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Negotiating Climates: The Politics of Climate Change and the Formation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 1979-1992

A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of

PhD

in the Faculty of Life Sciences

2014

David George Hirst

Table of Contents Abstract ...... 4 Declaration ...... 5 Copyright Statement ...... 6 Acknowledgements ...... 7 Key Figures in Thesis ...... 8 List of Acronyms...... 10 Chapter 1 – Introduction ...... 11 1. Aims of thesis ...... 14 2. Historiography of Climate Change ...... 17 2.1 Numerical Weather Prediction ...... 17 2.2 Funding Research ...... 19 2.3 Internationalisation and Climate Change ...... 21 2.4 Climate Models and the Politics of Climate Change ...... 22 2.5 The Genesis of the IPCC ...... 26 3. Theoretical Frameworks of Science-Policy: Assessing Global Environmental Assessments ...... 30 3.1 Bridging the gap: linking science and policy ...... 32 3.2 Governance of expertise and the geopolitics of knowledge ...... 38 4. Research Methods and Sources ...... 40 4.1 Archival Material ...... 41 4.2 Oral History...... 43 4.3 Bert Bolin’s Personal History of the IPCC ...... 47 4.4 Transnational History ...... 48 5. Outline of Thesis Chapters ...... 49 Chapter 2 – Manufacturing Consensus around Climate Change: Early Forays into Policy, 1979-1987 ...... 54 1. Introduction ...... 54 2. The Emergence of Science-Policy Advocates, 1980-1985 ...... 59 2.1 Villach-I: More Money, More Research ...... 61 2.2 SCOPE 29: More Science, More Certainty? ...... 66 2.3 Villach-II: Making a political argument with science ...... 70 3. ‘Scientized’ decision-making: Climate Solutions modelled on Ozone ...... 74 5.1 The Ozone Consensus for Climate Change ...... 75 5.2 The Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG)...... 77 6. Beyond Villach-II: Science, Policy and Science-advocacy ...... 82

6.1 Villach/Bellagio: Unrestrained advocates setting the agenda ...... 83 6.2 Toronto Conference: Scientists and Politicians mix ...... 88 6.3 Scientific Assessments: Who is speaking for the Climate? ...... 90 7. Conclusion ...... 93 Chapter 3 – Negotiating an ‘Intergovernmental Assessment Mechanism’...... 97 1. Introduction ...... 97 2. A New Mechanism to Assess the Issue ...... 100 3. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: from concept to reality ...... 110 3.1 The World Meteorological Congress, 1987: An International Mandate ...... 111 3.2 Continuing US influence: Architects of the IPCC ...... 114 4. Negotiating the Terms of Reference: Responsibilities, Participation and Working Arrangements ...... 122 5. Conclusion ...... 128 Chapter 4 – Balancing Scientific Credibility and Political Legitimacy: The First Assessment Cycle, 1988-1990 ...... 130 1. Introduction ...... 130 2. The First Session of the IPCC, November 1988: A Comprehensive Assessment .... 134 2.1 IPCC Structures and Personnel ...... 135 2.2 IPCC Schedule: Ensuring Salient Timing ...... 143 3. “An Authoritative Statement of the Views of the International Scientific Community” ...... 145 4. Reception of the Report: Political Legitimacy and Scientific Credibility ...... 159 5. Conclusions ...... 167 6. Appendix ...... 170 Chapter 5 – The Framework Convention on Climate Change: the intertwining science and politics of climate change, 1988-1992 ...... 171 1. Introduction ...... 171 2. Establishing the Primacy of the IPCC at Noordwijk ...... 175 3. The IPCC to the INC: Negotiating a Climate Convention ...... 182 4. Re-thinking the IPCC: From the INC to the ‘Earth Summit’ ...... 193 4.1 INC not the IPCC ...... 197 4.2 Increased developing country participation ...... 198 4.3 Sceptical White House advisers ...... 200 5. Conclusion ...... 204 Chapter 6 – Conclusion ...... 207 1. Science as Politics ...... 209

2. The Geopolitics of Knowledge Production: Assessing Global Environmental Assessments ...... 214 3. Scope for Future Research ...... 219 4. Discussion of Major Findings ...... 222 Bibliography ...... 225 Archival Sources ...... 225 Published Secondary Sources ...... 229 Interviews ...... 237 Websites/Newspaper Articles ...... 238

Word count: 84,155

Abstract

Climate change emerged as a topic of public and political concern in the 1980s alongside the discovery of the ‘Antarctic Ozone Hole.’ The issue was raised up the political agenda in the latter half of the 1980s by scientists and international administrators operating in a transnational setting – culminating in the eventual formation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988. Created to produce a comprehensive assessment of the science, impacts and possible response strategies to climate change, the Panel managed to bridge to the two worlds of science and politics as a hybrid science-policy organisation, meeting the divergent needs of a variety of groups, specifically in the US Government.

This thesis will provide an analysis of the negotiations that resulted in the formation of the IPCC in 1988. In particular, I examine the power politics of knowledge production in the relationship between a transnational set of scientists engaged in assessments of climate change and national policymakers. I argue that the IPCC was established as a means of controlling who could speak for the climate, when and how, and as such the Panel legitimised and privileged certain voices at the expense of others.

In addition to tracing and examining the history of international climate change assessments in the 1980s, I will scrutinise how the issue became a topic of international political concern. Focusing on the negotiations between the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United States of America in the formation of the IPCC, I will argue against the received view that the U.S. has consistently been in a battle with climate science and the IPCC. As I will show that the U.S. government was both integral to the decision to establish the IPCC and also one of its strongest backers. Following the formation of the Panel I examine the ad hoc decisions taken and processes adopted during the First Assessment (AR1) that contributed to the anchoring of the IPCC as the central authority on climate related knowledge. As such I show that in the absence of any formal procedural guidance there was considerable leeway for the scientists and Working Group Chairs to control and shape the content of the assessment.

Finally, I analyse the ways in which U.S. and UK policymakers strategically engaged with the Panel. Significantly, I show that the ways in which the U.S. pushed all political debates to the heart of the scientific assessment imparted a linear approach to policymaking –assessment precedes and leads the policymaking –contributing to the increasing entanglement of the science and politics of climate change. Moreover, the narrow technical framing of the issue and the largely tokenistic attempts to involve participants from developing countries in the IPCC resulted in the UN resolutions (backed by developing countries) establishing the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee/United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC/UNFCC) contrary to the wishes of U.S. policymakers.

Declaration

No portion of the work referred to in this thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other institute of learning.

i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes. ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended)and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such copies made. iii. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trademarks and other intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis , may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual property and/or Reproductions iv. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/DocuInfo.aspx?DocID=487 ), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations (see http://www.manchester.ac.uk/library/aboutus/regulations) and in The University’s policy on Presentation of Theses

Acknowledgements

This thesis was generously funded by the Economic and Social Research Council.

I wish to express my deep gratitude to my supervisory team of Dr. David Kirby and Dr. Simone

Turchetti who have both read, and re-read, the many drafts and iterations of this thesis as it has made its way into its current format. Their patience, advice and guidance have helped me immeasurably in the course of my studies. A special mention must also go to my Mum, who has dedicated her time and energy to reading drafts.

I would like to thank all of the interview participants I have spoken with throughout my research into the history of the IPCC. Specific thanks must, however, be reserved for Eugene Bierly and John

Zillman who both kindly provided me with their own personal records and papers which have served as an invaluable resource in the course of this thesis. .

A special note of thanks must also go to my fellow PhD students at CHSTM who have always been on hand with both confectionary and caffeine, two crucial ingredients in any PhD. And finally, I would like to thank all the many friends and family who have helped me remember that there is in fact a world beyond the thesis!

Of course, I wouldn’t have been able to have done all this without the love and support of my family.

In particular, I want to take this opportunity to thank my loving wife Nina, who has supported me through the long hours and many stressful moments over the last 3 and half years.

Key Figures in Thesis

Fred Bernthal, United States Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental

and Scientific Affairs, 1988-1990, Chairman of Working Group-III First Assessment of the

1988-1990 and Deputy Director of the US National Science Foundation, 1990-1994.

Bert Bolin, Swedish Professor of meteorology at Stockholm University from 1961 until his retirement

in 1990. Author of the influential SCOPE Report in 1986, he had extensive links with the

WMO and ICSU and was first chairman of the IPCC, from 1988-1997.

James ‘Jim’ P. Bruce, Canadian meteorologist and former Acting Deputy Secretary-General of the

WMO, 1986-1989, represented the WMO in the establishment of the IPCC. Assistant Deputy

Minister of the Canadian Atmospheric Environment Service, 1980-1986, chaired the

landmark WMO/UNEP/ICSU Villach Conference in Austria, 1985.

Bo Döös, Swedish Professor of meteorology at Stockholm University, 1965-1970, Director, Joint

WMO/ICSU Planning Staff for the planning and implementation of the Global Atmospheric

Research Programme (GARP), and the related global observation programmes, including the

First GARP Global Experiment, 1971 -1982, and subsequently Director of the

WMO/UNEP/ICSU World Climate Programme, 1980-1982.

Gordon Goodman, Welsh ecologist, founding director of the Beijer Institue of the Swedish Royal

Academy of Sciences, 1977-1989, first Director of the Stockholm Environment Institute,

1989 and honorary science adviser to UN Earth Summit Conference Chairman, Maurice

Strong.

Alan Hecht, Director of National Climate Programme Office, 1981 to 1989. In 1989 joined the US

Environmental Protection Agency where he was key member of US delegation to the

Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to the Framework Convention on Climate Change

1991-1992.

Sir John Houghton, British meteorologist, former Chief Executive of the UK Meteorological Office,

1983-1991, and the Chairman of IPCC Working Group I for the first (1990), second (1995)

and third assessment (2001).

Yuri Izrael, Russian meteorologist and Chairman of the USSR Hydrometeorological Service.

Chairman of Working Group II of the IPCC for the first assessment and supplementary report,

1988-1992.

Geoff Jenkins, British meteorologist, veteran of 30 years’ work at the UK Meteorological Office and

Head of Working Group I Chairman’s task force First Assessment, 1988-1992.

Godwin O. Patrick Obasi, Nigerian meteorologist. He was appointed Secretary-General of the WMO

in 1984 and served until 2003. During his tenure he was active in promoting global solutions

to environmental issues.

Mostafa Tolba, Egyptian scientist and Executive Director of UNEP, 1974-1992. At Cairo University

he established his own school in microbiology where he was subsequently awarded an

Emeritus Professorship. After leading his country’s delegation the United Nations Conference on

the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972, he became UNEP's Deputy Executive Director,

and two years later was promoted to Executive Director. During his long tenure, 1975–1992,

he played an important role in the fight against ozone depletion – which culminated with

the Vienna Convention, 1985, and the Montreal Protocol, 1987 – and in the negotiations that

constituted the IPCC in 1988.

Sir Robert ‘Bob’ Watson, British atmospheric chemist, worked on atmospheric science issues

including ozone depletion and global warming. Director of the NASA Mission to Planet Earth

and an unnamed member of the Working Group I Chairman’s task force, subsequently voted

Chairman of the IPCC, 1997-2002.

List of Acronyms

AGGG...... Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases CCOL……………………………………………………Coordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer DoE...... Department of Energy (USA) EPA...... Environmental Protection Agency (USA) FAO………………………………………………………………...Food and Agriculture Organization FGGE...... First GARP Global Experiment GARP...... Global Atmospheric Research Program GATE...... GARP Atlantic Tropical Experiment ICSU...... International Council of Scientific Unions INC...... Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee IPCC...... Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change NAS...... National Academy of Sciences NCP...... National Climate Program SCOPE...... Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment UN...... United Nations UNCED…………….United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (‘Earth Summit’) UNEP...... United Nations Environment Programme UNESCO………………………...…United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNFCCC...... United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UN GA...... United Nations General Assembly WCP...... World Climate Programme WCRP...... World Climate Research Programme WG...... Working Group WHO………………………………………………………………………..World Health Organization WMO...... World Meteorological Organization

Chapter 1 – Introduction

“Those who think we are powerless to do anything about the greenhouse effect forget about

the ‘White House effect.’”

-George H. W. Bush (1988)1

Upon taking office in 2001, one of the first acts of President George W. Bush was to state his opposition to the Kyoto Protocol – an international treaty requiring industrialised countries to limit their emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). Bush claimed, in a letter to four US Senators, that his opposition to the treaty was based on the serious harm it would do to the US economy.2 His approach was in stark contrast to the rhetoric deployed by his father on the election campaign trail in 1988, as seen in the quote opening this chapter.

A little over a year later, to great opprobrium, his administration was implicated in a plan to oust “one of the most outspoken scientists on the issue of global warming” from the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).3 Supported by European Union (EU) countries,

Dr Robert Watson, the IPCC chair from 1997-2002, was standing for re-election for a second five year term. President Bush and his US administration, however, strongly opposed his re-election as they considered him too forthright on the dangerous contribution of fossil fuel emissions to climate change. This was reportedly due to the influence of fossil fuel lobbyists. Instead, the US backed the challenger Rajendra Pachauri, an Indian engineer, economist and director of the Tata Energy Research

Institute in New Delhi, who was elected to succeed Watson as chairman of the Panel. Most importantly, for US officials Pachauri was not Watson. He did not have the same public profile as

Watson, nor was he considered to be as strong an advocate of the actions on emissions controls the

Bush presidency was so opposed to. This episode, and the failure of the US Senate to ratify the 1997

Kyoto Protocol, has led to the almost clichéd characterisation of the US as a laggard in the

1 George H. W. Bush quoted in Anon, “The White House and the Greenhouse” New York Times (9th May 1989) 2 George W. Bush, “Letter from the President to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts” (13th March, 2001) accessed on-line 26th September 2013: www.georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html 3 BBC, “Climate Scientist Ousted” (19th April 2002), accessed online 26th September 2013: www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/1940117.stm

11 international politics of climate change, which has in turn contributed to the impression that the US is unsupportive of and opposed to the IPCC.

While simplistic notions of an anti-science US administration in thrall to fossil fuel lobbyists has its allure, and some grounding in their actions, in this thesis I will present a more considered examination of what the purpose of the IPCC was and why it was created. In doing so I will reveal a more complex and intricate relationship between the US, the IPCC and the politics of climate change, showing the US’s crucial role as a major proponent of the organization during its developmental years. I will investigate how scientists, politicians and international administrators responded to the science of climate change over the decade leading up to the creation of the IPCC in 1988 and through its First Assessment, published in 1990. Established by a June 1988 World Meteorological

Organization (WMO) Resolution, the IPCC was created to produce a comprehensive assessment of the science of climate change and its impacts as well as to consider the possible response strategies.1

This resolution came after several years of national and international assessments and growing international concern about the possible socio-economic consequences of climate change. The IPCC was intended to provide an authoritative evaluation of climatic change and how it could be delayed by appropriate national and international actions.

In this thesis I will review how and why the IPCC was established, evaluating the contributions of the scientists and international administrators involved as well as their individual motivations. Central to my analysis will be the IPCC’s relationships with key stakeholders such as US and UK officials on the one hand and the representatives of developing countries on the other. I will review how their views and reactions impacted on the establishment, structure and overall effectiveness of the IPCC. In particular, I will historicise US involvement with the Panel highlighting a complex and strained relationship. Arguing against the received view that the US has consistently been in a battle with climate science and the IPCC, I will instead demonstrate that the US government throughout the foundational stages of the IPCC was in fact one of its strongest initial backers – even

1 WMO, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Resolution 4 (EC-XL), (June, 1988)

12 going as far as advocating that the Panel take on a far larger role in the international negotiations of a climate convention.

The Panel has to date produced four comprehensive assessments and is at this stage finalising the details of the Fifth Assessment report (AR5), due to be published in 2014. In 1990 at the end of the First Assessment cycle (AR1) IPCC Chairman of Working Group I John Houghton, felt the stage was set for international negotiation of a Convention. In his foreword to the First Assessment he confidently stated that “the Assessment and its Summary will provide the necessary firm scientific foundation for the forthcoming discussions and negotiations on the appropriate strategy for response and action regarding the issue of climate change.”1 Consequently, the United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed, but to date the Kyoto Protocol – a binding agreement calling on countries to reduce their Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions – remains as yet un- ratified by the US government. The Panel does not have a mandate to make or even recommend policy, but as I will show in this thesis it has been considerably politicised from the outset.

Particularly through the ways in which governments have sought to control who could legitimately speak for the “climate”: Privileging certain voices at the expense of others.

At the end of 2009 the future of the IPCC came into question as climate science and the Panel itself became embroiled in a series of controversies. Prompted first by the hacked email scandal in

November 20092 – dubbed ‘Climategate’ by the media – and subsequently by the reportage of false claims made in the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the IPCC, a Nature editorial asked five climate change scholars for their views on what the future ought to hold for the IPCC.3 Opinions ranged from: complete overhaul of the IPCC, through to suggestions for increased independence and a new ‘Wikipedia-style’ open debate portraying a true reflection of the heterogeneity of scientific views. Furthermore, in October 2013, the IPCC agreed to set up a Task Group to consider the future work of the Panel. This group has been asked to consider what the appropriate structure and modus

1 John Houghton, “Foreword,” in Climate Change: The IPCC Science Assessment, J. T. Houghton, G. J. Jenkins & J. J. Ephraums (eds.), (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1990) 2 Fred Peace, The Climate Files: The Battle for the Truth about Global Warming, (Guardian Books: London, 2010) 3 Mike Hulme, Eduardo Zorita, Thomas F. Stocker, Jeff Price & John R. Christy, “IPCC: Cherish it, tweak it, scrap it?” Nature 463, pp. 730-732 (11 February 2010)

13 operandi for the Panel should be going forward, in addition to advising on the ways to ensure enhancement of the participation and contribution of developing countries in the future work of the

IPCC. As will become clear in the course of this thesis, concerns about the IPCC’s geographic imbalance have been prevalent since the outset in 1988.

Twenty-five years after the IPCC was established, and as we await the publication of the Fifth

Assessment (AR5) report, this thesis will provide a timely and judicious insight into the how and why the Panel was originally created. As well as highlighting both the continuities and discontinuities across the Panel’s history, I intend to show, firstly, how the origins of the IPCC can go some way towards explaining the subsequent extreme focus on reducing uncertainty in climate change assessments, conspicuous in the IPCC’s headline statements accompanying from the Working Group

1 Summary for Policymakers in September 2013.1 Secondly, I mean to highlight the roots of the

IPCC’s linear approach to policymaking. In doing so I will describe an antagonism manifest between scientists acting as political advocates and the politicians and decision-makers, which has allowed uncertainty to become a political tool for inaction. Together these points indicate a pressing need to move beyond simplistic and outdated linear modes of scientific-political interaction, and to understand the assessment process as intrinsically politicised, in terms of who gets to speak for the climate, when and under what terms or conditions. The IPCC’s “objective” scientific assessment rather than be presented as the view from nowhere has, instead, been presented as a universalising view from everywhere.

1. Aims of thesis

This thesis traces the emergence of anthropogenic climate change as a salient international political issue between the years 1979 -1992. My period of study is both significant and interesting because of the establishment of the IPCC in 1988, a key site in the “contestation over the development of new

1 Tom Bawden, “Scientists ‘95 per cent certain’ that climate change is man-made,” Independent (London), (21 August 2013)

14 norms and practices for making decisions of potentially worldwide reach.”1 Beginning in 1979, with the World Climate Conference, significant for its recommendation – subsequently enacted by UNEP, the WMO and ICSU – to establish a World Climate Program with a focus trained almost exclusively on anthropogenic climate change, and the associated climate risks (impacts), my period concludes with an analysis of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)

– also known as the Rio ‘Earth Summit.’ The Earth Summit was noteworthy for bringing together delegations from 172 governments, 108 heads of State or government, approximately 2,400 representatives of NGOs and some 10,000 journalists to discuss environmental issues. 2 Also significant for this thesis, was the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change which came into force at the same time.

My aims in this thesis are to chart the emergence of climate change as a significant international political issue through the frame of the IPCC’s formation and to critically examine its ways and means of producing authoritative, legitimate knowledge in the First Assessment (AR1). I will provide an analysis of the negotiations between climate scientists, international administrators and national policymakers which resulted in the formation of the Panel. In the process, I will historicise US engagement with the science and politics of climate change. I will specifically explain the key role played by US policymakers in the decision to establish the Panel. I argue that organising an intergovernmental assessment – in the process blurring the lines between science and politics – was part of a concerted effort by the US government to control the influence of science-policy advocates3 who were recommending the initiation of a global convention on climate change. More broadly, I will critically examine the power politics of knowledge production in the relationship between a transnational set of scientists engaged in assessments of climate change and national policymakers. I argue that the IPCC was established as a means of controlling who could speak for the climate, when

1 Clark Miller & Paul N. Edwards, “Introduction: The Globalization of Climate Science and Climate Politics” in Changing the Atmosphere: expert knowledge and environmental governance Clark Miller and Paul N. Edwards, eds. (MIT Press: London, 2001) p. 3 2 UN, Accessed online 3rd July 2013: www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html 3 The notion of science-policy advocates will be raised in greater depth during chapter 2, where I describe a group of scientists and administrators seeking to influence the policy process in a highly scientized – technocratic – fashion

15 and how. As such I demonstrate that the Panel legitimised and privileged certain voices at the expense of others.

I investigate the international efficacy and legitimacy of the IPCC as a resource for speaking knowledge to power. In particular, I address the geopolitics of knowledge production, examining who was speaking on behalf of the international community and why they felt empowered to do so. I intend to show that practices adopted in the making of the First Assessment led on to considerable marginalisation of many developing countries. At the outset of the IPCC’s activities it notably portrayed a Western perspective. The IPCC thus reflected wider issues around globalisation and internationalisation in science and scientific research, namely that “globalization of institutional models and participation in science is accompanied by a deglobalization in dispersion of science” and consequently “scientific knowledge remains highly concentrated where it is first created, namely among OECD countries.”1

This thesis speaks to several audiences: International Relations scholars, historians of science, political historians, science and technology studies (STS) scholars as well as the scientists and politicians involved in the current administration and management of the IPCC. I specifically want to highlight the ways in which the naïve positivism adopted at an early stage in the history of the science and politics of climate change has contributed significantly to a highly “scientized” debate around climate change. In this thesis I use the term “scientization” to mean taking a cultural or political world view and rationalizing it using science. In arguing this point, I specifically highlight the ways in which linear formulations of the policy process – whereby more science leads to less uncertainty and hence political action – narrowed (arguably unnecessarily) the terms of the political debate to a question of whether a Global Convention on Climate Change could be signed. Accordingly, I suggest that this thesis is important because the establishment of the IPCC is significant, not just because of its continuing existence into the present day but also, because it signalled the formal integration of politics into a scientific assessment.

1 Aant Elzinga, "Science and Technology: Internationalisation". In: Smelser, Neil J.; Baltes P. B. (eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioural Sciences. (London: Elsevier, 2004) p. 13633-13638.

In the rest of this chapter I will detail and critically examine the existing scholarship on the history of climate change and climate modelling from around 1950 onwards, with particular emphasis on 1970s onwards. I will then move on to critically engage with some of the specific accounts of the scientific and political history of the formation of the IPCC. I will finish by reviewing and engaging the literature on science policy interactions – in particular focussing on issues around scientific expertise and evidence based policymaking, as well as the value in environmental assessments.

2. Historiography of Climate Change

While the history of the scientific discovery of the greenhouse effect can be traced back to John

Tyndall’s experiments and the prophetic predictions of Svante Arrhenius in the 19th century, the focus of this thesis is on the latter half of the 20th Century. A central and enduring feature in the history of climate science and politics in this period has been the emerging hegemony of climate models. Indeed, STS scholar Clark Miller argues that “when formed in 1988, the IPCC derived its understanding of climate from the work of climate modellers.”1 In this section I will provide an overview of these accounts and situate my thesis within this body of literature. My focus is on the latter half of the 20th Century, with a particular focus on the politics of the 1970s and 1980s. Therefore this historiographical overview does not provide a comprehensive overview of the much longer history of climate and culture extending further back than modern physical science and computer model based understandings of a human-induced threat. Fleming (1998) provides a thorough examination – a broader and longer history – of global climate change as a field of inquiry.2

2.1 Numerical Weather Prediction

The emergence of climate models has been intimately linked with meteorology and Numerical

Weather Prediction (NWP). Science historian, Spencer Weart, has traced the emergence of post-

1 Clark Miller, “Climate Science and the making of a global political order” in States of Knowledge; The co- production of science and social order (ed.) Sheila Jasanoff, (Routledge: London, 2004), p. 54 2 James R. Fleming, Historical Perspectives on climate change, (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1998).

WWII climate modelling to NWP in the early 20th century. Weart argues that in the 1900s NWP took hold as meteorology began to build its theoretical foundations. NWP is the mathematical solution of a number of fundamental physical equations that predicts the large scale motion of the atmosphere. It developed largely due to Vilhelm Bjerknes, a Norwegian physicist and meteorologist who did much to found the modern practice of weather forecasting.1 Bjerknes envisaged NWP making meteorology an exact science in which initial state variables of the atmosphere are subjected to graphical solution based on a set of fundamental physical equations, which constructs a new set of charts describing the atmosphere some hours later.2 The Bjerknes equations were utilised by Lewis Fry Richardson, who, unlike Bjerknes, saw the possibility to put these equations to practical use. In 1922 Lewis Fry

Richardson developed the first NWP system based on the solution of simplified versions of

Bjerknes’s equations.3 Both Weart and Paul Edwards note that at this time simplification was necessary in order to facilitate manual solution of the equations. But, computation of the differential equations was still a massive task – a six hour forecast took 6 weeks to calculate. Historian of meteorology, Frederik Nebeker, claims that the difficulties inherent in computing meant that no further attempts at NWP were made until the emergence of electronic computation after WWII.4

While Nebeker’s account cedes considerable explanatory power to technology, in an overly deterministic fashion, the 20th Century clearly saw meteorology and computation become ever more deeply intertwined.

Despite these historical antecedents it was not until the end of WWII that computer modelling was able to rise and dominate in the fields of meteorology and climatology. Indeed, the history of climate change and the emergent hegemony of climate models is generally traced back to the reorientation of meteorology in the aftermath of WWII. Historian of science Amy Dahan Dalmedico, goes as far as claiming that WWII caused a “near discontinuous change” in meteorological practice as

1 Peter Lynch, “The origins of computer weather prediction and climate modeling”, Journal of Computational Physics, 227, (2008), pp. 3431-3444 2 Peter Lynch, (2008) “The origins of computer weather prediction and climate modeling” (2008) 3 Paul N. Edwards, “Representing the Global Atmosphere: Computer Models, Data, and Knowledge about Climate Change”, in Changing the Atmosphere: expert knowledge and environmental governance (eds.) Clark Miller and Paul N. Edwards, (MIT Press: London, 2001), pp. 31-66 4 Frederik Nebeker, Calculating the Weather: Meteorology in the 20th Century, (Academic Press Inc: London, 1995)

18 the strategic utility of accurate weather forecasts to military operations sparked a huge demand for meteorology and hence for meteorologists. 1 Likewise, Kristine Harper argues that senior meteorologists capitalised on the large influx of trained meteorologists – many of whom were physics or maths graduates – in order to replace the art of forecasting with the science of meteorology.2

Broadly speaking, the increasing “mathematization” of meteorology in the aftermath of WWII in combination with the availability of the electronic stored computer are the two agents of change principally associated with the emergence of NWP and the subsequent development of climate models.

The main focus in the surveyed literature concerns NWP as a scientific achievement. This contributes little to discussions of the emergence of the meteorologist as an expert in government. A notable exception is Alexander Hall’s thesis, which explores the post-war history of the British

Meteorological Office. Hall argues that the emergence of the Met Office extreme weather warnings and forecasts afforded the organisation an authoritative expert position.3 Hall’s focus resonates with my own ambitions as I explore the emergence of the meteorologist as an expert in international environmental policymaking.

2.2 Funding Research

Several scholars have identified John von Neumann, a mathematician involved in modelling nuclear reactions at Los Alamos during WWII, as a key figure and early pioneer of operational computer forecasting.4 Significantly, von Neumann sold the research to the Office of Naval Research (ONR) on the hopes of weaponized control of the weather. STS scholar Chunglin Kwa claims that during the

1 Amy Dahan Dalmedico, “History and Epistemology of Models: Meteorology (1946–1963) as a Case Study”, Archive for History of Exact Sciences, 55, (2001), pp. 395–422 2 Kristine Harper, “Research from the boundary layer” (2003) 3 Alexander Hall, Risk, Blame, and Expertise: The Meteorological Office and extreme weather in post-war Britain, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, (The University of Manchester: Manchester, UK, 2012) 4 Chunglin Kwa, “The Rise and Fall of Weather Modification: Changes in American Attitudes Toward Technology, Nature, and Society” in Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance, Clark A. Miller & Paul N. Edwards (eds.), (MIT Press: London, 2001), pp. 135-165; Paul N. Edwards, “Representing the Global Atmosphere”(2001); Spencer R. Weart, “The idea of anthropogenic global climate change in the 20th century”, WIRE Climate Change, Vol. 1, (2010), pp. 67-81

1950s the US congress was broadly supportive of weather modification as a research field and that a latent fear that the Soviet Union had their own advanced weather modification research project furthered this support. Cold War pressures provided science-policy entrepreneurs the hook on which to sell their research to government-military funders. Similarly, James Fleming, in his book Fixing the

Sky, has detailed the hubris and overstatement from high-profile scientists in selling the possibility of weather and climate modification. Fleming’s case studies span the pre-WWII period through to the

Cold War, finishing with contemporary ideas and proposals concerning geo-engineering driven by current fears of climate change.1

While Fleming is explicitly concerned by the historically uninformed re-emergence of weather and climate modification in current debates around ‘solving’ climate change, Kwa’s account focuses on the “rise and fall of weather modification” as a research priority in the 1960’s. Kwa thus argues that research into weather modification left a legacy which has enabled concerns for anthropogenic climate change to surface, in particular, the demand for computer simulation models and extensive networks of satellites compiling data. I intend to explain this transition through examining the ways in which scientists sold their expertise to government and international backers in the1980s. I will illuminate how and why scientists actually went beyond the “more money, more research” mantra prevalent in Spencer Weart’s account of the Discovery of Global Warming.2As

David Hart and David Victor have argued, by the time of the 1970s environmentalism provided a window through which science-policy entrepreneurs3 were able to raise climate change to the top table of policymakers.4

1 James Rodger Fleming, Fixing the Sky: The Checkered History of Weather and Climate Control, (Columbia University Press: New York, 2010) 2 Spencer R. Weart, Discovery of Global Warming, (Harvard University Press: London, 2008) 3 For the purposes of this thesis I define science-policy advocates as the mediators of the relationship between bench scientists and the political community setting the priorities of the former by allocating resources such as jobs and grants and negotiating for these resources with the latter. 4 David M. Hart and David G. Victor, “Scientific Elites and the Making of US Policy for Climate Change Research, 1957-74”, Social Studies of Science, (1993) 23, pp. 643-680.

2.3 Internationalisation and Climate Change

Having established the potential of NWP models, researchers scaled up their endeavours towards

General Circulation Models (GCMs) of the atmosphere.1 GCMs differ from their antecedents in the scope of their simulations. GCMs rather than being limited to regional, continental scales seek to represent the whole global atmosphere. There were just three centres where GCM development took place: the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL) led by Joseph Smagorinsky and subsequently by Syukuro Manabe; the US National Centre for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) established in 1960 and headed by Akira Kahara and Warren Washington; and UCLA’s Department of Meteorology founded by Jacob Bjerknes in 1940.2 This concentration of scientific research is a feature observed more generally as science has become internationalised. STS scholar Aant Elzinga has observed that as science has become increasingly global in nature it has not decreased hierarchization, despite increased connectivity, scope and wider participation across national borders.

On the contrary, globalization of science and participation has led to a ‘de-globalization’ in the dispersion of science, concentrated in the OECD countries.3

A key theme of this thesis will therefore concern the implications of this concentration of research and expertise in OECD countries. In particular, whether the IPCC was created to speak on behalf of the whole globe and indeed whether this is even possible. These concerns are conspicuous in the 1988 comments of Bert Bolin concerning scientific assessments as he asked his colleague Stephen

Schneider: “Don’t you think global credibility demands global representation?”4 In this quote, Bolin appears to accept that scientific objectivity alone cannot compel political action. Moreover, credibility in science for policy is an intensely political process of trade-offs, legitimacy and saliency.

1 Paul N. Edwards, A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming, (MIT Press: London, 2010) 2 Paul N. Edwards, A Vast Machine (2010) 3 Aant Elzinga, "Science and Technology: Internationalisation" (2004) 4 Stephen H. Schneider, “Three Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 33; 1 (1991), p. 25

2.4 Climate Models and the Politics of Climate Change

GCMs inherited many of the same difficulties that plagued its predecessors, perhaps on an even grander scale. These problems included the difficulties in obtaining data, computer processing power, and research time on super computers. Optimisation of GCMs involved data smoothing, interpolation as well as choices on coding the differential equations. Edwards notes that as late as the 1970s models were still regional or continental in scale, not global. Whilst computing power and physical memory was increasing, missing data was still a major issue. Edwards observes that weather data is of such fundamental importance to computer models of the atmosphere, during the course of the Cold War massive efforts were engaged upon globally to plug these data gaps.1

In the context of the Cold War and increasingly close ties between science and the state, computer modelling of the atmosphere became embedded in the politics of the time. Cold War science was increasingly linked to military applications; military support for science sky-rocketed amidst the rise of the Military-Industrial-Academic complex.2 Both the US and USSR began to seek global information in arenas that included weather, which required the development of global data networks. Global data was gathered through two of the Cold War’s central technologies – computers and satellites – and forms part of Paul Edwards’ story of the emergence of what he calls

“infrastructural globalism” in meteorology.3 Infrastructural globalism took hold with the rise of the computer model. With the arrival of computer models vast amounts of data were required, spurring efforts to gather global data sets. The need for global data sets, and the spur of Cold War politics, led to the World Weather Watch – a web that combined various systems collecting and processing data and forecasting weather. This process of developing systems and building webs of data created global institutions, global observing stations and spread a specific method of making knowledge global.

1 Paul N. Edwards, “Representing the Global Atmosphere” (2001) 2 Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford, (Columbia University Press: Chichester, 1993); Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America, (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc: New York, 1977); Paul Forman, “Into Quantum Electronics: The Maser as ‘Gadget’ of Cold-War America” in National Military Establishments and the Advancement of Science and Technology: Studies in 20th Century History, (eds.) Paul Forman & Jose M. Sanchez-Ron, (Kluwer Academic Publishers: London, 1996), pp. 261-362 3 Paul N. Edwards, “Meteorology as Infrastructural Globalism” in John Krige & Kai-Henrik Barth (eds.), Global Power Knowledge: Science and Technology in International Affairs. Vol. 21. (Osiris: Chicago, 2006) pp. 229-250

Modelling became the way in which knowledge of the atmosphere was generated. Edwards claims that: “As concerns about global warming mounted during the 1980s, scientists and policymakers institutionalized a knowledge assessment process in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

(IPCC). This process represents the most visible layer of the climate knowledge infrastructure.”1

As I show in this thesis, the IPCC, as described by Paul Edwards, is part of a bigger and longer story. This story encompasses a transition from local and specific meteorological knowledge production, to a new global infrastructural system that combines disparate methods to bear on a common project. Infrastructural globalism is exemplified by the growth of computer models of the atmosphere as a means of knowledge production. For Edwards, models and data are symbiotic.

Models allow study of phenomena otherwise too big or too complex to apply traditional laboratory experimental techniques. Edwards’ thesis is a defence of climate models against “climate sceptics” in politicised debates over the nature of “raw” and “cooked” data.2 Edwards’ defence of climate models centres on his claim that all our knowledge about the climate comes from computer models, that

“global modelling does not merely represent, but in a social and semiotic sense constructs, the global atmosphere.”3 Moreover, that without these models there would be no coherent global data sets.4

The pre-eminence of climate models in this knowledge infrastructure has also been intrinsically linked with the politics of climate change. On this point, Clark Miller has argued that the globalisation of the atmosphere and climate was a crucial agent of change in the reorientation of global governance of the climate. Miller claims that “Only when the Earth’s climate was re-imagined as a global system […] did claims about climate change begin to engage with debates about international politics.”5 Meanwhile Mike Hulme, professor of climate and culture, has warned of the dangers posed by simulations of future climate from climate models becoming the dominant means of analysing present and future environmental change.6 Hulme is specifically concerned by the

1 Paul Edwards, A Vast Machine (2010), p xvi 2 Paul N. Edwards, A Vast Machine (2010) 3 Paul N. Edwards, “Representing the Global Atmosphere” (2001) p. 64 4 Paul Edwards, A Vast Machine (2010) 5 Clark Miller, “Climate Science and the making of a global political order” (2004) p. 51 6 Mike Hulme, “Reducing the Future to Climate: A Story of Climate Determinism and Reductionism,” Osiris, 26; 1 Klima, (2011), pp. 245-266

23 hegemony of climate models and the associated neo-deterministism/climate reductionism which isolates “climate as the (primary) determinant of past, present, and future system behaviour and response”1 Hulme, an outspoken critic of the overly positivist approaches embodied in the IPCC, has called for a re-examination of climate change led by “contributions from the interpretative humanities and social sciences, married to a critical reading of the natural sciences, and informed by a spatially contingent view of knowledge.”2 Hulme is particularly concerned by the presentation of climate models, and in turn the IPCC’s reports, divorced from their political, cultural and geographical context.

This thesis will further ground Hulme’s claims with a rigorous historical analysis of the

IPCC’s origin and its universalization of climate knowledge. STS scholar Silke Beck has argued that the linear model of expertise, exemplified by the IPCC, has led to proxy debates concerning the scientiﬁc evidence for global warming, which has distracted “attention from the causes of climate change and from political solutions while simultaneously politicizing climate science.”3 I will examine the initial formulations of the policy process of the IPCC to review the impact of this linear model. The simplistic naively linear approaches, I will argue, have contributed to the scientization of the politics which Beck has highlighted as a problematic feature of the subsequent IPCC reports. In the process I will historicise the IPCC’s commitment to consensus.

The IPCC is a major step in a much longer story in which climate change has increasingly been reduced to physics, climate models and rising temperatures.4 Furthermore, the IPCC’s establishment is a major step in the international politics of climate change. In a 2010 chapter Heike

Schroeder identified four distinct phases in the 30-year history of International Climate Change

1 Mike Hulme, “Reducing the Future to Climate” (2011), p. 253 2 Mike Hulme, “Geographical work at the boundaries of climate change,” Trans Inst Br Geogr, 33, (2008), pp. 5-11 3 Silke Beck, “Moving beyond the linear model of expertise? IPCC and the test of adaptation,” Regional Environmental Change, 11b, (2011), pp. 297–306 4 Mike Hulme, Why We Disagree About Climate Change Understanding Controversy, Inaction and Opportunity, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2009).

Politics.1 The first phase, what Schroeder calls the process of politicization of the issue, considers the creation of the IPCC and the institutionalisation of the science. The second phase spans the regime formation process and the adoption of the UNFCCC. My thesis examines this same period, and considers similar issues. The third and fourth phases examine the Kyoto Protocol and the negotiations toward a post-2012 deal. Pertinent to the themes in my thesis, Schroeder similarly identifies the internal tensions in the IPCC: tensions manifest between science – and notions of truth and credibility

– on the one hand and politics – considerations of power and legitimacy – on the other hand.

Schroeder also highlights the underrepresentation from the Global South in the work of the IPCC. 2

Similarly, Chukwumerije Okereke shows that the development of the global politics of climate change – the global climate regime – is characterised by a series of trade-offs and compromises amongst three key actors – the USA, the European Union (EU) and the developing countries under the aegis of G77/the People’s Republic of China.3 Okereke ultimately argues that these trade-offs and compromises have weakened the process, such that it is doubtful that the process will ever lead to the development of a robust regime capable of enforcing deep worldwide emissions reductions.

Okereke considers the many issues around formal negotiations, which is useful in informing the formal global politics of climate change. In contrast, I look at how politics, or the global political regime, has been in place in, and effective through the nominally technical – apolitical – assessment of the IPCC. Indeed, many of the key issues Okereke identifies in his chapter are also reflected in the wranglings of the IPCC’s Working Groups and plenary sessions.

Climate politics is notoriously complex and a key reason for this is the intertwined economic and political dimensions to the issue. Examining the politics of the carbon economy, Peter Newell and

Matthew Patterson argue that the ‘marketisation’ of climate politics – in and through the carbon economy – is a product of the entrenchment of neo-liberal politics throughout the 1990s. The socio-

1 Heike Schroeder, “The History of International Climate Change Politics: Three Decades of Progress, Process and Procrastination” in The Politics of Climate Change A Survey (ed.) Maxwell T. Boykoff, (Routledge, London: 2010) pp. 26-41. 2 Heike Schroeder, “The History of International Climate Change Politics: Three Decades of Progress, Process and Procrastination” in The Politics of Climate Change A Survey (ed.) Maxwell T. Boykoff, (Routledge, London: 2010) pp. 26-41. 3Chukwumerije Okereke, “The Politics of Interstate Climate Negotiations” in The Politics of Climate Change A Survey (ed.) Maxwell T. Boykoff, (Routledge, London: 2010), pp. 42-61.

25 political context of the late 1980s fostered a receptive environment through which market-based solutions were legitimised.1 Similarly, Max Boykoff, David frame and Sam Randalls also explore this,

“bringing together of science and economics” in relation to a stabilized temperature and concentration target.2 Boykoff et al show that the emergent model of climate policy, relying on the concept of climate stabilization, has an economic cost benefit framing, in which the economic benefits of releasing carbon and balanced against the potential GDP costs and risks of environmental change.3

Moreover, Boykoff et al suggest that the assessments of anthropogenic climate stabilization have prematurely foreclosed around fixed international policies on mitigation. These analyses highlight the deeply intertwined politics and economics of climate change which this thesis must make sense of in order to understand the decision-making context and realpolitik of interstate negotiations leading to the IPCC’s formation.

2.5 The Genesis of the IPCC

There are several scholarly accounts that touch on the formation of the IPCC, most of which have been provided by IR scholars and political scientists. Their attention therefore principally focuses on the political salience and efficacy of environmental assessments in informing policy. There is one account which directly addresses the context and early origins of the IPCC, which is provided by

Shardual Agrawala.4

Agrawala argues, from a counterfactual perspective, that by 1988 “something like the IPCC was an evolutionary necessity.”5 By highlighting some crucial shortcomings in the alternative prospect, the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG), established in 1986, Agrawala argues

1 Peter Newell and Matthew Patterson, “The Politics of the Carbon Economy” in The Politics of Climate Change A Survey (ed.) Maxwell T. Boykoff, (Routledge, London: 2010), pp. 77-95. 2 Maxwell T. Boykoff, David Frame and Samuel Randalls, “Discursive stability meets climate instability: A critical exploration of the concept of ‘climate stabilization’ in contemporary climate policy” Global Environmental Change, 20 (2010), pp. 53-64. 3 Maxwell T. Boykoff, David Frame and Samuel Randalls, “Discursive stability meets climate instability: A critical exploration of the concept of ‘climate stabilization’ in contemporary climate policy” Global Environmental Change, 20 (2010), pp. 53-64. 4 Shardul Agrawala, “Context and Early Origins of the IPCC,” Climatic Change, 39, (1994a), pp. 605- 620 5 Shardul Agrawala, “Context and Early Origins of the IPCC,” (1994a), p. 617

26 that the establishment of an intergovernmental assessment was inevitable. Agrawala’s counterfactual approach is, however, problematic and tends to produce a sense of inevitability, as “alternative histories” are used to explain how and why the actual events transpired. In contrast, to Agrawala I show the contingent factors, highlighting the ways in which political manoeuvrings on the part of US officials made the IPCC appear to be inevitable. Nevertheless, in support of Agrawala’s assessment of the AGGG, Bert Bolin has reflected on the AGGG in unequivocal terms suggesting that: “the

AGGG was not considered by these actors [WMO and the US] to have the status and composition that would be required of the major issues that were emerging” which was also his view1. Agrawala’s focus centres on the tension manifest between the US and UNEP, specifically UNEP’s executive director Mostafa Tolba. My thesis will expand on Agrawala’s account providing additional depth and detail to the negotiations between the US, UNEP and the WMO so central to the IPCC’s formation.

This additional detail will allow me to highlight exactly how the US sought to utilise the Panel as a mechanism to control knowledge production and legitimate specific understandings of climate change.

Other accounts of this period highlight a number of factors to account for the emergence of anthropogenic climate change as a salient political issue. Paul Edwards and Myanna Lahsen suggest four reasons to explain the gradual emergence of climate change as a political issue in the 1980s: (1) climate science was maturing, with a narrowing range of theory and model-based predictions, (2) a more concentrated effort among elite scientists to focus on global warming concerns, (3) nuclear winter and ozone depletion –both genuinely global atmospheric problems –paved the way for global climate change concerns to spread, and (4) the decline and end of the Cold War, leaving in its wake a sort of “apocalypse gap” readily filled by global warming doomsday scenarios.2 In this thesis I will directly address and evaluate their claim that the issue of ozone depletion “paved the way for global climate change concerns to spread.”3 Detailing the analogous approaches to dealing with both issues

1 Bert Bolin, A History of the Science and Politics of Climate Change: The Role of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2007), pp. 46-47 2 Paul N. Edwards and Myanna H. Lahsen, “Climate Science and Politics in the United States,” (2002) Unpublished chapter available online: http://pne.people.si.umich.edu/PDF/PMNPC/USA.pdf pp. 16-17 3 Paul N. Edwards and Myanna H. Lahsen, “Climate Science and Politics in the United States,” (2002) p. 17

27 and showing how ozone discussions provided the model for early climate change discussions, I argue has contributed significantly to the political inertia witnessed up to this day. This will redress the underdeveloped analysis of the ways in which the coincident ozone negotiations influenced the scientists involved in promoting the climate change issue. I find that the ozone issue grounded the thinking of many of the scientists and administrators involved in the early scientific assessments of climate change. This, crucially, has contributed to an elevated status for scientific consensus in climate change policymaking.

In this thesis I will address the end of the Cold War – the ‘apocalypse gap’ – as I seek to explain US engagement with the UN. Pamela Chasek, a scholar of environmental governance and

International Relations, has argued that “as the world’s one remaining superpower, the United States stands forth as a hegemon in international politics.”1 While the US has generally been labelled as a laggard in environmental politics, Chasek argues, that “when the United States assumes a positive leadership role, the possibility becomes greater that environmental policies and institutions will be stronger. However, if the United States fails to take the lead, progress can be blocked.”2 Chasek’s analysis speaks in broad terms about the US, the environment and international environmental policy; whereas, I will seek to specifically examine US engagement with the global politics of climate change through the IPCC. I will argue that the US was both leader and laggard. This will highlight the complicated, initially positive, but often antagonistic, relationship that has since developed between the US and the IPCC. Looking at the initial reasons motivating the establishment of the IPCC, as well as considering how the structures and processes of the Panel evolved, I explain the many subsequent confrontations.

A key event identified in the historiography of the period leading up to the IPCC establishment is the 1985 Villach Conference on the Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide and of

Other Greenhouse Gases in Climate Variations and Associated Impacts. Wendy Franz suggests that

1 Pamela Chasek, “U.S. policy in the UN environmental arena: powerful laggard or constructive leader?” International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Vol. 7; 4, (December, 2007), pp. 363- 387 2 Pamela Chasek, “U.S. policy in the UN environmental arena,” (2007), p 366

28 between 1985 and 1990, the “climate change domain changed significantly.”1 She argues that the

Villach conference was a catalytic event in reshaping the debate around climate change. Likewise,

Agrawala identifies the Villach conference as significant event because it presented a scientific consensus on the seriousness of the issue.2 Both accounts highlight the novel policy advocacy at the meeting, which Franz attributes to the (i) absence of domestic political constraints and (ii) the involvement of scientists who had previously not been involved with climate research. 3 These two accounts do provide an important insight into the significance of the Villach 1985 meeting, but their focus is chiefly on the emergence of climate change as a political issue, so they do not identify the key scientific and political legacies. As such, I will explore the policy legacy of the Villach meeting, namely, how the actions pursued in 1985 locked the scientists and politicians into pursuing/advocating a scientized linear formulation of the policy process that has since pervaded climate change policy.

Daniel Bodansky, Professor of Law, Ethics, and Sustainability, has claimed that 1988 represented a marked shift in the prominence of the climate change issue. 4 He asserts that the move towards a scientific consensus on climate change “was signiﬁcant in laying a foundation for the development of public and political interest”,5 but that this interest was then crystallised due to three additional factors which spurred governmental action. First, the work of a small group of environmentally oriented Western scientists, who worked to promote the climate change issue on the international agenda. Second, the latter half of the 1980s was a period of increased concern about global environmental issues generally and, at least, initially, public concern about global warming rode on the coattails of the ozone issue. Third, the North American heat wave and drought of the summer of 1988 gave an enormous popular boost to greenhouse warming proponents, particularly in

1 Wendy E. F. Torrance [nee Franz], “Science or Salience: Building an Agenda for Climate Change,” in Global Environmental Assessments: Information and Influence (eds.) Ronald B. Mitchell, William C. Clark, David W. Cash & Nancy M. Dickson, (MIT Press: London, 2006), p. 29 2 Shardul Agrawala, “Context and Early Origins of the IPCC” (1994a) 3 Wendy E. Franz [Torrance], “The Development of an International Agenda for Climate Change: Connecting Science to Policy”, ENRP Discussion Paper E-97-07, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, (August 1997) 4 Daniel Bodansky, “The History of the Global Climate Change Regime” in Urs Luterbacher & Detlef F. Sprinz (eds.), International Relations and Global Climate Change, (MIT Press: London, 2001), pp. 23-40 5 Daniel Bodansky, “The History of the Global Climate Change Regime,” (2001), p. 26

29 the United States and Canada.1 Bodansky shows how the ozone issue paved the way for environmental issues to gain political attention and action but not the mechanisms through which scientists and politicians interacted. Thus, his account of the ways in which the coincident ozone negotiations influenced the scientists involved in promoting the climate change issue is not sufficiently developed. This thesis, though, will scrutinise this influence in greater depth in order to evaluate the specific carryover from ozone depletion to climate change. In particular, I will analyse the motivations and reasoning of the science-policy advocates towards celebrating the scientific consensus as a prerequisite of political action. I intend to show how the technocratic ambitions of several prominent scientists and international administrators drove the formation of the IPCC. In addition, I will argue that this engagement with the politics of climate change at its foundation has contributed to a legacy of linear formulations in the policy process.

