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CHAPTER 10 the SENATE: the FILIBUSTER at FULL FORCE The CHAPTER 10 THE SENATE: THE FILIBUSTER AT FULL FORCE The Capitol Hill staff members supporting the civil rights bill gathered for a meeting in a conference room in the Old Senate Office Building. The mood at the start of the meeting was exceptionally upbeat. The civil rights bill had passed the House of Representatives without suffering any major setbacks in the form of damaging or weakening amendments. The bill now was in a sort of legislative limbo. It had passed the House, but it had not yet come over to the Senate for action in the upper house. The speaker at this particular meeting was Ralph Shepard. He was the special assistant on civil rights to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, the Demo- cratic whip in the Senate. It was well known that Senator Humphrey was a longtime supporter of civil rights and would be playing a major role in guiding the civil rights bill through the Senate. “Almost everybody in the United States has heard the word filibuster,” Ralph Shepard began. “But very few people know how the filibuster really works. The word conjures up the image of Southern senators with leather lungs giving bombastic speeches on irrelevant subjects. A lot of people regard the filibuster as a sort of comic opera rather than a serious impedi- ment to important legislation. They think of Southern senators reading obscure passages from the Bible, or conducting arcane discussions on names found in the New Orleans telephone directory, or telling jokes with one another, some of the jokes having a racist tinge.” “But those kind of ridiculous filibusters no longer exist,” Shepard continued. “The Southerners have learned how to stay on the subject of civil rights and only discuss topics that are relevant to the debate. They want to look wise and thoughtful to the folks back home. They no longer are willing to run the risk of looking and sounding like fools and buffoons.” 190 THE SENATE Ralph Shepard’s well organized presentation was interrupted by an early question: “Can just one senator, talking by himself, conduct a filibuster and defeat an important bill?” “Single-senator filibusters are well-known in Senate lore,” Shepard replied, “but they constitute no long range problem to the Senate. These one- person filibusters attract a lot of attention in the press but rarely last more than 24 hours. That’s about as long as one human being can hold out with- out getting some rest.” Clark Schooler had been looking for an opportunity to make a contribu- tion at these pro-civil rights staff meetings. Up to this point, he had played the proper role of a newcomer and had only been a passive listener at these meetings. But the subject of the single-senator filibuster was one which Clark knew something about. “There are two claimants to the title of having delivered the longest speech in the history of the Senate,” Clark chimed in with a somewhat weak and wavering voice. “The first is Senator Strom Thurmond, a South Carolina Democrat. He gave a 24-hour speech against a civil rights bill in 1957. That’s been the longest speech ever recorded in the Senate. But Senator Thurmond’s Southern pals helped him out by periodically requesting quorum calls. That enabled Strom to leave the Senate chamber from time to time to answer periodic calls of nature.” “The second claimant is Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon,” Clark continued. As Clark’s little lecture went on, his voice and confidence gained strength. “Senator Morse gave a 23-hour speech against an offshore oil drilling bill. He strenuously opposed drilling for oil in oceans and bays because he feared it would lead to environmental pollution. But during this marathon speech, lasting almost a full day and night, Senator Morse never once left his desk on the Senate floor. He had somehow solved the major problem of uninterrupted single-senator filibusters. That problem was the need to visit the rest room.” Clark’s historical contribution to the discussion was well received by the group of Capitol Hill staffers. There were a few smiles when he men- tioned Senator Morse’s unique achievements, and no one looked or acted as if Clark’s comments were out of place or otherwise inappropriate. “The type of filibuster that totally shuts down the Senate,” Ralph Shepard said, “occurs when a sizable group of senators get together and proceed to talk the bill to death. They refuse to stop debating until the bill is either withdrawn or seriously weakened by amendments. The filibustering senators divide up into teams in order to make the work lighter. Often all they do is hold casual little discussions that are no more trouble to carry on than a pleasant conversation.” THE FILIBUSTER AT FULL FORCE 191 “They talk on endlessly,” Ralph Shepard said, a tone of vexation beginning to come into his voice. “They know that the bill they are trying to kill will be enacted into law if it ever comes to a vote in the Senate. So they continue to blather to one another, oblivious to the passage of precious legislative time. The usual outcome of a filibuster is that the other senators give up, withdraw the bill in question, and allow the Senate to move on to other business.” The discussion then turned technical in nature. “The filibuster is found in the Senate rules,” Ralph Shepard explained, “and the rules state all too clearly: ‘No senator shall interrupt another senator in debate without his consent.’” “You have to interrupt a speaking senator in order to hold a vote on a bill,” Shepard concluded. “But under the rules, no senator can be interrupted when speaking on the Senate floor. That’s what makes the filibuster possi- ble, and 100 percent legal.” At that moment, a middle-aged woman stood up at the back of the room. She was a legislative aide to Senator Clifford Case of New Jersey. Senator Case was a liberal Republican and a strong supporter of civil rights. The woman was smartly dressed in a woman’s dark business suit with a white blouse. She spoke with the smoothness and assurance that comes from longtime service in a staff capacity on Capitol Hill. “The Senate rules and the filibuster exist,” the woman said, “because a majority of senators believe in them. You will not be able to get the civil rights bill passed by changing the Senate rules. The only way to get the bill passed will be to end the debate with a cloture vote, a vote of 2/3 of the senators to stop debate and vote on the bill.” Apparently the woman was just getting warmed up to the topic. “The Founders of this nation did not intend the Senate to be a popular body,” she said. “They did not want the Senate responding to the temporary majority that won the most recent election. When writing the United States Constitu- tion, the Founders took care to insulate the Senate from the popular will in two ways.” “The first way,” the woman continued, “was to have equal representa- tion in the Senate. There are two senators for each state, regardless of a state’s population. The traditional role of the Senate is to protect the states with small populations from the states with large populations. The filibuster fits nicely with this traditional role of the Senate. Senators from small states can band together and filibuster what they consider to be oppressive legisla- tion favored by large states.” “The second way,” the woman went on, “was to have senators serve a six-year term, with only 1/3 of the Senate elected every two years. That 192 THE SENATE makes the Senate a continuing body. The Senate cannot be completely changed by the results of just one election. Elections to the Senate are held every two years, but only one out of every three senators is up for reelection at any one time. Two out of three senators are held over without having to undergo judgement by the voters. The Senate thus is designed to respond mainly to long-term shifts in the political winds and is somewhat insulated from the short-term effects of the latest political breeze.” “Senators are very proud of the unique character of the Senate,” the woman concluded. “And most senators believe the filibuster is a logical extension of the Senate’s role of checking the mad passions of popular democratic government. The Founders of our nation did not create the filibuster, but most senators believe the Founders would view the filibuster with favor. It adds to the image of the Senate as the more thoughtful and prudent of the two houses of Congress.” Clark Schooler took it upon himself to respond to the woman’s well- thought out and historically accurate statements. “I agree with everything you just said,” Clark stated in a discussional rather than a confrontive tone. “But there is a grim irony here for those concerned with civil rights. The filibuster has not been used very much to protect the small states from the large states. It’s mainly been used by Southern senators, some of them from fairly large states such as Virginia and Georgia, to oppress the minority group known as Southern blacks. The filibuster has enabled Southern senators to stop Northern and Western senators from passing national laws designed to protect the civil rights of black persons in the South.” “The situation is almost laughable,” Clark said with emphasis. “The filibuster is proclaimed by the Southerners as an instrument for protecting the minority rights of small states.
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