A Case Study of Memri's

AL GHANNAM, ABDULAZIZ G., Ph.D., December 2019 TRANSLATION STUDIES

IDEOLOGY IN MEDIA TRANSLATION: A CASE STUDY OF MEMRI’S

TRANSLATIONS (294 PP.)

Dissertation Advisor: Brian James Baer

Translation is an invaluable tool for communicating between cultures and for bridging the

“knowledge gap.” Based on this fact, the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) claims that the purpose of its translations of media content from the Middle East, mainly the Arabic-speaking world, is to bridge the knowledge gap that exists between the West and Middle Eastern countries. Although MEMRI’s stated goal is a generous and worthy one, its translations have attracted criticism from major translation scholars such as Mona

Baker (2005, 2006, 2010a) and journalists such as Brian Whitaker (2002, 2007), as well as scholars from history and political studies. The main criticism regarding MEMRI’s translations revolves around the question of selectivity, or which texts are chosen for translation. However, no study to date has provided comprehensive evidence to support or refute that charge, which this study aims to do. This study focuses on English translations of texts and video clips that were found in the Saudi Arabia translation archive, published and available online on MEMRI’s website. By investigating all the

Saudi media sources (e.g., newspapers, TV channels, Twitter, YouTube, etc.) from which

MEMRI makes its selection of texts for translation, this study provides statistical evidence as to whether MEMRI’s translations are representative of what is being circulated in the source culture (Saudi Arabia) media. Supporting evidence is sought in

MEMRI’s approach to the translation of titles and in its translation of video clips

(subtitling).

IDEOLOGY IN MEDIA TRANSLATION:

A CASE STUDY OF MEMRI’S TRANSLATIONS

A dissertation submitted to the

Kent State University

College of Arts and Sciences

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Abdulaziz Al Ghannam

December 2019

Except for previously published material

A dissertation written by

Abdulaziz Al Ghannam

B.A., Al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University, 2006

M.A., Central Washington University, 2010

Ph.D., Kent State University, 2019

Approved by

Brian James Baer , Chair, Doctoral Dissertation Committee

Judy Wakabayashi , Member, Doctoral Dissertation Committee

Richard Kelly Washbourne , Member, Doctoral Dissertation Committee

Babacar M’Baye , Member, Doctoral Dissertation Committee

Christopher Banks , Member, Doctoral Dissertation Committee

Accepted by

Keiran Dunne , Chair, Department of Modern and Classical Language Studies

James L. Blank , Dean, College of Arts and Sciences

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... v

LIST OF FIGURES ...... xi

LIST OF TABLES ...... xiii

DEDICATION ...... xv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... xvi

CHAPTER ONE ...... 1

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Introduction ...... 1

The Concept of Ideology ...... 2

Ideology in Social Studies ...... 2

Ideology in Translation ...... 7

The Current Study: Importance and Rationale ...... 10

Why Focus on Ideology and Media? ...... 10

Why MEMRI? ...... 14

Islamophobia, Orientalism and MEMRI...... 25

Research Questions and Hypotheses ...... 28

First Question (Main) ...... 28

Second Question ...... 28

Third Question ...... 29

CHAPTER TWO ...... 30

LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 30

Introduction ...... 30

How Ideology Shapes Discourse ...... 31

Patronage...... 38

Approaches to Studying Ideology in Translation ...... 51

Narrative Theory (NT) ...... 53

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) ...... 64

Imagology ...... 70

Conclusion ...... 78

CHAPTER THREE ...... 80

METHODOLOGY ...... 80

Introduction ...... 80

Data Collection ...... 81

Stage One: Comprehensive Data from MEMRI’s Saudi Arabian Archive ...... 81

Stage Two: Specific Data Based on Topic and Source ...... 82

Tools 83

Analysis...... 84

Stage One: Creating Lists of the Most Translated Topics and Sources ...... 85

Stage Two: Creating Corpora, Frequency Lists, and Comparing Titles ...... 90

CHAPTER FOUR ...... 92

SOURCES AND RESOURCES ...... 92

Introduction ...... 92

Results and Discussion ...... 94

Resources ...... 94

Sources ...... 105

Conclusion ...... 115

CHAPTER FIVE ...... 117

TOPICS AND THEMES ...... 117

Introduction ...... 117

Results and Discussion: Topics: An Overview ...... 118

Political Topics ...... 118

Social Topics ...... 121

Sociopolitical Topics ...... 122

Religious (Islamic) ...... 123

Topics Summary: Visual Presentation ...... 126

Results and Discussion: Topic One (Iran) ...... 130

Themes and Narratives ...... 131

Report Types ...... 133

Sources and Resources ...... 134

Authors ...... 136

Arabic Corpus ...... 136

Conclusion ...... 142

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Results and Discussion: Topic Two (Israel/Palestine)...... 143

Themes and Narratives ...... 144

Type of Reports...... 147

Sources and Resources ...... 148

Authors ...... 151

Arabic Corpus ...... 152

Conclusion ...... 163

Results and Discussion: Topic Three (Human Rights) ...... 164

Themes and Narratives ...... 165

Type of Reports...... 169

Sources and Resources ...... 169

Authors ...... 175

Arabic Corpus ...... 177

Conclusion ...... 193

Results and Discussion: Other Translated Topics ...... 194

Hate Speech-Related Content ...... 195

Content Related to The United States of America (USA) ...... 197

Chapter Conclusion ...... 199

CHAPTER SIX ...... 204

TITLE TRANSLATION ...... 204

Results and Discussion ...... 204

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First Pattern: Adding Addressing Words ...... 205

Second Pattern: Replacing Original Titles ...... 207

Third Pattern: Titles Are Retained only if They Are Loaded or Contribute

to the Desired Narrative ...... 211

Fourth Pattern: Selective Titles in Selective Topics ...... 213

Conclusion ...... 230

CHAPTER SEVEN ...... 231

CONCLUSION ...... 231

Introduction ...... 231

Findings and Research Questions ...... 231

Evidence of Patterns of Selectivity ...... 232

Contributions...... 234

Limitations of the Study and Future Research ...... 235

Conclusion ...... 238

REFERENCES ...... 239

APPENDICES ...... 248

APPENDIX A: LIST OF SOURCES USED IN VIDEO CLIP REPORTS ...... 248

APPENDIX B: TOP 100 YOUTUBE CHANNELS BY SUBSCRIBERS ...... 260

APPENDIX C: A FULL LIST OF SOURCES FOUND IN ENGCORPUS ...... 265

APPENDIX D: REPORT TITLES IN TOPIC IRAN...... 270

APPENDIX E: REPORT TITLES IN TOPIC ISRAEL/PALESTINE ...... 276

APPENDIX F: REPORT TITLES IN TOPIC HUMAN RIGHTS ...... 281

APPENDIX G: REPORT TITLES IN TOPIC HATE SPEECH ...... 285

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Source languages of MEMRI's content (based on the study’s calculation of the

reports published in MEMR’s archives between 1998 and 2017)...... 19

Figure 2. MEMRI’s report types of translated content by country (using the same

classification as in MEMRI's archives)...... 22

Figure 3. Percentage of reports that were based on multiple resources and those based on

a single resource...... 96

Figure 4. Visual summary of MEMRI’s content based on report types and the resources

they were based on. The figure is made of 4 charts (A through D)...... 102

Figure 5. Top 20 most frequent sources in EngCorpus...... 106

Figure 6. Top 20 most translated sources in EngCorpus...... 109

Figure 7. Top five Saudi newspapers by reach (adapted from Dubai Press Club, 2018, p.

128)...... 111

Figure 8. Top five Saudi magazines by reach (adapted from Dubai Press Club, 2018, p.

129)...... 112

Figure 9. Top five TV channels in Saudi Arabia by reach (adapted from Dubai Press

Club, 2018, p. 129)...... 112

Figure 10. All translated Saudi media sources in EngCorpus...... 115

Figure 11. The four general topic categories within EngCorpus...... 127

Figure 12. Topics within the political content of EngCorpus...... 127

Figure 13. Translated topics in EngCorpus...... 129

Figure 14. Top five translated topics in EngCorpus...... 130

Figure 15. Top 10 most frequent sources in EngIranCorpus ...... 135

Figure 16. Top 10 most translated sources in EngIranCorpus ...... 135

Figure 17. Top 10 most frequent sources in EngIsraPalCorpus ...... 148

Figure 18. Top 10 most translated sources in EngIsraPalCorpus ...... 150

Figure 19. Social topics in EngCorpus ...... 164

Figure 20. Top 10 most frequent sources in EngHRightsCorpus ...... 170

Figure 21. Top ten most translated sources in EngHRightsCorpus...... 171

Figure 22. Top 10 most translated sources in Hate Speech-related content...... 196

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LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1. Discourse Features in Describing Ingroup Positive Action...... 34

2. Major Media Sources in Saudi Arabia, Organized in Alphabetical Order...... 110

3. Top 20 Frequent Words within the Titles of EngCorpus with Their Lemmas ... 125

4. Examples of Report Titles in Iran-Related Content ...... 132

5. Top 20 Frequent Words in EngIranCorpus ...... 133

6. Top 20 Frequent Words in AraIranCorpus ...... 139

7. Translated Versus Untranslated Content Related to Themes of Iran Topic...... 140

8. Examples of Report Titles on Israel/Palestine-Related Content ...... 144

9. Top 20 Frequent Words in EngIsraPalCorpus ...... 146

10. Top 20 Frequent Words in AraIsraPalCorpus ...... 155

11. Translated Versus Untranslated Content Related to Balfour Declaration 100th

Anniversary ...... 158

12. Translated Versus Untranslated Content Related to President Trump’s Jerusalem

Announcement ...... 159

13. Examples of Report Titles in Human Rights-related Content...... 165

14. Top 20 Frequent Words Found in EngHRrightsCorpus ...... 167

15. Top 20 Frequent Words Found in AraHRightsCorpus ...... 179

16. USA- Versus Iran-Related Content in Saudi Newspapers ...... 198

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17. Top 10 R1 Collocates to the Word ‘Saudi’ in the English Titles of EngCorpus 206

18. Original English Titles That Were Retained in MEMRI’s Reports ...... 208

19. English Original Titles That Were Replaced in MEMRI’s Reports ...... 209

20. Closely Translated Titles...... 212

21. Examples of Titles in Translated Reports Related to Terrorism/Extremism ...... 214

22. Examples of Titles in Translated Reports Related to Hate Speech ...... 219

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DEDICATION

إهداء

To my late father.

To my mother.

To my wife.

To my brothers and sisters.

To my children Ghannam, Mashail, Dalaal, and Naser.

To my family and friends.

إلى والدي رحمه هللا.

إلى والدتي الغالية مشاعل الدوسري حفظها هللا.

إلى زوجتي العزيزة ريهام الرباعي.

إلى أخواني و أخواتي.

إلى أوالدي غنام و مشاعل و دالل وناصر.

إلى أهلي و أصدقائي.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I am extremely grateful to Allah the Almighty for His countless blessings, one of which is the completion of my dissertation.

I would like to thank my adviser Dr. Brian Baer for his support and guidance throughout my Ph.D. journey. He was always understanding and helpful since I was accepted to the doctoral program to the very end of writing my dissertation. I am very grateful for his hard effort to accommodate my requests and meet tight deadlines.

I would also like to express my gratitude to the dissertation committee members,

Dr. Wakabayashi, Dr. Washbourne, and Dr. M’Baye for their thorough review of my dissertation and valuable feedback which helped me improve the content and style of the dissertation.

I am also sincerely grateful to my mother and my late father for their care, love and endeavors that made me the person I am now. Without them, my life would have been altered.

I would like to acknowledge the support, patience and love of my wife Reham

Alrebaei in my stressful and long days and nights of research and work. To her, I am very indebted.

I cannot forget to express my gratitude to my friends who have helped make my stay and study in the US more enjoyable and possible. I would like to especially thank my friend and brother Mohammad Alanazi for all he has done for me. He was the candle around which our friends gathered. Special thanks are due to my friends in Kent State

xvi

University Abdullah Alghamdi, Mohammad Alzahrani, Ali Arrabaei, and Sultan

Almuhaimid. Last but not the least, I would like to thank my friend Saif Aloqlan who was not only the best neighbor ever, but also a close friend and brother who was always there whenever needed.

xvii

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

Translation Studies (TS) has been growing as an interdiscipline since James

Holmes announced its “name and nature” in 1972. The focus in the field has gradually shifted from micro-level linguistics-based approaches to more comprehensive consideration of the function of culture in the 1990s. Since then, the cultural turn has drawn the attention of scholars in the field to more complex issues such as gender, power and ideology. Ideology has in fact been one of the key concerns in modern TS over the last two decades (Tymoczko, 2003, 2007). Using Middle East Media Research Institute’s

(MEMRI) translations as a case study, this study seeks to explore how media content is selected for translation and then manipulated and framed to legitimize an ideological agenda and shape the audience’s perception. MEMRI, among other news agencies, claims to provide a service to their community by providing free and timely translation of what is happening in the world. Their stated purpose is to help “bridge the language gap” between the West and the Middle East so that readers can know what people in the Arab- speaking world think about the West.1

Because of the importance of ideology as a key area of research within culture- oriented studies in general and translation studies in particular, and because of the

1 https://www.memri.org/about 1

ambiguity that the term ideology sometimes implies, this chapter starts with some definitions of ideology, followed by a discussion of how this term came to be a major concept in the field of TS. After establishing an understanding of what is meant by ideology, a statement of the research problem and its significance will follow. The chapter concludes with the research questions and hypotheses of the study.

The Concept of Ideology

Ideology in Social Studies

Ideology is a broad term that is often described as vague or complex. Yet it is hardly more vague and complex than other broad terms in the social sciences and humanities, such as society, power, and action (van Dijk, 1998, p. 1), or equivalence in

TS. However, ideology is essentially different from such general notions because “its commonsense usage is generally pejorative” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 1).

Although any definition, as Dijk notes, can hardly capture all the complexities of such terms, in what follows we will discuss some important definitions of ideology in the social sciences in general and in TS, in particular, in order to reach a viable working definition for the purposes of this dissertation.

If we accuse a person of being ideological, he or she would be offended simply because the concept of ideology has always been perceived negatively. This is primarily due to how it was first used by Marxists who associated ideology with “distortion”,

“dissimulation”, and “misrepresentation” of the working class by those in power. They see ideology as “a form of cognitive distortion, a false or illusory representation of the

real” (Gardiner, 2002, p. 60). “When Marxists speak of ‘ideology,’ they often mean belief systems that help justify the actions of those in power by distorting and misrepresenting reality” (Croteau & Hoynes, 2003, p. 159). In short, “ideology was understood to involve having ideas that were ‘false’ because they did not match one’s objective class interests”

(ibid, p. 164).

Another factor that has contributed to the negative meaning of ideology is that it is often associated with value judgment and condemnation of the Other compared to Us.

That is, “[t]he value-laden condemnation implied in the use of the term ideology to refer to the other, as opposed to oneself, explicitly excludes the speaker/writer from holding an ideology of his or her own” (Beaton, 2007). This has to do with the common belief that

“Ours is the Truth, Theirs is the Ideology” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 2). Similarly, according to van Dijk (1998), “few of ‘us’ (in the West or elsewhere) describe our own belief systems or convictions as ‘ideologies’.” As Hatim and Mason point out, “This common view of ideology categorizes fascism and anarchism, but not liberal democracy for instance, as ideologies and declares certain political moves or measures to be ‘ideologically motivated, as if others were not’” (Hatim and Mason, 1997, p. 144).

Similarly, the common association of ideology with power or struggle has further contributed to the negative perception of ideology. According to Thompson (1984), ideology exists when meaning serves to establish and create relations of power that are

“systematically asymmetrical” (p. 63). Fairclough (2013) argues that ideology lies in text whenever there is one or more social relation of power and domination. Ideology is one

of the two modalities of power, the other is physical force (p. 79). He adds that ideology is mainly a matter of representation and that discourses may be called ideological when social analysis plausibly shows a relation between their meanings, based on the ways of representing, and social relations of power (ibid). Therefore, the term ideology is often perceived as referring not only to belief systems but also to questions of power and struggle. It may even be claimed that ideology is related to legitimizing the power of a dominant social group or class (Eagleton, 1991, p. 5).

Although research and critique of ideology have lost most of its connection with

“false consciousness,” “ideological analysis is still concerned about questions of power and the ways in which systems of meaning—ideologies—are part of the process of wielding power” (Croteau & Hoynes, 2003, p. 165). Similarly, Beaton (2007, p. 272) believes that although the negative view of ideology may be still common, it is now considered “largely obsolete”. Thus, many scholars perceive the concept of ideology in more neutral terms, a route this study takes.

In a purely descriptive and neutral view, ideology is defined as a “system of thoughts”, “system of beliefs and disbeliefs”, or “symbolic practices” (Dijk 1998) that do not necessarily relate to power, dominance or struggle. In this view, ideology does not have a negative or a positive connotation. That is, according to Dijk (1998, p. 315), ideologies should not be defined as wrong, misguided, false, or distorted beliefs of a group. What matters is not their truth status for the group itself, which may be true or false to that group, but rather “their cognitive and social role (e.g. effectiveness,

usefulness) in the management of thinking and interaction that is the criterion for their evaluation” (ibid, p. 315). What is vital then in studying ideology is the “effectiveness” and “usefulness” of its application, rather than judging whether a certain ideology is false, because this would lead to a circular ideological claim of who is more ideological, in the negative sense, the researcher or the author of a discourse. Avoiding judgement and focusing on how discourses represent signs of an ideological nature, in the neutral sense, is key in any research concerned with ideology. This is relevant to the common arguments that “anything that is said or written about the world is articulated from a particular ideological position” (Fowler, 1991, p. 10).

Hodge, Kress and Jones (2019) provide another neutral and sound definition of ideology. According to them:

Ideologies are sets of ideas involved in ordering of experience, making sense of

the world. Such order and sense is partial and particular. The systems of ideas

which constitute ideologies are expressed through language. Language supplies

the models and categories of thought, and in part people’s experience of the world

is through language. (p.81)

Again, this definition highlights some important areas that should help in investigating ideology from a neutral position by assuming that any view of the world and events around us is partial because of the necessary partial nature of any experience and because of the limitations of expressions in language. Thus, researchers should be

careful when investigating ideology and not jump to conclusions that certain discourses are deliberately ideological or have an agenda.

Croteau and Hoynes (2003) define ideology as:

a system of meaning that helps define and explain the world and that makes value

judgments [emphasis added] about that world. Ideology is related to concepts such

as worldview, belief system, and values, but it is broader than those terms. It

refers not only to the beliefs held about the world but also to the basic ways in

which the world is defined. Ideology, then, is not just about politics; it has a

broader and more fundamental connotation. (p.159 - 160)

Croteau and Hoynes’ definition of ideology is similar to Dijk’s and other definitions that emphasize how ideology should not be viewed as a negative attitide of a group or an institution reflected in a discourse, simply because all discourses are ideological. However, it also highlights an important feature of ideology that many definitions avoid, namely, that ideology without value judgment would be difficult to differentiate from important concepts such as culture. Any culture has a system of values and beliefs. Culture in and of itself is not, however, concerned with the other but mostly with the people within its boundaries. When we try to pass judgement on other cultures or people, we move from being culturally influenced to being ideologically motivated. That does not mean such ideology is necessarily false or wrong, as it can be very objective and realistic. But it is the element of being judgmental and effective in shaping beliefs and judgments that differentiates ideology from culture. The role of researchers concerned

with the study of ideology is thus to be wary of passing judgement on an ideology as false or wrong, as it may be false to the researcher but not to whose to whom it belongs.

The researcher’s role, therefore, is mainly to find out how ideology is reflected in a discourse through images and representations of the other from within the discourse and to look for evidence of contradictions, manipulations, additions, omisissions, especially in the case of a translation, that may have an effect on the audience’s perception of the discourse.

This is especially important, as many are unaware that their perception is shaped by ideology. According to Dijk (1998, p. 276), underlying attitudes of any ideological shape will appear in speakers’ models. These attitudes will try to appropriately and effectively express social representations in talk, text and their contexts. This happens in a way that often results in the construction of preferred models without the awareness of the recipients. This is especially true and common in what we call manipulation (ibid).

Further discussion of how research on ideology should be approached and how ideology shapes text, especially in translation, will be presented in Chapter Two.

Ideology in Translation

Ideology in TS has also been viewed in two ways. From a negative perspective, translations are ideological in nature and are manipulations of texts as well as readers

(Lefèvere, 2017). Translators are “rewriters” who have means at their disposal of which the reader is unaware. Their ideology, whether consciously applied or not, leads them to fix, improve or “frame” a text to fit the target cultural “system” in which they operate.

This view of ideology, whether it be that of a translator, an institution or the target culture, especially in contexts marked by an asymmetrical distribution of power, is widely accepted today, as noted by Munday (2007, p. 196).

This negative view of translators as ideologically motivated reminds us of how translators have often been viewed historically as “traitors” and of the endless debate over “faithful” vs. “unfaithful” translations. This view is of course biased and is based on two common assumptions: the “in-betweenness” of translators and the a priori meaning of “original” texts. In other words, it does not consider the active and complex role of translators in negotiating linguistic and cultural asymmetries nor the difficulty in constructing meaning from a text.

From a neutral or even a positive perspective, to investigate ideology in translation is to investigate the translator’s or the institution’s role as an active mediator and a “gatekeeper” who cannot simply assume a position “in-between.” Studying ideology in translation, as Tymoczko (2006) notes, allows us to investigate questions pertaining to the “constructivist aspects of translation, the role of representation and the transculturation of cultural forms and values” (p. 445).

In short, ideology in translation can be summarized as a system of thoughts, beliefs and disbeliefs that functions, either consciously or unconsciously, to shape a translation and to impose a negative or positive “effect’ on the reader. That does not necessarily mean translations are not accurate per se, although many are, but the choice of certain terms and structures over others, and, more importantly, the semantic and

pragmatic features of the discourse in a translation have a controlling effect that may be different from that of the source text. Does this mean ideology is good or bad for translation? It might be difficult to judge for whom it is good or bad, “false” or “true”.

Because all writings as well as translations, especially those with literary, cultural, religious and political elements, are ideological, in the neutral sense, it is the role of critics and researchers, therefore, to explore the effect a translation has on the reader rather than making value judgments regarding a particular ideology. This can be achieved by focusing on first, how a translated discourse is controlled by ideology, and second, by focusing on the effect of that ideology on the translated discourse. Evidence has to be based on solid, empirical criteria to avoid entering into a circular ideological accusation that may leave the researcher in a position of being ideologically controlled, in the negative sense.

Selectivity. Selectivity has to do with how texts are selected for translation and how the selection is mostly nonrandom. This makes text selection a crucial part of the role of ideology in translation. Gideon Toury’s preliminary norms are also highly relevant to the concept of selectivity in translation.

Gideon Toury (1995) provides a lasting contribution to translation research by introducing and describing “norms” in translation in his essay “The Nature and Role of

Norms in Translation”. Among those norms are the Preliminary Norms, which are concerned with two sets of considerations that are related to: 1) translation policy; and 2)

directness of translation. Translation policy is relevant here as it clearly describes the often conscious choice of the texts to be translated. According to Toury:

Translation policy refers to those factors that govern the choice of text-types, or

even of individual texts, to be imported through translation into a particular

culture/language at a particular point in time. Such a policy will be said to exist

inasmuch as the choice is found to be nonrandom. (ibid. p. 58)

Although Toury’s definition of translation policy does not clearly link text selection to ideology, it provides a starting point for translation research on ideology.

Since the choice to translate texts over other texts is rarely random, there is often a motivation or a reason of the selection. It is the role of researchers to find out how texts are selected for translation and how the selection may affect the translation.

Selectivity has also been part of the discussion of research on ideology. Baker

(2006) for example, lists “selective appropriation” as an important element of the

Narrative Theory. Other scholars, such as Belsey (1981), have also discussed the role of patronage in text selection. All of such important topics are discussed in Chapter Two in light of how selectivity is an important feature in ideology.

The Current Study: Importance and Rationale

Why Focus on Ideology and Media?

Although there is some common ground between studies of translations focusing on ideology in literary and sacred texts and those focusing on media translation (e.g., systems theory and power relations, voice of the translator and the role of the patronage),

the latter has shifted attention to other important elements of translation. For instance, in the discussion of ideology in literary and sacred text translations, the focus is often on common and over-debated discussions, such as faithful versus unfaithful, the relation between the ‘original’ and the translation, and gender issues, as represented by the essays in Venuti’s (1992) anthology, all of which are concerned with specific texts and cultures.

On the other hand, studying ideology in media is more concerned with global issues that are often circulated through global news outlets, not to mention the fact that mass media is current and relevant to everyone’s life in our modern time.

Another point is the way ideology was perceived as marginal in TS in general and how it has garnered greater attention since the focus shifted to studying ideology in news translation. One can argue that non-translated news is more ideological than non- translated literary or cultural texts, which makes news translation doubly ideological.

Darwish (2006) argues that news translation is the reframing of already framed news. In addition, the reader of literary translations is often aware of the fact that what they are reading is a translation while readers of translated news are rarely aware that what they are reading is a translation, which make them more vulnerable to ideological influence.

Thus, the impact and degree of ideology in news translation has led to increasing interest in the study of ideology in news translation, in particular.

Another reason, which makes studying ideology in media different than in other genres, is that the “same” news is often translated by different news outlets, and so the different ideological positions of the media outlets can be studied, paying special

attention to how the translated text is (re)framed. This is because news agencies know that there are many available sources at the disposal of the audience to validate the accuracy of the translated news (not against the ST per se, but against other sources) and so are careful to observe standards of translation quality and accuracy. The target reader of a literary text, for example, usually does not have access to the source text, and there are rarely different versions of the source. Thus, the translator of a literary text may use different methods of “manipulation,” consciously or not, to impose a certain ideology without much fear of the reader discovering that what s/he is reading is not exactly what the source text said. In media translation, however, the situation is different, with many sources available to the reader just a click away—which may either confirm the same story or tell a different one.

Finally, studying ideology in news translation has opened the door for more consideration of other genres in which ideology can be traced. In Cunico and Munday’s

(2007) words, “to date most edited volumes […] have focused especially on literary and religious texts, thus limiting wider understanding of how ideological clashes and encounters pervade any context where power inequalities are present” (p.141).

That said, major works like Bielsa and Bassnett (2009) and Valdeón (2007) have established a good foundation for research on news translation. Bielsa and Bassnett’s volume, for example, connects the fields of translation studies and globalization studies.

It aims to address topics related to news translation and globalization in order to investigate the role that news agencies play in shaping the audience’s opinions through

translation. It discusses strategies and practices of news translators and agencies that are important to any research concerned with news translation and the role of translated news in global communication. Although the book does not directly address how ideology is involved in news translation, it serves to establish a basis for further research into the role of translation in global communication. Relevant to the current study is the book’s analysis of versions of translated news from major news agencies as well as alternative media organizations to demonstrate how texts from Spanish and Arabic are translated differently into English to present the “Other” in a certain way to the English reader.

Similarly, Valdeón’s study analyzes versions of translated Spanish news headlines to argue that different strategies were used by news agencies, namely CNN, the BBC and

Reuters, which have semantic and ideological consequences for the target texts. More recent studies (e.g., Azodi, 2016; van Doorslaer, 2010; Van Doorslaer, 2012) have discussed other aspects of news translation, while making clear that there is still much to be investigated in this new subfield of TS.

To conclude, researchers need to incorporate other tools and approaches to study ideology in news translation. Also, the importance of this kind of research and the important role that media plays in international communication between cultures and its role in escalating what is often called the ‘clash of civilizations’ necessitates this type of research and requires that people be educated regarding the manipulative tools and strategies employed by news makers. Thus, the current study aims to contribute to this field of research by focusing on another aspect or strategy in the discussion of ideology in

news translation, namely the selection of texts to be translated, and how the selection of texts is the first step in using translation to legitimize the ideology of news agencies and translators.

Why MEMRI?

This research finds MEMRI to be a valuable source of translated news and media content that can be used to investigate the workings of ideology in translation. MEMRI is basically an online organization that aims to fill the “language gap between the West and the Middle East and South Asia” by exploring the Middle East and South Asia through their media (MEMRI, 2017).2 Translation is the tool MEMRI relies on in fulfilling its goal, thus qualifying MEMRI as an important source of translation data to investigate important topics in TS, such as ideology, imagology, framing and narrative theory, translation norms and shifts, to name but a few. Obviously, the large amount of translated content that MEMRI produces is one important reason it was chosen for the current study of ideology in translated texts. This will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters. However, MEMRI’s outreach and influence on governments and organizations, especially in the United States, is also very important, especially if we consider the controversy around its translations and the way it selects them, which will be discussed later as well.

2 https://www.memri.org/about 14

MEMRI’s outreach and influence are remarkable. One of the former US House

Representatives, Tom Lantos, for example, thanked MEMRI for its efforts in exposing

“Arab antisemitism”:

I am full of admiration for the work MEMRI has done […] in its dedicated

exposure of Arab antisemitism. Until MEMRI undertook its effort to review and

translate articles from the Arab press, there was only dim public awareness of this

problem in the United States. Thanks to MEMRI, this ugly phenomenon has been

unmasked, and numerous American writers have called attention to it. (Lantos,

2002)

MEMRI is aware of its popularity among US politicians, proudly stating:

Every single day, MEMRI receives requests from members of the U.S.

government, military, and legislature. Since September 11, 2001, the demand for

this material has significantly increased – providing thousands of pages of

translated documents […] and tens of thousands of hours of translated footage

from Arab and Iranian television. […] MEMRI’s Government & Military Affairs

department assists all branches of the U.S. government and military, as well those

on the state and local level.

To date we have provided MEMRI research to counterterrorism departments in all

50 states. (MEMRI, 2019)3

3 https://www.memri.org/about 15

Members of the US Senate and House of Representatives – from both sides of the aisle – seek out MEMRI for background information on the region and for expert knowledge on breaking news, as well as for general research. The US Army, Navy, Air

Force, Marines and Coast Guard utilize MEMRI material for cultural awareness training, mission support for soldiers, training aids, pre-deployment preparation, and much more.

MEMRI has conducted briefings for the highest levels of the US government, including the White House, Department of Homeland Security, Justice Department, State

Department, the FBI, and many more (ibid.).

MEMRI also proudly tracks any press and media reports that compliment or quote its work in a website created solely for this particular purpose, www.memriinthemedia.org. Dozens of media and press outlets refer to or quote MEMRI in their news coverage or analysis of issues related to the Middle East, many of which are major American and British news agencies, such as Fox News, The New York Times,

Daily News, The Atlantic, Yahoo, The Washington Times, and The Washington Post.

This confirms the breadth of MEMRI’s influence.

MEMRI promotes itself and attracts funding by taking advantage of notions such as “war on terror” as it claims that its “work directly supports fighting the U.S. War on

Terror” (MEMRI, 2019). Although it “is not the only organization that promotes the terrorism and security agenda through translation […], it is by far the largest, most heavily funded, and most influential with politicians and the media, especially in the US”

(Baker, 2010a). As part of its funding, this claim allows MEMRI to carryout fund-raising

campaigns targeting its own audience, as is clearly advertised in its website. Additionally, it offers a subscription section on its website titled Jihad and Terror Monitor, which sends timely alerts that are available only to paid subscribers all over the world.

Nevertheless, MEMRI is willing to send regular free translation reports to government officials and organizations in the US.

From a research point of view, MEMRI’s coverage of news and media from the

Arab world makes it a unique case study. This is because, according to Croteau and

Hoynes (2003):

[Very often], [r]esearch on the ideology of media has included a debate between

those who argue that media promote the worldview of the powerful—the

“dominant ideology”—and those who argue that mass media texts include more

contradictory messages, both expressing the “dominant ideology” and at least

partially challenging worldviews. (p.161)

In MEMRI’s case, however, it is the other way around. It is using media to highlight the ideology of the “Other” or the less dominant and smaller minority (e.g., extremists and liberals in the Middle East), regardless of whether it is an accurate representation or not, which will be discussed in later chapters. Claiming to be a “nonprofit, and non-partisan organization,”4 MEMRI aims to promote not what the dominant wants or believes, although it often does when it comes to Israel, but rather that of the

4 https://www.memri.org/about 17

less dominant, the Arab world, promoting the narrative of Arabs and/or Muslims as hateful, anti-Semitic, and supporters of terrorism.

Finally, insofar as the researcher is an Arab and Saudi, he finds special interest in

MEMRI’s translated content, which he believes might not be representative of what is being circulated broadly in the Arab world media in general and in Saudi Arabia in particular. Therefore, the large amount of content that MEMRI produces, its outreach and influence, and most importantly the controversy surrounding its mode of selecting and framing content for translation, as well as the lack of empirical evidence regarding

MEMRI’s promotion of hatred and Islamophobia, suggest the importance of studying

MEMRI in a comprehensive and systematic way.

An overview of MEMRI’s work. MEMRI publishes its original translations of media content that was published originally in one of six languages: Arabic (official language in all Arab States), Turkish (official language in Turkey), Farsi (official language in Iran), Urdu-Pashtu (official language in Pakistan), Dari (official language in

Afghanistan) and Russian. However, the vast majority of the published content is from

Arabic, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Source languages of MEMRI's content (based on the study’s calculation of the

reports published in MEMR’s archives between 1998 and 2017).

This is a clear and obvious sign of targeted area and topic. MEMRI has been praised for helping to “shine a spotlight on hate speech wherever it appears” (Friedman,

2005).5 If that is true, the figures above suggest one of two conclusions: either hate speech is existent only in Arab countries and in some degree in Iran, all of which are

Muslim majority countries, which is unlikely; or MEMRI, in addition to ignoring all calls for peace and other good-will efforts within these countries, is focusing only on hate speech in those countries.

5 https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/22/opinion/giving-the-hatemongers-no-place-to-hide.html 19

Projects that MEMRI focuses on. According to its website, MEMRI’s translations mostly cover topics related to the following ten topics or “projects,” as it labels them:

1. Jihad and Terror Threat Monitor

2. Reform in The Muslim World

3. The Antisemitism Documentation Project

4. The MEMRI 9/11 Documentation Project

5. Russian Media Studies Project

6. The Cyber Jihad Lab

7. The Arab & Iranian TV Monitoring Project

8. South Asia Studies Project

9. The Iran Studies Project

10. Cartoon Project6

It seems very dubious that four of the seven projects that focus on Arab media are related to jihad and/or extremism, with an additional project, Reform in the Muslim

World, tangentially related. This indicates that there is already an assumption of extremism in the Arab/Muslim world. The fact that MEMRI uses these labels and specific “projects” is the most obvious sign of selectivity. Yet, MEMRI might argue that this is what the Arabic media is actually focusing on. In any case, the results and the

6 These labels are the exact same labels used by MEMRI. 20

discussion in the current study will address this point in more detail in the following chapters.

Types of MEMRI’s translated media. Each of the above projects makes use of four types of translated media:

Special Dispatch reports. MEMRI describes them as “original translations of

Middle Eastern media,” and they are basically translations of written essays published in the media. MEMRI gives a brief introduction to each report, followed by a translation of some excerpts but sometimes the complete article. Comments and analysis are kept to a minimum in these reports, which contributes to the impression that MEMRI is presenting these reports in a more or less unmediated fashion—as they appeared in Arab media and requiring little explanation.

MEMRI publishes these reports online in serial Special Dispatches; each report is a Special Dispatch sequenced with a number. The first translated report, available online, is Special Dispatch No.1, published on July 15, 1998. By November 15, 2017, MEMRI had posted a total of 7181 Special Dispatch reports online. These reports were originally written in one of six languages: Arabic, Turkish, Farsi, Urdu-Pashtu, Dari, or Russian.

However, most of those reports come from Arabic, as shown in Figure 1, which suits the purposes of this current research project.

Inquiry and Analysis reports. MEMRI also publishes its own reports in which it comments on, argues with, and analyzes different news articles, reports, TV clips and images on similar themes from different media outlets. These reports include minimal

translations of portions of the material covered, with extensive commentary and analysis by MEMRI authors based on “evidence.” MEMRI describes its analysis as “original analysis of political, ideological, intellectual, social, cultural, and religious trends” found in Middle Eastern media.7 As of November 15, 2017, there were 1493 Inquiry and

Analysis Reports available online. Again, most of them deal with the Arabic-speaking world, as shown in Figure 2 below.

2400 2200 2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0

Special Dispatch Inquiry and Analysis Clips

Figure 2. MEMRI’s report types of translated content by country (using the same classification as in MEMRI's archives).

Clips. MEMRI also supports a large TV Project, which includes nearly 16,000 minutes of translated video material, making it “the world’s largest archives of translated

7 https://www.memri.org/about 22

clips from the Arab and Muslim world.”8 MEMRI publishes TV and video clips pertaining to its projects mentioned above and provides subtitled translations of them.

Each clip is given a title and followed by an introduction or a brief about the original clip.

As of November 15, 2017, there were over 6357 subtitled clips available online, most of which are taken from Arabic media.

Cartoons. MEMRI produces translated subtitles for caricatures and video cartoons that purportedly aid in filling “the gap” between the West and Middle East. The cartoons are incorporated within the Special Dispatch Reports or the Analysis Reports. In some cases, both types of report are made specifically for a collection of cartoons that share a similar topic. As of November 15, 2017, there were 113 Special Dispatches and

Analysis Reports with cartoons as the main source of information.

A quick overview of MEMRI’s published content reveals that MEMRI does not seem to be strictly following a single classification in terms of content origin. For example, some of the reports and clips were listed in more than one country’s archives whenever those reports or clips mention or discuss more than one country. It would be more useful if content were classified based on the material’s origin, as the goal is “to fill a gap” in information based on those countries’ own media. This is very important because, for instance, published reports and clips in the Russian archives section appear to list translated Arabic content about Jihadists and extremists threatening Russia or its allies. Someone might think this section focuses on the Russian media rather than reports

8 https://www.memri.org/about 23

from Arabic media regardless of whether they are of interest to a Russian audience. One must ask whether or how this serves MEMRI’s goal of filling the gap of knowledge.

Criticism of MEMRI and MEMRI’s response. Some critics and writers have already criticized MEMRI for its biased published content, basically its selection of content for translation. Baker (2005, 2006, 2010b) applies narrative theory to accuse

MEMRI of following a selective approach and framing strategy by choosing specific news for translation and using certain captions and images to accompany its translations in order to impose a certain reading of the translations. Similarly, Brian Whitaker (2007), a writer and journalist for the British newspaper The Guardian, argues that MEMRI’s translations are “usually accurate (though it is highly selective in what it chooses to translate and often removes things from their original context). However, when errors do occur, it is difficult to attribute them to incompetence or accidental lapses.”9

On the other hand, MEMRI and others have defended its translations and its selection of texts. Thomas Friedman (2005), a writer for The New York Times, admired and thanked MEMRI for its efforts to “shine a spotlight on hate speech wherever it appears.”10 Another defense came from Yigal Carmon, MEMRI’s founder and President, in an email response to Whitaker’s criticism of MEMRI for having an agenda. Carmon wrote:

9 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/may/15/arabicunderfire 10 https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/22/opinion/giving-the-hatemongers-no-place-to-hide.html 24

[y]ou are right: we do have an agenda. As an institute of research, we want

MEMRI to present translations to people who wish to be informed on the ideas

circulating in the Middle East. We aim to reflect reality. If knowledge of this

reality should benefit one side or another, then so be it. (Whitaker, 2003a)11

He also responded to Whitaker’s accusations of distortion: “You accused us of distortion by omission but when asked to provide examples of trends and views we have missed, you have failed to answer.” Carmon also accused Whitaker of “using insults rather than evidence” in his criticism of MEMRI (ibid.).

Islamophobia, Orientalism and MEMRI

Islamophobia. MEMRI’s work is highly relevant to any discussion of

Islamophobia. MEMRI’s representation of Muslim society as uncivilized, hateful and dangerous urged Islamic organizations, such as, Center of Islamic and American

Relations (CAIR), to classify MEMRI as an Islamophobic organization (CAIR, 2019).

CAIR considers an individual or an organization an Islamophobic if they do any of the following:

1. Allege that Islam and Muslims are inherently or uniquely violent,

misogynistic, inferior, intolerant, primitive, static, authoritarian, homophobic,

manipulative, self-righteous, devious, or that Islam is the antithesis of

civilization.

11 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jan/28/israel2 25

2. Allege that Islam is an existential threat to the U.S. and/or the “West” and that

Muslims, or their representative institutions, are part of a plot to overthrow the

“West” or America.

3. Support unequal treatment under the law for Islam or Muslims.

4. Allege that violent groups which falsely and perversely claim a religious

cover possess the correct understanding of Islam. (ibid.)

As will be shown in the discussion of the study’s findings, this is exactly what

MEMRI does, whether deliberately or not, it is not the focus of the study.

Although CAIR’s Islamophobia Network lists tens of organizations and individuals, MEMRI stands out as the only organization that claims its non-partisanship and that what it presents is “an accurate representation” of Arabic media not that of what it believes about Arab/Muslim societies. This is contrary to many of the listed organizations and individuals in CAIR’s list that clearly state their goals as to show how dangerous Islam and Muslims are to the U.S./Christianity and Americans (e.g., Center for the Study of Political Islam, Bare Naked Islam, David Horowitz Freedom Center). The latter for example clearly claims that its aim is to confront “the efforts of the radical left and its Islamist allies to destroy American values” (ibid.) Unlike MEMRI, this makes such organizations less likely to persuade parties interested in learning about Muslim societies to accept what they claim as true about Islam and/or Muslims, unless, of course, there is an already established bias.

Finally, MEMRI also stands out as the only organization that relies solely on translation in its work that feeds Islamophobic narratives in the West in general and the

U.S. in specific.

Orientalism. The word Orientalism can be used to refer to two different but interrelated meanings: 1) an academic tradition or field of studying the East or the

“Orient”; 2) a “style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident’.” (Said, 1978, pp. 9-12)

Said also highlights the interrelation between Orientalism, power and politics and also how orientalists, especially in Europe in the 18th century, have contributed to the way

Arab cultures are portrayed ideologically in negative stereotypes. This leads us to a narrower definition of orientalism as way of thinking “that imagines, emphasizes, exaggerates and distorts differences of Arab peoples and cultures as compared to that of

Europe and the U.S. It often involves seeing Arab culture as exotic, backward, uncivilized, and at times dangerous” (AANM, 2011, qtd in Soules, 2015, p. 13). This makes MEMRI’s work highly relevant to any discussion of orientalism in both definitions above. Although MEMRI’s work clearly contributes to Islamophobia and orientalism research, this dissertation is more focused on investigating MEMRI’s work from a translation research perspective, and thus the discussion of such concepts, although highly relevant and important, is limited for the sake of concentration, time and space.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

This research aims to find evidence to prove or disapprove claims of MEMRI’s suspicious and biased translations and claims of selectivity. This study poses one main research question with a hypothesis and two supporting questions with corresponding hypotheses to guide the investigation.

First Question (Main)

To what extent are MEMRI’s translations representative of Middle Eastern

(Arabic) media in Saudi Arabia? To address this question, we will examine the sources from which MEMRI selects material for translation. Based on those sources, we will investigate whether there are patterns in the selection of material to be translated and, if so, what those patterns reveal.