In the wake of the Toronto Conference, Changing the Atmosphere June 1988, the IPCC was established amidst rising public concern and conflicting scientific results.2 The structure of the IPCC was debated and constructed during this period and as such reflects the conflicting views. Procedures were instituted and defined, institutional roles were created while the overarching mandate was established and governmental influence outlined. How the IPCC was structured owes much to behind closed doors negotiations and compromise, much of which is still shrouded in mystery.3 This thesis will provide an added depth to the existing accounts through access to previously unpublished documents, retrieved through an extensive program of oral history.

3. Theoretical Frameworks of Science-Policy: Assessing Global

Environmental Assessments

The original motivation behind my decision to research and write this thesis came from an interest in the scientific and political justification behind the establishment of the IPCC – a unique hybrid

1 Daniel Bodansky, “The History of the Global Climate Change Regime,” (2001) 2 Alan D. Hecht & Dennis Tirpak, “Framework Agreement on Climate Change: A Scientific and Policy History”, Climatic Change, 29, (1995), pp. 371-402 3 Shardul Agrawala, “Context and Early Origins of the IPCC” (1994a)

30 science policy body. I was particularly interested in the rationale to establish a specifically intergovernmental assessment mechanism. Moreover, the highly charged and often seemingly politicised character of the debate surrounding the IPCC, and the issue more broadly, merely added to my interest. As I started researching the IPCC’s history, I began with the intention to write a relatively straightforward institutional history of the body. But, due to the constraints on sources, and more importantly the unique status of the IPCC as a ground-breaking hybrid science policy – intergovernmental – assessment mechanism, I have integrated elements of Science and Technology

Studies theory. Drawing on a tranche of literature which has examined the interactions of science with policy, policy with science and the parallel organisations established to connect scientific evidence to policy has therefore been crucial in informing my conclusions. In this section I highlight the literature surveyed and detail the ways in which it has informed my thinking throughout the thesis. An enduring theme through much of the Science Studies literature is a call to democratise science and science- policy decision-making – to open up participation in the processes through which expert knowledge is assessed and incorporated in political decisions. The establishment of the IPCC, however, has in many ways constrained participation to a technocratic (scientific) western elite.

There are many different structures and institutions for scientific advice all of which reflect distinctive traditions of decision-making – the ‘civic epistemology’ through which expert claims are constructed or challenged in any given society.1 Sheila Jasanoff, Professor of Science & Technology

Studies, has persuasively shown that political cultures can shape ideas about what is considered to be objective knowledge; what normative commitments and administrative practices need to be adhered to; and ultimately how the science-policy interface is constructed. This thesis examines the IPCC as an embodiment of an international ‘civic epistemology’ through which expertise has been constructed as global, open to participation and above (and beyond) politics; capable of reducing the complexities of climate change down to a technical issue. Thus the IPCC’s structures can be seen as a reflection of the political cultures of the dominant States involved in the IPCC’s establishment, whilst also reflecting the international political landscape more broadly.

1 Sheila Jasanoff, Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in in Europe and the United States, (Princeton University Press, Princeton: 2005).

3.1 Bridging the gap: linking science and policy

The IPCC was created at the interface of the two steams of science and politics. This explicitly hybridised politico-scientific arrangement has created an opportunity for me to examine some of the ways and means of communicating across this boundary. This section examines some of the literature concerned with bridging the gap between science and policy, and in particular science studies scholarship which deals with increasing participation in science-policy – democratising and scrutinising expert knowledge.

Consensus and consensual knowledge

Bridging the gap between the scientific and political worlds is simplistically seen as a one-way stream of traffic from scientific knowledge at one end to political outcomes at the other. This thesis will look at some of the resources and rhetoric deployed in communicating the scientific consensus because consensus statements and the IPCC’s scientific consensus have, and continue to be, important features of the discourse around climate change science and politics. In this thesis I will consider some of these statements in the context of a historical narrative I describe which has seen climate change becoming politically scientised.

Whilst I am not looking to unpack the IPCC consensus, as I see it more as a rhetorical device implemented to support a scientific calls to arms, here I examine Guston’s argument which shows that an uncomplicated view of the scientific consensus is inadequate for the many roles that people desire science to play, especially in informing policy. Guston notes that one might suspect that knowing the outcome – what the relevant scientific community thinks – rather than the process would be most critical, particularly for the internal value of consensus.1 Guston argues strongly against this because policymakers find it easy to rely on consensus as outcome precisely because of the authority of

1 David Guston, “On Consensus and Voting in Science: From Asimolar to the National Toxicology Program” pp. 378-404 in, The new political sociology of science: institutions, networks and power (eds.) Frickel, S. and Moore, K., (The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison: 2006).

32 consensus as process that it is taken to represent; but will also challenge the outcome if they disagree with it. Guston instead favours a comprehensively more open and democratic science. In Guston’s view voting in science encourages a pluralism of views, heads off the reductive qualities of consensus and is therefore both practically and conceptually necessary for science to continue to have a legitimate input into policy decisions.1

Scientized Politics and Politicised Science

Despite the IPCC’s current self-appointed role as “policy-relevant and yet policy-neutral, never policy-prescriptive,”2 Silke Beck, argues that when the IPCC portrays itself to external audiences it does so firmly within a linear model of expertise. In this model the interaction between science and politics is conceived of as unidirectional: from science to policy. Firstly, science has to ‘get it right’ and following that policy comes into play.3 The linear model relies upon the assumption that a scientific program can establish a discrete body of scientific facts from which rational policy decisions can be derived.4 Simplistically, the linear model is premised on the idea that more science – information – makes for better decisions. The problems inherent in the linear model include: (i) the tendency to limit discussion of alternative policy approaches; (ii) politically relevant questions are framed and addressed in an abstract, disembodied, and non-political way, and; (iii) that it can depoliticize policies and politicize science. The overall effect is that the debate moves away from active policy decisions and instead focuses on the key question of whether existing scientific knowledge is certain enough to compel political action. The challenge then for scientists is to keep close to politics without risking the credibility associated with their independence. Lovbrand and

1 David Guston, “On Consensus and Voting in Science” 2 IPCC, accessed online 30th September 2013: http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml#.UkmExIOx-bM 3 Silke Beck, “Moving beyond the linear model of expertise?” (2011) 4 Eva Lovbrand & Gunilla Oberg, “Comment on ‘How science makes environmental controvsersies worse” by Daniel Sarewitz Environmental Science and Policy 7, 385-403 and ‘When Scientists politicise science: making sense of the controversy over the Skeptical Environmentalist’ by Roger A. Pielke Jr. , Environmental Science and Policy 7, 405-417” Environmental Science and Policy, 8 (2005), pp. 195-197.

Oberg argue that for policymakers, the challenge is to bring science close enough to legitimise political choices whilst maintaining a clear separation to avoid appearing expert-led and technocratic.1

In environmental controversies, such as climate change, science often lies at the heart of the debate. In these cases, Daniel Sarewitz maintains that the linear model of science for policy makes environmental controversies worse.2 Indeed, Sarewitz highlights that supporters and opponents of a particular (political) action are both equally likely to be able to draw on scientific justifications for their position. The complexity and methodological diversity of science is such that it can support a proliferation of facts that can legitimately support a range of competing value-based political positions. Thus, as science is increasingly deployed to lend legitimacy and credibility to political decisions it is increasingly subject to dispute and accusations of politicisation.3

The politicisation of science and the concomitant scientisation of politics are particularly nebulous and difficult to constrain and define. Roger Pielke Jr. has outlined a normative framework through which scientists in advisory positions can communicate science – without what he considers to be undue scientisation and/or politicisation – to policymakers: the pure scientist, science arbiter, issue advocate and honest broker of policy alternatives.4 The Pure Scientist will simply provide the decision-maker with fundamental information, allowing them to do what they want with it. The

Science arbiter stands by ready to answer factual questions the decision-maker thinks are relevant.

The issue advocate narrows the scope of choice and presents factual information to support a specific choice. And the honest broker provides the decision-maker with as much information as possible in an effort to expand (or at least clarify) the scope of choice for decision-making5. Pielke’s concern is the role scientists can play in advisory positions, where he explicitly states that scientists have an obligation to fulfil the role of honest broker.

1 Eva Lovbrand & Gunilla Oberg, “Comment on […] Daniel Sarewitz […] Roger A. Pielke Jr.” (2005) 2 Daniel Sarewitz, “How science makes environmental controversies worse” Environmental Science & Policy, 7, (2004), pp. 385-403. 3 Daniel Sarewitz, “How science makes environmental controversies worse” (2004). 4 Roger A. Pielke Jr., The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2007) 5 Roger A. Pielke Jr., The Honest Broker, (2007), pp. 1-2

Reiner Grundmann’s analysis of the ‘Climategate’ affair raises similar questions around how to assess knowledge production in a highly politicized context.1 It compares and contrasts two frameworks of scientific practice: Merton’s scientific norms and Roger Piekle Jr.’s ‘honest brokering’. The paper concludes by arguing that institutions of knowledge provision and advisory systems fostering aims of honest brokering – including viewpoints that go against the grain of the views of established elites of expertise and policy making – are required to ensure trust and reliability.

Accounting for the tensions inherent in organisations working at this science-policy interface and dealing with the issues discussed by Beck, Pielke and Grundmann, professor of political science,

David Guston, has introduced the concept of a ‘boundary organisation (an extension of the concept of boundary object2), which allows the “producers and consumers of research an opportunity to construct the boundary between their enterprises in a way favourable to their own perspectives.” 3 Boundary organisations: (1) can provide the opportunity and sometimes the incentives for the creation and use of boundary objects and standardized packages; (2) they involve the participation of actors from both sides of the boundary, as well as professionals who serve a mediating role; and (3), they exist at the frontier of the two relatively different social worlds of politics and science, but they have distinct lines of accountability to each. The boundary organisation, according to Guston, can prevent both the politicization of science and also the scientization of politics, because “it is tethered to both [and] suspended by the coproduction of mutual interests.”4 But the IPCC, as my thesis shows, whilst embodying many of the criteria of a boundary organisation, has, contrary to expectations, in fact contributed to a scientized politics. Indeed, the boundary organisation concept fails to take account of the power dynamics and various ways in which policymakers can utilise science and scientific rhetoric for their own ends. This thesis seeks to unpick and historicise the origins of this linear approach to policymaking.

1 Reiner Grundmann, ““Climategate” and The Scientific Ethos” Science Technology Human Values, 38;1, (2013), pp. 67-93. 2 Star, S. L. & Griesemer, J. R., “Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations’ and Boundary Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’ zoology, 1907-39”, Social Studies of Science, 19, (1989), pp.387-420 3 David H. Guston, “Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science: An Introduction”, Science, Technology, & Human Values, 26; 4, (Autumn 2001), pp. 399-408 4 David H. Guston, “Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science” (2001), p. 405

Environmental assessments have gradually emerged as a crucial means of informing policy decisions on transboundary environmental issues. The IPCC’s first assessment was at the vanguard of a formal process for embedding this process into an international regulatory regime. William Clark,

Ronald Mitchell and David Cash are the editors of a volume which evaluates the efficacy of these global environmental assessments. They identify credibility, saliency and legitimacy as the three key ingredients in a successful assessment. 1 Furthermore, “in almost every case, assessment reports were not the right focus of attention,” instead, global environmental assessments “are better conceptualised as social processes rather than published products.”2 The authors of chapters in this volume identify different situations through which environmental assessments successfully changed or influenced the policy process. For instance, as discussed earlier in this chapter, Wendy Franz argues that the salience of the IPCC assessment report was chiefly why it, and not the Villach Conference in 1985, influenced the international policymaking process.3

In this thesis I examine how the IPCC, its creators and those actively involved in producing the assessment often blurred the lines between the science and policy of climate change. Scientizing the politics of climate change – taking a cultural or political world view and rationalising through recourse to science. And politicizing the science – taking a political ambition, world view or specific outcome and utilising specific interpretations of the science to rationalise particular courses of action.

The degree to which one can identify on the one hand the scientization of politics and on the other the politicization of science is problematic. None the least of which because these are not two distinct categories, but rather a continuum – a sliding scale – of inputs and outputs from which, in the case of the IPCC, answers to what amount to a political question are being sought, such as: what, if anything, should governments be doing about humanity’s impact on the Earth’s climate. This continuum of science-policy is considered by Jasanoff through the introduction of the concept of co-

1 William C. Clark, Ronald B. Mitchell, & David W. Cash, “Evaluating the Influence of Global Environmental Assessments” in Global Environmental Assessments: Information and Influence (eds.) Ronald B. Mitchell, William C. Clark, David W. Cash & Nancy M. Dickson (MIT Press: London, 2006), pp. 1-28 2 William C. Clark et al, “Evaluating the Influence of Global Environmental Assessments”(2006), p. 14 3 Wendy E. F. Torrance [nee Franz], “Science or Salience: Building an Agenda for Climate Change,” in Global Environmental Assessments: Information and Influence (eds.) Ronald B. Mitchell, William C. Clark, David W. Cash & Nancy M. Dickson, (MIT Press: London, 2006), p. 29

36 production, which highlights the dynamic interaction between technology and society, or more aptly for this thesis science and politics, in generating new knowledge and technologies together.1 For

Jasanoff, it is no longer tenable to conceive of scientific knowledge coming into being independently of political thought and action, rather the two essentially create each other. Co-production sees science, technology, politics and society as deeply interwoven, with the threads of political and social meaning and power embedded in and reflected back through science and technology – and vice versa.2 Whilst I do not explicitly seek to deploy the co-production toolkit in this thesis, I am mindful of the implications of the overlapping spheres of science and the social-political in creating or authorising knowledge such as that in the IPCC’s assessment reports.

Post-Normal Science

‘Post-Normal Science’ is a concept developed by Silvio and Jerome Ravetz, to describe a method of scientific inquiry where facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent.3

Funtowicz and Ravetz assert that “the science appropriate to this new condition will be based on the assumptions of unpredictability, incomplete control, and a plurality of legitimate perspectives.”4 This model of post-normal science involves an interactive dialogue which, the authors maintain, can provide a path to the democratization of science.5 Indeed, anthropogenic climate change is a policy issue well-matched to the post-normal scientific methodology. Insofar as the uncertain knowledge of what could happen as a result of climate change is matched only by the high stakes of some of the more catastrophic projections. Thus, the far-reaching societal policies will be decided on the basis of inherently uncertain scientific information, which Funtowicz and Ravetz argue necessitates a new form of legitimisation through the incorporation of an extended peer review community, including an ever-growing set of legitimate participants, in the process of quality assurance of the scientific inputs.

1 Sheila Jasanoff, States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and the Social Order, (Routledge, London: 2006). 2 Sheila Jasanoff, States of Knowledge, (2006). 3 Silvio O. Funtowicz and Jerome R. Ravetz, “Science for the Post-Normal Age”, Futures, (September, 1993), pp. 739-755. 4 Silvio O. Funtowicz and Jerome R. Ravetz, “Science for the Post-Normal Age”, p. 739. 5 Silvio O. Funtowicz and Jerome R. Ravetz, “Science for the Post-Normal Age”, pp. 739-755.

In this thesis, I will show that the IPCC goes some way towards incorporating a more diverse heterogeneous array of voices into the political decisions to be taken around climate change, but falls short of a post-normal science ideal.

3.2 Governance of expertise and the geopolitics of knowledge

Bert Bolin has claimed that at the outset of the IPCC’s activities there were no strict or formal rules for the IPCC to follow. Instead, Bolin maintains, it was clear to the IPCC leaders that they had to develop their own procedures. 1 This lack of formal procedures meant that the Panel’s leaders had a great deal of responsibility in shaping the IPCC’s structures and processes, allowing the IPCC considerable flexibility. Similarly, Clark Miller has argued that “the IPCC offered a model of global politics in which experts and expert knowledge, as politically neutral agents, were accorded significant power to define problems of global policy.”2 This thesis will combine and balance these accounts in order to establish how the Panel addressed issues around the geopolitics of knowledge production. Through addressing the geopolitics of knowledge production – specifically considering the impact of geographical participation in the production of climate knowledge on international politics – I intend to demonstrate the ways in which the IPCC reflected and embedded the unequal distribution of expertise on climate change. This will principally involve an examination of the justifications of decisions taken over the inclusion and exclusion of experts in the IPCC’s bid to speak on behalf of the entire globe.

Anthony Giddens addressing the geopolitics of climate change, meanwhile, argues of the need to bring together discussions of the mechanics of reaching international agreements with the implications of climate change.3 This, however, treats the available knowledge upon which decisions are taken as occurring separately. I believe that through analysing the geopolitics of knowledge production, highlighting the influential role the assessment process can play in defining the terms

1 Bert Bolin, A History of the Science and Politics of Climate Change, (2007) 2 Clark Miller, “Climate Science and the making of a global political order” (2004), p. 47 3 Anthony Giddens, The Politics of Climate Change, (Polity Press: Cambridge, 2009)

38 from which the negotiations proceed, is an important component of the geopolitics of climate change.

Ignoring the origins of the knowledge produced is reductive politically. Thus, as I untangle the various ways in which the IPCC has constructed ideas about climate and climate change, I intend to demonstrate that by painting the IPCC as a globally representative body, able to speak on behalf of the entire international community, developed countries were, at best, simply engaging developing countries in tokenistic ways, and at worst, attempting to gain their assent to policies. As the IPCC, once again comes to the end of another assessment cycle in 2014, this thesis can provide a timely, judicious reminder of how the IPCC came to be structured as it is, and unpack the early motivations for a specifically intergovernmental assessment.

Giddens’s account fails to address the governance of expertise in an international context, in particular the power wielded by these institutions in opening up and constraining participation – what

I often refer to as the geopolitics of knowledge (production). In contrast, Clark Miller has written about this topic extensively. In a 2007 article Miller highlights that the construction and deployment of policy-relevant knowledge in international institutions is a significant source of power in its own right.1 Miller sees international scientific assessments as an attempt to rationalise global decision- making and to use epistemic structures to constrain the behavior of political actors in international spaces. Therefore, the roles these institutions play in opening up and constraining participation in international deliberation, Miller argues, need to be subject to their own democratic critique.

Crucially, for this thesis, and any analysis of the IPCC, Miller has subsequently argued that assessments are doomed to fail as instruments of democracy and sustainability unless we critically assess the ways in which power and authority are lodged within assessments themselves.2 Epistemic constitutionalism – the organization of power, authority, and legitimacy through epistemic means – in international governance has a significant underlying import in how, by whom and why decision are made. The IPCC’s establishment is thus an important site through which the framing and negotiations

1 Clark Miller, “Democratization, International Knowledge Institutions, and Global Governance” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 20; 2, (2007), pp. 325–357. 2 Clark Miller, “Democratization, International Knowledge Institutions, and Global Governance” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 20; 2, (2007), pp. 325–357.

39 underlying participation in the subsequent political decisions to be made took place, and worthy of further study in this thesis.

4. Research Methods and Sources

Due to the contemporary nature of this research I have relied upon a mixture of different sources: oral history, documentation volunteered by my interviewees, official records of meetings and Bert Bolin’s personal account of the IPCC’s history, published in 2007. Drawing these strands together, I have married a critical reading of the historical record with interviews with many of the “key players” in the IPCC’s early history. In particular, where documentary evidence has been sparse, I have attempted to plug the gap with oral history. In the process I have juxtaposed the various oral history accounts against one and other – and the archival record – in a bid to reconcile the imprecise and selective versions of the past presented in personal, historical reflections. The oral histories also offer an important additional source in ‘understanding’ the key players in the IPCC’s establishment.

Furthermore, the interviews crucially add a crucial means of overcoming the biases inherent in the documentary materials selected to be preserved by the IPCC.

The focus in this thesis has ultimately revolved around the key role of the US and, to a lesser extent, the UK. Despite the narrative arc focusing on the US, I have sought to unpack the ways in which climate change politics has both transcended the borders of nation states whilst being deeply mired in the politics of nation states. In this regard my thesis traces the IPCC’s history through what could loosely be described as a transnational historical lens. The US-focus stems from the fact that the

US were the single largest financial contributors to the UN system, wielded significant political influence, and also had perhaps the most explicit domestic policy on climate change. The incorporation of the UK in this thesis more prominently in Chapter 5 is the result of available archival material, but more crucially as comparator to show how the US policy evolved. Consequently, this thesis does have a relatively underdeveloped treatment of some other countries perspectives. This

40 stems from the fact that I have drawn on the interviews of English speaking scientists from Europe, and the US and archival documents from Britain the US and Australia.

4.1 Archival Material

In this thesis I have been able to draw on only a limited record of documentary archival evidence. The patchwork of documents I have been able to access include: official IPCC meeting records; personal papers donated by subjects in my oral history program; and UK Government documents accessed through requests through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Together these documents provide some documentary evidence for almost the entire period my thesis examines. Beginning with the unpublished and as yet unseen US policy documents that detail the evolving iterations of the proposal that went on to formally constitute the IPCC. Through to the UK Government correspondence between Whitehall officials and the delegation that travelled to the Netherlands for the Noordwijk

Ministerial Conference on climate change and global warming in 1989.

Official records of IPCC meetings and the expert workshops hosted and organised by the

WMO have been a crucial source in the preparation of this thesis. Indeed, for the first four years of the

IPCC’s existence, the plenary sessions, during which national representatives discussed the overarching aims and plans for the Panel, are fully documented. These sources have allowed me to unpick some of the discussions that took place about the IPCC’s programme of work, its financing and certain structural issues. But I am also aware that these documents are a sanitised version of the discussions, missing both the corridor conversations and often only reflecting the end result or agreement. As such, it has been helpful to draw upon the personal papers of John Zillman, an

Australian meteorologist, regular member of the Australian IPCC delegation and former President of the WMO and Eugene Bierly, an American meteorologist and former Director of the Atmospheric

Sciences Division at the National Science Foundation (NSF).

The Zillman papers consist of Australian delegation’s report on the proceedings of the IPCC plenary sessions. These papers do not provide an entirely dispassionate presentation of events but they

41 do provide a second perspective to the IPCC’s published record. The Australian delegation reports include discussions of conversations their delegation had during the meetings in the plenary session and in the corridor. Thus the papers offer up a different perspective and additional information on the events, discussions and agreements at the IPCC’s First and Second Sessions. The specific mention of different countries adopted negotiating positions on various topics has enabled me to better understand some of the political trade-offs during these meetings. In addition, the disputes and political negotiating blocs are more clearly stated in these unpublished accounts of the meeting, originally intended to inform Australian policymakers and not intended as formal, published record.

The Bierly papers, meanwhile, offer a unique insight into the iterations of the US proposal passed back and forth between US officials and the WMO’s negotiators that went on to form the final executive resolution establishing the IPCC. These documents are unpublished and, as far as I am aware, have not been seen or used before to inform academic accounts of the IPCC’s establishment.

They include copies of faxes sent to and from the WMO, accompanied by hand-written notes. And while it is difficult to verify the authenticity of the documents as they have not been transferred directly from the US Government department to the US National archive, Eugene Bierly’s involvement in the discussions is corroborated by some of my other interview subjects. Moreover, alongside Bo Döös, Bierly was himself using these very same documents to prepare his own history of the IPCC. By that metric it is reasonably safe to assume that Bierly himself thought the documents were genuine.

Due to the contemporary nature of the IPCC’s establishment, Government records pertinent to its formation have yet to be released under the 30-year rule. Therefore, in addition to the personal papers collected as part of my oral history programme, I have also drawn upon documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The documents released to me as part of my FOIA requests have been heavily redacted. These redactions have principally erased any mention of other countries opinions, political negotiating positions and other privileged unpublished information. This is unfortunate, but not altogether surprising. It also limits the usefulness of said documents in elucidating a global, transnational picture of the period. Because these records reveal the UK picture

42 much more clearly than any of its negotiating partners or opponents, my final chapter, which looks at the Noordwijk Conference in 1989 and the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 has had a stronger UK-focus than some of the earlier international and US-centric chapters.

4.2 Oral History

Oral history has provided an important evidential resource in researching and writing this thesis. Oral history is the subject of some degree of debate and disagreement amongst historians, including historians of science and technology.1 Whilst, I have been acutely aware of some of the limitations and methodological issues around utilising oral histories, it also worth remembering it has its own set of strengths. This section presents an overview of why oral history was used, and some of the practical problems encountered.

In the course of this project, I conducted 12 interviews with 11 different subjects between

December 2011 and August 2012. In addition, I drew on some of the material in the Oral History of

British Science British Library Project. All together I have been able to draw on the transcripts of around 12 hours of semi-structured interviews with most of the key protagonists in the thesis – detailed below:

Eugene Bierly – 1.11:41

An American meteorologist and former Director of Atmospheric Sciences Division at the National

Science Foundation (NSF).

James P. Bruce – 35:11

Canadian meteorologist and former Acting Deputy Secretary-General of the WMO, 1986-1989, represented the WMO in the establishment of the IPCC. Assistant Deputy Minister of the Canadian

1 For discussion see S. de Chadarevian, ‘Using interviews to write the history of science’, in T. Soderqvist (ed.), The Historiography of Contemporary Science and Technology (Amsterdam, 1997).

Atmospheric Environment Service, 1980-1986, chaired the landmark WMO/UNEP/ICSU Villach

Conference in Austria, 1985.

Alan Hecht – 39:23

Director of National Climate Programme Office, 1981 to 1989. In 1989 joined the US Environmental

Protection Agency where he was key member of US delegation to the Intergovernmental Negotiating

Committee to the Framework Convention on Climate Change 1991-1992.

John Houghton – 58:24

British meteorologist, former Chief Executive of the UK Meteorological Office, 1983-1991, and the

Chairman of IPCC Working Group I for the first (1990), second (1995) and third assessment (2001).

Jill Jaeger – 25:45

Austrian scientist who has worked as a consultant on energy, environment, and climate for numerous national and international organizations. In September 1994 she joined the International Institute for

Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA, Laxenburg) as Deputy Director for Programs, where she was responsible for the implementation and coordination of the research program.

Geoff Jenkins – 40:12

British meteorologist, veteran of 30 years’ work at the UK Meteorological Office and Head of

Working Group I Chairman’s task force First Assessment, 1988-1992.

John Mitchell –53:06

British meteorologist, with expertise in climate modelling. A convening lead author for the first and third IPCC Working Group I reports and lead author for the second. He currently works at the

Hadley Centre in climate modelling and detection and attribution of climate change and is Chief

Scientist at the Met Office.

William A. Nitze – 43:38

From 1994 to 2001, he served as Assistant Administrator for International Activities at the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Environment,

Health and Natural Resources from 1987 to 1990. In that capacity, he had a lead role in international negotiations on global issues such as climate change, ozone layer protection and trans-boundary air pollution.

Michael Oppenheimer– 59:03

Albert G. Milbank Professor of Geosciences and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School and the Department of Geosciences at Princeton University. Formerly employed at the US

Environmental Defense Fund.

Robert T. Watson – 42:18

British atmospheric chemist, worked on atmospheric science issues including ozone depletion and global warming. Director of the NASA Mission to Planet Earth and an unnamed member of the

Working Group I Chairman’s task force, subsequently voted Chairman of the IPCC, 1997-2002.

John Zillman – 49:57

Australian meteorologist, and former President of the World Meteorological Organization and the

Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering.

This list is not exhaustive, is biased towards English-language speaking countries, and is predominantly male. This is disappointing because as I set out to conduct the interviews I intended to, in particular, incorporate interview subjects from outside the Western developed nations. This ambition fell by the wayside for several reasons: Because I am not proficient in any foreign languages; the communications with potential non-Western interview subjects was insufficient to

45 conduct a phone or Skype interview1; and also because the make-up of the IPCC delegations and

Working Group task forces in 1988-1992 was predominantly male.

My selection criteria for choosing the interview subjects was very flexible. Insofar as I was interested in hearing from anyone who had been involved in the expert workshops in the 1980s, the negotiations of the IPCC, or the plenary or break-out meetings of the IPCC during its first assessment.

Firstly, I drew upon existing accounts of this period and created a short wish list of interview subjects, including Mostafa Tolba, John Houghton and James (Jim) P. Bruce. After making contact with some of these interview subjects I asked them who else they remembered being involved at the time, and my wish list snowballed. Ultimately, I was led by the content of the interviews and by my interview subjects. This led to me to interview most of the Working Group 1 Met Office task force: Geoff

Jenkins, John Mitchell and John Houghton.

During this process there have been two notable absentees from my list of interview subjects.

Firstly, Bert Bolin, who sadly passed away before I began my research into this topic. I have, in place of being able to interview him, been able to draw on his published manuscript: A History of the

Science and Politics of Climate Change: The Role of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change. I discuss how I have engaged with this manuscript as a source in the next section. Secondly,

Mostafa Tolba, who, despite my best efforts, I was unable to locate or contact in order to propose an interview. Nevertheless, because of the close relationship between Tolba and some of the other interview subjects (notably Bob Watson who worked very closely with him on the ozone negotiations) I feel that I was able to understand Tolba as a person. This information has been helpful in contextualising some of my arguments, and specifically making sense of US hostility to Tolba’s political involvement in the IPCC.

The use of oral history as a research tool has been widely criticised. Most commonly, oral history is criticised as reproducing a narrative memory, not a good source of accurate, reliable information: Interview subjects do not recollect the past, they recreate it in the present and the

1 Workneh Daegfu, the Senegalese IPCC delegate in 1988, initially responded positively at being interviewed, but couldn’t guarantee a good enough internet or phone line connection for an interview. By way of substitution I sent a set of questions he could reply to, but disappointingly I never received a response.

46 distance between the events studied and their recollection in the interview makes them frequently unreliable. Furthermore, the interviewer’s influence through the questions they ask can manipulate the source resulting in an artefact as much a product of the interviewer as the interviewee. Hence the end result – the transcript or audio recording – must be treated with suspicion.

While these criticisms do reveal legitimate concerns when performing oral history, many could also be equally levelled at the historian’s traditional heuristic tool – the written archival tool.

Because, just as an oral history does not reflect a perfect reality nor does any written source. Many written sources are created well after the event, by people with little close involvement in them.

Furthermore, some were produced with specific ambitions in mind. Historians do not treat any source as ‘factual’, rather they draw on a range of material to answer particular questions revealing the many versions of an event.

Ultimately, the major difference between oral history and archival history is that whilst the conditions of the original oral history interview can never be perfectly replicated, other historians can visit archive sources in order to re-examine them. That being said, the recordings and transcripts of my interview subjects have been preserved and are available for re-examining by other scholars.

4.3 Bert Bolin’s Personal History of the IPCC

Bert Bolin, as the first Chairman of the IPCC, plays a significant role in the narrative of this thesis.

Unfortunately, I was unable to interview him as part of my research for this doctoral thesis, as he passed away in 2007 before I began this project. As a substitute to speaking with Bolin directly, in an interview, I have drawn on his personal history of the IPCC, A History of the Science and Politics of

Climate Change: the role of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.1

This account usefully offers up a specifically Bolin-centric view of the IPCC’s history, much as some of the oral histories have. However, using a published manuscript as a historical source can be problematic. After all the IPCC in 2007 – having just recently been awarded a Nobel Prize – was a

1 Bert Bolin, A History of the Science and Politics of Climate Change: The Role of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2007)

47 considerably different organisation to the one Bolin presided over between 1988 and 1992. Crucially,

Bolin’s reflections on the IPCC appear to be to some extent couched in a triumphant narrative, mirroring his 2007 knowledge of the IPCC’s status and position in the science and politics of climate change. Similar methodological problems associated with oral history are manifest in using Bolin’s book as a historical source, including questions over the accuracy and veracity of certain claims. As such, Bolin’s motivation to write this book must be considered when using it as a source. In order to overcome the methodological problems detailed, I have endeavoured to both fact-check Bolin’s claims, and to critically appraise those claims in light of when the book was written. Above all I have sought to set Bolin’s claims against what I consider to be his motivation for the writing the book – namely to celebrate the IPCC.

4.4 Transnational History

A major theme of my research presented in this thesis centres on the global scale of climate change, both in terms of the anticipated effects and also in terms of the scale of participation in the assessments and politics of the issue. In this regard the history of climate change is clearly a fitting topic to be investigated through transnational historical perspectives. Transnational history “is the study of the ways in which past lives and events have been shaped by processes and relationships that have transcended the borders of nation states.” As a field of history it seeks to “understand ideas, things, people, and practices which have crossed national boundaries.”1 This thesis naturally has to transcend the boundaries of national and transnational history. To do this I have sought to incorporate the pressures exerted in a national context in order to understand how and why these were reflected in an international context. Throughout this thesis I view the IPCC’s structures as a reflection of the political cultures of the dominant States involved in the IPCC’s establishment, Jasanoff’s ‘civic

1 Ann Curthoys and Marilyn Lake, “Introduction” in Connected Worlds History in Transnational Perspective (eds.) Ann Curthoys and Marilyn Lake (Australian National University Press: Canberra, 2005), p. 17

48 epistemology.’ 1 The IPCC’s establishment therefore offers an opportunity to scrutinise the transnational science policy landscape in the 1980s.

In this thesis, my principal focus has centred on the role of the US and, to a smaller degree, the UK in the construction of specific features of the international political climate regime which emerged during the latter half of the 1980s and early 1990s. This focus has flowed from the fact that the US were the single largest financial contributors to the UN system, and hence wielded significant influence, as well as having the most sophisticated domestic policy on climate change. Nevertheless, other nations, their diplomats and delegations to conferences have played important roles in shaping the climate regime. Unfortunately, in this thesis my treatment of the impact and roles played by these countries has remained largely underdeveloped.

Absent in my analysis is what I would call the view from the ‘Global South.’. Language barriers, time and financial constraints have all contributed to this and highlight one of the major drawbacks of the current trend towards transnational histories: Is it even possible to prepare a genuinely transnational history? This thesis draws on transnational perspectives without producing a wholly transnational history. That doesn’t entirely detract from my conclusions, as I have scrutinised the major player in international politics during this period and their relationship to international advisory mechanisms. Thus, this thesis does contribute novel insights into how scientists approached climate change politics, how that has shaped and re-shaped the IPCC and how expertise can both constrain and open up participation in global environmental assessments.

5. Outline of Thesis Chapters

What this historiography shows is that the existing histories of the science and politics of climate change have so far tended to focus on the political salience and efficacy of environmental assessments in informing policy. This fails to account for the influence to be wielded in controlling environmental

1 Sheila Jasanoff, Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in in Europe and the United States, (Princeton University Press, Princeton: 2005).

49 assessments. Accordingly, I seek to redress this oversight highlighting how and why the IPCC was constructed as a hegemon in knowledge production of climate change. A key theme running through this thesis concerns the geopolitics of knowledge production. Examining the power politics of knowledge production in the relationship between a transnational set of scientists engaged in assessments of climate change and national policymakers. Reflecting on key decisions taken over who gets to participate in assessments and on what terms, I argue that the IPCC was established as a means of controlling who could speak for the climate, when and how, and as such the Panel legitimised and privileged certain voices at the expense of others.

The chapters in this thesis have been organised to reflect the chronology of events leading up to the formation of the IPCC in 1988, and the subsequent activities of the Panel. Chapter 2 deals with the emergence and salience of climate change as an international political issue and covers the period from 1979 to 1987. Chapters 3, 4 and 5, respectively, examine: the intense political negotiations between the US, the WMO and UNEP culminating in an agreement to convene the IPCC from 1986 to 1988; the First assessment cycle of the Panel from 1988-1990, and finally; the intertwining science and politics of climate change between 1988 and 1992, culminating in a discussion of US engagement with the Rio Earth Summit. Finally, chapter 6 provides a discussion of the main research findings and concluding comments.

Chapter 2 – “Manufacturing Consensus around Climate Change: Early Forays into Policy,

1979-1987” – examines the roles played by science-policy advocates in raising climate change up the international political agenda. By first focusing on the 1985 Villach Conference on “the assessment of the role of carbon dioxide and of other greenhouse gases in climate variations and associated impacts”, I explore the reasons why, and ways in which, the meeting was different from earlier assessments. Examining the differences will allow me to explain where the novel political advocacy originated from. Mostafa Tolba is a key actor throughout this thesis, and in Chapter 2 I highlight the way in which he used the Villach meeting in 1985 to make a political argument with science. I demonstrate how Tolba, by nurturing an environment receptive to political advocacy, was able to shape the early political priorities during these early forays into policy. This, as will become clear in

50 the subsequent chapters, crucially shaped the ways in which both scientists and policymakers have treated and engaged with scientific assessments of climate change – creating a specifically linear approach to international policymaking. In tracing the origins of the IPCC back to this meeting, I demonstrate a path lock-in which has consequently shaped political engagement with climate change.

Secondly, I focus on how the Villach conclusions and recommendations were spread and nurtured moving forward. To do this I trace the work of a small network of active science-policy advocates to emerge as a result of the Villach meeting, centred around a couple of workshops held two years later in Villach and Bellagio, 1987. Tasked with developing policies for responding to climatic change, I show that US policymakers were uncomfortable with the agenda they were setting. The response to this advocacy, a pushback from the political community, is the subject of chapter 3.

Chapter 3 – “Negotiating an Intergovernmental Assessment Mechanism” – provides a detailed analysis of the negotiations that resulted in the formation of the IPCC in 1988. In this chapter the focus is trained on the interagency negotiations within the US National Climate Program Policy

Board. In these discussions I reveal two contrasting positions held on the necessity of a global convention which led to a compromise agreement calling for a new kind of assessment, specifically conducted under the aegis of governments. Once this proposal was translated onto the international stage, via the WMO, US influence continued unabated throughout the formal negotiation of the IPCC.

This involvement, I argue, was based on a policy of controlling the political momentum towards a global convention. By promoting the “science” and relying on its inherent uncertainty, US policymakers are shown to have been attempting to control the assessment mechanism and hence the politics of climate change.

Chapter 4 – “Balancing Scientific Credibility and Political Legitimacy: The First Assessment

Cycle, 1988-1990”– traces the evolution of the structures and processes of the IPCC in the assemblage of the First Assessment (AR1). I explain how piecemeal decisions, taken on an ad hoc basis, allowed both scientists and policymakers the opportunity to shape the assessment mechanism.

The oscillating balance of power and influence between, on the one hand, the scientists writing the report, and on the other hand, the political representatives tasked with signing off on the final product

51 led to the predominantly positive reception of the final report. Focussing on the tensions between the lead authors and Working Group core members which led to the introduction of to two rounds of review of the assessment –scientific peer review and government review – I demonstrate the ways in which the assessment was at all times guided by the twin strains of balancing the scientific credibility and political legitimacy of the report. I finish, by arguing that while the report did successfully balance the concerns of both scientists and policymakers it, ultimately, left many developing countries marginalised, which I discuss in greater depth in the next chapter.

Chapter 5 – “The Framework Convention on Climate Change: the intertwining science and politics of climate change, 1988-1992” – is the penultimate chapter and charts the involvement of the

IPCC in the politics of climate change up to the Rio ‘Earth Summit’ by highlighting the strategic engagement of governments with the IPCC. Examining the Noordwijk Conference, November 1989, I demonstrate how both American and British officials sought to channel any political debate around climate change through the IPCC. This, I argue, saw American policymakers legitimise the knowledge produced by the IPCC in a bid to control the politics of climate change. The concomitant marginalisation felt by many developing countries in the IPCC led them to seek out ways and means of participating on more equal terms. Contrary to the wishes of US negotiators, developing countries succeeded in their campaign for the establishment of a new formal negotiating body for a global convention, which was to be conducted under the aegis of the UN General Assembly (UN GA). So, as developing countries became increasingly involved in the politic of climate change, US policymakers grew increasingly hostile and isolated.

Chapter 6 – I close with a discussion of the core themes and conclusions based on my study.

In addition, I identify the scope for future research. I examine the motivations behind establishing an intergovernmental assessment mechanism, highlighting the intensely political nature of producing knowledge for policymakers. I trace how the control of the assessment process has oscillated between the scientists (and their international sponsors) and government representatives, which demonstrates the ways in which the establishment of the IPCC has scientized climate politics, alongside politicising the science. Intrinsic to these arguments has been my treatment of the geopolitics of knowledge

52 production. Through its appeals to both pillars of scientific credibility and political legitimacy, the

Panel was positioned to speak on behalf of the entire international community. This powerful universalising tool of science and scientific assessment was utilised by US policymakers at maintaining a specifically environmental framing, thus delaying the implementation of a global convention.

Chapter 2 – Manufacturing Consensus around Climate Change: Early

Forays into Policy, 1979-1987

1. Introduction

By 1979, research into the Earth’s climate had been going on for several decades. The main focus of this research centred on improvements to climate models which enhanced the predictive tools available to meteorologists. Out of this basic research, concerns emerged around the possibility for dramatic changes to the earth’s climate. Firstly, that anthropogenic CO2 emissions would contribute to an enhanced greenhouse effect, thus warming the planet by somewhere between 1 and 5.5°C. This was briefly followed by concerns in the 1970s that aerosols produced in the course of burning coal, changing land use and deserts would lead to a dramatic global cooling. But, by the late 1970s and into the early 1980s, the prevailing concern centred on the warming effect of the increasing concentration of CO2 emissions. This warming effect signalled a wide array of implications affecting several different international organisations: the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the United

Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United

Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Health

Organization (WHO).

In 1977, the Executive Council of the WMO conscious of the potential threats posed, therefore decided the time was ripe for an international conference on climate change. Joining up with the UNEP, the FAO, UNESCO and the WHO, the WMO set in motion plans culminating in the First

World Climate Conference, in 1979. This conference was significant as the first international meeting to directly address anthropogenic climate change, distinct from other environmental concerns. It was first and foremost a scientific conference and was hence, primarily attended by scientific experts across a wide range of disciplines. Meeting to review the latest understanding of climate change and variability, the conference delegates were conscious of the potential implications of their research and so they decided to draft a conference statement – outlining the current state of scientific knowledge.

During the conference, ideas were exchanged and research presented, but the conference statement, ultimately, drew the conclusion that any political intervention on climate change would be premature.

The themes and topics of the conference demonstrated that while there were concerns over the threat posed by climate change, there was no inclination towards political advocacy. Instead, the experts agreed upon the need for more research to address the prevailing uncertainties over the timing, magnitude and impact of any future climatic change. As a result of decisions taken at this conference a formal international assessment of “CO2 on Climate Variations” was timetabled for just over a year later in Villach, Austria (henceforth referred to as Villach-I). This meeting was supposed to provide an authoritative statement on the state of the climate as well as what policymakers could or should do about the climate change.

The Villach-I meeting brought together many of the same scientific experts as at the First

World Climate Conference, but in much smaller numbers. A notable and prominent expert in attendance was Professor Bert Bolin, a Swedish meteorologist who had been involved in much of the basic research out of which concerns of a warming planet had emerged1.

Box 1. Introducing Bert Bolin

Bolin’s involvement in climate research stretched all the way back to the 1950s, where he was part of the research team working under Jule Charney at Princeton. There, using the ENIAC supercomputer,

Bolin was involved in the pioneering studies which sought to computerise weather forecasting, and later model the climate. Furthermore, Bolin was active and influential participant in many international, interdisciplinary collaborations; particularly under the guise of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU). Bolin was the archetypal international scientist and thus his name and scientific reputation were also matched by his extensive list of contacts among international scientific bodies. Commenting on his selection as Chair of the Global Atmospheric Research Program (GARP)

– an international collaborative research project to improve the scientific understanding of certain climatic indicators – in 1968, Spencer Weart states, “it was less for his wide-ranging scientific savvy

1 Bert Bolin went on to become the first Chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988.

55 that Bolin was chosen to organise GARP, than for his unusual ability to communicate and inspire people. It helped that he was based in neutral Sweden, but it was more important that, as one colleague put it, Bolin was “a brilliant and honest scientist, who listened to and respected diverse views.” Self-effacing and soft-spoken, as Bolin developed his diplomatic skills he would become the mainstay of international climate organising efforts for the next quarter-century.”1

As Bolin left the Villach-I meeting he was extremely frustrated. He felt that he and his fellow participants had not been able to comprehensively assess the issue, due to a lack of time. The meeting had lasted only a week and upon departing several of the participants began discussing the prospect of yet another scientific assessment. Furthermore, the final conference statement merely reiterated the conclusions drawn a year earlier. For Bolin, simply calling on governments and international organizations to sponsor yet more research was not enough, as he felt that the time was ripe for some sort of real political action. He was confident that the negative effects of human-induced climate change – including projections of rising sea levels and drought – were of such concern that he could not stand idly by without at least warning of the probable threat. Therefore, during these discussions

Bolin continually expressed his view that the assessment ought to be “wider in scope, greater in depth and more international.”2 Bolin was looking at how he and his fellow delegates could maximise their influence, whilst raising the political profile of climate change.

Five years later, in 1985, Bolin’s wishes were heeded, and another assessment was held in the same location (what I will refer to as the Villach-II conference).3 The conclusions drawn at Villach-II were based essentially on the same level of scientific certainty about the link between CO2 and climate change as Villach-I. Yet, these same scientists left Villach-II advocating immediate and radical political actions. What changed for them?

1 Spencer Weart, “International Cooperation” in The Discovery of Global Warming online resource. Accessed online 18 September 2014: www.aip.org/history/climate/internat.htm 2 Bert Bolin, A History of the Science and Politics of Climate Change (2007), p. 35 3 See Figure. 1 for a timeline of meetings, workshops and conferences in this chapter

This chapter will explore how this change in emphasis and novel political advocacy emerged.

In addition, it will investigate how the actions and decisions taken at Villach-II have affected the subsequent discussions of climate change. I will specifically show that decisions taken at Villach-II, emulating the mechanisms pursued in the coincident ozone negotiations, committed a group of scientists and international administrators to a linear ‘scientized’ approach to climate change policymaking. The advocacy of a group of what I call “science-policy advocates” – scientists and international administrators making political claims for influence through recourse to the authoritative and objective status of science – significantly laid the foundations for a similarly scientized approach to policymaking in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). By specifically considering how and why climate scientists at the Villach-II meeting took steps to begin advocating for policy changes I demonstrate that the scientists’ political advocacy emerged not because of any radically new scientific findings, but rather because of a transformation in the mind-set and attitudes of the scientists involved in the assessments towards uncertainty. In the earlier meetings uncertainty was seen as a barrier to advocating action. In contrast, at the Villach-II meeting perceptions of the possibility of climate change had become sufficiently probable for the scientists to justify recommending political action on climate change. This was made possible as certain key actors within the international organizations, chiefly Mostafa Tolba an Egyptian scientist and crucially the

Executive Director of UNEP, orchestrated the Villach-II meeting in such a way as to make it distinctly political. The Villach-II meeting, thus, set the political agenda and framed the subsequent debate in a particularly technocratic arrangement.

Box 2. Introducing Mostafa Tolba

Mostafa Tolba, Egyptian scientist and Executive Director of UNEP, 1974-1992, is a key figure and central character in the IPCC’s early history. At Cairo University he established his own school in microbiology where he was subsequently awarded an Emeritus Professorship and after leading his country’s delegation the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in

1972, he became UNEP's Deputy Executive Director, where two years later he was promoted to

Executive Director. During his long tenure, 1975–1992, he played an important role in the fight

57 against ozone depletion – which culminated with the Vienna Convention, 1985, and the Montreal

Protocol, 1987. During his tenure as UNEP’s Executive Director Tolba was synonymous with UNEP, without whom, Robert Watson – the IPCC’s second Chairman from 1997-2002 – believes would not have been nearly as effective on the international stage.1

Reflecting upon Tolba’s legacy as UNEP’s director, Osama A El-Kholy states that, “Under his leadership, UNEP became the core organization within the United Nations (UN) family acting as the catalyst spurring governments, business, academia, international governmental organizations (IGOs) and non-government organizations (NGOs) to meaningful action. UNEP, one of the small members of the UN family, could leverage on average four times its modest budget to carry out more than a thousand projects”2

The importance of the Villach-II Conference has been explored by several other scholars and journalists, it has for example been hailed as ‘the week the climate changed’3 by New Scientist environmental correspondent Fred Pearce. Additionally, Wendy Franz and Shardul Agrawala have highlighted the Villach-II meeting respectively as an important departure point in connecting the science and policy of climate change emphasising the urgency of action4, and as being representative of the earliest case of international consensus on the seriousness of the issue.5 These accounts principally focus on how the Villach-II meeting contributed to the rising political importance of climate change. That this meeting is important, in that regard, is clear. But neither of these authors addresses the scientific and political legacy of Villach-II; how and why the meeting has been important. Therefore, in this chapter I address this unquestioned assumption of both how and why

Villach-II affected the scientific and political discourse around climate change. I show that the change

1 Robert Watson, Interview with David Hirst, (13 February 2012), UK. 2 Osama A El-Kholy, “Tolba, Mostafa (1922-)“ extract from Encyclopaedia of Global Environmental Change (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.: 2002) Accessed online 17 September 2014: www.eu.wiley.com/legacy/wileychi/egc/pdf/GG627-W.PDF 3 Fred Pearce, “Histories: The week the climate changed”, New Scientist, No. 2521, (15 Oct 2005), pp. 52-54 4 Wendy E. Franz, “The Development of an International Agenda for Climate Change” (1997) 5 Shardul Agrawala, “Context and Early Origins of the IPCC” (1994a)

58 occurred because scientists established a new way of translating projections of climate risks and the associated socio-political impacts: by scientizing it. ’Scientization’, in the context of this thesis, involves taking a cultural or political world view and rationalising through recourse to science – crucially, in the case of climate change this means through scientific assessment. The scientists and administrators at Villach-II coalesced around a linear formulation of the policy process: more science and less uncertainty leads to political action. This scientized formulation of policymaking has had important lasting implications in the subsequent interactions between scientists and policymakers. In the subsequent chapters I will show that US policymakers embraced these ideas. In doing so they legitimised the findings of a select few scientists to reinforce their political standpoint, thus controlling the politics of climate change. Ultimately, I will answer how and why different scientists sought to raise climate change up the political agenda and what effect this has had on early interactions across the science-policy interface – what influenced their approaches and what legacy this has had on climate change politics as seen through the lens of the IPCC.

