University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Papers in Communication Studies Communication Studies, Department of 1-2016 Mitt Romney in Denver: “Obamacare” as Ideological Enthymeme Justin Ward Kirk University of Kansas, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/commstudiespapers Part of the Critical and Cultural Studies Commons, Gender, Race, Sexuality, and Ethnicity in Communication Commons, and the Other Communication Commons Kirk, Justin Ward, "Mitt Romney in Denver: “Obamacare” as Ideological Enthymeme" (2016). Papers in Communication Studies. 213. http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/commstudiespapers/213 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Communication Studies, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Papers in Communication Studies by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Published in Journal of Argumentation in Context 5:3 (January 2016), pp. 227–248; doi: 10.1075/jaic.5.3.01kir Copyright © 2016 John Benjamins Publishing Company. Used by permission. Published online January 16, 2017. Mitt Romney in Denver: “Obamacare” as Ideological Enthymeme Justin Ward Kirk University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, USA Corresponding author – Justin Ward Kirk, email [email protected] This paper argues that surface-level analysis of political argument fails to explain the effectiveness of ideological enthymemes, particularly within the context of presidential debates. This paper uses the first presidential debate of the 2012 election as a case study for the use of “Obamacare” as an ideological enthymeme. The choice of a terminological system limits and shapes the argumentative choices afforded the candidate. Presidential debates provide a unique context within which to exam- ine the interaction of ideological constraints and argument due to their relatively committed and ideologically homogenous audiences. Keywords: Barack Obama, enthymeme, ideology, Mitt Romney, Obamacare, presidential debates, public address Introduction On 3 October 2012 Mitt Romney and Barack Obama took the stage at Magness Arena at the University of Denver and participated in the first of three debates prior to the general election. Prior to the debate, Romney had suffered a slow bleed of independents and mod- erate conservatives heading into the Denver debate (John F. Kennedy School of Govern- ment 2013: 210). Commentators described the debate as “do-or-die,” “a game-changer,” a “reboot” of the campaign, and an opportunity for a “breakthrough” (Martin and Haber- man 2012; see also Crummy 2012b; Fitzgerald 2012; Balz and Rucker 2012). Critics were also uncertain about the impact of Romney’s previous arguments on economic inequality, the near-calamity of the GOP convention, or his persistent vagueness in regards to his tax K IRK, J OURNAL OF A RGUMENTATION IN C ONTEXT 5 (2016) policies, but most agreed that the campaign needed a significant boost to remain competi- tive in the last month of the election (Fitzgerald 2012; see also Guzder 2012; Grant 2012; Lee 2012). Despite attempts to lower expectations by the White House campaign team, Mitt Romney entered the debate in Denver with substantially lower expectations than the pres- ident (Levinson 2012; see also MacAskill 2012b). Likely voters favored Obama by a 2-to-1 margin before the debate, and they cited expe- rience and expertise as the reasons for their preference (Milbank 2012: A02). However, the expectations did not match the results. Rather than a “knock-down, drag-out fight,” the first debate was “relatively sleepy” with “no fireworks or big ‘moments’ to speak of” and “unusually civilized” (Metzler 2012; see also Haberman 2012; Mariucci and Farofoli 2012). Most pundits agreed that the biggest difference between expectations and results was the lackluster performance of the president (Medved 2012; see also MacAskill 2012a; Ingold 2012). Post-mortems of the debate blamed a variety of factors, including the president’s lack of preparation, the altitude in Denver, Obama’s overconfidence, or a general absence of enthusiasm displayed by the president (Alter 2013; see also Tau 2012; Harnden 2012; Krebs 2012). Hence, the debate failed audience expectations in two ways: it was less excit- ing than viewers expected and the favorite was soundly defeated in the minds of the pun- dits and viewing audiences. Mitt Romney’s debate performance, on the other hand, was surprising to audiences but should not have been unexpected. Debates were one of his strengths, and a variety of de- bate formats and opponents throughout the lengthy primary season tested and refined many of his strategies and debating skills (Fallows 2012). In fact, over the course of the