First hypothesis (main). MEMRI’s translations tend to be carefully selected to tell and enforce a single narrative, namely, that the Arab world is inherently and uniformly anti-Semitic and dangerous to Western civilization.

Second Question

What are the topics that tend to be translated the most? Are these topics representative of what is being circulated in the Saudi media?

Second hypothesis. The topics tend to serve the same narrative. These topics are related to terrorism, anti-Semitism, women’s rights, and dictatorial governments.

Third Question

How are the titles translated? Do the translations reveal patterns or framing that align with the findings related to the sources and selection of texts for translation?

Third hypothesis. Original titles are replaced with more shocking ones, often not reflective of the main idea of the article.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The impact that the ‘cultural turn’ has had on TS since the 1990s is obvious in research trends in the field. It has shifted the common and simplified view of translation as a linguistic activity based on ‘equivalence’ strategies between two texts to a more complex view of translation as an activity involving cultural interaction and negotiation between two cultures. The major works that announced the cultural turn also brought the question of ideology to the attention of TS scholars. Theo Herman’s edited volume The

Manipulation of Literature (1985), which included essays by translation scholars such as

Maria Tymoczko, Gideon Toury, André Lefèvere, and Susan Bassnett, officially inaugurated the cultural turn in the field. Those scholars, who were to become known as the ‘Manipulation School,’ demonstrated that translations are important textual tools at the disposal of social institutions, educational systems, and publishing firms to

“manipulate a given society in order to construct the kind of culture desired” (Tymoczko and Gentzler 2002: xiii). Since then, more scholars have become interested in the complex relationship between translation and culture, the question of whether a translator is “in between” and, importantly, questions of power and ideology in translation. This chapter discusses important topics, studies, and approaches related to ideology in translation and media.

How Ideology Shapes Discourse

Before discussing the approaches and models used in studying ideology in translation, it is important to shed light on the relationship between ideology and translation and how ideology shapes texts and discourse in general. Thompson (1984) discusses the role of ideology and how it operates in a text. He first points out that writing was and is the principal medium through which ideology is reflected, and although the

“Socratic preference for the spoken word [...] is inherently nonideological,” ideology is what allows certain things to be discussed and communicated (p. 85). Ideology not only

“expresses but also represses, excluding certain issues from discussion and creating a public unconsciousness” (p. 85). Thompson also describes ideology as “the linguistic legislature which defines what is available for public discussion and what is not” (p. 85).

Translation is not a simple process of matching more or less equivalent semantic units, as natural languages are not equivalent codes but are characterized by asymmetries at every level, as Mona Baker maps out in In Other Words (2011). Moreover, it involves, first and foremost, understanding, articulation and reflection on source text meaning(s).

This means that a translator must at times re-present ideas, reorder sentences and paragraphs or even “rewrite” a text. All these choices are to some degree subjective, and, as such, may produce an ideological slant in the final product.

Although ideology is often not easy to detect in a translation, there are some obvious translational choices that can shape a text ideologically. Addition, omission,

alteration, framing, and the use of notes and introductions are all translational choices that may have ideological implications. Perhaps the translational choice that reflects ideology in translation most clearly is omission. This is a translation strategy that a translator chooses for different reasons, such as avoiding redundancy, eliminating unnecessary information, or in the face of “untranslatability.” Nida (1964) refers to omission as “subtraction,” a sub-strategy of “adjustment.” Nevertheless, omission of information in a text can also be clearly ideological, and as Gordon (2002) argues, relating to Walter Benjamin’s The Task of The Translator (1968), “the intentional omission of text is beyond the pale of bad translation, since the hallmark of bad translation is one that is limited to the transmission of information, and in our case even that task was not fully accomplished” (Gordon, 2002, p. 812). That is, bad translation is limited to bad transmission of information, but in the case of the omission, there is both mistranslation and incomplete delivery of the original message. Thus, the task is not only incomplete but also distorted. Omission does not only jeopardize the task of the translator but is also a frequently used strategy in translation history to serve ideological purposes

(ibid.). That is, omission is often used to eliminate counter-narratives that “disturb […] ideological maneuvers” (p. 811).

Similar to omission, though far less obvious and thus harder to detect, are other strategies indexing possible ideological intervention. Mason (2010) points out that translation is an intervention. This intervention, whether intentional or unintentional, reflects an ideology that is usually detected through translator’s lexical choices, cohesive

relations, and the syntactic organization. These interventions are usually detected through

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

The overall structure and impact of a discourse, which is usually more than just one text or translation, can also reveal how the discourse is shaped by ideology.

According to van Dijk (1995), ideologies are employed and structured in discourse to serve the agenda of the “ingroup” (US), against the interests of the “outgroup”

(Other/Them). Therefore, discourses that are steered or shaped by ideologies usually serve to answer the following questions

- What do We do? What are Our activities? What is expected of Us?

- What are the goals of these activities?

- What norms and values do We respect in such activities?

- To which groups are We related: Who are Our friends and enemies?

- What are the resources We typically have or do not have (privileged) access

to? (van Dijk, 1995, p. 146)

Thus, any ideological discourse analyst needs to dig for answers to these questions in order to carry out an in-depth analysis of the discourse in question.

Furthermore, van Dijk provides features frequently found in ideological discourse when it comes to describing/ attributing positive action of the “ingroup” vs “outgroup”.

These features are very useful in any analysis of ideological discourses, as shown in

Table 1 below.

Table 1

Discourse Features in Describing Ingroup Positive Action. (Adapted from Dijk, 1995, p.

144).

Of course, “[t]he reverse will be true for the description and attribution of negative actions [emphasis added], which generally will tend to be de-emphasized for ingroups (e.g., by denial, euphemisms, implicitness and detopicalization), and emphasized for outgroups” (van Dijk, 1995, p. 144).

Although the above features and questions were discussed in non-translated discourse contexts, they can be applied to translation as well, since translated content is

still discourse. This is obvious in writings of translation scholars who ask similar questions about any translation or any text chosen for translation. Nord (1991) suggests the following questions for the analysis of any translation:

• What gets translated (what is valued and what is excluded)?

• Who does the translation (who controls the production of translation)? Who is

translated for (who is given access to foreign materials and who denied)?

• How is the material translated (what is omitted, added, altered, to control the

message)? (cited in Fawcett, 1998, p. 106)

Schäffner and Bassnett (2010) argue that although translation is often invisible in the field of politics, it “is actually an integral part of political activity. Which texts get translated, from and into which languages is itself already a political decision” (p. 12). In the context of government translation (which is related to institutionalized translation), they also suggest more detailed questions, such as:

• Who decides whether websites of governments, of individual government

ministries, of political parties are made available in foreign languages in the first

place, and more specifically, who decides which languages these should be?

• Who decides which texts are translated? Who translates these texts, that is, do

governments and political parties have their own in-house translation

departments? Or are translation needs outsourced to translation companies?

• By which criteria may a translation company be selected?

• Are some texts translated by politicians and/or political advisors and/or staff

themselves? If yes, which kinds of texts and for which reasons?

• Who checks the translations before they are put on a website?

• Are different policies and procedures in place for translating relevant texts into

foreign languages and for translating texts into the home language?

• Which criteria are [used to translate] speeches by the UK Prime Minister [for

example] and into which language(s) and by whom?

• Which criteria [are used to translate] speeches by foreign politicians into English

and by whom? Are the criteria the same, and if not, why not? (p. 14)

Because of how important these questions are in any discussion of ideology in translation, the current study asks similar questions regarding MEMRI’s translated content. These questions will be discussed in more detail during the discussion of data and results in the subsequent chapters.

The following quote by Schäffner (2003) summarizes the relationship between ideology and translation and how ideology shapes a translation:

the relationship between ideology and translation is multifarious. In a sense, it can

be said that any translation is ideological since the choice of source text and the

use to which the subsequent target text is put is determined by the interest, aims,

and objectives of social agents. But ideological aspects can also be determined

within a text itself, both at lexical level (reflected, for example, in the deliberate

choice or avoidance of a specific word)12 and the grammatical level (for example,

use of passive structures to avoid an expression of agency […]). Ideological

aspects can be more or less obvious in texts, depending on the topic of a text, its

genre and communicative purposes. (p.23)

Finally, it is important to point out that ideology is different from translational errors or inaccuracies. Translation problems are prototypical source text attributes that may eventually result in errors or trigger strategies for problem-solving (PACTE, 2011).

Some scholars have noted that ideological translations, in which ideology seems to be deliberately and cautiously employed, are often accurate. That is, if the two texts were compared, no obvious signs of mistranslations would be found. This is simply because errors or obvious translational shifts can disrupt, leading the audience to question the credibility of the translation or to lose interest. Thus, approaches that investigate ideology often look at the whole picture, including the paratextual elements, as a first step, before digging deeper to find evidence or traces of ideology. This study has adopted such an approach. More will be said about how ideology shapes a text/discourse and how it can be traced in research concerned with ideology and translation in the discussion of approaches used to investigate ideology.

12 More to be said on conscious vs. unconscious ideological choices and to what extent they can be determined in p. 71. 37

Patronage

Patronage and translation. A translator is not the only agent who can have ideological influence on a translation. Patrons, publishers, and editors all have a role that can influence translations especially on political discourse through media. And in the context of institutional settings, “the question of dominance and the notion of dominant ideology are of particular interest” (Beaton, 2007, p. 273). Therefore, it is important to discuss patronage and the role it has in translation and ideology.

In any discussion of patronage, André Lefèvere’s Translation, Rewriting, and The

Manipulation of Literary Fame is a valuable source. Although Lefèvere’s discussion of patronage focuses on the context of literary translation, it is highly relevant to any discussion of institutionalized translation practice. According to Lefèvere, patronage is

“understood to mean something like the powers (persons, institutions) that can further or hinder the reading, writing, and rewriting of literature” (2017, p. 12). Patronage can be exercised by persons, groups of persons, institutions and parties (e.g., religious, political or social), publishers, and the media (i.e., newspapers, magazines, television corporations, etc.) (ibid.). Most professionals work through patronage, yet patrons are often more interested in the “ideology” of literature, while professionals are more concerned with the “poetics” of literature (ibid.). For example, patrons often have “a canon of acceptable texts” which has to do with the selection of topics, texts, and their interpretations which help smooth out contradictions to their ideology. According to

Belsey (1981):

In thus smoothing out contradiction, closing the text, criticism becomes the

accomplice of ideology. Having created a canon of acceptable texts, criticism then

provides them with acceptable interpretation, thus effectively censoring away

elements in them which come into collision with dominant ideology. (p. 109, qtd

in Lefèvere, 2017 p.12)

McCabe (2016) provides another understanding of patronage. According to him, patronage “is largely a matter of reception, of inherited ideals, idioms, and aspirations constantly adjusted to emergent circumstances, of creative mimesis as a strategy for self- promotion, and even survival” (p. 10).

Patronage essentially consists of three elements that can be seen to interact in various combinations: 1) the ideological component, “which acts as a constraint on the choice and development of both form and subject matter”; 2) the economic component, in which “the patron sees to it that writers and rewriters are able to make a living, by giving them a pension or appointing them to some office”; 3) and the element of status, that is,

“[a]cceptance of patronage implies integration into a certain support group and its lifestyle” (Lefèvere, 2017, p. 13).

Although patronage provides great service to translation and translators by regulating, increasing and supporting production, it nonetheless can have a negative impact. Translators, for example, tend to have relatively little freedom when it comes to their relationship with patrons, “at least if they want to have their translations published,”

(Lefèvere, 2003, p. 19) This highlights the necessity to analyze translation “in connection

with power and patronage, ideology and poetics,” in order to expose the constant efforts devoted by patrons to use translation to promote their ideology and/or undermine rival ideologies (ibid, p. 10).

The impact of power held by patrons over the translation process and translators must be considered in any discussion of ideology. In a discussion of how little power translators have compared to those in power, Lefèvere (2012) argues that:

Translators, it could be said, are subjected to power, relegated to a position of

complete impotence. “They have no rights”, wrote the translator Maurice-edgar

Coindreau, “only duties” (1974:131). […] Translators are thought to have little

alternative but to respect the powers that be – especially if those powers hold the

purse strings.” (p. 127)

Bassnett (1998) also asks important questions related to patrons’ and translators’ roles in translation, which have to do with:

how a text is selected for translation, […] what role the translator plays in that

selection, what role an editor, publisher or patron plays, what criteria determine

the strategies that will be employed by the translator, how a text might be

received in the target system. (p. 123)

Patronage and ideology. To understand how the patronage role is very significant whenever ideology, politics, and power are the focus of an investigation and whenever the criteria for selecting content for translation are questionable, we need to shed some light on how ideology operates in a group versus individual settings. van Dijk (1998)

argues that ideology is socially driven and that it is rarely individual. The “system beliefs” of an ideology are socially acquired, motivated and driven. They do not operate in isolation from their society of environment. Thus, he argues that “the cognitive analysis of ideologies does not imply that ideologies are individual or only mental. They are both mental and social, and also their mental properties are socially acquired, shared and changed” (p. 314).

Thus, van Dijk highlights the necessity to distinguish between “personal beliefs,” on the one hand, and “social beliefs or social representations,” on the other hand. This is because ideologies are often of the latter kind and hence are defined as shared social beliefs of (specific) social groups (ibid, p. 314). This means that the most important feature to identify an ideology is that ideologies tend to have “structural characteristics, such as those of group polarization (Us versus Them)” (ibid).

Because of the predominantly social and group-affiliated nature of an ideology, ideologies tend to “control group knowledge” and “monitor the shared evaluative beliefs

(opinions) of a group.” (ibid., p. 315) Such ideologies become “the basis of the social judgements of groups and their members.” (ibid.)

This controlling nature of ideologies over group knowledge and ambitions to influence other groups leads us to the question of who is in control of a group’s ideologies and, ultimately, the group. According to Van Dijk, “various elites have a special role in the formulation and reproduction of ideologies” (ibid., p. 316). This is because of “their preferential access to, and control over, public discourse, and especially

of the media and education” (ibid., p.316) Van Dijk suggests that “[a]lthough ideological reproduction is both top-down and bottom-up, […] a relatively small number of

‘symbolic’ elites (writers, thinkers, politicians, scholars, journalists, etc.) may exercise the special role of ideological leaders, who preformulate and stimulate ideological debate” (ibid.).

Finally, and most importantly, comes the question of circulation and implementation of ideologies. Van Dijk asserts that “[t]he effective reproduction and implementation of group ideologies often requires organization and institutionalization

[emphasis in original], typically so by ideological institutions such as those of politics, the media and education” (p. 316).

MEMRI, patronage and ideology. The whole discussion and literature on the role of patronage and the group nature of ideology makes it important that we shed some light on the history of MEMRI as an organization and an institute of translation and research— its beginning, founders, and criticism of its work and goals. Such background sets the stage for an investigation of its criteria for content selection and translation.

Controversy around MEMRI can be attributed to three points

1. MEMRI’s institutional structure and its foundation, which has to do with the

background affiliation of its founders and personnel with the Israeli

government.

2. MEMRI’s stated goals and motives (e.g., from and into which languages do

they translate, why those languages, changing and contradictory stated goals

on different versions of its website).

3. Sponsors and funding sources.

4. MEMRI’s translated content (e.g., selectivity of topics and content, editing,

mistranslation)

MEMRI’s institutional structure and its foundation. MEMRI was founded in

1998 with its headquarters in Washington, DC and “branch offices in various world capitals.”13 According to Fathi (2011), these branch offices are presently in Jerusalem,

Berlin, Baghdad and Tokyo. MEMRI gained a more prominent role after the events of 11

September 2001, due to increased Western public interest in Arab and Iranian affairs.14

MEMRI states on its website that it is “an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit, 501(c) organization.” 15 However, the professional career and political background of many of its staff and specifically of its co-founders, Yigal Carmon and Meyrav Wurmser, have raised questions regarding its claim of being non-partisan and unbiased.

MEMRI’s 1998 website version included some information about its staff.

According to the website, Yigal Carmon, MEMRI co-founder and president, served in the

Israeli IDF/Intelligence Branch from 1968 to 1988 and was a colonel when he retired. He

13 https://www.memri.org/about 14 Fathi had phone conversations with MEMRI’s founder Yigal Carmon and a staff member from the Berlin office in 2005, from which the cited information is drawn. 15 https://www.memri.org/about 43

also worked as the Acting Head of Civil Administration in Judea and Samaria and the

Advisor on Arab Affairs to the Civil Administration. After his retirement from the IDF,

Carmon worked as an Advisor to Premiers Shamir and Rabin for Countering Terrorism from 1988 to 1993. This information about MEMRI’s core staff had disappeared from the website in 2001, apparently because of the criticism it attracted. Luckily, the Internet archives have recorded most of the early versions.16

Before co-founding MEMRI, Carmon was a member of the so-called “gang of three,” a group of lobbyists that reportedly lobbied Congress against the Oslo Accords between the government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization and that was said to be instrumental in convincing lawmakers not to place US troops on the Golan

Heights in the event of a peace agreement with Syria (Perelman, 2001).

Carmon was reportedly linked at the time with a small group of “hardline

American terrorism experts” that includes investigative journalist Steve Emerson, former

FBI associate deputy Oliver Revell, and a former FBI counterterrorism chief, Steve

Pomerantz (ibid.). Carmon explained that he was trying to create “an anti-terrorist think- tank” with Mr. Revell and Mr. Pomerantz. However, other observers suggested there was more to it (ibid.). Referring to Mr. Carmon’s association with Pomerantz, Vincent

Cannistraro, a former CIA official, said that “[t]hey were fund-raising together in D.C. to create this institute. They asked me to come on board, but I refused because I saw this was capped by Israeli intelligence and because it was too political” (ibid.).

16 http://web.archive.org/web/19991118000658/http://memri.org/about.html 44

On numerous occasions, Carmon described himself as a former member of the

Israeli government and stressed the fact that he had been retired for 13 years when he founded MEMRI. Fathi (2011, p. 170) argues that of course, “people feel unfairly treated when their work is judged by their past career. Yet, when dealing with the media is it good enough to say that who you are or who you associated with does not matter?”

Carmon's partner in setting up MEMRI was Meyrav Wurmser. She was the executive director of MEMRI17 but left the position in early 2000 to direct the Center of

Middle East Policy at the Hudson Institute, a pro-Israeli Institute. According to Web

Right, a website that aims at “Tracking militarists’ efforts to influence U.S. foreign policy,” the Hudson Institute is known for its efforts to influence US policy in the Middle

East, and “its scholars and work tend to reflect a deep ideological affiliation with militaristic security policies, as well as an anti-Islamic and right-wing ‘pro-Israel’ posture with respect to the Middle East” (“Hudson Institute,” 2015).

Meyrav Wurmser, with her husband, were among the six authors of the “now- infamous” Clean Break document, which proposed reshaping Israel's “strategic environment” in the Middle East, starting with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein

(Whitaker, 2007). Whitaker (2003b) describes Wurmser as “an ultra-Zionist opponent of the Oslo peace process who regards leftwing Israeli intellectuals as a threat to Israel.”

Meyrav Wurmser’s husband, David Wursmer, is also strongly committed to the state of Israel and was part of a Pentagon intelligence unit that supported military

17 http://web.archive.org/web/19991118000658/http://memri.org/about.html 45

intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq during the Bush administration between 2000 and

2007, when he left office (Bonney, 2008, p. 110).

Although the controversy over the co-founders’ political background and affiliation might trigger a conspiracy theory, it cannot be ignored, especially because of other more important red flags, such as the source of their funding and the controversy over MEMRI’s actual work, all of which will be discussed below.

MEMRI’s stated goals and motives. In addition to the controversy around

MEMRI’s personnel, analysis of MEMRI’s stated goals and motives raises questions regarding its “non-partisan”, “bridge-building” claims. Again, evidence from the different versions of MEMRI’s website casts doubt on its “non-partisan” status. Its current website emphasizes that “MEMRI bridges the language gap between the West and the Middle

East” and that its “work directly supports fighting the U.S. War on Terror.” 18 However, the 1998 version contains a more direct statement of affiliation. Besides its claim of being a “non-partisan, non-profit organization,” it boldly states that “the institute emphasizes the continuing relevance of Zionism to the Jewish people and to the state of Israel.”19

This statement disappeared from its website in November 2001.20

The website also used to state that “MEMRI relies on primary source material that it translates from the original Arabic and Hebrew […] MEMRI also studies internal

18 https://www.memri.org/about 19 http://web.archive.org/web/19991118000658/http://memri.org/about.html 20 http://web.archive.org/web/20011106013705/http://memri.org/about.html 46

developments in Israel, analyzing political and cultural trends in Israel.” MEMRI’s translation of Hebrew and coverage of Israeli’s media was, however, very limited, and

“articles translated out of the Hebrew press were scarcely found” (Fathi, 2011, p. 168).

The Hebrew translation project was abandoned one year later, in 1999, which was, according to a staff member in the Berlin office, “to avert the charge of an obvious imbalance between the Arabic and Hebrew media covered” (ibid). However, Yigal

Carmon, the President of MEMRI, stated that Hebrew translation was stopped due to personnel and financial constraints and because 80% of the Israeli media can be found online in English, so there is no need to provide additional translations (ibid). Regardless of the obviously contradicting statements, we wonder if the 80% includes TV and social media, which now constitute more than 50% of MEMRI’s translations, as will be discussed below, or if he meant the press only. Brian Whitaker from The Guardian argues that if MEMRI’s goal were to seek moderating speech and help fight extremism,

“one would expect it – for the sake of non-partisanship – to publicise extremist articles in the Hebrew media too” (Whitaker, 2002).

Such contradictory and continually changing statements made many critics consider MEMRI “a rather mysterious organization” (Whitaker, 2002). Since the launch of MEMRI, its website has not shown any names to contact nor any physical address, although lately it offers a contact form. The reason for this secrecy, according to a former employee, is that “they don’t want suicide bombers walking through the door on Monday

morning” (ibid.). Whitaker describes this secrecy as “a somewhat over-the-top precaution for an institute that simply wants to break down east-west language barriers” (ibid.).

MEMRI’s sponsors and source of funding. MEMRI is financed through individuals and private donors and foundations. Its website runs a fundraising from time to time and has links to payment channels. However, many of the foundations that have generously funded MEMRI are pro-Jewish and/or pro-Israeli, such as the Shoah

Foundation, the Meyerhof Foundation, Randolph Foundation, Schusterman Foundation, and Koret Foundation (Fathi, 2011, p. 169). According to Fathi (2011), “a very limited check revealed that a good number of these foundations have emphases on ‘Jewish Life and Culture’ or Israel-related projects and/ or support conservative projects in the United

States” (p.169 - 170). Another prominent foundation that has verifiably supported

MEMRI with funding was The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation (ibid.). According to www.mediatransparency.org, it is one of “the country’s largest and most influential right-wing foundations,” which has also sponsored the Heritage Foundation and the

Hudson Institute (cited in Fathi, 2011, p. 170). These are additional signs that raise questions regarding MEMRI’s affiliation, agenda, and non-partisan claims.

The analysis of translated content. Many writers and critics have criticized

MEMRI and questioned its work. Although there was some critique over mistranslations and accusations of deliberate or at least poor-quality translation that had a big influence in promoting MEMRI’s agenda (see e.g., Whitaker 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Baker 2006,

2010), most of the critique regarded MEMRI’s highly selective translations.

According to the journalist and former Middle East editor of The Guardian, “[t]he stories selected by MEMRI for translation follow a familiar pattern: either they reflect badly on the character of Arabs or they in some way further the political agenda of Israel”

(Whitaker, 2002). Similarly, Ibrahim Hooper of the Council on American-Islamic

Relations told The Washington Times: “MEMRI’s intent is to find the worst possible quotes from the Muslim world and disseminate them as widely as possible” (ibid.). “They are unrepresentative and give an unfair picture of the Arab media as a whole” (Whitaker,

2003a, para. 10). Vincent Cannistraro, former head of the CIA’s counterintelligence’s unit, criticized MEMRI, claiming that “They are selective and act as propagandists for their political point of view, which is the extreme-right of Likud […] They simply don’t present the whole picture” (qtd. in Perelman, 2001, para. 6).

Juan Cole, professor of history at the University of Michigan, is also a prominent critic of MEMRI. Besides accusing MEMRI of mistranslation and having a political

Anti-Arab agenda, he states:

The organization [MEMRI] cleverly cherry-picks the vast Arabic press, which

serves 300 million people, for the most extreme and objectionable articles and

editorials. It carefully does not translate the moderate articles. I have looked at

newspapers that ran both tolerant and extremist opinion pieces on the same day,

and checked MEMRI, to find that only the extremist one showed up. (Cole,

2004a, para. 15)

After Professor Cole’s article criticizing MEMRI of mistranslation and ideological selectivity, MEMRI’s president, Yigal Carmon, sent an email threating to file a lawsuit against him. This was not the first threat of legal action against critics of

MEMRI. The former mayor of London, Mr. Ken Livingstone, Brian Whitaker, and the

German magazine inamo have entered into, or been threatened with, legal action by

MEMRI (Fathi, 2011, p. 170). Professor Cole responded with another article “Repressive

MEMRI”, in which he added more criticism of MEMRI:

This technique of the SLAPP, or Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation,

has already been pioneered by polluting industries against environmental activists,

and now the pro-Likud lobby in the U.S. has apparently decided to try it out

against people like me. (Cole, 2004b, para. 1)

Some studies have also criticized MEMRI’s “cherry-picking” and

“recontextualization” of original content, which will be discussed soon in the examination of approaches to studying ideology in translation (see e.g., Al-Sharif, 2009;

Omar, 2016).

Of course, MEMRI also has a wide range of supporters, from journalists to governments officials, some of whom have already been discussed in Chapter One, and many are broadly and repeatedly cited by MEMRI in its secondary website, which was established for the sole purpose of finding and following media that cites its work, www.memriinthemedia.org.

To conclude the discussion of MEMRI as an institution and a patron of translation, it seems the discussion of its foundation, statements, and work is so controversial that it may activate conspiratorial allegations at different levels. However, its success among western politicians is evident in the fact that MEMRI’s president has testified on multiple occasions on varied matters in front of the Congress and EU parliament, which makes it worth further investigation. We will conclude with the following quote, which exactly describes the current state of the debate over MEMRI:

The way in which MEMRI is received, either embraced or rejected, allows

conclusions to be drawn regarding the political and ideological standing of any

one person. Similar to the way in which Said’s Orientalism or, in a lesser way,

Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations have managed to polarize a whole range of

disciplines, the proponents and critics of MEMRI, too, mark the two poles of

ideological discourse on the Middle East. (Fathi, 2011, p. 165)

Approaches to Studying Ideology in Translation

In the literature focusing on studying ideology in translation, there were mainly three approaches to studying translation and tracking how ideology is reflected in the product and how it affects its recipients:

1. Narrative Theory (NT), which is mostly concerned with paratextual elements of

discourse, such as the titles, notes, introduction, sources, and why a text is

selected for a translation in the first place. All those elements affect the reception

of the narrative. Several studies have implemented this approach in Translation

Studies (e.g., see Baker, 2005, 2006, 2010; Darwish, 2006; Al-Sharif, 2009;

Harding, 2013).

2. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which usually focuses on translational shifts,

censorship and the use of certain lexical choices, cohesive relations, and the

syntactic organization of a text, all of which, whether intentional or unintentional,

are part of a process of intervention on the translator’s part that can have

ideological impact on the translation. Several studies have implemented this

approach (e.g., see Azodi, 2015; Beaton, 2007; Díaz Cintas, 2012; McLaughlin &

Muñoz-Basols, 2016; Dimitriu, 2004).

3. Imagology, which is concerned with how specific groups or society members,

such as women versus men, minorities versus the rest of the society, are

represented in the original work and in the translation. A number of studies have

implemented this approach (e.g., Leerssen, 2000, 2016; Croteau and Hoynes,

2003; Kuran-Burçoğlu, 2000; Van Doorslaer, 2012).

Of course, each approach has its pros and cons and that is why many studies have

incorporated some features of each approach, as we will see in the rest of this

chapter. The following paragraphs discuss each approach in more detail and shed

light on definitions, strengths, limitations, and some major studies that have

adopted each approach.

Narrative Theory (NT)

Definition and analytical framework. The notion of narrative has been defined in different ways in different disciplines. However, the definition used in social studies is useful in its application to TS. According to Somers and Gibson (1994, cited in Baker

2005, p. 5), a narrative is not an optional mode of several modes we “choose” from (e.g., narrative vs. argumentation as a way of writing literature); narrative is “the principal and inescapable mode by which we experience the world” (Baker, 2005, p. 5). Thus,

“[e]verything we know is the result of numerous crosscutting story-lines in which social actors locate themselves” (Somers and Gibson 1994, p. 41, qtd in Baker 2005, p. 5).

Baker (2010b, p. 117) defines narratives as “the stories that we come to subscribe to— believe in or at least contemplate as potentially valid” and that can shape our perception of the world around us and create different realities no matter how neutral these narratives might seem to be. Therefore, in TS, NT is used to “examine some of the ways in which translators and interpreters reframe aspects of political conflicts, and hence participate in the construction of social and political reality” (ibid., p. 115).

Narrative Theory was first introduced to TS by Mona Baker in her article

“Narratives in and of Translation” (2005) and was further discussed and suggested for use as an analytical framework in her book Translation and Conflict: A Narrative

Account (2006). She further used and discussed NT in subsequent articles and book chapters (e.g., see Baker, 2010a, 2010b, 2016, 2017).

Baker (2005) aims mainly to draw attention to “disciplinary” narratives of scholarly works in TS, but she also discusses how NT can be useful in discussing important topics in TS. By focusing on and discussing how one common metaphor of translation as promoting peace can be misleading in understanding the depth of translation’s effect and role in connecting cultures, Baker sheds light on important aspects of the roles that translators, institutions, and ideology play in a translation. In

Baker’s words:

This article questions one of the narratives that dominate our disciplinary and

professional discourses on translation, namely the narrative of translation as a

means of promoting peace, tolerance and understanding through enabling

communication and dialogue to take place. […] The article ultimately argues that

translators and translation scholars must resist the temptation to over-romanticize

their role in society and must instead acknowledge the fact that they participate in

very decisive ways in promoting and circulating narratives and discourses of

various types – some promoting peace, others fueling conflicts, subjugating entire

populations and providing precisely the kind of bridging of language gaps

[emphasis added] that allow such atrocities to take place. (p. 4)

By highlighting the active role and denouncing the “romantic” role of translation, especially in conflict zones, Baker warns that such honest representation of translation and translators might lead the audience and readers to completely trust translations that were in fact motivated by political gains and/or negative ideological perceptions of the

other. Baker clearly states that her purpose is not to argue that “scholarly discourses about culture, language and translation are […] intentionally or openly manipulative”

(ibid., p. 4). Instead, she argues:

They are arguably disappointing in their attempt to explain away the politics of

language and translation by portraying a world in which cultural

misunderstanding is unintended, innocent and can be avoided once we are

sensitised to cultural differences and have a well-trained group of professionals

who can mediate between different cultures in a non-biased and responsible

manner. (ibid., p. 4)

Baker’s argument is highly relevant and useful in explaining why and how

MEMRI makes use of translation as a tool to “fill the knowledge gap” between the West and the Middle East. MEMRI uses translation to legitimize its narrative, since translation, until recently, has been perceived by scholars and ultimately by audiences in a romantic fashion. That is, the ordinary, non-specialized reader is rarely aware of how translation, especially in media, undergoes a good deal of “reconstruction” (Schäffner and Bassnett,

2010),“framing,” and “reframing” (Darwish, 2006), which ultimately leads to narrative shifts that are invisible to the readers and/or viewers of the translation. This is in part because of the romantic view of translation as a neutral and transparent conduit.

Contrary to other text analysis approaches, NT is concerned with the macro- elements and paratextual elements of a translation. It is less concerned, for example, with syntactic or lexical choices within a single text, but rather with the other elements or tools

that are set and configured in such a way as to shape the perception of the translation.

Some of these tools include introductions, notes, links, images, and contextualization.

The five features of a narrative. Baker (2005) cites five interdependent features of narrative construction: 1) Temporality, which refers to the time and place in which a narrative is constructed. It aims to benefit a particular temporal moment; 2) Relationality, which is the relationship between events that allows the human mind to make sense of the narrative; 3) Selective appropriation, or the selection of certain events from a set of open- ended choices to help construct a comprehensible narrative. This can be done by selecting portions of a specific text, or selecting specific texts, articles, essays while ignoring others that might tell a different narrative; 4) Causal emplotment, by which independent instances are given extra value to override their chronological or categorical order

(Somers 1992, 1994, 1997; Somers and Gibson 1994, cited in Baker 2005, p. 8 - 9). In other words, texts may be taken out of context to serve a different purpose; 5) Narrative accrual, which is the repeated exposure and recirculation of the same and/or similar narratives that eventually lead to the shaping of a culture, tradition, or history (Bruner

1991, p. 18, cited in Baker 2005, p. 9).

Framing is also a key term and strategy in NT. In social movement studies, framing is defined as “an active process of signification,” and frames are defined as

“structures of anticipation, strategic moves that are consciously initiated in order to present a movement or a particular position within a certain perspective” (Baker, 2006, p.

106). Framing processes are mechanisms through which individuals, or translators in our

case, can ideologically connect with the larger group they belong to, whether it was an institution or a political party, to achieve the group’s goals and become active participants in their groups (ibid.). Therefore, framing is “an active strategy that implies agency and by means of which we consciously participate in the construction of reality” (ibid.).

Framing in NT refers to the implementation of the five features of narrative construction, mentioned above, to shape the perception of the text. Framing can be achieved, for example, by using paratextual elements such as footnotes and commentaries and, more importantly, by how and why a text is selected for translation, as well as its relation to other translated texts.

Types of narratives. Baker (2005, 2006) discuss four types of narratives, all of which were originally distinguished by Somers and Gibson (1994). Not all those narratives are related to the focus of this study, but they are important to understand how narratives shape our lives and understanding of ourselves and the world around us.

The first type of narratives is ontological narratives, or “narratives of the self,” as Baker calls them. Ontological narratives are “personal stories that we tell ourselves about our place in the world and our own personal history. These stories both constitute and make sense of our lives” (2006, p. 28). They include memories, diaries, happy moments such as weddings or graduation, or tragic experiences such as violence or sexual abuse.

The second type of narratives moves beyond the self to the immediate larger environment, the society. Public narratives are “defined as stories elaborated by and

circulating among social and institutional formations larger than the individual, such as the family, religious or educational institution, the media, and the nation (2006, p. 33).

Examples of this type of narrative are ‘American social mobility,’ the ‘freeborn

Englishman,’ and ‘the emancipatory story of socialism’ (Somers 1992, p. 604, cited in

Baker 2006, p. 33). Baker gives her own examples of more recent public narratives of

‘Western democracy,’ ‘Islamic fundamentalism,’ ‘Christian fundamentalism,’ all of which circulate in different versions. “Individuals in any society either buy into the official or semi-official versions of such public narratives or dissent from them” (Baker,

2006, p. 32 - 33).

The third type of narratives is conceptual narratives, or disciplinary narratives, as Baker calls them. They are defined as “the stories and explanations that scholars in any field elaborate for themselves and others about their object of inquiry” (2006, p. 39).

According to Baker, “[e]very discipline, including translation studies, elaborates and thrives on its own set of conceptual narratives” (ibid, p. 39). Although most of such narratives do not have impact beyond their discipline, many have gone beyond.

Some examples of conceptual disciplinary narratives that had impact beyond their disciplinary boundaries include Darwin’s theory of natural selection, James Mill’s

History of British India, and more recently the “pernicious” conceptual narratives of

Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (ibid, pp. 39 - 40). In his reference and description of the “Hindus,” Mill’s repeatedly used the adjectives “wild,” “barbaric,” “savage,” and “rude,” “thus forming by sheer force of

repetition a counter-discourse to the Orientalist hypothesis of an ancient civilization”

(Niranjana,1990, p.776, qtd in Baker, 2006, p. 39). Niranjana quotes German Indologist

Max Mueller as stating that Mill’s History “was responsible for some of the greatest misfortunes that had happened to India” (Niranjana, 1990, p.779, qtd in Baker, 2006, p.

39). Similarly, Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of

World Order “classified world civilizations into distinct groups with ‘inherent’ cultural characteristics (mostly conflicting with ‘good’ American values) and predicted that culture would replace ideology as the principal cause of conflict in the twenty-first century” (Baker, 2006, p. 40). “Culture”, in this narrative, is a non-negotiable given:

cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily

compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. In the former Soviet

Union, communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor and the

poor rich, but Russians cannot become Estonians and Azeris cannot become

Armenians. In class and ideological conflicts, the question was ‘Which side are

you on?’ and people could and did choose sides and change sides. In conflicts

between civilizations, the question is ‘What are you?’ That is a given that cannot

be changed. (Huntington, 1993, p.27, qtd in Baker, 2006, p. 40)

Baker concludes that The Clash of Civilizations was a major reference point for the Bush administration, and “the narratives it spawned have been directly linked to the official public narratives of 9/11, the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq, and even before all these to the war in the Balkans” (p. 40).

The fourth type of narrative is the meta (master) narratives, “in which we are embedded as contemporary actors in history […] Our sociological theories and concepts are encoded with aspects of these master-narratives – Progress, Decadence,

Industrialization, Enlightenment, etc.” (Somers and Gibson (1994, p. 61, qtd in Baker

2005, p. 5). A more recent meta- or master narrative, according to Baker, is the public narrative of the ‘War on Terror,’ which “aggressively sustained and promoted through a myriad of channels across the entire world, thus rapidly acquiring the status of a super narrative that cuts across geographical and national boundaries and directly impacts the lives of every one of us, in every sector of society” (Baker 2005). As Baker argues:

The choice of terror rather than terrorism is significant here and offers a good

example of the discursive work required for the successful circulation and

adoption of narratives. ‘Terrorism’ refers to one or more incidents that involve

violence, and as such has a localised feel about it. ‘Terror’, on the other hand, is a

state of mind, of feeling, which can spread like wild fire across all sorts of

boundaries and encompass all in its grip. A narrative must have this type of

temporal and physical breadth, as well as sense of inevitability or inescapability,

to qualify as a meta or master narrative. Terror indexes these features much better

than terrorism. (p. 7)

Studies adopting the NT. A growing number of studies have used narrative theory to investigate ideology in translation. One of the important studies is Baker (2010), which demonstrates how narrative theory can be useful in investigating ideology in different

genres, such as film making and news reporting. For example, Baker shows how a neo- conservative organization such as MEMRI chooses to translate specific news from

Arabic, manipulate the titles and make use of images and captions to deliver and enforce a negative image of the Palestinian people.

Darwish (2006) does not employ narrative theory per se, but he makes use of its most important strategy, framing. Darwish studies Aljazeera and CNN-Arabic translations and concludes that translations go through “a reframing process of already framed text” (p. 54). Darwish examines the impact of translation on news making and argues that “by submitting news to translation, it undergoes a reframing process entailing a reconstruction of a constructed reality already subjected to professional, institutional and contextual influences” (p. 52).

Besides news translation, NT was extensively applied in many literary translation studies. For example, Ayoub (2010) examines the set of stories rewritten, adapted, and translated for children by the Egyptian author Kamil Al-Kilani. Ayoub focuses primarily on the ways in which framing is effective at sites around text, such as introductions, titles, footnotes, glossaries, and testimonials. Another study is Al-Herthani (2009), which investigates the translations of Edward Said’s literary works into Arabic by Arab institutions and mediators, such as the academy, media, publishing houses, and translators. Like Ayoub, Al-Herthani focuses on paratextual material and applies the notions of framing and counter-framing to discuss how such elements in literary translation can be used to construct narratives.

An important study that focuses on MEMRI as a topic of investigation is Al

Sharif (2009). Al-Sharif carries out a detailed analysis of MEMRI’s reports and investigates ways in which MEMRI actively uses translation to negatively construct narratives of Palestinians in general and Palestinian women and mothers in particular.

The study basically focuses on two reports and extensively applies NT to show how all features of NT are employed by MEMRI to frame translations in order to construct a narrative of Palestinian mothers as emotionless, heartless women who basically survive to serve as wombs delivering terrorist “bombers” and rejoice at their children’s death in

“martyrdom.”

Harding (2012) also applies NT as a tool for investigating how omission in translation is used to construct narratives. The study provides detailed and sustained textual analysis of online reporting published by three different Russian-language news websites. The analysis of both Russian and English texts highlights issues of translation, particularly in regard to online and fringe media, and ways in which translation and omission affect the construction and reconstruction of narratives.

Advantages and disadvantages of NT. Baker (2010) criticizes common approaches in TS, such as Norm Theory and other approaches that focus solely on translation strategies and dichotomies such as domestication and foreignization. That is because it is usually hard to assume that a translator is only domesticating or foreignizing, as both strategies may be employed in a single text. Moreover, these approaches have limited value in investigating the role of translation in contexts of

resistance and political conflict, as they tend to categorize translators and translations reductively, based on categories such as race, gender, religion and ethnicity.

By contrast, narrative theory provides many advantages. First, it acknowledges the translator’s role as an individual who has a unique relationship to cross-related elements of the text, author, society, and dominant ideologies, with his/her own unique beliefs rather than as a representative member of a certain society, religion or culture.

Second, narrative theory goes beyond the popular discussion of dichotomies, which cannot properly describe a translation. For example, in many instances, translators tend to use domestication and foreignization strategies in the same text. In such cases, it is difficult to describe the translation as representing either strategy. Third, narrative theory

“allows us to see social actors, including translators and interpreters, as real-life individuals rather than theoretical abstractions” (Baker 2010, p. 116).

However, narrative theory is not without its limitations. First, it is not effective in tracing ideological choices at the microlevel of a text, as in CDA, for instance. Second, it assumes deliberate ideological choices that cannot be proven without, as Mason (2010) notes, investigating the translator’s or publisher’s intention, which, of course, is notoriously difficult to prove. There are other limitations that narrative theory shares with other models in investigating ideology in translation, namely, the fact that “all writing on ideology is itself ideologically vested” (Koller, 2005, p. 220). In other words, one cannot study ideology from an ideologically neutral point of view.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

Definition and analytical framework. CDA is an analytical framework commonly used in linguistics to explore “opaque” relationships of causality between discursive practices and texts, on the one hand, and broader social and cultural structures and processes on the other hand, in order to investigate how texts and events are ideologically shaped by power relations and struggle (Fairclough, 1995, p. 132). Thus, CDA is a useful method for investigating ideology in translation and can be used in conjunction with NT.

CDA has been concerned with the investigation of ideology for the past thirty years, especially in the context of news reporting and media discourse (Pan, 2015, p.

216). In his summary of Fairclough’s model of CDA, Pan points out that in CDA, discourse analysis is performed to explore the relationships between language use and the social relations and processes in which language use is “imbricated” (Fairclough 1995, p.73, qtd in Pan, 2015, p. 216). Fairclough proposed a three-dimensional model that aims at revealing how values and power relations are encoded in texts. The dimensions that

Fairclough suggests are text, discourse practice, and socio-cultural practice (ibid.).