This chapter will, firstly, show how the Villach-II conference was positioned to present a political argument for a global convention through recourse to science and will specifically address how important the role of advocacy has been in raising the political profile of climate change.

Secondly, it will focus on how the actors involved at Villach-II framed the climate change debate prior to politicians engaging with it, crucially, locking both the scientists and political representatives into a highly scientized approach to policymaking.

2. The Emergence of Science-Policy Advocates, 1980-1985

This section will detail the change in emphasis between Villach-I and Villach-II. Throughout this period I show that the actions and ambitions of Mostafa Tolba, UNEP’s Executive Director, were a key driving force in the emergent political advocacy. Both he, and Bert Bolin, succeeded in creating a receptive environment for the Villach-II delegates to begin advocating policies. Tolba, an Egyptian scientist and civil servant served as the executive director of UNEP from 1974-1995, was seen to be a

59 champion of the causes of developing countries by the US and other Western countries. He was also a strong advocate of scientific managerial responses to environmental problems.

Previous accounts of the Villach-II conference, most notably those of Franz1 and Agrawala2, highlight the importance of the Villach-II meeting in connecting the science and policy of climate change. But, these accounts pay less attention to the inherent scientific uncertainties that initially represented a barrier to advocating political action. Yet, at the Villach-II conference the delegates constructed and deployed scientific uncertainty as a rhetorical justification for political action. Indeed, the political mechanisms the scientists chose to pursue at Villach-II contributed substantially to a

“scientization” of the politics of climate change, as they attempted to shape the political landscape by recourse to scientific assessment. As a result, restricting the options open to policymakers.

As a guide to my subsequent discussion of science-policy advocates, it is instructive to look to Roger Pielke Jr.’s four idealised roles of science in policy: the pure scientist, science arbiter, issue advocate and honest broker of policy alternatives.3 The Pure Scientist, according to Pielke, will simply provide the decision-maker with some fundamental information, allowing them to do what they want with it. The Science arbiter stands by ready to answer factual questions the decision-maker thinks are relevant. The issue advocate narrows the scope of choice and presents factual information to support a specific choice. And the honest broker provides the decision-maker with as much information as possible in an effort to expand (or at least clarify) the scope of choice for decision- making4. Pielke clearly believes that scientists have an obligation to play the role of the “honest broker.” But, as I will show in the course of this chapter, early interactions between scientists and policymakers in the science and politics of climate change were notable for what Pielke would call issue advocacy. Whereas Pielke is principally concerned with the roles of scientists in advisory positions, I will extend the analysis to the international administrators sponsoring research and organising assessments – operating at the interface between the two social worlds of science and

1 Wendy E. Franz, “The Development of an International Agenda for Climate Change” (1997) 2 Shardul Agrawala, “Context and Early Origins of the IPCC” (1994a) 3 Roger A. Pielke Jr., The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2007) 4 Roger A. Pielke Jr., The Honest Broker, (2007), pp. 1-2

60 policy. These science-policy advocates narrowed the scope of choices available to policymakers both in terms of the political choices available, but also by restricting the issue to the domain of science – scientizing the politics of climate change.

My arguments concerning the scientization of climate change politics and the concomitant politicisation of the science of climate change are derived from my reading of the archival record and from interviews with the participants of the meetings, workshops and behind closed doors negotiations of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. In addition, I draw on Pielke’s discussion of the four modes of communicating scientific findings to decision-makers described above and Daniel Sarewitz’s argument that “science makes environmental controversies worse.”1

Sarewitz’s point that science is capable of supplying salient, legitimate facts to support politically opposite beliefs which are made sense of through particular interests and normative frameworks is fundamental to my description of the scientization/politicisation of climate change through the IPCC.

As I see the IPCC as just one (of many possible) normative frameworks imposed upon the international political system. This chapter establishes the initial steps towards the IPCC’s model of climate change policy.

2.1 Villach-I: More Money, More Research

Between the Villach assessments in 1980 and 1985 a change in emphasis from recommending more money for more research, to recommending political intervention along the lines of a global climate convention took place. In order to appreciate this change in emphasis, added confidence to express political views and a reoriented set of priorities for the scientists involved, it is necessary to investigate the historical context from which it emerged. The Villach-II Conference in 1985 was held under the auspices of the World Climate Program (WCP). The WCP had only recently been established as a result of the historic World Climate Conference held in Geneva in 1979, mentioned in the chapter introduction. The World Climate Conference had been instigated as a result of concerns

1 Daniel Sarewitz, “How science makes environmental controversies worse” Environmental Science & Policy, 7, (2004), pp. 385-403.

61 over the possible threat posed by climate change. The final conclusion of the conference, couched in careful, conservative and heavily caveated scientific tones, was largely apolitical – beyond extending arguments for greater financial support for more research. The Villach-I meeting sought greater political status for science in policy through calls for more money for research, whereas by the time of the 1985 Villach-II meeting scientists were advocating specific political actions unrelated to securing more research funding. At Villach-I delegates merely stated that there was a need for more research to address the widespread uncertainties. The conference delegates also agreed upon the need to establish the WCP in order to carry out more research under four different headings: Climate Data, Climate

Applications, Climate Impact studies and Climate Research. At the conclusion of the World Climate

Conference the WMO, UNEP and the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) began a collaborative effort to monitor, assess and develop a greater understanding of climate change. It was through the WCP that the delegates at Villach-II were in a position to develop a scientific rationale for political action.

As a result of growing interest in gaining a better understanding of climate change, the WCP spanned a wide spectrum of problem areas and functions.1 Its remit extended to aiding on-going research as well as sponsoring new studies. Most significantly, the WCP was tasked with providing updates and assessments to assist policymakers in developing sound policies.2 Therefore, under the auspices of this program, several meetings were convened between 1979 and 1988 that assessed and updated the sponsoring agencies on the current state of the climate (see Figure 1). Whilst, the World

Climate Conference produced the first international assessment of the issue of climate change, the discussions were primarily scientific in nature. It was the follow up activities conducted under WCP auspices that saw the nascent move towards the novel and pronounced science policy activism.

1 WMO, “World Climate Programme,” WMO Bulletin, 27; 3, (1978) 2 WMO, “World Climate Programme,” WMO Bulletin, 28; 2, (1979)

Meeting / Event Date Coordinating Committee on Ozone Layer (CCOL)

established 12-23 February, 1st World Climate Conference, Geneva 1979 November, 1980 Villach Conference (Villach-I)

SCOPE Assessment Report Begins 1983 Brundtland Report Commissioned by UN GA (December) Vienna Convention on Ozone Depleting Chemicals Open for signature (March-September) 1985 Discovery of Antarctic Ozone depletion – the “hole in the ozone layer” – (May) 2nd Villach Conference – Villach-II – (9-15 October 1986 SCOPE Report published by ICSU Villach/Bellagio Workshops (October and November) Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the 1987 Ozone Layer (16 September) Brundtland Report Published and adopted by UNGA (December) June: US Senate Hearings

1988 June: Toronto Conference Changing Atmosphere November: IPCC First Session

Figure 1. Timeline of meetings, workshops, conferences, and other significant events in this chapter

The first international meeting convened to assess the climate issue as part of the WCP was held in Villach Austria in 1980 (Villach-I). The meeting was arranged to provide an up to date analysis of the current scientific understanding of climate change and was substantially different in both size and purpose to the 1979 World Climate Conference. There were fewer attendees at Villach-I

63 and the focus was directed at assessing and synthesising the existing research into a digestible format for the sponsoring organisations and policymakers. It therefore had the scope to make radical proposals for political action on climate change. Nonetheless, the Villach-I conference statement conveyed the same general message as the World Climate Conference a year earlier. The delegates attending the meeting were nominated representatives of their governments. Therefore, the conclusions and recommendations reflected those countries interests and principally called for an increased international program of research. The final Villach-I conference statement suggested that the potentially serious impacts associated with climate change were sufficiently probable as to require an international commitment to a program of co-operation in research to reduce scientific uncertainty.1 The delegates accordingly outlined five key areas for further research: (i) Projections of future fossil fuel consumption, (ii) prospective modes of management of the global biosphere, (iii) clarification of the carbon cycle, (iv) the climatic response to an increasing concentration of CO2 and

(v) the potential impact – both positive and adverse – of climatic change.

For the Villach-I delegates scientific uncertainty provided a continuing mandate for more research. At the same time, however, it presented an obstacle to advocating any kind of political intervention to combat climate change. Moreover, by concluding that further research into the issue of climate change was essential, but action premature, the delegates also claimed that any decision- making with respect to climate change had to be grounded on a firm scientific basis.2 Clearly, for complex environmental problems, such as climate change, science is a critical element in policymaking, and scientists can and should play an important role. Science and scientists should inform and advise. But it is equally important to consider that science is only one element of the complex deliberations that take place in a democracy. This approach neglects the economics of climate change, which, as Vladimir Jankovic and Andrew Bowman have highlighted, has in recent years seen climate change emerge as a an opportunity – a market transition – freed from risk-based

1 WMO, Report of the Meeting of Experts on the Assessment of the Role of CO2 on Climate Variations and their Impact, (Villach, Austria: 1980) 2 Robert M. White, “World Climate Conference: Geneva 1979,” WMO Bulletin, 28; 3

64 scientific debates, but this sort of alternative dialogue was not being opened up.1 Business leaders, citizens, politicians all have legitimate stakes in the decisions due to be taken over climate policies. It is only after values are clarified and some goals agreed upon that appropriate decisions can take place.

The Villach-I delegates though, were clearly positioning science as the critical and decisive factor.

These efforts toward imparting science at the core of the decision-making processes is crucial, because the elevated status of science in raising awareness of climate change was later embraced by

US officials in order to delay the action demanded by the science-policy advocates. The scientists at

Villach-I were self-legitimising themselves as the core-set of experts.2

Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars have persuasively demonstrated that scientific uncertainty is not simply an absence of knowledge. It is, instead, socially constructed and the varying degrees of confidence expressed are often dependent upon the audience.3 Consensus statements – statements of what is known and what is unknown – must be negotiated and agreed ahead of their presentation. Moreover, consensus, conference statements are, in this way, emblematic of this process of social construction of ‘official knowledge.’ In the case of Villach-I, the delegates were conscious of presenting the uncertainty in the climate system as something that could be overcome by more research. Simon Shackley and Brian Wynne have argued that in the climate change regime of the 1990s “advisory scientists’ representations of uncertainty in semi-public and policy contexts [facilitated] interaction, translation, and cooperation between science and policy worlds while still ordering the relations between science and policy so as to sustain the special cultural authority of science.”4 The uncertainty as constructed by the Villach-I delegates called for money for more research, whilst not undermining the authoritative status of science. Seeking to position scientific advice at the centre of the political process was thus as much of a political move the

Villach-I delegates were willing to make.

1 Vladimir Jankovic and Andrew Bowman, “After the green gold rush: the construction of climate change as a market transition” Economy and Society 43; 2, (2014), pp. 233-259. 2 Silvio O. Funtowicz and Jerome R. Ravetz, “Science for the Post-Normal Age”, Futures, (September, 1993), pp. 739-755. 3 S. Holly Stocking and Lisa W. Holstein, “Constructing and Reconstructing Scientific Ignorance: Ignorance Claims in Science and Journalism,” Science Communication, 15; 2 (1993), pp. 186–210; Trevor Pinch “The Sun-Set: The Presentation of Certainty in Scientific Life,” Social Studies of Science 11, (1981) pp.131–58 4 Simon Shackley & Brian Wynne, “Representing Uncertainty in Global Climate Change Science and Policy: Boundary-Ordering Devices and Authority”, Science, Technology & Human Values, 21; 3 (July 1996), p. 280

2.2 SCOPE 29: More Science, More Certainty?

As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, Bert Bolin left the Villach-I assessment unsatisfied with the outcomes. He was specifically disappointed that the assessment had not addressed the political implications of the issue. Immediately after the meeting, Bolin and several of the scientists and administrators from the WMO and UNEP discussed the prospect of another assessment. In these discussions it was clear that Bolin did not want further governmental representation; he wanted to see immediate political action based on more science. He also advocated the inclusion of a wider range of scientists from different countries, not just the standard Western countries.1 His intention was to strengthen the voice of scientists in directing the assessment, as well as the associated political outcomes. He felt this would allow the scientists sufficient leeway to make policy recommendations outside of the constraints of domestic policy. Bolin felt the issue could be solved through more science, which ultimately meant more certainty.

Tolba shared Bolin’s views about the need for more scientific voices and accordingly set about orchestrating another meeting, after Villach-I, to provide a further assessment of climate change. In 1982, Tolba travelled to Stockholm to discuss with Bolin a UNEP project to carry out a more extensive assessment of climate change, under the patronage of the World Climate Impacts

Program (WCIP). What transpired entailed a project generously funded by UNEP, with input from the

WMO and an agreement for ICSU to publish the assessment.2 The publication accordingly fell under the auspices of the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE) which was, and still is, a subsidiary body of ICSU. It was established in 1969 as an international scientific non- governmental organisation charged with identifying and undertaking analyses of emerging environmental issues caused by or impacting upon humans and the environment.

Beginning in 1983, the SCOPE project took two years to be completed, and provided the background to discussions at the Villach-II Conference. Led by Bolin, the editors of the SCOPE

1 Bert Bolin, A History of the Science and Politics of Climate Change (2007), p. 35 2 Bert Bolin, A History of the Science and Politics of Climate Change, (2007), pp. 35-36

66 report commissioned chapters evaluating the likely emissions of CO2 into the atmosphere due to future energy demands, and consequently the projections of future atmospheric concentrations. In both cases, the conclusions cited a high degree of uncertainty suggesting that it was not meaningful to attempt precise projections of energy use beyond 30-40 years, and hence upper and lower bounds were estimated. The report also reviewed how the climate may change i.e. what the computer models were telling them, and if there was a warming trend, had it been detected. Overall, the Report essentially mirrored the national and international assessments that had preceded it (see Figure 2). The

SCOPE report predicted that the change in global average temperature, due to a doubling in the concentration of atmospheric CO2 (the equilibrium climate sensitivity), would be between 1.5°C and

5.5°C. The executive summary warned that, “The possible problem of a change in climate due to the emissions of greenhouse gases should be considered as one of today's most important long-term environmental problems.”1

1 SCOPE, (1986) The Greenhouse Effect, Climatic Change and Ecosystems, (eds.) Bert Bolin, Bo Döös, R. A. Warwick and Jill Jäger, (World Climate Program): www.scopenvironment.org/downloadpubs/scope29/contents.html

Figure 2. The estimated global equilibrium annual temperature change for doubling of the CO2 concentration compared with estimates from previous assessments, and values obtained using climate models1

Though there was considerable uncertainty as to the precise impacts of climate change – such as precise projections of future surface temperature increases – there was also significant stability in the presentation of this uncertainty across assessments. The SCOPE report neatly illustrated that across the various assessments conducted in the 1980s there was little divergence in the various model predictions (see Figure 2.). Across the six year period, the predicted climate sensitivity – the equilibrium temperature change in response to changes of the radiative forcing – remained within the same range. Jerome van der Sluijs et al., suggest that this observed stability was a product of the pragmatic value in enabling communication between the two social worlds of science and policy.2

The relative stability in predictions operated as an ‘anchoring device’ in scientific assessments of

1 SCOPE, The Greenhouse Effect, Climatic Change and Ecosystems (1986) 2 Jerome van der Sluijs, Josee van Eijndhoven, Simon Shackley & Brian Wynne, “Anchoring Devices in Science for Policy: The Case of Consensus around Climate Sensitivity,” Social Studies of Science, 28; 2, (1998), pp. 291-323

68 climate change, functioning as a means of managing uncertainty by concealing the underlying scientific drift. The interpretative flexibility around this seemingly stable unchanging consensus allowed climate modellers the scope to translate and adapt the meaning of their predictions. Van der

Sluijs et al., thus argue that, “the dominant discourse, in postulating transfer of separately predetermined knowledge from science to policy, may conceal a more complex indeterminate process of mutual validation between these two worlds.”1 As such consensus, van der Sluijs et al., argue, is more complex and multi-dimensional than a simple agreement based on shared beliefs and uniform interpretations.

Notably, the SCOPE report dealt with the scientific uncertainty in a considerably different way to the Villach-I meeting. While the estimated climate sensitivity mirrored the same results as previous assessments, the conclusions drawn were substantially different. The stability of uncertainty ranges across the assessments of climate change in the 1980s, highlighted by the SCOPE report, thus allowed the authors to use the inherent scientific uncertainty as a justification for action rather than inaction. The flexibility in possible communications around a stable consensus, allowed varying rhetorical justifications of uncertainty. For example, in the assessment summary the editors (Bolin et al.,) warned that “[while] some of the uncertainties will still exist in the future, despite intensive research on the individual topics [the] prevailing uncertainty does not mean that the problem can or should be dismissed (italics in original).” The summary went on arguing that, “it is necessary to examine the characteristics of these uncertainties and assess what can be said about future changes and to consider if and when some actions are needed in view of such possible changes.”2

The organisers of the Villach-II conference ensured that the SCOPE findings provided the mainstay of the discussions at the meeting. Commenting on the predicted changes made in the

SCOPE assessment, Bolin has suggested the “threat of climate change became considerably more alarming.”3 Moreover, the reflections of the Conference Chairman Jim Bruce illustrate that both he and the other delegates sensed that climate change was being presented as a serious and pressing

1 Jerome van der Sluijs et al., “Anchoring Devices in Science for Policy” (1998), p. 315 2 SCOPE, The Greenhouse Effect, Climatic Change and Ecosystems (1986) 3 Bert Bolin, A History of the Science and Politics of Climate Change, (2007), p. 37

69 matter with present day implications. Reflecting on Bolin et al.’s SCOPE assessment, Bruce suggested that the impending threat was a key factor influencing his actions and the recommendations at Villach-II, Bruce explained that

“…I was rather struck by the report that Bolin and company prepared which indicated that if

you added in the impacts of gases other than CO2 particularly methane you ended up with a

much sooner timeline – a quicker timeline – to the effect of a doubling of CO2. So this, lent to

me and eventually to the other people who were at the conference a greater sense of urgency

about the issue of climate change, than we had previously. So that, that work by Bolin was

very important in giving me the sense that well this is getting to be an urgent matter and we

better sound the alarm.”1

The SCOPE assessment provided a foundation on which the Villach-II delegates could recommend more than just more research, as the scientific uncertainty presented to Villach-II delegates was sufficiently established and constant to allow a consensus statement to be formulated and agreed. Whereas previous accounts of the Villach-II assessment have tended to treat their results in isolation, I have shown how important both uncertainty and stability (in projections) have been in the climate science-policy realm. But, ultimately, it was through Tolba’s actions in organising the conference that ensured the delegates felt compelled to make political recommendations.

2.3 Villach-II: Making a political argument with science

The Villach-II meeting brought together eighty-five delegates from twenty-nine developed and developing countries for one week, on the 9-15 October 1985, to discuss the role of CO2 and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) on climate change. It was co-sponsored by the WMO, UNEP and ICSU and alongside the efforts to provide a new world-wide consensus on the existing knowledge of climate

1 Jim Bruce, Interview with David Hirst, (1 February 2012), UK/Canada

70 change,1 the delegates were loudly extolling the fact that it was a contemporary problem that mandated a solution now. Whereas the assessment report at Villach in 1980 (Villach-I) warned of the possible threat, in 1985 the delegates warned of the probable effects of climate change. On this subtle shift in emphasis, the delegates at Villach-II took a much larger step into a role of political advocacy.

The political advocacy that manifested itself at Villach-II did so, Franz argues, not due to any substantially new scientific findings. Instead it was because of the absence of domestic political constraints – that the scientists attended the conference in their personal capacities, not as representatives of their governments.2 In addition to a new found stability, Franz argues that the lack of government constraints allowed the Villach-II delegates considerable personal freedom at the meeting, such that the delegates were asked to “shed their national policy perspectives” and address the global issues in as comprehensive a way as possible.3

In the course of the preparations for the meeting, it was Tolba who persuaded the other agencies to internationalise the conference. Inviting the eighty-nine delegates to attend the meeting in their own individual capacity, not as governmental representatives was a deliberate tactic, which had been previously deployed by Tolba and UNEP at other expert assessments, most notably on pollution in the Mediterranean.4 This was a calculated ploy to enable the scientists an opportunity to speak more freely. But it also allowed the sponsoring agencies the scope to select the experts they wanted to attend the meeting. Tolba was openly advocating political intervention on the issue and accordingly orchestrated the conference to reflect these ambitions. With Tolba and UNEP’s stated ambitions favouring political intervention on climate change with a global convention known, the delegates at

Villach-II were encouraged to do likewise.

1 James P. Bruce,” The World Climate Programme: Achievements and Challenges,” in Climate Change: Science Impacts and Policy –Proceedings of the Second World Climate Conference eds. J. Jaeger & H. L. Ferguson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 152 2 Wendy E. Franz, “The Development of an International Agenda for Climate Change (1997), p. 12 3 Jim Bruce, Interview with W.E Franz and S. Agrawala. Telephone April 1997 quoted in Wendy E. Franz, “The Development of an International Agenda for Climate Change” (1997), p. 13 4 Peter M. Haas, “Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control,” International Organization, 43; 3, (Summer, 1989), pp. 377-403

Tolba’s influence in this way importantly highlights the role advocacy played in the emergence of the international political salience of climate change. Reflecting Bolin’s ambitions, articulated shortly after the first Villach-I assessment, for an international science-led assessment process, this crucially set the framework for climate change policymaking, creating a highly scientized technocratic process.

Positioning the conference to present a political argument with science, Tolba also allowed the delegates to perform considerable boundary-work – ensuring a future role for scientists in any decision-making with regards climate change. Boundary-work describes the processes through which scientists’ demarcate science and non-science. Describing boundary-work, Thomas Gieryn highlights the social construction of these boundaries, which are drawn and re-drawn in different ways to best achieve the demarcation of the scientist’s claims to authority or resources.1 This boundary-work, facilitated by Tolba, has shaped the methods and approaches to climate change policymaking in the assessment context. The recommendations made by the Villach-II delegates sought to integrate science in the decision-making processes. These recommendations allowed scientists to define their future role in any decision-making with regard climate change, shaping the environment in which political decisions were made. James Dooge, an Irish politician and hydrology expert, and the ICSU representative at Villach-II captured the conference mood as he argued that, “the two broad general lines of action, one concerned with science, the other with policy, are not antagonistic or incompatible

[...] It is for this Conference [Villach-II] to state how such an interchange can best take place.”2 It is, therefore, evident that the boundary work performed was less to do with protection of the autonomy of science from political interference, and more to do with actively shaping the political landscape along technocratic lines. Whereas the Villach-I meeting presented climate change as a possible issue,

Villach-II utilised the interpretative flexibility around a relatively stable consensus to communicate the problem as probable and as used consensus to drive the future approach.

1 Thomas F. Gieryn, “Boundary-Work” (1983) 2 James Dooge quoted in WMO, Report of the International Conference on the Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide and of Other Greenhouse Gases in Climate Variations and Associated Impacts, (Villach, Austria: 1986)

The executive summary of the Villach-II report contained five recommendations: (1) governments and intergovernmental organisations should take into account the Villach findings when formulating their policies on social and economic development, environmental programs and control of emissions; (2) public information efforts publicising climate change should be stepped up; (3) despite the remaining uncertainties the scientists and policymakers should begin collaborations to explore the effectiveness of alternative policies; (4) continued and strengthened support of scientific research into the various aspects of the problem; (5) UNEP, WMO and ICSU should establish a small task force on greenhouse gases to provide periodic assessment of the science, encourage research, advise governments on future actions, and initiate consideration of a global convention.1

All five recommendations were opening the door to a greater influence for scientific advice in the formulation of wide array of policies and represented a significant departure from the earlier

Villach-I assessment. The advocacy was rooted in the fertile environment Tolba had fostered by ensuring that the scientists invited attended as individuals. But it also drew on Bolin et al’s efforts in the SCOPE assessment, which had provided the foundation for discussions at Villach-II.

Significantly, the SCOPE assessment rationalised political action on climate change in spite of the continuing scientific uncertainty. These two factors joined together and allowed a group of scientists and their sponsors at the WMO, UNEP and ICSU to advocate policies for mitigating climate change.

The Villach-II meeting foregrounded the arguments of these science-policy advocates, who – as will be demonstrated in the next section – had clear ideas on how science should influence policies on climate change, namely that science should be a crucial, if not, decisive factor in policymaking. In the next section of this chapter I will describe these ideas manifested themselves. In so doing I demonstrate how the coincident timing of the negotiations on ozone depleting chemicals contributed to a consensus-based approach which attempted to narrow the potential for political debate.

1 Statement by the WMO/UNEP/ICSU International Conference on the assessment of the role of carbon dioxide and of other greenhouse gases in climate variations and associated impacts in SCOPE, The Greenhouse Effect, Climatic Change and Ecosystems (1986)

3. ‘Scientized’ decision-making: Climate Solutions modelled on Ozone

Throughout the 1980s a sort of environmental awakening in the general public, at least amongst the developed countries, materialised. Tied in with public warnings about global environmental threats of nuclear winter1 and Ozone depletion, Paul Edwards proposes, both issues “created an awareness that human actions were capable of causing sudden, potentially catastrophic atmospheric changes in the atmosphere not just regionally, but on a global scale.”2 This suggested that a kind of ‘apocalypse gap’ vacated by the end of the Cold War was readily filled by future predictions of climate change.3 Whilst

Edwards’ chronology events does not tie in exactly with the IPCC’s establishment in November 1988

– the Berlin wall came down in November 1989, and the collapse of the Soviet Union took place in

1991 – Soviet liberalisation at the end of the 1980s lessened the threat of global thermonuclear war. It is into this social-psychological space – a cultural niche – that Edwards argues global environmental threats like ozone and climate change were able to emerge into and occupy.4

Edwards provides an illuminating account of the role ozone debates played in increasing overall public environmental awareness. But, my focus in raising the issue of ozone discussions will be on the effect these negotiations had on the scientists and administrators working in an advisory capacity with climate change. The Vienna Convention on Ozone Depleting Chemicals often called a framework convention – as it offered a framework for efforts to protect the globe’s ozone layer – was adopted in 1985. It did not require countries to take concrete action, but instead obliged countries to cooperate in the formulation of agreed measures, procedures and standards for the implementation of the Convention, with a view to the adoption of protocols and annexes.5 It was widely considered an environmental success story. The Vienna Convention actually represented the first, formal international effort to deal with an environmental danger before it became manifest and therefore, had clear parallels with the climate change issue being discussed at Villach-II.

1 Nuclear Winter is a theory of radical climate change brought on by the combined planetary load of burning cities in a nuclear war, popularised by Carl Sagan 2 Paul N. Edwards, “Representing the Global Atmosphere” (2001) p. 49 3 Paul N. Edwards, “Representing the Global Atmosphere,” (2001) pp. 49-50; Joseph Masco, "Bad Weather: On Planetary Crisis," Social Studies of Science, (February, 2010) 40; 1, pp. 7-40 4 Paul N. Edwards, “Representing the Global Atmosphere” (2001) 5 United Nations, “Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,” (Vienna, 1985)

Tolba, as UNEP’s executive director, had been intimately involved in the negotiations on

CFCs and ozone depletion leading up to the Vienna Convention and was accordingly inspired and eager to achieve the same success with climate change.1 Agrawala has suggested, in his account of the emergence of the IPCC, that Tolba “flush with the success of negotiating the Vienna Convention on

Ozone, […] felt that the time was ripe to repeat the ozone ‘miracle’ for climate.”2 In this section I will, firstly, demonstrate the parallels and ‘carry-over’ from ozone to climate change and, secondly, I will argue that this has crucially contributed to the ‘scientized politics of climate change evident in the rest of this thesis. The actions taken in 1985, based on the successful negotiation of the Vienna

Convention, locked the scientists and administrators into specific modes of action, which became manifest in the IPCC’s ad hoc assessment processes.

5.1 The Ozone Consensus for Climate Change

The key message that the Villach-II delegates carried forward from the ozone negotiations into the climate change issue was the notion that science could force the issue in the policy arena. By reducing the uncertainties through more research; ozone had been solved. Therefore, Tolba and the scientists at

Villach-II believed that science had a key transformational role to play in the decision-making process on climate change. According to Jim Bruce, the Villach-II conference chairman, the key legacy of the

Villach-II meeting was the notion of developing a worldwide consensus on climate change.3 This was reflected in his opening statement to the Villach-II meeting, as he considered the tasks at hand of the delegates to be: first, formulating a scientific consensus; and second, developing recommendations for governments and international organisations to act upon.4 There was a clear and linear trajectory apparent in Bruce’s statement, which reflected the influence of the ozone negotiations.

1 Robert Watson, Interview with David Hirst, (13 February 2012), UK 2 Shardul Agrawala, “Context and Early Origins of the IPCC” (1994a), p. 609 3 James P. Bruce,” The World Climate Programme: Achievements and Challenges,” in Climate Change: Science Impacts and Policy –Proceedings of the Second World Climate Conference (1991), p. 152 4 WMO, Report of the International Conference on the Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide and of Other Greenhouse Gases in Climate Variations and Associated Impacts, (Villach, Austria: 1986), p. 7

The picture presented to the Villach-II delegates at the time was that the Vienna Convention was negotiated successfully largely due to the discovery of the Antarctic Ozone Hole. Despite the fact that the chronology did not match up1, the enthusiasm Tolba carried over from utilising science as a tool to force through an environmental treaty was an important influence upon Villach-II delegates.

From their perspective the scientific consensus had persuaded the negotiators to adopt the convention.

The administrators at UNEP and WMO as well as the scientists involved at Villach-II, who had also been involved in the ozone assessments, therefore sought to present policymakers with a scientific consensus, demonstrating that there was indeed a problem. Once achieved, this consensus could then convince them that it could be overcome with a treaty to limit CO2 emissions.

The consensus-led approach to policymaking with climate change has had the counterproductive effect of hindering progress towards the political actions scientists deemed necessary. Unlike with ozone, where certainty was established comparatively easily, the focus on uncertainty allowed those in favour of inaction an opportunity to stall proceedings. The thinking behind assessment preceding policy held that eventually the weight of evidence – a consensus statement – would tip the scales in favour of action. The opposite has also prevailed due to the difficulty of achieving absolute scientific certainty. By demanding more and more assessments, those opposed to action have accordingly been able to delay action. Interestingly, various arguments have been made since the Vienna Convention was adopted about both how and why it was successful.2 At the time of Villach-II meeting, Tolba was clear that a small scientific advisory panel promulgating a scientific consensus on the issue had been the key determining factor in getting countries to sign up.3

This consensus based linear approach to climate change policymaking was subsequently embedded within the IPCC, and will be examined in greater detail chapter 3.

1 Farman’s paper in which the ‘ozone hole’ was discovered was actually published 2 months after the Vienna Convention was opened up to signature. 2 Reiner Grundmann, Transnational Environmental Policy: Reconstructing Ozone, (New York: Routledge, 2001); Richard E. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy – New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet, (Harvard University Press: London, 1998); Karen T. Litfin, Ozone Discourses: Science and Politics in Global Environmental Cooperation, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) 3 Reiner Grundmann persuasively argues against the assumed importance of scientific consensus showing how the ozone negotiations actually progressed in the face of scientific uncertainty and an absence of consensus. In fact Grundmann shows that scientific uncertainty in various issues was utilised as a rhetorical resource which was employed by different actors in different ways.

The ozone negotiations encouraged the Villach-II delegates to attempt to emulate the methods employed in those negotiations in two ways. First, they established a small scientific advisory panel reporting to the three sponsoring organisations – the WMO, UNEP and ICSU – which sought to reduce the uncertainty and further establish the scientific consensus. This recommendation closely mirrored the Co-ordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer (CCOL) established to provide an analogous advisory role. Second, they recommended that governments consider actions “to initiate consideration of a global convention.”1 According to James Losey, a senior staff officer with the US

Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) International Activities Office (1980-1987), for some environmentalists at UNEP and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the ozone issue was nested within the larger and more complex climate issue, and an agreement on the former could be used as a springboard for dealing with the latter.2

5.2 The Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG)

Shortly after the conclusion of the Villach-II meeting, and in line with the recommendation for a small advisory panel, the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG) was established by the WMO,

UNEP and ICSU. It was convened to provide a standing advisory panel comprised of experts in a position to provide the best available information to governments and international organisations.

Each sponsoring organisation appointed their own choice of two scientists to the group. Ken Hare,

Bert Bolin, Georgy Golitsyn, Gordon Goodman, Mohammed Kassas, Syukuro ‘Suki’ Manabe and

Gilbert White made up the panel3, whilst the Villach-II Conference Chairman Jim Bruce served as the first secretary to the group. All of those involved were internationally recognised experts in the fields of climatology and atmospheric science.

1 Villach-II Meeting Executive Statement as quoted in: SCOPE, The Greenhouse Effect, Climatic Change and Ecosystems (1986) 2 James Losey, Interview with Karen Litfin , 17th September 1990 in Karen T. Litfin, Ozone Discourses: Science and Politics in Global Environmental Cooperation, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 68 3 Gordon Goodman, according to Jill Jaeger (in Jill Jaeger, Interview with David Hirst, (20 February 2012), UK/Austria), was appointed by ICSU, and it is highly likely Mohammed Kassas was appointed by UNEP (Tolba). But the archival record does not cover which organization’s appointed the different participants.

Box 3.. Some biographical information on AGGG members

Ken Hare was a distinguished English meteorologist who spent most of his career in Canada. His research interests spanned atmospheric carbon dioxide, climate change, drought and arid zone climates.1 During his career Hare served on numerous advisory committees and was notable writer on environmental topics.

Bert Bolin was a Swedish meteorologist whose research included work with John von Neumann and

Jule Charney on the ENIAC supercomputer in Princeton in 1950 pioneered computerised weather forecasting. He also served on numerous international committees, was heavily involved in the Global

Weather Experiments in the 1970s and was the first Chairman of the ICSU Committee on

Atmospheric Sciences in 1964. Bolin was at the vanguard of international, interdisciplinary research and was a pioneered for many of the international research collaborations still in place in 2014.2

Georgy Golitsyn is a Russian atmospheric scientist who had gained international recognition for his involvement in the Nuclear Winter theory earlier in 1982/3.3 He also participated in the World

Climate Programme workshop that resulted in the publication of a report on the climatic consequences of nuclear war.

Gordon Goodman’s involvement in this story will be elaborated upon in the next section. But his involvement in the AGGG was as a result of his lomg-standing involvement in international environmental science activities and as the founding director of the Beijer Institute of the Swedish

Royal Academy of Sciences (an environmental NGO established in 1977).

Mohammed Kassas was Egyptian, Mostafa Tolba’s right hand man at UNEP and a professor of botany. He was the President of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature from 1978-

1 science.ca “Scientist Profiles: F. Kenneth Hare” Accessed online 17 September 2014: www.science.ca/scientists/scientistprofile.php?pID=168&pg=0 2 Henning Rodhe, “Bert Bolin (1925-2007) – a wolrd leading climate scientist and science organiser” Tellus, 65, (2013), pp. 1-6. 3 Lawrence Badash, A Nuclear Winter’s Tale: science and politics in the 1980s, (MIT Press, 2009).

1984. Mourning his death in 2012, the IUCN described Kassas as an outstanding President who

“combined considerable scientific knowledge and ability with great human warmth.1

Syukuro Manabe is a Japanese meteorologist and climatologist who alongside Joseph Smagorinsky,

Kirk Bryan and Richard Wetherald pioneered the use of computers to stimulate global climate change.

Geoff Jenkins, a Met Office scientists interviewed during this research project described Manabe as

“the Godfather of climate modelling.”2

Gilbert White was a distinguished professor of geography known as the pioneer of flood plain management and a leader in natural hazards research. White was committed to national and international (scientific) cooperation and an obituary to White states that “the underlying notion that humans should adjust to their environment, coupled with a deep commitment to improving human welfare through social policy guided [his] career.”3

Upon forming, the AGGG was scheduled to meet twice a year, with the first meeting taking place at the WMO Headquarters in Geneva, from 1 to 2 July 1986. The group had two main tasks (1) biennial reviews of international and regional studies related to greenhouse gases, and (2) aperiodic

(sic) assessments of the rates of increases in the concentrations of greenhouse gases and of the effects of such increases.4 It was hoped that the compact nature of this expert panel would mean that the advice could be clear, certain and persuasive.

The plans and recommendations for the AGGG closely resembled the Coordinating

Committee on the Ozone Layer (CCOL), which had served a similar role during the ozone negotiations. The CCOL was established as an international scientific assessment panel. It was led by

1 IUCN, “IUCN Mourns loss of former President Professor Mohamed Kassas” (22 March 2012). Accessed online 17 September 2014: www.iucn.org/news_homepage/?9441/IUCN-mourns-loss-of-former-President- Professor-Mohamed-Kassas 2 Geoff Jenkins, Interview with David Hirst, (14 March 2012), UK 3 University of Colorado, “Gilbert F. White, 94, Geographer, Environmentalist, and Pioneer in Flood Plain Management and Natural Disaster Research, Dies” Accessed online 17 September 2014: www.colorado.edu/hazards/gfw/obituary.pdf 4 Thomas D Potter, “Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases established jointly by WMO, UNEP, and ICSU,” Environmental Conservation, 13; 4, (1986), p. 365

Professor Robert (Bob) Watson, the director of the NASA ‘Mission to Planet earth’ project, and reported directly to UNEP providing periodic scientific assessments of the ozone problem.1 It met to report on the latest research and prepare the ground for political decision making – an ambition Tolba also had for the AGGG. Thus, the analogous organisation of the AGGG both reflects Tolba’s influence but also the nature of his technocratic ambitions.2 Indeed, reflecting on discussions he had with Mostafa Tolba during this period Bob Watson explained

“…Mostafa Tolba wanted to put a group together that duly reported to him in UNEP – and I

forget what he was going call it – and a number of us said look it would be much better to

have a truly international assessment, that had two co-sponsors – one being UNEP, and one

being WMO – so in some ways Mostafa wanted to set up a much narrower thing, and many of

us looked at what we were doing in ozone and said, ‘look, it’s logical that we do something

parallel for climate.’” 3

Having witnessed first-hand how science and scientific advice could be used to legitimise political negotiating positions in the ozone negotiations, this advisory panel seemed a natural choice for Tolba.

As he saw the climate issue developing from one primarily concerned with the science of climate change, to one dealing with the politics of climate change, Tolba was a crucial driving force behind the suggestion for the AGGG’s establishment, which he saw as a means to further the scientific consensus for political action to be taken. He also, subsequently, sought to strengthen the panel, in order to increase scientific input to political negotiations and to position UNEP (his agency) at the crux of another important issue.

Shortly after establishing the AGGG, Tolba was keen to increase the panel’s influence and strengthen its role – to situate the AGGG as the principal source of legitimation in climate negotiations under UNEP’s gambit. At this time his vision was for a small, technocratic science-led panel, which would bring the issue under the rubric of UNEP, because, for Tolba, this had been the key factor in the successful ozone negotiations. A small and select few scientists could come to a

1 Karen T. Litfin, Ozone Discoures, (1994), p. 57 2 Robert Watson, Interview with David Hirst, (13 February 2012), UK 3 Robert Watson, Interview with David Hirst, (13 February 2012), UK

80 consensus, and since they were the “right” scientists they would come to the “right” decision. The panel was established with a view to encouraging “monitoring and research developments […] and

[to] issue statements to governments, international organisations and the public at large regarding the need for particular actions and the options open in response to a potential warming of the global climate.”1 For Tolba and the Villach-II delegates, the AGGG was seen to offer the best means available to reduce the uncertainties still present in climate change while advising governments of the

“right” course of action. In addition, the Villach-II delegates and Tolba saw an important role for the

AGGG in providing a bridging link between the scientists and policymakers. Indeed, through the

AGGG, Tolba sought to integrate UNEP scientists at the heart of climate change policymaking and so develop stronger links between the assessment mechanism and political decision-makers.

Unfortunately for Tolba, several governments viewed the limited size of the AGGG as problematic. Both the size and limited contact between the AGGG and governments was seen as a considerable drawback. Bert Bolin has reflected on the AGGG in unequivocal terms claiming that

“the AGGG was not considered by these actors [WMO and the US] to have the status and composition that would be required of the major issues that were emerging… this was indeed also my own view.”2 Additional concerns centred on the fact the AGGG was populated with independent not governmental scientists. For these reasons, the AGGG was severely underfunded by governments.3

The IPCC’s establishment, effectively a larger, more nationally diverse AGGG – science-driven, but aware of the need to appear politically inclusive – was, to some extent, driven by the specific institutional arrangements of the AGGG. As scientists drove the early political agendas in a particularly technocratic direction, governments – the US administration in particular – grew concerned as the issue appeared to be spiralling out of their control. Crucially, the AGGG appeared to be a UNEP-led vehicle and this was problematic for US government agencies and a wider array of interested organisations. For instance, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Bill Nitze, reflecting on the

AGGG’s position has stated that, “it was pretty clear early on that wasn’t gonna [sic] fly within the

1 WMO, Report of the International Conference on the assessment of the role of carbon dioxide and of other greenhouse gases in climate variations and associated impacts, (Villach, Austria: 1986) 2 Bert Bolin, A History of the Science and Politics of Climate Change (2007), pp. 46-47 3 Shardul Agrawala, “Context and Early Origins of the IPCC” (1994a)

UN, or within the key member governments. Because there was a very important constituency of organisations like NOAA, the Met Office, Hydro-Met in Russia and so on and so forth [that were excluded].”1 Similarly, Michael Oppenheimer, has claimed that the US government got nervous about the activities and recommendations being made by a group of scientists he was involved with:

“…the US government got nervous about scientists running around as policy entrepreneurs,

trying to push something about climate, and they had the, I think they didn’t want an

independent organisation of the sort that A triple G [AGGG] was – that is not a governmental

organisation running around.”2

The context, namely the coincident timing of the ozone negotiations, and the relationships and interactions facilitated at Villach-II provided a fertile ground for the scientists to advocate global political solutions to climate change. In his determination to ensure UNEP had a crucial role to play in the future scientific and political aspects of climate change, Tolba was a central driving force pushing forward the analogous (modelled on ozone) political solutions advocated at Villach-II. This significantly promoted the view that a scientific consensus was essential for making science for policy. Thus, led by Tolba, the Villach-II delegates advocated a highly “scientized” consensus-based approach to decision-making geared towards narrowing the terrain for political debate – focussing in on a global climate convention.

6. Beyond Villach-II: Science, Policy and Science-advocacy

Mostafa Tolba’s efforts at employing the Villach-II meeting to make a political argument through science allowed a loose coalition of scientists to coalesce around their desire to see science integrated at the heart of climate change policy. However, there was subsequently a significant push-back from governments determined to rein in what it considered to be an unrestrained set of scientists advocating unrealistic solutions. These science-policy advocates began to examine on what basis targets to limit

1 William A. Nitze, Interview with David Hirst, (7 March 2012), UK/US 2 Michael Oppenheimer, Interview with David Hirst, (5 December 2011), UK/US

82 the impacts of climate change ought to be set. These policies, building upon the Villach-II

“consensus”, were implicitly embedded within a global framing of the issue and consequently sought to articulate a targets-based global climate convention. These policies, with their focus trained on CO2 emissions, also generated significant negative government attention.

This section will first highlight the AGGG’s failure as a standing scientific advisory panel. It will then examine the subsequent actions taken by scientists in trying to bridge the gap between climate science and the policy they deemed necessary. By focussing on a set of two workshops in

1987, and the extensive connections of their organising committee, I show how important advocacy was in the IPCC’s subsequent establishment. Sharing the common goal of introducing a global climate convention guided by scientific advice, this group spread their message.

6.1 Villach/Bellagio: Unrestrained advocates setting the agenda

Following on from the Villach-II meeting and the establishment of the AGGG, further activities commenced under non-governmental auspices. A driving force behind these activities was a concern, amongst several of these science-policy advocates, that the material impact of the AGGG on the policy process had been, and would continue to be negligible. Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, for example, argues that “the AGGG [did not have] strong enough links to the centres of government to ensure effective government involvement.”1 Moreover, Agrawala argues, from a counterfactual perspective, that the AGGG was inadequate as a basis going forward for international policymaking, as it was far too detached from the centres of government.2 At the time Gordon Goodman, a well- known Welsh ecologist with a history of involvement in international environmental science activities as well the founding director of the Beijer Institute of the Swedish Royal Academy of Sciences (an environmental NGO established in 1977), shared similar concerns. Worried that the small panel was not the most efficacious means of connecting the science and policy on climate change, Goodman

1 Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, “Global Climate Protection Policy: the Limits of Scientific Advice –part 2”, Global Environmental Change, (1994), 4; 3, p. 187 2 Shardul Agrawala, “Context and Early Origins of the IPCC” (1994a)

83 offered an alternative. After the first meeting of the AGGG, Goodman set in motion preparations for a series of workshops designed to elaborate and refine the conclusions of the Villach-II Report.

Goodman was a savvy operator on the international political stage and had been significantly involved in the earlier assessments conducted under the auspices of the WCP. An author of one of the chapters for the SCOPE report, a delegate at the meeting and now one of the ICSU nominations to the

AGGG, Goodman was well placed to facilitate the dissemination of the Villach-II message to governments, international organisations and the wider academic community.1 He decided that organising two workshops, bringing together both scientists and politicians, was the best method for achieving this. He, therefore, invited a number of esteemed scientists to collaborate in organising the workshops, including: Jill Jaeger, who had been involved in editing the earlier SCOPE Report;

Michael Oppenheimer, who was working at the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), an American environmental NGO; George Woodwell, the director of Woods Hole Research Center a private, non- profit research organization focusing on environmental sciences; and, William C. Clark, then working at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, an international interdisciplinary research institute focussing on environmental, economic, technological and social issues. Reflecting on her involvement with the SCOPE assessment and then the Villach/Bellagio meetings Jill Jaeger explained that when

“…Gordon Goodman became one of the ICSU nominees for the Advisory Group on

Greenhouse Gases he approached me [Jaeger] and asked me whether I would support him in

all of that activity. So almost straight after the Villach meeting in ’85, when the advisory

group started up Gordon Goodman, as a member of that group, asked me to help. So, to some

extent, that was because I had been involved in the ’85 activity – I had written a large part of

the synthesis of what came out the background papers – and so it was kind of a natural follow

on, which then meant that I went to the meetings with Gordon.”2

1 Jill Jaeger, Interview with David Hirst, (20 February 2012), UK/Austria 2 Jill Jaeger, Interview with David Hirst, (20 February 2012), UK/Austria

The organisers of the workshops were all non-governmental scientists and unhindered by the constraints of government. However, this independence encouraged a sceptical reception of their findings by politicians. Just as at Villach-II a couple of years earlier, the intentions of the workshop organisers were to provide the scope and opportunity for scientists to make political recommendations. Furthermore, because Goodman was concerned that the workshop might fail, as the

AGGG had, to bridge the gap between the science and policy, he decided to invite politicians alongside scientists to these workshops. Again, reflecting on her involvement in the planning these meetings Jaeger explained that when inviting the participants to the 1987 Villach/Bellagio meetings,

“the attempt was to broaden it out to tackle some of the questions that had obviously come up that needed new people, needed new inputs.”1 The workshops therefore allowed scientists to make recommendations whilst, additionally, making connections with national policymakers.

The first workshop took place between 28 September and 2 October 1987 and was deliberately held in the same location of the earlier Villach-II Conference. At this workshop around

50 scientists met to discuss the science of climate change, and possible options for limiting or adapting to climate change. The second workshop was held from 9 to 13 November 1987 in Bellagio,

Italy at which 29 experts met to examine what policy steps could be taken in the near term in response to the predicted climate changes.

The workshops were explicitly planned as a spin-off from the Villach-II conference. The workshop’s formal report stressed that the “scientific consensus on greenhouse gases and climatic change reached at the conference in Villach-II [...] was the starting point” for their discussions.2

Jettisoning the rhetoric of uncertainty, the workshop organisers wanted the findings to provide an interim bridging mechanism that would provide the answers to policymakers questions in order to,

“trigger the negotiation of [a] convention” at the Second World Climate Conference scheduled for

1990.3 Additionally, the Villach/Bellagio report suggested there was an urgent “need for an agreement on a law of the atmosphere as a global commons or the need to move towards a convention along the

1 Jill Jaeger, Interview with David Hirst, (20 February 2012), UK/Austria 2 Jill Jaeger, (ed.) Developing Policies for Responding to Climatic Change, (1988) 3 Michael Oppenheimer, Interview with David Hirst, (5 December 2011), UK/US

85 lines of that developed for ozone.”1 To do this they began formulating the mechanisms and responsibilities governments ought to adopt.

