Quaderni Asiatici 101 – marzo 2013

Martino Sacchi

PIRACY IN SOMALIA: A LONG TERM MENACE OR A PHENOMENON IN ITS LAST THROES?

Abstract Piracy has become an impending problem for modern shipping. Updated statistics reveal that piracy has mainly spread in the following four areas of the world: in South-East Asia (the Strait of Malacca), the South Caribbean Sea, Nigeria and the Horn of Africa (the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean). During 2012 the media reported on a total of 297 attacks worldwide (75 in Somali waters) and 28 hijackings (14 in Somali waters); currently (January 2013) eight vessels and 127 hostages are being held by Somali pirates. 1 However, according to the International Chamber of Commerce, 2 «the number of attacks along the shores of Somalia has decreased considerably» in the second half of 2012 and the first months of 2013; the question to consider now is whether this means that the threat of Somali piracy is going to die off or whether pirates will continue to represent a serious risk. First of all, we are going to analyze why piracy has originated in the area around the Horn of Africa. The next step will then explore the ways piracy started and developed and what kind of means, weapons, strategies or tactics have been adopted and used by pirates.

1 See ICC, Piracy and Armed Robbery News and Figures , http://www.icc- ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsafigures, updated January 16, 2013. 2 See http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/prone-areas-and-warning.

123 Martino Sacchi Piracy in Somalia: a long term menace or a phenomenon in its last throes?

In the end, the consequences of piracy will be considered, also with a view to the strategies adopted by the western world to deal with this troublesome matter.

1. Why the Horn of Africa? he following factors are generally accepted as prerequisite T conditions for the occurrence and promulgation of piracy: 1. a favorable geographical and topographical position 2. easily available targets with little or almost no risk 3. uncontrolled areas 4. low GDP and widespread poverty The Horn of Africa unmistakably offers these features. The first consideration goes to the geographical position as the great French historian Fernand Braudel pointed out. The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are among the most strategic areas in the world: they constitute the chokepoint of some of the most important trade routes in the world, with an estimated traffic volume of 21.000-25.000 3 vessels per annum. Tankers, bulkers, roll on/roll off ships, passenger ships and many others transit through the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden on their way to and from Europe and the Persian Gulf, India, China and South-East Asia: to cite as an example, 30% of the European demands for crude oil go along this shipping route. Since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, this area has become a true bottleneck, and modern globalization has further increased the strategic importance of the area. Another very important factor is the easy navigability of the area: neither fogs 4 nor strong winds or dangerous shoals or reefs 5 hinder

3 Lower estimate is carried out by Italian Navy officers; according to officers of the Royal Navy higher estimates instead. Prof. James Kraska of the U.S. Naval War College assesses that «each year 20,000 ships transit the area». 4 See National Geospatial-intelligence Agency, Sailing Directions (Enroute), Red Sea and the Persian Gulf , Springfield, Virginia 2011, p. 169: «There is little fog observed within the area described in this sector. What little fog that does occur is rarely dense and usually disappears rapidly during the morning». 5 See National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Sailing Directions (Enroute), The Red Sea and the Persian Gulf , Springfield, Virginia 2011, p. 99 «The depths in the

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pirate boats to make out interesting and useful targets, leave the shore without any difficulty and carry out their plans. This leads to the second prerequisite condition for piracy: a startling number of valuable targets can be found off the shores of the Horn of Africa, more precisely about 70 vessels a day. Merchant ships are unarmed, often slow and with little freeboard, and are thus easy prey for anyone coming from the Somali coasts (or even from the south coast of Yemen). The third prerequisite condition for piracy regards uncontrolled areas. In the past centuries, these areas were limited to notorious coves such as Tortuga Island or Jamaica, but now they also include the areas around the Horn of Africa. This coastal strip is in large part territory of the Federal Republic of Somalia, a perfect example for a «failed state» since the overthrow of President Siad Barre’s regime in 1991. Subsequently, many attempts have been made to establish a stable Government in Somalia but none has been successful so far. The so called Transitional Federal Government, with its capital Mogadishu, was established in 2003 and lasted until August 2012, though remaining fairly ineffective. Nevertheless, on August 20, 2012 Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, founder father and chairman of the Peace and Development Party (PDP), was elected President of Somalia in what is described as «the first Presidential election in over forty years». 6 Somalia is divided into three relatively autonomous regions:

Somaliland in the northwest,
Puntland in the northeast and approach (scil. Yemen and Oman coasts) to this part of the coast are deep and clear». See also National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Sailing Directions (Enroute), East Africa and the South Indian Ocean , Springfield, Virginia 2010, p. 99: «From Muqdisho to Hobyo (5°21'N., 48°31'E.), the coast continues low and sandy... The monotonous aspect of this coast is broken by numerous white shifting sand hills and by occasional outcrops of limestone rocks which chiefly occur in the vicinity of Hobyo. From Hobyo to Raas Xaafun the coast has a different character, becoming rocky, bold and inaccessible and backed by tablelands in places, and in other areas having undulating sand hills». 6 See Somalia Report, 9/10/12.

125 Martino Sacchi Piracy in Somalia: a long term menace or a phenomenon in its last throes?

Central Somalia in the central and southern regions. So far only Somaliland, a former British colony, has claimed real independence from Mogadishu, while Puntland does not seek outright independence from Somalia 7. In any case, however, no effective central power exits: the northern territories are under the control of numerous tribal clans. This fact is very important when considering the reasons for the origin and development of piracy in Somalia, as illustrated below. Finally, Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world; according to 2009 estimates, the life expectancy for Somalis lies under fifty, and the gross domestic product per capita is calculated at about US $ 600 8. This means that a large part of the inhabitants live with less than two dollars a day. UNICEF reports an average annual GDP growth rate of -0.9% 9. per capita in the years ranging from 1970 to 1990. The Somali diaspora «constitutes the main source of funding for the Somalis living in the country». 10 These figures may explain the assertion of some authors according to whom «piracy is the fastest growing industry in Somalia destined to make up for agriculture and fishing as the country’s largest source of revenue». 11 A pirate can make up to $ 15.000 12 out of a single attack, whereas

7 The semiautonomous state of Puntland was established in Garowe, the administrative capital, on August 1, 1998. It is dominated by the Majeerteen clan but it gathers numerous sub-clans of the Harti-clan such as the Warsangeli, the Dhishiishe and the Dhulbahant. 8 See Central Intelligence Agency , The world factbook (2009) , available at: publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html.14, quoted in: Elliot A. Anderson, It's a Pirate's Life for Some: The Development of an Ille gal Industry in Response to an Unjust Global Power Dynamic, in Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Volume 17, Issue 2, Summer 2010, pp. 319-339 (Article), p. 321. 9 UNICEF, Somalia Statistics, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/somalia_ statistics.Html. 10 Mpondo-Epo Bruno, Root causes of Piracy in Somalia , RSIS Commentaries 2009 (June), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU (Singapore), p. 1. 11 David Axe, No Quick Solutions to Pirate Crisis , World Political Review, Oct. 6, 2008, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=2744. 12 Eugene Kontorovich, The Somali piracy problem: a Global Puzzle Necessitating a Global Solution , ASIL February 2009.