The term ‘text’ is used in CDA for “both written texts and transcriptions of spoken interaction” (Fairclough, 1993, p. 166, qtd in Pan, 2015, p. 216), but it is usually used to refer to “the product of the process of text-creation” (ibid.). “Discourse” is another key term in CDA, and it is considered “more informative and relevant” (ibid.) than the term “text”. Discourse is the “whole process of social interaction of which text is just a part” (ibid.) Of course, text is the starting point in which clues and signals are

traced during the analysis and later during interpretation. Text is embedded within discourse practice, which itself is embedded in sociocultural practice. In Fairclough’s analytical model, discourse analysis is carried out in three procedures: description, interpretation and explanation. Pan’s summary of this model suggests that researchers using CDA follow three steps; first, they describe the linguistic properties in the text.

Second, they interpret the relationship between the text and the productive and interpretative processes of discursive practice in processing analysis. Finally, they explain the relationship between discursive and social practice in social analysis (ibid., pp. 216 -

217)

Studies adopting CDA. Many studies have implemented CDA to study ideology in translation. One of those studies is Pan (2015), which investigates the Chinese translations of several English news reports related to the treatment of China’s human rights record as presented in Reference News, an authoritative Chinese state-run newspaper which is devoted to translating foreign reports for the Chinese reader and

“aims to establish how evaluative resources are resorted to by the translators to facilitate ideologically diﬀerent positioning in presenting events and identifying participants in the translated news” (p. 215). The study compares the translations with their English source texts, using Martin and White’s (2005) Appraisal Theory as the micro-analytical framework and Fairclough’s (1995) three-dimension model of CDA as the explanatory framework.

The results of the study suggest that “evaluative resources have been manipulated to realize ideologically diﬀerent positioning in translated news” (Pan, 2015, p. 233). It also found that in news translation, “evaluative resources deployed to identify news actors and present news actions are crucial for distinct positioning in the translated news that leads to diﬀerent interpretations of the reported event” (ibid). Finally, the study argues that “contrary to the general expectation of objectivity in news reporting, both the original news and its translations are not free from deploying linguistic resources to make judgments and express attitudes implicitly in representing news ‘realities’” (ibid).

Another influential study that has adopted CDA in its analysis of news reports is

Mason (2010), which analyzes a source text and a target text that appeared in the

UNESCO Courier. Mason shows how the translator’s translational choices were influenced by his ideology and thus resulted in a discourse in the target text that was demonstrably different from the one in the source text. Mason concludes that the translational choices a translator makes, although systematic in nature, tend to be subconscious and are affected by the environment and the discourses within which the translator is interacting.

Another study that used CDA as a framework is by Christina Schäffner (2003).

Schäffner analyzed a policy document that was jointly published by the British Labor leader Tony Blair and the German Social Democratic Party leader Gerhard Schröder in both English and German versions. Schäffner investigated the document to draw attention to the role of textual devices in projecting ideology via discourse. She concluded that the

implementation of textual decisions such as lexical choices and metaphors in each version, although they were meant to be the same, resulted in a different reception of the text in the two countries.

CDA and NT could be argued to be the two most popular approaches to the study of ideology in translation in general and in media in particular, so some studies have made use of both approaches. One of the studies that have incorporated both is Omar

(2016). It is also one of the few studies that investigates the ideological orientation of

MEMRI’s translations, although the study was limited—its focus was ideology in media in general, and MEMRI was one of the examples. Nonetheless, several of the study’s key findings are relevant to the current study.

Omar (2016) is a qualitative study that investigates ideology in political discourse translation in media during the Arab Spring revolutions. It explores strategies and techniques employed by media outlets that often contribute to shaping the political discourse. The study uses data from different news genres, such as news reports, news articles, interviews, statements and their translations, all of which are related to the political discourse associated with the Syrian Revolution. The data come from multiple news websites, newspapers and TV channels that were published via international media outlets, such as The Washington Post, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal,

BBC Arabic, and CNN. The study concludes that because these outlets use translations provided by pro-regime outlets, such as Russia Today, Al-Mannar and Syria Now, the translations “are, generally speaking, ideologically steered and/or politically biased to one

of the conflicting parties” (p. 192). The study proposes that such translations have been largely influenced by the ideological and political views of the translators and publishing media outlets. Omar presents evidence that the media outlets investigated employed various strategies and techniques to alter the messages embedded in the non-translated content, concluding, “The translations are manipulated in line with certain agendas, ideologies, and interests” (p. 16). The study further “proposes the idea that conflicting parties used media outlets to promote their versions of the narrative of the conflict, through translation, for the purpose of legitimising self-actions, while delegitimising others in the context of the Arab Spring” (p. 16).

Of particular importance to the current study is Omar’s (2016) investigation of some of MEMRI’s translated media content related to the Syrian Revolution. Finding evidence of “manipulation” or at least translational shifts, Omar argues that “[o]n many occasions, MEMRI has resorted to manipulation of the original message embedded in the source material through translation in order to achieve the aforementioned objectives”

(ibid, p. 203). Omar concludes:

Since the beginning of the revolution, Israel, along with pro-Israeli organisations

in the West, such as MEMRI, have tried to exploit the sufferings of the Syrian

people to achieve political agendas and legitimise the existence of Israel. MEMRI

has been monitoring, translating, and publishing videos produced by feuding

parties. (p. 203)

Omar further claims that in its translations of video content of the Syrian

Revolution’s fighters and leaders, MEMRI adopted a policy that sought to achieve three main goals:

1. Focusing on extremist ideological views expressed by a few military groups, and

thus presenting Syrian opposition fighters in general as terrorists.

2. Distorting and misrepresenting the image of the Syrian revolution as well as Arab

Syrian identity.

3. Highlighting any possible views that recognize, appreciate, or praise Israel’s

existence and role in the region. (ibid.)

Advantages and disadvantages of CDA. CDA has its advantages and disadvantages. Unlike narrative theory, it provides a systematic investigation of the micro-lexical and structural elements of a translation, but it does not go any further (e.g., it does not consider paratexts, such as commentary and notes, nor the text’s temporality, although it does not preclude analysis of paratextual material). Although some criticism of CDA has focused on its attention to linguistic analysis and a perceived over-emphasis on the ‘micro’, the effectiveness of CDA lies in its ability to analyze ‘the social’ in conjunction with linguistic microanalysis (Luke, 2002). Finally, and most importantly,

CDA can be argued to provide an analytical tool that allows the researcher to make more conclusive and consistent findings. For example, choosing some syntactic structures over others (e.g., the use of passive voice versus active voice) has been proven empirically to

alter meaning in a text. Thus, investigating specific translational choices is an advantage of this model.

CDA, too, is not without its limitations. For example, when CDA is used to investigate ideology, there is often a focus on certain syntactic structures, such as transitivity, as indicative of ideology. However, Munday (2007) argues that such structures may be easily argued to not be indicative of ideology in a translation, as in the case when the translator has not received proper training in the implications implied by certain structures (e.g., the passive vs the active form of verbs). Thus, the investigation of ideology may not be accurate. Because of this limitation, Munday argues that the

“phraseological plane” of narrative point of view allows for better analysis by focusing on word choice, naming and speech representation.

Another limitation is the fact that CDA focuses on ‘shifts’ or instances that prove the researcher’s argument and may ignore counter-instances that can indicate that the findings were not conclusive (Mason 2010). Additionally, and without denying the benefits of CDA, full analysis of shifts and non-shifts may tell us very little about what is going on and might provide misleading results (Mason 2010). One more limitation of

CDA that is always found in any approach or model investigating ideology is that it is still dependent on and can be influenced by the researcher’s or critic’s own ideology.

Imagology

Definition and analytical framework. Imagology, or the discursive study of ethnotypes (i.e., stereotypical attributions of national characters), is not a theory but

rather an academic specialization that has been long rooted in comparative and literary studies (Leerssen, 2016). As Leerssen explains, “Alongside gender, ethnicity and nationality are perhaps the most ingrained way of pigeonholing human behaviour into imputed group characteristics” (Leerssen, 2016, p. 14). Thus, and because we basically

“schematize and make sense of the world by means of notions (prejudices, stereotypes) of national characters and ethnic temperaments,” researchers of imagology are interested in tracing and analyzing the discursive articulations of such national characterizations (ibid).

Imagology began in literary history as the study of images and representations of foreigners in the 1940s but lost most of its appeal later (ibid.). However, “[i]n the current climate of intense ‘identity politics’ and resurging nationalism, imagology is quickly regaining the urgency it had in the post-1945 years” (Leerssen, 2016, p. 14).

According to Van Doorslaer (2010), “imagology does not study what nations or nationalities are, but rather how they are represented” (p. 184). It also takes a descriptive stand rather than an explanatory one, because it

is the aim of imagology to describe the origin, process and function of national

prejudices and stereotypes, to bring them to the surface, analyse them and make

people rationally aware of them. But it would be illusory to think that we can

remove the affective reasons for our prejudices. (Beller, 2007, pp. 11–12, qtd in

Van Doorslaer 2010, p. 184)

As such, imagology shares similarities and features with NT. Its key concern is the image which is projected or constructed by a narrative. In discussing imagology and

NT, one cannot but use key terms such as “frame,” “pattern,” and “narrative” to help in the analysis of images, stereotypes, and prejudices. According to Leerssen (2016, p. 24), the cognitive-psychological model of ‘frames’ and ‘triggers’ has deepened our understanding of ethnotyping, and of stereotyping in general. In our mental repertoire, we carry a set of ‘frames’ that function as the schemata of the plausible connections between situations and their underlying patterns. These ‘frames,’ he adds, can be activated by actual stimuli or ‘triggers,’ which can arise from real-world encounters and experiences, or from cultural processes such as following the twists and turns of a narrative.

Studies adopting imagology in TS. Although imagology began and has focused mainly on literary works, TS scholars have also been interested in its application to translations of literary works and more recently to media and news translation. Van

Doorslaer (2010, 2012) are important contributions that have drawn from imagology as well as NT to argue how imagology is a beneficial application to TS.

Van Doorslaer (2010) serves to elaborate on the findings of an earlier study, (Van

Doorslaer, 2009), to draw attention to how imagology can be applied in TS as a useful means of analysis and as a step to broaden the field of TS. The article starts by examining existing research on the role of translation in media news production. Van Doorslaer argues that “[a]n examination of this role leads inevitably to a critical view of the use of

‘translation’ and the difficulties that Translation Studies encounters as a discipline in asserting and distributing broader definitions of the term in the context of media news production.” (p. 175). Connecting features of NT and imagology, such as selective

appropriation and national image construction, to translation is justified by the fact that

“the role of image setting and of the construction of national images […] potentially co- determine the selection and de-selection procedures involved” (p. 186). As Van

Doorslaer concludes:

It seems from this first study that the findings and methods of imagology could

serve as an additional approach in analyzing and interpreting the function of

national images in news production. In other words: studying the translation of

national images in news texts. (p. 186)

Van Doorslaer (2012) follows a similar pattern to that of Van Doorslaer (2010) but moves beyond the argument to the application, presenting its own case study. It references both narrative theory and imagology to show how “the creation of national and cultural images occupies a special position in the intersections between translation studies, journalism studies and image studies” (p. 1046). The study uses a case study focusing on the representation of neighboring countries in Dutch-language Belgian (i.e.,

Flemish) TV news. The findings of the quantitative analysis of newscasts indicate that

“the transfer or translation of national and cultural images is connected with the selection of topics and the association of countries with certain social fields or topic clusters” (p.

1057). Van Doorslaer argues that “[B]eing a combination of approaches that are seldom combined, the construction of the framework itself is seen as one of the objectives of this contribution” (p. 1053).

An earlier contribution to the application of and connecting between image construction and translation is Kuran-Burçoğlu (2000). Kuran-Burçoğlu acknowledges the role of translation as initiative, formative and transformative as far as image construction is concerned (Kuran-Burçoğlu 2000, pp. 144 - 145). She differentiates between three levels or stages at which image construction may have an influence: at the time of the text selection, during the encoding process, and during the reception process

(cited in Van Doorslaer, 2012, pp. 1052–1053).

Strengths and limitations of imagology. Besides the many features that imagology shares with NT, one of its unique strengths is its ability in describing the relationship between ethnicity and attributes of personality. In his discussion of “the fundamental rhetorical characteristic of ethnotypical discourse,” Leerssen points outs that in actual life it is common to see “the mere attribute of ethnicity as the essential motivating character in a person’s actions” (p. 25). To clarify this, he gives the following example and explanation:

If, in real life or in a text, a Dutchman of Moroccan descent is seen to commit a

traffic offense or an act of vandalism, this will be ‘framed’ as somehow

meaningfully linked to that Moroccan ethnicity. By contrast, if a blond blue-eyed

Dutch football hooligan is witnessed in these same acts, the idea that his

vandalism has something to do with his Dutchness will not arise; and in that

difference – the uneven distribution of ethnic framing – lies the root of ethnic

prejudice and racism. Once ethnic identity is an essential characteristic rather than

an incidental attribute, each act will be framed against this ethnic background and

each individual will always be seen as a representative of his/her nation.

(Leerssen, 2016, p. 25)

One caveat in the investigation and analysis of image construction is that it may present image construction and representations as a conscious and deliberate act, but in many cases they are not. In this regard, Leerssen (ibid.) gives a good example. If a researcher decides to single out characteristics of a given nationality, Italians for instance, in a selected corpus of English Victorian literature and then continues to interpret patterns of their narrative presence and actorial role in terms of that nationality, the result “will be to reproduce in concentrated form the diffuse, latent attitudes that went into the books, representing a lazy prejudice as if it were a conscious, unremitting preoccupation” (ibid, p. 26). This will also result in presenting a British-Italian contrast in heightened and intensified terms, ignoring “the historical laxity of the ethnotyping, and the degrees of indifference, offhandedness, or mixed feelings that were also at work” (ibid.).

Another shortcoming concerning imagology is one that is found in NT and CDA or any approach concerned with investigating ideology in general, namely the concept of

“reality.” In their book Media/Society: Industries, Images, and Audiences, Croteau and

Hoynes (2003) discuss the role of media in societies and how images, ideology and news reporting are interrelated. They criticize scholars who examine media products to

“uncover their ideology” by investigating the underlying images of society they provide.

According to them, media scholars are often interested in assessing how media content

compares to the “real world.” Scholars, for example, may be interested in the images of women or African Americans and “how these images may change over time because they contribute to the ways we understand the roles of these groups in society” (p. 160). In this instance, they argue,

the question is not whether such media images are “realistic” depictions because

analysts of ideology generally perceive the definition of the “real” as, itself, an

ideological construction. Which aspects of whose “reality” do we define as the

most real? […] Instead of assessing the images and making some judgment about

levels of realness, ideological analysis asks what these messages tell us about

ourselves and our society. (p. 160) In other words, instead of focusing on the

stories and images media tells about the past or the present, researchers should

focus on the “effects” of such stories. (Croteau 2003, p. 159)

In this context, the current study does not focus on nor aims to show how MEMRI represents the Middle East, or more specifically Saudi Arabia, by constructing negative narratives or images, as it is obvious from a quick browsing of its content, and as earlier works have shown, that the representation is clearly negative. In fact, MEMRI openly confirms that its representation of the Middle East is, indeed, negative, but they justify this by claiming it to be the “reality”; in MEMRI founder and president Yigal Camron’s words, “While some of the topics covered do seem extreme to the western reader, they

are an accurate representation of what appears in the Arab and Farsi media.”21 Thus, the study focuses on the sources that MEMRI claims to be “accurate” representation of the region’s media, and hence their societies. By focusing on sources and topics that MEMRI translates and demonstrating that they are indeed not representative of the region’s media nor its societies, or in other words, they are not accurate representations of the region's own self-representations, the “effects” or “usefulness,” in van Dijk’s and Croteau and

Hoynes’s terms, of MEMRI’s narratives are weakened and undermined.

This study does not aim to prove that MEMRI’s narratives are necessarily deliberate, but to demonstrate that its use of translation betrays a romantic view of translation as a neutral instrument to bridge knowledge gaps. The study of course aims to show instances of contradiction, motivated selection and de-selection, but the question of whether such instances are deliberate cannot be answered without investigating intentions. By deconstructing MEMRI’s narrative, which is basically built on the claim that it is from sources “representative” of the region, the answer to whether the manipulations, mistranslations, and representations were intentional and deliberate is immaterial. It may serve to weaken the “effects” of MEMRI’s translations, which are used in political power struggles and to influence US policy in the Middle East in favor of Israel, a fact acknowledged by Yigal Camron when he said that they only “aim to

21 This response appeared in an email by Yigal Camron responding to Whitaker’s accusations to MEMRI of selectivity and having an agenda. See Whitaker (2003a) in reference list. 77

reflect reality. If knowledge of this reality should benefit one side or another, then so be it.”22

Conclusion

The findings of the studies that investigated MEMRI, namely Al-Sharif (2009) and Omar (2016), are consistent with earlier studies such as Baker (2006, 2010b) that prove there are mistranslations and manipulation, or at least signs of deliberate alteration of the original message that aims at presenting Israel and Israelis in a more favorable position and/or to distort the perception of Arabs and Muslims in the West. Such studies are valuable in showing strategies on how ideology can operates within the translation process as well as the product to gain and promote political agendas. However, focusing on mistranslations or even translational shifts can be easily defended by MEMRI or the concerned patrons as being unintentional and rare, or at worst attributed to the translational choices of the translator, not those of the institution.

Thus, the only way to find evidence of manipulation and ideology promoted by the institution is through empirical methods, that is a quantitative approach rather than a qualitative one. Of course, finding empirical evidence from both would be great ,but the reality is that finding significant evidence of prevalent ideology by focusing on the translation quality and accuracy is far too difficult, especially in cases with large translation archives such as those of MEMRI, and given the limitations of the current study. Therefore, a better and more solid approach that would provide significant

22 See note 21. 78

evidence of institutional ideology and biased translations can be achieved by investigating the sources and topics of the content that a media outlet chooses for translation. This is exactly what the current study aims to achieve.

What qualitative studies fail to achieve when it comes to institutional and patronage ideological motives—especially when evidence of translational shifts such as mistranslation, censorship or omission is scarce, as is the case with MEMRI—can be achieved by focusing on the more important connection between ideology and translation, that is, the first step of choosing content for translation. Why is a news item chosen for translation? Are there selection criteria? And is the promoted goal of translation consistent with the type of content being translated? It is these types of questions that the current study aims at finding answers to by investigating some of

MEMRI’s large archives of Arabic translated content that is supposed to be representative of the Arab countries’ media and is allegedly aimed at filling the knowledge gap between the Middle East and the West. The following chapters demonstrate and discuss the study’s findings in line with the study’s hypotheses and research questions.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Using MEMRI’s translations as a case study, this study seeks to explore how media content is selected for translation and framed to legitimize an ideological agenda and shape the audience’s perception. In particular, this dissertation investigates MEMRI’s translations to determine whether they are representative of Saudi Arabia’s media content, or whether they were selectively chosen and unrepresentative of the country’s media. This determination will be made mainly by investigating the most translated topics and sources and comparing them to the source country’s media sources and content.

In Chapter Two, the most popular approaches to studying ideology, all of which are suitable for interpretative and qualitative types of research, were discussed. The current study, however, does not focus on one particular approach, as it includes more quantitative analysis. Thus, the study uses specific features of each approach, but draws mainly on concepts of NT during the discussion of the results. Corpus tools are also incorporated to aid in the investigation of the research questions of this dissertation.

This chapter presents important details regarding how the study was designed and conducted in order to isolate selectivity patterns in MEMRI’s translations that ultimately

aim at creating narratives and producing images that are meant to shape perceptions in the target culture.

Data Collection

Since the research questions are designed in such a way that each question is dependent on the findings of the preceding question, the data collection had to be undertaken in two stages. The first stage involved collecting data that would help to create an overall representation of the most popular topics and sources of MEMRI translations. The second stage involves collecting data from specific sources on the topics that were found in the analysis of the data collected in the first stage. Below is a description of each stage in terms of collection of data, application of tools and analysis of data.

Stage One: Comprehensive Data from MEMRI’s Saudi Arabian Archive

This study has collected data from MEMRI’s Saudi Arabian (SA) Archive, which is published and available online on its website, www.mermi.org. Within the Saudi media archive, MEMRI has over 1200 reports, including Special Dispatches, Analysis, TV clips and Cartoons reports. Those reports were published over 20 years. Because of the large amount of data and the limitations of this dissertation, data collection was limited to the three years immediately preceding the approval of the dissertation prospectus, which was in September 2017. Thus, all of the available reports that were found in the SA archive and that were published between 1 Jan 2016 and 31 Dec 2018 were collected, 300 reports in total. This represents about 25% of the published reports in the Saudi archive, and thus

was judged to be sufficient for the purposes of the present study. Major pieces of information in each report, such as title, date of publication, author of the source text, report’s serial number, sources, and a link to the report, were manually collected and stored in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. The body of the reports was not collected at this stage, as this was not necessary yet; as the goal in this stage is to have an overall assessment of the most translated, sources and topics

Additional information from the source texts, such as title and date of publication, was also collected. It is important to note that MEMRI does not provide links to the source texts or clips, nor important details such as the title of the original material, its page numbers in the source publication, nor the exact minutes of translated video clips in the original video or TV programs. All that it provides in the references section is the name of the source, the date of publication, notes, and sometimes links to other reports it had published. The name of the author is often incorporated into the body text. Thus, the study looked up all the source texts and collected other important details, whenever possible. The data collection in this stage took over four months to complete. Data collected at this stage will be referred to as English Corpus (EngCorpus) from now on.

Stage Two: Specific Data Based on Topic and Source

In this stage, two sets of data were collected and used to create two sets of corpora—three translated English corpora, and three untranslated Arabic corpora. Both sets of data were collected based on the analysis of data collected in the first stage. That is, the analysis of data collected in the first stage produced a list of the most translated

topics and another for the most translated sources. Based on these lists, the data was collected in two steps.

Stage two, step one: English corpora. In this step, the English set of data was collected. The study collected all of the reports (from the 300 reports found in the Saudi archive in stage one), including the body of the text, that were related to one of the three most translated topics. Reports related to each topic were collected and used to create an

English corpus that would be compared with an untranslated Arabic corpus on the same topic. This resulted in three translated English corpora, each of which is discussed in detail in Chapter Five. Each corpus is named based on the topic it is related to:

EngTopicCorpus.

Stage two, step two: Arabic corpora. The untranslated Arabic data set was also collected based on the top three translated topics used in stage two, step one. Since the source in this data is obviously not from MEMRI’s archives, the data was collected only from the two most translated sources on each topic. This resulted in three untranslated

Arabic corpora, each of which is discussed in detail in Chapter Five. Each corpus is named based on the topic it is related to: AraTopicCorpus.

Tools

The data collection process itself was done manually. That is, the researcher manually looked up the collected data online, based on the criteria described above, and collected every report and newspaper article individually. Two tools were used in this study during the data collection and analysis, Microsoft Excel and Wordsmith Tools.

Microsoft Excel was used to store and organize the collected data in the first stage, to analyze the data and make calculations, and to create charts of the findings. In the first stage of data collection, each piece of information in the English reports was stored in a cell in a column designated for the same information in other reports, (e.g., one column for the titles of the reports, another for authors, sources, etc.). Later, Excel was used to create charts of the findings of the data analysis.

Wordsmith Tools 7.0 was the main tool used in the study for data analysis. A paid license was purchased specifically for this dissertation. In the first stage of data analysis, this software was used to create frequency word lists of some of the stored information in

Excel, namely, topics, sources, report types, and authors, all of which were used to determine the most translated topics, sources, and authors.

Wordsmith was also used to analyze the data collected in the second stage. The reports and articles that were collected in the second stage of data collection were copied and then stored in txt files. These files were exported to Wordsmith Tools to create corpora and then produce frequency wordlists of each corpus.

Analysis

As stated above, the study collected data in two stages, and the data analysis was similarly done in two stages. The first stage involved analyzing the first data set collected in the first stage and was aimed at creating lists of the most translated topics and sources.

The second stage of data analysis involved creating a translated English corpus for each of the top three topics. A similar untranslated Arabic corpus was also created for each

topic using data collected only from the top two translated sources on each topic. Each

English corpus was compared with the corresponding untranslated Arabic corpus, focusing on sub-themes reflected in the keywords and titles. Below is a more detailed description of how the study analyzed data in each of the stages.

Stage One: Creating Lists of the Most Translated Topics and Sources

The first research question, namely, whether MEMRI’s translated content is representative of Saudi media, is dependent on whether the sources are representative of the country’s media and whether the translated content is an accurate representation of what is circulated in SA media. Neither can be investigated unless we have lists of the sources and topics that MEMRI tends to translate the most, so that they can be compared with SA media sources and content. Below is a detailed description of how data from the first stage was analyzed to produce lists of the most translated sources and topics.

Sources vs. resources. To best investigate the translated sources and topics and whether they are representative of the source country’s media, it is important to highlight the difference between sources and resources. A resource refers to every piece of material or information that MEMRI translates or cites in its reports. This, for example, includes newspaper articles, cartoons, video clips, tweets, blogs and news. A source, on the other hand, is the place or origin from which the translated or cited resource is obtained. This includes, for example, newspapers, TV channels, YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook.

This difference is very important, because MEMRI usually translates or cites, in a single report, multiple materials (resources) that may come from the same source. To

clarify this, let us say that one report translates multiple newspaper articles, say five, all of which are from one source, Okaz newspaper, for instance. In such a case, MEMRI would list Okaz five times in the references section of that report. Thus, in the corpus frequency analysis of sources using Wordsmith, Okaz would be calculated five times even though it was only used in one report, which may produce inaccurate results when calculating the most translated sources based on frequency alone.

Another benefit of differentiating between sources and resources is that the high number and variety of resources used serves to show how MEMRI is capable of monitoring and translating a large amount of content from Arabic media. In other words, if resources were treated as a single resource or source in the above example, the results would suggest that only one source was translated, which does not reflect the fact that multiple articles by different authors from different dates were translated. That being said, the study used two methods for calculating sources and resources.

Calculation of sources: method one. This method is based on the frequency of the sources used in the corpus. Thus, it treats all the sources that were found in the reports equally, regardless of whether a given source was the only translated source in a report or one of several. For example, if in a given report 10 resources were translated/cited from four sources, A, B, C , and D (three resources from A and B, and two resources from each C and D), and in another report only one resource from one source, F, was translated, the result would be 11 resources from five sources in two reports. In this example, Wordsmith analysis of word frequency (sources) would produce a list in this

order A=3, B=3, C=2, D =2, and F=1. Because half of the content (resources) in the above example is from one source, F, and the other half was taken from four different sources, the list produced of the most frequent sources cannot be used to claim that A and

B are the most translated sources as they may have only been cited, or the translation was very limited in comparison with source F, which was mostly the case. By contrast, in the report that translates one resource from F, the whole report is a translation of it, which makes it the most translated source, or at least, the source from which the majority of translated content was obtained.

This method has two advantages. First, it is helpful in showing how MEMRI is capable of reaching out to find content, which is reflected in the high frequency of sources that are often unrepresentative of the source country’s media. Second, it is the most autonomous and feasible way of calculating the sources found in the translated reports. However, we need to determine the most translated Arabic sources, from which

Arabic data is collected in the second stage of data collection. Thus, another method is used to calculate the sources found in the translated reports.

Calculation of sources: method two. This method is used to calculate the most translated sources, from which most of the translated resources were obtained. The sources that were the only source in any given report were given one point out of a total of one point for each report in any given corpus. If there was more than one source in any report, each source is given a fraction of the one point. For instance, if a given report translates multiple resources from five sources, each source is worth 1/5 of the one point

of that report. In the example used in method one, source F would be worth 1/2, A and B

3/10 each, C and D 2/10 each. The final results would produce a list of the most translated sources in this order F=1 (50%), A= 0.3 (15%), B=0.3 (15%), C =0.2 (10%), and D = 0.2 (10%). In this way, reports based on a single source, as is the case with almost all of the clip reports and most of the special dispatch reports, are given their actual share of the translated content. This method requires closer analysis and calculation than the first method.

Although this method does not highlight the large variety of resources used, a variety that is helpful in showing how far MEMRI is willing to go to find content for translation, it is useful in investigating the impact of the translated content itself. That is, if content is claimed to be representative or ideologically selected and unrepresentative, the results from this method would show where that content was obtained. If the majority of translated content was obtained from sources that are representative of the translated country’s media, then that content can be claimed to be representative, and vice versa.

Finally, in both methods, Wordsmith was the tool used for creating frequency wordlists of the investigated sources in the English corpus. That is, EngCorpus included all the resources that were found in the references section of the investigated reports. All of the resources were copied and pasted into a text file and exported to Wordsmith to create a wordlist of the most frequent words.23 A comprehensive stop list was used in

23 The study collected all the available data found in the references section of the reports, which included, in addition to sources, notes and links to other reports. This was necessary because it was difficult and 88

Wordsmith to remove common words such as the verb to be, articles, and prepositions.24

Other words such as names of countries, numbers, and months were also added to the stop list so as to limit the frequency analysis to names of sources, as much as possible.

The final list was exported to Microsoft Excel to produce visual figures, which are presented in Chapter Four. However, in method two, one additional step was taken in which the sources’ frequency was recalculated using Microsoft Excel as described in method two above, so that each source reflects its actual share of translated content.

Finally, the presentation and discussion of the findings on sources is limited to the top 10 sources, or the top 20 sources, if necessary. Full lists are included in the appendixes. Lists and figures of sources produced using method one are called Top 10 most frequent sources. Lists and figures of sources produced using method two will be called Top 10 most translated sources.

Topics. During the data collection at the first stage, important information from every report was stored in Excel, and a column was designated for the possible topic of the report. The topic was assigned based on a close reading of the report’s title, introduction, and subheadings, and a quick overview of the content. Upon completion of the data collection, topics were reviewed in order to create a comprehensive list of the most translated topics.

time-consuming to manually collect only the sources from this section, as in many reports there were multiple entries in the references section, as many as 50 in some of them. 24 The stoplist was adapted from https://www.lextek.com/manuals/onix/stopwords1.html 89

Close manual categorization was seen to be the most accurate way, but it may appear subjective. Thus, a more systematic analysis was necessary. Wordsmith Tools software was used to create a frequency wordlist of all the English titles of the 300 reports in the EngCorpus. The findings are discussed and presented in Chapter Five.

Stage Two: Creating Corpora, Frequency Lists, and Comparing Titles

Sources. At this stage, more specific lists of most translated or used sources, using both methods discussed above, were created. That is, based on the list of the most translated topics found in the first stage of data analysis, three specific lists of translated sources were created. Each list was related to one of the top three translated topics. The findings are discussed in detail in Chapter Five.

Topics. This step involved focusing on only the top three translated topics that were found in the first stage of data analysis. In this stage, the reports, including the body of the text related to those three topics, were collected to create three English corpora, one for each topic. Similarly, three Arabic corpora were created, one for each topic. Each

Arabic corpus was created using newspaper articles from the top two most translated sources found in the second stage of data analysis. Each English corpus is analyzed in terms of related themes, types of report, translation (excerpt vs full), and translated authors. Then, each corpus was compared with the corresponding Arabic corpus in terms of themes and keywords and what was translated and what was not. In other words, this step compared neglected non-translated content with MEMRI’s translated content. This

should reveal what type of content was selected for translation and what was left out.

This is discussed in detail in Chapter Five.

References to specific MEMRI reports are not listed in the references section, for the sake of space, but the number of the report and date of publication are cited. The reports can be found easily online by using the report number next to the word MEMRI.

Titles. The third research question is based on an initial close analysis of

MEMRI’s translations and also on earlier researchers’ findings which claim that

MEMRI’s translations, especially of written content, are mostly accurate and that it is very difficult to find evidence of patterns of translation shifts that may suggest deliberate mistranslations. Therefore, this study focuses on titles in the third research question. We had noticed, early during the design of the prospectus, that MEMRI tends to amend or replace the original titles. This is critical in narrative theory, as this may shift the readers’ attention. Thus, a closer look at the way titles are translated should be very revealing.

Thus, the analysis is conducted in two steps. First, an overall presentation of the findings of patterns in title translation and some statistical analysis of how many titles were translated and how many were replaced are presented. Second, findings on how the translated titles were translated are presented and discussed with some detailed examples of how the titles were selected. Since most of the published clip reports did not include the title of the source video or TV show and the researcher could not find them, the investigation is limited to the titles of the translated newspaper articles and a few clip reports, along with their original Arabic titles. The findings are discussed in Chapter Six.

CHAPTER FOUR

SOURCES AND RESOURCES

Introduction

This chapter investigates the sources that MEMRI translates and the materials

(resources) it uses in its translations. This investigation aims at partially answering the study’s first research question and testing its hypothesis. Building on the findings in this chapter, the study proceeds to investigate and fully answer the first and the second research questions in Chapter Five, which investigates the topics that MEMRI translates.

The first research question of the study is concerned with MEMRI’s translations and whether they are representative of Middle Eastern (Arabic) media in Saudi Arabia.

In order to find out whether MEMRI’s translations are representative of published content in Saudi media, there is a first step that needs to be taken—i.e., a comprehensive analysis of where MEMRI obtains the resources that it believes are an “accurate representation”25 of Arabic media and thus worthy of translation. This is very important, because if MEMRI is to be accused of ideologically motivated translation and selectivity, evidence is required. If evidence of some important topics and content that MEMRI did not translate were presented, such an accusation could be easily refuted by stating that

MEMRI did not have access to the source the evidence came from.

25 See footnote 21, p. 70. 92

The second reason for investigating the sources before the content itself is that any discussion of recurrent topics and themes in MEMRI’s translations that does not bring sources into the picture—and vice versa—is meaningless. For example, some translated topics may indeed be recurrent topics in the media but when the sources are investigated, they may be unreliable online sources that cannot be considered representative of the country’s media nor its content simply because the sources themselves are not trustworthy and because translating such sources while ignoring major sources makes the selection criteria suspicious.26 Similarly, some of the sources that

MEMRI translates may indeed be major and reliable sources from Saudi media, but the translated topics and themes themselves may not be recurrent or may even be rare when compared with other topics and themes in SA media overall, and thus cannot be claimed to be representative.

Therefore, before studying the translated content and topics, the sources from which the content is translated have to be investigated. After establishing a clear understanding of MEMRI’s sources, we can establish whether MEMRI has access to all media sources in SA yet selects sources that publish content that is based on suspicious criteria and that is unrepresentative of the source country’s media. In either case, the findings regarding what sources are translated and what sources are ignored should help

26 This is achieved by comparing the translated sources to major sources in Saudi Arabia, which are defined and presented later in this chapter. 93

in investigating whether there are patterns of selectivity in the translated topics and themes in the most translated sources.

Results and Discussion

The study found 300 reports that were published in the period under investigation.

The analysis of sources and resources shows that there were over 1173 resources in multiple genres used in the 300 reports investigated. These resources were obtained from over 90 different sources from different languages and countries. Below is a more detailed presentation of the findings.

Resources

Single resource vs. multiple resources. To understand how such a large number of resources were used in only 300 reports, we must understand the way MEMRI publishes its reports. These can be classified into three categories:

Reports based on multiple resources of the same genre. These reports are often based on translations of excerpts taken from multiple resources (e.g., newspaper articles) on the same or related topic. The resources may come from a single source (one newspaper, for example) or from different sources (different newspapers in this example). They may also come from a single author or multiple authors. The publication date for this type of report is often days or even weeks after the most recent translated source in the report. MEMRI registers each resource as a reference in the references section at the bottom of each report. This way of reporting is common in Special

Dispatch reports, which will be discussed with other report types later.

Reports based on multiple resources of different genres. Such reports are often based on multiple resources of different genres (e.g., newspaper articles, cartoons, video clips, tweets, etc.) that obviously come from different sources (e.g., newspapers, TV,

Twitter, etc.). MEMRI references each resource in the references section at the bottom of each report, except for cartoons (caricatures), whose sources are directly cited below them, not in the references section. Again, the Arabic publication date of the translated resources can be days or weeks prior to the report’s publication date. Often, the publication date gap in this category is wider than in the first category, ranging from days to months. Translation in such reports is very limited compared with the first category.

This way of reporting is very common in Daily Brief reports and Inquiry and Analysis

Reports, but less common in Special Dispatch reports, and very rare in Clip reports.

Reports based on a single resource. In this type, each report is fully based on a single resource and source. A single report, for instance, is based on only one newspaper article from one newspaper, as in many Special Dispatch reports, or on only one video clip from TV or YouTube, as is the case with almost all of the TV Clip reports. In these reports, however, the translation is often of excerpts of the source material, as is the case with almost all the TV Clip reports and most of the Special Dispatch reports.

For a visual summary, Figure 3 shows the percentage of reports that were based on multiple resources compared with reports based on a single resource in all of the three categories described above.

Reports Based on Multiple Resources 27%

Reports Based on A Single Resource 73%

Figure 3. Percentage of reports that were based on multiple resources and those based on a single resource.

As Figure 3 shows, about 27% of MEMRI’s reports (i.e., 80 of 300 reports) have come from multiple resources, with an average of 13 resources per report. This is basically due to two reasons: 1) the fact that MEMRI tends to translate excerpts of original Arabic texts that cover similar themes, as in Special Dispatch reports, and 2) the fact that MEMRI cites multiple resources to support its analysis and summaries in its

Inquiry and Analysis and Daily Brief reports. Even in Special Dispatch Reports, MEMRI uses external resources in the introductions, suggests extra related resources in the references’ sections, and adds resources along with footnotes that are often used to correct or comment on a statement in the original.

Analysis of the variation found between the high number of resources compared with the number of published reports suggests a pattern. That is, the more resources used 96

in a single report, the more ideological impact the report had, as will be shown later in the chapter, especially when more than one genre was used, and thus more traces of ideology can be found in the translation. In other words, more translation intervention can be found in reports with a higher number of resources. Tools of ideological intervention include the use of long introductions, contextualization, subheadings, notes correcting historical events or statements that were in the original, and links suggesting other translations or materials for viewing.

MEMRI’s report types and the use of resources. This section briefly reviews the four types of reports that MEMRI publishes and how often resources are used in each type:27

Special Dispatch reports. MEMRI describes these as “original translations of

Middle Eastern media.” They are basically translations of written essays published in the media, but other genres such as cartoons and TV clips may sometimes be translated as the main resource used in the report or as supporting resources. MEMRI gives a brief introduction to each report, followed by a translation of some excerpts, but sometimes the complete article is translated. Comments and analysis, however, are kept to a minimum in these reports. At the bottom of each report MEMRI lists the references it used in the report. This type of report is the largest of the four types and makes up about 50% of all

27 These are the four type of reports that MEMRI makes available to the public. MEMRI has other types of reports that it calls Cyber Security and Jihad warning reports/alerts that are available only to paid subscribers or government officials. This study has investigated only the four types of reports discussed here. 97

the published reports in the period under investigation. Of the reports in this type, 62% are translations of a single resource, usually a newspaper article. The remaining 38% are translations of excerpts from multiple resources (e.g., newspaper articles, cartoons,

Tweets, online news websites), but mostly newspaper articles and cartoons from newspapers.

TV Clip reports. MEMRI publishes TV and video clips pertaining to one of its projects and provides subtitled translations of them.28 Each clip is given a title and followed by an introduction or a brief of the original clip. TV Clip reports are the second largest type, making up 40% of MEMRI’s published content. Nevertheless, and because all the reports in this type, except one, are translations from a single resource, they represent only 11% of the resources found in EngCorpus. TV clip reports were the least likely to be based on multiple resources, compared with the other report types. Almost

99.9% (121/122) were based on a single resource and source.

Although this might suggest that this type is the least ideological, the analysis of the sources used in this type reveals that it is not. That is, although almost all of the reports are based on a single resource and source and contain minimum analysis or comments from MEMRI’s side, the sources themselves are the problem. About 24% of the translated video clips in the EngCorpus, for example, are from YouTube, uploaded by individuals broadcasting on their YouTube channels, the majority of whom are not even well-known and do not have a large number of subscribers. Even translated TV clips are

28 The projects are listed earlier in Chapter 1, p. 20. 98

mostly taken from unpopular TV channels, or at least, they are not among the top- watched 10 or 20 in Saudi Arabia or in the Arab world.29 In fact, only 35% of the resources used in this type of report, excluding YouTube and “Internet” sources, are from

Saudi sources; the rest are from other Arabic sources from different countries in the region. See Appendix A for a full list of the sources used in this type, and Appendix B for the top-watched TV and YouTube Channels in Saudi Arabia.

In addition, the translations in all of the translated clips, about 3 minutes on average, are of segments of the original videos, which were 30 - 40 minutes long on average. These translated segments are selected by MEMRI, which makes them selected segments from a selected resource, from a selected source.

Inquiry and Analysis reports. MEMRI publishes its own reports in which it comments on, disagrees with, and analyzes different news articles, reports, TV clips and cartoons on similar themes from different media outlets. These reports include minimum translations of excerpts of the resources covered, with extensive commentary and analysis by MEMRI’s authors using those resources as “evidence.” MEMRI describes its analysis as “original analysis of political, ideological, intellectual, social, cultural, and religious trends” (MEMRI, 2017) found in Middle Eastern media. This type of reporting makes up about 7% of MEMRI’s published reports in the investigated period. Yet, it uses more

29 The majority of TV sources, for example, were from Arab countries, non-Saudi media sources, as will be discussed later. 99

than 28% of all resources found in EngCorpus. The resources vary from Arabic to non-

Arabic, and from official to non-official sources.

This type of report has the highest number of resources used in each report, with an average of 15.9 resources per report. About 76% (16 out of 21) of Inquiry and

Analysis reports were based on multiple resources. One of the Inquiry and Analysis reports was based on 119 resources, the report based on the highest number of resources among the 300 reports investigated. It can be argued that these reports are very selective and disguised as translations while they are in fact ideologically motivated essays. The use of translation in these reports, though very minimal, seems to be meant to serve as a tool to support MEMRI’s point of view as a neutral “gap bridge” builder.

MEMRI Daily Brief reports. This type is similar to Inquiry and Analysis Reports but with even less translation. It contains more opinion and analysis of the political situation in the region written by MEMRI’s president or top executives. Within this type of report, links to other reports are provided to support the writer’s argument. This type is the smallest of the four report types. It makes up less than 2% of MEMRI’s published reports and represents only 5% of the resources used. These reports are similar in their ideological impact to Inquiry and Analysis Reports and can serve as evidence that

MEMRI is ideologically and politically motivated and that it is biased toward Israel. This is evident, for example, when in one of these reports MEMRI’s president discusses the worsening political relationship between SA and Qatar. In the essay titled “Qatar, the

Emirate That Fools Them All, and Its Enablers,” Mr. Carmon analyzes the political

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tension between SA and Qatar, and after criticizing both countries for their human rights abuses, ultimately provides advice to Israel that it should stand with SA as the better of two bad options (MEMRI Daily Brief No.146, 2018). For a visual summary of MEMRI’s content based on report types and the resources they were based on, see Figure 4 (A through D) below.

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Figure 4. Visual summary of MEMRI’s content based on report types and the resources they were based on. The figure is made of 4 charts (A through D).

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CHART A. The four report types in MEMRI’s Saudi archive.

MEMRI Daily Inquiry & Brief Analysis Series 2% 7%

TV Clips 41%

Special Dispatch 50%

CHART B. The percentage of resources used in each report type.