The workshops at Villach/Bellagio turned the focus onto what the limits to climate change were and what targets would be needed in order to avoid catastrophic climatic change.2 Whereas, previous assessments had been principally associated with assessing the state of climate knowledge, these workshops were specifically addressing how to aid policymakers and in particular develop policies. The workshop organisers felt that “some procedural mechanism […] to guide planning and decision-making” would be needed in order to formulate a strategy for limiting future climatic change.3 This tied in with their ambitions for a global convention. Their ideas for specific targets and timetables were proposed at these workshops as the constituents of the prospective convention, which one of the workshop’s organisers – Michael Oppenheimer – maintains was a novel contribution in an international advisory context.4 The workshops’ organisers accordingly, advanced recommendations for setting environmental targets as a management tool. By targeting a specific rate of temperature or sea level change, it was argued, a corollary emissions target could be set to be used for regulatory purposes. A tentative target rate of warming was set at 0.1°C/decade based on the assumption that ecosystems and societies are less able to adapt to faster changes.

The Villach/Bellagio group set ecological thresholds that were very broad, embedding their research in the prevailing framing of climate change as a future global environmental problem.

Significantly, this side-lined the importance of the local, regional, and specific contexts of climate change impacts, a feature which was subsequently problematic for the Intergovernmental Panel on

Climate Change (IPCC) as the notion of targets and timetables was rejected by both the US and UK governments. These workshops were successful in speaking on behalf of a specific set of environmental scientists. But, the specifically environmental and technical framing of the issue – the

1 Jill Jaeger, (ed.) Developing Policies for Responding to Climatic Change, (1988), p. v 2 Michael Oppenheimer, Interview with David Hirst, (5 December 2011), UK/US 3 Jill Jaeger, (ed.) Developing Policies for Responding to Climatic Change, (1988) 4 Michael Oppenheimer, Interview with David Hirst, (5 December 2011), UK/US

86 highly scientized approach – actually served to disengage many developing countries (as will be discussed further in chapter 4).

In conveying how and when the climate may change in a digestible format, certain features had to be side-lined, and others highlighted. This ultimately reduced climate change down to two essential components – the future global average temperature, and future global average sea level change. Within this global, average framing, emissions responsible for the warming were divorced from their social, political and geographic origins. With neither the geographic origins nor the source of the emissions important, the human impact on climate change was in turn condensed down to a

“global average citizenry”.

Each workshop’s participants were leading policymakers down a specific political pathway without having to make their value commitments explicit – that they were committed to a program specifically targeting the introduction of a global climate treaty by the time of the planned Second

World Climate Conference in 1990. Developing upon the ideas of William Nordhaus1, an economist at Yale University, they were unequivocal that any limitation strategy would involve significant reductions in fossil fuel use. For example, underpinning the rationale for setting environmental targets was the assumption that different rates of change could be more or less socially tolerable.

Significantly, this assumption was a value-judgement, not a scientific argument. Furthermore, by way of seeking to influence policymakers, the Villach/Bellagio experts utilised their scientific credentials and authoritative status as experts on the science of climate change to create an authoritative voice on the politics of climate change. This placed the onus on science to provide a decisive account and basis for decision-makers, leading to excessive calls for objectivity and the assumed power of science to settle political debates.

1 William D. Nordhaus, Efficient Use of Energy Resources, (Yale University Press: London 1979).

6.2 Toronto Conference: Scientists and Politicians mix

The Villach/Bellagio workshops were important as a forum in which scientists continued to articulate and advocate the adoption of a climate convention. But they also created platforms in which scientists could enhance the role of scientists in the decision-making processes. This was further achieved through the extensive connections of the Villach/Bellagio steering committee.

Howard Ferguson’s dual roles as a key member of the Villach/Bellagio committee and as chairman of the Second World Climate Conference allowed him to integrate the Villach/Bellagio findings at this international conference. Ferguson’s connections extended even further enhancing the dissemination of the ideas formulated at Villach/Bellagio. As the Assistant Deputy Minister for the

Canadian Atmospheric Environment Service, Ferguson had responsibility for organising and chairing the Toronto Conference on Atmospheric Pollution in June 1988. 1 In conjunction with his predecessor

Jim Bruce, and Jim McNeill, Secretary General of the World (Brundtland) Commission on

Environment and Development, and the organising committee of the Villach/Bellagio group,

Ferguson was able to incorporate the recommendations from Villach/Bellagio into the conference statement. Jim Bruce has indicated how important some of these informal connections were in disseminating the ideas from the meetings in Villach

“…I had a number of discussions with Jim McNeill who’s another Canadian, who was the

secretary of the Brundtland Commission report and one of the key authors. We had several

discussions about how climate change should be factored into the Brundtland Commission

report.”2

The Toronto conference statement, therefore, echoed the warnings of both the Villach-II meeting and the workshops held in Villach/Bellagio in 1987. Tipping their hat to Roger Revelle and

Hans Suess’ prophetic 1957 pronouncement3, Howard Ferguson and the conference organising

1 The “World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security” took place 27-30 June 1988 in Toronto Canada. 2 David Hirst interview with Jim Bruce, (1 February 2012) UK/Canada 3 In the paper: Revelle, Roger, and Hans E. Suess, “Carbon Dioxide Exchange between Atmosphere and Ocean and the Question of an Increase of Atmospheric CO2 During the Past Decades,” Tellus, 9, (1957), pp. 18-27 the

88 committee warned that “humanity is conducting an unintended, uncontrolled, globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war.”1 With this threat ringing in their ears the Toronto conference delegates endorsed the draft conference statement calling for an international framework convention, with an optimistic initial goal to reduce CO2 emissions by 20% of 1988 levels by 2005 globally.

The Toronto Conference was very much the first headline conference on climate change, attracting both scientists and high-calibre politicians. Although the conference was originally planned to look into more general problems of atmospheric pollution, including acid rain, ozone depletion and climate change, it ultimately became a climate change conference. As it drew heavily on the findings of Villach/Bellagio it therefore provided a platform for the Villach/Bellagio findings to infiltrate further into public and political domains.

In the context of heightened media and public attention the Toronto Conference attracted a mix of scientists, politicians, and several heads of state and was notable for its ambitious recommendations. This centred on calls to governments, the UN and the wider global community to adopt an “international framework convention […] as well as national legislation for protection of the global atmosphere.”2 The conference coincided with several events in 1988 which suddenly brought climate change from the fringes to the forefront of the news agenda. This was especially due to a summer in which North America suffered a long heat wave and drought. Assessing the rise and decline of global warming as a social problem in the late 1980s and early 1990s, sociologist Sheldon

Ungar maintains that, “whether regarded as a warming signal or as a metaphor of a possible future, the weather unleashed a surge of fear that brought concerted attention to the greenhouse effect.”3

Unger argues that the hot weather of 1988 rendered the scientific claims at the Toronto Conference two scientists concluded that "human beings are now carrying out a large scale geophysical experiment of a kind that could not have happened in the past nor be reproduced in the future." 1Various Authors, Conference Statement, “Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security,” (Toronto: 27-30 June, 1988) accessed online: http://www.cmos.ca/ChangingAtmosphere1988e.pdf 13 April 2012 2 Various Authors, Conference Statement, “Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security,” (Toronto: 27-30 June, 1988) accessed online: http://www.cmos.ca/ChangingAtmosphere1988e.pdf 13 April 2012 3 Sheldon Ungar, “The Rise and (Relative) Decline of Global Warming as a Social Problem,” The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Winter, 1992), p. 491

89 more pertinent and urgent. By “piggy-backing” on dramatic real world events climate change was made more “real” for both the public and politicians.

6.3 Scientific Assessments: Who is speaking for the Climate?

The Toronto Conference really represented the peak of the non-governmental scientist’s role and influence in climate policy because counter-actions had already been mounted in response to the earlier vocal calls for a climate convention. Chiefly led by US officials, the pushback on the issue, sought to constrain who could legitimately speak for the climate, when and how. Yet these early forays into policy – at Villach-II, the subsequent workshops and finally at the Toronto Conference – did contribute at least two important and lasting legacies for climate change policy: (i) the continued pursuit of a global treaty on greenhouse gas emissions, and; (ii) a highly scientized, linear approach to policymaking.

The influence of the Villach-II conference and the subsequent workshops lay in the very vocal push for concerted international action, centred on a global convention. This vocal science- policy advocacy behind a global convention limiting CO2 emissions was of particular concern to several US government departments. As the single largest emitter of CO2, the US government had the most to lose if the proposed global convention came into effect mandating emissions cuts. So, during the preparations for the Villach/Bellagio workshops, Michael Oppenheimer, a US environmental scientist and key member of the steering committee, received a letter from the deputy undersecretary of state warning him that the US Government was concerned about the activities of the private group of policy entrepreneurs that he was part of.1 Jill Jaeger, another member of the steering committee, in an interview with me, explained that between 1985 and 1987 there was significant political pressure being put on UNEP and WMO to set up an intergovernmental panel because

1 Michael Oppenheimer, Interview with David Hirst, (5 December 2011) UK/US

“…the US Department of State decided that this was getting out of hand and a group of

eminent scientists, a group of loose cannons was out potentially setting the agenda, when the

government wanted to be setting the agenda.” 1

Concerned both by the fact that they were setting the agenda, but also the agenda they had set, the US government in early in 1987 began to lobby behind the scenes for a new intergovernmental assessment which could supersede the work of non-governmental scientists, as it would have the official and legitimate stamp of governments on it.

The ways in which the US strategically engaged with this group of scientists and their international sponsors – UNEP, the WMO and ICSU – will be explored in greater detail in the next chapter. Suffice to say, the notion of a group of out of control scientists setting the agenda –“loose cannons”2 – was of concern to various agencies in the US government. This concern was a contributing factor to the suggestion for a new intergovernmental assessment of the science, impacts and response strategies of climate change, which ultimately led to the formation of the IPCC.

The scientific assessment at Villach-II had provided the necessary grounding for these scientists to advocate the adoption of policies and mechanisms for limiting or adapting to climate change. But it was not sufficient to compel policymakers to implement the recommendations for global climate convention. As Peter Haas reminds us “even when scientists think they have developed truths for power, power appears disinterested at best, and possibly even uninterested.”3 For several reasons the route from scientific facts to political action is often circuitous at best. Policymakers may suspect any form of scientific consensus because the scientists themselves are part of a broader cultural discourse, and thus lack autonomy or independence. Science may not be sufficiently simple for the needs of policymakers or it may provide advice that is out of sync with the political plans of decision-makers or parliaments, and thus be dismissed. During this chapter I have demonstrated that while the scientists may have been credible scientifically, they were not politically legitimate as

1 Jill Jaeger, Interview with David Hirst, (20 February 2012) UK/Austria 2 Jill Jaeger, Interview with David Hirst, (20 February 2012) UK/Austria 3 Peter M. Haas, “When does power listen to truth? A constructivist approach to the policy process”, Journal of European Public Policy, 11:4, (August 2004), p. 570

91 evidenced by the failure of the AGGG and the lack of policy action after so many workshops, assessments and conferences. Thus, as I will show in chapter 3, US Government agencies consciously countered the policies recommended by the science-policy advocates at Villach-II, the

Villach/Bellagio workshops and the Toronto Conference, as they suspected the agenda’s of certain key actors involved.

In articulating a limited range of policy options based on the implementation of a global climate convention the Villach/Bellagio steering committee (and to a lesser extent the Villach-II delegates) closely resemble Pielke’s description of “stealth issue advocates.”1 There was a clear preference for specific kinds of policies, based on the implicit value judgements of the scientists involved. Jim Bruce, for instance considered the key issue at Villach-II to have been the need to future proof infrastructural problems. He was particularly concerned that projects were going ahead based on the assumption that past climate was a reliable guide to the future, reflecting on the Villach

Conference statement, Bruce has explained

“…the key issue that I was kind of worried about was that we’re going ahead – or in ’85 – we

were going ahead merrily designing all kinds of things, buildings and floodways and pipelines

and whatnot; on the assumption that the past climate was a reliable guide to the future. It had

to be said that this was no longer a very good assumption, and some adjustment to past

climate data was necessary if you were gonna [sic] design effectively for the future.” 2

These science-policy advocates successfully articulated a vision of the future that required global intervention from a climate convention. In constructing the evidence to reflect these concerns they were able to support policies to initiate a global convention.

In addition to resembling Pielke’s “stealth issue advocates”, as a by-product these science- policy advocates also significantly left a legacy that has subsequently shaped the IPCC’s processes.

The science-policy advocates were motivated by the coincident ozone negotiations whose success inspired their linear approach to policymaking. This linear approach has subsequently been embedded

1 Roger A. Pielke Jr., The Honest Broker, (2007), p. 4 2 James P. Bruce, Interview with David Hirst, (1 February 2012), UK/Canada

92 in the IPCC, setting the frame and determining certain modes of action. The push towards science determining policy has ultimately led the IPCC towards more conservative, (specifically) consensus- based statements.

In the history of climate change running from the 1985 Villach-II assessment through to the establishment of the IPCC in 1988, there was a concerted push from the international scientific community for a global convention on climate change. Although they were unsuccessful in directly realising their ambitions in the timetable set out, they did frame the politics of climate change in global terms which subsequently filtered the terms of the debate. They strongly backed a “scientized” formulation of the policymaking process and framed the issue in ways which restricted the terms of the political debate. By spreading their definition of the problem of climate change in the various locations – conferences, UN commissions, and government departments – they set the political agenda with specific terms of reference.

7. Conclusion

This chapter set out to establish the foundations from which political concerns over climate change emerged. As such the focus of this chapter has been trained on the international assessments conducted under the auspices of the WCP, which have already been identified as significant departure points in connecting the science and policy on climate change.1 Earlier accounts have focussed on

Villach-II in order to explain the emergent political salience of climate change. In contrast, in this chapter, my focus has been trained on where the political advocacy exhibited at Villach-II originated in addition to how this advocacy shaped the meeting’s scientific and political legacy, influencing subsequent climate change discourse. This expanded focus has necessarily involved a re-examination of earlier assessments – specifically the SCOPE assessment – as well as subsequent assessments, workshops and conference proceedings. In this regard, I have argued that Villach-II’s key scientific

1 Fred Pearce, “Histories: The week the climate changed” ( 2005); Wendy E. Franz, “The Development of an International Agenda for Climate Change” (1997); Shardul Agrawala, “Context and Early Origins of the IPCC” (1994a)

93 and political legacy has been the ways in which the scientists involved contributed to a scientized politics of climate change.

In contrast to the Villach-I meeting where scientists merely asked for money to do more research, at Villach-II, several factors came together to produce a fertile environment in which scientists felt able, indeed, compelled to make political recommendations. Firstly, the UNEP/ICSU commissioned SCOPE report was important in providing a scientific grounding for this advocacy.

The SCOPE report’s overall message argued that action was merited in spite of the continuing scientific uncertainty. The SCOPE assessment, notably, illustrated the relative stability in uncertainty.

Thus by 1985, at the Villach-II meeting, delegates were presented with several scientifically credible assessments that were uncertain over the magnitude of warming, but in agreement that there would indeed be change. The consistency in uncertainty across assessments actually allowed the delegates at

Villach-II to point to a consensus in the direction of change, if not the exact magnitude. For instance, while the SCOPE report cautioned that, “there [had] been substantial disagreement among previous studies regarding recommendations for future action” it was itself unequivocal that climate change was sufficiently probable as to require “thoughtful consideration of options and policies for avoiding long-term adverse consequences.”1 Therefore, the scientists invited to Villach-II – as individuals, not governmental representatives – had a scientifically credible document which crucially described climate change as being sufficiently probable as to require political action.

Secondly, the Villach-II meeting also coincided with the Vienna Convention on Ozone

Depleting Chemicals opening up to signatories (March- September), till then Tolba’s greatest success as UNEP’s executive director. Seeking to replicate the ozone success, Tolba and the Villach-II delegates carried over many of the same approaches into their early forays in international climate change policymaking. This was a significant factor for the subsequent types of policy recommended and the methods and approaches advocated towards implementing climate change policy. Thus, the scientists at Villach-II advocated political actions based on a highly scientized technocratic approach to policymaking, in which they sought to emphasise the scientific consensus.

1 SCOPE, The Greenhouse Effect, Climatic Change and Ecosystems (1986)

Crucially, going forward, a group of loosely associated scientists and international administrators took the Villach-II conference conclusions as a basis for developing policies for responding to climatic change. They framed the issue in terms of how to establish a global convention, specifically addressing approaches based on environmental targets and the concomitant timetables. As I will demonstrate further in the following chapters of this thesis, the enduring legacy of the Villach-II meeting and subsequent workshops has been the framing of the problem and solution of climate change. Resembling Pielke’s description of “stealth issue advocates”1 I have argued that the science-policy advocates, disseminating and building upon the Villach-II recommendations, narrowed the scope of policies available to decision-makers. In addition to supporting implementation of a global convention, they also left a legacy which has famed and shaped the IPCC’s processes. This contributed to shaping the methods of international policymaking on climate change, both in emphasising the importance of scientific assessments and in elevating the importance of consensus statements in supporting policymaking.

The methodological and disciplinary framing of climate change, in physical scientific terms at

Villach-I, Villach-II and beyond (such as global average temperature and global average sea-level rise) invited discussion of particular solutions. Daniel Sarewitz’s observation that environmental controversies are often made worse by science draws upon the plurality and diversity of scientific framings and perspectives on an issue. And whilst climate change in 1985 was not the hot-button topic of the 21st century, Sarewitz’s argument that science can legitimate politically opposite positions: “for a given value-based position […] it is often possible to compile s a supporting set of scientifically legitimated facts” highlights just how significant this initial framing of climate change has been.2

What has this meant for the history of the IPCC’s development? By the time politicians became aware of climate change they were presented with a limited scope of solutions. Scientists had effectively narrowed the issue to key physical environmental targets. Governments were, therefore,

1 Roger A. Pielke Jr., The Honest Broker, (2007), p. 4 2 Daniel Sarewitz, “How science makes environmental controversies worse” (2004), p. 389.

95 being asked whether or not countries should pursue the initiation of a global convention on climate change shutting down other possible ways of approaching the management and adaption to the climate change predicted. The highly scientized consensus-based approach to decision-making opened up the possibility for US policymakers to utilise further assessment as a means of controlling the politics. Tolba wanted science and technical expertise to lead every decision on climate change and the establishment of the AGGG was intended to fulfil his pursuit of this technocratic approach on climate change. Instead the AGGG was underfunded and deemed inadequate for the job.

Nevertheless, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter, the ways in which the Villach/Bellagio group had framed the terms of the debate contributed significantly towards the establishment of the IPCC, a scientific panel established to produce another assessment of the issue, reporting by consensus.

Chapter 3 – Negotiating an ‘Intergovernmental Assessment

Mechanism’

1. Introduction

In 1986, UNEP Executive Director Mostafa Tolba wrote to the US Secretary of State George Schultz

“urging the U.S. to take appropriate policy actions.”1 Accompanied with a copy of the Villach-II

Conference report, the implication was clear. Tolba wanted the US to support his ambitious calls for the implementation of a global climate convention. Upon receipt of this letter, Schultz forwarded it to the US National Climate Program Office (NCPO) seeking a suitable response. Accordingly, the contents of the letter, and the accompanying report were discussed at the interagency National

Climate Program Policy Board. It was during these discussions that US officials decided it prudent to pursue the establishment of an Intergovernmental Assessment Mechanism. The eventual agreement reached to press for this, specifically intergovernmental mechanism, reflected the suspicions and outright hostility the US Department of Energy (DoE) had for the findings of the 1985 Villach-II meeting. The DoE had commissioned its own assessment of the issue, just three years earlier, which significantly downplayed the consequences posed by climate change. Therefore, in this chapter I will show that, in calling for a new assessment, the US authorities were seeking to open up the “black- box” of the negotiated consensus from these previous meetings. The US strategy, I examine in this chapter, was part of a concerted effort to block, delay and hinder the momentum driving towards a global convention on climate change.

As we saw in the previous chapter, a network of science-policy advocates, inspired by the successfully negotiated Ozone Convention, had begun to ‘sound the alarm’ on the threat posed by climate change. Having negotiated a consensus statement, which significantly framed the political dimension of the problem in terms of the need or otherwise of a global convention, this vocal and well-connected group had clear ambitions for a small science-led group taking a highly technocratic

1 Alan Hecht, Interview with David Hirst, (19 July 2012), UK/US

97 approach to international climate change policymaking. The response to this advocacy in certain spheres of the US government, Michael Oppenheimer argues, provided the impetus which drove the formation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).1 Oppenheimer who was involved in the discussions is correct in one sense, and in this chapter I show how the IPCC was a product of the US government’s attempts to re-establish some sort of government control over an assessment process it considered unpalatable, specifically in the calls for a global climate convention along the lines of the ozone convention. However, it was considerably more complicated than this apparently linear story. As I will also show that while the science-policy advocates were principally responsible for increasing US attempts to take control of the issue, it was primarily the activism and advocacy of UNEP’s Executive Director Mostafa Tolba which forced the issue onto the political agenda of the US government. In fact, the decision to establish something akin to the IPCC was taken by US policymakers in 1986 as a result of Tolba’s activism and advocacy.

The subsequent actions of Oppenheimer (and others), outlined in chapter 2, accentuated the concerns of US policymakers. As a result in 1987, the Deputy Under-Secretary of State Bill Nitze warned Oppenheimer that several government departments were becoming increasingly concerned by the power wielded by this group of science-policy advocates. Specific concerns that scientists were setting the agenda led the US government to intensify its efforts to bring the issue securely under governmental auspices. What this shows is that the IPCC, while principally seen as a scientific body by much of the media at the time2, was in fact explicitly political from the outset, principally because of the influence the US administration exercised in its establishment.

The decision to begin an intergovernmental assessment was a novel approach to scientific assessments, insofar as it represented an explicit marriage of the scientific and political streams. The previous assessments of climate change had been conducted under either non-governmental auspices or by international organisations – the Villach-II assessment discussed in the last chapter was funded

1 Michael Oppenheimer, “Developing Policies for Responding to Climatic Change,” Climatic Change, 15; 1-2, (1989), p. 3 2 For instance: “Dr Houghton, speaking for the world's 300 leading atmospheric scientists” in Michael McCarthy, “Talks next month on global warming pact” Guardian (31 August 1990); John Mitchell, “the main body of scientific opinion, the IPCC.'” in Paul Brown “Vested Interests accused of greenhouse conspiracy” Guardian (13 August 1990).

98 and organised by the WMO, UNEP and ICSU. These organisations took the decision to conduct the

Villach-II assessment, not the governments that sponsored their activities through the UN. Similarly, the Villach/Bellagio workshops Oppenheimer believed to have been instrumental in driving the formation of the IPCC had been arranged and funded by the Beijer Institute, an environmental NGO.

This chapter details both how and why the US government contributed to the creation of the

IPCC, with a specific emphasis on its intergovernmental structure. By sketching out the back and forth proposals and counter proposals that eventually culminated in the June 1988 WMO Resolution establishing the IPCC, I will reveal how US policymakers saw the Panel as an opportunity to control or halt movement towards what they saw as the unpalatable prospect of a global convention. By making the assessment intergovernmental, the US government immediately enhanced the Panel’s stature, importance and centrality to the process. I suggest that US officials believed that by retaining a significant presence in the IPCC they could cede authority to the Panel whilst also being able to control the Panel’s outcomes. Accordingly, the IPCC became the conduit through which US policymakers pushed the scientific and policy questions on climate change.

Finally, the ways in which the US pushed scientific assessment to the heart of the politics of climate change imparted a linear approach to policymaking within the IPCC: Assessment would precede and lead the policymaking. In this view, more science meant better policy. By controlling what expertise was considered credible within the IPCC, US officials were consciously positioning the Panel to present a specifically Western picture of climate change. This meant climate change was to be understood as a technical problem, rather than an issue of social justice, wealth re-distribution or ethics. The Western framing positioned climate change as a global and near uniform threat (risk) based on a scientific, technical reading of increasing emissions; it did not examine the local, contextual readings of climate change and the embedded cultural underpinnings of the diverse understanding of weather, climate and variability. In order to legitimate this picture, there were tokenistic attempts of making the Panel represent a ‘whole world’ view on climate change. As such, a key theme, which will emerge further in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, concerns the attempts at gaining governmental assent of several developing countries through the IPCC assessment’s

“objective” scientific credibility: the IPCC did not present a ‘view from nowhere’, rather it was presented as representing the view from everywhere.1

In this chapter, I will also challenge conventional accounts of the establishment of the IPCC.

In these conventional accounts, the IPCC is set up as a result of a perfect storm of events in the summer of 1988. In the context of a drought-ridden summer in North America, the Toronto

Conference on the Changing Atmosphere in June 1988 combined with the infamous US Senate hearings a couple of days earlier, in which NASA scientist Jim Hansen testified that he was 99% sure that the climate was changing, driving climate change up the media and political agenda. However, I will show the proposal for an intergovernmental mechanism was first discussed in an intergovernmental context a year earlier at the WMO Congress in May 1987. It was also heavily influenced by US State Department officials, reflecting the fact that the US government was most concerned by the political implications of ceding authority to the experts who had been setting the agenda.

2. A New Mechanism to Assess the Issue

The 1985 Villach-II Conference – jointly sponsored by the WMO, UNEP and ICSU – produced the most politically minded scientific assessment to that point. The delegates specifically advocated immediate action to implement a global convention, along technocratic managerial lines. However, this alone was insufficient to effect any material policy changes, because climate change remained a fringe issue politically. There was little or no awareness of climate change beyond the academe and specialist climate modelling centres. Moreover, the material outcomes from the Villach assessment – namely, the creation of the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG) – did not have the status or composition to foster closer links with governments, nor the means available to do so. Nevertheless, within a three year period, the IPCC had been established, creating a new assessment mechanism with explicit and extensive links with policymakers. I will show that this is because US officials from the

1 Steven Shapin, “Placing the view from nowhere: historical and sociological problems in the location of science”, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 23; 1, (1998), pp. 5-12.

100

DoE effectively rejected the findings of the Villach-II assessment and, in turn, favoured the idea of a new intergovernmental assessment mechanism.

In 1985, the Villach-II delegates took inspiration from the heightened concerns over global environmental issues, and for the first time actively warned the public and government agencies. The scientists stated that they were concerned that the predicted climate change would occur a lot quicker than previously thought – within a single lifetime. Moreover, freed from national constraints and restrictive national policy perspectives, they readily endorsed the idea of a global convention on greenhouse gases, alongside the establishment of a scientific panel conducting regular assessments.

As outlined in the previous chapter, this advocacy was novel, moving on from the “more money, more research mantra” of earlier assessments. But it was not until Mostafa Tolba stepped in that the

Villach-II recommendations made their way to national policymakers, who were until this stage either unaware of climate change or still considered it to be a minor issue, with little or no immediate threat.

Mostafa Tolba was intimately connected to international environmental issues through his long association with UNEP. Indeed, after the Villach-II Conference, he had very clear ambitions for his small technocratic science panel, the AGGG, which he envisioned as advising policymakers on the details and specifics of a global convention. So, shortly after the publication of the Villach-II

Conference report in 1986, Tolba sought to raise the status of the climate change issue. To do this he targeted US policymakers. In addition to being one of the two global superpowers, and hence an influential participant in the UN, the US was the single largest emitter of greenhouse gas emissions

(GHGs). Thus, Tolba felt it necessary to enrol the US at an early stage. Following the 1986 publication of the conference Villach-II report, Tolba wrote to US Secretary of State George Schultz

“urging the U.S. to take appropriate policy actions.”1 As outlined in the introduction, upon receiving the letter, Schultz forwarded it to the US National Climate Program Office (NCPO), seeking a suitable response. Its director, Alan Hecht, took Tolba’s letter to the interagency National Climate Program

1 Alan Hecht, Interview with David Hirst, (19 July 2012), UK/US

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Policy Board, where the content of the letter was debated.1 In the course of these discussions, the idea of another, different type of scientific assessment on climate change was put forward.

In contrast to the earlier assessments, held under the auspices of the World Climate Program in Villach in 1980 and 1985, the NCP Policy Board, ultimately, came to the conclusion that the new assessment process should be intergovernmental. There were two principal reasons for this decision.

First, was the dissatisfaction of representatives of the Department of Energy (DoE) that the Villach-II meeting had been beyond the oversight of government, consistent with Tolba’s intentions. DoE concerns were further exacerbated by the establishment of the AGGG, reporting directly to the WMO,

UNEP and ICSU and not governments, with no means of establishing any form of meaningful governmental oversight. Second, US policymakers were fundamentally suspicious of international laws and norms and, as such, displayed significant animosity to UNEP. This was particularly evident during the Reagan administration where Pamela Chasek shows there was a notable turn away from support for international environmental policy as the administration became “determinedly anti- multilateralist and did not consider the United Nations a useful forum for negotiations.”2 Thus, because of the US government’s overwhelming distrust of UNEP, both the AGGG and the Villach-II

Report – with ties to UNEP – were viewed unfavourably. Furthermore, for the majority of the US federal agencies represented on the NCP Policy Board, the economic argument for a global convention had not been made strongly enough to support costly actions.3 Alan Hecht has explained how DoE officials argued that the report was a UNEP document and “if governments are going to call for a convention, the governments have to produce their report, not groups of scientists.”4

The stance adopted by the DoE was noticeably framed by a climate assessment they had commissioned earlier in 1983, titled Changing Climate.5 This report, produced by the National

Academy of Sciences (NAS), was conducted with governmental oversight and was, therefore, viewed as having greater legitimacy than the Villach-II report. Moreover, Changing Climate, chaired by

1 Alan Hecht, Interview with David Hirst, (19 July 2012), UK/US 2 Pamela Chasek, “U.S. policy in the UN environmental arena” (2007), p. 374 3 Alan Hecht, Interview with David Hirst, (19 July 2012), UK/US 4 Alan Hecht, Interview with David Hirst, (19 July 2012), UK/US 5 National Academy of Sciences, Changing Climate, Report of the Carbon Dioxide Assessment Committee, (National Academy Press: Washington DC, 1983)

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William A. Nierenberg director of the Scripps Institute of Oceanography, found in the “CO2 issue reason for concern, but not panic.” This finding significantly contradicted the Villach-II report, which was overtly advocating movement towards a global convention and emissions controls. Therefore, the

DoE were in possession of a report they viewed as more credible which suggested that that any action was premature. Instead, the Changing Climate report recommended “[more] research, monitoring, vigilance, and an open mind.”1 This in fact reiterated the message from the first Villach assessment in

1980.

The findings of the NAS Changing Climate report framed the climate change issue for the

DoE in specifically economic terms, rather than scientific. Naomi Oreskes et al argue that this report was an orchestrated attempt by its chairman William Nierenberg to reframe the climate change issue,

“challenging the emerging consensus view on global warming.”2 Oreskes et al argue that the inclusion of two economists, William Nordhaus Professor of Economics at Yale, and Thomas Schelling

Professor of Economics at Harvard, on the committee offered a means of reframing the problem “not as a matter of climate change per se, but as a matter of the human capacity to adapt to change when it came.”3 Oreskes et al also go on to suggest that this 1983 report was arguably responsible for launching the “debate” surrounding climate change.4 Nierenberg, in particular, is identified by

Oreskes and Erik Conway, as one of a triumvirate of scientists – they refer to as “Merchants of

Doubt” – with extensive links to the George C. Marshall Institute, responsible for questioning the underlying scientific consensus on climate change for politically motivated reasons.5

Rather than step into this debate, about the claims and counter claims of scientific support for climate change,6 my focus is instead on how this report, and its economic arguments, influenced the

1 NAS, Changing Climate, (1983) p. 61 2 Naomi Oreskes, Erik M. Conway & Matthew Shindell , “From Chicken Little to Dr. Pangloss: William Nierenberg, Global Warming, and the Social Deconstruction of Scientific Knowledge,” Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences, Vol. 38; 1, (2008), p. 113 3 Naomi Oreskes et al., “From Chicken Little to Dr. Pangloss,” (2008), p. 109 4 Naomi Oreskes et al., “From Chicken Little to Dr. Pangloss,” (2008); Naomi Oreskes & Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming, (Bloomsbury Press: London, 2010), pp. 174-183 5 Naomi Oreskes & Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt, (2010) 6 Nicholas Nierenberg, son of William Nierenberg, has argued against Naomi Oreske et al’s interpretation in “From Chicken Little to Dr. Pangloss,” in: Nicholas Nierenberg, Walter R. Tschinkel, & Victoria J. Tschinkel,

103 reception of the Villach-II Report by DoE representatives, and how this in turn shaped the US policy to support an intergovernmental approach. The Villach-II Report, based on the discussions at the conference and the background document edited by Bert Bolin under the auspices of the Scientific

Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE), represented a consensus view of the physical sciences.1 The Villach-II report, thus, dealt with when and how much climate change would happen, concluding that actions ought to begin imminently. Conversely, the Changing Climate Report, commissioned by the DoE, made economic arguments which countered the urgency and implicit calls for action made by the Villach-II report. Oreskes and Conway claim the principal message to emanate from the Changing Climate report – more research, less haste – was orchestrated deliberately by

Nierenberg and the economists at the behest of DoE officials.2 The effect of which meant that DoE officials had scientific arguments suggesting that climate change would happen, and economic arguments downplaying the consequences. Thus, suggesting that the changes predicted could be effectively managed, limited or adapted to.

Through a combination of the contrasting findings and questions over the legitimacy of the international Villach-II assessment, the DoE advanced the proposition of a new intergovernmental assessment, which would bring the issue back into the hands of governments. Scientists would still be involved in the assessment process, but their views would have to be signed off by government officials, thus constraining the scope for the kind of policy advocacy exhibited at Villach-II. Indeed the executive summary to the Changing Climate report stated that:

“We do not believe […] that the evidence at hand about CO2-induced climate change would

support steps to change current fuel-use patterns away from fossil fuels. Such steps may be

necessary or desirable at some time in the future, and we should certainly think carefully

“Early Climate Change Consensus at the National Academy: The Origins and Making of Changing Climate,” Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences, Vol. 40; 3, (2010), pp. 318-349 1 WMO, Report of the International Conference on the assessment of the role of carbon dioxide and of other greenhouse gases in climate variations and associated impacts, (Villach, Austria: 1986) 2 Naomi Oreskes & Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt, (2010), p. 182

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about costs and benefits of such steps; but the very near future would be better spent

improving our knowledge […] than in changing fuel mix or use.”1

Two points in this statement appear to have resonated with the DoE representatives when discussing the Villach-II report, during the NCP Policy Board meeting. Firstly, the economic argument for changes to be made to carbon dioxide emissions had not yet been made. Secondly, time and resources would be better spent on improving knowledge of processes contributing to the creation of GHGs.

The political economy of climate change is at the crux of the first point. In the report economists estimated the costs of tackling climate change, but did not challenge the underlying system supporting the economy. This particular framing of climate change crucially allowed the report’s authors to ignore climate risks, ethical questions of responsibility and the disparate unknown impacts. Rather they could focus on climate change as a hindrance to economic progress. This meant that there was no room for a precautionary approach to climate policymaking. Vladimir Jankovic and

Andrew Bowman have highlighted how throughout the 1990s onwards justifications for action on climate have been market-driven. In this framing the climate threat is made redundant as climate change becomes an opportunity for economic opportunity.2 Likewise, Max Boykoff, David Frame and

Sam Randalls show in their article examining the science and economics of climate stabilization, that cost benefit framings can be reductive in the solutions they proffer.3 Boykoff et al, for instance, show by relying climate stabilization, economic cost benefit framing has prematurely fixed international policies on mitigation, as opposed to adaptation.4 The economic focus on climate change in this report ultimately reified the status quo as it allowed different questions of cost, benefit and possible opportunity to be posed, as opposed to climate risk. Thus the report’s conclusions are a reflection of the economic questions asked.

1 NAS, Changing Climate, (1983) p. 4 2 Vladimir Jankovic and Andrew Bowman, “After the green gold rush: the construction of climate change as a market transition” Economy and Society 43; 2, (2014), pp. 233-259. 3 Maxwell T. Boykoff, David Frame and Samuel Randalls, “Discursive stability meets climate instability: A critical exploration of the concept of ‘climate stabilization’ in contemporary climate policy” Global Environmental Change, 20 (2010), pp. 53-64. 4 Maxwell T. Boykoff, et al, “Discursive stability meets climate instability” (2010), pp. 53-64.

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The second point is reflected in Alan Hecht and Dennis Tirpaks’s claims that the DoE representatives saw the creation of a new intergovernmental assessment mechanism as a means of buying time before engaging the policy implications.1 An intergovernmental assessment thus offered the DoE an opportunity to intervene against a move towards a global convention, whilst, crucially, it also made the US government appear to be taking a proactive approach. The assessment also prevented the issue being apprehended any further by the science-policy advocates and international administrators such as Tolba. In particular, the DoE representatives were looking to reduce UNEP’s influence as it was seen that their priorities did not align with US concerns. Specifically, UNEP was perceived as committed to enhancing the economy of developing countries through environmental issues. This proposition then was about buying time on the issue, appearing positively proactive and constraining UNEP’s influence.

The DoE were not the only US governmental agency that wanted a new intergovernmental assessment. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), agreed with the DoE on the need for a new intergovernmental assessment. However, the EPA had radically different reasons for supporting an intergovernmental assessment. In contrast to the hostility with which the DoE received the Villach-II findings, the EPA enthusiastically endorsed the Villach-II findings. Like the DoE, the EPA had also commissioned its own report – titled Can We Delay a Greenhouse Warming?2 – published in 1983, which evaluated the scale and dimension of the climate problem. In contrast to the Changing Climate report, the EPA report suggested there was a pressing need for action to combat the threat posed by climate change. The authors of the Can We Delay a Greenhouse Warming? report found that “global greenhouse warming was neither trivial nor just a long-term problem.”3 The Villach-II findings reinforced the conclusions of the EPA Report and validated the recommendation for a global convention. Consequently, representatives of the EPA in these NCP Policy board discussions agreed to the DoE proposal for a new intergovernmental assessment mechanism, not to delay movement towards a global convention on climate change, but because they saw in it the next logical step

1 Alan D. Hecht & Dennis Tirpak, “Framework Agreement on Climate Change” (1995), p. 381 2 Stephen Seidel and Dale Keyes, Can We Delay a Greenhouse Warming? The Effectiveness and Feasibility of Options to Slow a Build-up of Carbon Dioxide in the Atmosphere, (Environmental Protection Agency: 1983) 3 Stephen Seidel and Dale Keyes, Can We Delay a Greenhouse Warming?

106 towards their desired ends of a global convention.1 By involving wider international participation in the processes, EPA officials considered the intergovernmental aspect of the assessment to have been as important as the DoE for different reasons. What this shows, is that the proposal for an intergovernmental assessment was supported by two seemingly opposed government departments.

While the DoE wanted to hinder environmental regulatory actions, the EPA wanted to promote their implementation. Their divergent reasoning, however, converged on the proposal for an intergovernmental assessment as it simultaneously ameliorated both sets of concerns. Alan Hecht’s recollections of this period, while he was Director of the National Climate Programme, clearly draw out the divergent priorities of the EPA and DoE:

“In this period in the ‘80s, DOE – Department of Energy – was probably the strongest leader

on climate change and in 1986 they prepared four state of the art reports on the greenhouse

effect and climate change, but they made no policy recommendations in general. EPA, at the

same time, was far more aggressive and wanted to see more action on climate change and

they pushed very hard to try and get political attention.

“In addition to having a representative of each federal agency, as part of my operational

activities day-to-day, we had a policy level advisory board of different agencies, of all the

agencies and they met maybe once or twice a year and they were the ones that really would

help shape overall policy. But it was during this period with DOE largely being a dominant

player, not a lot of political support out of the White House, and that didn’t change a little bit,

but it trigged a lot of action once the Villach meeting occurred and the subsequent letter to me

or to the Secretary of State from Mustafa Talba of UNEP at that time.”2

There were two opposing viewpoints coming out of US agencies uniting on the same proposal, a new intergovernmental assessment mechanism, as it offered two separate and distinct possibilities at the same time. The DoE saw the intergovernmental mechanism as a delaying tactic, buying time before engaging in serious policy decisions. Meanwhile, the wider international

1 It is unclear exactly why the DoE ignored these conclusions. But, it seems likely the divergent priorities of the two organisations – energy vs. environment – go much of the way in explaining this. 2 Alan Hecht, Interview with David Hirst, (19 July 2012), UK/US

107 participation mandated by an intergovernmental assessment also convinced the EPA that a global convention was one step closer. So, for the EPA, the proposal offered a future in which prospective political negotiations would have the necessary robust scientific foundations. Yet, the specifically intergovernmental status of the proposal gave the DoE the scope to select the “right” government experts. Thus, the intergovernmental proposal simultaneously ameliorated DoE concerns and offered hope to the EPA.

The strategic engagement with climate change within the NCP Policy Board, as outlined, more broadly highlights the two faces of US engagement with the science and politics of climate change through the 1980s. In her account of US policy in the UN environmental arena through this period, Pamela Chasek similarly notes that the US has acted as both powerful laggard and constructive leader on international environmental issues.1 Chasek goes on to emphasise that throughout the 1980s and 1990s the US became increasingly obstructive.2 This, Chasek argues, was a result of the environmental agenda shifting away from environmental quality issues towards questions of economic and social development. It also supports my argument that the DoE’s obstructionist tactics, which led them to support an intergovernmental assessment, were in fact rooted in economic, not scientific or environmental terms. In combination with the prevailing free-market politics of the

Reagan administration in the 1980s, the US government was vehemently opposed to international regulatory requirements. The NCP Policy Board decision to push for a new intergovernmental assessment was evidently, at least partially, an attempt to block the path towards international regulation in the form of a global convention.

The DoE were instrumental in introducing the intergovernmental caveat to the proposed assessment mechanism. This was an attempt to control the movement towards the global convention.

The DoE could not prevent the internationalisation of environmental policymaking, but it could suggest it be intergovernmental, and by virtue of being the most powerful government agency on the issue they would by default be in control. Through an intergovernmental mechanism, the DoE sought

1 Pamela Chasek, “U.S. policy in the UN environmental arena” (2007), p. 364 2 Pamela Chasek, “U.S. policy in the UN environmental arena” (2007), p. 382

108 to recreate the structures that led to the 1983 Nirenberg report. The DoE envisioned that this would allow them to direct the assessment and hence control the outcomes as Oreskes and Conway show they had done the report in 1983.1 The ultimate objective, therefore, for the DoE was to see the US government assume responsibility for assessing the need for action, in the process reining in the activities of a group of science-policy advocates as articulated in the previous chapter. Specifically, these attempts were intended to constrain UNEP’s growing influence within the emerging politics of climate change.

As a consequence of the widening international participation mandated by the intergovernmental structures, the State Department became much more heavily involved in the climate change issue at the same time. On climate change, the State Department was politically positioned in between the two poles of the DoE and EPA. Conscious of the need for politically feasible outcomes, the State Department did not anticipate negotiations of a climate convention starting imminently, but wanted to be prepared. At this time, Deputy Under-Secretary of State Bill

Nitze felt, that with climate change becoming increasingly political, the State Department had to take a proactive position.2 So, as the agency responsible for international affairs, the first step was for the

State Department to begin lobbying to have the proposal for an intergovernmental assessment included at the forthcoming World Meteorological Congress of May 1987. The State Department were lobbying because a proposal made domestically, even in the US – the hegemonic political and economic global superpower – would not suffice to establish an intergovernmental global assessment.

What can be seen in the decision by the US to actively negotiate an international policy position is their eagerness to take a leadership position. Clearly, there were contrasting reasons for wanting to take this leading role. On the one hand, the DoE wanted to manage and halt the momentum being generated towards a global convention by an international scientific community. By contrast, the EPA, mindful of the environmental protection angle of the issue, thought that a global convention could be achieved through a widening of the base of international participation mandated by an intergovernmental assessment. Furthermore, the State Department were obliged to make the necessary

1 Naomi Oreskes & Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt, (2010), p. 182 2 William A. Nitze, Interview with David Hirst, (7 March 2012), UK/US

109 contingency plans for an issue with an increasing international political presence. It can be clearly seen that the initial spur to action in the US domestic context was Tolba’s 1986 letter to US Secretary of State George Schultz.

However, the proposals made for an intergovernmental assessment mechanism differed considerably from Tolba’s ambitions. He had envisioned a small technocratic panel reporting directly to UNEP and the WMO. Whereas, the US backed plan proposed greater scientific involvement, but strictly on the terms outlined by governments. By reducing the influence of UNEP and the science- policy advocates, it was hoped the intergovernmental assessment would also offer greater integration governmental involvement with the issue. In the next section I examine how these different ambitions converged in the establishment of the IPCC.

3. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: from concept to reality

Following on from the domestic interagency discussions, the State Department, the NCPO and the head of the National Weather Service ensured the issue of climate change was placed on the agenda of the upcoming 1987 World Meteorological Congress. This meeting provided the WMO with a mandate to consider establishing a new intergovernmental assessment mechanism and preliminary discussions began over the activities, initial responsibilities, and composition of the mechanism.

During this foundational period of the IPCC, the US retained a significant input, guiding decisions over structure and overall makeup of the assessment mechanism. US officials sought to drive the discussions during this foundational period as part of a wider strategy intended to control or halt movement towards the global convention. In this way, the US’s actions reflected the DoE agenda more than the EPA’s, primarily as a consequence of the more sizeable influence wielded by the DoE within the Reagan administration. By retaining a significant presence on the Panel, the US negotiators believed they would be able to ensure that its conclusions would be favourable to their interests.

Crucially, the US negotiators also created an impetus pushing the IPCC to the centre of all international debates on climate change. In this arrangement, the assessment was positioned as an in

110 situ decision-making device, in the process embedding a linear approach to environmental policymaking. In the linear approach to policymaking, assessment by scientists and experts precedes the policymaking. So, the architects of the IPCC, the decision-makers in the US NCPO Policy Board, were in effect ceding much authority over their future decision-making to the assessment, with a belief that this assessment would turn out their way. By ceding their control, they also politicised the scientific assessment, as they sought to provide this scientific organisation with a mandate to lead the policymaking.

3.1 The World Meteorological Congress, 1987: An International Mandate

The World Meteorological Congress gathers together the WMO national representatives every four years “to determine general policies for the fulfilment of the purposes of the Organisation.”1 To

Tolba’s distress, at the meeting in May 1987, many governments agreed that the AGGG was inadequate as a basis, going forward, for informing governments.2 Agrawala identifies the perceived inadequacies in the AGGG design, showing that the AGGG was financially hamstrung and significantly reported to the heads of the sponsoring organisations, not national policymakers.3

Ultimately, as Agrawala argues, “the gulf between science and policy could not have been wider.”4

The widespread dissatisfaction with the AGGG offered the US delegation an opportunity to raise the prospect of a new intergovernmental assessment. Crucially, their intergovernmental proposal met the kind of close connection between scientists and policymakers and financial backing, Agrawala highlighted as lacking in the AGGG design.

The US delegation arrived at the meeting with a clear intention of supporting a new intergovernmental assessment mechanism. However, at this point they were reluctant to be too forceful in proposing a resolution, preferring it to come out of general discussion, as they wanted it to appear as though the proposal was someone else’s idea. In fact the call for an intergovernmental

1 WMO, “World Meteorological Congress” accessed online 14th August 2012: http://www.wmo.int/pages/governance/congress/index_en.html 2 John Zillman, Interview with David Hirst, (26 March 2012), UK/Australia 3 Shardul Agrawala, “Context and Early Origins of the IPCC”, (1994) 4 Shardul Agrawala, “Context and Early Origins of the IPCC”, (1994), p. 613

111 assessment mechanism came from, Gladys Ramothwa, the principal delegate of Botswana. She raised the issue with an “impassioned call to the Congress” for the WMO to produce a document that would answer her government’s questions relating to climate change.1 Ramothwa was supported by several developing countries who also called on the WMO to produce a definitive statement to brief their governments.2 This led to a lengthy debate that culminated in a Congress resolution requesting the

WMO executive council –the executive body of the organisation – to “arrange appropriate mechanisms to undertake further development of scientific and other aspects of greenhouse gases.”3

Sensing an opportunity, the US delegation was able to capitalise Ramothwa’s concerns and they presented their argument for an intergovernmental assessment mechanism. And while this resolution only pointed the way for the mechanism, there was a clear vision produced during the debate of what it should entail. Thus, the US delegation achieved their aims without exerting any political capital in forcing the issue.

The WMO Executive Council assembled immediately after the conclusion of the Congress to implement its decisions. At this meeting, Richard Hallgren, head of the US Weather Bureau and the

US permanent representative to the WMO, introduced the concept of an intergovernmental mechanism.4 Hallgren outlined a mechanism that would see an intergovernmental group of expert scientists nominated by their government produce a consensus assessment of what was known and what might be done about climate change. The assessment would result in a document drawn up by approximately 15 or 20 experts from the countries involved in climate change research i.e. the US,

UK, France, Germany and Australia.5

The mechanism being described was an early incarnation of what would eventually become the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It also closely mirrored the mechanism for the Villach-II assessment, with one key exception: the new mechanism would be intergovernmental.

1 John W. Zillman, “Australian Participation in the Work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 1988-2001: part I”, Bulletin of the Australian Meteorological and Oceanographic Society, Vol. 20, p. 32 2 John Zillman, Interview with David Hirst, (26 March 2012), UK/Australia 3 WMO, “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: First Session, Geneva, November 1988,” WMO Bulletin, 38; 2, (April, 1989), pp. 113-114 4 Jim Bruce, Email correspondence with Author, 6th November 2012 5 John Zillman, Interview with David Hirst, (26 March 2012), UK/Australia

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As a result of the considerable weight of influence the US possessed in UN organisations, the WMO had been persuaded of the need to begin a new assessment in partnership with governments.