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pirate leaders and negotiators earn a lot more: no wonder that piracy enjoys great popularity with the poor Somalis, who see a chance to become rich instantly by participating in just one ship hijacking.

2. Origins of piracy in Somalia When considering Somali piracy, at least three stages of development are to be distinguished: - First stage: the very first attacks to vessels in Somali waters date back 1989-90, when the Somalis began to rebel against Siad Barre's dictatorship. On December 5, 1989, the Somali National Movement (SNM) 13 , for instance, attacked a ship sailing under flag of Panama on its way to the Somali harbor of Barbera. On December, 11 the same year the Italian freighter Kwanda was hijacked by Somali rebels. 14 However, this «political» piracy disappeared after the overthrow of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991. - Second stage: Somalia became a «failed state» lacking any kind of control. There was no government, no navy and no Coast Guards. A lot of foreign fishing companies (including Asian, Yemenite, African but also French and Spanish ones) moved their trawlers into Somali waters and exploited their rich fishing areas. 15

13 This movement was fighting in North-West Somalia (today the self-declared Republic of Somaliland) and intended to block exports from the port of Berbera. 14 «Rebels captured the Italian ship Kwanda and her crew of 2 Italians and 14 Somalis without a fight off the north coast of Somalia near the port of Zeila. She was carrying petroleum products from Djibouti. She was captured by rebels in speed boats armed with machine guns. No injuries were reported. The Kwanda was anchored and her cargo of petroleum was discharged by the rebels, 7 January 1990. Kwanda released by captors after 27 days. The Kwanda entered the port of Djibouti after being relieved of its cargo of 350 tons of fuel oil, food reserves, tools, and everything else that could be removed and sold. The crew were robbed of their money and clothes and beaten.» See IMO report December 11, 1989. Quoted in Abdi Ismail Samatar, Mark Lindberg and Basil Mahayani, The Dialectics of Piracy in Somalia: the rich versus the poor , in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 8, 2010, pp 1377–1394, p. 1384. 15 See Roland Marchal Somali Piracy: The Local Contexts of an International Obsession. Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011, pp. 31- 50 (Article).

127 Martino Sacchi Piracy in Somalia: a long term menace or a phenomenon in its last throes?

In the early Eighties «the Somalis only had a traditional fishing fleet. Fishing co-operations possessed about 700 small boats (6 to 8 m long), whereas the number of private fishermen amounted to another 100 boats of similar size». 16 Foreign trawlers caught «$90 million to $300 million fish per year in Somali territorial waters», says James Kraska 17 , destroying almost all kinds of sealife with their long-line fishing methods. Since the mid1990s, Somali fishermen have tried to defend what they considered their national resources and have prepared to pirate ships and extort «fines» at knife-point, assisted by part of the former Somali Coast Guard. At this stage, the Somalis considered themselves heroes, whose task was to defend their territory from foreign attacks. At that stage a major role was played by SHIFCO (Somali High Seas Fishing Company): the company was founded in the 1980s under the name of SOMITFISH with three trawlers built in Italy. Until 1991, SHIFCO enjoyed the legal monopoly on commercial fishing in Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone 18 , for which the Somali government established a joint venture with private Italian companies. After Siad Barre's fall, the SHIFCO trawlers (now six boats) were taken over by Muniye (or Mugne) Said Omar and the company became fully privatized. The company was said to be involved in illegal trafficking (weapons and pollutants), and with the death of the Italian journalists Ilaria Alpi and Miran Hrovatin, killed in Mogadishu, on March 20, 1994. Shortly before her death, Ilaria Alpi had interviewed the so called Sultan Abdulahi Mussa Bogor with regard to SHIFCO's activities in Somali waters. During this interview, Bogor admitted that Somali militias had hijacked the SHIFCO Faarax Oomar trawler. 19 Bogor was later interviewed by another Italian

16 See Marine Fisheries Review, December 1982, 44 (12). 17 See James Kraska, Freakonomics of Maritime Piracy , Brown Journal of World Affairs, Spring/Summer 2010 volume xvi, issue ii. 18 An Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a sea zone over which a state has special rights over the exploration and use of marine resources. It extends to a distance of 200 nautical miles (370 km) out from its coastal baseline. 19 Alpi: «Anche qualche mese fa era stata rapita una nave italiana » Abdullah : «Non italiana, ma taiwanese .» Alpi : «E' italiana? » Abdullah : «Sulla nostra costa. E non è italiana, è la Faraax Oomar. Porta anche il nome di un nostro eroe nazionalista »

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journalist, Maurizio Torrealta, and explained that the Faarax Oomar had been caught because she was found sailing with no licenses. 20 The trawler was released after a ransom payment of about half a million dollars. 21 − Third stage: the «defensive» stage was quickly replaced by hijacking with the target of extortion and hostage-taking. In Ilaria Alpi's last notebook, there is conclusive evidence to that regard, as the following words written just before her death clearly underline: Ma proprio per questo negli ultimi mesi si è scatenata una specie di pirateria, giustificata all’inizio come lotta alla pesca di frodo 22 . Piracy in Somalia therefore already existed in the first months of 1994, even though its line of action was still very limited. The real turning point came with the birth of the self-proclaimed and semi- independent Republic of Puntland in 1998. In that region «local militias started running the piracy business by targeting ships transiting through the busy waters of the Gulf of Aden, without any obvious reference to the initial reasons»23 . Marchal Roland states that, See: Commissione parlamentare d’inchiesta sulla morte di Ilaria Alpi e Miran Hrovatin, relazione di minoranza, Mauro Bulgarelli, p. 23. 20 Abdullah: «Hanno fermato la Faarax Oomar perché stava pescando senza licenza. L'iniziativa di fermare la nave fu presa dai miliziani, i quali avevano ordine di sequestrare tutte le navi che pescavano senza licenza nelle nostre acque. La nave venne liberata dopo circa un mese perché i miliziani chiesero un compenso alla Shifco, compenso che venne fornito... mentre questa nave era sequestrata, dopo due o tre settimane dall'inizio del sequestro, vennero da me questi due giornalisti, una ragazza e il suo operatore,... Fu la giornalista a tirare fuori i due nomi [SHIFCO and Mugne] chiedendomi se sapessi qualcosa di questa SHIFCO e del suo manager l'ingegnere Mugne... Non ricordo di preciso cos'altro mi abbia chiesto la giornalista ». See: Commissione parlamentare d’inchiesta sulla morte di Ilaria Alpi e Miran Hrovatin, relazione di minoranza Mauro Bulgarelli, p. 24-23. 21 «Il prezzo del riscatto fu tra i 500 ed i 700 mila dollari e venne pagato perciò dalle assicurazione Le Generali » Omar Mugne stated to dr. Giuseppe Pititto, Sostituto Procuratore della Repubblica at the Law Court of Rome, on June 6, 1996. See: ibidem , p 187. 22 « This is exactly the reason why a kind of piracy has come up in the last few months, and which initially seemed to be justified as a struggle against illegal fishing». See Commissione parlamentare d’inchiesta sulla morte di Ilaria Alpi e Miran Hrovatin, p. 255. 23 See Shortland Anja and Vothknecht Marc, Combating “maritime terrorism” off

129 Martino Sacchi Piracy in Somalia: a long term menace or a phenomenon in its last throes?

«piracy first started as an informal alliance between fishermen (or coastal communities) and militias. The former were skilled sailors while the latter had the necessary instruments to hijack a ship and deal with the hijacked crew onshore.» 24 From this moment on piracy has become more and more important.