previous fifteen months, Romney participated in 19 of the 20 scheduled primary debates. After the debate, voters agreed that Romney had closed the gap between himself and the president and was in a much better position to win the election than prior to taking the stage in Denver (Stelter 2012: A22; see also Milbank 2012: A02). David Axelrod, senior ad- visor to the Obama campaign, spoke about the result: “I think what he did was, in one night, he got back those Republican-leaning Independents. I think he improved enthusi- asm among his base. I think the race snapped back to where it was essentially before the convention” (John F. Kennedy School of Government 2013: 218). David Simas, director of opinion research for the Romney campaign, reflected on the impact of the debate and its effect on the election: “What we saw . was a consolidation back to Governor Romney . it opened up the door . for the first time we saw his very favorable numbers among the Republicans rivalling numbers that we had seen in 2008” (218–19). Romney, drawing on more than a year of experience in primary debates, outperformed Obama in the eyes of the media and voting public. There are three reasons the Denver debate warrants scholarly attention. First, the rise of the Tea Party in 2010 places new constraints on Republican candidates seeking the presi- dency. Bradberry and Jacobson (2014) find that the influence of the Tea Party on conserva- tive voters increases their hostility toward Obama and his policies, increases their receptiveness to unwarranted and unsubstantiated arguments, and constitutes the most loyal, active, and largest component of the Republican party. In order to appeal to this newly activated wing of the party, Romney needed to craft a strategy that appealed to the 2 K IRK, J OURNAL OF A RGUMENTATION IN C ONTEXT 5 (2016) electorate as a whole and simultaneously addressed the demands of an increasingly con- servative and influential segment of his own constituency. Secondly, there is disagreement about the result in the Denver debate. On the one hand, poll numbers and media coverage immediately following the debate favored the chal- lenger (John F. Kennedy School of Government 2013; see also Medved 2012; MacAskill 2012a; Ingold 2012; Tau 2012; Harnden 2012; Krebs 2012). In addition, David Zarefsky (2015) argues that Obama failed to capitalize on mistakes made by Romney in the debate and did not make strategic use of his time, allowing Romney to control the performative and strategic elements of the debate. On the other hand, Rowland (2013) focuses on the substantive arguments and finds that Obama’s performance was superior based upon the evidence provided and arguments developed during the debate. The disagreement be- tween a substantive and strategic analysis highlights a key feature of the Denver debate that this paper seeks to address. Why do strategic and substantive analyses find divergent results? And, consequently, what argumentative features of the debate can be analyzed to explain both findings? Finally, presidential campaign debates are important foci for analysis because they “set the agenda” for the rest of the campaign, and the first debate in any campaign cycle is the most important for audience perceptions of the candidates and their campaigns (Benoit, Hansen, and Verser 2003; see also Holbrook 1999). McKinney and Warner (2013) find that presidential debates do very little to change voter preferences in the general election. How- ever, if voters find debates to be useful tools in electoral decision-making and their evalu- ation of the debates is not based on substance, then they must be influenced by other factors. Research shows that low-knowledge voters typically evaluate debates based on the appearance of candidates, rather than the substance of their arguments (Lenz and Law- son 2011). The obvious reasoning would argue that Mitt Romney’s aggressiveness and ac- tive debating style contrasted directly with Barack Obama’s “sleepiness” and general passivity during the debate, and that this contrast led directly to the public perception that Romney dominated the debate. In what follows, I argue that Romney’s argumentative strategy for dealing with this new and constraining environment relies on a particular form of argument that eschews sub- stance for ideologically oriented claims and enthymematic reasoning. In addition, I exam- ine how Romney uses strategies that adapt to competing audience demands in political environments where fringe and center collide. I argue that it is more than just charactero- logical appearance or performative elements of a candidate that were at work in Denver, but rather the appearance of argument, or the performance of argument without the