Moreover, due to US policymaker’s negative attitudes towards UNEP the US delegation had lobbied for a new intergovernmental assessment mechanism to be led by the WMO, rather than UNEP, as

UNEP was considered to focus on the concerns of developing countries to the detriment of US interests.1 The State Department wanted to ensure there was no crossover between the issues around

(1) differentiated responsibility and (2) development aid funds with climate change, as this could have politicised the issue in ways the State Department was uncomfortable with.2 Consequently, when it came down to establishing a new intergovernmental assessment mechanism, there was a concerted effort, on the part of US officials in the State Department, to prevent UNEP hijacking the issue.

This was further compounded by the fact State Department officials were eager to prevent

Tolba capturing the issue, as he had done ozone a few years earlier. Therefore, as preliminary negotiations of the intergovernmental assessment began, UNEP’s involvement in the assessment was far from assured. Despite, the reticence of State Department officials to involve UNEP, they realised that it had to be involved in some way: Firstly, because of the organization’s involvement in the earlier international assessments in Villach and, secondly, because of Tolba’s key role in raising the issue in US political circles. In order to constrain UNEP’s role, and to a lesser extent the WMO, it was proposed that the intergovernmental assessment be jointly sponsored. The overall effect of joint sponsorship fed into US plans as neither group really had any control. So this meant that, upon forming, the IPCC had relative autonomy not only from UNEP, but also from the WMO.

This proposal was not what Tolba had envisaged as he set about lobbying Secretary of State

Schultz in 1986. Accordingly, Tolba had mixed feelings towards the Panel.3 Encouraged by the involvement of more governments in this proposal, he could see the issue was progressing up the political agenda in several countries. However, the proposed assessment mechanism was not what he had planned in the aftermath of the Villach-II meeting. Tolba had always stated his belief that a much

1 William A. Nitze, Interview with David Hirst, (7 March 2012), UK/US 2 William A. Nitze, Interview with David Hirst, (7 March 2012), UK/US 3 Robert Watson, Interview with David Hirst, (13 February 2012), UK

113 smaller, much more expert-led process would better inform governments of the steps to take at the same time as being coordinated by UNEP. Tolba certainly did not envisage, let alone plan for governments to be involvement in the ways articulated by Hallgren. His plans were guided by his previous involvement with the ozone assessments, which had not been intergovernmental and whose independent scientists he believed were crucial to the success of the ozone issue. Nevertheless, both

Tolba and UNEP embraced the proposal for a new assessment, as it did offer the potential for a bigger role for science and scientists in informing policymakers of the necessary actions.

The acceptance and realisation that the WMO was being asked to work together with UNEP in negotiating the intergovernmental mechanism meant that with the conclusion of the 39th Session of its Executive Council in 1987, the WMO Deputy Secretary General, Jim Bruce, travelled to the meeting of UNEP’s Governing Council. Here Bruce requested that UNEP contribute to an “ad hoc

[emphasis in original] intergovernmental mechanism to carry out internationally co-ordinated scientific assessments of the magnitude, timing, and potential impact of climate change.”1 UNEP’s

Governing Council responded positively, and urged Tolba to work in co-operation with Jim Bruce.

Together, they began to negotiate the terms of reference, the modalities, structure and timing of the first meeting. But, in addition to UNEP and the WMO, the US still had a large part to play in the proposals and counter-proposals that went on to frame the terms of reference under which the IPCC met in November 1988.

3.2 Continuing US influence: Architects of the IPCC

US efforts aimed at influencing the proposed mechanism intensified with the Congress resolutions and UNEP’s endorsement of the proposal. These efforts began with the US NCPO commissioning a series of draft proposals for the intergovernmental mechanism. These drafts were eventually personally transmitted to the WMO representative, its Deputy Secretary General Jim Bruce, who was

1 UNEP, “Resolution GC14/20: Global Climate Change,” in UNEP Report of the Governing Council on the work of the work of its 14th Session, (UN: New York, 1987) UN General Assembly 42nd Session, Supplement No. 25 (A/42/25) p. 72

114 tasked with convening the assessment mechanism. US influence in the earliest stages of the proposed mechanism contributed significantly to the formal resolution establishing the IPCC later in June 1988.

Reflecting on the negotiations with the WMO and UNEP over the draft IPCC proposal, Hecht explained to me:

“Basically we were looking to WMO as a lead, eventually partnered with UNEP […] It

wasn’t formal … It’s not like the US submitted a proposal and it was agreed to. We worked

behind the scenes and got the WMO to agree and then they worked it out.”1

The US architects of the draft proposals also importantly embedded a linear view of the policy process – depoliticising the politics of climate change as decision-making was recast as a matter for the scientific assessment to answer. Thus, both the US negotiators and Tolba were looking towards the establishment of a highly scientized politics led by assessment. They both had technocratic visions that they hoped to use in politically opposite ways. US negotiators were looking to use the experts to legitimate their policies. In contrast, Tolba hoped to enhance the scientists’ role, stature and importance in climate change policymaking.

In the early summer of 1987, informal discussions began between two meteorologists following a seminar in Washington DC. Bo Döös, a Swedish Meteorologist, the former WCP director and at the time working in the NCP office,2 began discussing the proposed assessment mechanism with his friend and fellow meteorologist Eugene Bierly, the Director of Atmospheric Sciences

Division at the National Science Foundation (NSF). Reflecting on his involvement with the IPCC’s origins, Bierly explained to me how these discussions progressed:

“When half of the seminar was over Bo and I sat down in a big room that we found and said,

you know, we got to really think seriously about this intergovernmental mechanism. We

thought about it. And so, because Bo and I had both been very much involved in GARP, and

my position prior to getting the climate area in NSF had been the GARP Coordinator for the

1 Alan Hecht, Interview with David Hirst, (19 July 2012), UK/US 2 Alan Hecht, Interview with David Hirst, (19 July 2012), UK/US

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National Science Foundation, this was where we began to draw upon our GARP knowledge

and try to make it applicable to the Climate Programme.

[…]

“So, we went back and we looked at some of the mechanisms that were used in FGGE [First

GARP Global Weather Experiment] and found that there was, in fact, some very, very

apparent similarities and so we began to explore what the FIGI Intergovernmental Panel did

and could that serve as a model for this desired mechanism that the WMO wanted.” 1

The similarities between the proposed mechanism and the Global Weather Experiment were manifest both in terms of the challenges and opportunities presented; they both relied on planned activities with a solid scientific base maintaining flexibility and independence within the intergovernmental structures.2

Following these discussions Döös returned to the NCPO, where he transmitted the content of conversation he had with Bierly to his boss Alan Hecht.3 Hecht agreed with the core arguments made over similarities and owing to Döös’ experiences within GARP, asked him to draft a proposal.

Evidently taking inspiration from his experience on the GARP Global Weather Experiment

Intergovernmental Panel, Döös accordingly outlined an assessment mechanism he felt could overcome the inherent difficulties in integrating a range of views and promoting international cooperation.

Subsequent discussions between Döös, Hecht and the government agencies in the NCP Policy board, principally involving the EPA, State department and DoE – agencies with a remit on foreign policy, energy security and environmental protection – resulted in a six page document outlining the activities, initial responsibilities, and composition of the ad hoc intergovernmental mechanism.4 The

1 Eugene Bierly, Interview with David Hirst, (1 August 2012), UK/US 2 Bo Döös & Eugene Bierly, “Bierly – Döös paper. Items to be considered,” (10th May 2009), Personal Papers of Eugene Bierly (Bierly Papers forthwith), p.11 3 Alan Hecht, Interview with David Hirst, (19 July 2012), UK/US 4Bo Döös & Alan Hecht, “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” (August 1987), Bierly Papers (Doc A.), pp. 1-6

116 draft proposal was circulated to the various interested agencies that agreed to the principals outlined by Döös.1 In response to these pressures Hecht and Döös outlined a US strategy on climate change which involved taking a lead on the issue balancing environmental protection, economic growth and energy policy.2 Though ultimately the decision to include or exclude these points was taken by Hecht and Döös, the draft proposal broadly reflected US interests. Notably, the draft proposal and policy on climate change was being coordinated by the interagency US NCP, not by the White House.

The Hecht-Döös draft proposal introduced the issue by way of citing the resolutions passed by the governing bodies of the WMO and UNEP earlier in 1987. It went on to stress that there was a

“growing international concern” over the climate change issue which had been compounded by the several national and international assessments, in particular the “major international assessment” conducted in Villach in 1985 (Villach-II).3 In recognising this important assessment in the proposal for another intergovernmental assessment, however, Villach-II was now being overshadowed. Owing to the growing international concern, the rationale behind the proposal was that a new mechanism, specifically with governmental oversight, was required. Thus while the legitimacy of the Villach-II report was not questioned, it was clearly being superseded by the newly proposed assessment, which was intergovernmental.

The proposal went on to conclude that the decisions of the WMO and UNEP governing bodies “reflect the need for an orderly process (emphasis in original) to ensure that research, monitoring and impact assessment studies proceed together, and that internationally agreed assessments should be prerequisites for legal or regulatory activities.”4 This statement was unequivocally suggesting that concern over the potential impacts of climate change was so rife and urgent that scientific assessments should not occur in isolation from their socio-political contexts.

1 Bo Döös & Eugene Bierly, “Bierly – Döös paper. Items to be considered,” (10th May 2009), Bierly Papers, p.11 2 Alan Hecht & Bo Döös, “Climate Change, Economic Growth and Energy Policy: A Recommended Strategy for the Coming Decades,” Climate Change, 13, (1988), pp. 1-3 3 Bo Döös & Alan Hecht, “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” Bierly Papers (Doc A.), pp. 1-2 4 Bo Döös & Alan Hecht, “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” Bierly Papers (Doc A.), pp. 1-2

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The proposal went on to recommend that in light of this “wide spectrum of problem areas” the panel should co-ordinate its activities into a dual stream.1 Assessment of a scientific base should lead onto an assessment of the socio-economic effects and societal responses to climate change. There was an overriding sense that this new assessment would provide the answers to any questions policymakers might have. As such the proposal replicated the modus operandi of the DoE report on climate change, rather than that of Villach-II.

The discussions, decisions and suggestions made during this period were in effect ceding authority over the issue to this new intergovernmental assessment. The intergovernmental mechanism proposed in the Hecht-Döös draft positioned the assessment centre stage, as a precursor to any regulatory activities. As such it was building on the underlying linear view of the policy process whereby assessment should precede policy. Moreover, the proposal was also an extension of the initial plans of the NCP Policy Board discussions earlier in 1986. Alan Hecht, in response to what he considered to be delaying tactics by the DoE, emphasised that if the assessment did indeed confirm the seriousness of the issue, they had to be prepared to go to the US President to recommend that he move forward with a convention.2 Eventually, the working group and the policy board agreed with

Hecht and the draft proposal reflects this; in particular stating that “internationally agreed assessments should be prerequisites for legal or regulatory activities.”3 The assessment proposed was more than an analysis of the problem and potential solutions. An added weight of importance had been placed upon the assessment by US policymakers as it was serving as an in situ decision-making device on whether or not to go forward with the suggestions for a global convention.

Thus, the assessment mechanism was being placed centre stage in the US political context.

Having recognised the growing international concern, but dissatisfied with the assessments that had come before and determined to control any movement towards a global convention, this proposal presented a linear model of the policy process. In this model, policy ought to follow scientific assessment. The Hecht-Döös draft proposal stated that, “the activities of the panel should be aimed at

1 Bo Döös & Alan Hecht, “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” Bierly Papers (Doc A.), pp. 2-4 2 Alan Hecht, Interview with David Hirst, (UK/USA), 19th July 2012 3 Bo Döös & Alan Hecht, “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” Bierly Papers (Doc A.), p. 2

118 providing the basis for the development of a realistic and effective, internationally accepted strategy of how the “greenhouse gas” issue can abe (sic) managed.”1 Furthermore, this approach – placing such emphasis on the assessment’s verdict – was in effect de-politicising the decision-making process as it was re-cast as a question for technical experts. As such this proposal fails the challenge set by

Eva Lovbrand & Gunilla Oberg – in the deployment of science in support of decision-making – to bring science close enough to legitimise political choices whilst maintaining a clear separation to avoid appearing expert-led and technocratic.2 Furthermore, the proposal – adopting a linear approach

– also effectively stated that more information will lead to better decisions. With no end date, by which action had to be taken, implementation of any action was thus delayed indefinitely, an advantageous situation for the DoE who wanted to see caution, not haste. Moreover, controlling the questions being asked, the experts being consulted, and the structures in place governing the assessment clearly more broadly was of paramount importance to the US officials in the NCP.

In Silke Beck’s analysis of the IPCC’s public facing application of the linear model of expertise she has shown how the linear approach can depoliticize policies and politicize science.

Similarly, the Hecht-Döös draft proposal recast the political debate away from active policy decisions

– what should be done, how it should be enacted – and instead focuses attention on attaining a fuller scientific understanding. The linear approach thus invites decision-makers to question what knowledge is sufficient to compel political action, rather than how can this knowledge improve or aid the decisions proposed. A scientific assessment clearly has a role to play, but in the assessment precedes policy paradigm proposed here, decisions of who gets to speak for the climate also define who gets to make decisions for the climate. The linear model shuts down debate of alternative framings, potentially involving (but not limited to) insurance companies, native peoples and construction/infrastructure engineers.

1 Bo Döös & Alan Hecht, “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” Bierly Papers (Doc A.), p. 3 2 Eva Lovbrand & Gunilla Oberg, “Comment on ‘How science makes environmental controvsersies worse” by Daniel Sarewitz Environmental Science and Policy 7, 385-403 and ‘When Scientists politicise science: making sense of the controversy over the Skeptical Environmentalist’ by Roger A. Pielke Jr. , Environmental Science and Policy 7, 405-417” Environmental Science and Policy, 8 (2005), pp. 195-197.

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At the end of August 1987 once the draft had been circulated among the various agencies of the NCP Policy Board, and meeting with general approval. Döös had anticipated that the State

Department would take some action to make the draft a reality. Surprised at the days of inaction, Döös decided to take matters into his own hands. And so, on a planned holiday back to Europe he decided to visit the WMO headquarters in Geneva. He met with and informally discussed the draft proposal with the people familiar with the proposed intergovernmental mechanism, particularly with Jim

Bruce. Bruce, had by now been delegated the job of negotiating the terms of reference with his counterpart at UNEP, Mostafa Tolba.1 Döös began by updating Bruce on what was going on in

Washington: that there was a draft proposal, and that this draft had been reviewed by the relevant agencies. According to Döös, upon reviewing the draft proposal Jim Bruce asked him whether there would be any obstacle to the draft being presented as a WMO proposal. Döös saw no impediments to this, and instead felt that the US agencies may very well be quite happy, which they were, seeing as how they could get what they wanted almost without having to ask for it.2 It also made any decisions taken over the scope, design and planned activities appear to have been taken multilaterally, not as a result of US influence. Much like with the initial proposal in the WMO Congress in earlier 1987, the

US government was able to get what they wanted without expending a great deal of political capital.

A couple of months later, on 3 November 1987 Jim Bruce faxed a slightly revised version of the Döös-Hecht draft proposal to Jim Rasmussen, a NOAA meteorologist. Rasmussen forwarded this fax on to Alan Hecht, Eugene Bierly, and Richard Hallgren a few days later. Upon reviewing the proposal, Döös assumed that Bruce wanted to be assured that the revised version was still acceptable to the US agencies.3 As the largest financial contributor to the WMO, the US influenced it significantly but often behind closed doors. Rather than campaigning overtly to get what they wanted

US delegations often utilised soft power diplomacy in ensuring favourable outcomes. Bierly discussing the passage of WMO resolutions referred to US tactics as follows:

1 James P. Bruce, Interview with David Hirst, (1 February 2012), UK/Canada 2 Bo Döös & Eugene Bierly, “Bierly – Döös paper. Items to be considered,” (10th May 2009), Bierly Papers, p. 12 3 James P. Bruce, “Fax from J. P. Bruce to J. Rasmussen: Intergovernmental Mechanism on Climate Change,” (16th November 1987), Bierly Papers

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“…even though the US puts up lots of money to the WMO and so forth, the delegation that

goes out to the WMO Congress and places like that, there may be some people in the world

who would really try to push their weight around and be overwhelming, but the US tried not

to play that role. Maybe in a couple of instances where something was really important

would the US push hard. It would be a lot of back-hall talking to delegates by US members” 1

Furthermore, Bierly highlighted that in this instance, US negotiators utilised an extensive network of informal professional connections in order to translate their own proposal into an altogether “less partisan” UNEP-WMO proposal resolution.

The back and forth continued, as another draft proposal revised the WMO document just a week later. This draft presented the Global Weather Experiment Intergovernmental Panel as a useful model for the intergovernmental mechanism. This resulted in the eventual adoption of the assessment mechanism being named the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Exchanges across the

Atlantic finally culminated in the decision of the 40th session of the WMO Executive Council in June

1988 which established the IPCC with the twin objectives of:

(i) Assessing the scientific information that is related to the various components of the climate

change issue such as emissions of major greenhouse gases and modification of the Earth’s

radiation balance resulting therefrom, and that needed to enable the environmental and socio-

economic consequences of climate change to be evaluated; and

(ii) Formulating realistic response strategies for the management of the climate change issue.2

This resolution was neither the end of the discussions over what the IPCC would, should and could do nor was it merely a reflection of the draft proposals described above. Rather, decisions taken in the interim, and even after the formation of the Panel, continued to shape and reshape the new mechanism. This section, therefore, shows how US officials applied their influence in constituting the

Panel’s eventual terms of reference. This was part of a developing strategy employed to regain control of the mechanism in order to avoid, slow or halt suggestions for a global convention. The US strategy

1 Eugene Bierly, Interview with David Hirst, (1 August 2012), UK/US 2 WMO, “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” Resolution (EC-XL), (June, 1988)

121 was three-pronged: It was premised on ensuring the involvement of their experts through government funded agencies (NOAA and NASA); constraining the authority of alternative advisory mechanisms, namely the AGGG; and positioning nation states – not the UNEP and the WMO – in a position of authority to limit the remit of the proposed mechanism, crucially by divorcing its budget from the two sponsoring organisations.1 The Panel was thus a means to remove power from scientists and UN technocrats who had advanced their agenda aimed at introducing a global convention. In a somewhat contradictory policy, the US NCP agreed to an assessment mechanism that empowered scientist’s decision-making powers. However, the proposed assessment mechanism also gave due influence to governments, specifically those with relevant expertise, the power to select the experts that would assess climate change. Therefore, US policymakers didn’t actually envisage ceding their authority over decision-making, because they saw the intergovernmental assessment as a vehicle through which they could still control the issue.

In the next section I will show how the US retained a substantial role in the proposals, counter proposals and the final terms of reference that constituted the Panel when it was formally established in June 1988. I will show how this fitted into a wider strategy to control or halt movement towards negotiations of global convention. And also, significantly, how the politics of climate change was increasingly becoming de-politicised as the locus of the debate was recast as a scientific question – in effect politicising the scientific assessment.

4. Negotiating the Terms of Reference: Responsibilities, Participation

and Working Arrangements

I have shown that the IPCC was explicitly political from the outset. The intention to create an intergovernmental assessment was meant to connect the two streams of science and politics. But their merging was done in ways that excluded many countries from the debate. So while the panel was

1 Eugene Bierly, Interview with David Hirst, (1 August 2012), UK/US; Bo Döös & Alan Hecht, “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” Bierly Papers (Doc A.); Alan Hecht, Interview with David Hirst, (19 July 2012), UK/US.

122 established with the stated intention of involving a geographically representative base, the actual enactment of involving non-Western expertise was ultimately a tokenistic gesture. The IPCC was accordingly established with the intention of generating a consensus statement of the findings of a select few climate modelling centres located in the USA, UK and Northern Europe.

By the end of 1987 a draft proposal for the IPCC was close to settled upon and discussions moved on towards questions of participation and the working arrangements of the Panel. In this regard the size of the Panel was a crucial concern to several interested parties. The US and UNEP were both determined, for different reasons, to see a small panel. US policymakers were keen to see a small number of experts selected by governments and government representatives with prior knowledge of the issues involved, so that they could retain wide-ranging influence. But, UNEP and

Tolba wanted a small panel of experts with considerable independence to produce the assessment.

Tolba wanted this advisory panel on climate change to mirror the structures in place for the ozone panel, because he felt that this offered the best means of achieving the requisite scientific consensus to compel political action. Neither UNEP nor the US wanted to see a large and unwieldy panel. In contrast, the WMO Secretary-General, Obasi, was obliged to invite every WMO Member State to participate, which created some friction between the WMO and UNEP. Moreover, Obasi was also aware that the US policymakers favoured the WMO as the lead organization for the IPCC. In the original proposal devised by Hecht and Döös, the implied hierarchy of the organizations was set out in a section on the proposed composition and working arrangements which stated that “the panel should be established by the WMO with the co-operation of UNEP.”1 The perception of this hierarchy was reinforced through informal channels and was confirmed when it was suggested, in the same draft proposal, that the WMO establish a secretariat in the headquarters of the WMO, not UNEP.

Obasi’s confidence in the strength of the WMO’s position meant that on 25 March 1988, he sent a letter to the ministers of foreign affairs of all WMO Member States, to enquire whether their

1 Bo Döös & Alan Hecht, “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” Bierly Papers (Doc A.), p. 6

123 country “would wish to be represented on the Panel.”1 The letter was sent out by the WMO prior to consultations with UNEP and Tolba. As such Tolba’s deputy on climate related matters in UNEP,

Peter Usher, wrote back to the WMO on 31 March 1988 requesting clarification of the “preferred maximum number of panel members.”2 Tolba was concerned that there was a move away from the

“Small Panel” concept, which was envisaged to be key aspect of an efficient, functional assessment.

This exacerbated Tolba’s concerns over the decreasing role to be played by UNEP in coordinating the assessment. The earlier drafting and re-drafting of proposals had initially contained a caveat on participation that stressed the desire for “the number of Panel members [...] be few to ensure the efficient functioning of the Panel.” However, this caveat fell by the wayside in the later iterations of the proposal, and only came to be incorporated again after Usher’s telex to the WMO on 31 March.

Responses to Obasi’s letter, however, indicated divergent expectations over the IPCC’s role.

While both UNEP and the WMO were seeking to establish a Panel with a significant input of policy expertise balanced against the necessarily scientific component, the majority of countries viewed it more simplistically: as a purely scientific assessment.3 As such the response on the whole was to nominate the heads of meteorological services. In light of these responses Obasi and Tolba co-signed a second letter, this time addressed to the ministers of foreign affairs of the 35 countries that responded positively to Obasi’s initial invitation. This second communication stressed the

“complexity and interdependence of the issues involved.”4 Owing to this perceived interdependence, the two organizations were calling on the participants to bring to the table a broader base of expertise spanning the atmospheric sciences, public policy and environmental resource management. This signifies a move away from establishing an insulated scientific assessment towards the inclusion of a much more diverse platform of expertise so as to contribute to policy discussions, mandated by the

Panel’s intergovernmental status. The letter sent out by Tolba and Obasi can thus be seen as an

1 G. O. P. Obasi, Letter To Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Members of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO-920), (25th March 1988), FOIA Request: 1234-11 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 2 Peter Usher, Telex to Victor Boldirev Ref: Terms of Reference for Intergovernmental Mechanism for the Assessment of the Greenhouse Gas/Climate Change Issue, (29th March, 1988) Bierly Papers Doc E1 3 John Zillman, Interview with David Hirst, (26 March 2012) Uk/Australia 4 G. O. P. Obasi & Mostafa Tolba, Letter to His Excellency the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, No. 35.865/M/IPCC, (17 August 1988), FOIA Request: 1234-11 FCO

124 attempt to set the criteria as to who could speak on behalf of the climate – as the IPCC. How decisions are made over who gets to participate in this process is according Clark Miller crucial if international assessments are to continue to inform international deliberations of environmental controversies, such as climate change. 1 Here I have shown how a select few decision-makers were constructing what expertise – and by that same token what knowledge – was deemed policy-relevant.

Peter Usher also asked for clarification of the term 'geographic distribution' and for an explanation of “UN classification into regions.” 2 The response from Victor Boldirev, in his capacity as Director of the World Climate Program at the WMO, exemplifies the unquestioned Western dominance that subsequently took hold of the IPCC, in addition to the, ultimately, tokenistic nature of calls to ensure equitable geographic representation. He referred Usher to the WMO regions in the

Organization’s regulations, and overleaf listed 20 suggested countries to be included.3 In these regulations the WMO regions were separated out into six categories: RA I – Africa; RA II – Asia; RA

III – South America; RA IV – North America; Central America and the Caribbean; RA V – South-

West Pacific; and RA VI – Europe. But Boldirev only drew attention to the inclusion of countries in

RA III and RA I (South America and Africa). Furthermore, the only country on the list from the

Pacific region was Australia, broadly atypical of the region as a whole. The countries that made it onto the list either possessed the requisite scientific capacities and expertise to contribute the assessment, or were included as representative of a geographic region.

Equitable geographic distribution was code for inclusion of non-expert countries and their inclusion was pointed to as a deviation from the norm. The invitation of these “representative countries” was an attempt to portray the assessment as inclusive and comprehensively global. But at the same time, it allowed the “real” experts to produce the assessments – favouring Western scientific interpretations of climate change. This implicit Western bias allowed US negotiators to play on the inherent inequities in the ability to produce knowledge about the climate. Because certain countries

1 Clark Miller, “Democratization, International Knowledge Institutions, and Global Governance” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 20; 2, (2007), pp. 325–357. 2 Victor Boldirev, Inter-office to memorandum to DSG (of WMO), (31st March 1988), Bierly Papers (Doc. E2) 3 The countries listed by Boldirev were: Australia, Japan, China, India, USSR, FRG (West Germany), UK, France Nordic (Sweden or Norway), USA, Canada, Brazil, Argentina or Mexico, Nigeria, Algeria, and Italy

125 lacked expertise, they also did not have as much say. These countries were included, nominally representing entire geographic regions, but in reality did not really have much impact on the outcomes. As a result, US officials were able to utilise the IPCC as a body that could use knowledge offered by US experts making claims about climate change in order to shut down debate. The motivations behind ensuring a geographically diverse and representative base appears to have been more about demanding governmental assent from non-Western countries, and not about widening participation. As I will argue in subsequent chapters, this Western bias alongside claims of the IPCC as a global mouthpiece has left a considerable legacy in the politics of climate change. This legacy has created considerable friction and a brief opening up of the negotiated consensus based approach for policymaking on climate change, which led on to the establishment of a separate formal negotiating body for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC).

The US strategy for implementation of the Panel makes sense as a result of the constructed

Western dominance and monopolisation of knowledge making claims in the IPCC. With US officials confident that the science, to which they were deferring to in the IPCC, would not surprise them in an unpleasant way they set about making “the IPCC a forum for evaluating the desirability [italics added] of a global convention.”1 Taken in isolation, this would appear to be a clear sign that the US administration was leading international efforts on consideration of a global convention. Moreover, it would also appear to go against the ambitions of DoE officials, determined to delay any meaningful movement on a convention. With an increasingly vocal set of science-policy advocates raising the stakes on the issue of a global convention, US policymakers wanted to be sure that if there was to be an assessment, they would be the ones leading it. The second objective outlined in this same document highlighted these leadership ambitions, calling on the US delegation “to play a leadership role by offering experts to chair or cochair (sic) working groups.”2

1 Anonymous, “US Strategy for Implementation of WMO-UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)” (15th August, 1988), Bierly Papers Doc. G 2 Anonymous, “US Strategy for Implementation of WMO-UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)” (15th August, 1988), Bierly Papers Doc. G

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Alongside US efforts at controlling the IPCC through playing a leadership role there was also a concerted effort at minimising and marginalising the material influence of the two sponsoring organisations. In this way, the IPCC would have the veneer of independence provided by the sponsorship of two organizations of the UN, whilst simultaneously being run by the country members most active in the planning and implementation of the assessment – namely the US. The intergovernmental status it was hoped would reassure member countries and their national communities “that the assessment of current knowledge would be based on the widest possible range of views in the published literature and would be carried out according to the peer-review methods of science rather than in response to the policy or political agendas of individual countries or interest groups.”1 At the same time US policymakers were attempting to subvert this projection of independence for their own gains. In order to marginalise both UNEP and the WMO it was decided that the funding of the Panel would be removed from their regular budgets.2

In this chapter, I have demonstrated the ways in which the US administration retained a considerable role in the final negotiations of the Panel’s terms of reference. They positioned the IPCC at the centre of the international debate on climate change and de-politicised climate change, as the debate was reconfigured as a scientific question. Yet, it remained political as US officials ensured they retained control. I have thus argued that US involvement in these negotiations was based on controlling the political momentum towards a global convention, or at least ensuring that US experts could be placed as the central proponents in the assessment. By ensuring that the IPCC appeared to be a consensus of the world-view of climate change, US policymakers hoped to present the Panel as a legitimate authoritative voice on climate change. However, I have shown that the actual effort to include a diverse and geographically equitable group of representatives was largely tokenistic. In reality consensus came only on the assent to a select few climate modelling centres located in

Northern Europe and the US. Ensuring equitable representation can accordingly be viewed as an

1 John W. Zillman , Australian Participation n the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” (2008), p. 22 2 WMO Anonymous, “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” (3rd November 1987), Bierly Papers Doc. B

127 attempt to gain developing countries acquiescence to Western interpretations of climate change, and climate policies.

5. Conclusion

I argued at the outset of this chapter that although there were several national and international assessments of climate change conducted throughout the 1980s, it was the international conference in

Villach 1985 that started the ball rolling leading ultimately to the IPCC establishment in November

1988. As the findings of the conference were conveyed to the US Secretary of State George Schultz, the spotlight of attention amongst US policymakers in the DoE, EPA and State Department was trained on climate change. Its conclusions did not drive the formation of the IPCC, but fears that it would, led US officials to then act to ensure that what resulted was favourable to them. The discussions prompted by the Villach-II Conference centred on the key issue of a mooted global convention on climate change. In the US National Climate Program (NCP) Policy Board these negotiations culminated in resolutions passed by the executive bodies of the WMO and UNEP agreeing to jointly sponsor “an ad hoc intergovernmental mechanism that could carry out assessments” that would be “objective, balanced and internationally co-ordinated.” 1

The eventual agreement in the NCP Policy Board for the proposed intergovernmental assessment mechanism was reached through compromise and divergent aspirations for the plan of an

IPCC. On the one hand, I have shown how the DoE proposed a new intergovernmental assessment mechanism as a means of controlling the trajectory towards a global convention and buying time before seriously engaging the issue. On the other, the EPA saw the intergovernmental assessment mechanism as a useful stepping stone towards achieving a global convention by widening the base of countries aware of and interested in the issue. The assessment mechanism as proposed by the US government was at once a barrier, as well as an aid, to introducing a global convention on climate change. This idea for a new intergovernmental assessment mechanism was translated to the

1 WMO, “WMO Executive Council: Twenty-Ninth Session, Geneva, June 1987,” WMO Bulletin, 36; 4, (1987), p. 307

128 international stage via the WMO Congress in May 1987, after which the US retained their influence in the subsequent proposals and counter-proposals.

Exchanges between the WMO, and the US during this period sought to marginalise UNEP’s role in order to prevent Tolba securing control over the issue as he had done ozone in the past. This was part of a US policy to push the IPCC to the centre of international debates. US negotiators saw the intergovernmental assessment as a vehicle through which they could control the issue in the future. US pressure to include specific scientific expertise had the effect of politicising the assessment and constrained the debate in specific ways. So while US negotiators, as architects of the IPCC, in effect ceded much authority over their future decision-making to the assessment, they were concurrently constructing a hegemonic role for their own scientists. Through painting the IPCC as a diverse representative and politically and geographically equitable body, the findings could be universalised. In the next two chapters I will build upon these ideas as I consider the ways in which the power politics of knowledge production in regards to the tokenistic responses to ensuring geographic representation became embedded in the IPCC’s assessment mechanism.

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Chapter 4 – Balancing Scientific Credibility and Political Legitimacy:

The First Assessment Cycle, 1988-1990

1. Introduction

“More than 1,000 specialists from 70 countries have participated in this great task in one way or

another. I would like to congratulate each one of you, and thank you all on behalf of the UN

system and of people everywhere. You have participated in the most comprehensive international

intergovernmental assessment ever undertaken of a serious environmental and scientific

problem.”

-G. O. P. Obasi, WMO Secretary-General (1990) 1

From 9 to 11 November 1988 in Geneva, the IPCC met for the first time. Attended by 103 representatives consisting of 30 WMO and UNEP Member States, 21 representatives of 16 international organisations, 7 invited experts, 8 representatives of the WMO and UNEP Secretariats and the two-man joint secretariat, the meeting marked the beginning of the IPCC’s First Assessment cycle.2 The First Assessment lasted 18 months and culminated in the publication of three assessment reports on the Science (Working Group I) of climate change, the Impacts (Working Group II) of climate change and the possible Response Strategies (Working Group III) to climate change. Two years later in his address to the Fourth Session of the Panel, the World Meteorological Organization

(WMO) Secretary-General Godwin O. P. Obasi thanked the one thousand or so specialists from seventy different countries to have participated in the production of the assessment. Obasi was positioning the IPCC to speak (on behalf of the entire global population) universal truths on climate change to policymakers. But, as I will show in the course of this chapter, while the IPCC did involve

1 Opening Remarks by Prof. G. O. P. Obasi, the Secretary-General of the WMO in IPCC, Report of the Fourth Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC-6, (Sundsvall, Sweden, 27-30 August 1990), p. 3 2 W J McG Tegart, “WMO-UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, First Session: Australian Delegation Report,” (16th November 1988), Personal Papers of John Zillman (Zillman Papers forthwith)

130 participation from 70 different countries, the overwhelming majority came from the developed world.

The IPCC assessment, therefore, opens up questions around the geopolitical implications of knowledge constructed as global in an unequal world; namely the grounds on which participation in an expert, intergovernmental assessment should be based. I will examine, in particular, the ways US officials sought to create a global politics of participation in the IPCC assessment in order to project authority onto a legitimised base of expertise.

This chapter will look to the first 18 months of the IPCC’s existence and the assemblage of

“an authoritative statement of the views of the international scientific community.”1 In examining the ways and means of preparing and legitimising the assessment, I evaluate how and who the IPCC sought to speak to and on behalf of whom. I will show that the authoritative status the IPCC, developed during this period, was built upon the credentials of its scientific leaders combined with the backing of some major world governments. Crucially, it was the US administration that endeavoured to legitimise the views of a select few scientists in order to present the IPCC as a global, representative assessment in a bid to circumvent the politics of climate change through recourse to science. As a result, in this chapter, I seek to unpick the rhetorical construction of the IPCC as a genuinely global assessment. Instead, I argue that the Panel was, first and foremost, a political vehicle for US policymakers to constrain climate change to a technical, environmental issue. However, the counter-actions of the scientists employed to author the assessment created a scientifically credible report, albeit one chiefly authored by a select few Western scientists.

Under the auspices of governments, and trading off the scientific authority of Bert Bolin and

John Houghton among others, the IPCC was positioned as a keystone organisation in the science and thus the politics of climate change. So, as the IPCC, and in turn the assessment, became increasingly political the Panel still managed to retain much of its credibility as a source of authoritative climate knowledge. Nevertheless, the Panel did have its critics, specifically those people, groups and countries who felt excluded from the process, most notably the Brazilian delegation.

1 John Houghton, “Foreword,” in Climate Change: The IPCC Science Assessment, J. T. Houghton, G. J. Jenkins & J. J. Ephraums (eds.), (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1990)

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Another theme addressed in this chapter, considers the effects of a specifically intergovernmental assessment, particularly how the institutional arrangements of the IPCC structurally impacted upon the assemblage of the report, and the reception and dissemination of its findings. The opening address to the First Session of the IPCC by G. O. P. Obasi highlighted the intersection between governments, international organisations and scientists mandated by an intergovernmental assessment. I will show how this intersection was a fundamental driving force during the IPCC’s First Assessment; shaping the content, structure and organisation. I show that the lack of a set of formal procedural roles gave the scope to both scientists and political representatives to exert an influence over the assemblage of the report, and the IPCC’s guiding principles.

As stressed elsewhere, the efficacy of global environmental assessments are most often built upon a foundation of a perceived credibility, saliency and legitimacy.1 Moreover, those studies evaluating the impact of global environmental assessments, have found that, “in almost every case, assessment reports were not the right focus of attention,” instead, global environmental assessments

“are better conceptualised as social processes rather than published products.”2 Following in this vein, this chapter examines who was responsible for the production of the First Assessment report and how the report was produced. I assess what it was that enabled the IPCC to be viewed as a credible, authoritative and legitimate means of assessing climate change knowledge: What, if anything, was unique or special about this assessment that led on to the subsequent political negotiations? I will argue that at all times the IPCC was guided by the two moderating constraints of appearing simultaneously scientifically credible and politically legitimate. I will highlight the ways in which experts and expert knowledge were allowed considerable freedom to define the processes and procedures of the Panel, and so contribute in a significant way to the published reports. I argue that during this assessment the IPCC constructed a scientized politics – in which decisions were effectively being taken out of the hands of policymakers, as questions over what to do were recast as questions for scientific and/or expert knowledge to answer. Broadly speaking, this is a story of how

132 the US strategy ultimately backfired: Their initial hubris, seeing the IPCC as a vehicle they could steer toward their interests, unravelled as the Panel grew increasingly out of their control.

The focus of this chapter revolves around the personnel, the methods and the activities of

Working Group I (WGI) within the IPCC. Although there were three WGs, it became in the course of researching this assessment cycle that WGI was the most influential WG in the context of decisions taken over the shape and content of the assessment. Similarly, WGI was widely regarded as the most authoritative and successful of the three reports in reviews of the Panel’s activities. Stephen

Schneider’s1991 review of the three reports suggests that:

“Ironically, the least scientifically original product of IPCC, the Working Group I report, has

proved to be the most useful. Although it contains few fundamental ideas or results that were

not already noted in previous assessments of global warming, the report is so comprehensive,

rationally argued, and broadly representative –with both advocates and critics of scientific

concern over global warming –that it is immensely credible and powerful.”1

In addition to the perceived authoritative status of WGI, there was also an added emphasis on its findings, as WGI provided the basis on which WG’s II and III could then report on the possible impacts and necessary response strategies. However, as the IPCC began its operations, US negotiators were chiefly concerned with controlling the political dimension of the assessment (the remit of WG

III). US officials were concerned with what the political recommendations of the IPCC would be, not the scale of the problem (being outlined by WGI). Thus, while WGI was at the fulcrum of determining the problem, US officials opted to devote their resources towards the chairmanship of

WG III. In their efforts to control the politics of climate change by expert assessment, US officials clearly viewed the political dimension of the IPCC to be the most pressing to their overarching strategy.

In the remaining sections of this chapter, I chart the evolution of the processes and protocols developed in the production of the assessment report, in order to show how it was scientists, and not

1 Stephen H. Schneider, “Three Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” (1991), p. 26

133 government representatives, who initially came to the fore throughout the assessment phase. In addition, I will go on to show how the evolution of these structures, methods and protocols during the two years compiling the assessment actually contributed to an institutional design that enhanced the reputation of the final reports. I will then detail examples of how the report was received in the US.

This focus on the US is due to the US administration’s involvement in the negotiations that constituted the IPCC, meaning it was substantially invested in the assessment outcomes. Through this detailed examination, I will show that the credibility and legitimacy of the assessment mechanism were crucial factors in the overwhelmingly positive reception of the report. The credibility and legitimacy established were intimately related to the methods, personnel and protocols established during the assessment. Moreover, the concerted effort on the part of both the IPCC’s sponsoring organisations and its Panel members ensured that the assessment would contribute to significant international political meetings. This subsequently anchored the Panel as the authoritative source of climate related knowledge for the upcoming political negotiations.

2. The First Session of the IPCC, November 1988: A Comprehensive

Assessment

Following on from months of consultations involving the Deputy Secretary-General of the WMO

James P. ‘Jim’ Bruce, the Executive Director of UNEP Mostafa Tolba and various agencies and representatives of the US government, the final, and formal, decision to establish the IPCC was taken in June 1988. At the 40th Session of the WMO Executive Council, the WMO Executive Council

Resolution stated that the Panel should aim to:

(i) Assess the scientific information that is related to the various components of the climate

change issue [..] to enable the environmental and socio-economic consequences of climate

change to be evaluated; and

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(ii) Formulate realistic response strategies for the management of the climate change issue.1

As a result, from the 9 to 11 November 1988 in Geneva, the IPCC met for the first time. At this meeting three key decisions were taken that shaped the first 18 months of the Panel’s activities: (i) the

Panel’s timetable for completion, (ii) its scope and methods of producing the assessment, and (iii) the selection of key personnel in the Panel’s hierarchy. These decisions were part of a conscious effort by the IPCC delegates to make the assessment politically expedient and scientifically credible. In particular the Panel, and in turn the assessment, traded off the credibility of its scientific leaders whilst the science was becoming increasingly political. As an integral part of this I will highlight how the initial structures introduced at the First session of the IPCC positioned governments and country representatives, not necessarily scientists, at the nexus of orchestrating and writing the assessment.

2.1 IPCC Structures and Personnel

A US policy document drafted in anticipation of the IPCC First Session in November 1988 identified the establishment of a chairman and vice-chairman of the Panel as its first order of business.2 To this end, Jim Bruce and Obasi “cornered” Swedish meteorologist Bert Bolin at the Toronto Conference for the Changing Atmosphere (June 27-30 1988) and set about persuading him to take on the IPCC

Chairmanship.3 Bruce and Obasi believed Bolin was the perfect fit for the job of IPCC chairman, as did the scientific research community, the WMO, UNEP, and national policymakers. These three groups had differing but complimentary aspirations for the chairman of the Panel to appear to be politically neutral and scientifically literate. Bolin emphatically embodied these criteria as a citizen of a non-aligned country, an internationally respected scientist (in meteorology), and someone well versed in the field of international scientific co-operation.4

1 WMO, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Resolution 4 (EC-XL), (June, 1988) 2 Anonymous, “Scope of Activities, Issues, and Timetables for WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” (June 1988), Doc. F: Bierly Papers 3 James P. Bruce, Interview with David Hirst, (1 February 2012) UK/Canada 4 Bo Döös & Eugene Bierly, “Bierly – Döös paper. Items to be considered,” (10th May 2009), Bierly Papers, p.16

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While there was a broad consensus among those researchers active in the climate science community that Bolin was the most suitable candidate for the role, he was himself reluctant to take on the job.1 Bolin thought the job of chairman would be unnecessarily burdensome, and was in fact interested becoming the chairman of WGI, which he felt would be more stimulating scientifically.2

Both Bo Döös, a Swedish meteorologist working in the US at the time, and the Director of the UK

Met Office John Houghton viewed Bolin as the standout candidate for the IPCC’s chairmanship. He was a prominent and internationally respected scientist and it was hoped his presence would engender in the scientific community a sense of trust in the Panel. Similarly, Bolin’s balanced, measured approach to previous scientific assessments of climate change and his chairmanship of international scientific programs (Global Atmospheric Research Program (GARP) and the World Climate Research

Program (WCRP)) meant politicians viewed him as both competent and trustworthy. Bolin embodied the twin strains – scientific and political – guiding the decisions taken over the IPCC’s timetable, scope and methods. As such the decision to appoint Bolin, a seemingly apolitical scientifically credible chairman, is representative of a wider ambition to create a broadly inclusive, scientifically credible and politically legitimate Panel.

Bolin’s perceived suitability for the role of Chairman was such that, despite his reluctance to continue beyond the conclusion of the IPCC First Session in November 1988, he was unanimously elected alongside Dr. Abudul Bar Bin Abdullah Algain (Vice-Chairman) and Mr K. R. Rufai

(Rapporteur).3 Bolin subsequently went on to chair the Panel until 1997. Robert ‘Bob’ Watson,

Bolin’s eventual successor, claims that Bolin’s leadership was a significant factor in the success of the

IPCC.4 Watson suggested that there was a great deal of confidence in Bolin, from both scientists and government officials. His apparent neutrality imparted a great deal of confidence in scientists and

1 John Houghton, Oral History of British Science: John Houghton, (British Library: C1379/45) 2 John Houghton, Oral History of British Science: John Houghton, (British Library: C1379/45) 3 W J McG Tegart, “WMO-UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, First Session: Australian Delegation Report,” (16th November 1988), Zillman Papers 4 Robert Watson, Interview with David Hirst, (13 February 2012), UK

136 politicians alike.1 The IPCC was, thus, able to trade off Bolin’s credibility and was so presented as similarly trustworthy.

Beyond selecting the chairman, and vice chairman of the IPCC Bureau, delegates at the First

Session also took considerable steps towards establishing IPCC methods in the production of the assessment. The newly elected IPCC Chairman, Bert Bolin, initiated discussion of agenda item three of the First Session (work program of the panel) with a debate on the number of Working Groups

(WGs) to be established.2 The agreed terms of reference for the WGs stressed that each WG had sole responsibility for the timely production of the assessment report. This led to the separation of the assessment into three streams of activity and three corresponding WGs. The three WGs were agreed upon in order to fulfil the three aspects of the assessment set out in the June WMO Resolution – (i)

WGI, assessing the scientific information, (ii) WGII, evaluating the environmental and socio- economic consequences, and (iii) WGIII, formulating realistic response strategies. Furthermore, discussions over the terms of reference produced an agreement that each WG would comprise about a dozen national representatives designated as “core members,” a Chairman, and a small number of

Vice-Chairmen. It was further agreed that each WG “should strive to obtain the best possible expertise,” but that ultimately “core members would be responsible for the completion of the tasks of the Working Groups.”3 So, the IPCC’s terms of reference clearly gave core members – governmental representatives – much greater responsibility than the experts.

Significantly this provided national representatives substantial scope and responsibility for the decisions to be taken over the production of the assessments. The negotiations and power-broking that determined the make-up of the each of the WGs is indicative of the ways in politics was embedded into each aspect of the assessment. While Bolin’s appointment to the role of IPCC Chairman largely reflected the need for scientific credibility, the division of national representatives onto the various

WGs was a political decision. This, I will show, was dictated by the intergovernmental mandate of the

1 Robert Watson, Interview with David Hirst, (13 February 2012), UK 2 W J McG Tegart, “WMO-UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, First Session: Australian Delegation Report,” (16th November 1988), Zillman Papers 3 IPCC, Report of the First Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC-1: TD –NO.267, (Geneva, 9-11 November, 1988)

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Panel, in which appeals to scientific credibility were finely balanced against appeals to political legitimacy – chiefly through participation of non-Western members who may not have been as scientifically capable.

In a bid to make the IPCC much more expert led the Australian delegation suggested an alternative to the country-representative core membership proposal. They suggested that the core members should be made up of nominees of relevant existing bodies, such as the WCRP.1 This proposal would have made the assessment expert-led, technocratic and managerial and in the process would have removed much of the oversight of the proposal from the governments and national representatives. The decision to reject the Australian proposal highlights the fact that national governments, most notably the US administration, wanted to be able to oversee and control the compilation of the assessment. Therefore, the argument for national representatives to be assigned as core members is indicative of how the assessment was itself becoming politicised. Overall countries at the IPCC First Session felt that if they could control the production of knowledge, there was significant scope for guiding the politics of climate change.

Figure 3. IPCC Structure during 1988-1990 Assessment.

1 W J McG Tegart, “WMO-UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, First Session: Australian Delegation Report,” (16th November 1988), Zillman Papers

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Although each WG had been given a preliminary list of topics and items of consideration to incorporate in the assessment by the IPCC as a whole, it was envisaged that the core members, Chairs and Vice-Chairs of each WG, would be the principal architects of the final reports. In addition to their appointed roles coordinating the day-to-day activities, the Chairs and Vice-Chairs were also going to make up the Bureau (the Executive Group of the IPCC) alongside the IPCC Chair and Vice-Chairs.

This arrangement offered the chair of each WG the potential for significant influence over the course of the WG, the proceedings and assessment making. Each WG Chairman was, therefore, in a position to be able to push the interests of his/her country.

With the responsibility of the Panel’s assessment shifted to the WGs, the negotiations over the composition and governance structures of each WG took on greater significance. As discussions turned towards the composition of each WG, each delegation was invited to put forward their nominations and preferences for WG membership to a small nominations committee. This committee was chaired by Dr Greg Tegart (the Australian principal delegate) and comprised of representatives from the US, USSR, Mexico, Senegal and Malta. The composition of this committee reflects the Cold

War political context. Comprising the two opposing global superpowers, two formally non-aligned countries (Malta, Senegal) and one country with non-aligned observer status (Mexico), it highlights just one of the many political trade-offs and compromises mandated by the intergovernmental structure.

The selection committee was advised to propose chairmanship, vice-chairmanship and core- membership of the three WGs, taking into account the need for equitable regional representation and for a balance of scientific and policy expertise.1 So, while the delegates were vying for key roles in order to gain political influence, this was tempered by the fact that the committee was tasked with achieving equitable regional representation. The push for equitable regional representation was included as an appeal to political legitimacy and allowed the IPCC to project an image of an

1 W J McG Tegart, “WMO-UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, First Session: Australian Delegation Report,” (16th November 1988), Zillman Papers

139 international assessment constructed by an international community on behalf of an international audience.

Following the nominations and discussions it was agreed that WG I would be chaired by the

UK (John Houghton – the head of the UK Meteorological Office); WGII on impacts would be chaired by the USSR (Yuri Izrael – the head of the USSR Hydrometeorological Service), and; WGIII examining the possible response strategies would be chaired by the US (Fred Bernthal – Assistant

Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs). Furthermore,

Brazil and Senegal were appointed as Vice-Chair to WGI, Australia and Japan to WG II and Canada,

China, Malta, the Netherlands and Zimbabwe to WG III (see Figure 4). Overall, the three WGs were, therefore, going to be chaired by representatives of countries either side of the Cold War divide.