3. How pirates work Six different types may be distinguished among pirates. The first group is made up of the nomadic people coming from the inland; they are at the bottom of the piracy hierarchy. These pirates are often very young (sometimes only 12) and their only objective is to earn enough money to buy a house or a car, and to get married. They have no navigation skills, and a lot of them don't even know how to use fire weapons. So they can only work (at least at the beginning of their career) as simple guards in the holding group (see below), and consequently receive a small share, sometimes not more than a few hundred dollars. 25 Former fishermen constitute a more important group. Members of this group have become pirates attracted by the promise of making big money. Thanks to their navigation skills, they act as leaders of the attacks: they know the sea and are good at driving skiffs or whales (but no large ships). Skiff drivers are highly considered in the piracy hierarchy (up to second in command in holding teams), as their task is fundamental. A third, more dangerous type of pirates are former soldiers or militia fighters. They are recruited either as members of an assault group or as guards in a holding group. They can manage weapons such as AK47s or RPG, and during the assault they are selected as shooters. Besides former soldiers, there are often very young Somalis who may be born in Mogadishu or in another major city of the country, and may have grown up during the Civil war in the nineties. They are the coast of Somalia , European Journal of Political Economy 27, 2011 p. 135. 24 See Marchal Roland, Somali Piracy: The Local Contexts of an International Obsession . Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism and Development, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011, p. 39. 25 See Coping with capture. Hostage handbook of Somali pirates, Danish Maritime Officers 2012, p. 16.

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experienced in fighting and killing, unpredictable, and have neither respect for traditional values different from most members of clans nor for religion. They act under orders only because they want to belong to a group; and these feelings can change quickly and with them their loyalty to their gang 26 . Among pirates there are also a lot of craftsmen or educated Somalis who are compelled to become pirates because of the civil war or in order to support their family or to save up enough money to escape from the country. At the top level in the piracy hierarchy there are well educated men with a wide network of connections. In general, they speak at least one foreign language (mostly English), use the Internet, text messaging services and the social media; they dress western style and act as negotiators with the ship owners. Negotiators often hold tight connections to Somalis living in Western countries, and are entitled to receive a considerable share of the ransom. The highest rank is reserved to the bosses. They stay ashore, organize the assault groups and the holding teams, raise funds for boats, engines, fuel, weapons and whatever is needed to supply prisoners and gang members with food during negotiations The boss «takes the largest share of the ransom, typically one third, but sometimes even as much as fifty per cent». 27 Pirates can be divided in 60-70 clan-based groups. On average, a pirate group is made up of 12 to 35 members who are in most cases, though not always, split into attack, hostage takers, and reconnaissance teams. At the beginning most pirates had their headquarters in Puntland, the north-east region of the country. Subsequently, they moved southwards into Naal and, in particular, the Mugud region. This is quite interesting because, from a historical point of view, all political and social movements in Somalia have moved from the desolated arid northern territories to the fertile southern areas of Shebeli and Giuba. The most important pirate coves are: 28
Harardhere ,

26 See ibidem , p. 13. 27 See ibidem , p. 15. 28 Harardhere is an inland village, about 20 km from the coastline, whose port is

131 Martino Sacchi Piracy in Somalia: a long term menace or a phenomenon in its last throes?

Ely,
Boosaaso, 29
Obio 30
and Garacad . Journalists often deal with these villages as though there were describing real «harbors». However, it is very hard to consider these places «harbors». They have neither piers nor lighthouses or naval stations. There are only low cliffs protruding into the sea offering little shelter from the high oceanic waves. Boats are moored close to the beach or, more often, simply stranded on the sand. That’s it. These circumstances also constitute one of the reasons why there is no point in attacking pirates onshore: there is nothing to destroy, but little villages and their inhabitants. The fact that only two attacks against onshore targets have been reported since the outbreak of piracy seems to be a further confirmation:

French special forces attacked the pirates who had hijacked the big sailing yacht Le Ponent, on April 11, 2008
and a EU helicopter destroyed some skiffs near Harardhere on

Raas Cusbad (which «does not protrude from the adjoining coastline but consists of a sheer cliff of black rock of a height of 20m in a position where there the coast slightly bends out. A small belt of sand hills, covered with grass, is located on Raas Cusbad.») and Handulle, 30 km northbound. 29 See National Geospatial-intelligence Agency, Sailing Directions (Enroute), East Africa and the South Indian Ocean , Springfield, Virginia 2010, p. 103: « Hobyo (Obbia) (5°21'N., 48°32'E.) is a small town situated on a large open undulating plain close inland of Raas Diga (Punta Diga). During the Northeast Monsoon, the wind sometimes reaches Force 7, and is characterized by periodic cessations of up to 2 days at times. During this monsoon, the current runs strongly to the S. The anchorage off Raas Diga, in 7 to 9 m, is good but is entirely exposed; with a fresh wind there is a heavy surf... Raas Diga (5°21'N., 48°32'E.) is the NE extremity of the rocks which extend NNE from a projection of the shoreline. Scoglio Sud, two rocks awash, and Scoglio Nord, an above-water rock, lie on a coastal bank about 0.3 mile and 0.5 mile NNE, respectively, from Raas Diga; there are other rocks located on the bank». 30 See ibidem , p. 103: «the coast is low, sandy, is fringed by reefs in places, and backed by numerous sand dunes. Garacad (Garad) (6°57'N., 49°19'E.) is the ruins of a fort, which are visible between the bearings of 335° and 005°. A beacon and a light are situated in the vicinity of the ruins».