MEMRI Daily Brief TV Clips 5% 11%

Inquiry & Analysis Series 28%

Special Dispatch 56%

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CHART C. The number of investigated reports in MEMRI’s Saudi Archive, by type, and the percentage of single-resource reports and multiple-resource reports in each type. The number inside each bar is the number of reports (the total number of all reports is 300).

Based on Mutiple Resources Based on Single Resource

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

T V C LIP S 1 121

SPECIAL DISPATCH 58 93

INQUIRY & ANALYSIS SERIES 16 5

MEMRI DAILY BRIEF 5 1

CHART D. The number and average of resources used in each report type.

700 18 16 600 14 500 12 400 10

300 8 6 200

REOURCES REOURCES TOTAL 4

100 RESOURCES AVERAGE 2 0 0 TV Clips Special Dispatch Inquiry & Analysis MEMRI Daily Brief Series

Total Number of Resources Average Number of Resources

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Sources

Now that an overview of the report types and resources has been presented, we will take a closer look at the sources (e.g., a newspaper, a TV channel, Facebook, etc.) from which MEMRI takes its resources (e.g., newspaper articles, video clips, cartoons, etc.).30 Based on those sources, Arabic untranslated data was collected and investigated in order to answer the second research question in Chapter Five.

MEMRI used over 1173 resources, as presented earlier. Those resources have come from about 90 different sources. The sources included all different types of media sources, official and non-official, traditional media and social media, Arabic and non-

Arabic, Saudi and non-Saudi media sources.

The findings discussed above regarding the high number of resources that

MEMRI used in its different reports, compared with the number of published reports, suggests that MEMRI indeed has access to the majority of major and secondary sources of Arabic media in general and Saudi media in particular. This section investigates this finding further.

MEMRI’s translated sources. There were over 90 different sources found in the

EngCorpus that appeared at least twice in the frequency analysis. Figure 8 below shows the top 20 most frequent sources in EngCorpus. The percentage refers to how many times

30 A detailed discussion of how resources and sources are different and how they are calculated was included in Chapter Three. 105

the source was used in obtaining the 1173 resources found in EngCorpus. In other words, each one percent equals 11 resources.

FREQUENCY Okaz (Newspaper-SA) 7.25% Twitter 5.97% Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (Newspaper-SA) 5.20% A-Jazirah (Newspaper-SA) 4.86% Al-Riyadh (Newspaper-SA) 4.77% Al-Watan (Newspaper-SA) 3.67% YouTube/Internet 3.32% Al-Arabiyah (News TV - SA) 2.81% Al-Hayat (Newspaper-SA) 2.22% Al-Quds Al-Arabi (Newspaper-Palestine) 2.13% Rotana Khalijiya (TV-SA) 1.53%

SOURCE Al-Aharam (Newspaper-Egypt) 1.45% Al-Ghad (Newspaper-Jordan) 1.28% Alrai (Newspaper-Kuwait) 1.28% Makkah (Newspaper-SA) 1.28% Al-Yawm (Newspaper-SA) 1.19% Facebook 1.02% A- Mustaqbal (Newspaper-Lebanon 0.94% Al-Madina (Newspaper-SA) 0.94% Al-Masri Alyawm (Newspaper-Egypt) 0.94%

Figure 5. Top 20 most frequent sources in EngCorpus.31

Figure five shows the most frequent sources that were used in EngCorpus and from which 54% of the 1173 resources were obtained. A source from which a minimum of 1% of the resources have come (11/1173) should be considered favored or at least

31 Internet and YouTube were calculated as the same source because in many clip reports MEMRI cites “Internet” as the source for many of the translated video clips, often along with “YouTube”, and thus, YouTube is the most likely source for clips without TV station logos. 106

highly accessible by MEMRI compared with sources with less than 1%. See Appendix C for a full list of the 90 sources that appeared at least twice in EngCorpus, along with their frequency.

Although Figure 5 shows only the top 20 most frequent sources of the 90 translated sources, many of those sources are non-Saudi sources. Additionally, the majority of the remaining 70 sources are non-Saudi sources. To be precise, there were only 27 (30%) Saudi sources out of the 90 sources used, from which only 39.9% of the resources in EngCorpus were obtained.

The existence of many non-Saudi sources is due to the fact that the translated content often mentions SA, or, less often, is from a Saudi speaker on a non-Saudi TV program. The problem is that the content, in the first case, is often critical of SA and highlights tension between SA and other countries or highlights human rights issues in

SA. In the second case, the Saudi speakers are either critical of Iran and Palestinian leaders or call for normalizing ties with Israel. This is discussed in more detail during the discussion of the translated topics in Chapter Five.

This finding of the wide range of sources, most of which are non-Saudi, suggests that MEMRI has access to all major and secondary sources in the Arab countries in general and in SA in particular, but is more interested in the content theme and topic than the source. This suggests a pattern of selectivity that is evident in two findings.

First, many of the 20 most frequent sources, such as the Egyptian newspaper Al-

Ahram, the Palestinian newspaper Al-Quds Al-Arabi, and the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Rai,

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are non-Saudi, as shown in Figure 5. There were also other non-Saudi sources from Iran,

Russia, Pakistan, and Turkey found in the SA archive. See Appendix C for a full list of translated sources and countries.

Second, MEMRI does not shy away from using social media as a source for its translated content. As Figure 5 shows, YouTube, Twitter and Facebook were among the most frequent sources in EngCorpus. In fact, resources from YouTube and Twitter alone, not counting other online resources, make up 9% of the total number of resources used in

EngCorpus.

Additionally, the analysis of the most translated sources reveals that YouTube was not only highly frequent in EngCorpus, but also was the most translated source. In other words, it was the number one source in EngCorpus from which translated content was obtained. This is because YouTube, as a source, often appeared only in clip reports, which always translated from only a single resource, which makes the size of the translated content from that resource significant.

This leads us to an investigation of the most translated sources, or, in other words, the sources from which the translated content was obtained. Figure 6 shows the most translated sources in EngCorpus.

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CONTENT YouTube/Internet 11.54% Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (Newspaper-SA) 6.98% Okaz (Newspaper-SA) 6.90% Rotana Khalijiya (TV-SA) 6.00% Al-Arabiyah (News TV - SA) 5.39% Al-Jazirah (Newspaper-SA) 3.78% Al-Riyadh (Newspaper-SA) 3.76% Twitter 3.17% Al-Watan (Newspaper-SA) 2.84% AL-Majd (TV- SA) 2.33% MBC (TV - SA) 2.02% Al-Ahwaz (TV - SA) 2.00%

SOURCE Al-Jazeera (TV - Qatar) 1.67% Al-Hurra (TV - USA) 1.36% Arabnews (ENG Newspaper - SA) 1.36% Skynewsarabia (News TV - UAE) 1.36% Russia Today (News TV -Russia) 1.33% Al-Hayat (Newspaper-SA) 1.21% Al-Madina (Newspaper-SA) 1.18% Saudi Gazette (ENG Newspaper - SA) 1.02% Al-Manar (TV - Lebanon) 1.00% Al-Resala (TV - Kuwait) 1.00%

Figure 6. Top 20 most translated sources in EngCorpus.

As shown in Figure 6 above, YouTube was the most translated source, with

11.4% of the translated content being obtained from this source. In other words, the source in most of the translated content in EngCorpus was YouTube. On the other hand, translated content that came from Saudi sources made up less than 48% of the translated content in EngCorpus, obviously less than half.

Now, in order to discuss what media sources from SA were translated and what were not, we need first to know the major media sources in Saudi Arabia, so they can be

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compared with MEMRI’s most translated sources to see whether the translated sources were indeed representative of Saudi media sources.

Major sources in this study are defined as those that are widely accessible to the public in Saudi Arabia and that involve a review and approval system before publication or airing and thus can be cited as credible sources of information or news. Most of these sources are traditional media agencies or institutions such as newspapers, magazines, TV channels, and news agencies. Social media sources such as Facebook, Twitter, and

YouTube are considered secondary sources unless content comes from an official or entity that represents a major party of political, social or religious affiliation.

Media sources in Saudi Arabia. According to Arabic-Media.com (2019) and

Parry (2011), there are 13 official daily newspapers, one weekly newspaper, and five weekly magazines published in Saudi Arabia. In terms of TV, there are 100s of TV channels that are available to the public through satellite reception. The table below includes only Saudi-owned TV channels, the majority of which are privately owned. 32

Table 2 shows major media sources in Saudi Arabia, including newspapers, magazines, and TV channels.

Table 2

Major Media Sources in Saudi Arabia, Organized in Alphabetical Order.

Saudi Newspapers Saudi Magazines Saudi TV Channels Al-Iqtisadiyya Al-Jamila Al-Arabiya Al-Hayat Al-Majalla Al-Ikhbaria

32 The TV list is based on more than a single source, namely, Ajel.sa (2017) and Alaraby.co.uk (2016). 110

Al-Jazirah Al-Yamamah Al-Iqtisadiya Al-Madina Al-Yaqaza Al-Majd TV (10 Channels) Al-Riyadh Arrajol Al-Resala Al-Watan Fawasel Al-Sahaa

Al-Yawm Hia Bedayah

Arab News (ENG) Rotan Magazine Iqraa Al-Sharq Al-Awsat Sayidaty Line Sports Al-Riyadiyah Waseet MBC (18 Channels) Makkah Rotana (10 Channels) Okaz Rotana Khalijiya Saudi Gazette (ENG) Saudi 24 Um Al-Qura (weekly) SBC

Of course, these sources differ widely in their popularity and reach. Figures 7, 8, and 9 show only the top five newspapers, magazines and TV channels by reach.

Okaz 25%

Al-Jazirah 14%

Al-Madina 13%

Al-Watan 13% NEWSPAPER

A-Riyadh 11% REACH

Figure 7. Top five Saudi newspapers by reach (adapted from Dubai Press Club, 2018, p.

128).

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Sayidaty 15.00%

Zahrat Al-Khaleej 14.50%

Laha 14.20%

MAGAZINE Hia 9.50% Al-Mubawaba 7.80% Dammam REACH

Figure 8. Top five Saudi magazines by reach (adapted from Dubai Press Club, 2018, p.

129).

MBC 1 47.70%

Al-Arabiya 18.90%

MBC 4 18.70%

MBC 2 15.20% TV TV CHANNEL Dubai Al-Oula 14.60% REACH

Figure 9. Top five TV channels in Saudi Arabia by reach (adapted from Dubai Press

Club, 2018, p. 129).33

Major media sources in SA vs. MEMRI’s translated sources. A comparison of

Saudi media sources in Saudi Arabia, as presented in

Table 2, with MEMRI’s translated sources shows that all 14 Saudi newspapers, except Al-Riyadiah (a sports newspaper), were translated or cited at least twice in

EngCorpus, but none of the magazines, and only a few of the TV channels.

33 Dubai Al-Oula is a non-Saudi TV channel. 112

Translated Saudi newspapers. Newspapers were the most translated source type.

Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (6.98%) and Okaz (6.9%) were the two most translated Saudi sources.

That is, almost 14% of the translated content came from these two newspapers alone.

Other popular Saudi newspapers, such as Al-Riyadh (3.78%), Al-Jazirah (3.76%) and Al-

Watan (2.85%), were among the top 10 most translated sources. This was expected, as all of these newspapers, except Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, are among the five most popular newspapers in SA, as shown in Figure 7. The fact that the Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper is the most translated Saudi source, and the second in the EngCorpus after YouTube, can be explained by the fact that, as its Arabic name [Middle East] suggests, it focuses on political issues in the Middle East, a very common topic found in MEMRI’s translations.

Since newspapers usually focus on political topics, this is also consistent with the top translated topics found in EngCorpus, namely political content related to Saudi relations with Iran and Israel/Palestine. More will be said on this in the next chapter.

Translated Saudi TV. In terms of Saudi TV sources, Rotana Khalijiya (6%) and

Al-Arabiya (5.3%) were the two most translated Saudi TV sources. Al-Arabiya is a news

TV channel that is often considered the rival of Al-Jazirah in terms of news coverage in the region. Its presence among the top translated sources may be explained by the fact that its focus is political, which is a common theme found in media studies. Rotana

Khalijia, however, is a mix entertainment TV, which is very popular in SA, yet much of the translated content from this source was related to political topics and human rights,

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namely, Israeli normalization efforts with Arab countries, and women’s rights. Both are discussed in depth in Chapter Five.

Translated Saudi magazines. In terms of Saudi magazines, it is surprising that no

Saudi magazines were translated, although four of the top five magazines in SA (Figure

8) are women’s magazines. This comes as a surprise, as MEMRI claims that it aims to highlight topics related to Arab women and that women-related content is among the most translated topics, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

The only explanation is the fact that all the women’s magazines are moderate and more liberal, rather than religious or conservative. These magazines are specifically targeting women in Saudi Arabia and cover topics related to education, fashion, art, travel, and biographies of and interviews with Saudi women pioneers. Such content, which shows how women in Saudi Arabia are educated, active members of their societies, meet the highest standards of global fashion, and have access to all the sources of entertainment and knowledge that is available in their country, would not fit MEMRI’s representation of Saudi women as abused captives of their male relatives, a recurrent theme in MEMRI’s translations, as will be shown in the next chapter when discussing the topics that MEMRI translates.

To conclude, translated content from Saudi sources makes up 49.3% of all translated content in EngCorpus. Figure 10 shows all of the translated Saudi media sources along with their percentage of translated content in EngCorpus. Noteworthy is the existence of Arab News and Saudi Gazette, both English-language newspapers, from

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which content was published as is. Although they are both Saudi sources, there are two problems. First, MEMRI published content that was already in English. Second, the translated topics from English Saudi sources are similar to recurrent topics found in

EngCorpus in general. Both facts suggest selectivity, which might go unnoticed without a discussion of the topics, as will be shown in the next chapter.

CONTENT

Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (Newspaper-SA) 6.98% Okaz (Newspaper-SA) 6.90% Rotana Khalijiya (TV-SA) 6.00% Al-Arabiya (News TV - SA) 5.39% Al-Jazirah (Newspaper-SA) 3.78% Al-Riyadh (Newspaper-SA) 3.76% Al-Watan (Newspaper-SA) 2.84% AL-Majd (TV- SA) 2.33% MBC (TV - SA) 2.02% Al-Ahwaz (TV - SA) 2.00%

SOURCE Arabnews (ENG Newspaper - SA) 1.36% Al-Hayat (Newspaper-SA) 1.21% Al-Madina (Newspaper-SA) 1.18% Saudi Gazette (ENG Newspaper - SA) 1.02% Al-Resala (TV - SA) 1.00% Al-Yawm (Newspaper-SA) 0.63% Al-Iqtisadiya (Newspaper -SA) 0.47% Sabq (Online NP - SA) 0.45%

Figure 10. All translated Saudi media sources in EngCorpus.

Conclusion

Last but not the least, the results confirm the first part of the hypothesis, namely that the translations are carefully selected. This is evident in the large number of resources used and the use of Saudi and non-Saudi sources. The fact that only 49% of the 115

translated content comes from Saudi sources and that the most translated source by far is

YouTube (Figure 6) suggests selectivity and a preference for non-representative sources.

That is, MEMRI has access to all of the available Arabic media sources in SA and Arab countries (e.g., newspapers, TV, social media, online content, etc.), yet it chooses to translate unrepresentative sources. Its neglect of major source types, such as women’s magazines and content from Saudi English sources, requires further investigation of the nature of the content being published and translated, which is the focus of the next chapter.

Now, having demonstrated that MEMRI has access to all traditional and non- traditional media sources in SA, and having presented the top sources translated by

MEMRI, the remaining question is whether the translated content itself is representative of what is circulated in the media in SA and if it indeed helps “fill the knowledge gap,” as

MEMRI claims

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CHAPTER FIVE

TOPICS AND THEMES

Introduction

While the previous chapter answers part of the first research question, which is concerned with the sources that MEMRI translates, this chapter aims to answer the remaining part of the first research question, namely, whether MEMRI’s translations are representative of Middle Eastern (Arabic) media in Saudi Arabia, as well as the second research questions, which aim at investigating the topics that MEMRI translates.

This can be achieved through a two-step analysis. The first step analyzes

MEMRI’s content and classifies it into topics on related themes. This first step also serves to answer the second question, which aims to determine the most translated topics and whether these topics are representative of what is being circulated in the Saudi media. After having established a comprehensive list of the topics that are recurrent in

MEMRI’s translations, the second step will be to focus only on the top three topics that are commonly translated. This step requires collecting data from Saudi media based on the topics chosen for investigation to compare it with MEMRI’s translated content. Thus, the new data consists of two corpora for each topic; one from MEMRI’s translated content, (EngTopicCorpus), and the second corpus collected from only the top two

Arabic Saudi media sources that were found in the corresponding translated corpus. The

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Arabic corpora will be named AraTopicCorpus, each corresponding to its English data set, respectively.

The study uses Wordsmith to produce a frequency wordlist for each corpus, and then compares the findings of the English and Arabic corpora on each topic. The study also compares the titles that appeared in each corpus to see what they reveal in terms of what is translated and what is not.

Results and Discussion: Topics: An Overview

In the following paragraphs, an overview of the topics that were found to be recurrent and favored in MEMRI’s Saudi Archive is presented. A more detailed analysis and discussion will follow with more of a focus on the most translated topics. As a reminder, the English data used in this section is the same as that used in the previous chapter (EngCorpus), which was collected from MEMRI’s SA’s Archive from January 1,

2016 to December 31, 2018.

The content type of MEMRI’s translations can be classified into four general topics or categories: political, social, sociopolitical and religious. Each topic includes a number of related topics, resulting in a total of 10 topics.

Political Topics

Content in this category focuses on SA’s relations with many countries, but mainly Iran, Israel/Palestine and the United States. From only a cursory glance at the titles of the reports on this topic, it is very clear that the content focuses on conflicts or political tension between SA and other countries. This type of content also clearly favors

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material involving accusations of terrorism support between Saudis and other disputing parties, such as Iran, Hizbullah of Lebanon and Iraq, Qatar, or Syria. It also includes content related to US intelligence investigation of Saudi Arabia’s involvement in 9/11, and Saudi writers’ criticism of such accusations or of related policies of the United

States, such as the JASTA act.34

The political content is the largest of the four categories, making up about 60% of

MEMRI’s content. Topics and themes within this category are related to the following countries, and each one is treated as one topic out of 10 topics:

Iran (Topic One). Content on this topic highlights Iranian-Saudi issues, such as the

Ahwaz Region in Iran, Sunni cleansing, US sanctions on Iran, Iranian interference in other countries (e.g., Yemen, Syria, Iraq), Iranian threats to attack Saudi Arabia, or content that carries threats or accusations of terrorism from either side. Iran-related content was the largest within the political topics and within all the translated content as well, making up 26% and 15.5% of the translated content, respectively.

Israel/Palestine (Topic Two). Content on this topic focuses on Israeli- or

Palestinian-related issues, whether they have something to do with SA specifically or

Arabs in general. Content in this category comes from Saudi and non-Saudi media but was found in MEMRI’s SA archive. It is clear that the translated content on this topic clearly favors Israel. For example, the content either translates Saudi writers or speakers

34 The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) is a law passed by the United States Congress that narrows the scope of the legal doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity. It aims to allow legal suits by families of victims of terrorism in the US against other countries’ governments. 119

who may present Israel as a peaceful and democratic state or blame Palestinian leaders and Arab leaders in general for the failure to achieve peace with Israel. In other instances, the translated materials clearly downplay the enmity of Israel toward Arab states compared to Iran’s, or support and call for normalizing relations with Israel. MEMRI calls content of the latter type a “Shift in Saudi Media's Attitude to Israel” (MEMRI,

2018, Inquiry & Analysis Series No.1398). Surprisingly, there was no content at all that represents “Saudi’s attitude towards Israel” before “the shift,” at least in the period under investigation. Content on this topic is the second largest after the topic of Iran, by a marginal difference, making up 25% and 15% of the translated content in the political category and of the whole English corpus, respectively.

The United States of America (USA) (Topic Three). Content on this topic is mainly related to US policies in the Middle East and to conflicts and instability in

Palestine, Iran, Syria and Yemen. The content also translates content that criticizes bills targeting SA, such as JASTA, or US media coverage accusing SA of involvement in

9/11. Content on this topic makes up 13% and 8% of the translated content in the political category and of the whole investigated content, respectively, placing it in third place within political content and sixth place within the entire English content.

Other countries. The remaining content in the political category is related to

SA’s relations with countries other than Iran, Israel, and the USA. The countries concerned in this content are Iraq, Qatar, Egypt, Syria, Canada, Russia, Lebanon and

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Iraq.35 As noted earlier in the discussion of political content, content on this topic clearly focuses on tension or conflicts between SA and other countries. Some reports on this topic may sound neutral, as they mainly highlight major and recent world news incidents or tensions between the parties involved (e.g., the Saudi dispute with Canada after its foreign minister demanded the release of some detained Saudi women, or tension with

Turkey after the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi). However, most of the content of this type is related to Saudi disagreements or tensions with other long- established friend countries (e.g., Egypt, UAE, and Pakistan), or criticism from other parties directed toward SA (e.g., from the UN or Congress regarding human rights violations or the war in Yemen). This is a strong indication of selectivity, as it clearly ignores much content in Saudi media that comments on SA’s historic and peaceful relations with other countries, as will be presented later in the chapter.

Social Topics

This category is the second largest after political content, making up 26% of the whole data set. Content in this category highlights issues within SA or Arab/Muslim societies in general, and it almost exclusively related to three topics:

Human rights (Topic Four). Content on this topic is made up mostly of reports highlighting violations and incidents (e.g., Khashoggi) or the absence of laws protecting human rights in general (e.g., minorities’ rights, freedom of speech, etc.), and women’s rights in particular. Women-related issues, such as the ban on driving, polygamy or

35 Content related to each country is too small to be classified into a designated topic. 121

abuse, are the most frequent themes. Themes related to this topic make up 46% of the translated content in the social category and 12% of the EngCorpus, placing it in first and third place within social content and the entire English data, respectively.

Extremism/terrorism (Topic Five). Content of this type includes translation of writers or speakers claiming terrorism and extremism stem from Islam or Salafi Islam and/or that it is widespread in Saudi/Arab/Muslim societies. It may also include translations of threats by terrorists from Al-Qaeda or ISIS who were originally from

Saudi Arabia. Content on this topic makes up 33% of the translated content in the social category and 8.5% of the whole data, placing it in fifth place among the ten topics.

Reform (Topic Six). Reports in this category focus either on content that blames religious authorities or Arab governments for the chaos and instability in the region or country or that calls for “social reform,” as MEMRI calls is. For example, many reports translate liberal Saudis who openly call for social reform by adopting secularism as the only solution for moving forward.

Sociopolitical Topics

Content in this category is related to Arab and Muslim societies in relation to other societies or cultures on a political level. This category makes up 12% of the whole data set and can be classified into two topics:

Hate speech (Topic Seven). This includes content that may encourage anti-

Semitic, anti-Christian, anti-Western, and anti-US sentiments, or content claiming that hate speech is prominent in Saudi/Arab or Muslim societies. About 83% of the

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sociopolitical content is related to this topic, which makes it the fourth most translated topic in EngCorpus.

Sunni-Shiite conflict (8/10 topics). Such content focuses mostly on Shiite clerics attacking Sunnis and their beliefs, and/or the enmity between Sunnis and Shiites in general.

Religious (Islamic)

Content in this category is the smallest as compared to the other categories discussed above, only 4% of EngCorpus. Content in this category is related to either controversial Islamic issues or unusual or irrational claims.

Controversial Islamic issues (Topic Nine). This, for example, includes fatwas36 that may sound weird or unjustified especially to people from the outside of the Muslim community, especially if not discussed in detail and/or without historic background, or fatwas that are very strict, although there are less restrictive fatwas on the same matter that are widely accepted.

Unusual or irrational claims (Topic Ten). Translated content of this type involves claims by “clerics,” the term favored by MEMRI, that highlight traditions or beliefs that are rare and/or obsolete. The content includes, for example, arguments of the supremacy of Arabs, a ruler’s fundamental right to crush protesters, or claims that Islamic traditional medicine is better than or incompatible with modern science.

36 A fatwa is a legal opinion or decree given by an Islamic religious person or authority based on Sharia law. 123

The topics above are very representative of the type of content that MEMRI translates. That is, virtually no other topics can be found in MEMRI’s archives, at least not within the time period under investigation. To be precise, there were only three reports (0.03% of EngCorpus) that would not fit into the above topics: one regarding the widespread use of English in SA (Special Dispatch No. 6797); another translating a Saudi on a TV program claiming that SA has already obtained nuclear weapons (Clip No.

5327); and the third translating the Saudi economic minister’s claim that the Saudi economy would have collapsed within 3 to 4 years had the government not taken bold decisions regarding economic reform. Thus, even without any further discussion,

MEMRI’s translated topics clearly reveal what type of content is selected for translation and what is not. However, more will be said about other factors, such as sources, authors, type of reports and type of translation, which will move us closer to answering the research questions proposed by this study.

As discussed in Chapter Three, analysis of topics was basically done manually.

That is, each report was classified by topic based on a close reading of the title, introduction, subheading and a quick overview of the content. Upon completion of the data collection, topics were reviewed to arrive at the comprehensive list of topics presented above. However, while a close, manual categorization was seen to be the most accurate approach, it may appear subjective.

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Thus, a more systematic analysis was necessary. Wordsmith Tools was used to create a frequency word list of all the English titles in EngCorpus. Table 3 below shows the 20 most frequent words found in the titles of the translated reports.

Table 3

Top 20 Frequent Words within the Titles of EngCorpus with Their Lemmas

WORD FREQUENCY LEMMAS 1 Saudi 284 Saudi[242] SaudiArabia’s[33] Saudis[9] 2 Iran 85 Iran[51] Iran's[9] Iranian[25] 3 Arab 40 Arab[29] Arabs[11] 4 Israel 36 Israel[26] Israel's[1] Israeli[9] 5 Cleric 33 Cleric[31] Clerics[2] 6 Woman 32 Woman[1] Women[25] Women's[2] 7 Palestine 31 Palestine [2] Palestine's[1] Palestinian[23] Palestinians[5] 8 Columnist 30 Columnist[28] Columnists[2] 9 Journalist 29 10 Daily 24 Daily[22] dailies[2] 12 Terror 23 Terror[9] terrorism[8] terrorist[4] terrorists[2] 13 Writer 22 Writer[17] writers[5] 14 Hizbullah 19 Hizbullah[17] Hizballah’s[2] 15 Attack 18 Attack[9] attacks[9] 16 Gulf 18 17 Jew 18 Jewish[3] Jews[15] 18 Trump 17 Trump[12] Trump's[5] 19 Peace 16 20 Press 15

As Table 3 shows, Wordsmith analysis confirms that the manual categorization of the topics was accurate, although the size of some topics may not be as presented above.

For example, Iran was the most frequent word used in the tiles after Saudi, and this is also consistent with the manual analysis of EngCorpus content topics, in which Iran-

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related content is the most represented. However, the word cleric was the fifth most frequent word, which may suggest that religion is an important topic within EngCorpus, which indeed it was. Yet, in the study’s analysis of the content, the study finds religious

(Islamic) content to make up only 4% of the EngCorpus. This is because cleric was used frequently in many instances that would fit more than one topic. For example, cleric was found in content classified under hate speech, extremism, and human rights or even Iran- related content. After all, religion is an important element of societies, and the manual classification was seen as better at classifying topics more narrowly in order to carry out the next step of data collection.

Topics Summary: Visual Presentation

The data analysis of MEMRI’s content shows that out of the four categories, political content was the largest, of which 51% was content related to two topics: Iran and

Israel/Palestine. Social content was the second largest, of which 45% was content related to human rights, most of which was related to women’s rights. Below are two figures to summarize the topics and their size in EngCorpus. Figure 11 presents the four general categories and their size within EngCorpus, while Figure 12 shows the size of the topics within the political category.

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Sociopolitical 12% Islamic 4%

Social Political 26% 58%

Figure 11. The four general topic categories within EngCorpus.

The United States 13.7%

Qatar 4.9% Iran 26.5% Russia 3.4% Syria 4.9%

Iraq 2.0% Other 34.3% Turkey 2.0%

Canada 1.5%

Yemen 5.4% Egypt 2.0%

ArabJordan states0.50.5%% Israel/Palestine Lebanon/Hizbullah Pakistan 0.5% 25.5% 6.9% Figure 12. Topics within the political content of EngCorpus.

The large size of the political content compared to other topics within EngCorpus is very consistent with media reporting practices in general, where political content

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represents the largest portion of the news and its analysis. According to Schäffner and

Bassnett (2010), while “[t]he media report on a variety of topics, and we find a number of different genres represented in the print media,” “A large number of texts, however, are related to political topics” (p. 4).

In order to determine the presence of ideological bias in political reports, it is important to ask, for instance, why a particular news item was selected, and in the context of translated media, more questions rise. For example, beyond the selection of the materials, there are other important factors that are often ideologically motivated, such as the translation or replacement of the titles, and addition of introductions, notes, subheadings and links to extra materials. Additionally, reporting in different news genres may reflect different degrees of bias. All of these factors lead Schäffner and Bassnett

(ibid.) to conclude that media genres in news reporting “do not simply report on political events in a neutral way, but they provide evaluations and thus can have an impact on public opinion about politics and also on policy making.” (ibid.)

Despite this, this study focuses only on the effect of the selectivity and translation of titles in its investigation of MEMRI’s approach to media translation. The investigation will also be limited to the top three most translated topics that were found in EngCorpus, namely, Iran, Israel/Palestine and Human Rights. Figure 13 shows all the translated topics found in EngCorpus, while Figure 14 shows only the top five topics.

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CONTENT Iran 15.4% Israel/Palestine 14.8% Human Rights 12.0% Hate Speech 10.0% Extremism/Terrorism 8.5% The United States of America 8.0% Social Reform 5.1% Lebanon/Hizbullah 4.0% Yemen 3.1% Syria 2.8% Qatar 2.8% Russia 2.0%

TOPIC Sunni Shiite Conflict 2.0% Unusual/Irrational Claims 2.0% Controversial Islamic Issues 1.7% Iraq 1.1% Turkey 1.1% Egypt 1.1% Canada 0.9% Other 0.6% Arab States 0.3% Jordan 0.3% Pakistan 0.3%

Figure 13. Translated topics in EngCorpus.

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Social Extremism Terrorism 8.50% Hate Speech 10.00%

Other 39.49%

Human Rights 12.00%

Israel/Palestine 14.80% Iran 15.40%

Figure 14. Top five translated topics in EngCorpus.

Translated Versus Untranslated: Themes, Sources, and Selectivity

Following the overview of the topics most frequently translated by MEMRI, this section discusses in more detail the top three topics, based on their size within the

EngCorpus, with more focus on the relationship between sources, themes and patterns of selectivity, as evident through a comparative analysis of the translated English corpus and the untranslated Arabic corpus on each topic.

Results and Discussion: Topic One (Iran)

Iran-related content was the largest within the entire EngCorpus (15.4%) and the largest within the category of political content of EngCorpus (26.5%). The first question this brings to mind is whether political content is the most recurrent topic in Saudi media, or whether Iran-related content is the largest or among the most frequently occurring recurrent topics. This may be difficult to ascertain within the given means of the study, 130

unless we compare some of the topics to each other—that is, comparing Iran-related content in SA media to content related to another country, such as the USA. Given the fact that MEMRI translates almost all types of genres and all types of media sources, as presented in Chapter Four, this task might be impossible, unless we focus on a specific genre published in a couple of days in a couple of sources, which is not the goal of the current study.

Instead, the study compares the content that MEMRI chose to translate on this topic to untranslated content on the same topic that was found in top translated sources and in the same genre.

To determine which genre to use and which sources to look at, we need first to analyze the translated content and look out for important factors in the selectivity process that ultimately affect the translation beyond the general topic, such as sub-topics or themes (e.g., whether content highlights tension, threats, or peace and negotiation talks, or even just analytical and argumentative content), translation type (excerpts vs. full translation), genre type, sources and authors.

Themes and Narratives

The analysis of Iran-related content reveals that it mostly involves three themes:

1) exchange of accusations of terrorism support between SA and Iran, 2) exchange of threats of war or attack, 3) calls for US sanctions over Iran’s nuclear program and interference in other countries such as Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon. Table 4 shows

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examples of the titles of the reports on this topic; for a full list of the report titles on this topic, see Appendix D.

Table 4

Examples of Report Titles in Iran-Related Content

Tile (as appeared in MEMRI) Date of Report Reference Publication Number 1 Anti-Saudi Threats During Tehran Friday Sermon: If the 10-Nov-17 Clip No.6265 Enemy Takes Action, We Will Shatter Its Teeth to Smithereens. 2 Anti-Iranian Articles in The Saudi Press: The 9-Nov-17 Special Dispatch No.7173 Diplomatic Paths Have Failed; Now the Drums of War Are Beating Loudly. 3 Saudi Researcher: The Clinton and Obama 4-Sep-18 Special Dispatch No.7654 Administrations Ignored Iran's Involvement in Terror and Courted It. 4 Saudi Dailies: U.S. State Department Reshuffle Is a 15-Mar-18 Special Dispatch No.7386 Positive Move, Will Lead to More Pressure on Iran. 5 Senior Saudi Journalist 'Abd Al Rahman Al-Rashed: Oil 6-Jul-18 Special Dispatch No.7555 Sanctions Are the Most Effective Weapon Against the Iranian Regime. 6 Articles in Saudi Press: Europe's Commitment to 24-May-18 Special Dispatch No.7489 Nuclear Agreement Is Economically Motivated, Threatens Security of Region, World.

Wordsmith was also used to create a frequency wordlist to see whether it would confirm this finding. In order to do this, reports related to Iran, including the body of the texts, were collected and compiled in a new corpus (EngIranCorpus). This included all 54 reports related to Iran, which resulted in a corpus size of 75018 words. The wordlist

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generated by Wordsmith shows that among the top 20 words were terrorism, nuclear, war, missile, and American, all of which are indicative of the themes found in the primary analysis. Table 5 shows the 20 most frequent words found in EngIranCorpus.

Table 5

Top 20 Frequent Words in EngIranCorpus

WORD FREQUENCY WORD FREQUENCY 1 IRAN 1,773 11 WORLD 142 2 SAUDI 914 12 SYRIA 138 3 REGIME 278 13 YEMEN 138 4 COUNTRY 253 14 ATTACK 137 5 REGION 204 15 PRESIDENT 132 6 TERROR 183 16 MISSILE 123 7 ARAB 182 17 AMERICAN 113 8 PEOPLE 173 18 POLICY 109 9 SUPPORT 173 19 TRUMP 109 10 NUCLEAR 153 20 WAR 105

Report Types

Iran-related content appeared in all four types of reports that MEMRI uses to publish its content. Special dispatch reports were used 59% of the time, compared to 33% for video clip reports, 5.5% for inquiry and analysis reports, and less than 1% for

MEMRI daily brief reports.

Special dispatch reports were based on different genres but mostly newspaper articles. More precisely, 50% of the reports were based on news articles alone; 19% were based on both newspaper articles and newspaper cartoons (caricatures), and about 6% were based on online genres such as Twitter and online news; and the remaining 10% 133

were based on multiple genres, including newspaper articles, caricatures and online genres.

Video clip reports were based on TV clips from news shows 90% of the time. The remaining 10% were based on Friday sermons aired on Iranian TV channels.

Sources and Resources

The analysis of sources and resources on this topic shows that there were over 170 resources used in the 54 reports on this topic. These resources were obtained from 52 different sources, of which only 13 (25%) were Saudi sources. The remaining sources

(75%) were non-Saudi sources. However, resources coming from Saudi sources make up

61% of the resources used on this topic. This means that the majority of resources on this topic were obtained from Saudi sources. Figure 15 shows the most frequent sources found in EngIranCorpus, from which 60% of the used resources on this topic were obtained.

FREQUENCY Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (Newspaper - SA) 12.07%

Okaz (Newspaper -SA) 10.92%

Al-Riyadh (Newspaper -SA) 9.77%

Al-Jazirah (Newspaper -SA) 5.17%

Twitter 4.60%

Al-Watan (Newspaper -SA) 4.02% SOURCE Akhbar Al-khaleej (Twitter- News- SA) 3.45%

Al-Arabiya Net (News TV -SA) 3.45%

Al-Iqtisadiyya (Newspaper -SA) 3.45%

AL-Sharq (Online Newpaper -SA) 2.87%

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Figure 15. Top 10 most frequent sources in EngIranCorpus

As Figure 15 reveals, nine of the 10 most frequent sources are Saudi. However, because the method used here (method one) shows the most frequent sources but necessarily the most translated sources, method two is used to investigate whether that translated content was indeed from Saudi sources.

The analysis of the most translated sources (method two) reveals quite different results.

Figure 16 shows the top 10 most translated sources in EngIranCorpus.

CONTENT Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (Newspaper - SA) 10.32% Okaz (Newspaper -SA) 9.79% Al-Riyadh (Newspaper -SA) 9.26% Al-Arabiya Net (News TV -SA) 6.35% Al-Jazirah (Newspaper -SA) 3.97%

Internet/YouTube 3.97% SOURCE Al-Jazeera (News TV - Qatar) 3.70% Russia Today (News TV- Russia) 3.70% Kayhan (Newspaper - Iran) 2.65% Twitter 2.12%

Figure 16. Top 10 most translated sources in EngIranCorpus

Figure 16 shows that five of the 10 most translated sources were from Saudi media. However, translated content from all Saudi sources was only 45% of translated content in EngIranCorpus. This means that the majority of translated media (55%) was from non-Saudi sources, mainly, as in the figure above, from Irani, Iraqi, Russian, 135

Lebanese, and Qatari media, from which MEMRI translates anti-Saudi content from pro-

Iranian authors.

Authors

In terms of authors, there was not a significant finding that would suggest a preference for specific authors. The most frequently translated authors were either well- known Saudi writers such as Abdulrahman Al-Rashed from Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper and Mohammad Al-Sheikh from Al-Jazirah newspaper, or official politicians such as Prince Turkey Al-Faisal and Prince Khalid Ibn Salman from Saudi Arabia and

President Hassan Rouhani from Iran. However, other less-known politicians from Jordan,

Palestine and Iran were also translated, which suggests that there is no preference for a particular author, nor that those most translated were officials representing their country or country’s media. Similar to the finding in the analysis of sources and resources in

Chapter Four, this also suggests that what matters to MEMRI is the content, not the author nor the source of the content as long as the content is consistent with what

MEMRI is circulating—in this context, the severe enmity between SA and Iran—and that both are terror-supporting countries.

Arabic Corpus

Regardless of whether Iran is a recurrent topic in Saudi media or not, the findings clearly show that content MEMRI translates is mostly related to tension, threats and accusations of terrorism support, the majority of which is from non-Saudi sources, as shown earlier. So, the question remaining is whether these narratives are representative of

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Saudi media in regard to this topic and whether there is other content related to Iran as a topic that does not carry threats, accusation of terrorism or similar themes.

To find out, the study collects untranslated content from the top two translated sources found in EngIranCorpus, namely Al-Sharq Al-Awsat and Okaz, both Saudi newspapers (see Figure 16). Another reason behind this decision is that newspaper articles were the most used genre in EngIranCorpus. Thus, an Arabic corpus is created to include only newspaper articles that are related to Iran and that appeared in both newspapers. Both newspapers are among the top 10 most read newspapers in SA, as shown in Chapter Four, and both have advanced search engines that allow searching by keyword, date, section, or/and writer.

The study used the same time period as the one used in the English corpus, from

January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2018. To look for only newspaper articles and avoid other news materials, the search was limited to the section of Alra’i (opinion) in Al Sharq

Al-Awsat and the section of kutab wa Maqalat (writers and essays) in Okaz. Both sections included only opinion pieces by the newspaper’s writers and from which most translated articles from these newspapers derived. Only one keyword was used in the search, Iran, which is obviously the most relevant word and the most recurrent word found in

EngIranCorpus (see Table 5).

The number of articles found was very large, as there were 2954 essays in Al-

Sharq Al-Awsat and 1018 essays in Okaz. Since EngIranCorpus had only 54 reports, of which 34 were newspaper articles, and the total wordcount was only 75,018 words, it was

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not wise to collect all the Arabic articles that were found, 4000 essays in total. Thus, the study collected all the titles of the articles that were found in Okaz (1018) and another

1000 from Al-Sharq Al-Awsat focusing on the months in which MEMRI published reports related to Iran. Research Randomizer was then used to choose only 54 articles to be used in creating the Arabic corpus.37 The total number of collected essays was 54—26 from Al-Sharq Al-Awsat and 26 from Okaz, all of which were used to create the Arabic corpus on the current topic (AraIranCorpus). The total wordcount of the corpus was

36,419 words. The difference in word count between the Arabic and English corpora is because EngIranCorpus included introductions and references and because the translations were in general longer than the Arabic text. Additionally, many of the reports were based on multiple genres and the study included inquiry and analysis reports, which were much longer than the average special dispatch reports based on newspaper articles.

This, however, should not compromise the results, as the goal is to see if themes in both corpora are similar, which can be reflected in the type of keywords and titles of the essays.

Translated vs untranslated: frequency wordlist. The word frequency analysis of the AraIranCorpus suggests that the themes found in EngIranCorpus are similar to those found in AraIranCorpus. Table 6 shows the 20 most frequent words in AraIranCorpus.

37 Research Randomizer is an online free service offered by Social Psychology Network for researchers, students, and others interested in generating sets of random numbers. 138

Table 6

Top 20 Frequent Words in AraIranCorpus

Word in Translation Freq. Word in Translation Freq Arabic Arabic

AGREEMENT 97 االتفاق IRAN 852 11 إيران 1

TEHRAN 84 طهران SYRIA 221 12 سوريا 2

ISRAEL 82 إسرائيل AMERICAN 221 13 أمريكا 3

IRAQ 78 العراق NUCLEAR 194 14 نووي 4

SAUDI 77 السعودية ARAB 185 15 العرب 5

COUNTRY 70 دول REGIME 201 16 النظام 6

TERROR 69 إرهاب REGION 109 17 المنطقة 7

COUNTRY 67 الدول PRESIDENT 101 18 الرئيس 8

WORLD 64 العالم TRUMP 100 19 ترمب 9 UNITED الواليات 10 STATES 20 FOREIGN 60 الخارجية 72 المتحدة

As both Table 5 and Table 6 show, the high similarity between the most frequent words in the Arabic and English corpora suggests that the themes in the AraIranCorpus are similar to those found in the EngIranCorpus. For example, words such as terror and nuclear suggest that the theme of terror accusation is recurrent in the Arabic corpus.

Also, the presence of names of countries in the region, such as Yemen, Iraq and Syria, and the word region suggest that Iran is often discussed in relation to its interference in other countries in the region. Additionally, words such as Trump and American were frequently used in the context of discussing American policy in the region and the

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sanctions on Iran. This high similarity between the most frequent words in both corpora, though they come from different texts, suggests that MEMRI’s published content on the topic of Iran is representative of content related to the same topic in these specific Saudi newspapers and in Saudi media in general, or at least on the part of Saudi accusing Iran of terrorism, but not the other way. This suggests that this finding does not confirm the research second hypothesis, which predicts that MEMRI’s published content is ideologically selected and thus is not representative of similar content in the Saudi media.

