20061200 Annual Report 2006.Pdf

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20061200 Annual Report 2006.Pdf Abbreviations and Acronyms ALP Arakan Liberation Party MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front AP Mine Antipersonnel Mine MINSED Mindanao Sustainable Economic Development ARNO Arakan Rohingya National Organisation/Rohingya National Army MINURSO Mission des Nations Unies pour l’Organisation d’un Référendum au Sahara Contents ASG Abu Sayyaf Group Occidental (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) AT Mine Anti-Tank Mine MNLF Moro National Liberation Front AV Mine Anti-Vehicle Mine MRE Mine Risk Education AXO Abandoned Explosive Ordnance MSP Meeting of the States Parties BIAF Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces NCBL Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines CCCH Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities NDBF National Democratic Front of Bodoland CCCM Compaña Colombiana Contra Minas (Colombian Campaign Against NDFP National Democratic Front of the Philippines Landmines) NGO Non-Governmental Organization CCW Convention on Conventional Weapons NPA New People’s Army CJPD Centre for Just Peace and Democracy NPA Norwegian People Aid CNA Chin National Army NSA Non-State Actor CNDD-FDD Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie - Forces de Défense de NSCN-IM National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Isak/Muivah la Démocratie NSCN-K National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Khaplan CNF Chin National Front NUPA National Unity Party of Arakan/Arakan Army CPN-M Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs CPP Communist Party of the Philippines OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe DDG Danish Demining Group Palipehutu-FNL Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu - Forces Nationales de Libération DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (Palipehutu - Forces for National Liberation) DPIK Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers Party) ELN Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army) PMAC Puntland, the regional Mine Action Centre EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal PSIO Program for the Studies of International Organization(s) ERW Explosive Remnants of War PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed RPA-ABB Revolutionary Proletarian Army - Alex Boncayao Brigade Forces of Colombia) RPM-M Revolutionary Workers’ Party of Mindanao FPOL Frente Polisario (Polisario Front) RRA Rahanweyn Resistance Army FSD Fondation Suisse de Déminage (Swiss Foundation for Mine Action) SAMO Somali African Muki Organisation GCS General Community Survey SCOPP Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process GIAN Geneva International Academic Network SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining SEACSUCS Southeast Asian Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers GoS Government of Sudan SNF Somali National Front GoSL Government of Sri Lanka SOCBAL Somalia Coalition to Ban Landmines GRP Government of the Republic of the Philippines SPDC State Peace and Development Council HI Handicap International SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army HPA Hiran Patriotic Alliance SPM Somali Patriotic Movement HPG Hezen Parestena Gel (People’s Defence Forces) SRRC Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council IBS Institute for Bangsamoro Studies SSA-S Shan State Army - South ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines SSNM Southern Somali National Movement ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross SWEDEC Swedish EOD and Demining Centre ICU Islamic Courts Unions TFG Transitional Federal Government IED Improvised Explosive Device ULFA United Liberation Front of Asom IHL International Humanitarian Law UN United Nations IIPDEP Indian Institute for Peace, Disarmament and Environmental Protection UNDP United Nations Development Programme IKMAC Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Centre UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund IMAS International Mine Action Standards UNFL United National Liberation Front IPMs Indigenous People and Minorities UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service IPRT Institute for Practical Research and Training UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia IUHEI Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales (Graduate Institute UNPO Underrepresented Nations and People’s Organisation of International Studies) USAID United States Agency for International Development IWPR Institute for War and Peace Reporting USC/SNA United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance JVA Juba Valley Alliance UXO Unexploded Ordnance KA Karenni Army KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party KNLA Karen National Liberation Army KNO Kuki National Organisation KNPP Karenni National Progressive Party KNU Karen National Union KONGRA-GEL Kurdistan People’s Congress LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam MAG Mines Advisory Group MBT Mine Ban Treaty MFDC Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance Contents Principles guiding the work of Page 1 I. Message from the President Geneva Call in relation to governments: 3 II. Geneva Call’s Mission 5 III. Highlights • Geneva Call is transparent about 7 IV. Geneva Call Operations Worldwide its activities (website, annual report, 7 AFRICA newsletters) 7 Burundi 8 Senegal • Geneva Call informs the concerned 10 Somalia government when it starts to engage 13 Western Sahara concretely an armed non-State actor 15 ASIA • Geneva Call consults the government 16 Burma/Myanmar when planning a field mission in the 17 India concerned country 19 Nepal 20 Philippines 21 Sri Lanka 22 LATIN AMERICA 22 Colombia 25 MIDDLE EAST 26 EUROPE 26 Turkey 28 SOUTH CAUCASUS 30 V. Supporting Engagement Worldwide 30 Public Advocacy 34 Communication Material 35 Research 37 Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict 37 Gender & Conflict 39 VI. Finances 42 VII. Deed of Commitment & List of Signatories 46 VIII. Donors, board, staff & partners increase”. of mine victims resulting from use of anti-personnel landmines by non-State actors is likely to to be continued, as with progress towards universalisation of the be Convention, given the so that proportion also non-State actors meet the goals of the Convention. This approach the needs Convention. More generally, the European Union is aware that further consideration must of provisions the apply to Commitment of Deed a through actors non-State engage voluntarily to pursuit its and organisation Call Geneva the of work the of appreciative is Union European “The From the European Union General Statement at the 7MSP to the MBT, the to 7MSP the at Statement General Union European the From Geneva, September 2006. September Geneva, ANNUAL REPORT 2006 I - Message from the President Over the past year, three more armed groups have signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment. As was the case with States, the first signatories were the easiest to convince to sign up to the antipersonnel mine ban. Today, echoing the Ottawa process, the pace of new signatories has dropped. While this slowdown may have been inevitable, it remains a matter of great concern, since people on the ground continue to live in suffering and fear of returning home or cultivating agricultural land. Consequently, Geneva Call has decided to adapt its strategy. In many regions where armed groups are reluctant to stop using mines (because, since they have no heavy weapons at their disposal, they consider mines to be essential to their armed struggle), Geneva Call has begun to adopt a “CCW approach” to its work with armed groups. Since a total ban remains out of reach for the time being, one must spare no effort in protecting civilian populations: marking mined areas, demining inhabited areas, facilitating mine risk education programmes, etc. Such an approach, in contrast to the “all or nothing” approach, also helps to build confidence between armed groups and Geneva Call’s team of partners in the field. Gradually, the strategy provides a strong basis for working towards a total mine ban. As well as implementing this gradual approach, Geneva Call continues to monitor the progress of signa- 6 tory groups. On the whole, most groups have honoured their commitments, and some are making swift 0 progress towards implementing their obligations under the Deed of Commitment. 0 2 Another situation has also come to Geneva Call’s attention over the past year: namely, the need for armed groups to receive training in issues such as human rights, international humanitarian law, mine action, T negotiation and how to make the transition from armed struggle to political party. Requests for such as- R sistance have been received from several of the groups with which Geneva Call has been working for O a number of years. It has tried to respond positively, by organizing and facilitating training sessions, P provided by experts and/or local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It is widely recognized that E groups enter into peace negotiations more easily and with a more constructive approach if they receive R adequate training. Geneva Call’s specific programme for women combatants forms part of its overall training strategy. L A The issue of child soldiers has cropped up with increasing regularity. Geneva Call’s approach has at- U tracted interest from organizations and individuals working on the issue, and it has been urged to broaden N the scope of its activities accordingly. Its experience, its knowledge of groups and contacts relating to the N landmine issue might also be extremely useful in combating this scourge. A 1 Geneva Call’s development has demonstrated three things: 1) Its inclusive approach
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