this paper would be beneficial, that they would have a realistic chance of being implemented, and that they would strike a delicate balance between conflicting agendas. The proposed reform is meant to achieve the following overall goals: a. To make Members of Knesset (MKs) more accountable and answerable to their voters; b. To improve government stability.
  • Electoral Processes in the Mediterranean

    Electoral Processes in the Mediterranean

    Electoral Processes Electoral processes in the Mediterranean This chapter provides information on jority party if it does not manage to Gorazd Drevensek the results of the presidential and leg- obtain an absolute majority in the (New Slovenia Christian Appendices islative elections held between July Chamber. People’s Party, Christian Democrat) 0.9 - 2002 and June 2003. Jure Jurèek Cekuta 0.5 - Parties % Seats Participation: 71.3 % (1st round); 65.2 % (2nd round). Monaco Nationalist Party (PN, conservative) 51.8 35 Legislative elections 2003 Malta Labour Party (MLP, social democrat) 47.5 30 9th February 2003 Bosnia and Herzegovina Med. Previous elections: 1st and 8th Februa- Democratic Alternative (AD, ecologist) 0.7 - ry 1998 Federal parliamentary republic that Parliamentary monarchy with unicam- Participation: 96.2 %. became independent from Yugoslavia eral legislative: the National Council. in 1991, and is formed by two enti- The twenty-four seats of the chamber ties: the Bosnia and Herzegovina Fed- Slovenia are elected for a five-year term; sixteen eration, known as the Croat-Muslim Presidential elections by simple majority and eight through Federation, and the Srpska Republic. 302-303 proportional representation. The voters go to the polls to elect the 10th November 2002 Presidency and the forty-two mem- Previous elections: 24th November bers of the Chamber of Representa- Parties % Seats 1997 tives. Simultaneously, the two entities Union for Monaco (UPM) 58.5 21 Parliamentary republic that became elect their own legislative bodies and National Union for the Future of Monaco (UNAM) independent from Yugoslavia in 1991. the Srpska Republic elects its Presi- Union for the Monegasque Two rounds of elections are held to dent and Vice-President.
  • BOOK ALL.P65

    BOOK ALL.P65

    LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL THE BARCELONA PROCESS 175th EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 5-6 NOVEMBER MALLORCA, SPAIN Sponsored by With the support of the European Parliament With the support of the Dutch Foreign Office Table of Contents Background - Barcelona Process 2 - Economic and Financial Chapter 3 - Foreign Policy and Security Chapter 4 - Israel and Palestine 5 - Human Rights 6 Programme 7-9 Professional Profiles 10-14 Participants 14-16 The Barcelona Process The poor democratic record of Maghreb and Mashrek countries, com- bined with the demographic trends and the economic imbalances be- tween the southern and the northern shores of the Mediterranean, led to the launch of a new initiative in 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Partner- ship (EMP), which became known as the Barcelona Process. It was launched to foster cooperation on political reform, economic liberalisation, and social issues between the European Union (EU) and the countries on the southern and eastern rim of the Mediterranean (Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey). Members are commit- ted to implementing reforms and continuing dialogue. The agreement calls for reform in three areas, known as the political, economic, and social chapters. The first objective is the creation of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogues based on fundamental principles such as respect for human rights and democracy (Political and Security Chapter). The second objective calls for the construction of a zone of shared pros- perity through an economic and financial partnership that includes the gradual establishment of a free zone by 2010.
  • Inequality, Identity, and the Long-Run Evolution of Political Cleavages in Israel 1949-2019

    Inequality, Identity, and the Long-Run Evolution of Political Cleavages in Israel 1949-2019

    WID.world WORKING PAPER N° 2020/17 Inequality, Identity, and the Long-Run Evolution of Political Cleavages in Israel 1949-2019 Yonatan Berman August 2020 Inequality, Identity, and the Long-Run Evolution of Political Cleavages in Israel 1949{2019 Yonatan Berman∗ y August 20, 2020 Abstract This paper draws on pre- and post-election surveys to address the long run evolution of vot- ing patterns in Israel from 1949 to 2019. The heterogeneous ethnic, cultural, educational, and religious backgrounds of Israelis created a range of political cleavages that evolved throughout its history and continue to shape its political climate and its society today. De- spite Israel's exceptional characteristics, we find similar patterns to those found for France, the UK and the US. Notably, we find that in the 1960s{1970s, the vote for left-wing parties was associated with lower social class voters. It has gradually become associated with high social class voters during the late 1970s and later. We also find a weak inter-relationship between inequality and political outcomes, suggesting that despite the social class cleavage, identity-based or \tribal" voting is still dominant in Israeli politics. Keywords: Political cleavages, Political economy, Income inequality, Israel ∗London Mathematical Laboratory, The Graduate Center and Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality, City University of New York, [email protected] yI wish to thank Itai Artzi, Dror Feitelson, Amory Gethin, Clara Mart´ınez-Toledano, and Thomas Piketty for helpful discussions and comments, and to Leah Ashuah and Raz Blanero from Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality for historical data on parliamentary elections in Tel Aviv.
  • The Success of an Ethnic Political Party: a Case Study of Arab Political Parties in Israel