Translated vs. untranslated content: Titles. In order to test the hypothesis further, the study compares some of the translated titles with untranslated ones. Table 7 shows some examples of English titles of translated articles from EngIranCorpus and titles of untranslated articles found in AraIranCorpus.

Table 7

Translated Versus Untranslated Content Related to Themes of Iran Topic

MEMRI’s English Title Original Arabic Title and Date of Newspaper Translation [My Translation]38 Publication (Arabic) 1 Saudi Journalists Claim U.S. Multiple resources: Dec-27-18 Okaz, Al-Sharq أي فوضى فعلها ترمب؟ Withdrawal From Syria Serves Al-Awsat, Al- [Which chaos has Trump caused?] Riyadh عندما تتساقط األمطار األميركية على الشرق Iran, Wonder about the Motives األوسط behind It. (Special Dispatch [When American Ranis Fall on The No.7821) Middle East]

قنبلة ترمب السورية [Trump’s Syrian Bomb]

38 All translations from the Arabic hereafter are mine unless otherwise indicated. 140

Jun-16 Okaz-2 سليماني.. الشيطان اإلرهابي األكبر Saudi Daily: IRGC Qods Force 2 [Soleimani is The Biggest Terrorist Commander Qassem Soleimani Is Satan] 'The Great Terrorist Satan' (Special Dispatch No.6455) 3 Anti-Iranian Articles in the Saudi Multiple Nov-9-17 Multiple Al-Jazirah, Press: The Diplomatic Paths Al-Riyadh, Have Failed; Now the Drums of Al-Sharq Al- War Are Beating Loudly Awsat -Nov-6-17 Al-Sharq Al خطورة إيران على مستقبل سوريا Untranslated 4 Awsat [Iran’s Danger on Syria] -Dec-16-18 Al-Sharq Al نظام والية الفقيه كيان واحد في اإلرهاب Untranslated 5 [Governance of the Jurist Regime Awsat One Entity in Terrorism] Nov-13-17 Okaz إرهاب إيران مكب ال Untranslated 6 [Iran’s Terrorism handcuffed] Aug-14-17 Okaz القلق اإليراني في العراق Untranslated 7 [The Iranian Worry in Iraq] Oct-16-17 Okaz النووي ليس خطر إيران الوحيد Untranslated 8 [Nuclear is not the Only Danger of Iran] -Al-Sharq Al النظام اإليراني يقود بلده إلى التهلكة Untranslated 9 [Iranian Regime Leading Its Awsat Country to Destruction] Sep-30-18

As Table 7 shows, the untranslated titles from the Arabic corpus are highly reflective of the themes found in the English and Arabic corpora using frequency wordlist analysis. Although it is clear from MEMRI’s translation of many of the titles, especially in reports of multiple resources, that there is unnecessary exaggeration or at least a focus on loaded words, that may add additional effect that may not resemble that of the original titles.39 More is to be said on how MEMRI makes use of title translation to enhance its

39 Loaded word are often strong words that carry or trigger emotional response- positive or negative, but in the context of MEMRI’s translations, such words are often negative descriptive words of people and/or 141

narratives, even if it is reflective of what is being circulated in the original sources, as is the case on this topic. However, the original Arabic titles are often reflective of the articles’ content. And in the context of Iran, they are often loaded with words such as terror, Satan, and similar words, which is a common practice found in the Saudi press in similar contexts.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the findings in terms of the used sources and resources do not show strong evidence that may suggest unrepresentative selectivity. That is, although the majority of sources were non-Saudi sources, 61% of resources were from Saudi sources.

However, because translated content from Saudi sources constituted 45% of the translated content on this topic, this may suggest otherwise. Thus, the findings regarding sources and resources are not significant to confirm the first hypothesis that the overall translated sources are not representative of Saudi media.

On the other hand, the overall findings in terms of the translated themes and content suggest that the translated content from Saudi sources is representative of the circulated content in Saudi media on the topic of Iran. This means there were no significant findings on this topic that confirm the second hypothesis that MEMRI’s translated content is carefully selected and thus unrepresentative of Saudi media. This may be due to the type of reports and sources used on this topic, as the majority of the

countries based on religion, race, or gender. More examples of how such words are used and translated are presented and discussed throughout this chapter and in Chapter Six. 142

reports were special dispatches that were based on government-affiliated TV and/or press. Additionally, there was little use of online sources and social media, such as

YouTube (3.9%) and Twitter (2%), as compared with other topics, as will be discussed later.

However, MEMRI’s choice to translate content related to Iran, compared to other countries that may be of more interest to the English reader, such as the United States, appears to be deliberate. Since Saudi and Iranian media and leaders alike are already fighting and accusing each other of terrorism support, MEMRI does not need to select content to prove that either country supports terrorism; the source media does that on their own, and MEMRI has only to translate the reports. Although this study does not go beyond the sub-themes and thus does not investigate whether the translated topic, in this case Iran, is the most circulated topic in Saudi media, it is very clear from the other translated political topics that they all highlight tensions and ignore other important matters, such as trade deals, peace negotiations, and friendships and/or what those societies have in common. This suggests that Iran was not the most important topic in

Saudi media, not even in the political content category. This will be discussed at the end of the chapter when discussing the topic of US-related content.

Results and Discussion: Topic Two (Israel/Palestine)

Content related to Israel and/or Palestine was the second largest within the entire

EngCorpus (14.8%) and the second largest within the political content category (25.5%), which means it was very close to Iran-related content (see Figure 12 and Figure 13).

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The analysis of this topic follows the same steps used in the analysis of the first topic. That is, first the English translated content was analyzed by focusing on patterns in the selection process related to type of content and themes, translation type, genre, sources and authors. Second, the content on this topic that was selected for translation was compared with untranslated content that was similar in terms of sources, genre, and time of publication.

Themes and Narratives

The analysis of content on this topic reveals that it was limited mostly to the following themes: 1) content that is critical of Palestinian authorities or Arabs in general for their failure to accomplish peace with Israel; 2) content that compares SA’s dispute with Iran to Israel but lessens the latter; 3) content that calls for or justifies normalization with Israel; 4) claims from non-Saudi sources that link SA with Israel in working against

Arabs’ interest; and 5) other content that praises Israel in some way or another. Table 8 provides examples of the titles of reports found on this topic. For a full list of the titles on this topic, see Appendix E.

Table 8

Examples of Report Titles on Israel/Palestine-Related Content

Title (As Appeared in MEMRI) Date of Report Reference Publication Number 1 Senior Saudi Journalist on Anniversaryof1973 War 19-Sep-18 Special Dispatch between Israel and the Arabs: Some Arabs Still Haven't No.7677 Learned the Lessons of the War

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2 Saudi Journalist Mishal Al-Sudairy Criticizes Palestinian 3-Jul-18 Special Dispatch Leaders for Multiple Missed Opportunities for Peace No.7550 3 Saudi Writers: Why Should Saudi Arabia Pay the Price 12-Dec-17 Clip No. 6335 for the Mistakes of the Palestinians? 4 Debate about Normalization of Ties Between Gulf States 9-Nov-18 Clip No. 6848 and Israel: Iran Is the Real Enemy; Israel Should Be Part of the Anti-Iranian Alliance 5 Saudi Journalist Dahham Al-Enazi: We Should 16-Dec-18 Clip No. 6916 Normalize Relations with Israel, Iran and Turkey Are Bigger Threats. 6 Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah: Saudi 11-Nov-17 Clip No. 6264 Arabia Asked Israel to Attack Lebanon. 7 Saudi Columnist: The Sight of a Former Prime Minister 7-Aug-17 Special Dispatch in Prison Illustrates the Superiority of Israel's Justice No.7043 System over the Arabs'.

Wordsmith was used to create a frequency wordlist to see if it would reveal similar themes. In order to do this, reports related to Israel and/or Palestine, including the body of the texts, were collected and compiled into a separate corpus

(EngIsraPalCorpus). This included 40 of the 51 reports on this topic: 29 Special Dispatch reports, 16 Clip reports’ transcriptions. Because this study investigates translated media,

Inquiry and Analysis reports (4), and MEMRI Daily Brief reports (2), were excluded, because they were mostly commentary and analytical and included minimal translation, which is common in these reports as explained earlier in the chapter. This resulted in a corpus size of 45,336 words.

The frequency wordlist generated by Wordsmith for this corpus shows that keywords such as Palestine, Israel, Gaza, region, peace, and resistance were among the 145

20 most frequent words found in EngIsraPalCorpus. Table 9 shows the 20 most frequent words found in this corpus.

Table 9

Top 20 Frequent Words in EngIsraPalCorpus

WORD FREQUENCY WORD FREQUENCY 1 PALESTINE 979 11 RESISTANCE 88 2 ISRAEL 464 12 SUPPORT 81 3 ARAB 407 13 CALL 79 4 SAUDI 293 14 PRESIDENT 78 5 IRAN 200 15 REGION 77 6 PEACE 157 16 DOCUMENT/ISSUE 74 7 COUNTRY 116 17 WORLD 73 8 PEOPLE 112 18 CAUSE 70 9 POLITICAL/WAR 95 19 TRUMP 70 10 TIME 89 20 TERROR 69

As Table 9 shows, some of the themes found in the primary analysis can be confirmed, but others cannot be. For example, Palestine, Israel, peace and resistance indeed indicate that the content on this topic is related to Israel and Palestine and the peace process in general, and possibly the role of the US in these issues, as represented by the word Trump. Similarly, the high frequency of Iran is due to the common theme of comparing Iran to Israel in many reports.

Yet, the wordlist does not reveal much about the other themes found in the primary analysis, such as blaming Arabs and Palestinians, but not Israel, for failing to achieve progress on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. This should not affect the findings of the

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primary analysis, as a quick look at the titles of published reports on this topic reveals common themes in what was translated. See Table 8 and Appendix E for examples of report titles on this topic.

Type of Reports

Israel/Palestine-related content was published in all of the four report types that

MEMRI mines for content. Special Dispatch reports were used about 57% of the time, compared to 31% for Video Clip reports, 8% for Inquiry and Analysis reports, and less than 4% for MEMRI Daily Brief reports.

Special Dispatch reports were based on different genres, but mostly newspaper articles. More precisely, 83% of the reports were based on newspaper articles alone; 3% were based on both newspaper articles and tweets, 6% on TV clips, and 7% solely on online sources, such as Twitter and online news websites.

Video clip reports were based on TV clips from TV shows 90% of the time.

Rotana Khalijia, a privately-owned Saudi TV channel based in Dubai, and Mayadeen TV

(Lebanon) were the most translated. The remaining 10% of the clip reports (2 clip reports) were based on clips from Iraqi and Palestinian clerics claiming SA had worked with Israel against Palestinians’ interests (Clip No. 6644 and Clip No. 6803). The source for both clips, according to MEMRI, was “YouTube,” and the “Internet,” respectively.

Such content from a source like the “Internet” raises questions and suspicion over

MEMRI’s criteria for selecting material for translation.

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Sources and Resources

The analysis of sources and resources on this topic shows that there were over 128 resources used in the 50 reports on this topic. These resources were obtained from 34 different sources, of which only 12 (35%) were Saudi sources. The remaining sources used (65%) were non-Saudi sources, mainly Palestinian and Egyptian media. Resources coming from Saudi sources make up only 37% of the resources used on this topic. This means that the majority of resources (63%) on this topic were obtained from non-Saudi sources. Figure 17 shows the most frequent sources found in EngIsraPalCorpus, from which 60% of the used resources on this topic were obtained.

FREQUENCY Twitter 9.38% Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (Newspaper - SA) 7.81% Al Quds Alarabi (Newspaper - Palestine) 6.25% Al-Jazirah (Newspaper - SA) 5.47% Youm7 (online Newspaper - Egypt) 5.47%

Al-Ahram (Newspaper - Egypt) 4.69% SOURCE Ayyam (Newspaper - Bahrain) 4.69% Wafa (News Agency - Palestine) 4.69% Al-Riyadh (Newspaper - SA) 3.91% Al-Watan (Newspaper - SA) 3.91%

Figure 17. Top 10 most frequent sources in EngIsraPalCorpus

As Figure 17 shows, there are many non-Saudi sources on this topic that were very frequently used, which is consistent with the earlier finding that most of the

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resources used (63%) were from non-Saudi sources. However, the fact that Twitter is the most frequent source on this topic is notable and thus requires further investigation.

The analysis of how Twitter was used suggests unrepresentative selectivity, as it was often used for opinions that seemed to favor Israel. For example, two Inquiry and

Analysis reports were based mostly on a single genre, tweets. The titles of the reports were 1) “Shift in Saudi Media’s Attitude to Israel – Part I: Saudi Writers, Intellectuals:

Iran Is More Dangerous than Israel; Peace With It Is Vital in Order to Repel Iranian

Threat” (Inquiry & Analysis Series No. 1398), and 2) “Shift in Saudi Media’s Attitude to

Israel – Part II: Saudi Writer Who Visited Israel: We Want an Israeli Embassy in Riyadh;

We Should Make Peace with Israel, Uproot Culture of Hatred for Jews” (Inquiry &

Analysis Series No.1399). A third report was also mostly based on tweets, but this time it highlighted tension between Saudis and Palestinians. The title of the report was “Twitter

Clash: Saudis vs., Palestinians. On the Palestinian Cause, Palestinian Resistance”

(Special Dispatch No. 7203). In any debate there are always two sides, but in these reports only one side is translated.

In order to validate the above findings of whether translated content is obtained from Saudi sources or not and to determine which were the most translated sources, method two was used to calculate the most translated sources. Figure 18 shows the top ten most translated sources.

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CONTENT Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (Newspaper - SA) 16.42% Rotana Khalijia (TV - SA) 8.00% Al-Jazirah (Newspaper - SA) 6.84% Alhurra (TV - USA) 6.00% Al-Riyadh (Newspaper - SA) 4.63%

Okaz (Newspaper - SA) 4.42% SOURCE MBC (TV - SA) 4.00% Mayadeen (TV - Lebanon) 4.00% Al-Watan (Newspaper - SA) 2.84% Al-Hayat (Newspaper - SA) 2.63%

Figure 18. Top 10 most translated sources in EngIsraPalCorpus

As is clear from the above figure, the results are quite different. Saudi newspapers were the most translated source type. Yet, the translated content obtained from Saudi official sources was 53%, and the remaining 47% was from social media, such as Twitter and YouTube, or from non-Saudi media.

The most translated source by far was Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, from which 16% of the translated content on this topic was obtained. The fact that Al-Sharq Al-Awsat was at the top may be because it specializes in political content related to the Middle East, which is the English translation of its Arabic name.

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The two most translated TV channels were Rotana Khalijia and Alhurra. Rotana

Khalijia is a Dubai-based liberal TV channel that belongs to Rotana Group, which is primarily owned by Saudi prince and billionaire Alwaleed Bin Talal.40

Alhurra is a US-based TV channel specializing in news. It is operated by The

Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc., which is financed by the U.S. Government.41

The translated TV clips from both channels were mostly from speakers calling for normalizing ties with Israel or from speakers supporting Trump’s announcement of

Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, both of which are discussed below.

Authors

In terms of authors, there was no clear evidence that would suggest a preference for specific authors, although there is a clear preference for Arab/Saudi liberals who speak in favor of Israel. In terms of specific author names, although the most frequently translated authors were senior Saudi journalists, such as Abdulrahman Al-Rashed and

Mishal Alsudairi from Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper and Mohammad Al-Sheikh from

Al-Jazirah newspaper, all of whom have criticized Palestinian leaders, there were also authors who are not as senior, such as Baina Al-Mulhim and Muhammad 'Arif from Al-

Riyadh and Al-Madina newspapers, respectively, and Dahham Alenazi, a writer for Al-

Sharq, a Saudi online newspaper that has made frequent calls for normalizing ties with

Israel. This suggests that MEMRI prefers crediable high-profile authors and sources, but

40 Rotana is frequently cited as a liberal TV by MEMRI and The Independent. 41 https://www.alhurra.com/p/417.html 151

other authors are fine, too. This also suggests, similar to the finding on the topic of Iran and in the analysis of sources in Chapter Four, that what matters most to MEMRI is the content, not the author or the source of the content, as long as the content is consistent with MEMRI’s agenda and/or narratives—in this context, Arabs not Israelis are the ones to blame for the failure to achieve peace in the region.

Arabic Corpus

Regardless of whether Israel/Palestine is a recurrent topic in Saudi media or not, the content that MEMRI translates clearly favors Israel and is highly critical of

Palestinian authorities, as discussed above and shown in Table 8. So, the question remaining is whether these narratives are representative of Saudi media on this topic and whether there is any other content that criticizes the Israeli role in the peace process or in other issues.

To determine this, the study focuses only on the two most translated press sources found in EngIsraPalCorpus, namely Al-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al-Jazirah, both of which are

Saudi newspapers (see Figure 18 above). Another reason behind this selection is that newspaper articles were the most frequent genre on this topic. Thus, an Arabic corpus was created to include only newspaper articles that appeared in both newspapers. These newspapers are among the top ten most-read newspapers in SA, as shown in Chapter

Four, and both have advanced search engines that allow searching by keyword, date, section, or/and writer, which is suitable for the purpose of the study.

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Again, the study used the same time period as the one used in the English corpus:

January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2018. In order to include only newspaper articles

(editorials and opinion pieces, the types that are often translated by MEMRI) and avoid other news materials (e.g., news articles), the search was limited to the section of Alra’i

(opinion) in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat and the section of maqalaat (essays) in Al-Jazirah; both sections included only essays by the newspaper’s writers.

The search within Al-Sharq Al-Awsat with the keyword Israel resulted in over

7000 hits for news items and articles combined. Since MEMRI tends to translate opinion pieces more than news articles, the study collected only essays that appeared in the opinion section of the paper, from which MEMRI translated most of its articles related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The result was 1194 articles. To further eliminate the possibility that most articles might not be related to Israel itself, as the search engine found all articles in which Israel appeared within the body of the text, the study filtered the results to show only those that had Israel, Palestine, Hamas, Netanyahu, Balfour,

Jerusalem, peace, or embassy in the headline, including, of course, Israel as well.42 The result was 195 articles, 75 of which had Israel in the headline. If this suggests one thing, it is that out of these highly restricted results, MEMRI translated only those that favored

Israel or that were highly critical of Palestinian leaders, provided there was no content critical of Israel, which is discussed below.

42 These words were very frequent in the titles of the English corpus (EngIsarPalCorpus). 153

Similar search techniques were used for Al-Jazirah, but the results were much smaller. The two keywords Israel and Palestine resulted in 355 items, of which 83 were opinion pieces from The Essays section, the most translated section of the newspaper.

Since the results were not as large as those found in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, no further steps were taken to filter the results.

Since EngIsraPalCorpus had only 40 reports, among which there were translations of 29 newspaper articles, and the total wordcount was only about 45,336 words, it was necessary to create an Arabic corpus of similar size. So Research Randomizer was used to randomly choose 40 articles: 20 from the 195 titles collected from Al-Sharq Al-Awsat and 20 from the 83 titles found in Al-Jazirah. The total wordcount of the new corpus

(AraIsraPalCorpus) was 33,504 words. The difference in word count between the two corpora is due to the fact that EngIsraPalCorpus included introductions and references and that the English translations were longer in general than the Arabic texts. This, however, should not compromise the results, as the goal is to find out whether the themes, which are reflected in the keywords and titles that are circulated in the English corpus, are similar to the themes in the untranslated Arabic corpus.

Translated vs. untranslated: Frequency wordlist. Wordsmith was used to create a frequency wordlist of the Arabic corpus to compare with the English corpus frequency wordlist. Table 10 shows the 20 most frequent words in the Arabic corpus.

Table 10

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Top 20 Frequent Words in AraIsraPalCorpus

Word in Translation Freq. Word Translation Freq Arabic

IRAN 72 إيران ISRAEL 514 11 إسرائيل 1

WORLD 60 العالم PALESTINE 363 12 فلسطين 2

COUNTRIES 50 الدول ARABS 233 13 العرب 3

SECURITY 47 األمن AMERICAN 219 14 األمريكي 4

SOLUTION 45 حل TRUMP 172 15 ترمب 5

CAPITAL 45 عاصمة JERUSALEM 169 16 القدس 6 الواليات COUNTRY 17 7

UNITED/STATES 44 المتحدة 123 دولة

REGION 43 المنطقة PEACE 114 18 السلم 8

ISSUE 40 القضية PRESIDENT 102 19 الرئيس 9 10 INTERNATION FOREIGN 39 الغربية AL 99 20 الدولية

As the table shows, most of the words are related to the Israeli-Palestinian issue in general, which confirms that the data collected are indeed similar to that of the English corpus in terms of the general topic (i.e., Israel/Palestine). However, comparing this table with that of the English corpus (Table 9) reveals major differences.

For example, in the English corpus, Palestine was the most frequent word, at a frequency of almost 210% more than Israel. In the Arabic corpus, however, it is almost the opposite: Israel is 141% more frequent than Palestine. This suggests that in the

English corpus, Palestine is mostly the target of the criticism, or at least the discussion,

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while in the Arabic corpus, Israel is at the center of the criticism, although Palestine is not far away.

Another major difference is that there were words that were not as frequent in the

English corpus as in the Arabic corpus. For example, there were many words in the

Arabic corpus that were related to the USA, such as American, Trump and the United

States, which were among the 20 most frequent words; in fact, the first two, Trump and

American, were among the five most frequent words in the Arabic corpus. On the other hand, in the English corpus, only one word, Trump, was among the 20 most frequent words. This suggests that the USA was an important element in the discussion of the

Israeli Palestinian issue in the Arabic corpus, yet this was not the case in the English corpus.

Such differences in the frequency of the keywords suggest unrepresentative selectivity on MEMRI’s side. In other words, the content that MEMRI selected for translation is not representative of what was found in the Saudi media, which confirms the second hypothesis of the study.

Translated vs. untranslated: Titles. To provide further support for these findings and to eliminate the possibility that translational choices may have had an impact on the

English corpus, the study compares the titles of both corpora to determine whether they are similar in terms of themes. That is, the study compares the titles that were not translated and that appeared on the same day or days with materials that MEMRI did translate. It is important to note here that MEMRI’s translated content was not published

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and translated on the same day of the original publication. Although some articles were indeed translated and published on the same day, the majority of content took days and sometimes weeks to be translated and published. This suggests that MEMRI took time to select and translate its content.43

The dates on which MEMRI published content on this topic were mostly within days or weeks from three major incidents: 1) the 100th anniversary of the Balfour declaration 44on November 2, 2017; 2) Trump’s announcement of the USA’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and his order to relocate the US embassy from Tel

Aviv to Jerusalem on December 6, 2017; and 3) the scheduled opening of the US embassy in Jerusalem on May 14, 2018. Translated content following these events was either highly critical of Palestinians or Arabs, but not of Israel, or supportive of Trump’s

Jerusalem decision. Only examples of untranslated content related to the first two events were investigated.

Looking for Arabic content regarding the first two events revealed that many newspaper articles that were not translated had completely different views from those translated by MEMRI. Table 11 shows examples of untranslated content compared with translated content relating to the first event.

43 This is based on the researcher’s observation and comparing the dates of publication as shown in MEMRI’s reports to those of the original Arabic content in its original source. 44 The Balfour Declaration was a public statement issued by the British government in 1917 during the First World War announcing support for the establishment of a "national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine, which was at the time, an Ottoman region with a small minority of Jewish population.

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Table 11

Translated Versus Untranslated Content Related to Balfour Declaration 100th

Anniversary

MEMRI’s English Title Original Arabic Title and Date of Newspaper translation publication (Arabic) Nov-2017 Al-Sharq-2 مئوية وعد بلفور... نقد الذات بدل Article in Saudi Daily 'Al-Sharq 1 Al-Awsat البكائيات Al-Awsat ' on the 100th Anniversary of the Balfour [The 100th Anniversary of the Declaration: Lamentations Balfour Declaration: Self- Won't Help, It's Time to Take Criticism instead of Lamentations] Stock and Learn from Our Mistakes Oct-2017 Al-Sharq-9 بلفور كتب رسالته ورحل Untranslated 2 [Balfour Wrote His Letter and Al-Awsat Left] Nov-2017 Al-Sharq-1 بلفور... إحياء أم احتفاء؟ Untranslated 3 [Balfour: Remembrance or Al-Awsat Celebration?] Nov-2017 Al-Jazirah-5 )الثمن (.. هو: )االعتراف( بـ)الدولة Untranslated 4 الفلسطينية(!.. [The Price Is the Recognition of the Palestinian State] Nov-2017 Al-Jazirah-9 وعد بلفور أو ُحكم القوي على الضعيف Untranslated 5 [A Belfour Declaration or the Rule of the Strong over the Weak?] Dec- Al-Jazirah-23 اإلرهاب )اإلسرائيلي( في ذكرى وعد بلفور Untranslated 6 (1/2) 2017 [The Israeli Terrorism in the Anniversary of Balfour Declaration (1/2)]

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As the titles of the above untranslated articles suggest, they were either very critical of Israel’s continuous occupation of Palestinian lands and violations of the 1967 border agreement or recognized and celebrated Palestinians’ resistance to the Israeli occupation. Two essays were also very critical of the British government’s decision to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the Balfour declaration. However, MEMRI ignored such content and preferred to translate only content that put the blame on Palestinians or

Arabs but not on Israelis, such as the essay mentioned above.

Trump’s announcement about Jerusalem triggered another major reaction in the

Saudi press. However, only one newspaper article was translated. Below are some titles that were not translated.

Table 12

Translated Versus Untranslated Content Related to President Trump’s Jerusalem

Announcement

MEMRI’s English Title Original Arabic Title and Date of Newspaper Translation Publication (Arabic) Dec-2017 Al-Jazirah-13 ال يا سيد ترمب! Saudi Prince Turki Al-Faisal in 1 Open Letter to Trump: Rectify No Mr. Trump! Your Arrogant Mistake, Recognize Palestinian State Whose Capital Is East Jerusalem Dec-2017 Al-Jazirah-9 القضية الفلسطينية والبوصلة األمريكية Untranslated 2 المتوقفة.....

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[The Palestinian Issue and the Broken American Compass] Dec-2017 Al-Jazirah-11 خطأ ترامب الفادح.. الصياغة والتوقيت..... Untranslated 3 [Trump’s Costly Mistake…Timing and Form] Dec-2017 Al-Jazirah-29 ترامب وبلفور الجديد..... Untranslated 4 [Trump and the New Balfour] Dec-2017 Al-Jazirah-10 القدس.. خط أحمر..... ! Untranslated 5 [Jerusalem is a Red Line!] Dec-2017 Al-Jazirah-17 )االعتراف( كـ)االحتلل(.. عملة واحدة..... Untranslated 6 [Recognition is Like Occupation …Same Coin] Dec-2017 Al-Sharq-6 القدس والسفارة... ال لليأس Untranslated 7 [Jerusalem and the Embassy…No Al-Awsat Despair] Dec-2017 Al-Sharq-8 اإلسرائيليون سيدفعون ثمن مغامرة ترمب Untranslated 8 [Israelis will Pay the Price for Al-Awsat Trump’s Venture]

As Table 12 shows, all the untranslated titles clearly express the dissatisfaction and criticism by the Saudi press over the US decision on Jerusalem, and they do so in a moderate, peaceful and argumentative way. Though many writers expressed their concern over this historic decision, only one essay was translated and, more importantly, its title was clearly manipulated. The Arabic title of the translated article is la mistr trump, which literally means “No Mr. Trump!” MEMRI, however, chose to replace the title with

“Rectify Your Arrogant Mistake, Recognize Palestinian State Whose Capital Is East

Jerusalem” to indicate that Prince Turki Al-Faisal, the essay’s writer, does not mind west

Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, as long as east Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine, and 160

to shift attention from the whole point of the article, which was to condemn Trump’s decision. Also, the fact that this article was translated by many world news outlets, such as Los Angeles Times, which translated the title as “No, Mr. Trump, Jerusalem is not the capital of Israel,” and Reuters, which translated it as “Senior Saudi prince condemns

Trump’s ‘opportunistic’ Jerusalem move,” underscores MEMRI’s selectivity in terms of topic, content and title.

The only other published reports related to this event (Trump’s Jerusalem decision) that were unsupportive of it were based on other genres, such as tweets, cartoons and video clips. For example, one report (Special Dispatch No. 7217) published on December 10, 2017, had the title: “Reactions to U.S. President Trump’s Jerusalem

Announcement: Hamas, Resistance Axis Call for Violence, Attacks on U.S. Interests;

Palestinian Authority, Moderate Arab Countries Express Restrained Condemnation, Hope for Retraction,” and it was filled with violent cartoons and threats to the US from

Lebanese sources affiliated with Hamas and Hizbullah.

Another report (Clip No. 6324) published on December 15, 2017, translates the content of a Saudi report supporting the US decision on Jerusalem. The title of the report was “Saudi Researcher Abdelhameed Hakeem: Jerusalem as Israeli Capital with

Palestinian Management of Islamic Holy Places Is a Framework for Peace; Arabs Must

Change Anti-Jewish Mentality, We Need to Realize That Jerusalem Is a Religious

Symbol for the Jews.” Another clip report translating content by the same person was published a few days later, on December 18, 2017, under the title: “Saudi Researcher

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Abdelhameed Hakeem: I Visited Jerusalem; Israeli Society Wants Peace” (Clip No.

6350). The first translated clip was from Alhura,45 and the second clip was from BBC

Arabic.

Translating such content while ignoring other content from more representative sources seems to suggest that when failing to find content that supports its narrative, and being unwilling to translate representative content that goes against its narrative, especially on important historic events, MEMRI shifts to other sources, such as Twitter, online websites and TV, to find content that better suits its narratives. Such selection criteria are further evidence of ideological selectivity on MEMRI’s part.

In regard to other themes on this topic translated by MEMRI, such as content critical of Palestinian authorities, but not of Israelis, for failing to achieve peace, here are some examples of untranslated titles of newspaper articles that blamed both Israelis and

"إسرائيل :Palestinians, which again proves that MEMRI tendentiously selects its content

Israel and Palestine from Both Sides of the Mirror] (Al-Sharq] وفلسطين من كال جانبي المرآة"

The Document of Hamas and] "وثيقة »حماس« ومراوغة إسرائيل" Al-Awsat, June 2017), and the Maneuvering of Israel] (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, May 2017).

There was a another finding that raises additional questions regarding MEMRI’s selection of content for translation and publication. It was very unusual that two special dispatch reports were based on TV clips, which had already been published as distinct video clip reports. The first dispatch report had the title “Saudi Journalist Mishal Al-

45 Alhurra is a US-based public Arabic-language satellite TV channel. 162

Sudairy Criticizes Palestinian Leaders for Multiple Missed Opportunities for Peace”

(Special Dispatch No. 7550). The report basically publishes the transcript of a video clip that had already been published in a separate clip report (Clip No. 6646). The same thing was done in a second report, which had the title “Saudi Researcher Abdelhameed

Hakeem: Jerusalem as Israeli Capital with Palestinian Management of Islamic Holy

Places Is a Framework for Peace; Arabs Must Change Anti-Jewish Mentality, We Need to Realize That Jerusalem Is a Religious Symbol for the Jews” (Special Dispatch No.

7237 and Clip No. 6324). From both the title and content of these reports, one could conclude that they are in favor of Israel. The fact that the special dispatch reports and the clip reports used the same material is further evidence that MEMRI is highly interested in this type of content and wanted a larger audience to view the translated material.

Conclusion

There is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that MEMRI is ideologically and politically motivated in its selection of specific content for translation. Both Wordsmith word frequency analysis and the provided examples of titles of untranslated content that were found through a very restricted search in only two of the dozens of sources that

MEMRI translates, and within a restricted time period, prove the unrepresentativeness of its selections. In addition to the fact that there was no single report in the translated

English corpus that was critical of Israel in any way, there was abundant evidence in the

Arabic corpus that supports the first and second hypotheses. That is to say, MEMRI’s translated content and sources were carefully selected to promote specific narratives, and

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the published content is not representative of Saudi media. Sources as well and content were selected based on how they can promote the image of Israel as a peaceful state, while placing the entire blame for the failure of the peace process in the Middle East on the Arab states.

Results and Discussion: Topic Three (Human Rights)

This topic is clearly different from the other two discussed in this chapter. It is related to social issues that are frequently highlighted in the foreign media, namely, human rights issues in general but mostly those related to women.

MEMRI’s translated content highlighting human rights issues was the third largest within the entire EngCorpus (12%) (Figure 14) and the largest within the social content (45%)—far larger than the other social topics, such as extremism and reform (see

Figure 19).

Social Topics Other 3% Social Reform 20%

Human Rights 45%

Social Extremism/Terror ism 32%

Figure 19. Social topics in EngCorpus 164

The analysis of this topic will follow the same steps used in the analysis of the first two topics. That is, first the translated English content was analyzed, focusing on patterns in the selectivity process involving type of content, translation type, genre, sources and authors. Second, the content that was selected for translation on this topic was compared with untranslated content that was similar in terms of sources, genre, and time of publication.

Themes and Narratives

The analysis of content on this topic reveals that it is mostly related to the following themes: 1) content that highlights women’s issues in SA, such as the driving ban, polygamy and violence; 2) content that highlights other human rights violations, such as Khashoggi’s murder and complaints involving the Yemen war; 3) content that highlights the absence of laws protecting minorities, such as lesbians and gay men. Table

13 shows examples of the titles of the reports found on this topic, all of which are reflective of the themes just mentioned. For a full list of the titles on this topic, see

Appendix F.

Table 13

Examples of Report Titles in Human Rights-related Content.

Tile (as appeared in MEMRI) Date of Report Reference Publication Number 1 Saudi Demands for Women to Be Allowed to Drive 29-Nov- Special Dispatch Continue; Columnist: This Ban Is Aimed at Perpetuating 2016 No.6747 Men's Control of Women

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2 Al-Jazeera TV Simulation of the Murder of Jamal Al- 16-Oct-18 Clip No.6844 Khashoggi 3 Saudi University Lecturer: The Solution to the Problem 5-Mar-2017 Special Dispatch of Single Women in Saudi Arabia Is Polygamy – Three No.7049 Wives Per Man, and If That Works out, He Gets One More 4 Saudi Family Therapist Khaled Al-Saqaby Gives Advice 23-Feb-16 Clip No.5444 on Wife Beating, Says: Women's Desire for Equality Causes Marital Strife 5 TV Host Nadine Al-Budair: Saudi Men Say Women Are 6-May-17 Clip No.6026 Diamonds but Treat Them as Cheap Stones 6 Saudi-Born Atheist Rana Ahmad: My Family or the State 15-Aug-16 Clip No.5639 Would Have Killed Me If I Hadn't Fled; The Hijab Robbed Me of My Childhood 7 Saudi-Kuwaiti Singer Shams Bandar Slams Arabs' 24-Sep-18 Clip No.6792 Antisemitic Notions, Adds: I'm Not Against Gays, but They Are Sick Unhappy People, Most of Whom Commit

Suicide

Wordsmith was also used to create a frequency wordlist to determine whether it would confirm these findings or reveal other themes. In order to do this, content related to human rights was compiled in a new separate corpus (EngHRightsCorpus). It included all of the 40 reports that were related to the current topic, of which 15 were special dispatch reports, 23 transcriptions of clip reports, and two inquiry and analysis reports.

This resulted in a corpus of 36,635 words.

The frequency wordlist generated by Wordsmith from this corpus shows that keywords such as woman, drive and wife were among the 20 most frequent words found in EngHRightsCorpus. Table 14 shows the 20 most frequent words found in this corpus.

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Table 14

Top 20 Frequent Words Found in EngHRrightsCorpus

WORD FREQ. % WORD FREQ. % 1 WOMAN 780 2.33 11 PEOPLE 64 0.19 2 SAUDI 537 1.61 12 LAW 61 0.18 3 DRIVE 222 0.66 13 ALLOW 60 0.18 4 ARABIA 181 0.54 14 REPORT 58 0.17 5 RELIGIOUS 86 0.26 15 TWITTER 58 0.17 6 WIFE 75 0.22 16 LIFE 57 0.17 7 CLERIC 70 0.21 17 ISSUE 55 0.16 8 DECREE 70 0.21 18 CALL 52 0.16 9 MOSQUE 66 0.20 19 COUNTRY 49 0.15 10 SOCIETY 65 0.19 20 BAN 47 0.14

As Table 14 shows, the most frequent word by far is woman, which reflects the frequency of women-related issues in the EngHRightsCorpus. In fact, content related to women in this corpus represents more than 75%, while the remaining 25% is related to the other human rights issues mentioned above. Since themes related to women’s rights are by far the largest on this topic, this section focuses on those themes, and then collects untranslated content related to women rights to be compared with the findings in

EngHRightsCorpus.

Content related to women rights in the English corpus is mostly related to three themes: 1) driving-related content, which was mostly from journalists calling for the lifting of the ban on women driving or from religious speakers arguing in favor of the

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ban. After the royal decree,46 content was much less than before the ban was lifted, celebrates and supports the new law. This theme is reflected in the words drive, decree, call, law and ban. Content related to women driving constitutes more than 50% of the content on women-related themes; 2) polygamy was the second most frequent theme within women-related content. Most of the translated content supports polygamy. This theme is represented by the word wife, the sixth most frequent word on this topic and the second most frequent word related to women. Concordance analysis of wife in the corpus shows that it frequently appears in concordance with ordinal numbers, as in the following collocates from the English corpus: “first wife”, “second wife”, “four wives;” 3) violence against women mainly by their husbands; this was also reflected in the word wife in the corpus, which appeared in concordance with beating, beats, etc.

Other high-frequency words such as religious and cleric were used across all themes on this topic. This is because a large portion of the translated content comes from clerics, preacher, Sheikhs47 or Imams48 expressing their “religious” opinion on women- related issues.49

46 The royal decree issued by King Salman ibn Abdulaziz on September 26, 2016, which allows women to drive in Saudi Arabia and applies Saudi traffic laws equally on men and women.

47 Sheikh in Arabic is often used, among other meanings, to address a religious person. 48 Imam in Arabic is often used, among other meanings, to address the prayer leader at a mosque. 49 All of the four words were used as lemmas of cleric because of the strong relation in function and meaning between them in the current corpus. 168

Type of Reports

Human rights-related content was published in three of the four report types that

MEMRI used to supply its content. Contrary to the previous two most translated topics, video clip reports were the most frequently represented type for this topic. They made up

56% of the reports on this topic, compared with 49% for Special Dispatch reports.

Inquiry and analysis reports were the least used type. They made up less than five percent of the reports on this topic.

Video clip reports (23/41 reports) were based on clips from TV shows 70% of the time. Rotana Khalijia, a privately-owned Saudi TV channel based in Dubai, was the most translated. The remaining 33% of the clip reports (7/21 clip reports) were based on clips from YouTube or the Internet. When compared with the entire content on this topic, reports based on content from the Internet or YouTube made up 17% of the content, which is relatively high. This will be discussed more below.

Sources and Resources

The overall findings show that the sources that were most used in

AraHRightsCorpus were newspapers, the most translated source type for special dispatch reports on this topic, and for the previous two topics as well. There were more than 99 resources used in this corpus, coming from 24 sources. Almost half of these sources

(11/24) were from Saudi media, most of them being newspapers. Resources obtained from Saudi sources represented about 62% of the total number of resources used on this topic. Figure 20 shows the top 10 most frequent sources found in this corpus.

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FREQUENCY Twitter 20.20% Okaz (Newspaper - SA) 14.14% Al-Jazirah (Newspaper - SA) 13.13% Al-Watan (Newspaper - SA) 11.11% Internet/YouTube 7.07%

Al-Riyadh (Newspaper - SA) 6.06% SOURCE Rotana Khalijia (TV - SA) 5.05% Al-Arabiya.net (TV- SA) 3.03% Al-Hayat (Newspaper - SA) 3.03% Makkah (Newspaper - SA) 3.03%

Figure 20. Top 10 most frequent sources in EngHRightsCorpus

As Figure 20 shows, Twitter is the most frequent source on this topic, similar to the finding for the topic of Israel/Palestine. The high frequency of Twitter for the current topic is basically due to multiple tweets being translated in two of the reports, and thus appearing in the corpus based on how frequently they were translated. Saudi newspapers, especially Okaz and Al-Jazirah, were also very frequently used on this topic, which is similar to the findings for the previous two topics as well. However, contrary to the ten most frequent sources on the previous two topics, YouTube was more frequently used, which is due to clip reports being the most published report type on this topic.

The investigation of the most translated sources (using method two to calculate the sources) produces a rather different list, in which TV sources are the most translated source type, (compared to newspapers in first method), and YouTube is the most translated source. Figure 21 shows the most translated sources in EngHRightsCorpus.

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Content Internet/YouTube 17.07% Okaz (Newspaper - SA) 14.72% Rotana Khalijia (TV - SA) 12.20% Twitter 9.94% Al-Watan (Newspaper - SA) 7.41%

Al-Arabiya.net (TV- SA) 7.32% Source Al-Jazirah (Newspaper - SA) 6.46% Al-Jazeera (TV - Qatar) 4.88% Al-Riyadh (Newspaper - SA) 2.98% Sabq (Online Newspaper - SA) 2.94%

Figure 21. Top ten most translated sources in EngHRightsCorpus50

As Figure 21 shows, TV sources are the most translated sources, providing 66% of the translated content. Again, this is due to clip reports being the most used report type on the current topic. However, 60% of the overall translated content was obtained from major Saudi media sources—40% from newspapers and 20% from TV stations.

Because the current study relies on the top two sources to collect untranslated

Arabic data, and because three of the top five translated sources on the current topic are either too vague, large, or hard to investigate objectively, such as YouTube and Twitter, or impossible to access and locate content that was published in the past, as is the case with Rotana Khadija TV, the data collection was based on the top two press sources,

50 The Internet and YouTube were calculated as the same source, because the Internet was cited by MEMRI as the source for many of the translated video clips, and thus, YouTube is the most likely source for those clips. 171

namely, Okaz (2nd most translated) and Al-Watan (5th most translated). However, it is necessary to shed some light on the sources between these.

YouTube and Twitter are thought-provoking sources. In addition to being almost impossible to investigate objectively at the given time and with the current means at our disposal, the fact that most of the translated content comes from low-profile people/accounts and that none of them belong to nor represent official Saudi government entities makes it unnecessary to investigate them. Such content is clearly evidence of selectivity, as it cannot be representative unless it comes from an authority or entity that may have an impact on the opinions of the general public, or at least from a majority analysis research, which is not what MEMRI does.

Roatan Khalijia. Roatan Khalijia is another source that raises more questions over

MEMRI’s selectivity criteria. It is the most translated TV source in all of the EngCorpus

(6%), the third most translated source on the current topic (12.2%), and the second most translated source on the topic of Israel/Palestine (8%). It is also the only TV source that made it to the top ten sources in two of the three topics investigated. As noted earlier,

Rotana Khalijia is a Dubai-Based liberal TV channel that belongs to Rotana Group, which is primarily owned by Saudi Prince and billionaire Alwaleed Bin Talal.51

On the topic of Israel/Palestine, translated content on Rotan Khalijia came mostly from two authors who supported normalizing ties with Israel; on the current topic, however, most of the translated content is taken from a single show hosted by Ms.