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May 15, 2012. 31 Sometimes journalists call for more effective, drastic measures as RID - Rivista Italiana Difesa: «Non sarebbe neanche necessario compiere un'infinità di colpi di mano anfibi. Basterebbe che ogni barchetta utilizzata dai pirati, una volta identificata la natura dell'equipaggio e le sue intenzioni, fosse colata a picco quando esce dai sorgitori, o si avvicina ai mercantili, o rientra dopo una incursione fallita o riuscita. Le navi dirottate dovrebbero essere bloccate in mare, i pirati... eliminati ». 32 A similar policy, which is NOT being followed by western Navies, would not be easy to realize, however, as pirates use the same small fiberglass boats as fishermen, the so called six-meter-long «skiffs». These boats are very simple: they have no deck, no deck-house, no helm, no rudder. Photographs taken by western navies show small hulls with very uncomfortable accommodation, powered by one or two outboard engines. The cheapest models are made in China and are unsinkable because they have one or more foam filled lockers. There is no way to distinguish «good» boats from «bad» ones. These «small skiffs are painted white or light blue and are difficult to pin down on the radar», 33 especially with high waves. Moreover, fishermen very often carry weapons (usually old AK47s) to defend themselves from pirates, too. 34

31 A ship-based EU helicopter attacked and destroyed three skiffs near Handulle, about 11 miles from Harardhere. The attack was described this way by Omar Haji, a self-professed pirate: «It was night time and a small group from Guushaaye' men were chewing khat near their camp... Around 2:30 or 3:00 there were 13 pirates in the camp we heard helicopters flying toward the area of Handulle and my friends escaped from the area... The airstrike destroyed three speed boats and other equipment including four ladders, a half tanker of fuel, two fishing nets and mobile». 32 «Every little pirate boats, after being recognized, should be sunk when leaving her port or boarding her target or coming back... Hijacked ships should be stopped in high seas, pirates... shot down» See RID – Rivista Italiana Difesa, 2012, June, n° 6, p. 7. 33 See Coping with capture. Hostage handbook of Somali pirates, Danish Maritime Officers 2012, p. 18. 34 See, for instance, what Dr. Willett has said in front of House of Lord European Union Committee, session 2009-10: «Many of them [Somali fishermen] carry

133 Martino Sacchi Piracy in Somalia: a long term menace or a phenomenon in its last throes?

Referring to piracy, Rear Admiral Jones declared: «A pirate is only a pirate when he is committing an act of piracy, and what we are finding frequently is that he may be a people smuggler overnight taking Somalis to Yemen against payment, he may then turn into a fisherman the next morning and then, in the afternoon, go out to do some piracy, and it is only when he commits the act of piracy that he becomes liable to arrest and prosecution by the maritime forces there». 35 So, the only real difference between fishing boats and pirate boats is that pirate boats may have additional tanks to carry more gasoline in order to have a wider range of operation (this is, however, no proof that a boat is manned by pirates) and that they are always equipped with aluminum ladders or grappling ropes to board the targeted ships. So it's almost impossible to distinguish a pirate boat from a fishing boat before she begins to run at full speed towards a targeted vessel, or opens fire against her. It's very important to note that since 2008 pirates have also been using «mother-ships» (usually captured local dhows or trawlers) with two or three tugged boats, to increase their cruising radius significantly. In this manner, the so called Pirate Attack Groups (or PAGs 36 ) can easily attack their targets 1.000 nautical miles or more from African coasts: the whole West Indian Ocean is virtually exposed to these assaults. The International Maritime Bureau and the weapons on board their skiffs anyway, even if they have no intention of conducting piratical activity, so you may have a helicopter with the best systems in the world on, which will pick up an AK47, for example, but it does not mean that that skiff or those therein are imminently intending or intending at all to conduct pirate activity». (House of Lords, European Union Committee, 12th Report of Session 2009–10: Combating Somali Piracy: the EU’s Naval Operation Atalanta, page 70, Question 169). See also Mr Alderwick's speech: « They do carry grappling hooks and ropes which can scale ships as well, so what they would use as a primitive anchor could easily be used to try and board a ship as well. It is very difficult to discriminate» (p. 43, Question 170). 35 See House of Lords, European Union Committee, 12th Report of Session 2009– 10: Combating Somali Piracy: the EU’s Naval Operation Atalanta , p. 30 Question 8. 36 A «PAG» is defined as «any group consisting of a mother-ship or mother- skiff/whaler, accompanied by at least one attack skiff, or one-to-two skiff(s) operating independently (predominately in the Gulf of Aden), engaged in piracy operations». See Nato Shipping Center, http://www.shipping.nato.int/operations/OS/Pages/Definitions.aspx.

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Nato Shipping Center have defined «the area bounded by the Suez and the Strait of Hormuz to the North, 10°S and 78°E» 37 up to the Somali coasts to India and from the Strait of Ormuz to the Seychelles High Risk Area. «Mother-ships» are relatively easier to make out than simple pirate skiffs because of their tugged boats (usually two or three): in this case land- or ship-based aerial surveillance can really be effective. A very simple but relevant question may now come up. Somali pirates attack their targets on the high seas, while those are going on their course. How is this possible? How can pirates manage to capture enormous, modern, technically up-to-date ships by means of very small, badly equipped boarding parties? The fact is that these vessels have an average crew of only 20-25 men. At any given moment, about one-third of the crew are in bed. When the captain is in his cabin, on the bridge there is often only the mate and one or two sailors to keep watch. The engineers and their assistants have to remain in the engine room; the galley crew can't leave the living quarters. So very few people can actually handle anti- piracy measures, and this fact allows these ships to be boarded by pirates. Merchant vessels, moreover, voyage at only 12-14 knots (i.e. 22-25 km/h), although their top speed is 20 to 22-24 knots. This low speed is usually considered the best compromise between costs and benefits, but at the same risks in so doing, ships are put in jeopardy. Pirate crafts are faster (although their top speed is rarely more than 30 knots) than ships, so «pirates may be very fast at boarding and entering the ship». 38 It's not only a problem of speed, though: a running ship generates large waves, which make it very difficult for pirate boats to approach the sides. So one of the most important «best practices» for vessels to defend themselves from pirates is simply to go «full ahead», as United Kingdom Marine Trade Operations (UKMTO ) says: «One of the most effective ways to defeat a pirate attack is by using speed to try to outrun the attackers and/or make it difficult to board». 39 Masters can

37 See Best Managed Practices , p. 11. 38 See Coping with capture. Hostage handbook of Somali pirates, Danish Maritime Officers 2012, p. 23. 39 See UMKTO, Best Management Practices 4, p. 7.

135 Martino Sacchi Piracy in Somalia: a long term menace or a phenomenon in its last throes?

make evasive maneuvers too, but in this case the speed of the ship can dramatically decrease, and pirates can more easily board the ship. Contrary to what results from many journalistic sources, Somali pirates are generally low tech. 40 First of all, as already said above, their skiffs are very small, so their range of operation is heavily conditioned by wind and sea conditions.

The graph (courtesy of Diego Catalano, MSCHOA) in fact evidences that pirate attacks are strictly related to monsoons: from

40 See for instance, Mr Alderwick' answer to Lord Inge's question: «In terms of the tactics they are using, if you read certain sources, you will say, oh, they are highly sophisticated operators; evidence to date and certainly all the people that I speak to that are involved directly in this operation, say that is simply not the case. This is not sophisticated....conducting the physical operation of boarding the ships et cetera is pretty basic: it is grappling hooks, pilot ladders....Indeed, the material state of the equipment they are using is very poor.» House of Lords, European Union Committee, 12th Report of Session 2009–10: Combating Somali Piracy: the EU’s Naval Operation Atalanta, pag 43 Question 172.