Moreover, the Global South – in effect developing countries – were represented only by Brazil and

Senegal, displaying how the constraints of geographic representation were operating and guiding decisions within the Panel.

The decisions taken over the composition of the WGs reflect the twin strains guiding the

IPCC’s First Assessment: The need to ensure equitable geographic representation balanced against the necessary scientific and policy expertise. The appointment of John Houghton (UK), Greg Tegart

(Australia), Yuri Izrael (USSR) and Howard Ferguson (Canada) demonstrate the commitment of the

Panel to ensure the presence of highly competent and scientifically literate personnel. It is therefore evident that the selections committee had endeavoured to establish structures that would ensure the

IPCC assessment would be viewed as scientifically credible. By ensuring equitable geographic representation, the committee addressed an equally important point; that of ensuring that the IPCC would be viewed as legitimate by every country. Before he took on the chairmanship of the IPCC,

Bolin stressed that “right now, many countries, especially developing countries, simply don’t trust assessments in which their scientists and policymakers have not participated.”1 The IPCC was actively and directly addressing these issues of distrust through their selection of WG membership.

However, in attempting to create a global environmental assessment that could be said to be matched

1 Stephen H. Schneider, “Three Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” (1991), p. 25

140 by its truly global inclusivity, it could equally be argued that traditional scientific rigours went by the wayside. Core membership established on the basis of national representation meant participation was premised not on scientific merits but instead political criteria.

Figure 4. Core Membership of WGs: IPCC.

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The structure of the WGs encouraged delegations to target key roles so that they could exert influence over the actions and outcomes of the WGs. As outlined in its briefing document, a principal objective of the US delegation at the IPCC First session was to volunteer to chair one of the WGs.

Prior to the meeting, the US delegation was already being asked to play an integral role in the IPCC’s assessment in the two areas deemed to be of greatest significance – the science and policy. Their strategy identified both WG I and WG III as key areas in which “to play a leadership role by offering experts to chair or cochair [sic].”1 The US delegation was further instructed to ensure that the IPCC was the forum for “evaluating the desirability of a global convention”2, because if WG I found that there was no mandate for action, scientifically, there would be no reason for a global convention.

Similarly, if WG III found alternative response strategies available to the international community they could avert the looming possibility of implementing a global convention. Hence the document outlining US strategy went on to assert that “the U.S. could consider a framework convention that does not call for the adoption of response strategies prior to completion of the assessments.”3 This clear statement of US strategies at the First Session reinforces my earlier contention that the IPCC assessment was a means of delaying the global convention. Aware that “calls for a global convention are likely to be made by several other countries” the US delegation was being advised on how to deflect that line of reasoning back towards the IPCC’s assessment.4

Chairmanship of the working group on policy offered the US delegation a key role in shaping any negotiations of a global convention to follow. As such during the course of the meeting the US delegation, at the behest of Bill Nitze, prioritised chairing WGIII on response strategies.5 This was part of a concerted effort on the part of the US to control movements towards any formal convention, and in further making any convention that did come to pass “as light a touch as possible in terms of

1 Anonymous, “Draft U.S. Strategy for Implementation of WMO-UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),” (August 15th, 1988), Doc. G Bierly Papers 2 Anonymous, “Draft U.S. Strategy for Implementation of WMO-UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),” (August 15th, 1988), Doc. G Bierly Papers 3 Anonymous, “Draft U.S. Strategy for Implementation of WMO-UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),” (August 15th, 1988), Doc. G Bierly Papers 4 Anonymous, “Draft U.S. Strategy for Implementation of WMO-UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),” (August 15th, 1988), Doc. G Bierly Papers 5 William A Nitze, Interview with David Hirst, (7 March 2012) UK/US

142 mandatory emission reductions.”1 This was a reaction to Tolba’s push towards beginning negotiations of a global convention. In his opening address to the IPCC Tolba envisaged the conclusions emerging from the assessment to be sufficiently advanced so as “to justify actions by governments to limit and cope with climate change and possibly the start of negotiations over a global framework Convention on the subject.”2 While the US saw the IPCC as an essential forum for debating this question, their strategy was to control movement towards it, privileging debate over action. This ultimately imparted a political question – the need or otherwise of a global convention –at the heart of the assessment.

2.2 IPCC Schedule: Ensuring Salient Timing

The timetable of the Panel was also determined at the IPCC First Session. Before the national representatives arrived in Geneva, Tolba and Bruce set forth an eighteen month timetable for the production of the assessment which was approved at the meeting by the IPCC delegates. The work schedule was explicitly geared towards three meetings which externally generated key deadlines.

Panel members considered these three meetings to be of international significance. First, the Panel identified the Second World Climate Conference, scheduled for 25 June-3 July 1990. Second, was the anticipated call for a report to the 45th Session of the UN GA in 1990. And third, it was pointed out that the report could be submitted to the 11th WMO Congress and UNEP Governing Council Meeting in 1991.3 The Panel members were all in agreement on the need for the assessment report to be made available as an input to international political meetings, not just scientific conferences.

The timetable, and the specifically political nature of the meetings targeted, signifies the efforts to ensure the political relevance of the Panel’s report. On the one hand this is illustrated by the determined drive to be ready to make the assessment report available to the Second World Climate

Conference, which it was anticipated would bring scientists together with politicians and several

1 William A Nitze, Interview with David Hirst, (7 March 2012) UK/US 2 Mostafa Tolba, “ ‘Warming: Warning’ –Statement by Mostafa Tolba to the 1st Session of the IPCC” in W J McG Tegart, “WMO-UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, First Session: Australian Delegation Report,” (16th November 1988), Zillman Papers, p. 34 3 IPCC, Report of the First Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC-1: TD –NO.267, (Geneva, 9-11 November, 1988)

143 heads of state to discuss the issue. On the other, when it seemed that the Panel would not have a complete report ready in time for the conference, the suggestion of some of those involved, to postpone the conference until later in 1990 highlights the growing importance of the IPCC’s assessment to politicians, international administrators and scientists.1 The US and Canadian delegations argued that a delay would allow the Conference to benefit from the results of the Panel’s work, and for the Panel to benefit from having presented a completed report at such an important forum. Both the US and Canadian delegations supported this call as it served to further anchor the

IPCC as the key international body actively involved with climate change issues.

However, the Australian delegation was mindful that the Conference had already been delayed beyond the deadline set by the 10th WMO Congress. They, and the Soviet delegation, were concerned that the conference would slip further, but more so over the duplication of the activities of the WCP. For both the Soviet and Australian delegations, there was a concern that the IPCC was treading on the toes of the WCP. This ultimately boiled down to the fact that the Second World

Climate Conference was intended to be a forum at which the first ten years of the WCP’s activities were reviewed. The Soviets, in this context, were especially worried that the US was attempting to circumvent the WCP; the directorship of which had recently changed hands from a US citizen to a

Soviet citizen.2 As I interpret the evidence, though, it appears that the US delegation was not attempting to circumvent any particular country so much as they were attempting to anchor the IPCC as the keystone international organisation addressing climate change not the WCP. In August 1988, the draft briefing document to the US delegation stressed that, “the IPCC should encourage the WCP

IGBP (international Geosphere Biosphere Program) to address specific issues raised by the international scientific assessment.”3 The IPCC was neither performing research nor commissioning research; it was instead assessing the research and providing a bridge in order to communicate the findings of the WCP to policymakers. The decision for the IPCC to assess research – not commission

1 IPCC, Report of the First Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC-1: TD –NO.267, (Geneva, 9-11 November, 1988) 2 W J McG Tegart, “WMO-UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, First Session: Australian Delegation Report,” (16th November 1988), Zillman Papers 3 Anonymous, “Draft U.S. Strategy for Implementation of WMO-UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),” (August 15th, 1988), Doc. G Bierly Papers

144 research – reflected the time constraints on preparing the report (this is discussed in greater depth in the next section.

At the conclusion of the IPCC’s First Session, the Panel members had agreed upon the timetables, outlined the terms of reference for the WGs, and stratified into the different WGs according to their respective interests. Throughout this period, Panel members had primarily been guided by the need to ensure that the WGs were in a position to produce an assessment that could speak to as wide a political audience as possible. The IPCC was thus positioned to contribute to significant international meetings, as a means of demonstrating its saliency. In the remaining part of this chapter, I will focus on the motives of several countries in relation to the participation of developing countries, especially in WGI. I will demonstrate the politics of participation – ensuring equitable geographic representation – was much more a means of demanding governmental acquiescence, not a means diversifying the range of views.

The next step for the Panel, if it was to hit the deadlines imposed over the next eighteen months, was for the WGs to assemble and commence working on the their respective tasks.

3. “An Authoritative Statement of the Views of the International

Scientific Community”

The proposal to implement a core membership brought national representatives to the fore in the compilation of the assessment. But, as I will now show, a series of ad hoc, piecemeal decisions taken by the scientists working within the confines of this structure took the assessment out of the control of governments, exactly what the US negotiators had been trying to avoid in establishing this intergovernmental assessment. As these scientists rose to prominence in the production of the assessment, the politics of participation was disrupted. This was because the drive to enlist the best expertise tended to focus on incorporating Western scientists. The best expertise in this instance refers primarily to those scientists familiar to the WGI task force. These decisions are further evidence of the ways in which the power and authority lodged in the assessment favoured Western scientists. So, as

145 control of the assessment processes swung away from the government representatives, and towards the scientists, the priorities guiding the assessment changed. Subsequently, the US delegation, were instrumental in clawing back much of the control governments had conceded as a result of the time constraints imposed in the production of the assessment. The pushback from these governments, who decided there needed to be a review process put in place to supervise actions of the scientists, resulted in the introduction of the concept of government review. At all times, the intergovernmental structure was a constraining influence – requiring the Panel to appeal both to the ideals of scientific truth and credibility and to claims of interest and geographically equitable participation in order to appear politically legitimate.

The evolution of the working arrangements, which came about through a series of piecemeal decisions over the production of the report, ultimately marginalised the role of the core members. WG chairs (and in the case of WGI its administrative task force: scientists at the UK Met Office), came to the fore as the principal decision-making agents in the course of the assessment. As these scientists and experts were brought to the fore they were able to make decisions based on their own “scientific” criteria. Because the national representatives on the Panel – the core members – saw the assessment being conducted under their auspices, but not their guidance, they sought out ways to reintegrate some form of ownership of the report. This led to the concept of core members being abandoned at the next

IPCC session.

Immediately after the First Session the influence over the Panel swung away from governments and their representatives towards the scientists. This is prominently seen in the personnel involved in the writing of the reports, in particular WGI, which, as I stressed at the outset of this chapter, would be my principal focus due to its influential and pioneering role during the First

Assessment. At the end of the IPCC First Session, John Houghton quickly established a small task force housed in the UK Met Office to take charge of the day-to-day activities of WGI. Geoff Jenkins, a meteorologist at the Met Office, headed up the task force, and was assisted by James Ephraums

(science support), and Shelagh Varney (technical support). In addition, Jenkins was further supported in the report writing by Robert (Bob) Watson, an atmospheric chemist working at NASA and the

146 second chairman of the IPCC, and Dan Albritton, an atmospheric scientist and administrator at

NOAA.

At the outset of the activities of WGI John Houghton maintains that he wanted to see a thorough report with contributions from as many scientists as possible. 1 In an interview reflecting on his chairmanship of Working Group I, Houghton explained that:

“First of all I had to decide what our job was. And that was to do, of course, to assess as

thoroughly as possibly the whole area of human induced climate change and why it might be

occurring and so on. So we had to set an agenda of that kind. The idea was that we should

write a report of a very thorough kind. And that we should involve as many scientists as we

could.” 2

But this would have increased the size of the task of producing the assessment on such a short timescale immeasurably and been incredibly unwieldy. In response, Jenkins, Watson and Albritton quickly agreed that WGI should emulate the Scientific Committee on the Problems of the

Environment (SCOPE) 29 Report and utilise “lead authors” to write the report. As Geoff Jenkins explained to me, “Scope 29 was definitely a very influential book and really was the blueprint for how we did the IPCC Working Group One report.”3 This proposal was considerably less inclusive than

Houghton’s vision, but did meet the pragmatic needs of writing a comprehensive assessment of the physical science basis of climate change in a short 18 months.

For the SCOPE report, lead authors were asked to draw on their own expertise and the scientific community in order to draft each chapter, which then became part of a wider assessment.

The Lead authors, teams of two or three experts, coordinated meetings and workshops with other researchers in that particular field in order to synthesise and report on the latest research. In light of the restrictive deadlines imposed from the IPCC plenary meeting, and the breadth of subject areas,

Jenkins, Watson, and Albritton thought that separating the assessment out and delegating the work to

1 John Houghton, Interview with David Hirst, (30 July 2012), UK 2 John Houghton, Interview with David Hirst, (30 July 2012), UK 3 Geoff Jenkins, Interview with David Hirst, (14 March 2012), UK

147 teams of lead authors offered the greatest chance of completing the assessment in a timely and relevant fashion.

Speed and accuracy were of chief concern. They wanted the assessment done “correctly” which meant the scientists were the ones to do the work. Under these structures set out by the WGI task force, the lead authors were being given the responsibility for compiling the relevant literature and ultimately writing the report. Importantly, for Jenkins and the WGI task force, this meant work on each chapter could occur in parallel, simultaneously. Significantly, it was scientists, and not the core members, who were at the forefront of operations. In this one decision it can thus be seen that the working arrangements introduced by the WGI task force transferred the responsibilities for the production of the assessment away from governments. As a by-product, the core members were shunted to the side, not as a conscious decision to marginalise the governments, but simply to ensure the scientific accuracy.

When the core members of WGI1 gathered together for their first plenary meeting at the end of January 1989, Jenkins presented this idea of lead authors as the most viable effective use of resources towards producing an assessment. Even though this marginalised their role, the core members of WGI agreed to the principal of lead authors. The ten topics to be addressed in the assessment were also agreed. This meant that ten different teams would need to be established with a select group of lead authors, comprised of two or three experts in that area of the assessment, to draft the chapter for each respective aspect of the assessment. Crucially, this plenary meeting was important, insofar, as it allowed the WGI task force a mandate to petition a number of prominent climate scientists to become involved in the assessment process, as lead authors and expert contributors, who went on to write and review the assessment report.

With an agreement in place that it would fall to the lead authors to draft the individual chapters of the assessment, discussions as to who these lead authors would be were set forth. Guided by the ten different chapter topics and initial suggestions made by the WG core members the final

1 The core members of WG1 were: China, Denmark, FRG (Federal Republic of Germany), Japan, Kenya, Switzerland, Tanzania, USA and the USSR

148 decisions taken over who to approach in order to assemble the report ultimately fell to the WGI task force. The motivations of the WGI core members was to ensure the task force could petition a select few experts in order to ensure the scientific credibility. To this end, John Mitchell wrote to several of the US climate modelling groups, inviting them to participate in the next meeting of WGI at Princeton in March 1989. Choosing to meet in Princeton was a deliberate ploy to ensure the participation of the

US Climate modelling groups. Notably, Princeton was home to Syukuro Manabe – the “Godfather” of climate modelling, according to Geoff Jenkins.1 Holding this meeting in the US, but also at Princeton, was a ploy to make it as easy as possible to get the US climate modellers on board. These scientists had already been heavily involved the previous assessments and working on another scientific assessment, this time under the guises of the IPCC held relatively little appeal. The assessment would be time consuming, there was very little money to fund the activities, and there was no chance of any scientific publication. Nonetheless, the Working Group task force successfully persuaded Manabe, among others, to participate as a lead author on one of two climate modelling chapters.

Despite the overriding principle of equitable distribution, the drive to enlist the “best” scientists resulted in WGI approaching mainly Western scientists. Reporting on the activities of WGI to the IPCC Second Session, Geoff Jenkins pointed to the 29 lead authors from 13 countries selected by the WG task force, as well as a “total of some 200 scientists” involved in the writing of the report.2

Emphasising the global reach of the Panel’s expertise in this way, whilst not inaccurate, certainly presented a misleading picture. For whilst there were thirteen different countries represented and some two hundred scientists involved there was also a significant majority of British and American based scientists involved as lead authors. In fact British and American based scientists comprised twenty-two of the thirty-four lead authors,3 with this figure closely replicated in the overall makeup of contributors to the report.

1 Geoff Jenkins, Interview with David Hirst, (14 March 2012), UK 2 W J McG Tegart, “WMO-UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Second Session: Australian Delegation Report,” (11th July 1989), Zillman Papers 3 The country of residence of the 34 Lead authors listed: Britain – 11, USA – 11, Switzerland – 2, Sweden – 1, West Germany (FRG) – 1, China – 1, Russia (USSR) – 2, Japan – 1, Netherlands – 1, Brazil – 1, India – 1 and Canada – 1.

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At first glance these figures might appear to reflect the social biases of the WGI task force, which, of course, to some extent they do. Insofar, the networks and social contacts of a group of

British meteorologists extended only so far and was predominantly limited to trans-Atlantic and

European connections. Thus, when choosing who to invite, the WGI task force was influenced by attendees at past expert meetings and workshops in addition to WMO contacts (through John

Houghton). But significantly, they also reflect the geographic concentration of scientific research into climate change at the time. Pertinent to this observation, STS scholar, Aant Elzinga has noted that as science has become increasingly global in nature it has not decreased hierarchization. Despite increased connectivity, scope and wider participation across national borders, most scientific research remains concentrated in a few areas of the developed world. Elzinga maintains globalization of science and participation has led to a ‘de-globalization’ in the dispersion of science, concentrated in the OECD countries.1 This is exemplified by Jenkins comments to the IPCC Second Session, as we see its architects seeking to reconcile this de-globalization of the dispersion of science with the

Panel’s global accountability. By highlighting and arguably exaggerating the diversity of the WGI participants, Jenkins can be said to be responding to the pressure to ensure the political legitimacy of the assessment.

Following this meeting in Princeton, it fell to the chapter lead authors to begin writing their respective chapters. The diffuse organisational structures in WGI meant that during the process of compiling the assessment, individual scientists were allowed to make decisions based on their own scientific criteria. For instance, in a bid to retain some form of WG task force oversight, Jenkins sought to place a British scientists on each chapter lead author team. Explaining the rationale for selecting lead authors, Jenkins explained to me:

“We wanted one lead author who was the best in the world. We also wanted a lead author

who was from the UK, because, or where possible, because it meant we had no control over

1 Aant Elzinga, “Science and Technology: Internationalisation” (2004) p. 13633-13638

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these people, so if we had to deliver this thing, which we had to, then we needed somebody in

the UK so that we had to make sure it got done at the end of the day.”1

So apart from inviting the various experts to participate in the assessment as lead authors, the actual writing of the various chapters was almost completely delegated to these experts. This distribution of labour consequently reduced the role of the WG Chairman, who was nominally the highest government representative in the IPCC.

Accordingly, between April 1989 and January 1990 the lead authors convened several meetings at which two-hundred scientists were invited to participate in the process of writing the report. These meetings ranged in length from one day to one week, during which decisions were taken over the scope and content of the various chapters. A multitude of seemingly insignificant ad hoc decisions over the inclusion/exclusion of minor details taken by the lead authors was as a whole contributing meaningfully to the overall content of the assessment. One such example was a point of conflict and contestation between WGI and a group of Soviet scientists influenced by Mikhail

Budyko, the director of the Division for Climate Change Research at the State Hydrological Institute in St. Petersburg. Budyko’s approach to researching climate change differed considerably to that of the WGI task force, and their associated selection of lead author experts. Whereas, Budyko’s research suggested the preferred way to forecast or to predict what was going to happen was to use analogues – specifically paleoclimate analogues – the focus of WGI was to predict the climate through climate models. Budyko continued to push for the inclusion of his ideas on paleoclimatic analogues in the assessment via Yuri Izrael, the chair of WGII, ultimately to no avail. In order to reconcile the issue, the WGI task force decided to hold a small workshop to discuss, deliberate and evaluate the merits of utilising paleoclimatic analogues as predictors of future climate change. The eventual outcome of the meeting backed up the WGI task force view and, thus, reinforced the hegemony of climate models in the prediction of climate change in WGI, side-lining Budyko’s ideas.2

1 Geoff Jenkins, Interview with David Hirst, (14 March 2012), UK 2 John Houghton, Interview with David Hirst, (30 July 2012), UK

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The organisational structures introduced during this phase of the IPCC’s assessment meant the WGI task force and lead authors had considerable leeway and scope to shape the assessment as they saw fit. Through a combination of the time constraints imposed from the upper echelons of the

Panel’s hierarchy and the aspirations of John Houghton for a thorough report with contributions from as many scientists as possible1 the spotlight was shifted away from the core members of the WGs, and onto the scientists – the lead authors. The assemblage of the report was occurring through a loose network of lead authors and experts held together with the WGI task force at the head.

Independently the structures and methods introduced by WGI were emulated by the other

WGs. So that by the time IPCC Panel members met for the IPCC’s Second Session at UNEP’s headquarters in Nairobi (28-30 June 1989), the three WGs had all taken similar steps towards compiling their assessment reports. The core members operating in the three distinct WGs were all in the same position. Having entered into a process in which they anticipated being the central architects of the assessment, they now found themselves marginalised, their role being far smaller role than initially envisaged. Consequently, the marginalisation felt by the core members led them to seek out a way of essentially being able to approve the assessment – providing their assurance on the quality and the content.2

In pursuit of this mechanism of quality control the concept of government review surfaced during discussions at the IPCC Second Session. WGI was certainly open to the idea of review, but that was for the “natural” process of scientific peer review, for which there was already an arrangement, not for government review. In John Houghton’s report to the delegates in Nairobi, he stressed that he had asked each of the lead authors to incorporate a scientific peer review before the chapters were presented to the WG plenary meeting. Houghton went on to highlight that following the final drafting of the assessment, it would be “sent to all IPCC countries with a request to arrange for a

1 John Houghton, Interview with David Hirst, (30 July 2012), UK 2 John Zillman, Interview with David Hirst, (26 March 2012), UK/Australia

152 further scientific review.”1 Operating under the constraints of normal academic practise, Houghton and the WGI task force prioritised academic peer review as the primary means of preserving

“science’s autonomy from potentially tainting social interests… keeping non-scientists out of decisions about scientific content.” 2 As Mario Biagioli argues “peer review is deployed as a powerful discursive tool for the legitimation of science and expertise.”3 But in this instance, the introduction of a government review actually subverted the public image of scientific peer review as a guarantor of good science and reflects the on-going political considerations driving many of the decisions taken in the course of the assessments assemblage.

The nature and centrality of the peer review process of the assessment was of particular importance to the US delegation. Indeed at the first meeting of the Panel there were reports of considerable dissension among the delegates as to the source and nature of the peer review. The proposed scientific review appealed to the scientific delegates among the US delegation. But, the political representatives were concerned that this unreasonably constricted who could and should be able review the document before the government signed off on its content. These concerns became manifest half a year later at the IPCC’s Third Session when the Chairman of WGIII and the principal

US delegate, Fred Bernthal, stressed that peer reviewers should not be limited to those directly involved with climate research.4 Bernthal wanted to spread the net of potential reviewers wider than one just including scientists. Arguing against a singularly scientific peer review was the first step towards the introduction of a government review as Bernthal responded to a pressing need for the US government to ensure that they retain a strong influence over the Panel.

US policy leading up to the IPCC’s First Session had invested significant importance into the

IPCC and its findings. For the US, the IPCC assessment was acting as a stand-in for decision-making on what, if any, action was required in response to climate change. The introduction of a government

1 John Houghton, “Report From Chairman WG1 (Scientific Assessment of Climate Change)” in W J McG Tegart, “WMO-UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Second Session: Australian Delegation Report,” (11th July 1989), Zillman Papers, pp. 28-29 2 Mario Biagioli, “From Book Censorship to Peer Review” Emergences: Journal for the Study of Media & Composite Cultures, (2002) 12; 1, p. 13 3 Mario Biagioli, “From Book Censorship to Peer Review,” (2002), p.35 4 IPCC, Report of the Third Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC-5, (Washington D.C., 5-7 February 1990)

153 review was, therefore, a response to concerns that the Panel was becoming increasingly run by scientists beyond US influence. The intergovernmental nature of the assessment demanded that, rather than being led solely by the pressures of scientific legitimacy, the Panel had to satisfy the needs of political legitimacy. This politics of participation set this intergovernmental scientific assessment apart from the previous national, international and NGO led assessments. The government peer review, introduced in addition to the scientific peer review, provided the final authorisation of the report following the decisions marginalising the core members. It was a means to enable Panel members a sense of ownership and a means of control as ownership transferred back from experts to governments.

In addition to opening up the peer review process to a wider, arguably more inclusive, group of actors, the Panel also agreed to abandon the concept of core membership of its WGs.1 Panel members had expressed concerns that the core/non-core distinction discriminated against those countries only recently to have joined the Panel. So it was agreed that the principal of core membership would be dropped for similar reasons to the call to extend the peer review process. In making the process more open a wider array of participants would be able to contribute to the assessment and in turn they would have a greater sense of ownership of the report. These decisions reflected efforts to ensure the political legitimacy of the end product. By widening the access to the assessment, with participation driven by geopolitical imperatives, the final report could in this way be described as a universal, global statement on the science of climate change, its impacts and response strategies. Constrained by the demands of ensuring political credibility and legitimacy, IPCC members at this meeting saw it as essential that the assessment be viewed as open to participation by everyone.

The decisions being taken over the IPCC’s structures were guided by presenting a view from everywhere. This required instituting processes inviting review beyond a core set of participants, thus

1 W J McG Tegart, “WMO-UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Second Session: Australian Delegation Report,” (11th July 1989), Zillman Papers

154 adhering to what we would now call a ‘post-normal science’ approach. 1 Post-Normal Science’ describes a method of scientific inquiry where facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent.2 This model of post-normal science involves an interactive dialogue which,

Funtowicz and Ravetz maintain, can provide a path to the democratization of science.3 However, during the IPCC assessment the peer group was extended – increasing the number of legitimate participants – but inclusion of new experts was still done in a hierarchical fashion.

So while at the Second Session of the IPCC there was strong support for the establishment of an IPCC Special Committee on the Participation of the Developing Countries, I believe these efforts though well-intentioned actually invited participation on unequal terms.4 After Tolba’s opening statement on the issue, in which he noted with pleasure that more developing countries were present.

He went on to point out that more financial and technical assistance, education and other concrete support mechanisms were needed immediately.5 In fact even with the heightened presence of developing countries at the plenary sessions of the IPCC, there was concern at their limited participation in the activities of WGs. Tolba invited further discussion of this issue following his warning that, “developing countries needed to be assured of full participation in all actions for limiting the emission of greenhouse gases and for preparing for global warming.”6

The subsequent discussions concerning the participation of developing countries in the activities of the Panel began by considering a report submitted by Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Brazil and

Zimbabwe on the “Involvement of developing countries in the work of the IPCC.” This report had been commissioned by the IPCC Bureau earlier in the year.7 The ensuing discussion, according to the

1 Silvio O. Funtowicz and Jerome R. Ravetz, “Science for the Post-Normal Age”, Futures, (September, 1993), pp. 739-755. 2 Silvio O. Funtowicz and Jerome R. Ravetz, “Science for the Post-Normal Age”, (1993) 3 Silvio O. Funtowicz and Jerome R. Ravetz, “Science for the Post-Normal Age”, (1993) 4 IPCC, Report of the Second Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC- 3, (Nairobi, 28-30 June 1989) 5 IPCC, Report of the Second Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC- 3, (Nairobi, 28-30 June 1989), p. 2 6 IPCC, Report of the Second Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC- 3, (Nairobi, 28-30 June 1989), p. 2 7 IPCC Ad-hoc Sub-group, “Involvement of Developing Countries in the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” Annex III in IPCC, Report of the Second Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC-3, (Nairobi, 28-30 June 1989)

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IPCC Report, “brought out clearly the enthusiasm on the part of the developing countries for the work of IPCC and their genuine concern about climate change.”1 In the course of these discussions, Panel members agreed to adopt of a mixture of short, medium and long term measures recommended by the report’s authors. The long term measures were considered to be under the remit of WG3, so it was asked to include recommendations for increasing participation in the context of its proposed report sections. With regard to the short term measures though, the report’s authors, placed the emphasis on money and awareness. It was regarded as imperative to both raise awareness of the issue and promote the understanding of the issue to the public and policymakers, while at the same time providing assistance for those experts in developing countries to fully participate in the IPCC’s activities.

The IPCC was striving to take actions to create an inclusive and representative assessment, the inclusion of developing countries was specifically identified as being essential in this. So much so that the report written by a sub group convened by the IPCC explicitly answered the question of “why assist developing countries?” with two interrelated points. First, the climate change examined by the

IPCC was global. The significance of this for developing countries might be seen as minimal, as at present, developing countries are contributing but a fraction to the causes of climate change. Second, it reiterated the global dimension of climate change in both the consequences and strategies designed to limit or adapt to it. It went on to claim that it is therefore imperative that the developing countries participate effectively in any decisions regarding the response strategies.

The call in this report for universal participation was not an ideological claim, but rather had underlying interests. Fears among developing countries that, having contributed only a small fraction of climate change, they may either have to (a) pay the same (or even higher) prices because of the consequences, or (b) may be called on to contribute remedial actions, such as cutting their emissions at the expense of developing economically. The report concluded, by stressing, that participation by developing countries was essential. Indeed in claiming that any strategies pursued as a result of the assessment without the developing country participation may not be accepted was clearly interest-

1 IPCC, Report of the Second Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC- 3, (Nairobi, 28-30 June 1989), p. 18

156 driven.1 It was felt, that without the universal ownership, there would not be universal acceptance of the need for action, outlined in WGI and WGII, nor the adherence to the recommended response strategies, outlined in WGIII. The wide scale endorsement of this report by the Panel as a whole is indicative of how political legitimacy was of paramount importance to all the countries in the IPCC.

Whether it was the developing countries, who wanted an increased role, or the developed countries, who wanted to portray the IPCC as universally accessible, issues around participation were at the fulcrum of the IPCC’s political legitimacy.

Further evidence of the degree of attention being given over to ensuring political legitimacy is borne out in the subsequent agreement to establish a special committee on the Participation of developing countries. During the initial discussions many delegations expressed an interest in contributing to the committee and strong support for its proposed work. Bolin proposed that five members each from the developed and the developing world be appointed to the committee and for it to be chaired by France.2 Developed countries were plainly eager to ensure that the IPCC assessment didn’t come across as skewed or biased against developing countries. Indeed, there was a stated ambition to ensure equitable geographic representation in even WGI where participation would seem to be more naturally based on levels of technical expertise. 3 However, while these pressures to speak to a wide audience, through the politics of participation, were widely broadcast, there remained an inherent bias towards Western scientists when it came down to the preparation of the assessments.

As I will argue in greater depth in chapter 5, the attempts to incorporate developing countries in the IPCC were largely tokenistic. Indeed the inclusion of developing countries in a process dominated by Western scientists (88% of all contributors to the First Assessment were from developed countries)4 was more about gaining governmental assent than widening participation. The

1 IPCC Ad-hoc Sub-group, “Involvement of Developing Countries in the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” Annex III in IPCC, Report of the Second Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC-3, (Nairobi, 28-30 June 1989) 2 IPCC, Report of the Second Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC- 3, (Nairobi, 28-30 June 1989), p. 19 3 John Houghton, Interview with David Hirst, (30 July 2012), UK 4 Claudia Ho-Lem, Hisham Zerriffi & Milind Kanlikar, “Who participates in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and why: A Quantitative assessment of the national representation of authors in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ” Global Environmental Change, 21, (2011), pp. 1308-1317

157 intergovernmental aspect of the assessment allowed US policymakers to create a veneer of political legitimacy by suggesting the panel was, despite its overwhelmingly Western perspective, open to participation by everyone. Moreover, this also forcefully implied that the end-product could speak on behalf of the entire globe – East, West, North, South, developed and developing country alike.

By the conclusion of the Second Session of the IPCC, the delegation of responsibilities in writing the assessment to the WG chairs and its selection of lead authors was complete. The official report of the IPCC’s Second Session affirms this in a clear and concise manner, stating that “the

Chairmen of the Working Groups are given the discretion and the responsibility to conduct their business in the most effective way.”1 In this way between the IPCC’s First Session in November

1988, and the Second Session in June 1989, the working group chairs and “core members” had taken decisions that instituted specific practises and procedural mechanisms and shaped content of the First

Assessment. Discussions between British and American scientists at the outset of activities in WGI advanced the idea of lead authorship. This one proposal and its subsequent approval at WG plenary meeting contributed significantly to the institution of two forms of peer review – scientific and government –and in the relaxing of the core/non-core distinction in the WGs.

This briefly contested battle for control and influence of the assessment demonstrates the oscillating poles of influence to have shaped the overall structures of the First Assessment. Firstly, government representatives had more influence because of their core membership status. This was gradually eroded through the actions taken by WGI, who managed to manoeuvre the lack formal structures in the assessment process in order to reinstate the central position of experts in assembling the assessment. However, in response to this marginalisation, governments were able to utilise the intergovernmental nature of the assessment in order to regain greater oversight of the process through mandatory review. And so, the scientific and political concerns were again realigned, as the power swung back in the direction of government representatives.

1 IPCC, Report of the Second Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC- 3, (Nairobi, 28-30 June 1989), p. 22

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Houghton did not foresee the scale of involvement of either scientists or government representatives in writing the first assessment. But, in order to produce a document that could be accepted and agreed as universally as possible, it became the intention of WGI, and subsequently

WGII and WGIII, to involve “as many scientists […] from as many countries as possible.”1 This ambition was also reflected in the main IPCC sessions. During these meetings there was a concerted effort to construct both a scientifically and politically credible assessment. The scientific credibility was established through recourse to normal scientific justifications of authority on the subject.

Conversely, the political legitimacy appears to have been of greater concern and importance to the

IPCC members. In order to establish political legitimacy, the Panel members endeavoured to demonstrate that they were indeed including as wide and diverse an array of experts in the production of the assessment and to gain peer review approval. What transpired was an assessment that reiterated the consensus statements from earlier international assessments, through the involvement of many of the same scientists. In effect, the governments of a few developed countries legitimated the scientific credibility of a number of scientists operating within a determinedly Western framing of climate change.

4. Reception of the Report: Political Legitimacy and Scientific Credibility

The aim of the IPCC was to have the final assessment report available in the latter part of 1990. With this objective in mind, the IPCC’s report from the Second Session in June 1989 charted a course for the following twelve months of activities. It was hoped that the report would be approved at its Fourth

Session, due to be hosted by the Swedish government in August 1990. This would allow the report to feed into discussions at the SWCC, which had been deliberately delayed by two months to November

1990, especially for its last two days when several heads of state were expected to attend. The timetable of meetings would allow the Panel’s findings to contribute directly to political discussions over the ways in which climate change could be limited, and/or adapted to, thus ensuring its saliency.

1 John Houghton, Interview with David Hirst, (30 July 2012), UK

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In this section I will outline the interactions between the WGs, the IPCC Bureau (comprising the IPCC Chairman, Vice-Chairman and WG Chairs), and the delegates at the main plenary IPCC sessions in finalising the assessment report. During these final stages and the subsequent reception of the report, the dual legitimacy – the appeals to both pillars of scientific and political legitimacy – of the IPCC will become manifest. This dual legitimacy was an important factor in ensuring the political relevance of the assessment in 1990, but has subsequently opened the IPCC up to criticisms questioning the politicisation of the science used in the assessment. In this section I will show how the

IPCC’s methods and practises, devised in an ad hoc piecemeal fashion, were deployed in defence of their findings against this criticism. The exceptional qualities of an intergovernmental assessment, namely the ability to speak authoritatively to scientific and political audiences, meant the IPCC was able to cement itself as the central authoritative body providing information on climate related matters in the subsequent negotiations.

In order to ensure that the final report was received as scientifically credible the interim work of the WGs was thoroughly scrutinised. Following the Second IPCC Session in Nairobi and in the intervening 6 months leading up to the Third IPCC Session in February 1990 the lead authors of WGI organised “16 workshops [...] to prepare drafts of each of the sections.”1 With each chapter lead author team also having been asked by Jenkins to include a round of peer review the drafts were brought together for discussion at a meeting of the lead authors shortly after the Third IPCC Session later in February 1990.2 Notifying the Panel of the WGs intention to hold this meeting, Jenkins indicated that it would ensure that the document was a “clear and concise statement of the current understanding of the climate change issue.”3 This meeting was the last chance for the WGI task force to ensure some sort of coherence in the overall report. Thus, owing to the past experiences of Jenkins and Watson in the scientific and technical assessments of ozone depletion from the mid-1970s to the

1 IPCC, Report of the Third Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC-5, (Washington D.C., 5-7 February 1990), p. 18 2 Geoff Jenkins, Interview with David Hirst, (14 March 2012), UK 3 IPCC, Report of the Third Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC-5, (Washington D.C., 5-7 February 1990), p. 18

160 late-1980s, the WGI task force called upon the lead authors to contribute to an overarching ‘Summary for Policymakers’.

At this meeting the final draft was scrutinised on a line-by-line basis. Notably, there was no governmental representation nor a formal process outlined. It was instead a conspicuous example of one of the ways in which a series of ad-hoc piecemeal decisions taken by the WGI task force on the working arrangements of the IPCC shaped the content of the assessment. Indeed, the fact that the meeting happened at all was at the insistence of the WGI task force. Driven by scientific considerations and a kind of crowd-sourced expert peer review, this meeting highlights the lengths the

WGI task force went to in order to ensure the final report was perceived as scientifically credible.

Meanwhile the ‘Summary for Policymakers’ also addressed at this meeting was a conspicuous example of how the task force were also influenced by the overarching political considerations demanded by an intergovernmental assessment. The Summary for Policymakers was explicitly intended to ensure that the WGI assessment could not possibly be ignored due to overly complex and technical language. Jenkins and Watson were eager to see the report translated into a short, concise summary which would highlight the details deemed relevant by the lead authors, invited experts and WGI Task force in order to directly address politicians rather than experts. After

Jenkins’ initial proposal for the summary, he called upon the political representatives at the IPCC plenary session to advise “what questions they wished to have addressed” so as to “bring out the aspects of special relevance to policy decisions.”1 Executive statements and summaries of assessments were not necessarily novel in past environmental assessments. However, the IPCC Summary for

Policymakers was novel, in that explicitly addressed the issues, concerns and questions posed by policymakers. The science in the assessment was thus being positioned so as to be salient to their needs.

The WGI authors were keen to ensure that summary, whilst politically motivated, maintained its scientific credibility. Drafted by Geoff Jenkins, John Mitchell, Chris Folland (UK Met Office), and

1 IPCC, Report of the Second Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC- 3, (Nairobi, 28-30 June 1989)

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Bob Watson the document was taken to the meeting of lead authors at the end of February to be scrutinised. During the course of the meeting, the draft was analysed, dissected and amended on the basis of clarity or scientific justifications. John Houghton, chairing the meeting, was quick to side-line anything he deemed to be a “policy-point,” because, as far as he was concerned, WGI dealt with the science, not the policy.1 Houghton explained his recollections of this meeting to me in an interview:

“So we already had our final report when the governments present went through the final

document sentence by sentence and agreed it sentence by sentence. And that was a scientific

meeting too, because it was all about science and no policy matters were allowed to come in.

And if somebody got up and made a policy point then I, as chairman, just ruled it out and

said, well that’s a policy point; that’s not a scientific point, so you can’t say that. We’ll take

no notice of that. And it worked actually for Working Group One; it was much harder in the

other two working groups.”2

Clearly, Houghton, the lead authors and the WG task force were insistent upon scientific rigours, but issues around participation and the decision to mandate a policymaker’s summary was itself a political decision. Houghton’s assertion, therefore, ignores the very political nature of an intergovernmental as opposed to expert assessment. Through the involvement of governments in the selection, legitimation and endorsement of experts in the IPCC processes, the assessment, whilst clearly geared towards the production of a report with defensible scientific credentials, also had overtly political considerations shaping and guiding the IPCC’s processes. Thus, while the credibility of the scientific assessment was being assured by its chairman and lead authors, it was also becoming increasingly political.

In order to guarantee that the final report would be seen as a legitimate and globally representative; both the draft of the assessment and the policymaker’s summary were sent out to each government represented in the IPCC accompanied by a request to review the report and submit their concerns promptly. The responses that WGI received were mixed, with varying levels of engagement

1 John Houghton, Interview with David Hirst, (30 July 2012), UK 2 John Houghton, Interview with David Hirst, (30 July 2012), UK

162 with the report. While some government reviews engaged the report superficially, often due to a significant dearth in appropriate expertise, others provided extensive comments and reviews. US contributions to the review process were the most extensive, closely followed by the Australian government’s responses. The Australian authorities, for example, convened a workshop under the auspices of the Australian Coordination Committee for the IPCC (ACCIPCC). At this workshop fifty five high level scientists and government officials from the Bureau of meteorology, university departments, the national science agency and several government departments met to review, assess and comment on the assessment.1

While it was vitally important to the way the assessment was received that every country represented in the IPCC had the opportunity for their own input into the report, the American and

Australian responses were in fact exceptional. The government responses from countries with a much less developed climate change program were much smaller scale, principally involving reviews from individual scientists from those countries.2 The Thai Government, for instance, had only one reviewer,

P. Patvivatsiri, from the meteorological department in Bangkok. Discussing WG I involvement, John

Houghton explained to me in an interview that:

“People were very pleased to be involved, even if their science wasn’t quite up to it on the

scale; they didn’t have the facilities in some countries of course, than people in the more

advanced countries had. But we did want to make it so that people felt they belonged.”3

This meant that the WG task force received varying levels of engagement with the report predominantly in line with the relevant expertise within the country on the matter. Indeed the WGI report was actually reviewed by only twenty-one of the thirty IPCC members States represented at the

First Session of the IPCC in 1988. Therefore, while there was significant attention paid to the pressures to present the assessment as being geographically, even globally, representative, the evidence to support these claims was lacking.

1 John Zillman, Interview with David Hirst¸ (26 March 2012), UK/Australia 2 Geoff Jenkins, Interview with David Hirst, (14 March 2012), UK 3 John Houghton, Interview with David Hirst, (30 July 2012), UK

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Despite these issues regarding geographic representation, the comments submitted by the governments were then used to prepare a second order draft. The WGI task force, headed up by Geoff

Jenkins, weighed up the various review comments and attempted to formulate a balanced final draft.

In May 1990, this draft was then taken to the final plenary meeting of WGI in Windsor, where it was discussed alongside the policymaker’s summary. This final version of the report had therefore undergone at least two rounds of scientific peer reviewing, and had also been submitted to a round of government reviews. All of which contributed to the largely positive manner in which it was received by the scientific community, governments and the media.

At the final plenary meeting of WGI, the assessment report was unveiled to widespread media and political attention. However, it was not until later in 1990 that all three WGs of the IPCC finalised their drafts and compiled the reports for approval at the Fourth IPCC Session. So, in August 1990, the

Fourth IPCC Session opened with the intention of approving the final assessment reports. In Obasi’s opening address at the IPCC Fourth Session, he suggested that, “the importance of this meeting has been greatly enhanced by the reputation of which the IPCC has built up in the short two years of its existence, not only in scientific terms, but also in the political arena.”1 Obasi went on to thank the

“more than 1,000 specialists from 70 countries” for their work in contributing to “the most comprehensive international intergovernmental assessment ever undertaken of a serious environmental and scientific problem.”2 Obasi’s recognition of the enhanced political reputation of the IPCC is indicative of how the Panel was anchoring itself as the authoritative body for politicians to consult on climate change. In stark contrast, the AGGG, which was still functioning under WMO,

UNEP and ICSU auspices diligently going about its business, had been comprehensively marginalised and superseded by the IPCC. Furthermore, the IPCC was similarly overshadowing on-going domestic national assessments.

1 IPCC, Report of the Fourth Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC- 6, (Sundsvall, Sweden, 27-30 August 1990), p. 3 2 IPCC, Report of the Fourth Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC- 6, (Sundsvall, Sweden, 27-30 August 1990), p. 4

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In addition to the size and scope of the First Assessment, praised so highly by Obasi, the

Panel also agreed to arrive at its decisions by consensus.1 There is little information on who made this suggestion, but this small, yet significant, caveat added to the report at the Fourth IPCC Session, essentially meant that the final assessment could justifiably be described as a product of all the governments, as each representative would had to have signed up to the conclusions. Moreover, John

Houghton’s foreword to the published version of the IPCC’s Scientific Assessment suggested that the peer review process “helped ensure a high degree of consensus amongst authors and reviewers regarding the results presented.”2 These two strands of consensus – political and scientific – were actively sought after and constructed throughout the assessment cycle. This is illustrated by the work conducted within the WGs, certainly WGI, of ensuring perceptions of scientific integrity, and thus credibility informing their decision-making.

It is instructive to revisit David Guston’s critique of scientific consensus as a means of informing policy decisions. 3 Guston, notes that the outcome – what the relevant scientific community thinks – rather than the process – how they have reached their decision – would, at first glance, appear to be the most critical aspect of a consensus.4 But, Guston, highlights that consensus as outcome can be deployed by policymakers as stand-in for the authority of consensus as process that it is taken to represent. The result of which is that policymakers will equally challenge the outcome if they disagree with it. Crucially, the procedure of reaching a consensus connotes that some deliberation has taken place. The consensus as process agreement was essential to the IPCC defence when challenged by other agencies. The significance of this consensus agreement manifested itself as the report was disseminated after the IPCC approved the report in full. This is particularly evident in Bob Watson’s experience in a meeting with, the White House Chief of Staff, John Sununu, and, Director of the

Office of Management and Budget, Richard Darman two very influential voices during the first Bush

1 IPCC, Report of the Fourth Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC- 6, (Sundsvall, Sweden, 27-30 August 1990), p.13 2 John Houghton, “Foreword” in IPCC, Climate Change: The Scientific Assessment (eds.) J. T. Houghton, G. J. Jenkins & J. J. Ephraums, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1990), p. v 3 David Guston, “On Consensus and Voting in Science: From Asimolar to the National Toxicology Program” pp. 378-404 in, The new political sociology of science: institutions, networks and power (eds.) Frickel, S. and Moore, K., (The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison: 2006). 4 David Guston, “On Consensus and Voting in Science” (2006).

165 presidency. Watson was called into this meeting by George H. W. Bush’s presidential science advisor,

Allan Bromely, to discuss the first draft of the policymaker’s summary. In this meeting Sununu challenged Watson, in no uncertain terms, to explain why the WGI policymaker’s summary was so

“strong” and who had written it.1 Watson explained that he, John Houghton, John Mitchell, and Geoff

Jenkins had written it and that there was a process that was very straightforward – that it undergoes a peer review both by experts and by governments. Watson went on to stress that, “if there is indeed anything in there that can’t be defended based on the evidence in working group one it will indeed be changed to be consistent.”2 Watson’s defence of the assessment was based on the peer review mechanism, which meant that no one person or small group could be singled out. Neither Sununu nor

Darman were particularly happy about the summary statements regarding dramatic emissions reductions. But the US willingly joined the rest of the IPCC in adopting the report at its Fourth

Session. Sununu and Darman, ultimately, either felt they could not argue with the consensus, as they saw that it was based on, what Bob Watson had conveyed as, a solid scientific foundation. Or, they were at this stage unwilling to take a strong public stance opposing the WGI statement, believing that the WGIII report would have greater significance in the political negotiations anticipated to follow the report’s publication.

Finally, the intergovernmental aspect of the assessment meant that there was a twin ownership of the outcomes. The involvement of leading scientists writing the reports gave the assessments scientific credibility. Meanwhile, the procedures established and ratified by the government representatives on the panel similarly gave the governments a sense of political ownership of the report. John Houghton felt that “it was absolutely key to the IPCC’s progress that [it was] an intergovernmental body belonging to governments so that governments would take notice of us and that’s been true ever since.”3 However, it is crucial that the IPCC assessment be understood as a report belonging to a select few governments and a selectively small scientific community. Hence, the ownership of the report by this group of influential governments, such as the US, prevented them

1 Robert Watson, Interview with David Hirst, (13 February 2013), UK 2 Robert Watson, Interview with David Hirst, (13 February 2013), UK 3 John Houghton, Interview with David Hirst, (30 July 2012), UK

166 from openly criticising it. The US administration had invested significant capital in legitimising the

IPCC report in order to control the politics of climate change. Houghton’s model of ownership is naively true, to a large extent, but substantially downplays the embedded political motivations behind the reports acceptance.

5. Conclusions

The principal focus of this chapter has been the 18 months of activities of IPCC WGI, culminating in the publication of the Scientific Assessment of Climate Change in 1990 and the accompanying

Summary for Policymakers. I have shown how numerous ad hoc decisions – taken prior to the IPCC’s first meeting, during the course of composing the assessments and at the plenary sessions of the IPCC

– produced a report that was widely accepted as an authoritative assessment of the issue of climate change. To a large extent the authoritative status of the assessment was achieved through appeals to scientific credibility, political legitimacy and ultimately in the expeditious and salient publication of the report. But there was also significant political capital invested, most notably by the US administration, in legitimising the report in order to control the politics of climate change.

Throughout the assessment cycle, capitalising on the absence of a set of formal procedural guidelines, both the scientists and political representatives exerted an influence. Thus, it was through the actions and counter actions, of those involved in the IPCC plenary sessions and the minutiae of assessment writing, that the IPCC structures evolved. As a result the assessment’s authoritative status was built on a dual legitimacy, specifically through its appeals to notions of both scientific credibility and political legitimacy.

The inauguration of the IPCC was accompanied by an initial exuberance of the scientists involved. Houghton, for instance looked to create a comprehensively science led technocratic review.

The structures and checks introduced in the course of the reports assemblage, as a result of the WGI task force, drew heavily on practises deployed in previous assessments of climate change. In prioritising expert peer review and the “lead author” method of assembling the report, scientists were

167 given (i) full authority to begin compiling the assessment, and (ii) full responsibility for checking and authorising its validity. Thus, the IPCC assessment, led by eminent scientists such as Bert Bolin and

John Houghton, was able to project itself as scientifically credible.