51 www.independent.co.uk 172

Nadine Budair, a liberal Saudi journalist living in Dubai, UAE who is known for her extreme criticism of Saudi and Arab societies in general. On her shows, Ms. Budair highlights women’s topics, such as men’s control and abuse of women, polygamy, and the driving ban, which often feed a narrative of Saudi women being abused by their relatives under the protection of the law. This narrative is often circulated by the liberals in SA or on foreign media.

What is even more important is that Ms. Budair hosts the most biased speakers possible—individuals who express weird and ridiculous ideas or extreme views regarding women’s interests, or liberals who accuse Saudi society and/or the Muslim religion of failing to appreciate women and discriminating against them. Below are a couple of examples of reports translated from Budair’s show.

In one of the shows, Budair hosts Ms. Hawazin Mirza, a supposedly conservative woman, judging from the way she is dressed and speaks. The guest is represented as an

“academic” and “a university lecturer” who allegedly has a solution to “the large number of unmarried Saudi women.” Her solution is an academy in which single men and women are educated about marriage and polygamy. Men who pass the training after six months get help and funding from the academy to marry three wives, from among those in the academy, “within one month.” After ten years, if the marriage proves successful, the man

“gets the fourth wife free” (Mirza, 2017, 3:15).52

52 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OTFFQL4tSCI 173

This marriage “academy” received very widespread criticism within Saudi media, from conservatives, liberals and religious figures alike, in addition to general public disapproval, as represented in trending hashtags on Twitter. Many of the newspaper articles that were published in Okaz, Al-Jazirah, Al-Watan and Sabq, as well as two trending Twitter hashtags, mocked or expressed negative views of Ms. Mizrara’s proposal for ridiculing the nature of marriage and degrading women.53

Nevertheless, MEMRI published a report three months after the show aired to highlight this incident. The title of the report was “Saudi University Lecturer: The

Solution to the Problem of Single Women in Saudi Arabia is Polygamy – Three Wives

Per Man, and if That Works Out, He Gets One More” (Special Dispatch No. 7049).

Although MEMRI, in the same report, published excerpts of two articles that frankly criticized Ms. Mirza and her academy idea, the articles were published, alongside other articles defending polygamy, with the introductory statement: “This report will review articles in the Saudi press on the subject of polygamy as a solution to the problem of single women in Saudi Arabia” (ibid, para. 6). In fact, nothing in the report nor in its long introduction mentions that Ms. Mirza’s proposal was widely rejected. The fact that the report was published three months after the show had aired makes it difficult to argue that

MEMRI published its report before such abundant disapproval had emerged. This also

53 https://www.okaz.com.sa/article/1536347, https://sabq.org/polygamy/academy, https://www.elbilad.net/article/detail?id=68296, https://Rotana.net/polygamy/academy, https://twitter.com/hashtag/polygamy/academy

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suggests, as is evident in other reports as well, that MEMRI digs around for content on the “Internet,” even if it was published months or years ago, as long as it feeds the narrative it seeks to circulate.

Another report that translates Nadine Budair’s show was published under the title:

“TV Host Nadine Al-Budair: Saudi Men Say Women Are Diamonds but Treat Them as

Cheap Stones” (Clip No. 6026). Although someone would expect that such an important topic would be taken seriously, that official representatives or guests with special knowledge of the topic would be invited, and that discussion, criticism and solutions would be based on studies and statistics, the whole show—or at least what was translated from it—was an angry and aggressive verbal attack from Ms. Budair on Arab societies and men for their hypocrisy and cruelty toward women.

Authors

In terms of authors, there is an obvious pattern that suggests a preference for a specific type of author. Most of the translated authors were representatives of two extreme sides of Saudi society. That is, translated authors were either liberals criticizing

Saudi/Arab societies for their abuse of women and the absence of human rights protections, or religious individuals expressing extremely degrading views of women.

Liberal authors criticizing society in terms of women rights or human rights in general were frequently translated on this topic (30%). Nadine Budair, for example, was by far the most translated author in this corpus (15%). Although there were no other names that were frequently translated or cited, there is a clear preference for liberal

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authors criticizing Saudi/Arab societies on issues related to human rights or abuse of women. Some examples of such authors are present in the following reports: “Liberal

Moroccan Writer Said Nachid: Raif Badawi Is Forced to Pray and Attend Religious

Classes in Prison” (Clip No. 5768), and “Saudi-Born Atheist Rana Ahmad: My Family or the State Would Have Killed Me If I Hadn’t Fled; The Hijab Robbed Me of My

Childhood” (Clip No. 5639). This also suggests, similar to the finding on the previous two topics and in the analysis of sources in Chapter Four, that what matters to MEMRI is the content, not the author nor the source of the content, as long as the content is consistent with what MEMRI is circulating, in this context, the idea that there are few human rights protections in SA, especially when it comes to women.

There is another type of author that MEMRI frequently translates. They are authors who have some sort of religious affiliation and who express extreme views on women’s issues. This type is evident in the corpus in the use of addressing words such as cleric, imam, religious and preacher, which is most likely due to MEMRI’s effort to draw a connection between what women lack in SA and in other Muslim countries and between Islam/Sharia law in its coverage of Saudi and Arab media. An example of this is

Clip Report No. 5786, published with the title “Saudi Cleric Abd Al-Rahman Abd Al-

Karim: The Woman Is Better Off at Home; We Need Separate Hospitals for Men and

Women,” and Clip Report No. 5609, published with the title “Senior Saudi Cleric Saleh

Al-Fawzan: Husbands Must Force Wives to Wear The Hijab (Archival).” Interestingly,

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the video in the latter report was uploaded to YouTube in April 2013 but translated and published by MEMRI in August 2016.

Arabic Corpus

Regardless of whether human rights and/or women’s issues are hot topics in Saudi media, the content that MEMRI translates clearly highlights violations of human rights and presents Saudi women as powerless victims of men and the government as supporting or ignoring such practices, as presented above. So, the question remaining is whether these narratives are representative of Saudi media as a whole in regard to this topic and whether there is other available content that does highlight topics other than women driving, polygamy and physical abuse.

To find out, the study collected untranslated data for the purpose of comparing what is translated with what is not translated. It collected data from the first two most translated Saudi newspapers, using the same method used with the two other topics investigated. These newspapers are Okaz, the second most translated source in

EngHRightsCorpus, and Al-Watan, the fifth most translated source in the same corpus, as shown in Figure 21.54 Both newspapers are among the top ten most read newspapers in

SA, as shown in Chapter Four. Content collected from these two sources was used to create a new Arabic corpus (AraHRightsCorpus), which was compared to

54 The first, third, and fourth most translated sources were YouTube, Rotana Khalijia, and Twitter, respectively, all of which are hard to be objectively investigated within the limits of this study. 177

EngHRightsCorpus in order to find out whether the two corpora were similar in terms of their coverage of the topic overall and of related themes.

Okaz has an advanced search engine that allows searching by keyword, date, section, or/and writer. Thus, data from this source was collected using the newspaper search engine. The search was limited to the section of kutaab wa mgalaat (writers and essays) in the newspaper, from which most of MEMRI’s translated articles from this source derived. Using one keyword almara’h [woman] in this search resulted in 719 essays. All the titles were collected into an Excel spreadsheet, and using Research

Randomizer, 40 essays were randomly chosen and collected to create the Arabic corpus for the current topic (AraHRightsCorpus).

The search engine within Al-Watan newspaper, however, was very limited and did not allow for searching by section or by date of a long time period. Thus, Google’s advanced search engine was used to collect data from this source. Using one keyword almara’h [woman] for this search resulted in 143 essays, all of which related to the topic at hand with the word woman in the title. All the titles with their links were imported into an Excel spreadsheet. Using Research Randomizer, 20 essays were randomly chosen and added to AraHRightsCorpus. The study used the same time period as the one used in the

English corpus, from January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2018.

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The total number of essays in AraHRightsCorpus was 60, 40 from Okaz and 20 from Al-Watan, with a total word count of 32,894 words, close to the English corpus of

36,635 words.55

Translated vs. untranslated: Frequency wordlist. Wordsmith was used to create a frequency wordlist of the Arabic corpus to be compared with the English corpus frequency wordlist.

Table 15 shows the 20 most frequent words in the Arabic corpus.

Table 15

Top 20 Frequent Words Found in AraHRightsCorpus

Arabic Translation Freq. % Arabic Translation Freq. % Word Word GUARDIANSHIP 76 0.23 الوالية WOMAN 818 2.49 11 المرأة 1 0.20 66 قرار SAUDI 157 0.48 12 السعودية 2 (FEMALE) DECISION MATTER 63 0.19 األمر MAN 140 0.43 13 الرجل 3 ALLAH/GOD 57 0.17 هللا RIGHT 121 0.37 14 حق 4 SAUDI (MALE) 50 0.15 سعودي SOCIETY 118 0.36 15 المجتمع 5 PUBLIC 49 0.15 العامة ENABLING 105 0.32 16 تمكين 6 LIFE 48 0.15 الحياة WORK 104 0.32 17 العمل 7 DIVORCE 47 0.14 الطلق SOCIAL 102 0.31 18 االجتماعي 8 VISION 46 0.14 رؤية KINGDOM 96 0.29 19 المملكة 9 WIFE 42 0.13 زوجة DRIVING 818 0.27 20 قيادة 10

55 The reason that the study collected 40 from Okaz compared with only 20 from Al-Watan is that Okaz was translated more than twice as much as Al-Watan, as shown in Figure 21, and because of the limited results found in Al-Watan compared with those found in Okaz. 179

المرأة {As Table 15 shows, the most frequently used word by far was {almar’ah

(woman), representing 2.45% of the current corpus, which is significant and very close to its use in the English corpus (2.33%). This confirms that the data collected is indeed similar to that of the English corpus in terms of the general theme (i.e., women rights).

However, by comparing this table with that of the English corpus (Table 14), major differences come to light.

For example, in the English corpus, content related to women driving, either before or after the royal decree lifting the ban, was the most translated content—50% of the women-related themes, which is represented by the high frequency of words such as drive (0.66%), decree (0.21%), and ban (0.14%). However, in the Arabic corpus, similar

qiayda} represented only }قيادة words were not as frequent. The Arabic word for driving

0.21%, which is three times less than drive (0.66%) in the English corpus.56 This suggests that the driving ban on women was not the most discussed issue in the Arabic corpus.

Although the majority of the articles in the Arabic corpus indeed highlight issues related to women, they are not limited to the topics found in the English corpus, such as women driving and “wife beating.” Topics such as divorce, work opportunities for women, and male guardianship were very common. There were also articles celebrating and highlighting women’s active role in society. The latter is clearly represented in the high frequency of words such as social, society, and life in the untranslated articles that discuss not only what Saudi women may lack in terms of rights, but also what they

56 In both corpora, drive and driving were uses as lemmas of the same word. 180

man] is] الرجل {already have and how they compare with Saudi men. The word {alrajaul indeed among the most frequent words in the Arabic corpus, which is due to Saudi

هللا women’s roles being compared with those of Saudi men in their societies. The word

[Allah/God] is among the 20 most frequent words, which is due to the frequent theme of discussing women’s rights in Islam/Sharia law, compared with practices that may be present in society. None of this content is present in the English corpus.

Another major difference is the presence of words such as enabling and vision alongside Saudi women in the Arabic corpus; both words were very common in essays celebrating Prince Mohammad Ibn Salman’s role in enabling women, especially in his

2030 Saudi vision. Again, similar content was not present in the English corpus.

wife) in the Arabic corpus was not as) الزوجة {Finally, the word {aljawjah common as it was in the English corpus, nor was it used in the same context. Below are just a couple of examples of how the word wife appeared differently in the two corpora.

Concordance examples of WIFE in EngHRightsCorpus (the first five occurrences in the corpus):

1. “[…] marital consultant, responded: ‘One wife is not enough’.”

2. “Al-Muabi said [...] on Al-Arabiya TV, that if a man beats his wife, she should beat

him back.”

3. “[..] and that “the husband must make his wife wear it,” [Hijab] Sheikh Al-Fawzan

said.”

4. “Khaled Al-Saqaby Gives Advice on Wife Beating.”

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5. “Beating one’s wife, said Al-Saqaby, should be intended as a means of discipline.”

On the contrary, in the Arabic corpus the word wife frequently, and almost exclusively, appeared in relation to divorce and other marital contexts, as in the following:

Concordance examples of WIFE in AraHRightsCorpus (the first five occurrences in the corpus):

"أصدرت المحكمة العليا أخيراً، مبدأً قضائياً يتمثل في حق الزوجة فسخ النكاح، كرهاً لزوجها" .1

[The higher court has issued recently a law that gives the wife the right to divorce

if she hates her husband.]

"هناك تمييز واضح في عدم اشتراط حضور الزوجة لتنفيذ حكم الطالق" .2

[There is a clear discrimination in not making the wife’s presence obligatory in

order to issue a divorce certificate.]

"أجمع مأذونو أنكحة على أن القرار يدعم حفظ الحقوق الخاصة بالزوجة" .3

[Many marriage registrars have said that the new law protects the wife’s rights.]

"يجب القول إن مهر وصداق الزوجة يختلف من مجتمع إلى آخر." .4

[We have to say that a wife’s dowry is different from one society to another.]

"هناك من يستدين ألجل المهر ويبقى لسنوات يلوم الزوجة على ضيق معيشته بسبب مهرها، وقد يسجن .5

إن عجز عن السداد، وتخفيض المهر حسب التجارب المتداولة بالمجتمع ليس لصالح الزوجة..."

[Some men may continue to blame the wife for many years for their financial burden because of her dowry [that husbands had paid before marriage]. Some might even

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go to jail for their debts. Yet, lowering the dowry has proven not to be to the advantage of the wife …]

As the above examples show, polygamy or wife beating/violence were almost the only contexts for the word wife in the English corpus, while in the Arabic corpus wife was almost exclusively used in relation to marriage and divorce. The almost complete absence of violence toward women as a theme in the Arabic corpus is evidence of how rare, compared with other topics, it is in the Saudi media, yet they are selected and translated by MEMRI from a wide range of sources that cannot be claimed to be representative of Arabic Saudi media.

Finally, the major differences between each corpus in terms of which keywords are more frequent and how frequently they are used in the corpora suggest unrepresentative selectivity on MEMRI’s part. In other words, the content that MEMRI selected for translation is not representative of what was found in Saudi media, which confirms the hypothesis of the study.

Translated vs. untranslated: Titles. In order to confirm these findings, the study compared the titles in both corpora to determine whether they were similar in terms of their messages. That is, this section compares the titles that were not translated, and which appeared within a short period, with the materials that MEMRI translated. Again, it is important to note here that MEMRI’s translated materials were not published and translated on the same day as the original content. Although some articles were indeed translated and published on the same day, the majority of the content took days and

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sometimes weeks or even months to be translated and published. This suggests that

MEMRI had time to select and translate its content.

Most of the content that was related to human rights, such as abuse of women, guardianship, polygamy, gay rights, and other themes, was not related to major incidents or events that may have triggered an increase in publication. However, analysis of the dates on which MEMRI published content related to human rights reveals that there were three major incidents around which Arabic media and even global media responded with increased publications. These incidents were: 1) the royal decree that allowed women to drive in SA, September 26, 2017; 2) the first day in which the royal decree took effect and a woman could get a driver’s license and actually drive in SA, June 2, 2018; and 3) the murder of Jamaal Khashoggi inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on October 2,

2018. Even though it is clear how important such incidents were, content related to them constituted only about 14% of the EngHRightsCorpus.

We will now focus on the first incident only, as it is the most important and relevant topic in the discussion here and is very closely related to the most translated theme in the human rights corpus, which is women driving, before women were allowed to drive.

Content related to this incident servers as strong evidence of selectivity. First,

MEMRI rarely translates news, but often translates opinion articles that discuss major news events. However, in its coverage of the important and historic royal decree to lift the ban on women driving, the first report MEMRI published was: “Saudi King Lifts Ban

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on Women Driving: Over a Decade of MEMRI Reports and Clips on the Issue of the

Ban” (Special Dispatch No. 7111, September 27, 2017). There was no translation at all; in addition to an introduction and a poster explaining the royal decree, which had already been published in English by the foreign ministry of SA, the report provides over 30 links to reports that MEMRI had published over a decade on the topic of the ban on women driving. Perhaps time and the rush to publish the important news on its website did not provide sufficient time for MEMRI to find and translate articles that shed light on the lifting of the ban. However, the title and the links provided undercut the effect of the happy news. Additionally, in the introduction to the report, MEMRI made sure to take credit for the lifting of the ban, because for over a decade “MEMRI has followed the calls to end the ban on women driving in Saudi Arabia, as well as the public debate in the kingdom on this issue and on women’s rights in general” (ibid., para 1).

The second report that MEMRI published after September 27, 2017, was “Sister,

You Will Drive - Saudi Band Releases “Born To Be Wild” Cover Celebrating Royal

Decree Permitting Women to Drive” (Clip No. 6239, October 1, 2017). The source of the video song was YouTube. The problem here is not whether the report contains a negative message, but rather the continued ignoring of official media.

In October 10, 2017, MEMRI finally covered some of what was being said in the

Saudi press, but instead of translating articles, it opted to translate cartoons in its report

“The Lifting of the Saudi Ban on Women Driving as Reflected in Cartoons” (Inquiry &

Analysis Series No. 1350, October 10, 2017). Besides ignoring newspaper articles and

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basing its report on cartoons alone, MEMRI chose to classify and frame the cartoons in this report in a very manipulating way.

Over 25 cartoons were published with explanatory captions provided by MEMRI and were classified into five categories (subheadings): 1) “Appreciation for the King’s

Historic Decree, Which Advances Saudi Women and the Entire Saudi Nation”; 2) “The

Economic Benefits of Women’s Driving”; 3) “Humorous Cartoons”; 4) “Cartoons

Mocking Saudi Conservatives and Their Hypocritical Reaction to the Royal Decree;” and

5) “Even after the Lifting of the Ban, Women’s Rights in Saudi Arabia Still Have a Long

Way to Go.”57 All of the sources in the last two categories were anonymous accounts on

Twitter, Qatari media, or in the online London-based Alarab newspaper, which is known for its biased criticism of SA. This method of recontextualizing what was supposed to be positive or at least neutral content so as to make it appear negative is evident here.

Again, the continued ignoring of the Saudi press in such a critical period raises suspicion around MEMRI’s selection criteria. This may be the result of one of two things: there were no newspaper articles published that highlight the importance of this decision, or the published content told a narrative different from MEMRI’s.

A search for articles covering the royal decree between September 26 to October

10, 2017, the time period in which MEMRI published reports related to the event, reveals that there were abundant articles published in all the Saudi newspapers, but we will focus here only on two, Okaz and Al-Watan.

57 These are the exact words of the subheadings used in the reports. 186

In Okaz alone, using the phrase “women driving” in the section of “Writers and

Essays” produced 33 articles, all of which discuss the new law from different perspectives. Below are some examples of the titles of the published articles and their translations that appeared days after the royal decree.

The following are untranslated articles from Okaz:

With Women Driving, the Last leaf] قيادة النساء« تسقط آخر »أوراق التوت« الحقوقي» .1

of the Rights Tree Falls] (Alnajrani, 2017).58 In this article, Alnajrani argues

that with the announcement of the royal decree that allows women to drive,

“foreign human rights activists and organizations have lost their last card

which they frequently used to accuse SA of human rights violations” (ibid).

,Women Driving a Key to Change], (Alshamari] قيادة المرأة للسيارة مفتاح التغيير .2

2017).59 In this article, Ms. Alshamari celebrates the royal decree, which has

given women their right to drive and which treats women and men equally

and which “does not require the permission of a woman’s guardian to get her

driver’s license or to drive” (ibid.).

And the Liberals have Lost their Case], (Alissa, 2017).60] وخسر الليبراليون قضيتهم .3

As is clear from the title, Ms. Alissa argues that, contrary to what people

might think, liberals, especially those appearing in foreign media, are not in

58 https://www.okaz.com.sa/article/1576328/september29 59 https://www.okaz.com.sa/article/1576458/september30 60 https://www.okaz.com.sa/article/1577861/October5 187

fact extremely happy about the historic decision, and they are hiding their

extreme sadness because they have lost the case which they have always used

to prove women’s lack of rights in SA (ibid).

Similar articles were also published in Al-Watan. The following are some examples of the articles’ titles from that newspaper:

Eight Advantages Men Get When]ثمان إيجابيات يجنيها الرجل من قيادة المرأة للسيارة .1

Women Drive], (Albugimi, 2017).61 Mr. Albugimi discusses some of the benefits

that society and men in particular will accrue after women are allowed to drive,

most of which are financial, such as a lower financial burden by getting rid of

family chauffeurs62 and women’s increased involvement in family responsibilities

outside the home.

Women intellectuals: The] مثقفات: قرار قيادة المرأة سيغير نظرة المجتمع لها ولحقوقها .2

Decision Changes Society’s View Toward Women), (Alahmadi, 2017).63

Professor Alahmadi cites some academic and intellectual women who expressed

their joy and opinions over the decision, which was “a milestone step that reflects

and matches the current status of Saudi women in their society” (ibid).

61 https:\www.alwatan.com.sa\article\354624\September28 62 It is estimated that there are about 1.5 million non-Saudi chauffeurs working fulltime for families in SA, which its population is about 30 million people (Okaz, 2017). 63 https:\www.alwatan.com.sa\article\355236\October5 188

Women Driving is the Last Obstacle] قيادة المرأة هل هي الحاجز السعودي األخير الذي قفزناه .3

We Jumped], (Arishi, 2017).64 In his article, Mr. Arishi discusses many of the

historic changes in Saudi society that took place since the Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia was established in 1932. The women driving obstacle was similar to the

decision to grant women the right to education in 1938 (ibid.).

As all these examples show, there were many publications on this topic in the

Saudi media and especially in the press. However, MEMRI chose to translate only cartoons and to provide links to remind its audience that the decision to allow women to drive had come only after a decade of appeals and that MEMRI had for a long time generously shone a light on the matter.

More importantly, not only did MEMRI ignore content that did not feed its narratives, it also intervened to reduce the effect of any good news on human rights in SA and especially that related to women. For example, on July 31, 2018, MEMRI published a clip report of one of its staff members in an interview on Alhurra TV, a US-owned

Arabic TV station based in New York. The title of the report was “MEMRI Reform

Project Director Mansour Al-Hadj: Allowing Women to Drive Is A Formality; Political

Reforms Are the Most Important” (Clip No. 6704). It is not clear what is meant by political reform, but in the report Mr. Al-Hadj mentions that “when Muhammad bin

Salman rose to power […] instead of releasing the political prisoners, he increased their

64 https://www.alwatan.com.sa/article/35407/October5 189

numbers” (ibid., MEMRI’s translation). Of course, he did not use specific numbers or sources. In his criticism of human rights in SA, Mr. Al-Hadj writes:

Until a few months ago, Saudi Arabia was the only country in the world that did

not allow women to drive cars […] Even in areas that are under the control of Al-

Nusra Front or Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham [terror groups in Syria], women are

allowed to drive cars” (ibid.).

When the host interrupts him by saying that there have been major changes economically and socially, such as the law permitting women to drive, Mr. Al-hadj interrupts him by saying: “These are all formalities” (ibid.). Then when the host asks Mr.

Al-Hadj what he means by a formality when “for years you have been saying that women in Saudi Arabia are not allowed to drive, but when they are finally allowed to drive you call it a formality?”, Al-Hadj responds:

It is indeed a formality, because Saudi Arabia could no longer defend its denying

women one of their basic human rights. It was becoming increasingly difficult to

justify it. I do not think that Saudi Arabia has any reason to be happy or to

celebrate. Saudi women should be compensated for all the years in which the

Saudi authorities did not allow them to drive. The Saudis are calling for real

reforms, such as freedom of speech. (ibid.)

It is surprising that Mr. Alhadj was talking about the detainees and Saudis calling for

“real reforms,” but what they translated in MEMRI was mostly about “formalities,” such as women driving.

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There was another report that shows how MEMRI readily intervenes to reduce the effect of news or laws that are supposed to be celebrated by anyone who cares about human rights in general and women’s rights specifically. The report was published a couple of weeks after King Salman bin Abdulaziz had issued a royal decree easing and regulating guardianship (wilaya) requirements for women in the country. The title of the report wa: “The Saudi Royal Decree Easing Guardianship Requirements for Women, and

Responses to It in Saudi Arabia,” (Inquiry & Analysis Series No. 1316, June 2, 2017). In the report, one of MEMRI’s staff discusses the royal decree and translates minimal excerpts of Saudi articles before and after the decree, but mostly MEMRI translates multiple tweets from unverified Twitter accounts, allegedly by Saudi women, under the subtitle: “Claims that the Decree Is Insufficient, Calls to Continue the Struggle for

Women’s Rights,” all of which demand the complete abolition of guardianship. Similar to the decree allowing women to drive, the decree regulating the guardianship law inspired many publications in Saudi media, but MEMRI preferred to intervene and say that the new law was perhaps just another “formality.”

It is important to note that Saudi state law, even before the royal decree regulating guardianship, required a woman to receive the consent of her guardian (mahram), who is mostly the husband or the father, only in three restricted cases: obtaining a passport, traveling outside the country and contracting marriage.65 However, there had been

65 A new law was issued on August 1, 2019 which removed the guardian’s consent requirement on the first two cases above, passport issuance and traveling outside the country. 191

complaints, especially from women, that some state and private companies were still requiring the guardian’s consent for women to perform certain acts, such as opening a bank account or getting a job. Thus, the royal decree made it clear that all state and private institutions must remove such requirements except under the three conditions stated above, of which only one is still effective today. In the media, however, and in the discussion of guardianship in SA, women are invariably portrayed as able to do almost nothing in SA without a guardian’s permission, or that they cannot even leave the house, which is not true, as stated above. Thus, it seems MEMRI was not interested in clarifying this for its audience, and instead of publishing content from Saudi media that discusses the topic, it chose to ignore all of what was being circulated in official Saudi media and use unverified twitter accounts and sources to simply say that the royal decree did not change anything.

It is also important to note here that what is almost never discussed in the media, especially in foreign media and MEMRI in particular, regarding male guardianship in

SA, and in other Muslim countries in general, is that a man is financially responsible by law for all of the females but only the minor male members of his family (e.g., his wife and daughters and minor sons, and, in some cases, his sisters). Even when a wife or daughter is, for example, an adult and has an income of her own, she does not have to share the financial responsibilities of the household unless she is willing. A man continues to be responsible for the women in his family until they get married. If a father dies or becomes incapable of providing for his family, the responsibility moves to the

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closest male relation, typically, a brother or uncle. This also means that women in SA were not financially liable for any financial liabilities, such as bank loans, until the royal decree prohibiting the requirement of a guardian’s consent for a woman to open a bank account.

Thus, when it comes to completely abolishing guardianship, there are two camps.

On one side are those who are afraid that the complete abolition of guardianship would release men from their responsibility toward their families, especially with the high level of unemployment among Saudis in general and women in particular. On the other side, there are those who argue that, since women are equal to men, they should be financially responsible for themselves, even when they have no income, which may create social problems.

Conclusion

There is enough evidence that the translated content on the topic of human rights in general and women in particular is not representative of Saudi media. Both the

Wordsmith word frequency analysis and comparison of translated titles to the untranslated titles confirm the second hypothesis of the study, namely, that MEMRI tends to carefully select content that enforces the narrative that SA lacks human rights protections and that women are abused by their male relatives.

Additionally, among the sources that were translated the most on this topic were

YouTube, Twitter and Rotana Khalijia, all of which are arguably not representative of official media or even of social media, because the translated content is mostly of

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individual opinions and not of the majority, and thus cannot be argued to be representative of the society as a whole. The translated authors merely represent themselves and their opinions. Such media sources arguably deliver different opinions from different people, and although the study does not have the means to investigate such sources, all the translated content clearly circulates the same narrative of the abuses by

Saudi society, religion and government and ignores content that highlights the bright side of Saudi society in general and human rights in particular. Even when the calls for human rights protections are answered, MEMRI intervenes, labeling them “formalities.”

All this reveals patterns of selectivity. First, hot topics that are attractive to a western audience or that are often circulated in foreign media, such as women driving, are selected. Second, the source should be an official source, but when there is no content that supports the narrative MEMRI wishes to circulate, secondary sources, such as

Twitter and YouTube, are selected. Third, the authors in those sources typically represent extreme social views; they are either liberals who condemn their society or religious individuals who express biased and extreme views against women. Fourth, there is clear ideological interference, which is achieved by making use of titles and subheadings or by deliberate interference by MEMRI’s staff to reduce the effects of positive progress in SA society that may contradict MEMRI’s circulated narratives.

Results and Discussion: Other Translated Topics

This section briefly presents and discusses some of the findings on the other topics that were frequently translated by MEMRI, which were presented in Figure 13.

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Hate Speech-Related Content

The fourth most-translated topic in the English corpus is Hate Speech, which makes up more than 10% of the English corpus (35/300 reports). Content on this topic serves to prove that hate speech is prevalent in Saudi and/or Arab societies. About 70% of the reports on this topic focus on anti-Semitic content. The remaining content is related to anti-Western or anti-US content.

The translated authors of such content are mostly religious individuals claiming that Jews are in control of the world, as in the report titled “Saudi Scholar Saad Ibn

Abdullah Al-Humayd: What Is Written In ‘the Protocols of The Elders of Zion’ Is

Translated into Reality” (Special Dispatch No. 7434), or that Jews have historically betrayed and failed their host societies, as in “Saudi Cleric Awadh Al-Qarni: Hitler

Wanted to Solve the ‘Jewish Question’ by Gas Chambers, the West by Sending them to

Palestine” (Clip No. 5489).

The other type of translated authors consists of journalists who claim that Arab

"ملف ,societies historically oppressed Jews, as in the article from Al-Sharq Al-Awsat

The Forgotten File], which MEMRI replaced with “Saudi Journalist: The Arab]منسي"

Countries Oppressed Their Jews, Failed to Benefit from their Presence” (Special

Dispatch No. 7433). For a full list of titles on this topic, see Appendix G.

Regarding the report type and sources, 65% of the reports (23/35) are clip reports, the source for the majority of which (52%) is either YouTube or the Internet. This is the largest use of this report type and source, as compared with other topics in the English

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corpus. Contrary to other investigated topics, special dispatch reports were used only

28% of the time (10/35). In fact, one of the ten special dispatch reports was actually a republication of a clip report that had already been published, and another report was based on a clip from a Friday sermon found on the “Internet.” The sources in the remaining special reports were mostly newspapers. Figure 22 shows the most translated sources on this topic.

CONTENT YouTube/Internet 34.29%

Al-Majd (TV -SA) 8.57%

Al-Resala (TV- Kuwait) 8.57%

Al-Ahwaz (TV - SA) 5.71%

Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (Newspaper - SA) 5.71%

Wesal (TV - SA) 5.71% SOURCE Al-Jazirah (TV - SA) 2.86%

Al-Maiadin (TV - Iraq) 2.86%

Al-Watan (Newspaper - TV) 2.86%

ATV (TV -Kuwait) 2.86%

Figure 22. Top 10 most translated sources in Hate Speech-related content.

As Figure 22 shows, the most translated source by far was YouTube. The majority of the remaining sources were privately-owned Satellite TV channels, which do not have wide circulation in SA, except Al-Majd TV, which is among the top ten most- watched TV channels in SA, as shown in

Table 2. Content from printed newspapers makes up less than 10% of the corpus.

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That said, although the study does not investigate any of the translated sources for evidence of untranslated content that is not reflective of the translated themes on this topic, the fact that more than 80% of the translated content comes from YouTube (34%) and other unpopular TV sources that cannot be claimed to be representative of the most circulated media sources in SA, as presented in Chapter Four, suggests biased and unrepresentative selectivity on MEMRI’s part.

Content Related to The United States of America (USA)

Content that was related to the USA related mainly to the USA’s policies in the

Middle East and toward the tension, instability and war zones in Iraq, Iran, Syria and

Yemen. The translated content also contains criticism of US bills targeting SA, such as

JASTA, or accusations by the US media that SA was involved in 9/11. Content on this topic makes up 13% and 8% of the translated content in the political category and

EngCorpus, respectively, placing it in third place within political content and sixth place within EngCorpus.

What is unique about this topic is that, although MEMRI mainly targets Western audiences around the globe and primarily in the US, content related to the USA was far smaller than the content related to other countries, such as Iran and Israel/Palestine. This suggests one of two things: 1) that there is less content related to the USA than Iran and

Israel/Palestine in the Saudi media; or 2) content related to this topic in the Saudi press is of less importance to MEMRI, for whatever reason. However, the fact is that multiple keywords related to the USA, such as Trump and American, were very frequent not only

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on this topic, but also on most of the political topics, as shown in the discussion of Iran and Israel/Palestine topics. This needs to be further investigated.

Therefore, a brief study was conducted in two of the Saudi newspapers that were the most translated sources for Iran-related content to find out whether the USA-related content was indeed far less than content related to Iran. To limit the results to only newspaper articles and to eliminate other types of material, the search in Okaz was limited to the section of kuttab wa maqalat [Writers and Essays], while in Al-Sharq Al-

Awsat the search was limited to alra’i [The Opinion]. Using some keywords related to each country, the search produced the results presented in Table 16.

Table 16

USA- Versus Iran-Related Content in Saudi Newspapers

USA-RELATED KEYWORDS IRAN-RELATED KEYWORDS

إيران طهران اإليراني/اإليرانية الواليات واشنطن األمريكي/األمريكية NEWSPAPER

[The Iranian] [Tehran] [Iran] المتحدة [The American] [Washington]

[United

States]

Okaz 862 334 644 692 335 1018

Al-Sharq Al-Awsat 3 1804 2963 0 1321 2954

Total 865 2138 3607 692 1656 3972

Grand Total 6610 6320

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As Table 16 shows, the results suggest that there was more content related to the

USA than to Iran in the Saudi press. In fact, in Okaz there were two sections dedicated to

US-related content: alintikhabat alamirikiah [US Elections] and ziarat trump [Trump’s

Visit]. There are no other dedicated sections in the newspaper for any other country, which suggests that US-related content is the most covered topic among political topics in this newspaper and in the Saudi press in general.

Yet, Iran-related content in the translated corpus was far greater than content related to USA or other Western/European countries combined, though one would expect

MEMRI’s targeted audience to be more interested in reading and hearing about their countries in foreign media than about Iran, of which they hear enough in their own media. MEMRI’s preference for translating Iran-related content more than US-related content is mostly due to the type of content that is often circulated in Saudi media when discussing Iran—i.e., it is often loaded with terror accusations and threats, as discussed earlier in this chapter. This is evident in the type of translated content found on other political topics, such as Iraq, Syria, Canada, and the USA. In all of those, the content highlights issues related to terrorism and/or political tension.

Chapter Conclusion

This chapter began with an overview of the topics and themes that are translated and found in EngCorpus. The findings show that political topics, namely, Iran and

Israel/Palestine, are the two most frequently translated. Social topics, namely, human

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rights and hate speech, were the third and fourth most frequently translated topics in

EngCorpus.

Focusing on the three most translated topics, Iran, Israel/Palestine, and Human

Rights, the study compared the translated content on these topics to the untranslated content found in the two most translated newspapers used in the English corpus on each topic. The study used a two-step analysis. First, frequency wordlists for both the English and Arabic corpora were created and compared. When the results suggested major differences, the following step was taken: the titles of translated reports were compared with those of untranslated articles that were published around major dates found in the corresponding English corpus. Findings and patterns were highlighted in terms of which sources, authors and themes were translated and which were not.

The overall findings suggest that there are major patterns in the way MEMRI selects content for translation. First, MEMRI targets Arabic media in particular.66

Second, MEMRI focuses on topics that are often loaded with content related to terror, tension, human rights, and/or hate themes. Third, within each topic, MEMRI selects certain themes while ignoring others. Fourth, sources are carefully selected. MEMRI prefers official major media outlets, but when there is little or no content that feeds its circulated narratives, it readily selects and translates from unrepresentative sources, such as YouTube and Twitter. Sixth, authors are selected, regardless of their authority, based on two criteria: Are they liberals who condemn their societies or at least who may serve

66 As presented in Chapter 1, and highlighted in earlier studies, which are discussed in Chapter Two. 200

as witnesses of the existence of terror and hatred in Arab societies? Or are they religious figures who are translated to provide evidence of hate and backwardness or of the abuse of women in Islam or Muslim countries?

All these steps were presented in the analysis, and the most translated topics and themes were discussed. In the discussion of the translated content related to Iran, the study did not find sufficient evidence in the untranslated corpus to prove that the selected and translated content was not representative of Saudi media. However, there is evidence that US-related content is more prevalent in Saudi media than Iran-related content, yet the latter is selected for translation because of the type of themes that are often circulated in

Saudi media in its handling of Iran-related issues, which often carry terror and destruction accusations. Not only this, but MEMRI also translates Iranian media that express similar content toward SA. Both serve as evidence of chaos and terror in the region, and the fact that both countries are Muslim majority countries is enough to establish a narrative about how terrorism is prevalent in Muslim countries.

The findings on the topic of Israel/Palestine reveal the second and third levels of selectivity. The content related to this topic was far less in the Saudi press than content related to the USA or Iran, yet it was selected for translation mostly because the topic was important to MEMRI. Not only this, the translated content on this topic is either very critical of Palestinian leaders or praises Israel, portraying it as a peaceful and prosperous nation. However, in the Arabic untranslated corpus, the findings suggest that the translated content is not representative of the Saudi press, or only partially representative,

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as there is an abundance of untranslated content that blames and criticizes Israel for its maneuverings in the peace process, its multiple violations of signed agreements, and its crimes against unarmed Palestinians.

The findings on the topic of human rights reveal patterns similar to those found on the topic of Israel/Palestine, that is, in the selection of the topic and sub-themes, as well as the sources. Selecting the topic itself and then the sub-themes is evidence of selectivity. Themes related to women’s rights are the most translated on this topic.

However, the untranslated corpus reveals untranslated themes that have little to do with the themes circulated by MEMRI, such as wife beating and polygamy. Many untranslated articles, for example, celebrate major progress on the most criticized issues related to women rights in SA, such as women driving, guardianship, and equal employment opportunities, yet MEMRI prefers to ignore such content and select from other sources for translation, such as Twitter, and from other genres, such as cartoons from non-Saudi sources, to claim that any progress on women’s rights in SA are mere “formalities.”

The remaining translated topics were not investigated in depth in this study, but a brief analysis of the translated sources and authors confirms similar patterns in the top three translated topics. For example, on the topic of hate speech, more than 80% of the translated content comes from individual accounts on YouTube or unpopular religious

TV. Very little translated content comes from newspapers, which were the main source on political topics.

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Hence patterns of selectivity in translation are found across all the translated topics to varying degrees. With some topics, selectivity patterns did not go beyond the selection of the topic itself, as with Iran-related content. With other topics, strong selectivity patterns were found in the topic and sub-themes but little in the sources and authors, such as the topic of Israel/Palestine. However, with the remaining topics, selectivity patterns were found that ranged from the selection of the topic to the selection of sources and authors, as with the topics of human rights and hate speech.

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CHAPTER SIX

TITLE TRANSLATION

The last two chapters were meant to investigate whether MEMRI’s translations and the sources it used were representative of SA’s overall media sources and content.

Some patterns in selectivity, especially in terms of topics and sources, were presented.

The argument was that sources and topics were carefully selected in order to enforce and circulate specific narratives and images that are not representative of Saudi media.

However, the selection of specific topics, themes and sources for translation is not the only tool that can be used to manipulate and frame texts and content in translation. The use of appealing titles is also an important tool, and this will be discussed in this chapter.

Because of the importance of such framing, this chapter will discuss the translation of titles. The chapter starts by presenting an overview of the patterns found in title translations in EngCorpus. It then presents a detailed discussion of examples of some of the titles found in EngCorpus along with the source text titles to highlight the overall patterns in selectivity in general and in title translation in particular.

Results and Discussion

There were 300 reports published online in MEMRI’s archive of SA, as presented and discussed in Chapter Five. However, the study was able to retrieve only 79 Arabic titles of the materials used in the translations. This is due to two factors. First, forty percent of the published reports were clip reports with no mention of the source

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video/show’s title and no link to the source material, which made it difficult to find the

Arabic titles of these clips. Second, many of the reports were based on multiple resources from different genres, such as tweets and cartoons, many of which did not have Arabic titles, which makes the English titles of such reports not useful in investigating how titles were translated, because such reports use generic titles for the translated materials.

Therefore, focusing only on reports based on a single source material, the study was able to collect 79 English titles with the original Arabic titles. The majority of these titles (93.5%) were from special dispatch reports that were based on newspaper articles; the few remaining titles (6.5%) were from clip reports. All these titles were used to create a small corpus (EngTraTitles) for analysis using Wordsmith Tools.

The overall analysis of these reports reveals three patterns, as described below.

First Pattern: Adding Addressing Words

Here addressing words are the words that are often used to describe or introduce the author or source of the translated material. MEMRI frequently makes use of addressing words such as Saudi, Islamic, journalist, and cleric in the reports’ titles. Such words serve to draw a link between the authors’ opinions and their affiliation, country and/or religion. The word Saudi, for example, was used as a modifier 89% of the time in

EngTraTitles and 84% of the time in the report titles of EngCorpus.67 Saudi was often used as a modifier for professions, such as columnist, journalist, and writer; for religious figures, such as, cleric, preacher and imam, and less often, for more general words, such

67 Not counting Saudi as a modifier for Arabia in Saudi Arabia, which often appeared in the titles as well. 205

as daily, and TV. It even modified words with negative connotation such as jihadi. Table

17 shows only the top 10 R1 collocate words that were frequently used with Saudi in the titles in EngCorpus.68 Note, the word Saudi appeared 242 as a modifier to 80 words in the

English titles of EngCorpus. Table 17 only shows the top 10 R1 collocates with the word

Saudi (111 of the 242 occurrences).

Table 17

Top 10 R1 Collocates to the Word ‘Saudi’ in the English Titles of EngCorpus

R1 WORD FREQUENCY 1 JOURNALIST 28 2 CLERIC 22 3 COLUMNIST 19 4 DAILY 13 5 WRITER 13 6 PRESS 10 7 GOVERNMENT 6 8 AMBASSADOR 5 9 SCHOLAR 5 10 AUTHOR 4

All such addressing words, which of course are not in the original Arabic titles, are presumedly used to serve one of two purposes. First, words such as writer and journalist establish that the translated content is from a credible source from the country’s media, and the authors serve as witnesses of the narratives presented. Second, titles with words such as cleric and preacher serve as examples of the country’s media

68 R1 collocate words are those that appeared as the first word to the right of Saudi. 206

content, and the authors serve as representatives of popular authors in the country’s media. The latter has the key advantage of linking the translated content with the religion of the translated authors and their country. In both cases, this strategy serves to obscure the fact that most of the translated materials cannot be claimed to be representative, as they are no more than the subjective opinions of their authors, who are often not authoritative figures in their source culture, and there are often other authors who express different opinions but were not translated, as shown in Chapter Five. This is especially true when we know that the majority of translated newspaper materials are opinion pieces and that the majority of video clips are from YouTube. More importantly, selecting one text over others gives the author of the selected text greater resonance and may have the effect of simplifying the presentation of Saudi discourse.