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December to March, when the north-east monsoon blows, assaults are less frequent; from mid-February to mid-May, when the wind falls and waves are low, assaults reach their maximum; during the period from June to mid-September the strong south-west monsoon arises and brings about sea conditions that pirates cannot face with their skiffs; consequently, the number of assaults and hijacked vessels decreases whereas numbers rise again from mid-September to December due to light breezes. In addition, pirates generally use quite elementary weapons. Most of them use old AK47s, pistols 41 and even simple knives, as shown in photographs taken by Western naval forces. Sometimes they have machine-guns and RPG ( Rocket Propelled Grenade ) too, but these weapons are rarely used, because the pirate's goal is to obtain ransom from ship owners and not to destroy vessels.42 Of course, pirates need some basic knowledge of GPS, high frequency radio and satellite telephones, because after catching their plunders they have to steer them to the Somali coast and then contact the ship owners. This is the reason why in PAGs we can often find former Somali sailors and/or people who have studied or worked in Western countries and can understand radar/GPS data and consequently order the helmsman to steer the ship in the requested direction. Most pirates, nevertheless, as above mentioned used to be fishermen or poor folks seeking their fortune without having any technical experience. When a vessel is moored, the assault group is replaced by the holding team: «there can be more than 200 people connected to a single hijacking. Usually there will be 20-40 pirates at a time on-board an anchored vessel». 43 In a holding team an important role is played by the negotiator.

41 The most common pistols used among pirates are the Makarov and Tokarev (Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 2010, p. 36). 42 See the opinion expressed by Mr Holtby at House of Lords: « The equipment that they use seems to be still at a very basic level». House of Lords, European Union Committee, 12th Report of Session 2009–10: Combating Somali Piracy: the EU’s Naval Operation Atalanta page 75 Question 303. Mr Holtby in 2010 was Deputy Head of Security Policy Group. 43 See Coping with capture. Hostage handbook of Somali pirates, Danish Maritime Officers 2012, p. 16.

137 Martino Sacchi Piracy in Somalia: a long term menace or a phenomenon in its last throes?

Negotiators need to master foreign languages (above all English) and modern technology, such as radio communications and satellite telephones: as ship owners and most western journalists only speak to the negotiators, they may easily be led to believe that pirates are more sophisticated than they actually are. Journalists often speak about the pirates’ skills at finding their targets on the high seas and hint at a dark network of spies and informants inside navigation companies. In a few cases, actually, vessels seemed suspiciously well known to pirates, but there is no proper proof for the existence of this spy-network. Nevertheless, there is a very simple reason for the success of pirates: the enormous number of ships transiting off the coasts of Somalia. As indicated previously 21.000 to 26.000 vessels per annum pass through Bab el Mandab and the Gulf of Aden, which amounts to 70 vessels a day. During his audition Mr. Alderwick stated: «They [the Somali pirates] only have to sit offshore by two miles and they can see what is on offer, and select and hamper and harass as required, so I do not think they are running a sophisticated intelligence operation». 44 They simply choose their targets according to size and vulnerability, including : 45
low free board 46
slow speed
the absence of on-board defensive measures (such as barbed wire and fire hoses)
and medium to large tonnage (which are presumed to elicit higher ransom demands). 47

44 See House of Lords, European Union Committee, 12th Report of Session 2009–10: Combating Somali Piracy: the EU’s Naval Operation Atalanta, page 45, Question 179. 45 Free board is the distance from the upper deck to the waterline; pirates very rarely attacked vessels with a free board greater than 8 meters, which means a vertical wall as high as a three flats house. 46 To date, there have been no reported attacks where pirates have boarded ships proceeding at over 18 knots, i.e. 33 km/h. 47 Anonymous Royal Australian Navy (RAN) officer, Canberra, quoted by Peter Chalk (July 2009); the data were substantially confirmed by Marina Militare Italiana officer, Diego Catalano, in personal conversation in June 2012.

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Pirates are «quite opportunistic», an IMB Report says, 48 and attack every type of ship: General Cargo vessels, all types of Tankers, Ro-Ro Vessels, Container Vessels, Fishing Vessels, Tugs, Dhows and yachts. But sometimes they choose the wrong target, as did the pirates who attacked the Spanish Navy replenishment oiler SPS Patiño , at that time the flagship of the EU naval forces in Somali waters on January 12, 2012, mistaking it for a merchant ship. 49 When a potential target is sought, two or three skiffs try to get closer. When they are near the ship, the crew of one of the boats is directing fire weapons at the bridge to make the ship stop, while their fellows are trying to place their skiffs alongside the ship in order to allow one or more armed pirates to climb on board using very simple devices 50 such as:

long lightweight hooked ladders,
grappling hooks with rope attached and
long hooked poles with a climbing rope attached to board vessels underway. Pirate attacks take place in a short lapse of time: «it is generally thought that from the sighting of pirates to their boarding, it takes approximately fifteen minutes». 51 When pirates are on board, they generally make their way to the bridge to take control of the vessel. Once on the bridge, the pirates order the mate to stop the ship so as to let further pirates come on board. Typical attacks are carried out during the day (over 93 percent) and last between 30 and 45 minutes on average. After taking control of the ship, the pirates sail her to the coast of

48 ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and armed robbery against ships , Report for the period 1 January -30 June 2012, pag 21. 49 Spanish sailors shot back, of course, and one of the helicopters of the Patiño managed to chase the pirate boat which was eventually stopped by the helicopter’s machine gun. Six pirates, five of whom were wounded, were captured. 50 A special bonus is offered to the first man who spots the target and to the first pirate who climbs on board of the targeted ship (in this case usually a new Toyota Land Cruiser). 51 See Roger Middleton, Piracy in Somalia. Threatening global trade, feeding local wars , Chatam House, Africa Program, October 2008, AFP BP 08/02, p. 4.