In response, to the emergent control and power being wielded by scientists – shaping the assessment’s priorities, activities, and report content – and because of the marginalisation of overt governmental representatives, the government representative sought to reassert their control over the

IPCC. This was achieved, firstly, through the introduction of ‘core membership.’ This assured governments of their central role in the various WGs of the IPCC. Secondly, through the extension of the peer review process to include governments, and political representatives, Panel members were seeking to reassert their “ownership” of the report. This consequently transferred much of the control back from the scientists to the governments, and their representatives.

Alongside the tussles for control of the assessment mechanism the IPCC assessment was positioned to produce usable knowledge. Usable knowledge, according to Peter Haas, is accurate and politically relevant information.1 This is illustrated by the timetables proposed by the IPCC’s architects, which ensured that the report would feed into significant high level political meetings. This saw the IPCC positioned at the crux of the emergent international climate regime. US officials were instrumental in championing the IPCC (which I will explore in greater depth in Chapter 5) as they wished to control the Panel whilst also appearing to be an active participant. Behind closed doors, however, they obstructed progress of policies they were unhappy with. Because US strategic engagement with the IPCC was based on a linear model of policymaking, whereby scientific assessments delineate suitable policy response options which are then implemented, US delegations at

IPCC plenary sessions were instructed to take on a leadership role. The US delegation, therefore, legitimised the knowledge produced in the IPCC in so doing strengthening their political position. The knowledge and power in the politics of climate change was connected in a reciprocal relationship of legitimation. US officials at IPCC meetings were seeking to control the politics of climate change by

1 Peter M. Haas, “When does power listen to truth?” ( 2004)

168 legitimising the knowledge contained within the IPCC. Therefore, controlling the IPCC structures, activities and the scope of the assessment was a crucial pillar of US climate policy.

The unique, evolving nature of the IPCC allowed it to harness the often divergent forces of science and politics harmoniously. This was essential to the successful reception of the final report in

November 1990. However, one underlying concern in November 1990 remained – that of true equitable geographical representation. While there were efforts were made to involve as many countries as possible in the IPCC, the existing research and expertise remained firmly in the hands of

Western, developed nations. The efforts to widen the inclusion of developing countries was at best tokenistic, and at worst, allowed US policymakers to include other countries in the assessment as a means to gain governmental assent to their policies. Ultimately, the authoritative status of the IPCC was achieved through a combination of its scientific credibility legitimised under the auspices of governments.

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6. Appendix

Figure 5. Report of IPCC WGI (Science) activities presented at the Second Session of the IPCC in Nairobi, 28-30

June 1989.

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Chapter 5 – The Framework Convention on Climate Change: the intertwining science and politics of climate change, 1988-1992

1. Introduction

“Right now, many countries, especially developing countries, simply don’t trust assessments

in which their scientists and policymakers have not participated ... Don’t you think global

credibility demands global representation?”

-Bert Bolin, Chairman of IPCC (1988)1

Several events in 1988 suddenly brought climate change from the fringes to the forefront of the news agenda and, hence, an important political issue. In June 1988, as North America endured an unusually hot and dry summer, the US media focused on the issue of climate change through the frame of extreme weather and drought. Capitalising on this attention US senators arranged a Senate hearing.

On 24 June 1988, in a stiflingly hot committee room in Washington D.C. the gathered media and

Senators in the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee were informed that it was “time to stop waffling so much and say the evidence is pretty strong that the greenhouse effect is here.”2 James

Hansen, director of the NASA Goddard Institute of Space Studies, stressed that although the on-going heat wave could not be directly attributed to global warming, it was a warning of the increasing likelihood of extreme weather events, if action was not taken. The overriding message emphasised the

3 urgent need to shift energy production away from fossil fuels and in turn reduce emissions of CO2.

A few days later, that same message was echoed, at what Shardul Agrawala has referred to as the “first ‘million dollar’ meeting on climate change.”4 The Toronto Conference on the Changing

Atmosphere attracted a mixture of scientists, politicians, and several heads of state and was notable

1 Bert Bolin quoted in Stephen H. Schneider, “Three Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” (1991), p. 25 2 Michael White & Tim Radford, “Pollution threat of scorched Earth: NASA scientist urges ‘cut the waffle’ on danger of global drought,” the Guardian, (June, 25 1988) 3 Philip Shabecoff, “Global Warming has Begun, Expert tells Senate”, New York Times, 24th June 1988, accessed online 11th June 2012: www.nytimes.com/1988/06/24/us/global-warming-has-begun-expert-tells- senate.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm 4 Shardul Agrawala, “Context and Early Origins of the IPCC” (1994a), p. 610

171 for its ambitious recommendations centred on calls to governments, the UN and the wider global community to adopt an “international framework convention […] as well as national legislation for protection of the global atmosphere.”1 In 1988, unusually hot weather combined with the Senate hearings and turned the Toronto Conference into a “media mecca.”2 The hot weather had clearly heated up the debate around climate change.

In the aftermath of the heightened media attention, the IPCC first met in 1988 Geneva, failing to capture the same level of interest. Nevertheless, throughout this period several other international meetings on climate change did garner considerable media attention contrary to the wishes of US and

UK officials, who were eager to ensure that the IPCC was the chief focus of international attention for climate change policy. In this chapter I highlight several other sites, forums, and meetings at which other countries sought to raise the political stakes on climate change and the response from US and

UK officials, who reaffirmed their stance on the necessary centrality of the IPCC to climate change policy, a strategy which, ultimately, failed as it was superseded by a new organisation established to explicitly deal with the political dimensions of climate change. A key question addressed throughout this chapter is: how and why did the IPCC lose its political mandate, but retain its governmental authority.

In this chapter, I trace the evolution of the IPCC’s involvement in the politics of climate change from its inception in 1988 through to the publication of its interim report in time for the Rio

Earth Summit in 1992. In doing so, I highlight the ways in which US and UK negotiators utilised the

IPCC’s nominally apolitical status to meet specific political ends – chiefly to avoid the implementation of a binding global convention with specific targets and timetables. I first focus on the strategic engagement of US and UK delegations at the Noordwijk Conference on Atmospheric

Pollution, 1989. In doing so, I show the various ways in which they sought to funnel all debates through the IPCC assessment. Second, I explore the negotiations resulting in the establishment of the

1 Various Authors, Conference Statement, “Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security,” (Toronto: 27th-30th June, 1988) accessed online: http://www.cmos.ca/ChangingAtmosphere1988e.pdf 13th April 2012 2 Sheldon Ungar, “The Rise and (Relative) Decline of Global Warming as a Social Problem” (1992), p. 492

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Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to the Framework Convention on Climate Change

(INC/FCCC) – a formal political negotiating body for a climate change treaty. I show that the establishment of the INC, and the subsequent interactions between the IPCC and the INC, forced the

IPCC into a subordinate position regarding the politics of climate change. This was contrary to the wishes of US policymakers who had previously expended substantial political capital in circumscribing a central role for the IPCC in the politics of climate change. Finally, I discuss the

IPCC’s input at the Earth Summit, whereby I suggest that US disengagement from the politics of climate change emerged as a result of the co-option of the issue more deeply within a sustainable development framing under the UN.

Over the course of the IPCC assessment, its scientific credibility and authority was utilised as a strategic political resource by both the US and UK governments in order to meet their own political ends. The overriding aim of the two countries was to establish and maintain a particularly technocratic approach to international policymaking, in order to constrain both the terrain and scope of the debate.

Their mantra was, “we need more scientific certainty before we act” and the IPCC, with its scientific focus, fit the bill. Thus, the US and UK administrators championed the IPCC as the preferred conduit through which to channel political debate, in effect politicising the science while de-politicising the politics. To further legitimise the knowledge produced by the IPCC, US administrators found a prestigious ally to support their bid to control the politics of knowledge production.

While the IPCC remained the focal point for the discussions around representations of climate change for developed countries, developing countries, such as Brazil and India, grew increasingly disenfranchised. Though participation in the IPCC was guided by both the need for equitable geographic representation and scientific and technical competency, the resulting composition noticeably favoured scientists from developed countries. Indeed, many developing countries involved in the IPCC felt unable to participate on an equal basis. Thus, while the IPCC First Assessment was celebrated as a scientific and technical success, it clearly also engendered disaffection among many developing countries. So, as the IPCC assessment report was being finalised, several developing countries consequently began campaigning for a new intergovernmental negotiating body to be

173 convened under the auspices of the UN General Assembly (UN GA) resulting in the establishment of the INC. The remit of this newly created committee circumvented the more politically-oriented future role, US and UK officials had envisaged, for the IPCC. Following this the political debate around climate change came under the banner of the UN. On this rearranged political landscape, politics came much closer to the heart of climate change. All of which was contrary to the wishes of the US and UK, whose political representatives had been the architects of a technocratic science-led de- politicised process, which had led, originally, to the development of the IPCC.

As more developing countries acquainted themselves with the issue, the politics of climate change evolved from an environmental issue into a developmental issue, which was a framing unsuited to the IPCC’s technocratic approach. The initial political fault line vis-à-vis climate change had divided most of the developed countries. On the one hand, there were those countries who were advocating the establishment of GHG emissions targets and timetables. On the other were the US and

Britain, who questioned their validity, instead emphasising the need for more scientific research. For the US government the IPCC assessment had from the very outset been a delaying tactic. While other

Europeans would have adopted targets fairly readily, the US and UK wanted the intervention of the

Panel’s scientific assessment and the inherent uncertainty to slow the process down.

By the time of the Rio ‘Earth Summit’ a fundamentally scientific era in the history of climate change had ended. But, in spite of the attempts to open up the politics of climate change, the climate regime has retained a highly scientized politics of climate change. First, through the establishment of the IPCC and, subsequently, in the creation of the INC, the science of climate change was embedded into increasingly political bodies. The next section of this chapter highlights how US and UK officials sought to bury the politics of climate change in the IPCC assessment. The second section illustrates the ways in which the IPCC’s framing excluded many developing countries and the subsequent reaction. The final section focuses on the changing functions of the IPCC as a result of the INC process in the build-up to the Rio ‘Earth Summit’ in 1992.

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2. Establishing the Primacy of the IPCC at Noordwijk

Climate change, as a political issue, quickly rose up the political agenda of several countries governments with the establishment of the IPCC and was then rapidly co-opted into the wider international political strategy of countries with well-developed climate research programs, including the US, UK and Germany. Alongside the IPCC meetings and workshops between 1988 and 1990, there were other significant activities addressing the science and politics of climate change, most notably the Noordwijk Conference on Atmospheric Pollution, which took place from 6-7 November

1989. These alternative settings for formal discussions of the scientific and political dimensions of climate change were problematic for countries, like the US and UK, who wanted the IPCC to provide the primary scientific and political discourse on climate change.

Rather than engage in political negotiations in these alternative contexts, both the US and UK governments sought instead to funnel any debate and discussion of climate change through the IPCC, confirming its primacy. This meant that at the Noordwijk meeting, the first formal Ministerial-level meeting to take place on climate change, the US and UK delegates emphatically stressed the importance and centrality of the IPCC. By acting as champions of the IPCC, they could demonstrate their environmental credentials whilst at the same time delay further material discussion of any binding legal agreement, because the IPCC was not due to report for another year. The IPCC assessment offered the two countries a legitimate escape route from awkward questions over how and when emissions reductions would be made. It also allowed these countries the scope to reaffirm the importance of the IPCC and its assessment.

In 1989, the Noordwijk Conference met in the context of an unstable and transitional phase of international relations. The Berlin Wall had fallen and it was not clear how much longer the USSR would last. Throughout the second half of the 20th Century, UK officials effectively saw themselves as mediators between Europe and the US, despite increasing American impatience with this stance. 1

Indeed, with the end of the Cold War, US policymakers were anxious to see greater European

1 John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After, (Macmillan Press Ltd: Basingstoke, 2001), pp. 173-195

175 integration, as it afforded them an important seat at the European table through NATO. In the face of these factors, though, the UK was still committed to an ‘Atlanticist’ approach. This was guided by

Thatcher’s views that an integrated Europe would augment a unified Germany’s power and not constrain it.1 So while there was a slight cooling of the transatlantic special relationship in 1989 as

President George H. W. Bush sought to distance himself from his predecessor’s close ties with

Thatcher. Ultimately, the UK continued to play an intermediary role between the US and Europe, and so aligned itself with the US at most international meetings. The Noordwijk conference was no exception.

The Noordwijk Conference was itself the idea of the outgoing Dutch Environment Minister and had been conceived of in June 1988, before the IPCC and other international activities on climate change began.2 According to the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Dutch wanted to utilise the conference to negotiate new initiatives on emissions targets as well as on funding for developing countries.3 Both of these aims ran counter to the strategic aims of the FCO officials coordinating the UK delegation to the conference. There was in fact a split between the European countries – led by the Netherlands and Germany – who wanted to see binding targets and timetables established to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the US and UK who emphasised the need for more research before any actions could be undertaken. Indeed, both the US and UK championed the

IPCC as a more appropriate organisation to assess the merits and specific targets and timetables to be set. The US and UK administrations demonstrably wanted to delay discussion of these targets, and thus saw the IPCC as an ideal mechanism to avert any overtly political discussions, because it still promoted a scientific approach. FCO concerns were, therefore, exacerbated as it was made clear that the Dutch were intent on making the conference a legitimate forum in which political negotiations

1 John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship, (2001), p. 185 2 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO forthwith) to [redacted], “Telno 991: Dutch Ministerial Conference on Climate Change,” October 1989, FoI Request 1126-12: FCO 3 FCO to [redacted], “Telno 991: Dutch Ministerial Conference on Climate Change,” October 1989, FoI Request 1126-12: FCO

176 could take place on a convention along the lines of that for ozone depleting chemicals, if only in a preparatory fashion.1

The strategic objectives of the FCO officials were at odds with the attempts of the Dutch organisers to focus the conference on political negotiations and discussions concerning the selection and allocation of emissions targets. This meant that while the Dutch environment ministry were keenly pronouncing that the final declaration “must contain elements to combat worldwide emissions

2 of CO2 and other greenhouse gases” a member of the UK delegation, reporting upon his involvement in a steering committee meeting in September 1989, referred to a policy of “constructive damage limitation”.3 The UK was prepared to participate, and were in fact eager to retain the appearance of a concerned and diligent contributor, but they were not prepared to engage with a number of issues, namely emissions targets that other European countries were pushing for. The conference looked as though it would offer nothing but problems and controversial issues. Nevertheless, the UK government had already committed itself to taking on a leadership role on climate change through the

IPCC, John Houghton head of the UK Met Office was also Chairman of IPCC Working Group (WG)

I. At the outset of the IPCC’s activities, even before he had taken on the chairmanship of WG I,

Houghton had been told by Department of Environment officials that the Prime Minister wanted “to put the UK in the forefront of this whole activity.”4 Furthermore, this was a position they wanted to maintain, and in order to retain some form of credible international influence, the FCO recognised that they would have to offer some sort of compromise so as to not “be left on the sidelines.”5

As talks were on-going regarding the nature and content of the proposed declaration for the conference, the Department of Environment wrote to the FCO to assist them in outlining the UK strategy for the conference. Despite the fact that UK officials did not want to discuss targets, with the

1 British Embassy [redacted] to FCO[redacted]:, “Letter Atmospheric Pollution: Noordwijk Conference,” 18th September 1989, FoI Request 1126-12: FCO 2 British Embassy [redacted] to FCO[redacted]:, “Letter Atmospheric Pollution: Noordwijk Conference,” 18th September 1989, FoI Request 1126-12: FCO 3 Redacted to William Waldegrave, “letter: Netherlands Conference on Climate Change, 6/7 November,” (25th September 1989), FoI Request 1126-12: FCO 4 John Houghton, Interview with David Hirst, (30 July 2012), UK 5 FCO [redacted] to Department of Environment [redacted], “letter: Noordwijk Conference,” 24th October 1989, FoI Request 1126-12: FCO

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Dutch organisers drafting the Conference statement, the Department of Environment maintained that targets were likely to feature at the conference and also in any future international regime on climate change. 1 The issue for the Department of Environment was, therefore, not whether there should be targets, but the basis on which they would be derived. Clearly, several countries saw setting targets as a way of achieving action going forward. Accordingly, FCO officials advocated that the IPCC investigate alternatives and include these in the assessment report. The concession the FCO were willing to offer at Noordwijk, was to channel any further discussion of targets through the IPCC, which they ultimately succeeded in doing. This nuanced line offered the UK an opportunity to achieve its aims by looking both proactive on climate change, while similarly maintaining the centrality of the

IPCC process to future and on-going negotiations. Moreover, because the IPCC was concerned with presenting an almost unrealistic notion of scientific consensus these discussions could be postponed indefinitely.

The public pronouncements of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at this time similarly straddled this nuanced line. In October 1989 Thatcher was, for instance, talking up UK proposals for a global convention, whilst going no further than describing the convention as “a sort of good conduct guide to the environment.”2 Her government was in fact still committed to market-based solutions to environmental problems. The global convention was not a means of imposing international regulatory requirements, it was instead meant to “enable all our economies to grow and develop because without growth you cannot generate the wealth required to pay for the protection of the environment.”3

The US approach to the Noordwijk meeting, and more broadly the politics of climate change at this time, resembled that of the FCO. In a speech to the IPCC plenary meeting in February 1990,

President Bush articulated a vision of continued US commitment to a process bringing together the community of nations in “an orderly and disciplined way”.4 Bush was offering US support to a

1 Department of Environment [redacted] to FCO [redacted], “Letter: Noordwijk Conference of Environment Ministers 6/7/ November,” 18th October 1989, FoI Request 1126-12: FCO 2 Margaret Thatcher, “Speech to Conservative Party Conference,” (13 October, 1989), Margaret Thatcher Foundation, accessed online: www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107789 3 Margaret Thatcher, “Speech to Royal Society Dinner,” (22 March, 1990) Margaret Thatcher Foundation, accessed online: www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108046 4 IPCC, Report of the Third Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)

178 program of assessment, in which scientists and experts could continue to look for a consensus to precede political negotiations. But this similarly hints at the on-going US attempts to control the process through its significant presence on the many Working Groups (WGs). As I outlined in

Chapter 3, US climate policy was guided by the National Climate Program (NCP) Policy Board who had been responsible for the initial suggestion that the IPCC be established. A significant guiding force in the Policy Board was the Department of Energy (DoE), who were determined to utilise the

IPCC as a means of delaying any form of negotiations toward a global convention. Indeed, at the end of the IPCC’s First Assessment in 1990, journalist David Nicholson-Lord reported that “the US

Department of Energy is proposing that the IPCC should conduct another investigation in 1992-3 - thus delaying world agreement on restricting emissions for perhaps as long as five years.”1

Neither the FCO nor the State Department wanted the negotiations to begin before the end of the IPCC’s assessment cycle. In contrast, the organisers of the Noordwijk Conference were looking to the conference as a venue in which political negotiations could begin in anticipation of the assessment. 2 This led to considerable dissatisfaction in the US at the pressure exerted by the Dutch and other European countries. Following another round of unsatisfactory talks over a conference statement involving targets and timetables, Klaus Topfer, the German Minister for the Environment, publically berated the US delegations’ compromises for Noordwijk as “totally insufficient.”3

US concerns, about the targets being proposed, and dissatisfaction, over the pressure being exerted from other European countries, came to a head at a working party meeting of the US domestic policy council on 20 October 1989. At this meeting only the EPA and State Department actually supported US participation in the conference.4 The EPA was in fact an outlier on the general consensus amongst the various US agencies involved in the discussions, as they also supported

(Washington DC, 5-7 February 1990a), IPCC – 5 1 David Nicholson-Lord, “Bush Defies alert on global warming,” The Independent (London), (November 4th 1990) 2 FCO to [redacted], “Telno 991: Dutch Ministerial Conference on Climate Change,” October 1989, FoI Request 1126-12: FCO 3 From the Hague to Immediate FCO, “Letter: Noordwijk Conference on Climate Change: FRG Attitudes” (October, 1989), FoI Request 1126-12: FCO 4 From Washington to Deskby 270900Z FCO, “Telno 2784 UKMIS New York for Beetham (Head/MAED, Visiting) Your Telno 1957: Dutch Ministerial Meeting on the Environment,” (October 1989), FoI Request 1126-12: FCO

179 beginning negotiations on an international convention on global warming.1 This reflected the split in opinion in the NCP Policy Board that had initially driven the US backing of a proposal to establish the

IPCC. The split of opinion meant that the ultimate decision over the attendance at the meeting was left to the White House, which despite its misgivings ultimately decided in favour of participation. The participation was, however, to be guided by some specific terms: continued support for the development of a framework convention under the IPCC process and timescale. It ruled out precipitous implementation of a protocol, and reaffirmed US support for the IPCC.2 The result of these policies meant that through strategic recourse to the science of the IPCC, the US could continue to engage in dialogue but also put off any action in the near future.

Significantly, the involvement and influence of White House advisors increased in the development of strategies for the subsequent international meetings addressing climate change. Two of President Bush’s most influential advisors, the White House Chief of Staff, John Sununu, and the

Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Richard Darman, were both highly sceptical of the dangers posed by climate change. So unlike the majority of the other countries attending conferences and meetings on climate change, whose delegations were coordinated by the Environment Ministries, the US delegations were increasingly coordinated by these advisors.

The actions of the US and UK delegations at the Noordijk Conference highlights the ways in which both countries administrations were intent on strengthening and consolidating the IPCC role in the climate change debate. Justifying this commitment to the IPCC, the UK delegation principally deployed strategic recourse to the authoritative status of scientific evidence. Indeed Prime Minister

Thatcher’s notes for a question addressing climate change in October 1989 stressed the countries commitment to a process that would provide “the hard [italics added] scientific basis on which we can make meaningful international agreements.”3 The scientific consensus was a rhetorical device

1 From Washington to Deskby 270900Z FCO, “Telno 2784 UKMIS New York for Beetham (Head/MAED, Visiting) Your Telno 1957: Dutch Ministerial Meeting on the Environment,” (October 1989), FoI Request 1126-12: FCO 2 From Washington to Deskby 270900Z FCO, “Telno 2784 UKMIS New York for Beetham (Head/MAED, Visiting) Your Telno 1957: Dutch Ministerial Meeting on the Environment,” (October 1989), FoI Request 1126-12: FCO 3 Anonymous, “PM’s Question 31st October: Climate Change,” (October 1989), FoI Request 1126-12: FCO

180 designed to reinforce the centrality of the IPCC role. The decision to channel discussion into the IPCC and to provide a general impetus to the IPCC process was a means of maintaining a particularly technocratic approach to the politics. The US and UK wanted to achieve a politics by scientific consensus within the IPCC framing of the problem, which was itself skewed by a dominance of

Western science. For these two countries, the IPCC process both delayed the implementation of these binding protocols whilst, simultaneously, restricting the authoritative voices to those of IPCC scientists.

When the conference ended the FCO found that they were, on the whole, satisfied with the general outcomes of the Noordwijk meeting for several reasons. The Noordwijk meeting had given further impetus to the IPCC and its work towards a framework convention, and reinforced its role in approaching the establishment of CO2 emission targets. The delegations report at the end of conference appreciated the general consensus.1 Since there would be no follow-up ministerial meeting

(other than the Second World Climate Conference), the UK delegation could justifiably claim they had comprehensively channelled the debate into the IPCC process.2 Furthermore, the final conference declaration took a UN text almost unchanged urging an intensification of work in the IPCC.3 And while there was no final agreement on emissions targets, there was a consensus – namely that emissions targets would be set “at levels to be considered by the IPCC.” 4

The ways in which the US and UK strategically engaged with the Noordwijk Conference is instructive of their overall strategic priorities throughout the IPCC’s First Assessment cycle. Both countries governments were determined to remain active and fully integrated in any international activities related to climate change. Moreover, there was a conscious effort to position the IPCC at the nexus of these activities. Pushing discussion into the IPCC, both countries were openly advocating an evidence-based, often technocratic, approach to environmental policymaking. In effect the IPCC

1 From the Hague to FCO, “Tel No 451: Noordwijk Conference on Climate Change,” (November 1989), FoI Request 1126-12: FCO 2 From The Hague to Deskby 060900z FCO, “Telno 442: Noordwijk Conference on Climate Change: Officials Meeting,” (November, 1989), FoI Request 1126-12: FCO 3 From the Hague to FCO, “Tel No 451: Noordwijk Conference on Climate Change,” (November, 1989), FoI Request 1126-12: FCO 4 From the Hague to FCO, “Tel No 451: Noordwijk Conference on Climate Change,” (November, 1989), FoI Request 1126-12: FCO

181 offered the two countries a politics by the back door approach as they continued to direct the Panel to provide definitive answers to questions in which facts and values were intermingled.

3. The IPCC to the INC: Negotiating a Climate Convention

Championing the IPCC, US and UK officials were positioning the Panel as a cornerstone in the politics of climate change. By forcing the politics of climate change into the IPCC, the two countries were attempting to steer the debate away from specific binding emissions targets and any extension of developmental aid which neither country was willing to commit to. Conversely, most European countries, Germany and the Netherlands prominent among them, were at the same time pushing for substantial cuts in line with the Toronto target, which recommended a 20% reduction of CO2 emissions from 1988 levels by 2005. UK concessions did go beyond the US, offering a compromise of stabilising CO2 levels by 2000. But, both countries were roundly criticised for their unwillingness to accept further emissions cuts.1

Rather than commit to these targets and timetables, the US and UK governments committed to the eventual introduction of a framework convention on climate change to be negotiated and implemented through the IPCC. Notably, the IPCC was principally composed of Western scientists – the US and UK chaired two out of the three IPCC Working Groups – and participation in its work did not take place on an equal footing. Thus, counter-arguments, mounted by the G-77, a loose coalition of developing countries, calling for a new intergovernmental negotiating body, scuppered these

Anglo-American aspirations. The significant difference between the IPCC and this new proposal was the wider participation demanded. The IPCC was an assessment group that the US and UK thought would be used to negotiate from, while the G-77 proposal was explicitly calling for a “negotiating body”. So, in a December 1990 UN resolution, the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) was established. This section outlines the arguments made for and against an IPCC backed negotiation process. It demonstrates that the decision

1 Michael McCarthy, “Thatcher calls for sacrifice to hold back global warming,” The Times, (November 7 1990)

182 to circumvent the IPCC principally reflected the concerns of the G-77 over unequal participation.

After, the establishment of the INC, I highlight the ways in which the continuities and discontinuities in the IPCC’s practices were integrated into the new political landscape.

As already stated retaining a prominent, influential position in the climate regime was a strategic objective of the UK government’s approach to the international politics of climate change.

Therefore, as discussions began regarding the future work of the IPCC and attention turned towards preparations for negotiation of a framework convention there was an expectation that the IPCC would be the principal conduit through which these negotiations would be conducted. In June 1989, Bert

Bolin addressed the IPCC’s Second Session remarking that he viewed the IPCC’s assessment as just the first step of many. He went on to recommend that the Panel begin contributing to an outline of a convention.1 This was seemingly confirmed at the IPCC’s Third Session, as Mostafa Tolba confirmed that the Panel had been requested by the UNEP Governing Council (GC) to “produce the elements for a framework convention on climate change.”2 As a result, the UK government positioned itself at the centre of these talks.3

The UNEP GC Resolution, endorsed at the Third Session of the IPCC, requested “the

Executive Director of the Programme [UNEP], in co-operation with the Secretary-General of the

World Meteorological Organization, begin preparations for negotiations on a framework convention on climate.”4 Mostafa Tolba and Godwin Obasi accordingly established a small task force charged with producing elements for a framework convention on climate change. The body was composed of two members from UNEP, two from the WMO, the co-ordinator of the Second World Climate

Conference and three members from the IPCC in their personal capacities.5 Advising the two executive heads on the steps to be taken, it was anticipated that, although the IPCC would not be

1 IPCC, Report of the Second Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC- 3, (Nairobi, 28-30 June 1989) 2 IPCC, Report of the Third Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (Washington DC, 5-7 February 1990a), IPCC – 5 3 From [Redacted] to: William Waldegrave, “Letter Netherlands Conference on Climate Change, 6/7 November,” (25 September, 1989), FoI Request 1126-12: FCO 4 UN GA, “Protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind,” A/RES/44/207, (22nd December 1989) 5 IPCC, Report of the Third Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (Washington DC, 5-7 February 1990a), IPCC – 5

183 responsible for negotiating a convention (that would be the responsibility of governments), it was going to be intrinsic to the process, and was likely to be the stage on which any future negotiations would take place. Moreover, immediately after the conclusion of the IPCC Fourth Session, at which its assessment report was formally adopted, UNEP and the WMO convened an ad hoc working group of government representatives to prepare for negotiations on a framework convention on climate change.

In September 1990, this ad-hoc working group convened to consider the means and modalities for the negotiations. This meeting merely served to highlight an opening schism between the developed and developing countries.1 Developed countries tended to support carrying forward the

IPCC process; while developing countries tended to support a UN General Assembly (GA) ordained process.2 It was the G-77, led by the Brazilian delegation, who mounted these proposals. The G-77 wanted an alternative to the IPCC for two interrelated reasons. First, they wanted a single intergovernmental negotiating process conducted under the auspices of the UN GA, because they felt that the IPCC was not representing their interests fully. There was a very real sense among representatives of several developing countries that this was a developed world problem being imposed on developing countries (see Figure 5.). Second, many countries felt it impossible to operate within the IPCC on an equal basis. While the IPCC process was nominally open to all members of the

UN, participation was significantly predicated on scientific and technical expertise and, consequently, favoured the industrialised countries. Thus, bringing the negotiations under the banner of the UN, offered the developing nations an opportunity to participate on more equal terms in contrast to their experiences with the IPCC.

1 Daniel Bodansky, “Prologue to the Climate Convention” in Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention (eds.) Irving M. Mintzer & J. Amber Leonard, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1994), p. 59 2 Daniel Bodansky, “Prologue to the Climate Convention,” (1994) p. 60

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Figure 6. Cartoon by Scott Willis (USA): from the cover of 1991 Center for Science and Environment Report, "Global Warming in an Unequal World: a Case of environmental colonialism

The UN also offered a kind of democratisation of climate change. It opened up the possibility of re-politicising climate change, as developing countries began questioning the fundamentally scientific and technical framing of the problem. The developing countries dissatisfaction stemmed from the technical framing of climate change within the IPCC process. This was made explicit in

August of 1990 at the IPCC’s Fourth Session in Sundsvall, Sweden. The IPCC Chairman Bert Bolin had anticipated this meeting to be more or less a procession, leading to the adoption of the final report.1 But significant fault lines emerged between the developed and developing countries. The

Brazilian delegation, engaged in diplomatic brinksmanship, refused to adopt the report without a caveat in the introduction stressing that the report was a “technical assessment of experts rather than government positions, particularly those governments that could not participate in all Working

1 Bert Bolin, A History of the Science and Politics of Climate Change (2007), p. 67

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Groups.”1 This caveat in effect undermined the core unique facet of the IPCC, its intergovernmental status, and significantly implied that the science was not independent of governments or politics. The caveat, additionally, demonstrated a vein of antipathy towards the IPCC and its overly technocratic approach to environmental policymaking.

The US and UK governments, however, were determined to restrict discussions of climate change to the technical environmental framing of the issue presented by the IPCC. In limiting the discussion to environmental issues and the science of climate change, the two countries were eager to prevent climate change becoming co-opted into issues of poverty and developmental barriers to environmental protection. For example, when the Dutch organisers of the Noordwijk Conference advocated new funding initiatives for developing countries, the UK delegation was tasked with ensuring discussion on new funding initiatives was limited to no more than a “consideration.”2 The two countries were acutely aware that, alongside many other industrialised countries, they were historically responsible for the vast majority of the CO2 emissions and, hence, responsible for the current problem posed by climate change. Figures available to world leaders in 1990 suggested that

North America was responsible for 26% of the man-made emissions, the rest of the OECD was responsible for 22%, 26% came from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and 26% came from developing countries.3 These figures suggested that climate change was a global problem originating in Western countries with the impacts predominantly felt in the non-Western world. Global actions were needed in order to have any meaningful effect. 4 As such, US and UK officials recognised the need to involve and enrol both developed and developing countries in the proposed convention calling for actions to combat climate change. However, they were seeking the involvement of the developing

1 IPCC, “IPCC First Assessment Report Overview” in IPCC, Report of the Fourth Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), (Sundsvall, Sweden, 27-30 August, 1990), IPCC – 6 2 From The Hague to Deskby 060900z FCO, “Telno 442: Noordwijk Conference on Climate Change: Officials Meeting,” (November, 1989), FoI Request 1126-12: FCO 3 Margaret Thatcher, “Address by The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland” in Climate Change: Science Impacts and Policy –Proceedings of the Second World Climate Conference (eds. J. Jaeger & H. L. Ferguson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 517 4 Margaret Thatcher, “Address by The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland” in Climate Change: Science Impacts and Policy (1991), p. 517

186 countries strictly on their own terms, within the IPCC and framed in the terms outlined by their own scientists and IPCC administrators.

The IPCC was being asked to both maintain a separation of the environmental and developmental aspects of climate change and to enhance the integration of developing countries in its processes. The scientific and technical confines of the IPCC as evinced in the meeting of the ad hoc working group in September 1990, though, continued to exclude many of the developing nations who had smaller bases of scientific and technical competency. This meant that whilst there was a significant amount of time given over to enrolling and engaging with developing countries it remained on the terms of the developed nations. That is to say that the focus of the IPCC was shaped by the experts it enrolled, the overwhelming majority of whom, were from UK and North American universities and government labs. This accentuated the concerns of the G-77, who clearly saw these efforts as the tokenistic gestures they were. Designed to merely gain governmental assent to a

Western perspective of the issue, the G-77 were even more convinced of the need to create a new intergovernmental negotiating body, responsible for housing the explicit political decisions required to achieve an international agreement on climate change.

The criticisms levelled at the IPCC by developing countries were importantly unresolved.

Thus impeding the US and UK ambitions for the IPCC to lead the negotiations. Instead, in resolution

45/212 of 21December 1990, the UN GA established the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee

(INC) for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). The advocates of an IPCC-led process addressing the legal and political measures to combat climate change had lost out to the advocates of a UN process. The fact that the negotiations would be conducted under the auspices of the UN GA was of particular importance. As this offered the developing countries an opportunity to participate in the negotiations regardless of the scientific and technical expertise they could muster.

Paragraph 2 of the UN resolution establishing the INC exemplified the desired democratisation of the climate regime, as it stated that the INC “should be open to all State Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies, with the participation of observers in accordance with the

187 established practice of the General Assembly.”1 The establishment of the INC, thus, signifies the further politicisation of climate change. As the INC did not have the same caveats for participation based on technical competence and expertise as the IPCC. Rather, participation was constrained exclusively along political lines. The INC’s remit extended to the preparation of “an effective framework convention on climate change, containing appropriate commitments, and any related instruments as might be agreed upon.”2 It invited Member States, and, as appropriate, the scientific community, industry, trade unions, non-governmental organizations and other interested groups to contribute to the preparatory process. But, it was also very clearly a political body, designed to house the formal political negotiations of an international treaty.

This resolution emerged very quickly in response to the proposed WMO/UNEP/IPCC process. This proposal would have mirrored the analogous negotiations constituting the Vienna

Convention on Ozone Depleting Chemicals. In November 1990, just a month prior to the UN

Resolution establishing the INC, Margaret Thatcher, taking encouragement from the ozone agreements signed in London in the same year, anticipated that the WMO and UNEP would be the two “principle vehicles” guiding the negotiation of the framework convention.3 A crucial difference between the ozone negotiations and climate negotiations though lay in the differing scales of involvement of developing countries. The ozone negotiations were essentially conducted between a small group of developed nations with financial interests in the commercial trade of CFCs. Thus, the agreement to cut CFC emissions affected comparatively few nations. The competing interests, divergent impacts and unequal causes of climate change made the prospect of a WMO/UNEP/IPCC led process almost impossible.

The UN resolution sanctioning the INC establishment followed on from discussion of the

IPCC’s First Assessment report in December 1990. Tasked with preparing a framework convention

1 UN GA, “Protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind,” A/RES/45/212, (21st December 1990 2 UN GA, “Protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind,” A/RES/45/212, (21st December 1990 3 Margaret Thatcher, “Address by The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland” in Climate Change: Science Impacts and Policy –Proceedings of the Second World Climate Conference (eds. J. Jaeger & H. L. Ferguson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 517

188 for submission to the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), scheduled to take place in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, the INC had 18 months in which to complete its assignment.

After President Bush’s offer to host the first negotiating session, earlier in February 19901, delegations from 108 countries met in Chantilly near Washington DC for the First Session of the INC.

At this meeting, any lingering questions over the continuing existence of the IPCC beyond the publication of its assessment report were resolved as the relationship between the INC and IPCC was raised as a topic for discussion. During these discussions most of the delegations of the INC welcomed the continuation of the IPCC’s work. But significantly, the IPCC was now clearly the subordinate partner in the climate regime; since it was now simply a scientific organisation tasked with providing, alongside other groups, an input to the INC. Because the INC now had the political legitimacy, the INC delegates wanted the IPCC to serve as a source of authoritative scientific assessment. The INC delegates still considered the institutional independence of the Panel to be an important complementary attribute to the formal political negotiations to be undertaken in the INC forum. So, the IPCC remained as arbiter of scientific and technical assessment. In addition, the UN

GA resolution creating the INC/FCCC formalising the process, mandated the two bodies engage in a dialogue. There was, though, a strict hierarchy indicated by the language employed which requested the IPCC co-operate closely with the INC and “respond to the needs and requests for objective scientific and technical advice.”2

There was a concerted effort to separate the scientific and technical assessment of the IPCC, on the one hand, and the political negotiations and discussions of the INC, on the other. This division of labour between the negotiations and assessment, at once, saw the IPCC’s role, as envisaged by US and UK delegations reduced, whilst, simultaneously further legitimising the IPCC as the authoritative source of scientific and technical information on climate change for policymakers, governments and negotiators involved in the UN system and beyond. IPCC contributions to the INC were, therefore, legitimised by political actors negotiating the convention.

1 IPCC, Report of the Third Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), (Washington DC, 5-7 February 1990), IPCC – 5 2 UN GA, “Protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind,” A/RES/45/212, (21st December 1990)

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So, influenced by the INC’s criticisms about the lack of any formal rules of procedure, as well as the proliferation of subsidiary groups, at the IPCC’s Fifth Session (held just a month after the First

Session of the INC), the principles governing its work were reassessed and formally articulated.1This was done under three different headings: Organization, Participation and Procedures. The overall impact, was that the principles governing the IPCC’s work were made more explicit, contrasting with the piecemeal approach during the First Assessment. In a bid to maintain their scientific and institutional independence, it was agreed that the Panel needed to codify what they would address as well as how they would address it.

The new IPCC rules reified the twin, often competing, influences that guided the First

Assessment – equitable geographic representation and the best available expertise. For instance under the heading of Participation, the selection and invitation to participate in the expert assessment was to be coordinated by the Chairman and the IPCC Bureau. The Bureau comprised of the Chairman, the two vice-chairmen and the three WG chairs. Bert Bolin, reviewing this particular guideline, considered it to be a very important principle, as he saw it contributing to the scientific integrity of the assessment process.2 Notably, these rules retained a significant freedom for the Bureau and Chairman in conducting the business of the IPCC, thus providing considerable scientific autonomy.

Furthermore, under the heading of Organization, the rules stressed that “the IPCC WGs and any task forces established by Plenary shall reflect balanced geographic representation with due consideration for scientific and technical requirements.”3 Thus the guidelines formally enshrined the politics of participation which were previously informally adhered to for political reasons.

Also at the IPCC Fifth Session, delegates went on to outline and agree to undertake six4 specified tasks that had both short term and long term goals in order to ready itself to respond to the

1 IPCC, Report of the Fifth Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva, (13-15 March 1991), IPCC – 7 2 Bert Bolin, A History of the Science and Politics of Climate Change, (2007) p. 70 3 IPCC, Report of the Fifth Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),” (Geneva, 13-15 March 1991), IPCC – 7 4 (a) Assessment of national net GHG emissions; (b) Predictions of the regional distributions of climate change and associated impact studies, including model validation studies; (c) Specific issues related to energy and industry; (d) Specific forestry-related issues; (e) Vulnerability to sea level rise; and (f) Emissions scenarios

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INC’s requests1 These tasks were initially proposed by the IPCC Chairman, Bert Bolin, in a letter circulated to members of the IPCC Bureau on 31 January 1991.2 Having presented these six tasks to the INC in February to general acclaim, Bolin was in a strong position to advocate the IPCC adopt and follow these tasks in its future programme of work.3 The purpose of the short-term programme of work was to provide an update on the 1990 IPCC Scientific Assessment. It is thus clear to see that the interim report was intended as a vehicle with which to deliver an update of certain key findings to the negotiators of the FCCC prior to the upcoming Rio Conference scheduled for 1992.4

By targeting the needs of the FCCC negotiators, the IPCC delegates were ensuring its political salience, in order to remain relevant. But, it was also losing its political utility for the US and

UK as its recommendations for political action were no longer controlled within the organisation itself. Moreover, in Bert Bolin’s foreword to the 1992 supplementary report it was made plain that the key issues selected for inclusion in the supplementary report closely matched the views expressed by a number of nations during the First Session of the INC, and so reinforced the link between the INC and IPCC.5 Furthermore, this linked the IPCC assessment cycle to the cycles of climate change politics. Significantly, the IPCC retained an important role in climate change politics, by ensuring it was ready to respond to the scheduled formal political negotiations. This has allowed the IPCC assessment to be utilised by negotiators as a powerful political tool, legitimising and privileging certain political values and beliefs.

At this juncture it is fitting to consider boundary organisations. Crucially, I want to highlight how the evolving structures and responses of the IPCC here can be seen as an embodiment of a successful boundary organisation. The push, pull and negotiation of the IPCC’s remit shows how the producers – scientists – and consumers – politicians, decision-makers and international bureaucrats - of the IPCC’s assessment were afforded the opportunity “to construct the boundary between their

1 IPCC, Report of the Fifth Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), (Geneva, 13-15 March 1991), IPCC – 7 2 See footnote 19 in Bert Bolin, A History of the Science and Politics of Climate Change, (2007) p. 70 3 INC, Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its First Session, Washington D.C., (4 -14 February 1991) A/AC.237/6 4 IPCC, Report of the Sixth Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Geneva, (29-31 October, 1991) 5 IPCC, Climate Change: The 1990 and 1992 IPCC Assessments, (IPCC: Canada, 1992), p. ix

191 enterprises in a way favourable to their own perspectives.” 1 The distinct lines of accountability to both science and politics, according to Guston, can prevent both the politicization of science and also the scientization of politics.2 With the push towards a separate, formal treaty negotiating body, the

IPCC retained scientific credibility and importantly political legitimacy – as a useful resource of expertise. Furthermore, in deciding what topics to address, Bolin, the Bureau and plenary delegates had taken on board the UN GA resolution, and were directing the work of the Panel towards the specific requirements of the negotiators. This led the IPCC to assemble a supplementary report with an update on topics under the guise of WGI (Science) and WGII (Impacts). The supplementary reports compiled by the IPCC were designed in response to the requests made by the INC, but were also careful to not overstep its remit, thus highlighting how the IPCC was the subordinate partner in the climate regime. The supplementary report was targeting the topics deemed to be of most relevance to the negotiators, whilst cautiously avoiding duplicating, contradicting or challenging the discussions and work of negotiators in the INC. This meant that the two supplementary IPCC reports published in

1992, covering the scientific and impact studies pertaining to climate change, neglected the political dimensions of WGIII (Response Strategies), which was not the responsibility of the INC/FCCC. The creation of the INC/FCCC as a forum through which political negotiations could be conducted clearly challenged the US strategy outlined at the outset of IPCC activities. US strategy had crucially centred on controlling the politics by controlling the assessment. But, as I have shown, the INC/FCCC establishment curtailed these ambitions.

The interim report was finalised in time for the Rio ‘Earth Summit’, and alongside the 1990

Comprehensive assessment report, was highly lauded by several prominent members of the INC

Secretariat as well as members of delegations to the INC. This section has highlighted the reasons behind the establishment of the INC, and the subsequent evolution of the IPCC’s practises. As late as

November 1990, it was still widely anticipated by most countries that the IPCC would be the body responsible for leading the political negotiations of a framework convention. But due to the

1 David H. Guston, “Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science: An Introduction”, Science, Technology, & Human Values, 26; 4, (Autumn 2001), pp. 399-408 2 David H. Guston, “Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science” (2001), p. 405

192 dissatisfaction of the G-77 countries, concerning issues of participation, a new intergovernmental negotiating process was established under the auspices of the UN GA. The INC formation considerably changed the international political landscape. And significantly for the IPCC, the language employed forming the INC implied a hierarchy in which the IPCC was relegated to a mere scientific body that was tasked with responding to the INC’s needs and requests.

The subsequent relegation of the IPCC to a subordinate role in the global political climate regime actually enhanced its scientific credibility. It was stripped of its political mandate, but retained its governmental authority. With the emergence of a formal political negotiating body, the scientific and technical aspects of the IPCC were foregrounded, and the more politicised aspects embedded in the INC/FCCC. Through this division of labour, between the negotiations and assessment, the IPCC position as the authoritative source of scientific and technical information was further legitimised.

However, this also undermined US strategic engagement with the IPCC. US officials had targeted controlling the politics of climate change by burying them in the assessment. As the politics were made visible in the INC, US negotiators ceded the control they had wielded over the issue in the

IPCC. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated in the next section, this contributed to the increasing political isolation of US negotiators during the 18 months of formal negotiations leading up to the Rio

Conference.

4. Re-thinking the IPCC: From the INC to the ‘Earth Summit’

The negotiations begun under the auspices of the INC/FCCC banner were scheduled for completion by the time of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also known as the Rio ‘Earth Summit,’ which was held from the 3 to the 14 June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro.

The Summit was a remarkable event in the history of global environmental policymaking as it brought together delegations from 172 governments, 108 heads of State or government, approximately 2,400 representatives of NGOs and some 10,000 journalists.1 Both the scale and scope of the conference’s

1 UN, Accessed online 3rd July 2013: www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html

193 concerns were unprecedented. But the most significant and lasting impact was its commitment to put environmental issues at the heart of the development agenda and economic policy and decision- making.1

In this section, by examining the preparations for the Summit, in particular looking at the increasing isolation of US negotiators at the INC meetings, I highlight the evolving role played by the

IPCC in climate politics. For the two years after the IPCC’s First Assessment, US attempts at controlling the politics through the IPCC were nullified as political debate was formally moved under the auspices of the INC. In contrast to the ways in which the politics were buried in the IPCC, in the

INC political decisions were made visible. As a consequence, I argue that US political intransigence on climate change, exemplified by President Bush’s threat to not attend the Summit, grew out of these concerns. The US administration was concerned that climate change had gotten out of their control.

Specific concerns, that under the moniker of sustainable development, climate change had been co- opted into a redistributionist plot associated with the UN crystallised as the Summit drew nearer.

The commitment to an expanded view of environmental issues, taking in poverty and development issues, at the Summit was a product of the origins of the conference. This in many respects reflected the origins of the Summit growing out of the historic UN commissioned report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (more commonly known as the

‘Brundtland Report’, named after its Chair Gro Harlem Brundtland).This Commission was formed in response to the perception that there was a growing conflict between the demands posed by globalised economic growth and the accelerating global environmental damage being wrought. Thus in 1983 the

UN General Assembly commissioned Brundtland to produce a report which would unite countries around the shared aims of a creating a sustainable development model. As a result, the final report was particularly significant as it established development as a key issue in environmental policymaking. In 1987, finalising 4 years of meetings, workshops and writing, Brundtland submitted

194 to the UN General Assembly a report, Our Common Future, which was notable for popularising the concept of sustainable development, which it defined as:1

“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future

generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the concept of

'needs', in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority

should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social

organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs.”2

Discussing the Brundtland Report, at its 42nd session in December 1987, members of the UN

General Assembly invited governments in cooperation with the regional commissions and UNEP to engage in follow-up activities such as conferences. One year later the UN GA decided it “highly desirable that a United Nations Conference on environment and development be convened no later than 1992.”3 Another year later, it was officially announced that the UNCED Conference would be convened to coincide with World Environment Day, on the 5 June 1992, twenty years on from the seminal Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. Predating the establishment of the INC and the IPCC, the issue of climate change was quickly embedded into the planning of the Summit preparatory committee. Moreover, the INC, tasked with producing a text for signature at the Earth

Summit, had a clear deadline by which time they had to be finished. The INC vice-chairman Ahmed

Djoghlaf considered this deadline integral to the success of the INC, as it “prevented a breakdown of the negotiating process” with no country, or group of countries, willing to accept responsibility for the failure of the negotiations over fears of a public relations backlash.4

The processes driving towards the Summit, however, were not straightforward. Indeed the drafting of the text during the INC negotiations was a discordant affair. Between February 1991 and

1 World Commission on Environment and Development, Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, (Transmitted to the General Assembly as an Annex to document A/42/427, 1987) 2 World Commission on Environment and Development, Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, (Transmitted to the General Assembly as an Annex to document A/42/427, 1987), p. 40 3 UN GA, “United Nations conference on environment and development,” A/RES/43/96, (20th December 1988) 4 Ahmed Djoghlaf, “The Beginnings of an International Climate Law,” in Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention (1994), p. 101

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May 1992, the INC held five sessions each lasting for two weeks, as per the terms of reference set out in UN Resolution 45/212. Meeting in Washington DC from 4-14 February 1991, the first INC session was concerned predominantly with procedural issues. Delegations from some 102 countries were in attendance and progress was slow. The major outcome of the meeting was the establishment of two working groups: Working Group I on commitments and; Working Group II on mechanisms. The WGI mandate extended to all types of commitments of the convention. It was tasked with preparing a text related to: commitments, beyond those required by existing agreements, accounting in particular, for equitable responsibility; commitments on adequate and additional financial resources to assist developing countries, and; commitments addressing the special situation of developing countries, with special consideration for the problems of economies in transition.1 Alongside this, the WGII mandate covered all of the legal and institutional mechanisms available to implement the convention including entry into force, withdrawal, compliance, assessment review, scientific co-operation, monitoring and information, financial resources and technological needs and co-operation.2

Aside from these formalities, countries also set out their initial negotiating positions. At the first INC session it quickly became apparent that the US negotiators had arrived with no intention to compromise. They had clear priorities – refusal to negotiate on emission targets and timetables – which the INC Chairman Jean Ripert maintains left them especially politically isolated.3 This isolation was not new, but it was considerably more noticeable in the negotiating sessions. US officials had been isolated at previous conferences on climate change, namely Noordwijk, but three factors combined to exacerbate US isolation at the INC meetings. First, the negotiations were happening through the INC, not the UNEP/WMO/IPCC process US officials had envisaged and pushed for. Second, both the developed countries and developing countries (G-77) were calling on the

US government to adopt a global convention with commitments on emissions. Third, the negotiations

1 Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC), “Organizational matters. Proposal concerning subsidiary organs submitted by the Vice-Chairman,” Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), First session, (4-14 February 1991) Washington D.C., A/AC.237/L.3 2 Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC), “Organizational matters. Proposal concerning subsidiary organs submitted by the Vice-Chairman,” Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), First session, (4-14 February 1991) Washington D.C., A/AC.237/L.3 3 Delphine Borione & Jean Ripert, “Exercising Common but Differentiated Responsibility,” in Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention (eds.) Irving M. Mintzer & J. Amber Leonard, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1994), p. 82

196 had been co-opted by key policy advisers in the White House – who were sceptical of the need for any action on climate change – not the State Department, as had been the case in previous conferences, meetings and workshops.