Second Pattern: Replacing Original Titles

This pattern was evident in 94% of the 78 titles in EngTraTitles. Not only were

Arabic titles replaced, but the original titles of newspaper articles that were originally published in English in the Saudi press were also replaced most of the time. Out of 12 articles originally published in English and were found in EngCorpus, only four articles were published by MEMRI with their original titles, after adding addressing words similar to the ones discussed in the first pattern above. Table 18 shows the only four

English titles that were not replaced by MEMRI.

Table 18

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Original English Titles That Were Retained in MEMRI’s Reports

MEMRI’s Title Original English Title 1 Saudi Prince Turki Al-Faisal to Mr. Obama, We Are Not Free Riders. (Arab News, March Obama: ‘We Are Not Free 14, 2016) Riders’ (Special Dispatch No.6348) 2 Senior Columnist Raghida Is Trump Endorsing Obama’s Policy in Iraq and Syria? Dergham in Saudi Daily: 'Is (Arab News, July 30, 2017) Trump Endorsing Obama's Policy in Iraq and Syria?' (Special Dispatch No.7035) 3 AbdAlRahman AlRashed: Doha Doha Must Wave the White Flag. (Alarabiya.net, June 28, Must Wave the White Flag 2017) (Special Dispatch No.6988) 4 Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. Why Iran’s Malign Behavior Must Be Confronted — Not Khalid Bin Salman: 'Iran's Appeased (Arab News, July 23, 2018) Malign Behavior Must Be Confronted, Not Appeased' Like Nazi Germany's in the 1930s (Special Dispatch No.7585)

It is surprising that the four retained titles above were related to political topics such as the US and Iran, but not Israel/Palestine. However, when we look at the titles that were replaced, they were related to the narratives that MEMRI circulates about the Saudi and Arab societies or about Israel and Palestine political issues. Table 19 shows the

English titles that were replaced in MEMRI’s reports.

Table 19

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English Original Titles That Were Replaced in MEMRI’s Reports

MEMRI’s Title Original English Title 1 Saudi Columnist: 'Selfish' Why are Saudi Women against their Husbands Taking a Women Who Keep Their Second Wife? (Saudi Gazette, January 10, 2018) Husbands from Taking Second Wife Cause Them to Commit Adultery (Special Dispatch No.7435) 2 AbdAlRahman AlRashed: Nadia Murad’s Story Shames the World (Alarabiya.net, Terror Is Product of Extremism August 11, 2106) in Media, Mosques and Schools (Special Dispatch No.6570) 3 Prominent Saudi Journalist Educating Europe's Refugees as Important as Feeding AbdAlRahman AlRashed: Them (Alarabiya.net, January 16, 2017) Europe Must Educate The Syrian Refugees to Prevent Them from Being Radicalized By Resident Extremist Muslims (Special Dispatch No.6327) 4 Saudi Columnist: The Future of A Critical Look at the Past Is an Absolute Must Arabs and Muslims will Remain (Alarabiya.net, March 14, 2017) Dark Unless They Subject Their Values and Heritage to a Critical Assessment (Special Dispatch No. 6832)

In all the examples in Table 19, the original English titles were replaced with new titles that highlight a statement from the original text or a biased interpretation of it. For example, in the first example, the original title was a question that does not tell much about the author’s opinion nor about the content of the article, but it is clear from the title that Saudi women do not support polygamy; whether the author is in favor or against it is 209

a different matter, which is not clear from the title alone. MEMRI, however, prefers a title that is shocking and that would most likely trigger a reaction and an interpretation even before reading the text.

The second example in Table 19 is worthy of a closer look. The original English title is clearly blaming the world, as the story of Nadia Murad and other girls who were raped by terrorists in Iraq shames “the world.” How that story shames the world is explained in the body text in which the writer says, “her tragedy and that of her people will remain a disgrace to the entire world forever” (Alrashed, 2016).69 In his article,

Alrashed blames the world for allowing extremists—who “may live in Paris or Kuala

Lumpur” (ibid.)—to preach extremism, whether in schools, media or mosques around the word. However, MEMRI’s title completely ignores the tragedy of Nadia and the writer’s casting of blame onto the whole world and presents a statement from the text out of context in order to associate “terror” with “mosques,” which are mostly in the Muslim world.

The third example is also of special importance in how it was selected and translated. The original English title is “Educating Europe’s Refugees [is] as Important as

Feeding Them”, without any mention of terrorism or radicalization. Although the writer states that it is important to educate new refugees to Europe in order to help them integrate into their new society and protect them from attempts to radicalize them by

69 http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2016/08/11/Nadia-Murad-s-story-shames-the- world.html 210

extremists in Europe, he never uses the word “Muslim,” nor any word related to Islam, as a modifier or precedent to “extremists.” In fact, the only time the word Muslim is mentioned in the text is in the last paragraph, in which the writer says,

I am confident that it is possible to spread the culture of co-existence and

tolerance, which can be derived from the refugees’ Muslim [emphasis added] and

Middle Eastern culture that has collapsed in the last three decades due to

extremist and hateful ideologies and ongoing wars. (Alrashed, 2016)70

Although Muslim in this context is used in a positive way to argue that Muslim culture has always been, except in the past thirty years, tolerant and promoting co-existence,

MEMRI replaced the original English title with “Europe Must Educate the Syrian

Refugees to Prevent Them from Being Radicalized by Resident Extremist Muslims”

(Special Dispatch No. 6327), reinforcing the idea that he is talking about “extremist

Muslims,” not extremists in general, and thereby associating Muslims with terrorism.

The fourth example in Table 19 is similar to the third one discussed above.

MEMRI’s title includes the words Arab and Muslim to support its narrative that Arab and

Muslim societies “will Remain Dark Unless They Subject Their Values and Heritage to a

Critical Assessment” (Special Dispatch No. 6832).

Third Pattern: Titles Are Retained only if They Are Loaded or Contribute to the

70 http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2016/01/17/Educating-Europe-s-refugees-as- important-as-feeding-them.html 211

Desired Narrative

As stated above, 94% of the 79 titles in EngTraTitles were replaced with new titles that highlight single statements or enforce an interpretation by adding addressing words such as Saudi and cleric and/or other modifying words such as Arab and Muslim.

This makes it necessary to investigate why the remaining 6% of the Arabic titles were translated but not replaced. Table 20 shows the three titles that were closely translated and not replaced.

Table 20

Closely Translated Titles

MEMRI’s Translation Original Arabic Title آخر السياسيين األمريكيين Saudi Journalist Mourns Passing 1 المحترمين ! of Sen. John McCain: He Was 'The Last of The Honorable ['The Last of the Honorable American Politicians' and He American Politicians] (Okaz, Understood the Importance of August 27, 2018)71 Saudi-U.S. Relations (Special Dispatch No.7645) سليماني.. الشيطان اإلرهابي األكبر Saudi Daily: IRGC Qods Force 2 Commander Qassem Soleimani [Soleimani ... the Greatest Is 'The Great Terrorist Satan' Terrorist Satan] (Okaz, May 30, (Special Dispatch No.6455) 2016)72 شيطنة الكونغرس .. تفتح أبواب :'Saudi Government Daily 'Okaz 3 Senate's Passage of Bill جهنم على أكبر دولة في العالم Allowing to Sue Saudi Arabia for September 11 Attacks will

71 https://www.okaz.com.sa/article/1666670/ 72 https://www.okaz.com.sa/article/1059604 212

'Open Gates of Hell' for U.S. [Satanizing Congress …will (Special Dispatch No.6442) Open Gates of Hell for the World’s Biggest Country] (Okaz, May 16, 2016)73

As Table 20 shows, MEMRI did not replace these original titles as it did with most of the other titles. Rather, in addition to other strategies, such as using addressing words, the titles were very closely translated to reflect the exact words of the original titles. So why weren’t these titles replaced like the other ones? Although this is a very limited set of examples, the only explanation is that all the original Arabic titles were already sufficiently loaded that MEMRI chose to translate them literally.

The first title in the table, for example, is loaded enough in that it implicitly says that none of the living American politicians is honorable. Whether this was the writer’s intention or not, the title serves to indicate there is tension in U.S.-Saudi relations.

The second and third titles in Table 20 use very strong words, such as Satan and hell, and both highlight escalating tension between SA, on the one hand, and Iran and the

U.S., on the other hand. Such titles do not need to be replaced, as they are loaded enough the way they are.

Fourth Pattern: Selective Titles in Selective Topics

This pattern is like the umbrella pattern of all of the four patterns found in

MEMRI in regard to title translation. That is, many titles were created by MEMRI based on a single statement in the body text, or worse, an interpretation of it. More importantly,

73 https://www.okaz.com.sa/article/1058030 213

a comparison of the titles suggests that the most ideologically and politically motivated titles were related to four topics: Israel/Palestine, human rights, hate speech, and terrorism/extremism. In other words, a title on those topics must either highlight a statement in favor of Israel or a statement that portrays Saudi or Arab/Muslim societies negatively. In the following paragraphs, we discuss a few titles in only two of those topics to show how unrepresentative the single statements used in these titles were. Note that all four patterns discussed above can be found in a single title.

Since the first two topics were discussed in depth in Chapter Five in terms of the selected themes and sources, the discussion below will be limited to titles on the other two topics, terrorism/extremism and hate speech.

Terrorism/Extremism. Most of the translated newspaper articles on this topic present a strong condemnation by Saudi media of extremism and terrorism and related incidents. However, MEMRI frames the texts by adding paratextual materials and by altering the original titles, in the ways shown above, thereby presenting them as evidence that extremist preachers are given a media platform in Arab and Muslim countries and that no one is doing anything to stop them. Table 21 shows examples of translated articles with their original Arabic titles, followed by a discussion of how the titles were translated, or rather replaced.

Table 21

Examples of Titles in Translated Reports Related to Terrorism/Extremism

MEMRI’s Title Original Arabic Title

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حين كان العرب يصفقون للعمليات اإلرهابية Saudi Writer: It Is our Duty to Condemn 1 Terror Attacks against Civilians – They Harm [When Arabs Used to Clap for Terrorist Innocent People and Damage the Arab Attacks] Reputation (Special Dispatch No. 6863) (AlSurayhi, April 5, 2016)74 األقليات المسلمة في الغرب..هل قامت بواجبها؟ :Saudi Writer to Muslims in the West 2 Integrate into Local Societies and Work [Muslim Minorities in the West - Have against Terrorism (Special Dispatch No. 6755) They Done Their Duty?] [MEMRI’s translation in the report’s intro] (Al-Abad, December 27, 2016)75 االنتحار في سبيل هللا Saudi Writer: Islamic Law Prohibits Suicide 3 Attacks – but Clerics Fear to Speak out [Suicide for The Sake of God] (AlMugrin, against Them (Special Dispatch No. 6593) August 2, 2016)76

حين “ In the first example in the table above, the title of the AlSurayhi article was

When Arabs Used to Clap for Terrorist Attacks], which] ”كان العرب يصفقون للعمليات اإلرهابية

kaana}, which means used to. The article was a response to the} كان uses the Arabic word metro bombing in St. Petersburg, Russia, on April 3, 2017, in which 14 people were killed. Condemning all terror attacks, AlSurayhi writes, is a human duty no matter who carried them out and who was the target (AlSurayhi, 2016). In this context, AlSurayhi expresses his joy that Arabs have realized their mistakes, because in the past “we Arabs used to cheer and praise similar operations carried out by some Palestinian groups against civilians in Israel […]” (ibid.). These actions, he argues, have harmed the Palestinians’ cause to restore their land and the Arabs’ reputation because they supported such actions

74 https://www.okaz.com.sa/article/1537824 75 http://www.alriyadh.com/1557871 76 https://www.alwatan.com.sa/article/31402/ 215

(ibid.). In this context, it is clear the author regrets the past and is grateful that Arabs do not react that way anymore. However, the title is manipulated in such a way as to suggest that the writer is claiming that Arabs still support terrorist attacks against civilians.

Although it is not the focus of this study, there were significant ideological translational shifts in the translation of this article—e.g., shifting the tense from factual past to hypothetical past and adding unnecessary words to link past incidents with the

"كنا كعرب نهتف طويال ونشيد بأعمال مماثلة كانت recent incident. For example, in the sentence

we as Arabs used to praise such] تقوم بها بعض الفصائل الفلسطينية ضد المواطنين داخل اسرائيل operations carried out by some Palestinian groups against civilians in Israel] was translated by MEMRI as “we Arabs would loudly cheer and praise [terror attacks] like

[the one in St. Petersburg] carried out by some Palestinian factions against civilians in

Israel” (MEMRI, 2016, Special Dispatch No. 6863), the square brackets and what is in between were added by MEMRI. The words in square brackets change the meaning in such a way as to suggest that the writer is claiming that Arabs supported terror attacks in general, like the one in St. Petersburg, while from the original context without the added words it is clear that he meant the ones carried out in Israel.

The second title in Table 21 was for an article by Al-Abad. The title of his article is [Muslim Minorities in the West – Have They Done Their Duty?] [MEMRI’s translation in the report’s intro]. What is surprising is that MEMRI provides this literal and accurate translation of the original title in the introduction to the report. However, the title of the actual report is completely different: “Saudi Writer to Muslims in the West:

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Integrate into Local Societies and Work Against Terrorism.” The original title was a question that does not say much about the author’s argument or give an opinion on whether Muslim minorities in the West have done their duty. In addition to other strategies, such as using addressing words in the title “Saudi writer” and the negative word “terrorism”, MEMRI uses a title that implies that all Muslims in the West are not doing their duty and are not integrating into their societies. This not even what the writer says in the body text.

In his article, Al-Abad acknowledges that “Arab and Muslim minorities that live in the diaspora are often good and innocent communities, that have in the past carried out beautiful and important initiatives […]” (Al-Abad, December 27, 2016).77 He gives an example of the initiative that was carried out by the Muslim community in Lens, France, to protect Churches there during Christmas celebrations, “which was very well received”

(ibid.). He concludes by saying that such initiatives are important but still limited and thus should be carried out more often (ibid.). The writer does not give a clear answer to whether Muslim minorities in the West have done their duty. Rather, he uses a title that encourages readers to read the article and decide for themselves, but MEMRI uses a title that attributes to Muslims in the West the command “Work Against Terrorism!”, as if they are not doing anything.

The third and final example of MEMRI’s manipulation of titles on the topic of terrorism and extremism is evident in Special Dispatch No. 6593, published with the title

77 http://www.alriyadh.com/1557871 217

“Saudi Writer: Islamic Law Prohibits Suicide Attacks – But Clerics Fear to Speak out

Suicide] االنتحار في سبيل هللا against Them.” The original title of the translated article was for The Sake of God] (AlMugrin, August 2, 2016). The title is meant to be cynical, because in Islam suicide is prohibited, as the writer notes in the body of the text, but terrorist groups nonetheless encourage young people to carry out such attacks against civilians (ibid).

In his argument, AlMugrin states that “Muslim clerics today have already responded to the justifications used by terrorist groups […] But, in my opinion, their efforts are still insufficient […]” (ibid.). Then he argues that, “on the issue of suicide, some clerics [emphasis added], unfortunately, are still unable to criticize it for fear of criticizing the historic heritage and in an effort to resist innovation […]” (ibid.).

So, it is clear that the writer was urging “some,” not all, clerics who have not condemned “suicide” to do so. However, MEMRI’s title uses “clerics” in general and adds the word attack to suicide in “Suicide Attacks.” Even in the text, when the writer is talking about suicide in general, MEMRI’s translation included the word “attacks” each time the word “suicide” appeared.

Finally, in all three examples, the other title translation patterns were evident.

Addressing words were frequently used to link the content to the source. In addition,

MEMRI made every effort to associate Muslims and Arabs with terrorism by adding words such as Muslims and Islam to negative words in the title. Moreover, each title promoted an interpretation of the text that altered the goal of the original articles from

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providing evidence that the Saudi press and media are making every effort to condemn terrorism and extremism whenever it happens, regardless of the country, religion or ethnicity involved, to evidence of terrorism as prevalent in Muslim/Arab societies in general and in SA in particular.

Hate speech. Many of the titles on this topic are clearly selective. Similar to the patterns discussed above, the titles focus on a statement or a distorted interpretation of it.

And of special significance is that the original titles of many of the translated materials, video clips in particular, were about a completely different topic, dedicating only a very small portion to the topic of the translated report, based on which the new title was created. The table below shows examples of titles on this topic with their original titles and translations.

Table 22

Examples of Titles in Translated Reports Related to Hate Speech

MEMRI’s Title Original Arabic Title and Translation فلسطين ملك اليهود؟! معلومات غريبة ورهيبه Saudi Blogger Wields Dagger in 1 Antisemitic Skit, Celebrates “Jerusalem [Palestine Belongs to the Jews?! Strange Intifada” – Archival (Mar 2017, Clip No. and Interesting Info] (Iskander, Oct 23, 5973) 2015)78 شمس ع السيف .. حلقة نارية مع الفنانة شمس Saudi-Kuwaiti Singer Shams Bandar Slams 2 الكويتية Arabs' Antisemitic Notions, Adds: I'm Not against Gays, but They Are Sick Unhappy People, Most of Whom Commit Suicide (Clip No. 6792)

78 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cnETqES-weg 219

[Shams in The Seef [name of the show], an Episode on Fire with Artist Shams Alkuwaitiah] (ATV, 2018)79 مكانة المرأة في اإلسلم! Saudi Cleric Muhammad Al-Shemali: Women 3 in the West Suffer Humiliation and [Women’s Status in Islam] (Alshemali, Degradation (Clip No.5648) 2016)80 لماذا يكره الغرب المهاجرين العرب والمسلمين؟ Saudi Journalist: If Muslims Despise The 4 'Infidel' West, Why Are They So Eager To [Why Does the West Hate Arab and Muslim Live There? (Special Dispatch No.7840) Immigrants?] (Al-Alshaikh, 2018)81 ملف منسي! Saudi Journalist: the Arab Countries 5 Oppressed Their Jews, Failed to Benefit From [Forgotten File!] (Shobokshi, 2018)82 Their Presence (Special Dispatch No.7433) إمبراطورية روتشيلد المالية Writer for Official Saudi Daily: The Jews 6 Have an Eternal Plot to Destroy Mankind [Rothschild Financial Empire] (Alqahtani, (Special Dispatch No.6927) 2017)83

As Table 22 shows, all the original titles were replaced with titles that focus on the narratives that MEMRI circulates about Arabs’ anti-Semitic and anti-Western attitudes. In fact, some titles go so far as to alter the topic of the original material. For example, the original title of the third example in the table above is for a 40-minute-long

TV show about women in Islam, but the translated clip was only two minutes long and dealt only with women in the West. Similarly, the Arabic title of the fourth example in the table is for a newspaper article in which the writer discusses “why the West Hates

79 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=omon6TR-99c 80 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=49jw0nm5JlQ 81 http://www.al-jazirah.com/2018/20180708/lp6.htm 82 https://aawsat.com/home/article/1208136/ 83 https://www.alwatan.com.sa/article/33226/ 220

Arab and Muslim Immigrants,” but MEMRI’s translation is about why “Muslims Despise the ‘Infidel’ West.” Such titles underscore selectivity without even going into detail regarding the translated content. However, other titles were not as clearly selective as those titles. They appear to be a summary of the translated material, as in examples five and six above. Below is a discussion of only the first two titles in the table to shed some light on how they promote MEMRI’s politics.

The first three examples in Table 22 are from translated video clips from the only five video clip reports whose source materials and titles could be found. Thus, discussing at least two of them can shed some light on how titles on the topic of hate speech are selected, and it is also a good opportunity to shed some light on how MEMRI translates

(subtitles) video clips.

Hate speech: title one. In addition to MEMRI’s selection of the title, the first example in Table 22 is very significant for three reasons. First, it was uploaded to

YouTube on March 23, 2015 but was published and translated by MEMRI in August

2017. MEMRI tends to use the word “archival” in its published title when the translated material was published more than a year earlier. It is not clear if this material had been translated before the period under investigation. More importantly, MEMRI does not provide the accurate publication date of the video clip reports. Rather, it uses the same publication date of the source material, which means the average audience would not notice such a big gap between the publication of the source material and its translation.

Because MEMRI’s reports appear in chronological order when a specific archive is

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chosen, however, the study was able to discover this publication strategy, which is very common in many TV clip reports.

Second, the source of the video, according to MEMRI, is YouTube. The author of the video is a Saudi “blogger”, whose channel Anas Iskander, by August 2019, had 2.4 million subscribers. Although this is obviously a large number of subscribers, the channel ranked 71 among the top 250 Saudi YouTube channels, according to Socialblade.com

(2019).84 However, the channel, which was created in 2014, had acquired most of its subscribers in 2017 and 2018 and was not even among the top 250 Saudi YouTube channels in 2015 (ibid.), the year the video was uploaded to YouTube. This raises a question over MEMRI’s selection criteria of materials as well as sources. In other words, how could such a video, assuming it is indeed anti-Semitic, from an unpopular YouTube channel, at least when it was translated, get MEMRI’s attention among the millions of videos and channels on YouTube? This suggests that the most likely strategy for selecting content for translation from YouTube is using specific keywords on specific topics that feed the circulated narratives, regardless of whether they are representative of the majority of media content.

The third reason is related to the length of the video. On average, the length of

MEMRI’s published video clips is three minutes, with some clips as short as one minute

84 Socialblade is an online platform that compiles data from social media outlets such as YouTube, Twitter, and Instagram to produce statistical graphs and charts that track their progress and growth. The statistics are freely available to anyone using its website or smartphone apps (https://socialblade.com/info). For a list of the top 100 YouTube channels in Saudi Arabia, see Appendix B. 222

or as long as six minutes, taken from source materials that are on average 30–40 minutes long. However, this clip was 2:47 minutes long and taken from a video that was already short, 3:51 minutes. This raises the question of why the rest of the video was not translated, since it is within the average length of MEMRI’s translated clips. Was the omitted material irrelevant to the title MEMRI had created? Or was it inconsistent with

MEMRI’s narratives? A comparison between the translated clip and the source video shows that the non-translated portion was the last minute of the source video, which presented what the author claims as facts related to how Israel has killed hundreds of

Palestinian children, causes a humanitarian crisis almost on a daily basis, and has frequently blocked Palestinians from entering the Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem (Iskander,

2015, min 2:55). It is unclear why MEMRI omitted such claims, regardless of their truth, while many translated clips that were based on unsubstantiated claims but attacked Arab and Saudi societies were translated, as shown in reports translating Nadine Budaier on the topic of human rights.

Based on all of these framing strategies, the most important element of the report, the title, was created. The original title was “Palestine Belongs to the Jews?! Strange and

Interesting Info!,” which clearly states the goal of the video, to shed some light on claims that the people of Israel were the first to live in Jerusalem/Palestine (ibid.). In the video,

Iskander plays two roles, that of himself, an Arab, and that of another person dressed as an Orthodox Jew. After exchanging some claims about who lived in Palestine first,

Iskander argues that Israelis had occupied Palestine by military force in a clear violation

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of the UN 276 law (ibid.), then the Orthodox Jew says to him: “You are a liar.

Palestinians are terrorists. They want to kill us with knives.” To this, Iskander responds by raising a knife, saying: “Strange! We take knives to defend ourselves and we are labeled ‘terrorists.’ The Jews fight us with tanks, planes, rockets, and heavy weaponry, and the entire world defends them” (ibid, 2:20). MEMRI framed the whole scene by using the title “Saudi Blogger Wields Dagger in Antisemitic Skit, Celebrates ‘Jerusalem

Intifada’ – Archival.” All strategies of framing discussed earlier are used here and the features of the narrative are manipulated.

Hate speech: title two. The second example discussed here is of a clip report about an alleged Saudi singer who expresses anti-gay sentiments, and who allegedly accuses Arabs of being anti-Semitic and confirms that anti-Semitic notions are prevalent in Arab countries, although it is clear that such content is merely the opinion of its author and cannot be claimed to be representative of the author’s nationality, religion or affiliation. Below is a brief discussion of MEMRI’s framing strategies in its translation of the report’s title in terms of how the singer is addressed, the length and selection of the translated clip, and how the title was selected based on a comparison of the selected and translated clip with the original.

The first strategy used in the title involves presenting the author’s nationality as an evidence of the representativeness of the source and the authority of the author. This strategy was found in the majority of the investigated reports. However, in this example, the author, Shams, is a multinational singer. She was born in Saudi Arabia but was raised

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and grew up in Kuwait. In 2012, she announced in a TV interview that she had acquired

Mexican citizenship.85 In 2015, she announced that she had dropped her dual Arab citizenship, from SA and Kuwait, after having obtained British and French citizenship, according to Al-Arabia.86 The translated clip was from a TV interview in 2017, a time when she was, technically, neither Saudi nor Kuwaiti and could safely claim British or

French citizenship. So can we argue that her views are representative of the British or

French people? Was MEMRI not aware of this fact when the report was published? What if the title were “British-French Singer: I’m Not against Gays, They Are Sick Unhappy

People, Most of Whom Commit Suicide?” Would MEMRI dare to publish such title?

Now we come to the second strategy, which is the selection of the translated portion of the original show, on the basis of which the new title was created. The translated clip runs for 3:55 minutes, while the original TV show runs for one hour, seventeen minutes and fourteen seconds (1:17:14).87 MEMRI’s title was clearly based on the translated three-minute clip. So can the translated clip be considered a representative portion of the entire program?

”شمس ع السيف .. حلقة نارية مع الفنانة شمس الكويتية“ The Arabic title of the show was which literally means [Shams in the Seef [the name of the show]… An Episode on Fire with Artist Shams Alkuwaitia.] Thus, the Arabic title suggests that there are lots of hot

85 https://www.alraimedia.com/Home/Details?Id=2be26f12-d097-4851-b885-015bb0fb3b16 86 https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/last-page/2015/06/23 87 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=omon6TR-99c 225

and exciting topics or statements discussed by the guest, who is known for such things, but the title does not say anything more about the content. Shams discussed different topics ranging from her personal life and albums to sports and politics, and at the end of the show she talked about her recent tweets, which the host asked her about. The translated clip relates only to the latter. It starts by the host asking the guest about her two tweets which have “caused a commotion.” In one of the tweets she wished Jews a happy new year according to the Muslims’ calendar. In the second tweet, she replied to some fans’ question about gays, to which she responded, “something along the lines of leave the creations to the Creator” (ibid, 1:02:20), an Arabic saying which means leave them alone, or they are not my/our business.

The host asked her about the first tweet, saying that people may have not understood her tweet correctly as “there are people who do not differentiate between

Jews and Israelis, which is a different situation […] First tell us about the tweet blessing the Jewish religion.” (ibid, 1:02:10). Shams replies with anger and irony:

So burn them. Bring Hitler back, bring ovens… We have modern ovens that burn

faster… You can solve it this way… How is this your business? Who created the

Jews? I don’t understand, who created them? Did Mandela create them? No, God

created them. Moses is mentioned in the Quran more than the Prophet

Muhammad. Moses is mentioned in the Quran 145 times. [MEMRI’s translation]

(ibid, min 1:02:46).

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There was one minute omitted after these words, which will be discussed below, but now let us discuss how MEMRI selected its title based on these words. Based on these words, MEMRI claims that Shams “Slams Arabs’ Antisemitic Notions.” How

Hitler’s crimes and the Holocaust were Arabs’ notions is not clear. And how these words could mean that Shams is saying anything about Arabs’ anti-Semitism is also not clear.

From the host’s question, it is clear that the singer’s fans may have been angry because they did not know whom she meant, the Israelis living in Israel/Palestine or Jews in general.

Additionally, besides the forced interpretation and framing of the translated content, there is a significant omission within the selected clip. The first translated word in the clip starts at minute 1:1:56 of the original show, and the last word ends at minute

1:06:26. This means that the clip should be 4:30 minutes long, but it is not. It is only 3:55 minutes, including the 20-second introduction about MEMRI, meaning that there was one minute omitted from the translated clip. The omission of a 30-second clip can be justified as the guest was laughing and making asides, but the remaining 30 seconds are significant to the context in which Shams was still angrily wondering why her fans would be angry because she blessed Jews. She was still talking about the prophet Moses when she said:

How can I refute his existence and the existence of his followers who follow his

path? I follow the path of our prophet Moses as the Quran says, ‘We make no

distinction between any of His messengers.’ How? One of the conditions of Islam

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is to believe in all prophets and their messages, otherwise your belief as a Muslim

is incomplete. Right? How do you want me to eliminate and ignore another

religion? How am I better than them? (ibid, 1:03:11 to 1:03:41)

The only plausible reason that this portion of the clip was omitted is that it goes against

MEMRI’s meta-narrative of the anti-Semitic nature of Arabs and Muslims. In fact, any sentence from the omitted portion could have been used as a title to tell a different narrative, one that sheds a more positive light on Muslims and Arabs in general, but it would not have fit MEMRI’s narratives and political agenda.

The second part of the title is related to Shams’ opinion of homosexuality, which was based on her reply to the host’s question regarding her second tweet. When the host asked her to clarify what she meant with her neutral tweet about homosexuality, she repeatedly asked the host if she could keep it to herself and be neutral by saying: “There are those who oppose them and those who support them. Am I allowed, with your permission, to be somebody who neither opposes nor supports them?”, because it is simply none of her business, as she says (ibid, 1:04:12). When the host insists, demanding clarification, she says with some hesitation that she believes that homosexuality is caused by hormones or a congenital mental disorder and that homosexuals themselves wish they are not so, and thus are unhappy (ibid.). MEMRI interpreted her opinion and used it in the second part of the title as “I’m Not against

Gays, But They Are Sick Unhappy People, Most of Whom Commit Suicide.”

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Regardless of her opinion on this matter and how MEMRI understood and translated it, the key part here is how MEMRI presents some opinions as personal in some cases, but representative and stereotyping in other cases. Shams’ opinion about

Jews, which was undoubtedly positive and tolerant, as shown above, was ignored because

MEMRI most likely believes it is personal and unrepresentative of Arab and Muslim views, but her negative view of homosexuality was not viewed as personal and was used as if it were representative of all Arabs, which was achieved by associating the singer’s views with her former nationalities.

To conclude, this report in particular reveals a lot about MEMRI’s strategies of selection in general and in clip subtitling in particular. First, the selected author and source are neither popular nor authoritative in SA or Arab countries, or at least they were not suitable sources of content related to hate speech. Second, the selected topic is selected from a wide range of topics discussed in the show. Third, the translated clip is only three minutes long, out of a 77-minute-long show. Fourth, the selected clip is based on selected segments of a selected clip on a selected topic; although it could have been at least 4:30 minutes long, without cuts, MEMRI omits any sentence within the clip that might jeopardize its narrative. Fifth, the association of citizenship, or former citizenship, with personal views to create a national image of societies is manipulative and ideologically motivated and can be argued to be racist and stereotyping, which is exactly the narrative MEMRI is circulating about Arab societies. Finally, replacing the title with

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a new one based on an unrepresentative single statement, or worse, a misinterpretation of that statement, is a strategy that MEMRI has mastered.

Conclusion

This chapter discusses important patterns found in MEMRI’s translations of titles.

Such patterns include the use of addressing words related to nationality and religion, either to claim that the source is representative of the source country’s media or that the content, after adding words with negative connotations to the title, is evidence of hateful or extremist speech in the country’s media and society.

Another pattern was found in the replacement of the original titles. Not only were

Arabic titles replaced, English original titles were also replaced with different ones, based on a statement in the source text or an interpretation of it. The very few titles that were closely translated and used as part of MEMRI’s report titles seem to have been translated only because they suited MEMRI’s agenda as they were either in favor of Israel or highly critical of Arab societies.

Finally, the overall pattern of manipulation is related to the degree to which

MEMRI’s titles were ideologically selective. Many examples were discussed and analyzed to show that titles are selected to promote the narratives that are often circulated in MEMRI’s translations on specific topics, mainly political content related to Israel and social content related to hate speech, terrorism and extremism. Thus, all of the findings discussed in this chapter support the third hypothesis of the study, that original titles are replaced with more shocking ones, often not reflective of the main idea of the article.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

Introduction

This chapter aims to provide direct answers to the study’s research questions based on the findings discussed in earlier chapters. It also restates the study’s main contributions, discusses the limitations, and suggests future research directions.

Findings and Research Questions

In terms of the research questions, the findings confirm the study’s main hypothesis and its supporting hypotheses. The first hypothesis of the study states that

MEMRI’s translations are carefully selected to tell a meta-narrative, namely, that the

Arab world is inherently and uniformly anti-Semitic and dangerous to Western civilization. The second hypothesis states that translated topics and themes are carefully selected to serve the same narrative. The third hypothesis states that titles are replaced and manipulated to frame the translated content and thus are not representative of the main idea of the source material.

There was sufficient evidence in the investigation of MEMRI’s selected sources, topics, themes and titles to confirm the first hypothesis and its supporting hypotheses.

That is, MEMRI translates all the major and non-major sources in Arab countries in general and SA in particular, yet it translates only content that serves its agenda to support Israel and influence US policy in the Middle East. This is achieved by circulating

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a meta-narrative of Arabs as inherently anti-Semitic and anti-American, feeding that narrative by supporting narratives of Arabs as extremists and uncivilized people who despise women and violate human rights. When MEMRI translates content that is related to Israel, it translates only materials that are in favor of Israel.

These narratives are found in the topics that MEMRI translates. All the translated topics, besides SA political tension with other countries, either present Israel as a peaceful state, compared with the failure of Arab states to achieve peace with Israel, or highlight stereotypes related to violations of women’s rights, or hate and extremist speech, as shown in Chapter Five. Even political content that highlights Saudi tension with other countries is negative, as it consists mostly of accusations of supporting terrorism, which serve to portray those countries, most of which are Arab and/or Muslim countries, as troublemakers, uncivilized and terrorist.

The biased and unrepresentative selectivity of sources and topics is supported by unrepresentative titles, which serve to ensure that the desired message is received.

Replacing titles using specific strategies to frame the translated material was found in the majority of the titles investigated, as discussed in Chapter Six.

Evidence of Patterns of Selectivity

Patterns of unrepresentative selectivity were also found in translated sources, topics, authors and titles. MEMRI’s criteria for selecting materials for translation seem to follow a series of steps, starting from the selection of sources and ending with the selection of titles.

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Sources were selected based on how the published material might serve to circulate common narratives and stereotypes about Arab societies. MEMRI prefers major sources, but it does not mind using minor sources, online and unpopular sources, or even unverified accounts from social media, as long as the translated content is consistent with its narratives.

Since the source is not the primary concern for MEMRI, topics are carefully selected based on ideologically motivated criteria. That is, translated topics aim to show that Arab and Muslim societies are radically different from western societies and that the two civilizations could never reconcile. Not only are topics carefully selected, but so too are the themes within those topics. The translated themes make up the core of the narratives of peaceful Israelis and hateful Arabs circulated by MEMRI.

This means that the translated content often comes from the two extremes: either from extremist and bigoted authors who express hateful sentiments of the other, or from secularists and liberals who condemn their societies for not catching up with western countries and for failing to adopt their standards. Content from the latter is what MEMRI calls “reform.”

But that does not mean all the published content is really what MEMRI claims it to be. In many instances, MEMRI makes use of framing strategies, such as casual emplotment, contextualization, packaging, introductions, titles and headings. The latter produce coherence and effectively create “chain associations that cluster around a single

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image or phrase, directing the reader into certain familiar channels of cognition”

(Huxford, 2000, p. 188), as was shown in Chapter Six.

Contributions

This dissertation makes important contributions to multiple disciplines within translation studies. First, the topic of this dissertation contributes to recent discussions of ideology, imagology, and media translation. The study mainly focuses on selectivity in media translation, but it also provides detailed discussion of framing strategies in the translation of titles, in addition to a brief discussion on subtitling.

Second, although the methodology of the study heavily relies on narrative theory, it also makes use of other approaches, such as corpus analysis and critical discourse analysis. In fact, this dissertation is the first of its kind, to the best of my knowledge, to incorporate corpus tools in studying ideology and its role in the selection of translations.

The methodology adopted in this dissertation makes use of the strengths of each approach while seeking to avoid the undesirable aspects of each approach.

In addition to its contributions to TS, this dissertation also contributes to other disciplines, namely, sociology and political science. MEMRI’s translations rely on the political conflict in the Middle East and US policy related to it. The topics selected for translation seem to serve a political agenda by circulating images of societies in the

Middle East. By showing how radically different the societies in the Middle East are from the West, with the exception of Israel, MEMRI aims to influence the US to protect

Israel’s interests and not to trust Arab countries as allies. This highlights the relationship

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between sociology and political science and the fact that one cannot be fully understood without the other.

Limitations of the Study and Future Research

In its investigation of claims of selectivity in MEMRI’s translations, this dissertation was designed to provide empirical evidence of what is translated and what is not. For example, the investigation, included all the different reports found in MEMRI’s archive on SA (i.e., single-resource vs multi-resource reports, single-genre vs multi-genre reports, etc.), but it did not analyze each report type in depth. Thus, future research might focus on specific types of reports based on genre and/or the number of resources used.

Also, analysis might exclude reports that were based on foreign resources and focus only on reports from the country’s sources. However, this would require great effort to exclude the irrelevant reports and to cover a much longer period so as to create a reasonably sized data set.

Because the dissertation was designed to focus on the sources, topics and themes, as closely as possible, more evidence could have been found had it included broader themes. That is, the study only compares MEMRI’s most translated topics and themes to untranslated content on the same topic and theme (e.g., women’s rights, hate speech) by using the same keywords found in the translated corpora. Although there was enough evidence of unrepresentative selectivity, the results would have been stronger if the investigated untranslated content had not been limited to the same topics or themes. For example, on the topic of human rights, there was plenty of content highlighting Saudi

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efforts on human rights initiatives worldwide, such as SA’s support of the Houston flood victims, and the two Saudi students who died trying to rescue American children who fell in the Chicopee River in July 2018. Such content was not analyzed during the investigation; rather, the study focused on untranslated women-related content, the most translated theme within the category of human rights, which was already a hot topic on its own.

Other materials within the topic of human rights, such as the ones listed above, were not used in this study because the investigation was limited to the most translated topics, themes and most frequent keywords for the sake of feasibility. Now that the study has found significant evidence of selectivity, even in the very narrow scope of its investigation, future research may be designed to objectively go beyond the most translated themes to other themes within the same topic and investigate less frequent or untranslated themes. It might even go beyond the translated topics and find evidence of untranslated topics, such as economy, sports, travel, traditions, daily life in SA (e.g., men’s vs women’s roles in the family and society), and the treatment of foreigners living in the country. Such topics were not translated, although they would have helped in building a knowledge bridge between the West and the Middle East instead of enlarging an existing knowledge gap by circulating distorted images and false narratives.

In terms of sources, the study had neither the means nor the time to investigate selectivity within translated content from social media. At least 11% of the translated content was obtained from YouTube and Twitter from private and unverified accounts.

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Thus, future research might compare translated content with untranslated content from

YouTube, for example, and investigate the authenticity of such sources.

In regard to clip reports and subtitling, which make up more than 40% of

MEMRI’s published content, the study briefly analyzed a few examples in Chapter Six, during the analysis of title translation, and found some evidence of translational shifts, omission, and unrepresentative selection that might call for additional investigation.

Future research might, for example, conduct a closer critical discourse analysis that highlights patterns of omission to determine whether the selected clip is representative of the source video.

There was also a significant pattern revealed in terms of a time gap between the source material and its translations. Although some examples were provided in the discussion of the results, future research might focus on this pattern and investigate the topics and sources in which it most often happens.

Finally, and most importantly, the methods used in this dissertation, and the suggested future research, are not limited to future research focusing on MEMRI. They can be adopted to investigate other media outlets, especially ones specializing in translation. Important questions should be investigated whenever translation and especially media translation is involved. These questions might include, for example:

What topics and sources get translated and what do not? Is the translated material representative of the general source media field? Are there apparent criteria for selecting

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content for translation? What is the role of ideology in the selection of material? How are titles translated?

Conclusion

Previous scholars and writers have suggested that MEMRI’s translations are very selective and unrepresentative of the source country’s media. However, no study has provided empirical evidence for such claims. This study is the first to present statistical evidence and overall patterns of selectivity in MEMRI’s translations at different levels, including topics, sources, dates, and authors. Additional evidence is also presented in how MEMRI selects its titles for the translated materials. The goal here is not to shame

MEMRI so much as to show how translation is a complicated process that fundamentally involves ideology and that goes beyond simple neutrality. Although ideology can be reflected in translated texts, it is arguably more prevalent in the process of selecting texts for translation, especially when political factors are at play. MEMRI’s claim of neutrality, merely filling a knowledge gap, is based on the public’s misconception of translation as an accurate reflection of the source text, which is not always the case, as shown in

MEMRI’s translations and in the theoretical literature. Thus, it is our duty as translators and translation scholars to enlighten public opinion of the important role of translation, and how—although it was historically used to build bridges between civilizations and pass knowledge from generation to generation—it has also been used to destroy bridges, enlarge knowledge gaps, and spread hate, which may lead to a clash of civilizations.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: LIST OF SOURCES USED IN VIDEO CLIP REPORTS

Note: All of the reports below were published on MEMRI’s website between 2016 and 2018, although some dates may show otherwise.