139 Martino Sacchi Piracy in Somalia: a long term menace or a phenomenon in its last throes?

Somalia and drop anchors in its territorial waters in front of well- disposed communities. «When they seize a ship they bring it back to a central location, three or four of which are known to us, and from those locations they maintain they keep the ships under control and start the negotiations», 52 explains Rear Admiral Hudson. Their basic goal is to elicit as large a ransom payment as possible, so they avoid killing or harming the crew or causing structural damage to a captured ship. 53 When a ship is secured to a mooring, the original pirate assault group disembarks from the vessel, and a hostage-taker team assumes the command This team is responsible for guarding the hostages and protecting the ship not only from attempts to free the vessel but above all from other pirate gangs. Hostage-taker teams have a lower social status than assault teams: 54 pirates of this group may be simple recruits with little experience, whose job consists in watching the hostages and guarding the ship. Both the pirates who boarded the ship and the guards are armed with AK-47s. They constantly chew a local drug called «khat» to stay alert when on duty 55 . They plunder the ship and rob all valuable objects (money, jewels, electronic devices and others). According to reports from captured and active pirates, ransom is divided in the following manner: 20 percent goes to the financiers, 20 percent is reserved for operating costs, 30 percent for bribes and 30 percent is equally divided among the pirates. 56 Historically, one of the most important pirate group is the so called

52 Rear Admiral Hudson in House of Lords, European Union Committee, 12th Report of Session 2009–10: Combating Somali Piracy: the EU’s Naval Operation Atalanta, page 55, Question 111. 53 See Peter Chalk, Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Scope, Dimensions, Causes and Responses , Brown Journal of World Affairs, Spring/Summer 2010 volume xvi, issue ii page 93. 54 See Coping with capture. Hostage handbook of Somali pirates , Danish Maritime Officers 2012, p 34. 55 This drug offers a similar, weaker stimulus as amphetamine and cocaine. Pirates chew khat leaves to obtain increased alertness and energy. They usually start chewing khat after lunch; they simultaneously consume heavy sugared beverages, because khat increases blood pressure and burns up a lot of energy. 56 See Raymond Gilpin Counting the Costs of Somali Piracy , United States Institute of Peace, 2009, p. 11.

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Hoboyo-Haradhere cartel (sometimes referred to as the Somali Marines or Somali Coastguard). «Largely the product of one man, Mohammed Abdi Hassan «Afwyne» (meaning «big mouth» in Somali language) the group operates out of El-Huur and El-Gaan (roughly 400 kilometers north of Mogadishu) and by the end of 2006 he had a militia of 75 to 100 members and a flotilla of at least 100 skiffs». 57 Mohamed Hassan Abdi Afwyne is considered one of the founders of Somali piracy. He's implicated in the most famous hijacking action in 2008 (MV Faina and the tanker Sirius Star ) and is reportedly the boss of the khat trade. Afwyne has recently announced his intention to retire, 58 and this announcement has been interpreted as the end of an era in Somali piracy. Other notorious pirates among the Puntlander leaders are Abshir Abdillai «Boyah», Mohamed Abdi «Garaad» and Mohamed Garfanje. 59

4. Counter-piracy Operations At its very early stages, piracy had largely been underestimated. In the late 90s, only a few vessels had been hijacked and no warships had been deployed to the Gulf of Aden area to protect shipping. Only after September 11, 2001, the Multinational Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150, former US Navy formation) was deployed to the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa. Its Area of Operation (AOR) covered the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Oman 60 but its major target was fighting Al Quaeda terrorist groups

57 See Peter Chalk, Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Scope, Dimensions, Causes and Responses , Brown Journal of World Affairs, Spring/Summer 2010 volume xvi, issue ii, pag 92. 58 See for instance «The Telegraph», January 13, 2013. 59 Boyah started hijacking ships in the 1990s and is said to have been involved in around 20 cases (but Boyah himself claims to have hijacked almost 60 ships). He was arrested in 2010 and sentenced to five years in Bosaso prison. Garaad was trained by British security agency in the late 90's for Puntland government forces, but he soon became a pirate, leading a network of 800 men. He was captured by Iranian special forces in April 2012. Garfanje is said to have created a personal force as a result of his piracy success (he was involved in the hijacking of MV Faina in 2008). 60 But not the Arabian Gulf, where operates another Combined Task Force, CTF- 152.

141 Martino Sacchi Piracy in Somalia: a long term menace or a phenomenon in its last throes?

in Afghanistan and in the Middle East, not Somali piracy: assistance to attacked vessels was just occasionally provided, and only if the ship under assault was in the vicinity. It was the Marina Militare Italiana (the Italian Navy) that organized the first exclusively anti-piracy operation, called «Mare Sicuro», in 2005, after having to put up with various assault attempts to Italian ships, such as the tanker Jolly Marrone (July 21, 2005) and Cielo d'Amico (July 27, 2005). Patrol Frigate Nave Granatiere left Italy on August 6, 2005 and returned to her base in Taranto on November 25, 2005. In that period she escorted 75 merchant vessels. «Somali piracy, however, was not [yet] considered to be a significant problem beyond the shipping community». 61 The real turning point in counter-piracy operations arrived in 2008. Two attacks showed how dangerous Somali piracy had become: the Ukrainian flagged MV Faina was hijacked on September 25, 2008 when heading to the port of Mombasa with her cargo of 33 Soviet-made T-72 tanks, weapons and ammunition. After a few weeks, the VLCC62 Sirius Star was hijacked by pirates about 450 nautical miles south-east the coast of Kenya: with a length overall of 332 meters and a cargo capacity of 318.000 metric tons, she was the largest ship ever captured. The two ships were released after the payment of an enormous ransom. NATO immediately launched two short operations, respectively called «Allied Provider» (from October to December 2008) and «Allied Protector» (from March to August 2009), and finally «Ocean Shield» (from August 2009 to date), intended as counter-piracy operations. In the meantime, European Union launched «EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta», the first ever EU Naval operation, whose tasks are to escort merchant shipping vessels carrying aid for the World Food Program as well as vessels of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), protect vulnerable shipping in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, and lastly to monitor fishing activity off the coast of Somalia. 63 Its composition changes because of rotation of ships, but

61 See Shortland Anja, Vothknecht Marc, Combating “maritime terrorism” off the coast of Somalia , European Journal of Political Economy 27, 2011. 62 Very Large Crude Carrier. 63 The Marina Militare Italiana deployed to «Operation Atalanta» the following ships: Comandante Bettica (March 7, 2009 – March 21, 2009)

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«it typically comprises of approximately 1200 personnel, 4 – 7 Surface Combat Vessels and 2 – 4 Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft»: 64 in January 2013, for instance, the Naval force is composed by four frigates 65 . EU NAVFOR launched also the Maritime Security Center – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) to provide 24- hours monitoring of ships transiting the Gulf of Aden and coordinate all counter-piracy efforts in the area. The third major operation in counter piracy is the Combined Joint Task Force 151 (CTF-151), a spin-off born from CTF-150 and launched in January 2009 as a US led multinational force. The CTF- 151 works «actively to deter, disrupt and suppress piracy». 66 Chinese, Indian, Russian Navies deploy to Indian ocean and HOA some ships, too. The most important counter-piracy measure is the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), which has been active since February 1, 2009. IRTC is situated in the Gulf of Aden: it is composed by two lanes, respectively eastbound and westbound; each lane is 492 miles long and 5 miles wide, with a 2 mile separation between the lanes. In order to obtain naval protection, every ship transiting the Gulf of Aden is strongly recommended to adhere the IRTC and transmitting her time of arrival, speed and course to the naval group patrolling the area by means of MSCHOA. Vessels are organized not into actual convoys, but into «Group Transits», which are intended to put ships into different speed groups in order to be protected by naval units. «The times for different groups to enter the IRTC are calculated

Maestrale (April 2, 2009 – September 18, 2009) Comandante Borsini (July 4, 2009 – August 3, 2009) San Giorgio (May 3, 2009 - August 13, 2009) Etna (December 11, 2009 – April 24, 2010 - Flagship) Libeccio (July 19, 2010 - December 1, 2010) Zeffiro (December 3,2010 – February 25, 2011) Espero (February 27,2011 – June 20, 2011) Scirocco (April 14, 2011 – July 25, 2012) San Giusto (July 26, 2012 – December 16, 2012, Flagship). 64 See official site http://eunavfor.eu/mission/. 65 In January 2013 these vessels were: Mendez Nunez (Spain, flagship); Karlsruhe (Deuschland); Louise Maire (Belgium); Sorcouf (France). 66 Hansen Jack, The UK as a Counter Piracy Actor, in e-International Relations, November 4, 2012.