4.1 INC not the IPCC

In response to the INC processes the IPCC had begun a reappraisal of its structures, protocols and general terms of reference. Recognising the IPCC had to adapt its mandate to the INC; IPCC

Chairman Bert Bolin was able to direct the IPCC plenary delegates towards a mandate which contemporary observers of the IPCC would more readily recognise – that of a “policy-relevant and yet policy-neutral, never policy-prescriptive” scientific assessment.1 This new focus, at once, strengthened assessment of the science and impacts and stripped away its political mandate.

Discussing the future role of the IPCC at the fifth plenary session in 1991 delegates agreed that they would produce a supplementary report as an input to the INC negotiations. Significantly, while the supplementary IPCC report did provide an update on the scientific assessment of WGI and the impacts assessment of WGII, it did not provide an update on the response strategies assessment of

WGIII. This reflected the changing political landscape the IPCC now inhabited.

The supplementary report2, and the comprehensive 1990 assessment report, were both highly lauded by several prominent members of the INC Secretariat as well as members of delegations to the

INC. Elizabeth Dowdeswell, Assistant Deputy Minister of Environment in Canada, and Richard J

Kinley, of the Canadian Atmospheric Environment Service, reflecting on the INC/FCCC process found the IPCC’s work to have been of fundamental importance to the success of the negotiations.

They maintain that one lesson to be learnt was that bodies “like the INC should not negotiate on the

1 IPCC, www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml#.Ucr9trqaeGY accessed online: 26th June 2013 2 IPCC, Climate Change: The 1990 and 1992 IPCC Assessments, (IPCC: Canada, 1992)

197 science but they should be informed by it.”1 It can thus be seen that the INC establishment was a significant factor in the IPCC being neutered of its political dimension.

As a consequence of the politically subordinate role of the IPCC, US negotiators changed their strategies for the INC sessions. US strategic engagement with the politics of climate change was originally premised on the IPCC as the central conduit for negotiations. This backfired and the IPCC was no longer the principal international organisation with a remit extending across the potential response strategies to climate change. Having lost out in their attempts to politicise the assessment and control the negotiations along scientific and technical lines the INC process opened up participation in more than the tokenistic ways observed during the IPCC assessment.

4.2 Increased developing country participation

The democratisation of the negotiations under the INC opened up the issue to a wider array of opinions and posed further problems for US negotiators. There were now two opposing blocs calling for the US government to adopt a binding global convention with a commitment to reduce emissions.

However, US negotiators had been tasked with emphasising the need for more scientific research in defence of a general framework convention which precluded the introduction of binding quantitative targets and timetables until the options were better understood. The US was put under pressure by several allies in the developed world, as well as members of the G-77 bloc. The same European countries to have criticised the US negotiating position at Noordwijk, maintained their objective of stabilising CO2 emissions in the year 2000 at 1990 levels. The G-77 developing countries wanted the developed world to: (i) curb their emissions; (ii) transfer technology and money back to the developing world, and; (iii) allow the developing countries to develop, first, before implementing any emissions controls. Arguments from poorer developing nations suggested that it was the industrialised

1 Elizabeth Dowdeswell & Richard J Kinley, Constructive Damage to the Status Quo” in Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention (eds.) Irving M. Mintzer & J. Amber Leonard, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1994), p. 120

198 countries that should drive and emit less, whilst they were allowed to continue to grow and get out of poverty without the need to be ecologically pristine (see Figure 6.).

Figure 7. David Horsey (2004). The pitfalls of ‘Sustainable Development’

In contrast arguments from the richer industrialised countries suggested that the poorer developing nations ought to slow their growth and re-orient their industrial practices in a more environmentally friendly fashion.1 The emergence of the G-77 developing country bloc in these negotiations therefore left many of the developed countries in a progressively more awkward situation.

Much of the disagreement in the negotiation of the convention text focussed in on the concept of common but differentiated responsibility. Highlighting the disparity in historic responsibility for the majority of the greenhouse gas emissions between the industrialised countries and the developing countries, this concept was used to support arguments that developing countries ought to be able to

1 Sylvia Nasar, “Cooling the Globe Would be Nice, But Saving Lives Now May Cost Less,” New York Times, (May 31st 1992) accessed online 8th July 2013: www.nytimes.com/1992/05/31/weekinreview/conference-rio- rich-vs-poor-cooling-globe-would-be-nice-but-saving-lives-now-may.html

199 continue emitting in order to ‘catch up’.1 It also supported even larger commitments to cuts in GHG emissions from the largest emitters historically, namely the US. Because of a reluctance to participate, as the largest emitter of GHG emissions, the US was “universally perceived as both the largest part of the problem and the largest part of the solution.”2 The contested agenda meant little progress was made on the draft text of the convention. Reflecting this disagreement, substantial portions of the text were bracketed out (often more than once). Suffice to say, disagreements and disparate aspirations over the convention text meant that it looked increasingly unlikely that the convention text would in fact be in ready in time for the Summit. Not until the final day of the second week of the INC Fifth

Session in New York in May 1992 was the Convention text eventually adopted by consensus, and prepared for signature at the ‘Earth Summit.’3

4.3 Sceptical White House advisers

Having expended considerable effort and resources in attempting to restrict the discussion of climate change to its environmental and technical terms, the commitment to embedding climate change into a sustainable development agenda at the Earth Summit was problematic for key US policymakers.4 The shift to a wider conception of environmental issues was highlighted in a speech by Maurice Strong,

Earth Summit conference chairman, at the Second World Climate Conference in 1990. Strong, discussing the plans for the Earth Summit, stressed that while climate change may at first seem to be primarily environmental in nature “every environmental issue leads directly into development when

1 This is still a major theme in the negotiations on-going between governments at the annual Conference of Parties (COP) meetings to this date. Developing countries have called for financial compensation based on cumulative GHG emission totals. Interestingly, as the Brazilian delegation, at the COP 19 (Warsaw) in suggesting the IPCC produce a report on these totals were actively seeking to utilise the IPCC to make a political argument with science. 2 William A. Nitze, “A Failure of Presidential Leadership,” in Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention (eds.) Irving M. Mintzer & J. Amber Leonard, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1994), p. 187 3 INC, Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of the second part of its fifth session, New York (30 April-9 May 1992) A/AC.237/18 (Part II) 4 James L. Malone, “Report on the United nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio de Janeiro, June 3-14, 1992,” Folder UNCED Follow-up OAID 07663 [7 of7] Bromley, D. Allan Files: George H. W. Bush Presidential Records

200 you examine both causes and remedies.”1 Strong’s comments and the planning for the Earth Summit consequently led to John Sununu and Richard Darman taking on key roles in the formulation of climate policy. This contributed to the hard-line approach adopted in preparation of the Earth Summit.

US isolation in these negotiations coincided with John Sununu’s rise to prominence as a key player formulating US climate policy. Sununu, the White House Chief of Staff, was particularly hostile to what he regarded as an environmentalist plot to halt economic growth and this was instrumental in the isolating of the US.2 Sceptical of both the threat posed by climate change, but more significantly the solutions being proposed by the UN, Sununu advocated a hard-line intransient approach to the negotiations. Indeed it was not until Sununu resigned his post in early 1992 that the

US gradually offered up compromises culminating in Bush attending the Earth Summit and signing the convention.

Domestic influences, principally getting Bush re-elected in 1992, took greater precedence for

Sununu, and other key Bush advisers. This meant that as Bush sought out a second term as President, he spent much of 1992 appealing to his Conservative base, many of whom were predominantly opposed to environmental regulations. This led the Chairman of the Main Committee of the Earth

Summit, Tommy Koh, to remark “this will teach the United Nations not to hold a conference in an

American election year.”3

US negotiators prioritised a non-binding comprehensive approach, allowing individual countries set their own national action plans Thus US negotiators considered the issue of targets and timetables to be out of consideration. This hard-line approach is exemplified by the fact President

Bush only agreed to attend at the Summit at the eleventh hour. The White House Deputy Chief of

Staff Robert Zoelick deployed the threat of President Bush boycotting the summit as a negotiating

1 Maurice F. Strong, “Climate Change and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development” in Climate Change: Science Impacts and Policy –Proceedings of the Second World Climate Conference (eds. J. Jaeger & H. L. Ferguson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 431 2 William A. Nitze, (1994) “A Failure of Presidential Leadership,” in Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention 3 William K. Stevens, “The Earth Summit; Lessons of Rio: A New Prominence and an Effective Blandness” New York Times , 14 June, 1992), available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/14/world/the-earth- summit-lessons-of-rio-a-new-prominence-and-an-effective-blandness.html?src=pm

201 aid.1 the threat to not to attend the Earth Summit was significant because in establishing the INC to the FCCC it was agreed that the negotiations should be completed in time for the Rio Earth Summit, where it would be opened up for signature. This was thus an instrumental factor in the US achieving their aims as most countries decided that a global convention with the exception of the US was not a global convention at all. So, by the time Bush did agree to attend, the groundwork had been laid by

US negotiators which allowed him to sign the convention. The convention allowed industrialised countries the leeway to develop their own specific action plans to limit their GHG emissions and did not set specific targets.

By candidly threatening to not attend this conference, Bush was openly intimating his dissatisfaction with the convention. The White House was particularly aggrieved with the FCCC text and the summit’s aims. Disquiet around the Earth Summit, in US policy circles, centred on what it considered to be an environmentalist agenda seeking to impose anti-growth policies on the US economy.

US policy on climate was predominantly being driven by economic arguments. For instance reflecting on the agreement in a letter to the Washington Post, Clayton Yeutter, the domestic policy coordinator, stressed that George Bush had decided to not “hamstring the U.S. economy with commitments that could hamper economic growth and reduce the number of jobs available for

American workers.”2 Moreover, even the EPA Administrator, was at pains to stress that whilst the

IPCC had produced a substantial assessment of the issue there was as yet no detailed assessment of

“the economic costs and benefits, technological feasibility or market potential of the underlying

1 James L. Malone, “Report on the United nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio de Janeiro, June 3-14, 1992,” Folder UNCED Follow-up OAID 07663 [7 of7] Bromley, D. Allan Files: George H. W. Bush Presidential Records 2 Clayton Yeutter, “Bush on Environment-Development - - Balanced, Sensible,” Washington Post , (12th June 1992) , Rio De Janeiro U.S. information service Wireless File Rio 92’ Special Edition, Bromley, D. Allan Files: George H. W. Bush Presidential Records

202 policy assumptions.”1 It can thus be seen that the Bush presidency was committed to neo-liberal market solutions to environmental problems and a laissez-faire approach to regulation.

Alongside the economic arguments against targets there was also an overwhelming distrust of in the US of the UN system as an agent of economic decision-making. Notably, the Earth Summit itself was viewed as having “anti-capitalist, socialistic underpinnings.”2 Moreover, the agenda for the

Earth Summit was seen as an extension of the 1987 Brundtland report which was in turn was giving

“the UNCED process a “blame the West” thrust.”3 The sustainable development concept, as popularised by the Brundtland report, was being equated with widespread redistribution of money from North to South. The combination of all these factors point towards the reluctance of the US to participate in the Earth Summit as being a principally economic decision. Climate change was being tied in with the concept of sustainable development which in various circles of the US government was viewed as a redistributionist plot.

The Rio Earth Summit is emblematic of the end of a largely scientifically overseen period in the history of climate change. Whilst I have shown throughout this thesis how political considerations have intruded throughout, science and scientists were still intrinsic to the climate regime. Indeed, in previous chapters of this thesis it was the scientists who were setting the agenda and advocating certain policies. However, by the time the INC negotiations had begun the issue was firmly within the political sphere. The negotiations, while grounded in the science of the IPCC, hinged less on the scientific ‘facts’ and more on the politics of the issue. The intransience of US negotiators was a key factor in a watered down convention text, with no targets/timetables and no additional aid agreements.

This was a product of the reduced role played by the IPCC, which US officials were more

1 William K Reilly, “Testimony of William K. Reilly Administrator U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Before the Foreign Relations Committee on United States Senate” (18th September, 1992) Folder UNCED Follow-up OAID 07663 [7 of7] Bromley, D. Allan Files: George H. W. Bush Presidential Records 2 James L. Malone, “Report on the United nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio de Janeiro, June 3-14, 1992,” Folder UNCED Follow-up OAID 07663 [7 of7] Bromley, D. Allan Files: George H. W. Bush Presidential Records 3 James L. Malone, “Report on the United nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio de Janeiro, June 3-14, 1992,” Folder UNCED Follow-up OAID 07663 [7 of7] Bromley, D. Allan Files: George H. W. Bush Presidential Records

203 comfortable managing. The IPCC was much narrower, in terms of participation, and was thus easier to undermine.

The politics of climate change had by the time of the Rio Earth Summit fully caught up with the science. Indeed, US politicians and delegates at the Earth Summit were highlighting disagreements, uncertainty and the embedded political assumptions of the IPCC’s findings. While the

Rio Earth Summit represented what one report called a “public relations disaster” for the US government, it also saw the final convention on climate change signed mirror their ambitions from the outset. Crucially most countries eventually compromised in order to facilitate a global agreement alongside the US rather than without.

5. Conclusion

This chapter has charted the evolving status of the IPCC as climate change transitioned between a principally scientific, environmental issue into a political, economic and developmental issue. Far from a smooth transition, it was markedly contested in a series of high profile meetings. These disagreements and the contested political agenda are a reflection of, and reflected in, the changing nature of the IPCC’s activities. On the one hand, the changes made to the IPCC’s activities were a reflection of US attempts to deploy the IPCC as a political vehicle by stealth. On the other hand, the changing activities were reflected in the subordinate (to the INC) role it came to occupy as formal political negotiations began.

The various fault lines to emerge have highlighted the very political ways in which counties have sought to stage manage the knowledge production in the IPCC assessment to reflect their own interests. At the Noordwijk Conference on Atmospheric Pollution in 1989, the American government focussed on channelling the debates around climate change into and through the IPCC. The

Americans found, in Thatcher’s government, a precious ally sharing a neo-liberal approach to the climate change issue. Both countries were determined to remain active and influential participants in these meetings, but were also overtly concerned about the prospect of specific emissions targets,

204 timetables and in particular the implementation of binding international regulatory requirements.

Championing the IPCC’s role offered a way out of these discussions, delaying any decisions until at least the end of 1990. Moreover, by controlling and legitimising the IPCC, US and UK policymakers similarly sought to legitimise through science their political position. This de-politicised the issue through an exaggerated focus on the power of an assessment to define solutions and answer politically loaded questions.

Having successfully ensured the focus for discussions of climate change remained within the

IPCC’s purview it was widely anticipated that it would also subsequently house the negotiations of a global convention on climate change. However, due to the considerable marginalisation of developing countries in the IPCC process – many developing countries did not feel they were able to participate on an equal basis – they sought ways and means of increasing their role and influence. Coupled with the only token efforts to widen participation, the Brazilian delegation, in August 1990, essentially rejected the Panel’s findings and scuppered the plans for an IPCC-led negotiation of the climate convention. Instead, through extensive lobbying of the UN, the G-77 countries successfully campaigned for the establishment of the INC.

The INC was established under the auspices of the UN GA offering a democratisation of the politics of climate change. Almost inevitably as a result of the developing country backlash, the INC did not have the same caveats for participation as the IPCC. This meant that participation was no longer constrained by scientific and technical competencies and considerably opened up the politics of climate change. In contrast to the hidden politics of the IPCC, the establishment of the INC represents an overtly increased politicisation of climate change.

The changing remit and evolving status of the IPCC through this period is a sign of the geopolitical power available to those who controlled the mechanisms for knowledge production. The scientized technocratic approach to climate policy favoured by the US and UK Governments functioned as a politics by the back door as it favoured Western experts in the IPCC. The establishment of the INC, though, effectively relegated the IPCC into a subordinate position on the

205 international stage. This chapter has shown the political power available to those who can speak for the climate.

206

Chapter 6 – Conclusion

“In the preparation of the main Assessment most of the active scientists working in the field

have been involved. One hundred and seventy scientists from 25 countries have contributed to

it, either through participation in the twelve international workshops organised specially for

the purpose or through written contributions. A further 200 scientists have been involved in

the peer review of the draft report although, as in any developing scientific topic, there is a

minority of opinions which we have not been able to accommodate, the peer review has

helped to ensure a high degree of consensus amongst authors and reviewers regarding the

results presented. Thus the Assessment is an authoritative statement of the views of the

international scientific community at this time [italics added].”

-John Houghton, (1990)1

The IPCC, established in 1988, is currently in the process of finalising its Fifth Assessment Report (AR5). The Twelfth session of Working Group (WG) I of the IPCC, held from 23 to 26 September

2013, approved the Summary for Policymakers and accepted the underlying scientific and technical assessment. The headline message was that scientists are more certain than ever that humans are causing climate change – ninety-five per cent, to be precise.2 This figure has been increasing steadily with each successive IPCC assessment. Rising from the 90% certainty figure in the previous Fourth

Assessment in 2007, the 66% certainty in the Third Assessment in 2001 and the 50% certainty reported in the Second Assessment in 1995. The First Assessment Report in 1990 (examined in this thesis) did not qualify its certainty by the same statistical metrics, but suffice to say it was less certain than the subsequent reports. All of which increasingly begs the question of whether there was in fact a scientific mandate for political action at Rio in 1992. At least part of the answer lies in the message- spin, and an embedded and implicit linear approach to policymaking in the IPCC. In this thesis, I have

1 IPCC, (1990) Climate Change: The IPCC Science Assessment, J. T. Houghton, G. J. Jenkins & J. J. Ephraums (eds.), (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge) 2 Tom Bawden, “Scientists ‘95 per cent certain’ that climate change is man-made,” Independent (London), (21 August 2013)

207 historicised the IPCC’s intensive focus on certainty and uncertainty. Showing a clear path traceable back to the assessments conducted earlier in Villach in the 1980s, I have argued these meetings locked

IPCC scientists and administrators into specific modes of action and created a fertile environment in which a technocratic international regulatory regime emerged.

In the course of this thesis I have charted the IPCCs formation and its involvement in the emergence of anthropogenic climate change as an important international political issue. I firstly describe the actions of a group of science-policy advocates acting under the rubric of international organisations in raising climate change up the international political agenda. I particularly highlight the role of Mostafa Tolba and the influence of the coincident ozone negotiations in nurturing a fertile environment for the observed political advocacy, which I argue shaped the early political priorities for politicians and government officials who came to engage with climate change. Secondly, I provide a detailed analysis of the negotiations that resulted in the formation of the IPCC in 1988. Focussing on interagency negotiations within the US, I show how the IPCC proposal – intergovernmental, rather than international or independent – was crucial in securing the buy-in of government agencies with divergent political ambitions. Moreover, in promoting the “science” and relying on its inherent uncertainty, I argue the US Department of Energy – the dominant US government agency involved in these negotiations – sought to control the assessment mechanism and by association the politics of climate change. Thirdly, I detail the IPCC’s first assessment cycle running between 1988 and 1990. I show that decisions taken over the structures, processes and deadlines were made in an ad hoc, piecemeal fashion. This resulted in an oscillation of power, control and influence between, on the one hand, the scientists (authors of the report) and, on the other, the politicians and government officials represented at the plenary sessions of the IPCC. Finally, I chart the evolution of the IPCC’s structure, role and position on the international political landscape in the build-up to the Rio ‘Earth Summit’. I particularly, draw attention to the tensions manifest between calls for greater and more equal participation in the decision-making process, and the attempts of US policymakers to legitimise the knowledge produced by the IPCC in a bid to constrain alternative viewpoints.

208

Evidently, it is beyond the remit of this thesis to explain the subsequent inertia in the global politics of climate change. Rather I have charted the emergence of anthropogenic climate change as a salient international political issue through the frame of the IPCC’s formation. In the process I have teased out a number of observations under two overarching themes: the scientization of climate change politics; and the politics of participation and geopolitics of knowledge. In what follows, I draw conclusions about the formation of the IPCC. This is related to the politics of knowledge production in environmental assessments, and the consequent battles over who could speak for the climate, when and how. I will finish by discussing the scope for future research, the limitations of my thesis and highlight again the major findings with a discussion of the contemporary and historiographical relevance.

1. Science as Politics

“It should not be worrisome that the implementing of boundary organizations may at times be

characterized by a political intrusion into the workings of science, largely because there is a

reciprocal intrusion of science into politics. The politicization of science is undoubtedly a

slippery slope. But so is the scientization of politics. The boundary organization does not slide

down either slope because it is tethered to both, suspended by the coproduction of mutual

interests.”

-David Guston, (2001)1

Contemporary debates surrounding climate change often pit opposing camps of climate sceptics – so- called ‘deniers’ and ‘sceptics’ – against climate believers – so-called ‘warmists’ or ‘alarmists’. In this context, there have been competing claims and appeals to notions of scientific objectivity and authority in order to support their respective positions. In combination with counterclaims, suggesting

1 David H. Guston, “Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science” (2001), p. 405

209 the opposing scientific arguments have been unduly affected by politics. In fact, historians of science

Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway have argued that a handful of scientists have obscured the truth on global warming for political reasons.1 Specifically, Oreskes and Conway, argue that these scientists used their prestige and Cold War contacts to “support their political agenda, even though it meant attacking science and their fellow scientists.”2 Likewise, these accusations have been cast in the other direction. And the accusations of politicising the science are never far from discussions of climate change and the IPCC.

In examining the motivations and political rationale behind the formation of the IPCC, this thesis has significantly historicised the notion that science ought to determine action on climate change – the linear model of expertise and policymaking. Its historical lineage can be traced back to the Villach-II assessment in 1985, and the coincident effects of the ozone negotiations. Drawing parallels with the coincident ozone negotiations a handful of scientists and international administrators drove the early political agenda on climate change. They significantly advocated policies favouring intervention along the lines of a global convention, but also more importantly in a highly technocratic mode. The scientized decision-making processes to be subsequently implemented in the IPCC were a corrupted version of these early technocratic intentions.

At the outset of this thesis I defined the scientization of politics as taking a cultural or political world view and rationalising it through recourse to science, and politicizing the science as taking a political ambition, world view or specific outcome and utilising specific interpretations of the science to rationalise particular courses of action. However, these are not two distinct categories, but rather a continuum of inputs and outputs, and any knowledge generated is ‘co-produced’ through the dynamic interactions of the social and political world with the scientific realm.3 In this thesis I have attempted to disentangle the ways and means the IPCC has co-produced climate change knowledge.

Crucially, through an examination of the IPCC’s history, I have shown how the IPCC’s processes

1 Naomi Oreskes & Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt (2010), pp. 169-215. 2 Naomi Oreskes & Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt, (2010), p. 211. 3 Sheila Jasanoff, States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and the Social Order, (Routledge, London: 2006).

210 were used to legitimise particular value preferences with allegedly independent scientific facts. As US policymakers came to engage with climate change, they situated their own experts within the advisory mechanism and in doing so they further sought to legitimise the IPCC as a means of controlling who could speak on behalf of the climate. US officials therefore utilised, what Daniel Sarewitz describes as, “the enduring social commitment to the idea of scientific facts as detached from values, and the consequent desire of everyone on all sides of a given controversy to legitimate their value preferences with an allegedly independent body of facts.”1 During the formative years of the IPCC – in the decisions constituting its establishment, during the first assessment and moving forward into supplementary report prepared for the ‘Earth Summit’ – scientific debate concealed people’s interests and values (their political vision) behind technical arguments. Indeed, since its formation, the IPCC has been employed variously as a political tool for action and inaction.

US policymakers embraced a linear approach to policymaking within the IPCC, whereby assessment precedes and leads the policymaking. In this view more science meant better policy. US officials recognised the power to be wielded by guiding an organisation that employed the rhetoric of scientific objectivity to speak incontestable and universal truths. In this regard, US policymakers thus saw the IPCC as a means of advancing their own interests, which in the case of the DoE included blocking negotiations of a global convention. Retaining a sizable role in the negotiations of the terms of reference of the IPCC, they positioned it at the centre of all the international debates on climate change. Accordingly, dialogue over what could, indeed should, be done about combatting climate change, was increasingly divorced from expectations for the future involving an explicit statement of a common set of goals and values. The IPCC presented a vision of both future climate change but also the governance structures of a nascent climate regime. And while I do not deny that scientific knowledge and technical expertise does have a part to play in decisions about the future, these decisions will also inevitably involve a commitment to a set of goals and values.2 So the IPCC recast political questions in technical scientific terms, or at least as questions to be answered by an

1 Daniel Sarewitz, “How science makes environmental controversies worse” Environmental Science & Policy, 7, (2004), p. 397. 2 Daniel Sarewitz, “How science makes environmental controversies worse” (2004).

211 assessment. The assessment proposed was, therefore, more than simply an analysis of the problem and potential solutions. The added weight of importance imparted by US policymakers situated the IPCC as an in situ decision-making device, in particular addressing the question of whether or not to go forward with the suggestions for a global convention.

Although I have presented a picture here of US hegemony within the IPCC, there was internal contestation – a tussle to control the IPCC’s agenda. From 1985 to 1988 and beyond, climate change politics as enacted through the IPCC (and its establishment) was characterised by power struggles between, on the one hand, the scientists and international administrators at UNEP, and on the other,

US policymakers working in the Department of Energy (DoE). The scientists and international administrators were seeking to generate a scientific consensus, which they considered a prerequisite for the adoption and implementation of a global convention on climate change. Concerned by the actions, activities and advocacy of these ‘out of control’ scientists, US policymakers attempted to reassert (their) governmental control of the issue. This contestation over (i) how to conduct an assessment and (ii) who should be included precipitated the discussions in the US which resulted in the initial steps taken towards creating the IPCC. These competing claims for the control of the levers of knowledge production have accordingly created divergent priorities at different stages in the period of this study (1979-1992). Whereas, Professor of Politics and Global Studies David Guston (quoted above), points to the mutual interests supporting the inner workings of a boundary organization.1

Guston has proposed the concept of ‘boundary organizations’ as a way of explaining the stabilisation in communications between the two relatively distinct social worlds of politics and science.2 He argues that a successful boundary organization will, thus, “succeed in pleasing two sets of principals and remain stable to external forces astride the internal instability at the actual boundary.”3 I argue

1 Boundary organisations are an extension of the concept of boundary object. Boundary organisations: (1) can provide the opportunity and sometimes the incentives for the creation and use of boundary objects and standardized packages; (2) they involve the participation of actors from both sides of the boundary, as well as professionals who serve a mediating role; and (3), they exist at the frontier of the two relatively different social worlds of politics and science, but they have distinct lines of accountability to each. Boundary organisations are involved in co-production in two ways they facilitate collaboration between scientists and non-scientists, and they create the combined scientific and social order through the generation of boundary objects and standardized packages. 2 David H. Guston, “Boundary Organizations” (2001) 3 David H. Guston, “Boundary Organizations” (2001), p. 401

212 that it is in fact the inner tension, the competing claims for authority, that have characterised the

IPCC’s establishment and early work. In this regard, the IPCC has been supported by the competing appeals to the twin strains of scientific credibility and political legitimacy.

This thesis shows that the science and policy interface was successfully integrated and embedded in the IPCC throughout the first assessment cycle. It internalised questions of participation as it created a façade of open participation. It presented a vision of scientific credibility to certain audiences and political legitimacy to others. Indeed, the dual ownership of the IPCC’s assessment lent the IPCC credibility with both audiences – scientists and politicians. Subsequently, questions over whether it was appropriate that the IPCC be responsible for political negotiations created the momentum behind the decision to create the INC. The boundary negotiations were forced out into view as questions over political accountability, legitimacy and open democratic participation in the

IPCC were raised. The re-examination of the science-policy interface redefined the IPCC’s role and actually strengthened the Panel’s credibility, political legitimacy and aided its role as a useful resource of expertise in political decisions.

In this thesis I have focussed on the importance and centrality of the US in articulating a vision for the future of international policymaking on climate change. In particular, I have highlighted the early interactions between Mostafa Tolba and the US State Department in 1986. This in itself does not differ a great deal from the account of Shardul Agrawala, who argues from a counter-factual perspective that something like the IPCC was a necessity by 1988. With the issue having outgrown the mechanisms introduced by Tolba, UNEP, the WMO and ICSU, Agrwala argues that an intergovernmental panel was the next logical step.1 Whilst Agrawala’s account argues from the counter-factual that an intergovernmental panel was inevitable, I crucially highlight that it was the actions of a select few US officials who made the IPCC appear inevitable. Insofar the intergovernmental status of the assessment mechanism, proposed by the US, was part of a conscious effort to control the issue. In contrast, Agrawala suggests that following the Villach-II meeting the political profile of the issue demanded the assessment mechanism integrate governments, hence the

1 Shardul Agrawala, “Context and Early Origins of the IPCC” (1994a)

213 novel intergovernmental approach. In this divergence from Agrawala’s account of the origins of the

IPCC I have, in conjunction, highlighted the ways the establishment of the Panel has scientized climate politics alongside politicising the assessment. By historicising the initial negotiations of the

IPCC, I have highlighted how early science policy interactions were heavily influenced by the coincident ozone negotiations. The actions of the scientists and administrators at Villach-II and beyond were instrumental in shaping the methods and approaches pursued in earnest in the IPCC.

Furthermore, these approaches have crucially locked climate change policy into a specifically scientized way of thinking.

By looking to the IPCC’s origins I have illustrated the science-policy tensions manifest in the

IPCC’s creation. The scientific push and the political pushback that ultimately resulted in the IPCC’s creation also brought to the fore a particularly linear approach to policymaking, still evident in the

IPCC today. This specific approach – of first developing consensus and subsequently getting policymakers to implement the “necessary” policies – was seen as an essential prerequisite of action by the scientists and administrators involved in the assessments, but was also embraced as a useful resource to delay action by certain governments, namely the US and UK.

2. The Geopolitics of Knowledge Production: Assessing Global

Environmental Assessments

The scientization of the politics of climate change and the concomitant politicisation of the science of climate change poses interesting questions in evaluating how we measure the success, credibility and democratic accountability of expert advisory bodies such as the IPCC. I have argued in this thesis that the IPCC, for the most part, managed to present a credible, legitimate and importantly authoritative assessment of climate change. This was achieved through an internal struggle to steer the direction of the assessment mechanism – a back and forth between scientists and policymakers.

The initial proposal for the IPCC from US policymakers was a clear attempt at deliberately shaping the politics of climate change. By setting up the IPCC as a scientific endeavour, framing

214 climate change as a technical issue, the US government endorsed the opinions of a specific group of scientists in order to make their judgement more authoritative. US officials sought to narrow and constrain the scientific – and by association political – dialogue rather than opening up and inviting a more diverse set of voices into the conversation.

The initial vision US officials, alongside Mostafa Tolba, had for the IPCC was for a small assessment Panel – similar to the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG) – but crucially, led by countries actively involved in researching the issue. This would have, at once, satisfied the concerns of the sponsoring organisations, providing them with a coordinating role, at the same time as, circumscribing the involvement of a select few countries and their experts. This version of the

IPCC proposal never came to pass as a result of the WMO Secretary-General Godwin O. P. Obasi, who ensured that every UN member country was invited to participate.1 Instead, the IPCC’s structure emerged piecemeal through a series of ad hoc decisions, in the main, taken by the scientists leading the three separate Working Groups (WGs) of the assessment.

The actions of the scientists leading each WG and the counter actions of the national representatives – designated core members – was the principal agent shaping the assessment’s structure during the eighteen months of the First Assessment cycle. Many of these informal arrangements were subsequently formalised by the IPCC, as it augmented its role immediately after the First Assessment. I have argued that the initial exuberance of the scientists was curbed by the implementation of ‘core membership’. The purpose of core membership was to ensure governmental oversight of the work of the scientists. It was also a way of involving a wide range of countries and so contributed immediately to the legitimacy of the process. Significantly, over the course of the eighteen months spent compiling the assessment the two, apparently competing, spheres of science and politics were able to compromise. This is demonstrated by, on the one hand, the relaxing of the concept of core members, which allowed scientists the leeway to assemble the report independently.

And on the other hand by the efforts made by the panel to widen the participation, particularly to include representatives from developing countries so that the report could be viewed as speaking from

1 Only thirty-five countries actually responded to this invitation.

215 a global perspective. Similarly, the integration of two rounds of review into the assessment process, one of scientific peer review and another for government review, further exemplifies the dual pressures on the IPCC. In appealing to both competing pillars, in the various ways outlined in this thesis, the IPCC accomplished a kind of dual legitimacy – appearing both scientifically credible and politically acceptable.

The decision to extend the review process to incorporate a wider more diverse and heterogeneous array of voices into the political decisions to be taken around climate change does in many ways reflect a post-normal scientific approach. However, in the introduction to this thesis I stated that throughout this thesis the IPCC ultimately fell short of a post-normal science ideal. ‘Post-

Normal Science’ describes a method of scientific inquiry where facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent.1 Post-normal science invites a plurality of legitimate perspectives involving an interactive dialogue democratising science.2 It is on this issue of democratisation that I feel the IPCC fails to fulfil a post-normal approach, because while the IPCC does open up dialogue beyond the ‘core-set’ of experts, it limits participation beyond that to a select few countries and the government representatives.

The unique and key factor throughout this period was the intergovernmental structure, which forced the Panel members, scientists and political representatives to appeal to both pillars of scientific credibility and political legitimacy. This curbed the overzealous ambitions of the scientists and some international administrators, notably Tolba, who wanted to see a predominantly (almost exclusively) science-led technocratic assessment as well reigning in explicitly political concerns. This balancing of both scientific and political concerns, when combined with the desire of many countries to push the

IPCC to the centre of all international debates, ensuring it fed into high level political meetings, meant that the Panel was credible, legitimate and importantly salient. The IPCC’s credibility with both scientists and political leaders was capitalised upon by the US administration, as they sought to

216 constrain the debate via the IPCC. The US sought to control the IPCC, and only legitimise a select few scientists.

By the completion of the assessment in August 1990, however, one underlying concern still remained – that of a true equitable geographical representation. Therefore, while efforts were made to involve as many countries as possible in the IPCC process, the existing research and expertise remained firmly in the hands of Western, developed nations. The efforts to involve developing nations were at best tokenistic, and at worst, more about gaining governmental assent to a specific Western, technical framing of the issue. In this regard, developed countries were intent on projecting an image of the IPCC as a globally representative body able to speak on behalf of the entire international community. In reality, the US and UK made up nearly half of the contributing authors of the WG I report. Moreover, the material ability for every government globally to comment on a comprehensive assessment of a highly complex and technical issue such as climate change was unrealistic, as most of the expertise on the issue was located in just a few developed countries. Thus, while everyone and anyone could, in theory, comment on the report, only a select few countries and their scientists could in reality actually make substantive comments.

The dissatisfaction and disenfranchisement felt by several prominent members of the G-77 with this state of affairs, subsequently led to the IPCC’s relegation into a subordinate position in the international political regime on climate change. It also highlights the important implications of the geopolitics and knowledge production in global environmental assessments. With the IPCC processes involving an explicit transfer of ownership of the assessment’s findings from scientists onto policymakers, the IPCC was being deployed to speak on behalf of people, countries, and entire regions even whilst they were at the same time unable to contribute to the knowledge production. The backlash against the IPCC I argue was, therefore, less about a rejection of any specific scientific findings, and instead more about the geopolitics of knowledge of production, and a kind of politics of participation. The politics of participation was addressed by the IPCC’s actions during the First

Assessment cycle, but was patently insufficient for the several countries (Brazil and India predominantly) who led the backlash against the Panel. Whether a more comprehensive post-normal

217 approach could have ameliorated these concerns is an unanswerable counterfactual; but what I have attempted to show is that participation (or lack thereof) in the IPCC was a key factor in the partial rejection of its findings in Sundsvall Sweden.

The Brazilian delegation stood out in rejecting the IPCC findings in 1990 after which they began lobbying the UN General Assembly (GA) for a new intergovernmental body, to coordinate the proposed negotiation of a global convention. They saw that a UN GA backed organisation offered the proposition of opening up the issue to a wider base of participation – a kind of democratisation of the politics of climate change. This was because the UN GA is the one organ of the UN in which all member nations have equal representation. The campaigning of Brazil successfully led to the establishment of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to the UN Framework

Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Meeting five times between February 1991 and May

1992, the INC managed to at the last minute to get the States to adopt the Convention text which was then prepared for signature at the Earth Summit.

This formally separated the scientific processes and inputs to climate change politics from the knowledge making processes. These processes, I have argued, led to the comprehensive diplomatic isolation of the US. By the time of the Rio ‘Earth Summit’ in June 1992, President Bush had gone from talking up his environmental credentials – as I showed at the outset of this thesis in the introduction Bush was talking about the ‘White House effect’1 to combat climate change in 1988 – to threatening to not even turn up at the ‘Earth Summit’ in 1992. What had changed was the ability for the US to be able to shape the political terrain by retaining a tight grip on access to and evaluation of the assessment of the problem. In presenting a consensus statement of the findings of a select few climate modelling centres located in the US, UK and northern Europe, the IPCC was concentrating the focus on the technical and scientific aspects of the problem of climate change, not the wider socio- economic, political systems it was a product of. The US government was content to see the problem discussed, uncertainty reduced and technical aspects framed in this way, as it offered them a way of delaying any meaningful discussion of how to combat the problem.

1 George H. W. Bush quoted in Anon, “The White House and the Greenhouse” New York Times (9th May 1989)

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3. Scope for Future Research

There are three areas related to my thesis in which I see scope for future research: Firstly, a micro- analysis – scrutinising the IPCC assessment reports, interpreting the ways in which IPCC constructed and portrayed uncertainty and consensus; secondly, a more extensive view from the Global South, providing a counter-narrative to this thesis; and lastly, due to the contemporary nature of this historical research, my findings are subject to revision as more and more archival evidence becomes available.

This thesis has focussed on a macro-scale reading of the actions of political and scientific actors and their involvement in the IPCC’s program and overarching methodology. Through this I have elucidated the actions of individuals in shaping the ambitions and of international organisations and Nation States. In this thesis I have not examined the assessment report text in extensive detail.

Micro textual analyses are capable of interpreting the language used, sentence structure and narrative construction in order to understand particular ambitions of the author, in ways it has not been possible to consider for the more wide-ranging focus of my thesis. A micro-analysis could, for example, draw out how IPCC authors constructed uncertainty in the first assessment – a significant and enduring characteristic of IPCC reports. Furthermore, a closer reading of the assessment text could also help to identify the ways in which a diversity of views over controversial and uncertain topics were portrayed: How, for instance, were different scientists and groups of researchers represented in the final report?

To aid this kind of micro-analysis, further material such as earlier drafts of reports, review comments and marked-up versions of the assessment report would be important. In the process of researching this thesis I have found that the IPCC did not have a structured archiving process in place during the first assessment. Plenary reports are available, but the WG’s were left to their own devices in regards to organising and administering their work. Thus, while this documentation may become available subsequently as national governments release their government papers, and the personal

219 archives of individual scientists become available, at present any micro-analysis would have to focus exclusively on the published end report.

The IPCC s’s history is a product of the global scale of climate change, both in terms of the anticipated effects and also in terms of the scale of participation in the assessments and politics of the issue. David DeMeritt highlights that the IPCC have regarded climate as a universal and global-scale problem of atmospheric emissions, divorced from the social and political contexts of both its material production and its cognitive understanding.1 Indeed, throughout this thesis I have discussed anthropogenic climate change as global. Accordingly, the IPCC is ripe for study through a transnational historical lens. Transnational history “is the study of the ways in which past lives and events have been shaped by processes and relationships that have transcended the borders of nation states.” As a field of history it seeks to “understand ideas, things, people, and practices which have crossed national boundaries.”2

In this thesis, my principal focus has centred on the role of the US and, to a smaller degree, the UK in the construction of specific features of the international political climate regime which emerged during the latter half of the 1980s and early 1990s. This focus has flowed from the fact that the US were the single largest financial contributors to the UN system, and hence wielded significant influence, as well as having the most sophisticated domestic policy on climate change. Nevertheless, as I have shown on numerous occasions throughout this chapter other nations, their diplomats and delegations to conferences have played important roles in shaping the climate regime – in particular, the roles of Brazil and India. Unfortunately, in this thesis my treatment of the impact and roles played by these two countries has remained largely underdeveloped. As my thesis has principally drawn on interviews of English speaking scientists from Europe, and the US and archival documents from

Britain the US and Australia I have not been able to provide a comprehensive and truly global analysis of the IPCC.

1 David DeMeritt, “The Construction of global warming and the politics of science”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 91; 2, (2001), pp. 307-337. 2 Ann Curthoys and Marilyn Lake, “Introduction” in Connected Worlds History in Transnational Perspective (eds.) Ann Curthoys and Marilyn Lake (Australian National University Press: Canberra, 2005), p. 17

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Missing from this analysis is what I would call the view from the ‘Global South.’ In this regard, I suggest there is unquestionably scope for more research to be conducted into the roles played by India and Brazil as two prominent members of the G-77 during the First Assessment cycle and in the run-up to the Rio Earth Summit. India, on the one hand because of the influential role played by the Center for Science and Environment, and Brazil on the other, because of their longstanding involvement in issues around eco-development and sustainable development and as hosts of the ‘Earth

Summit’ in 1992. These alternative viewpoints would add depth and detail to subsequent accounts of the IPCC’s history; however, I am confident they would not undermine my major conclusions. This is because my arguments while necessarily touching on Brazilian and Indian viewpoints – notably at the conclusion of the fourth session of the IPCC in Sundsvall Sweden – principally deal with the US.

Thus the alternative viewpoints would add depth and detail to subsequent accounts of the IPCC’s history but would not undermine my overarching conclusions as they relate to US engagement, not

Brazilian or Indian engagement.

The contemporary nature of the subject matter in this thesis has necessitated that I rely heavily on oral history. The imperfect, often contradictory and patchwork nature of these sources have been augmented by the personal archives of a number of the interview subjects as well as their personal accounts. Bo Döös and Eugene Bierly, for instance, were in the process of compiling their own history of the IPCC, when Döös passed away in January 2010. Bierly and Döös’ son Kristofer

Döös have been kind enough to provide me with many of their notes and their own personal papers in order to write this thesis. However, while I am confident in the conclusions I have been able to draw from these sources presently available, I am acutely aware that more policy documents will likely be made available over the next ten years. Therefore the arguments I have put forward in thesis will be open to revision from future historians of the IPCC and Global Environmental assessments of the late

1980s early 1990s.

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4. Discussion of Major Findings

At the outset of this thesis I stated my intention was to investigate how the science and politics of climate change evolved over the decade leading up to the creation of the IPCC in 1988, how this affected the First Assessment of the IPCC and what this ultimately could tell us about scientific advice – ‘speaking knowledge to power’. In this final section I will highlight two of my key arguments and what I see as their contemporary and, or historiographical implications.

Firstly, I have sought to argue against the simplistic notion that the US government has consistently had an antagonistic relationship with the IPCC and the science and politics of climate change. By drawing on previously unseen documentation I have described and analysed the proposals, counter-proposals and negotiations in and between the US, the WMO and UNEP which Shardul

Agrawala describes as “still shrouded in mystery”.1 I highlight the role of Bo Döös in forcing his and

Alan Hecht’s proposal (the Döös-Hecht draft proposal) through the various layers of bureaucracy within the US National Climate Program and at the WMO. As such this thesis goes beyond Shardul

Agrawala’s account of the IPCC’s “context and early origins”. It does so by historicising many of the

IPCC’s legacy features, such as the notion of an extended peer review (including Governments), and the formative arrangements of the policymaker’s summary.

Additionally, I have specifically highlighted when, and why US policymakers became disillusioned by the IPCC and disengaged with the emergent political regime for climate change. This happened as the IPCC was superseded by the INC as the body through and under which negotiations of a climate convention were conducted. Prior to this, the US government were one of the IPCC’s strongest backers. I raise this specific argument because of its contemporary relevance concerning US engagement with the IPCC. While it is beyond the remit of this thesis to answer why the US

Government has refused to ratify the Kyoto treaty, this thesis can add a historical context and material depth to the issue. By demonstrating both how and why the US became isolated politically at the Rio

‘Earth Summit’ in addition to their obstructionist tactics within the qualitatively more political

1 Shardul Agrawala, “Context and Early Origins of the IPCC,” Climatic Change, 39, (1994a), p. 615.

222 atmosphere of the INC it is possible to see US ambitions to constrain and steer climate politics at an earlier date in and through the IPCC.

In addition to demonstrating the need to contextualise US engagement with the IPCC, I have brought out the close relationship between the US and UK policymakers at key meetings during this period. With previous accounts principally focussing on the US role in the politics of climate change, this thesis adds to the complexity of the politics of climate change at the time. In my examination of the UK government’s role, I have shown the two faces of UK policy on climate change. Thus, despite

Prime Minister Thatcher’s green credentials – speaking to the Royal Society on global warming as well as at the Second World Climate Conference in 1990 – behind the scenes, UK policymakers were aligned much more closely with the anti-regulatory proposals from the US, not the pro-environmental agendas of several European countries. This point, however, must be juxtaposed against UK involvement in the IPCC, through the chairmanship of WGI (John Houghton and his Met Office

Chairman’s task force), substantial funding of the Panel and the involvement of many British and

British-based scientists in contributing to the assessment report.

Secondly, I have demonstrated the need to consider the geographies and geopolitics of global environmental assessments. I have argued that the IPCC’s First Assessment is an exemplary example of how questioning who gets to speak on behalf of climate change and how, in scientific assessments, can highlight fundamental inequities. The varying capabilities to produce knowledge across countries, regions and cultural boundaries can marginalise the concerns of some while legitimising and privileging others. For a global assessment to really be able to speak on behalf of the entire international community, more needs to be done to genuinely address the inherent inequities in the concentration of scientific expertise in much of the developed world. Indeed a group of scholars recently authored a letter reflecting just these issues in response to efforts to establish an international body to connect expert advice with decision making biodiversity. They specifically argued that “we should move beyond conventional scientific knowledge assessments that legitimize, almost

223 exclusively, only peer-reviewed material.” 1 The assessment processes, they argue, should involve

“knowledge established across all scales (especially the knowledge of local and indigenous peoples) and validated in multiple ways.”2 It is beyond the remit of thesis to argue what specific arrangements should be made going forward on climate change. But this thesis can provide a timely, judicious reminder of how the IPCC came to be structured as it is and what the early motivations for this were.

In this thesis I have argued that the IPCC assessment constructed a body of knowledge informing policymakers of specifically salient scientific facts, at the exclusion of a diversity of alternative frameworks. Ultimately, this thesis provides the origin story of climate politics, importantly demonstrating the deep geographic inequities embedded into the assessment mechanism from the outset.

I will conclude finally by saying that I find that the IPCC’s greatest strength has also been its greatest weakness: Bringing together scientists and politicians it has been able to ‘speak truth to power’. But, the intergovernmental structure has also resulted in a highly scientized approach to policymaking with an overreliance on particular types of expertise. The resulting scientized decision- making has been accompanied by competing appeals to science to settle political debate, doing a disservice both to the science and politics of climate change.

1 Mike Hulme, Martin Mahony, Silke Beck, Christoph Görg, Bernd Hansjürgens, Jennifer Hauck, Carsten Nesshöver, Axel Paulsch, Marie Vandewalle, Heidi Wittmer, Stefan Böschen, Peter Bridgewater, Mariteuw Chimère Diaw, Pierre Fabre, Aurelia Figueroa, Kong Luen Heong, Horst Korn, Rik Leemans, Eva Lövbrand, Mohd Norowi Hamid, Chad Monfreda, Roger Pielke Jr., Josef Settele, Marten Winter, Alice B. M. Vadrot, Sybille van den Hove, Jeroen P. van der Sluijs, “Science-Policy Interface: Beyond Assessments,” Science, (5 August 2011), 333; 6043, pp. 697-698 2 Mike Hulme et al, “Science-Policy Interface: Beyond Assessments,” (2011)

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