    The Success of an Ethnic Political Party: a Case Study of Arab Political Parties in Israel

    University of Mississippi eGrove Honors College (Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors Theses Honors College) 2014 The Success of an Ethnic Political Party: A Case Study of Arab Political Parties in Israel Samira Abunemeh University of Mississippi. Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Abunemeh, Samira, "The Success of an Ethnic Political Party: A Case Study of Arab Political Parties in Israel" (2014). Honors Theses. 816. https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis/816 This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College (Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College) at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Success of an Ethnic Political Party: A Case Study of Arab Political Parties in Israel ©2014 By Samira N. Abunemeh A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion Of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies Croft Institute for International Studies Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College The University of Mississippi University, Mississippi May 2014 Approved: Dr. Miguel Centellas Reader: Dr. Kees Gispen Reader: Dr. Vivian Ibrahim i Abstract The Success of an Ethnic Political Party: A Case Study of Arab Political Parties in Israel Israeli Arab political parties are observed to determine if these ethnic political parties are successful in Israel. A brief explanation of four Israeli Arab political parties, Hadash, Arab Democratic Party, Balad, and United Arab List, is given as well as a brief description of Israeli history and the Israeli political system.
  • 1 Schlaglicht Israel Nr. 19/16 Aktuelles Aus Israelischen Tageszeitungen 1

    1 Schlaglicht Israel Nr. 19/16 Aktuelles Aus Israelischen Tageszeitungen 1

    Schlaglicht Israel Nr. 19/16 Aktuelles aus israelischen Tageszeitungen 1.-15. Oktober Die Themen dieser Ausgabe Beerdigung von Shimon Peres ................................................................................................................................. 1 UNESCO-Debakel .................................................................................................................................................... 3 Terror in Jerusalem ................................................................................................................................................... 4 Medienquerschnitt .................................................................................................................................................... 6 Beerdigung von Shimon Peres to Peres’s determined pursuit of peace, it was jarring Die Beisetzung von Israels früherem Staatspräsi- to observe the rejectionist front being represented, denten Shimon Peres, der Ende September den not just by a terrorist organization, but by a party of Folgen eines schweren Schlaganfalls erlag, ent- Israeli parliamentarians. Due to all of this, Abbas’s puppt sich rückblickend mehr und mehr als Politi- participation was an important step that should be kum. Mehrere Redner, darunter US-Präsident Ba- appreciated by Israel and the Netanyahu govern- rack Obama und der israelische Schriftsteller Amos ment. (…) Abbas took an important step on Friday, Oz, nutzen die Bühne zur Mahnung, das Erbe von especially considering the criticism that he faced Peres
  • The Increasingly Polarised and Fragmented Party System in Israel Will Make It Difficult for a Stable Government to Emerge from This Month’S Elections

    The Increasingly Polarised and Fragmented Party System in Israel Will Make It Difficult for a Stable Government to Emerge from This Month’S Elections

    blo gs.lse.ac.uk http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/01/14/israel-elections-2013-israeli-party-system/ The increasingly polarised and fragmented party system in Israel will make it difficult for a stable government to emerge from this month’s elections. Blog Admin Israel’s next parliamentary elections are due to be held on 22 January. As part of EUROPP’s coverage of the European neighbourhood, André Krouwel and Daniel Rajmil give an overview of the country’s highly fragmented party system, noting that the results are likely to be significantly different from those in the last election in 2009. New parties have emerged in the last four years, while the largest party in the current parliament, Kadima, could well lose all of its seats. Of all established democracies, Israel has the highest electoral change per election over the post-war period. Only new democracies in Eastern Europe are more electorally volatile. On average almost a quarter of the Israeli electorate shif ts party allegiance per election. One of the main reasons f or this exceptional electoral volatility is that Israeli elections are held under a system of proportional representation (PR). This means that many political parties will enter the f ray, as it is relatively easy to enter parliament compared to majoritarian electoral systems. Parties will gain a number of seats equal to the proportion of the vote they gained in the election, albeit that Israel has introduced a 2 per cent threshold to avoid too much parliamentary f ragmentation. Nevertheless, over the last decade between 12 and 15 parties entered the Knesset in each election.
  • Strategic and Non-Policy Voting: a Coalitional Analysis of Israeli