143 Martino Sacchi Piracy in Somalia: a long term menace or a phenomenon in its last throes?

so that they pass through the area of statistically greatest danger, between 47° and 49° E, at night and ensures that all ships, regardless of speed, are together at dawn». 67 In this way naval forces can be in the best position to protect ships and to offer support in case of an attack. The table below shows the daily moments in which every ship, according to her speed, has to enter the corridor in order to find herself protected by naval assets in the most dangerous areas at the right time: Speed Eastbound Lane Westbound Lane 10 knots 01.00 UTC 68 04.00 LT 69 15.00 UTC 18.00 LT 12 knots 05.30 UTC 08.30 LT 21.00 UTC 00.01 LT 14 knots 08.30 UTC 11.30 LT 01.00 UTC 04.00 LT 16 knots 11.00 UTC 14.00 LT 05.30 UTC 08.30 LT 18 knots 13.00 UTC 16.00 LT 07.00 UTC 10.00 LT In this way different ships, running at different speed and entering the corridor in different moments, find themselves together in the most dangerous moment (at dawn) and can be easily protected by naval and aerial assets. IRTC is reputed to be very effective in order to contrast pirate attacks, which quickly dropped in Gulf of Aden area after it became operative. But quite unexpectedly, the great effectiveness of IRTC had a negative consequence, because it pushed the pirates into the Indian Ocean, which is absolutely too much wide to be conveniently patrolled. Attacks to hijacked vessel are generally not allowed by NATO and EU navies ROE, 70 because crew safety is top priority. Nevertheless, if required by special circumstances (especially if hostages' life is

67 See Gulf of Aden Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor & Group Transit Explanation . 68 Coordinated Universal Time, in this case synonymous with Greenwich Medium Time. 69 Local Time. 70 Rules of Engagement. The Rules of Engagement are rules or directives to military forces that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force may be used. See Nato MC (Military Committee) 362/1.

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thought to be in imminent danger or, on the contrary, if crew members are known in safe conditions, for instance because they are in a «citadel» or in «secure room»), Navy special forces in several occasions have attacked vessels hold by pirates. 71 At least in two occasions a hijacked vessel was attacked by Puntland Marine Police Force (PMPF) attempting to free her: only one has been successful. 72

5. Conclusions Attacks against vessels continued to increase until 2011, when a maximum of 147 attacks was reported by the statistics of the Nato Shipping Center; but they drastically dropped to only 23 in 2012 and to only 1 in the third quarter of the that year. This very significant drop is due to many factors: first of all, the general situation in Somalia is slowly getting better. 73 Al-Shabaab Islamic forces retired from Mogadishu in August 2011; a new president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, the first chosen by democratic elections in decades, was elected in August 20, 2012; Puntland government forces seem to be more effective than before in counter- piracy operations; 74 the increased military action of naval Western

71 When a 17.375 DWT American flagged container ship, MV Maersk Alabama , was hijacked by four pirates 240 nautical miles southeast of the Somali port of Ely on April 8 , 2009, US Navy immediately sent the destroyer USS Bainbridge to foot the ship, and then the guided-missile frigate USS Halyburton and the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer . The crew of Alabama had received anti-piracy training: pirates captured the Master of Alabama, Richard Philips, and others members of the crew, but the others went into a «secure room» and shut down all ship systems. The ship became ungovernable and pirates leaved her using a 28 foot lifeboat and taking Philips as hostage. Philips war rescued on April 12 th , when US Navy SEAL snipers were able to kill the three pirates remaining in the lifeboat. 72 On June, 3 2012, as reported by Somalia Report, Puntland Marine Police Force came close to crude oil tanker Smyrni , hijacked on May 15, 2012 with 26 crew member on board. Pirates returned fire and Puntland forces came back to their bases without casualties. Three pirates are reported dead, but vessel remained in pirate hands. On December 15, 2012 they attacked the team holding MV Iceberg 1 , and this time the attack was successful. 73 «The security situation continued to improve as AMISOM and the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) expanded their areas of control» says Security Council Report, February 2013. 74 The most remarkable success of the Puntland government's forces is the

145 Martino Sacchi Piracy in Somalia: a long term menace or a phenomenon in its last throes?

Navy forces is more and more effective; eventually, preventive measures have been implemented by shipping companies. Vessels transiting Gulf of Aden and High Risk Area sail faster than before and more careful watching and security measures are put into effect. But all these measures are very expensive. An accurate calculation of piracy costs for the shipping community was carried out by Anna Bowden and Shikha Basnet in 2011. 75 Quite surprisingly, ransom is by no matters among the most expensive items. The table below shows the weight of every item (in millions of dollars): Increased speed 2713 Military 76 1273 Security equipment 77 1112 Insurance 635 Re-routing 78 583 Labor 79 195 Ransom 160 Organizations 20 Prosecution 16 The total cost of Somali piracy in 2012 was calculated at about 6707 million dollars, 80% of which were paid by industries and the remaining 20 % by governments. Ransoms, as show above, only make constitute 2% of the total amount of the costs of piracy. The bulk of the expenses is represented by higher fuel consumption, because of the higher speed with which vessels transit the Gulf of Aden and the High Risk Area. Bowden and liberation of the crew of MV Iceberg , seized on March 29 th , 2010. The ship, stranded on shore, was attacked on December 15 th , 2012. 75 See Anna Bowden, Shikha Basnet, The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011 , One Earth Future Foundation. 76 Naval and aerial assets. 77 Razor wire, water spray and foam monitors, upper deck lighting, citadel/safe muster point, closed circuit television, alarms, and so on. 78 Many vessels pass south Cape of Good Hope to avoid transit through High Risk Area. 79 Seafarers are eligible for double pay when they transit the HRA.

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Basnet's statement is based on the supposition that vessels when transiting through the Indian Ocean are traveling at an increased speed of 13 knots (just a bit higher than their economical «best speed» of 12 knots) and when passing off Somali coasts increase their speed up to 18-20 knots. This is reputed a «security speed» because «to date, there have been no reported attacks where pirates have boarded a ship that has been proceeding at over 18 knots». 80 Nato Shipping Center suggests: «Ships are recommended to proceed at Full Sea Speed, or at least at 18 knots wherever they can run at greater speed, throughout their transit of the High Risk Area». 81 The combinations of all these measures seems to be effective to reduce the number of the attacks but Somali piracy has not at all disappeared. For instance, on January 5, 2013 a merchant vessel sailing 260 miles off the Somali Coast made a distress call, reporting that she was being assaulted by six men in a fast moving boat, armed with rocket propelled grenades, as reported by EUNAVFOR website. NATO warship USS Halyburton , which was patrolling only 80 nautical miles away, launched her helicopter and was able to locate a suspect boat within a very short time: the twelve men aboard were apprehended. Anyway, the general impression may suggest that piracy is less dangerous than it was before. When ship owners decide that risks have again become sufficiently low, they will order a speed reduction of their vessels in order to save fuel: and so ships transiting off the Somali coast will once again be the perfect target for the next generation of pirates. The only way to interrupt this cycle is to significantly improve wealth and the way of living in Somalia, as shown in all analysis to this critical matter.

80 See Best Managed Practices , p. 14. 81 See ibidem , p. 14.

147 Martino Sacchi Piracy in Somalia: a long term menace or a phenomenon in its last throes?

My special thanks go to the following people who offered me active collaboration giving me precious information in order to carry out my research, or simply dedicated me some time to help me gain deep insight into this topic: B. Nicolini, History and Institutions of Africa - Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Catholic University, Milan, Italy. G. Ghisi, special delegate for the Italian government for counter- piracy affairs. CA G. Gumiero, Staff Officer of the Italian Navy. Lt D. Catalano, EUNAVFOR. CC M. Carosella, Press Officer of the Italian Navy.

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References

Institutional Sources

• Coping with capture. Hostage handbook of Somali pirates, Danish Maritime Officers 2012. • House of Lords, European Union Committee , 12th Report of Session 2009–10 Combating Somali Piracy: the EU' Naval Operation Atalanta , 2010. • ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and armed robbery against ships , Report for the period 1 January -30 June 2012. • Kaija Hurlburt and Cyrus Mody, The Human Cost of Somali Piracy 2011 International Maritime Bureau and Oceans Beyond Piracy, (22 june 2012). • National Geospatial-intelligence Agency, Sailing Directions (Enroute), East Africa and the South Indian Ocean , Springfield, Virginia 2010. • National Geospatial-intelligence Agency, Sailing Directions (Enroute), Red Sea and the Persian Gulf , Springfield, Virginia 2011. • ONU: Resolution 1851, 1846. • Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011) on line at this address: http://www.somaliareport.com/downloads/UN_REPORT_2012. pdf UMKTO, Best Management Practices.

Articles

• Anderson Elliot A., It's a Pirate's Life for Some: The Development of an Illegal Industry in Response to an Unjust Global Power Dynamic , in Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Volume 17, Issue 2, Summer 2010, pp. 319-339 (Article), p. 321. • Anna Bowde, One Earth Future Foundation, Geopolicity, The Economics of Piracy. Pirate Ransoms and Livelihoods off the Coasts of Somalia , 2011. • Axe, David, No Quick Solutions to Pirate Crisis , World Pol. Rev., Oct. 6, 2008,

149 Martino Sacchi Piracy in Somalia: a long term menace or a phenomenon in its last throes?

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=2744. • Chalk Peter, Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Scope, Dimensions, Causes and Responses , Brown Journal of World Affairs, Spring/Summer 2010, volume xvi, issue ii, pag 92. • Gilpin Raymond, Counting the Costs of Somali Piracy , United States Institute of Peace, 2009. • Hansen Jack, The UK as a Counter Piracy Actor, in e- International Relations, November 4th , 2012. • James Kraska, Freakonomics of Maritime Piracy , Brown Journal of World Affairs, Spring/Summer 2010, volume xvi, issue ii. • Marchal Roland, Somali Piracy: The Local Contexts of an International Obsession . Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism and Development, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011, pp. 31-50 (Article). • Middleton Roger, Piracy in Somalia. Threatening global trade, feeding local wars , Chatam House, Africa Programme, October 2008, AFP BP 08/02. • Mpondo-Epo, Bruno, Root Causes of Piracy in Somalia . RSIS Commentaries 2009 (June). 2009. • Murphy, MN, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World. C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd., 2010. • Murphy, MN, Somalia, The New Barbary?: Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa, New York: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd. 2011. • Nincic, Donna, Maritime piracy in Africa: The humanitarian dimension, African Security Review 18(3): 2-16, 2009. • Oliveira, Gilberto Carvalho De, 2012, Naval Peacekeeping and Piracy: Time for a Critical Turn in the Debate, International Peacekeeping 19 (1): 48-61. • Onuoha, Freedom C., Piracy and Maritime Security off the Horn of Africa: Connections, Causes, and Concerns, African Security 3 (4): 191-215, 2010. • Samatar Abdi Ismail, Lindberg Mark and Mahayni Basil, The Dialectics of Piracy in Somalia: the rich versus the poor , in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 8, 2010, pp 1377–1394, pag 1384.

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• Shortland Anja and Vothknecht Marc, Combating “maritime terrorism” off the coast of Somalia , European Journal of Political Economy 27, 2011 pag 130-151. • Silva, Mario, Somalia: State Failure, Piracy, and the Challenge to International Law, Virginia Journal of International Law 50(1): 553-578. 2010. • Sterio, Milena, 2011, The Somali Piracy Problem: A Global Puzzle Necessitating A Global Solution, American University Law Review 59(5): 1449-1498. • Stevenson, Jonathan, Jihad and Piracy in Somalia, Survival 52(1): 27-38, 2010. • Striuli Lorenzo, La Pirateria Somal a, CEMISS 2009. • Sullivan, Alexa K, Piracy in the Horn of Africa and its effects on the global supply chain, Journal of Transportation Security 3(4): 231-243. 2010. • Task Force 2012, 2012. The Challenge of Piracy off the Horn of Africa . International Studies, Seattle: University of Washington, Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies. • The international response to somali piracy : challenges and opportunities, edited by Bibi van Ginkel and Frans-Paul van der Putten, Leiden-Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010. • Treves, Tullio, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia, European Journal of International Law 20(2): 399-414, 2009. • Upadhyaya, Shishir, 2011. Piracy in the Gulf of Aden: Naval Challenges, Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India 6 (2): 133-147. • Vasan, RS, 2011, Case Study of MV Suez and Anti Piracy Operations: Lessons for India and Pakistan, Journal of Defence.

151 Martino Sacchi Piracy in Somalia: a long term menace or a phenomenon in its last throes?

L'autore Martino Sacchi, laureato in Filosofia Teoretica presso l’Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano, esperto di storia navale e di storia della tecnologia navale. Tra le sue pubblicazioni, Terra in vista! Le grandi esplorazioni oceaniche del XV secolo (Effemme editore). Collabora con la cattedra di Storia e istituzioni dell'Africa, Facoltà di Scienze politiche e sociali, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano.

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