    Strategic and Non-Policy Voting: a Coalitional Analysis of Israeli

    Strategic and Non-policy Voting: A Coalitional Analysis of Israeli Electoral Reform Ethan Bueno de Mesquita Department of Government Harvard University Forthcoming in Comparative Politics, October 2000. Strategic and Non-policy Voting: A Coalitional Analysis of Israeli Electoral Reform Abstract I examine why a majority of Israel’s legislators voted for direct election of the prime minister, reforming the electoral system that vested them with power. The analysis incorporates coalitional politics, strategic voting, and voter preferences over non-policy issues such as candidate charisma. The model generates novel hypotheses that are tested against empirical evidence. It explains five empirical puzzles that are not fully addressed by extant explanations: why Labour supported the reform, why Likud opposed it, why small left-wing parties supported the reform, small right-wing parties were split, and religious parties opposed it, why the Likud leadership, which opposed reform, lifted party discipline in the final reading of the bill, and why electoral reform passed at the particular time that it did. Strategic and Non-policy Voting: A Coalitional Analysis of Israeli Electoral Reform On March 18, 1992, Israel’s twelfth Knesset legislated the direct election of the Prime Minister, fundamentally altering Israel’s electoral system. Such large-scale electoral reform is rare in democracies.1 This is because electoral reform requires that those who have been vested with power by a particular system vote for a new system whose consequences are uncertain. Efforts to explain the political causes of Israeli electoral reform leave critical questions unanswered. A theory of electoral reform must explain both the interests of the political actors involved as well as why reform occurred at a particular time; it must specify the changes in the actors’ interests or in the political system that led to reform.
  • Geographical Representation Under Proportional

    Geographical Representation Under Proportional

    CSD Center for the Study of Democracy An Organized Research Unit University of California, Irvine www.democ.uci.edu It is frequently assumed that proportional representation electoral systems do not provide geographical representation. For example, if we consider the literature on electoral reform, advocates of retaining single-member district plurality elections often cite the failure of proportional representation to give voters local representation (Norton, 1997; Hain, 1983; see Farrell, 2001). Even advocates of proportional representation often recognize the lack of district representation as a failure that has to be addressed by modifying their proposals (McLean, 1991; Dummett, 1997).1 However, there has been little empirical research into whether proportional representation elections produce results that are geographically representative. This paper considers geographical representation in two of the most “extreme” cases of proportional representation, Israel and the Netherlands. These countries have proportional representation with a single national constituency, and thus lack institutional features that force geographical representation. They are thus limiting cases, providing evidence of the type of geographical patterns we are likely to see when there are no institutions that enforce specific geographical patterns. We find that the legislatures of Israel and the Netherlands are surprisingly representative geographically, although not perfectly so. Furthermore, we find an interesting pattern. While the main metropolitan areas
  • DISPLACED in THEIR OWN CITY the Impact of Israeli Policy in East Jerusalem on the Palestinian Neighborhoods of the City Beyond the Separation Barrier June 2015

    DISPLACED in THEIR OWN CITY the Impact of Israeli Policy in East Jerusalem on the Palestinian Neighborhoods of the City Beyond the Separation Barrier June 2015

    DISPLACED IN THEIR OWN CITY THE IMPACT OF ISRAELI POLICY IN EAST JERUSALEM ON THE PALESTINIAN NEIGHBORHOODS OF THE CITY BEYOND THE SEPARATION BARRIER JUNE 2015 27 King George St., P.O. Box 2239, Jerusalem 94581 Telephone: 972-2-6222858 | Fax: 972-2-6233696 www.ir-amim.org.il | [email protected] DISPLACED IN THEIR OWN CITY THE IMPACT OF ISRAELI POLICY IN EAST JERUSALEM ON THE PALESTINIAN NEIGHBORHOODS OF THE CITY BEYOND THE SEPARATION BARRIER JUNE 2015 Written by: Ehud Tagari and Yudith Oppenheimer Research: Eyal Hareuveni and Aviv Tatarsky Hebrew editing: Lea Klibanoff Ron English translation: Shaul Vardi English editing: Betty Herschman Photography: Ahmad Sub Laban Thanks to: Atty. Oshrat Maimon, Atty. Nisreen Alyan of the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), Christoph von Toggenburg of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), Roni Ben Efrat and Erez Wagner of WAC-MAAN, the Workers Advice Center, Lior Volinz of Amsterdam University, Atty. Elias Khoury, and Eetta Prince-Gibson. This publication was produced by Ir Amim (“City of Nations”) in the framework of a joint project with the Workers Advice Center WAC-MAAN aimed at strengthening the socio-economic rights of East Jerusalem residents. We thank the European Union, the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Israel, and The Moriah Fund for their support. The content of this publication is the responsibility of Ir Amim alone. taBLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 5 Chapter One: Israeli Policy in East Jerusalem since 1967 8 A. Annexation and Confiscation . 8 B. Ensuring a Jewish Majority . 9 C. Non-Registration of Land. 10 D.