English Title Report Date Source Reference

Number 1 Saudi Cleric Muhammad Al-Munajid: Jailbreaking Your IPhone Is Not Forbidden Clip No.5347 2-Apr-11 AlMajdTV by Islamic Law 2 Saudi Cleric Ali Al-Malki: West Tampers with Burgers, Whiskey to Induce Birth of Clip No.5291 13-Jan-13 Internet (DanaTV) Girls Among Muslims (Archival) 3 Senior Saudi Cleric Saleh Al-Fawzan: Husbands Must Force Wives to Wear the Clip No.5609 14-Apr-13 Internet Hijab (Archival) 4 London Lecture by Saudi Cleric Muhammad Al-Malki: Polygamy Is the Remedy for Clip No.6933 26-Nov-13 TheInternet - "Brixton Aids [Archival] Mosque on YouTube 5 Saudi Cleric Muhammad Al-Arifi: The Jews Are Cowardly by Nature; in the Clip No.6785 20-Sep-14 Internet - "Al-Arifi on Holocaust They Came to Be Slaughtered - Archival YouTube" 6 Saudi Blogger Wields Dagger in Antisemitic Skit, Celebrates "Jerusalem Intifada" - Clip No.5973 22-Oct-15 YouTube Archival 248

7 Cleric Sa'd Al-Ateeq Warns Saudis Travelling to the West of the Promiscuity of Clip No.5364 23-Nov-15 Alahwaztv Modern Girls 8 Hizbullah Secretary-General Nasrallah in Response to Al-Nimr Execution: This Will Clip No.5242 2-Jan-16 AlManarTV Spell the End of the Saud Regime and Clan (Lebanon) 9 Saudi Cleric Ali Al-Malki: Our Ruler May Kill One Third of the People So That Clip No.5238 2-Jan-16 RotanaKhalijiyaTV Another Third Can Live in Peace (Saudi Arabia) 10 Saudi TV Host on the Iranian Threats Following Al-Nimr Execution: We Represent Clip No.5237 2-Jan-16 Internet (Saudi 24) Two Billion Muslims, Iran Only 200 Million 11 Egyptian Cleric Al-Naqib on Execution of Shiite Cleric Al-Nimr: KSA Must Clip No.5251 3-Jan-16 Internet Eliminate Two Enemies - Shiites and Secularists 12 Ex-Inmate Shaker Aamer to RussiaTodayTV: Families Should Refuse to Send Their Clip No.5264 12-Jan-16 RussiaTodayTV Sons to Serve in Guantanamo (Russia) 13 Kuwaiti Researcher Fahd Al-Shelaimi Waxes Lyrical About Saudi War Ethics in Clip No.5344 19-Jan-16 AlSharjahTV (UAE) Operation Decisive Storm, Says: Ali Abdallah Saleh Should Be Hanged by the Belt of His Pants 14 Sheikh Akram Kaabi, Leader of Iraqi Hizbullah, in Tehran: We Will Retaliate Clip No.5276 20-Jan-16 Internet (Fars News Militarily for Al-Nimr Execution on Saudi Agency) 15 Saudi Ambassador to Iraq Thamer Sabhan Insinuates Iraqi Government Involved in Clip No.5282 24-Jan-16 SumariaTV (Iraq) Anti-Sunni Ethnic Cleansing Near Iran's Border 16 Former Russian Energy Minister Yuri Shafranik: U.S. Priorities 'Are Directed Today Clip No.5300 31-Jan-16 RussiaTodayTV toward Iran' (Russia) 17 Saudi Cleric Ateeq Al-Ateeq: Pictures Posted on Social Media May Cause Cancer in Clip No.5351 3-Feb-16 Alahwaztv Children 249

18 Saudi Author Said Al-Suraihi: The Ogre of ISIS Emerged from Our History Books Clip No.5430 12-Feb-16 SkyNewsArabia 19 Saudi Political Analyst Dahham Al-'Anzi: KSA Has Obtained Nuclear Bomb. Test Clip No.5327 15-Feb-16 RussiaTodayTV May Be Held Soon (Russia) 20 Saudi Information and Culture Minister 'Adel Al-Toraifi: Hizbullah Is a Terrorist Clip No.5358 21-Feb-16 SkyNewsArabia Organization That Wants to Turn Lebanon into a Failing State (U.K./Abu Dhabi) 21 Gulf Politicians: Hizbullah Is Cancer, Lebanon Is an Iranian Province Ruled by Clip No.5357 21-Feb-16 SkyNewsArabia Hizbullah (U.K./Abu Dhabi) 22 Saudi Singer Challenges Russia: You Are No Match for Saudi Arabia, Putin Has Clip No.5370 22-Feb-16 YouTube Brought Trouble upon You 23 Saudi Family Therapist Khaled Al-Saqaby Gives Advice on Wife Beating, Says: Clip No.5444 23-Feb-16 Personal Women's Desire for Equality Causes Marital Strife 24 MEMRI TV Weekly Highlights: February 26 - March 3, 2016 Clip No.5365 23-Feb-16 AlJadidNewTV (Lebanon) NBNTV (Lebanon) MBCTV (SaudiArabia) InternetHiwar TV (U.K.) SkyNewsArabia (U.K./Abu Dhabi) AlArabyTV (U.K.) 25 Saudi TV Channel Parody Lampoons Hizbullah's Leader Nasrallah, Sparks Anger Clip No.5355 27-Feb-16 MBCTV Among Supporters

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26 Islamic Preacher Wajdi Akkari: Certain Emoticons Are Forbidden to Share on Clip No.5447 1-Mar-16 YouTube Whatsapp, But Okay to Google 27 Resigning Lebanese Minister of Justice Ashraf Rifi: Hizbullah and Iran Have Gone Clip No.5363 2-Mar-16 AlJazeeraTV (Qatar) Way Too Far in Their Terrorist Practices 28 Saudi Cleric Awadh Al-Qarni: The Mossad Placed Me on Its Hit List, and So Did Clip No.5394 10-Mar-16 AlMajdTV ISIS and the Shiites 29 Saudi TV Host Nadine Al-Budair Takes to Task Apologists Who Claim Terrorists Clip No.5436 2-Apr-16 RotanaKhalijiyaTV Have Nothing to Do with Islam and the Muslims: They Emerged from Our Schools (Saudi Arabia) and Universities 30 Saudi Cleric Muhammad Al-Habdan: Citizenship of Infidel Countries Only in Cases Clip No.5448 6-Apr-16 Alahwaztv of Life and Death 31 Senior Saudi Cleric Saleh Al-Fawzan: Taking Pictures with (or Without) Cats Is Clip No.5482 16-Apr-16 Internet Forbidden 32 Saudi Cleric Awadh Al-Qarni: Hitler Wanted to Solve the "Jewish Question" by Gas Clip No.5489 21-Apr-16 AlMajdTV Chambers, the West by Sending Them to Palestine 33 Twin Saudi Princes Deliver Multi-Lingual Anti-Iranian Messages: Iran Is 'Killing Clip No.5523 1-May-16 AlAlahwaztv Women and Children in Iran, Syria, Iraq, Yemen,' 'Destroying Itself Because of Its Religious, Moral, Economic Corruption' 34 Saudi Cleric Muhammad Al-Munajid: Our War with the Jews, the Plague of History, Clip No.5502 14-May-16 AlMajdTV Will Continue to the End of Time 35 Saudi Ambassador to the U.N.: Russia Sheds Crocodile Tears over Yemen, But Clip No.5495 27-May-16 ALArabiyaNet Does Not Donate a Single Dollar

251

36 Former Imam of Mecca's Great Mosque Adel Al-Kalbani: The Shiite Scholars Are Clip No. 6018 30-Jun-16 MBCTV Heretics; "Salafi Seed" Gave Rise to ISIS 37 Former Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. Prince Turki Al-Faisal At Mek Rally: I Want Clip No.5565 7-Jul-16 ALArabiyaNet to Topple the Iranian Regime 38 Saudi-Born Atheist Rana Ahmad: My Family or the State Would Have Killed Me If Clip No.5639 15-Aug-16 DeutscheWelleTV I Hadn't Fled; the Hijab Robbed Me of My Childhood Arabia 39 Islamic Researcher Muhammad Al-Tawbah: Jews, West behind Islamophobia, Gay Clip No.5711 20-Aug-16 AlMajdTV Rights 40 Saudi Cleric Muhammad Al-Shemali: Women in the West Suffer Humiliation and Clip No.5648 24-Aug-16 AlAlahwaztv Degradation 41 Saudi Scholar Abdallah Al-Yahya: The Jews Are Like a Cancer; Woe to the World Clip No.5698 30-Aug-16 YouTube If They Become Strong 42 Lebanese Satirist Nadim Koteich Mocks Syria: Assad Not Man Enough to Down an Clip No.5675 14-Sep-16 ALArabiyaNet Israeli Plane on His iPad 43 Saudi Cleric MamdouhAlHarbi: "Blessed" Terrorism and Jihad Required by the Clip No.5705 20-Sep-16 YouTube Channel Shari'a, but Blowing Up a Car among Peaceful People Forbidden - Archival 44 Saudi Author Said Al-Suraihi: The Arab Regimes Have "Swept the Dirt under the Clip No.5718 1-Oct-16 ALArabiyaNet Rug" Rather Than Address Our Sectarianism 45 Saudi Writer Khaled Mushawah Calls for Reexamination of Islamic Concepts: Our Clip No.5782 6-Oct-16 RotanaKhalijiyaTV Understanding of the Meaning of Jihad Is Stagnant (Saudi Arabia) 46 Houthi Leader Abd Al-Malik Al-Houthi Blames the U.S. for Saudi-Led Airstrike on Clip No.5716 8-Oct-16 AlMasirahTV Sanaa: America Masterminded, Planned, and Supervised This Vile Crime (Yemen)

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47 Saudi Writer and Women's Rights Activist Hala Al-Dosari: The Saudi Legal System Clip No.5714 9-Oct-16 BBCArabic Uses 7th-Century Mentality to Deal with People in the 21st Century 48 Saudi Writer Shtiwi Al-Ghithi: ISIS Shares Its Ideological Infrastructure with the Clip No.5727 14-Oct-16 SkyNewsArabia Religious Discourse Common in KSA and the Arab World (U.K./Abu Dhabi) 49 Saudi Deputy Economics Minister Al-Tuwaijri: Without Bold Reforms, We Would Clip No.5724 19-Oct-16 MBCTV Have Gone Bankrupt in Three to Four Years 50 Saudi Scholar Muhammad Al-Sallomi: Minorities Should Have Human Rights, Not Clip No.5730 23-Oct-16 AlMajdTV Cultural or "Sovereign Rights" 51 Saudi Imam Zayd Al-Bahri's Execution Tips: An Eye for an Eye, an Evil Eye for an Clip No.5755 27-Oct-16 YouTube Evil Eye 52 Saudi Jihadi Leader Al-Muhaysini in Aleppo Salutes Mother and Wife of Suicide Clip No.5731 27-Oct-16 YouTube Bomber before Sending Him to His Death 53 Saudi Activists Defy Guardianship of Women in TV Debate: The State Still Clip No.5751 30-Oct-16 RotanaKhalijiyaTV Considers Women to Be Inferior (Saudi Arabia) 54 Saudi Shura Council Member Ibrahim Al-Buleihi Criticizes Arab Society: All We Clip No.5954 2-Nov-16 RotanaKhalijiyaTV Want Today Is to Regress Further (Saudi Arabia) 55 Saudi-Born Singer Shams Bandar Rejects Traditional Political and Religious Clip No.5739 2-Nov-16 AlNaharTV (Egypt) Notions: Black-Eyed Virgins? God Did Not Open a Hotel in Paradise 56 Saudi Professor Sheikh Ibrahim Duwaish in Friday Sermon: Like Foxes and Snakes, Clip No.5783 4-Nov-16 YouTube the Jews "Never Abandon Their Slyness and Wickedness 57 Saudi Cleric Abd Al-Rahman Abd Al-Karim: The Woman Is Better Off at Home; Clip No.5786 6-Nov-16 RotanaKhalijiyaTV We Need Separate Hospitals for Men and Women (Saudi Arabia)

253

58 Saudi Cleric Khaled Al-Felaij: Muslims Are Forbidden from Greeting Christians and Clip No.5806 12-Nov-16 YouTube Jews on Their Holidays 59 Liberal Moroccan Writer Said Nachid: Raif Badawi Is Forced to Pray and Attend Clip No.5768 12-Nov-16 Internet Religious Classes in Prison 60 Saudi Marital Consultant Dr. Zahra Al-Muabi: One Wife Is Not Enough; Men Are Clip No.5764 14-Nov-16 RotanaKhalijiyaTV Capable of Dispensing Love to Four Wives (Saudi Arabia) 61 Saudi Journalist Mushari Zaidi: Obama Brought Humiliation, Frustration, and Terror Clip No.5778 22-Nov-16 ALArabiyaNet Upon the U.S. and its Allies 62 Saudi Writer Abdullah Alalweet: There Is No Better Model for Morality than the Clip No.5792 3-Dec-16 RotanaKhalijiyaTV West (Saudi Arabia) 63 Saudi Cleric Abd Al-Aziz Moussa: Suicide Operations Are Forbidden in Riyadh as Clip No.5817 15-Dec-16 RotanaKhalijiyaTV Well as Tel Aviv (Saudi Arabia) 64 Saudi Prince Khalid Al-Faisal: We Need a New Path Based on Moderation; There Clip No.5824 18-Dec-16 ALArabiyaNet Are No Longer Conspiracies 65 Saudi Cleric Awadh Al-Qarni: 911 Was "Fabricated", the West Exploits and Utilizes Clip No.5878 10-Jan-17 AlMajdTV Terrorism in Islamic Countries 66 Saudi Academic and Preacher Saad Al-Durihim: Islamic Law Does Not Prevent Clip No.5910 19-Jan-17 RotanaKhalijiyaTV Women from Driving; the Ruler Should Make This Decision (Saudi Arabia) 67 Liberal Saudi Author TurkiAlHamad: Our Society Has Been Hijacked, but Clip No.5873 22-Jan-17 RotanaKhalijiyaTV Liberalism Will Prevail (Saudi Arabia) 68 Former Palestinian FM and Chief Negotiator Nabil Shaath: Saudi King Abdullah Clip No.5912 7-Feb-17 ONTV (Egypt) Financed the Second Intifada

254

69 Saudi Cleric Advocates Offensive Jihad and Death for Apostasy: Liberalism and Clip No.5955 15-Feb-17 AlAlahwaztv Coexistence Null and Void (SaudiArabia) 70 Saudi Deputy Crown Prince: The War Will Be Waged in Iran, Not SaudiArabia; No Clip No. 6003 1-May-17 Channel 1 to Direct Dialogue with Iran 71 U.K.-based Islamic Scholar Haitham Al-Haddad Speaking in Norway: We Want to Clip No.6306 5-May-17 YouTube channel of Bring Light to Europe So Europeans Decide That They Want Islam Islam Net 72 TV Host Nadine Al-Budair: Saudi Men Say Women Are Diamonds but Treat Them Clip No.6026 6-May-17 RotanaKhalijiyaTV as Cheap Stones (Saudi Arabia) 73 Iranian Defense Minister: If SaudiArabia Does Anything Stupid, No Place in the Clip No.6009 6-May-17 AlManarTV Kingdom Will Remain Intact Except Mecca and Medina (Lebanon) 74 Saudi Painter and Sculptor Diyaa Aziz Criticizes 911 Conspiracy Theories: The Clip No.6078 27-May-17 RotanaKhalijiyaTV Arab World Got Itself in a Mess Because of Its Ignorance (Saudi Arabia) 75 Istanbul Friday Sermon by Syrian Cleric Mohammad Basem Dahman: The U.S. Clip No.6160 19-Jun-17 YouTube Created ISIS to Distort the Image of Islam 76 Saudi Ambassador to Algeria: Hamas Is a Terror Organization; No Saudi Relations Clip No.6118 11-Jul-17 EnnaharTV (Algeria) with "Zionist Entity" 77 Shi'ite Guest Kicked Out of Egyptian TV Studio for Saying Iraqi PMU Would Clip No.6183 26-Jul-17 AssemaTV (Egypt) Protect Saudi Women 78 Saudi Cleric MamdouhAlHarbi: Muslims' War Is with the Jews, Not Just Zionists Clip No.6162 26-Jul-17 YouTube 79 Yemeni Health Minister Nasser Ba'aom: We Will Fight Khat Only When the War Is Clip No.6211 20-Aug-17 AlGhadAlMoshreq TV over; I Myself Chew Khat (Yemen) 80 Sheikh Kamal Khatib, Deputy Leader of the Islamic Movement in Israel, Slams Clip No.6199 8-Sep-17 Internet Saudi King for Offering Aid to Houston "Oppressors" Instead of Rohingya People 255

81 SaudiArabia and Allies Lash Out at Qatar for Calling Iran “Honorable” at Arab Clip No.6205 12-Sep-17 NileNewsTV (Egypt) League Meeting ONTV (Egypt) 82 Houthi Leader Threatens to Sink Saudi Oil Tankers, Adds: UAE Unsafe, Our Clip No.6207 14-Sep-17 AlMasirah TV Missiles Can Reach Abu Dhabi (Yemen) 83 Oman Deports Indian Cleric Salman Al-Nadwi to Qatar after He Lambasted Saudi Clip No.6216 19-Sep-17 Internet King and U.S. President 84 Sister, You Will Drive - Saudi Band Releases "Born to Be Wild" Cover Celebrating Clip No.6239 1-Oct-17 YouTube Royal Decree Permitting Women to Drive 85 Saudi Author AhmedAlArfaj: Normalization of Ties with Israel Is on the Agenda; Clip No.6266 25-Oct-17 RotanaKhalijiyaTV We Have a Greater Problem with Iran (Saudi Arabia) 86 Kuwaiti TV Host Mohammad Al-Mulla to "Zoroastrians," Houthis, and Muslim Clip No. 6292 5-Nov-17 KuwaitiTV Brotherhood: You Are a Disgrace! We Shall Lead the World Again 87 Saudi Commentators Advocate a Military Operation to Annihilate Hizbullah Clip No.6277 8-Nov-17 RotanaKhalijiyaTV (Saudi Arabia) 88 Anti-Saudi Threats during Tehran Friday Sermon: If the Enemy Takes Action, We Clip No.6265 10-Nov-17 Channel 1 (Iran) Will Shatter Its Teeth to Smithereens 89 Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah: SaudiArabia Asked Israel to Attack Clip No.6264 11-Nov-17 MayadeenTV Lebanon (Lebanon) 90 AlJazeeraTV Reports: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani Says that Saudi Siege on Clip No.6263 11-Nov-17 AlJazeeraTV TV Yemen Is Unacceptable (Qatar) 91 Former Jordanian Ambassador to Iran Sheikh Bassam Al-Amoush: Missiles Fired at Clip No.6301 21-Nov-17 RoyaTV (Jordan) SaudiArabia Were Iranian; Hizbullah Is Slaughtering the Syrian People

256

92 Saudi Cleric Abd Al-Aziz Fawzan Al-Fawzan: It Is Forbidden to Congratulate Clip No.6328 3-Dec-17 Kuwaiti AlResalaTV Christians on Christmas or Send Them Gifts 93 Saudi Writers: Why Should SaudiArabia Pay the Price for the Mistakes of the Clip No.6335 12-Dec-17 RotanaKhalijiyaTV Palestinians? (Saudi Arabia) 94 Lebanese-American Imam Abu Musaab Wajdi Akkari: by Saying "Merry Clip No.6327 15-Dec-17 Kuwaiti AlResalaTV Christmas," You Are Acknowledging a Satanic Holiday; Your Religion Is a Joke 95 Saudi Researcher Abdelhameed Hakeem: Jerusalem As Israeli Capital with Clip No.6324 15-Dec-17 AlHurraTV Palestinian Management of Islamic Holy Places Is a Framework for Peace; Arabs Must Change Anti-Jewish Mentality, We Need to Realize That Jerusalem Is a Religious Symbol for the Jews 96 KSA Animation Video: Saudi Forces Conquer Tehran in Retaliation for an Iranian Clip No.6319 16-Dec-17 YouTube- "Saudi Attack on a Saudi Ship Strike Force on YouTube" 97 Saudi Researcher Abdelhameed Hakeem: I Visited Jerusalem; Israeli Society Wants Clip No.6350 18-Dec-17 BBCArabic Peace 98 Yemeni Houthi Politician Abd Al-Wahhab Al-Mahbashi Threatens to Target Saudi Clip No.6348 27-Dec-17 AlManarTV Oil Tankers, Turn Red Sea into "Black Sea" 99 Senior Iranian Official Admiral Ali Shamkhani: Protests Led by SaudiArabia and Clip No.6352 1-Jan-18 MaeedinLebaneseTV Israel; Trump Asked to Meet Rouhani, But Was Rejected 100 Tehran Friday Sermon - Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami Accuses U.S. and KSA of Clip No.6364 5-Jan-18 IRANTV Trying to Smuggle Weapons into Iran, Adds: We Want Locally-Administered Internet, Like in China and Russia

257

101 Saudi Journalist Mohamed Al-Suhaimi Calls to Silence Mosque Call to Prayer and Clip No.6442 18-Feb-18 MBCTV channel to Reduce the Number of Mosques in KSA 102 Saudi Cleric Abd Al-Aziz Fawzan Al-Fawzan: One Must Not Tell a Muslim He Has Clip No.6449 23-Feb-18 AlResalaTV (Kuwaiti) the Nasty Despicable Traits of the Jews - Even If It's True 103 Saudi Scholar Saad ibn Abdullah Al-Humayd: What Is Written in "the Protocols of Clip No.6518 21-Mar-18 WesalTV the Elders of Zion" Is Translated into Reality 104 Fmr. Saudi Intelligence Chief Prince Turki Al-Faisal: Iran, Not Trump, Causing Clip No.6494 26-Mar-18 RussiaTodayTV Trouble in the Region; Russian Media Should Highlight Iran’s Atrocities 105 Top Houthi Official Mohammed Ali Al-Houthi Threatens to Continue Shelling Clip No.6502 31-Mar-18 France24TV Aramco, Jeopardizing the NEOM Project 106 Deputy Secretary-General of the Iraqi Hizbullah Al-Nujaba Movement, Sheikh Clip No.6531 7-Apr-18 AfaqTV (Iraqi) Yusouf Al-Nasseri: Saudis Placed a Sniper in Mecca to Kill the Mahdi When He Arrives 107 Egyptian-Canadian Writer Said Shoaib: The Prevalent Islamic Ideology in Canada Clip No.6230 5-May-18 YouTube Breeds Terrorism, We Need to Train Imams in Canada 108 Top Iranian Official Mohammad-Javad Larijani on Claims in U.S. 911 Report: In Clip No.6622 30-May-18 IRANTV Some Cases, We Allowed Al-Qaeda Members to Pass Through Iran Without Stamping Their Passport 109 Head of Paris-Based Peace Ngo: Hamas Is Bad, Serves As Iran's Hired Gun Clip No.6635 2-Jun-18 24SaudiNetwork 110 Shiite Iraqi Militia Leader Yousuf Al-Nasseri Calls to Topple Saudi "Kingdom of Clip No.6619 5-Jun-18 AlmaiadinIraqi TV Sands": More Dangerous Than Zionism 111 First Saudi Women Obtain Their Driver's License - Saudi Government Broadcast Clip No.6607 5-Jun-18 Youtube.com

258

112 Shiite Iraqi Cleric Yassin Al-Musawi Slams Saud Clan: That "Innocent Lamb of a Clip No.6644 8-Jun-18 YouTube Country" Sends Us Suicide Bombers on a Daily Basis, Stands Alongside Israel 113 Saudi Journalist Mishal Al-Sudairy Criticizes Palestinian Leaders for Multiple Clip No.6646 13-Jun-18 MBCTV Missed Opportunities for Peace 114 MEMRI Reform Project Director Mansour Al-Hadj: Allowing Women to Drive Is a Clip No.6704 31-Jul-18 AlHurraTV Formality; Political Reforms Are the Most Important 115 Saudi TV Commentators Take on Canada's Human Rights Record: If You Live in a Clip No.6703 6-Aug-18 24SaudiNetwork Glass House, Oh Canada, Don't Throw Stones 116 Saudi-Kuwaiti Singer Shams Bandar Slams Arabs' Antisemitic Notions, Adds: I'm Clip No.6792 24-Sep-18 ATV (Kuwait) Not against Gays, But They Are Sick Unhappy People, Most of Whom Commit Suicide 117 Leading Saudi Scholar Abdullahalmutlaq on Polygamy: Instead of Going Berserk, Clip No.6791 3-Oct-18 SaudiChannel 1TV the First Wife Should Help Her Husband Treat His Wives Equally 118 Saudi TV Debate: Should You Go to a Psychiatrist or Have Quranic Verses Recited? Clip No.6810 14-Oct-18 RotanaKhalijiyaTV (Saudi Arabia) 119 Al-Jazeera TV Simulation of the Murder of Jamal Al-Khashoggi Clip No.6844 16-Oct-18 AlJazeeraTV (Qatar) 120 Al-Aqsa Mosque Address by Sheikh Abu Mus'ab Al-Hadra: Saudis Cannot Even Clip No.6803 20-Oct-18 Internet Carry Out an Assassination Professionally 121 Debate About Normalization of Ties Between Gulf States and Israel: Iran Is the Real Clip No.6848 9-Nov-18 AlHurraTV Enemy; Israel Should Be Part of the Anti-Iranian Alliance 122 Saudi Journalist Dahham Al-Enazi: We Should Normalize Relations with Israel, Iran Clip No.6916 16-Dec-18 RotanaKhalijiyaTV and Turkey Are Bigger Threats (Saudi Arabia)

259

APPENDIX B: TOP 100 YOUTUBE CHANNELS BY SUBSCRIBERS

Rank Channel Username Uploads Subscribers Video Views 1st mmoshaya 858 13041805 7177119541 2nd Rotana 6224 12179034 7763285350 1261902739 9812800 718 حقائق وأسرار 3rd 891162786 7331781 1284 هل تعلم؟ 4th 1209109341 7091038 1464 متع عقلك 5th 1473348810 6864647 2760 شبكة العاب العرب |… 6th 7th MjrmGames 323 6575320 680014006 681815818 6265960 472 حول العالم !؟ 8th 807160046 6248280 271 دايلر | 9th Dyler 578279571 5912562 2193 الجانب ال ُمشرق |… 10th 11th MrMrSnB2 293 5664809 607450618 3680286495 5562018 14257 خليجية 12th 854749492 5312533 204 …سعودي | 13th TheSaudiReporters 851949824 5041295 668 أسرار لم تكن تعرفها 14th 15th realnollywoodclips 1333 4977345 154283209 16th BanderitaX 923 4811970 835306230 709620071 4756684 890 دحومي٩٩٩ | 17th d7oomy_999 546773712 4739392 1149 حول العالم 18th 2 3273003793 4736824 755 عائلة فيحان 19th DSTOR I 273 4689289 569905424دستور 20th 260

694405324 4672460 1000 اغرب 21st 22nd Its OZX 199 4466910 488368389 23rd Banen Stars 120 4307615 240200360 24th Yousef Ahmed 305 4272500 436369323 t1GGEEr 197 4090570 329356756تايقر | 25th 176963814 4028829 558 غذي ذهنك 26th Saud Channel l 197 3997268 584324579قناة سعود 27th M3loma 1111 3761976 478873656معلومة | 28th ANINNKM 212 3704116 494876916انيينكم | 29th 426717660 3562265 409 أحداث وحقائق 30th 611061893 3524591 879 ثقف نفسك 31st 32nd Hello TV- Nursery Rhymes 83 3498571 1971154837 Sa7i 981 3446691 774993739صاحي 33rd 550053533 3389816 99 ماوكلي 34th 35th Fahad Sal 353 3374303 289653997 339142512 3356546 265 أوكتان 36th Octan l 37th BarryTube 153 3320075 328376528 3436877 3311519 234 فى رحاب السنة… 38th 39th BasSTOP 816 3304247 469804311 946437221 3257975 188 ماشا و الدب 40th 41st DvLZStaTioN 2870 3256143 488737672 910186442 3215472 63 كتاكيت بيبي 42nd Baby TV

261

395191079 3161284 125 ايش اللي - 43rd EyshElly 44th TMFaisal 958 3112393 529905034 390582447 3074528 573 خلف زون | 45th KhalafZone 46th Fir4sGamer 1413 3073366 590236869 47th oPiiLz 864 3062059 520120597 Badr_Family 415 3052798 813397587عصابة بدر 48th 274563803 3049985 578 هل تعلم؟ الرياضية 49th 322089434 3006465 112 معلومه في كتاب 50th oCMz 1817 2996357 533172013أوسمز 51st 52nd S7S 98 2982470 345959316 126168504 2898017 116 رحلة العقل 53rd TOPZ 307 2828112 212601038توبز 54th 378909604 2817480 236 تلفاز١١ 55th Txlir 433 2760582 302300723تكسلر | 56th 272854572 2660381 501 متع ذهنك 57th 12930734 2637646 109 كوكب المعرفة 58th 192716736 2606307 222 بيكاتشو /59th Pikachu 119031988 2599198 63 …فارس - 60th Fares Alhumaid 304583523 2592922 149 التمساح 61st 408372779 2592583 3223 اعرف دينك 62nd 63rd MAX HD 171 2574097 201296207 212086852 2572145 319 سعودي جيمر - 64th Saudi Gamer

262

65th Myrkott 262 2539617 504168532 SAIIF 118 2502155 325683685سيف 66th 1865400508 2484688 727 عائلة رياض 67th 125338635 2480139 167 لولو 68th lolo 7 69th Top Arab10s 1194 2471555 416424502 364263258 2445080 650 نيرو قيمر70th NeroGamer55 l 55 157484091 2443995 81 انس اسكندر 71st Anas Iskander I 138884029 2424547 111 سويمي 72nd SWiMY GAD TV 391 2414910 345549854ساري جاد 73rd cm1 79 2409565 184548096عز الخد 74th 75th Lift and Cheat 134 2390536 267462160

215987552 2375816 292 متع عقلك | حقائق 76th 275691978 2361292 93 …أنس و 77th anasala family I 78th Moha 247 2340520 174603904 79th Saud Brothers 79 2325727 247593277 DanyahShafei 317 2292247 805068847دانية شافعي 80th 81st xxYjYxx 314 2276934 343523976 226522173 2247451 1147 آب تو ديت | 82nd UpToDate Mmbawe 287 2214522 169250734ممباوي | 83rd Ted 203 2198825 193460163ون تيد | 84th 1 223713626 2184732 30 خمبلة 85th GamesMzuuoon 812 2177950 437135843مزيون قيمز - 86th 263

389505468 2167536 1302 آرام تي في - 87th ARAM TV 163671745 2156647 323 متع عقلك | شخصيات 88th 269073388 2144304 625 أسرار 89th 90th iiKlay 91 2117707 115879472 193371672 2101317 437 الملك هيمو - 91st Hemo king Abdulelah l 216 2059720 166421464عبداالله 92nd 492167 2058549 9 مصارعة المحترفين 93rd 238503272 2033244 225 حقائق وأسرار 94th 2 95th BestOfPatienceOzokwo 176 2016282 20239496 96th VISION 770 1980118 516464730 97th Abdoh4Magic 225 1946093 159807065 AMR 121 1915827 219239031عامر/98th 3 Mohamd Tariq l 96 1914765 139372507محمد طارق 99th 100th M3YGAMES 663 1890526 366643792

Adapted from Socailblad.com (2019).https://socialblade.com/youtube/top/country/sa/mostsubscribed [accessed Aug/29/2019]

264

APPENDIX C: A FULL LIST OF SOURCES FOUND IN ENGCORPUS

Note: These are only the sources that appeared at least twice in the frequency analysis.

N Word Freq. Source Type Country 1 OKAZ 85 Newspaper Saudi Arabia 2 TWITTER 71 Social Media Varied 3 ALSHARQALAWSAT 61 Newspaper Saudi Arabia 4 ALJAZIRAH 57 Newspaper Saudi Arabia 5 ALRIYADH 56 Newspaper Saudi Arabia 6 ALWATAN 43 Newspaper Saudi Arabia 7 YOUTUBE/INTERNET 39 Social Media Varied 8 ALARABIYANET 33 News TV Saudi Arabia 9 ALHAYAT 26 Newspaper Saudi Arabia 10 ALQUDSALARABI 25 Newspaper Palestine 11 ROTANAKHALIJIYATV 18 TV Saudi Arabia 12 ALAHRAM 17 Newspaper Egypt 13 ALGHAD 15 Newspaper Jordan 14 MAKKAH 15 Newspaper Saudi Arabia 15 ALRAI 14 Newspaper Kuwait 16 ALYAWM 14 Newspaper Saudi Arabia 17 FACEBOOK 12 Social Media Varied 265

18 ALMADINA 11 Newspaper Saudi Arabia 19 ALMASRIALYAWM 11 Newspaper Egypt 20 MUSTAQBAL 11 Newspaper Lebanon 21 ALITTIHAD 10 Newspaper UAE 22 ALWATANQ 10 Newspaper Qatar 23 RAIALYOUM 10 Online Newspaper Palestine 24 ALAKHBARL 10 Newspaper Lebanon 25 DUSTOUR 9 Newspaper Jordan 26 ALHAYATALJADIDA 8 Newspaper Palestine 27 ALSHARQ 8 Newspaper Qatar 28 ALYAWMALSABI 8 Newspaper Egypt 29 CNN 8 News TV USA 30 ROZNAMA 8 Newspaper Palestine 31 TASS 8 News Agency Russia 32 AKHBARALKHALEEJ 8 Newspaper Bahrain 33 ALIQTISADIYYA 7 Newspaper Saudi Arabia 34 ALMAJDTV 7 TV Saudi Arabia 35 MBCTV 7 TV Saudi Arabia 36 YOUM7 7 Online Newspaper Egypt 37 SHOUROUQ 7 Newspaper Egypt 38 ALBAYAN 6 Newspaper UAE 39 ELAPH 6 Online Newspaper UK

266

40 SABIL 6 Newspaper Jordan 41 SABQ 6 Online Newspaper Saudi Arabia 42 SAFIR 6 Newspaper Lebanon 43 WAFA 6 News Agency Palestine 44 ALARABIALJADID 6 Online Newspaper Lebanon 45 AYYAMPA 6 Newspaper Palestine 46 ALJAZEERATV 5 News TV Qatar 47 ALSHARQQ 5 Newspaper Qatar 48 ARABNEWS 5 Newspaper Saudi Arabia 49 SKYNEWSARABIA 5 News TV UAE 50 WASHINGTONPOST 5 Newspaper USA 51 ALHURRATV 5 News TV USA 52 ALNAHAR 4 Newspaper Lebanon 53 ALWATANE 4 Newspaper Egypt 54 ARABI21 4 Online Newspaper Egypt 55 KAYHAN 4 Newspaper Iran 56 RUSSIATODAYTV 4 News TV Russia 57 SAUDIGAZETTE 4 Newspaper Saudi Arabia 58 ALAHWAZTV 3 TV Saudi Arabia 59 ALARABQ 3 Newspaper Qatar 60 ALEQTISADIAH 3 Newspaper Saudi Arabia 61 ALJAZEERA 3 News TV Qatar

267

62 ALMANARTV 3 TV Lebanon 63 ALRESALATV 3 TV Saudi Arabia 64 ALWATANEGYPT 3 Newspaper Egypt 65 ALWATANSYRIA 3 Newspaper Syria 66 AMMONNEWS 3 Online Newspaper Jordan 67 MASRAWY 3 Online Newspaper Egypt 68 RISALA 3 Online Newspaper Palestine 69 NYTIMES 3 Newspaper USA 70 AYYAMB 2 Newspaper Bahrain 71 AKHBARCOM 2 Online Newspaper Lebanon 72 ALAHEDNEWS 2 Online Newspaper Lebanon 73 ALAHRAMALARABI 2 Newspaper Egypt 74 ALARABY 2 Online Newspaper UK 75 ALMASIRAHTV 2 TV Egypt 76 ALWATANB 2 Newspaper Bahrain 77 ALWATANK 2 Newspaper Kuwait 78 ASSABEELNET 2 Online Newspaper Jordan 79 INDIANEXPRESS 2 Newspaper India 80 IRANTV 2 TV Iran 81 MAANNEWS 2 Online Newspaper Palestine 82 MAGHREBALAAN 2 Online Newspaper Moroco 83 MISRIYYOUN 2 Newspaper Egypt

268

84 RIADIYYA 2 Newspaper Saudi Arabia 85 ROTANANET 2 TV Saudi Arabia 86 TIMESOFINDIA 2 Newspaper India 87 ALWATANVOICE 2 Online Newspaper Egypt 88 BBCARABIC 2 News TV UK 89 HAWAJORDAN 2 Online Newspaper Jordan

269

APPENDIX D: REPORT TITLES IN TOPIC IRAN

(Ordered by Date of Publication)

English Title (as appeared in MEMRI) Refrence Number Date of in MEMRI Publication 1 Saudi TV Host on the Iranian Threats Following Al-Nimr Execution: We Represent Two Billion Clip No.5237 2-Jan-16 Muslims, Iran Only 200 Million 2 Unprecedented Tension Between SaudiArabia, Iran Following Execution of Shi'ite Cleric Nimr Al-Nimr Inquiry & Analysis 4-Jan-16 Series No.1215 3 Iran Furious over SaudiArabia's Execution of Shi'ite Sheikh Nimr Al-Nimr Special Dispatch 4-Jan-16 No.6251 4 Saudi-Iranian Tension Extends to Sports – SaudiArabian Football Federation Announces: We Will Not Inquiry & Analysis 6-Jan-16 Play in Iran Series No.1219 5 Editorial in Saudi Daily: The West Made Mistakes with North Korea; It Is Now Repeating Them with Special Dispatch 8-Jan-16 Iran No.6253 6 Arab Commentators on American Sailors Incident: This Is Iran's Message on the Eve of JCPOA Special Dispatch 14-Jan-16 'Implementation Day' No.6266 7 Editorial in Saudi 'AlRiyadh' Daily Advocates Setting Timetable for Peaceful Saudi Nuclear Program Special Dispatch 18-Jan-16 No.6268 8 Saudi Ambassador to Iraq Thamer Sabhan Insinuates Iraqi Government Involved in Anti-Sunni Ethnic Clip No.5282 24-Jan-16 Cleansing Near Iran's Border

270

9 Iranian Website: The Attacks in Iran on Saudi Diplomatic Representations – an Own Goal Special Dispatch 25-Jan-16 No.6276 10 Former Russian Energy Minister Yuri Shafranik: U.S. Priorities 'Are Directed Today toward Iran' Clip No.5300 31-Jan-16 11 Gulf Politicians: Hizbullah Is Cancer, Lebanon Is an Iranian Province Ruled by Hizbullah Clip No.5357 21-Feb-16 12 Resigning Lebanese Minister of Justice Ashraf Rifi: Hizbullah and Iran Have Gone Way Too Far in Clip No.5363 2-Mar-16 Their Terrorist Practices 13 Gulf Press Divided on Iranian Election Outcome: 'It Is Meaningless'; 'It Is a Hopeful Sign' Special Dispatch 23-Mar-16 No.6359 14 Twin Saudi Princes Deliver Multi-Lingual Anti-Iranian Messages: Iran Is 'Killing Women and Children Clip No.5523 1-May-16 in Iran, Syria, Iraq, Yemen,' 'Destroying Itself Because of Its Religious, Moral, Economic Corruption' 15 Saudi Daily: IRGC Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani Is 'The Great Terrorist Satan' Special Dispatch 2-Jun-16 No.6455 16 Saudi Writer: 'Mullah Obama' Provides Iran a Safe Haven to Realize Its Interests; U.S. Administration Special Dispatch 20-Jun-16 Now in Service of Iranian Policy No.6486 17 Former Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. Prince Turki Al-Faisal At Mek Rally: I Want to Topple the Iranian Clip No.5565 7-Jul-16 Regime 18 Following Rafsanjani Call to Moderate Iranian Policy Vis-a-vis SaudiArabia, Khamenei Delivers Special Dispatch 12-Sep-16 Virulently Anti-Saudi Speech, Sparking Increased Conflict with Kingdom No.6607 19 Iran, SaudiArabia Clash Swords in U.S. Press Special Dispatch 21-Sep-16 No.6622 20 Saudi Writer: Ahwaz Region Deserves Self-Determination; Its Occupation by Iran Is No Less Barbaric Special Dispatch 19-Jan-17 Than Palestine's Occupation by Israel No.6751

271

21 AbdAlRahmanAlRashed: We Must Form 'Arab NATO' to Confront Iran Special Dispatch 22-Feb-17 No.6796 22 Saudis Optimistic on Trump Administration's Middle East Policy, Express Hope It Will Act Against Iran Special Dispatch 1-Mar-17 No.6807 23 Saudi Deputy Crown Prince: The War Will Be Waged in Iran, Not Saudi Arabia; No to Direct Dialogue Clip No. 6003 1-May-17 with Iran 24 Iranian Defense Minister: If Saudi Arabia Does Anything Stupid, No Place in the Kingdom Will Remain Clip No.6009 6-May-17 Intact Except Mecca and Medina 25 At This Stage, the Trump Administration Consents to Iran's Regional Expansion, Exchanges Messages Inquiry & Analysis 29-Jun-17 Seeking an Understanding with Iran; Qatar Crisis, Escalation of Conflict Between Iran and Its Axis and Series No.1322 Saudi-Sunni Camp Are Outcome of U.S.'s Incoherent Dual Policy 26 Article in Saudi Daily Slams Hamas: It Has Founded an 'Iranian Emirate' in Gaza and Is Completely Special Dispatch 25-Oct-17 Subordinate to Iran's Ayatollahs No.7148 27 Anti-Iranian Articles in the Saudi Press: The Diplomatic Paths Have Failed; Now the Drums of War Are Special Dispatch 9-Nov-17 Beating Loudly No.7173 28 Iranian-Saudi Conflict Ramps Up: November 6 'Kayhan' Front Page Threatens War on SaudiArabia, Special Dispatch 9-Nov-17 UAE No.7172 29 Anti-Saudi Threats During Tehran Friday Sermon: If the Enemy Takes Action, We Will Shatter Its Teeth Clip No.6265 10-Nov-17 to Smithereens 30 Palestinian Authority Daily: We Will Not Sit Idly by in Face of Iran's Interference in the Palestinian Special Dispatch 10-Nov-17 Arena No.7176 31 Editorials in Pakistani Dailies Examine Implications of Pakistan Army Chief's Visit to Iran to Discuss Special Dispatch 10-Nov-17 Kashmir, Gulf Crisis, U.S. No.7175 272

32 Aljazeeratv Reports: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani Says That Saudi Siege on Yemen Is Clip No.6263 11-Nov-17 Unacceptable 33 Former Jordanian Ambassador to Iran Sheikh Bassam Al-Amoush: Missiles Fired At Saudi Arabia Were Clip No.6301 21-Nov-17 Iranian; Hizbullah Is Slaughtering the Syrian People 34 KSA Animation Video: Saudi Forces Conquer Tehran in Retaliation for an Iranian Attack on a Saudi Clip No.6319 16-Dec-17 Ship 35 SaudiArabia and Iran: Beyond the Duel of the Videos MEMRI Daily 20-Dec-17 Brief No.144 36 Iranian Regime Mouthpiece 'Kayhan' Daily: The Yemen War Has Entered a New Phase Special Dispatch 21-Dec-17 No.7242 37 Senior Iranian Official Admiral Ali Shamkhani: Protests Led by Saudi Arabia and Israel; Trump Asked Clip No.6352 1-Jan-18 to Meet Rouhani, But Was Rejected 38 Gulf Press Expresses Optimism, Delight At Popular Uprising in Iran Special Dispatch 3-Jan-18 No.7261 39 Tehran Friday Sermon - Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami Accuses U.S. and KSA of Trying to Smuggle Clip No.6364 5-Jan-18 Weapons into Iran, Adds: We Want Locally-Administered Internet, Like in China and Russia 40 Following Waiving of U.S. Sanctions on Iran, Fading of Iranian Uprising, Saudi Press Condemns West's Special Dispatch 2-Feb-18 Passivity Vis-à-vis Iranian Regime No.7312 41 Saudi Dailies: U.S. State Department Reshuffle Is a Positive Move, Will Lead to More Pressure on Iran Special Dispatch 15-Mar-18 No.7386 42 Fmr. Saudi Intelligence Chief Prince Turki Al-Faisal: Iran, Not Trump, Causing Trouble in the Region; Clip No.6494 26-Mar-18 Russian Media Should Highlight Iran’S Atrocities

273

43 SaudiArabia, UAE, Bahrain, Egypt Welcome President Trump's Withdrawal from JCPOA 9-May-18 Special Dispatch No.7462 44 Articles in Saudi Press: Europe's Commitment to Nuclear Agreement Is Economically Motivated, 24-May-18 Threatens Security of Region, World Special Dispatch No.7489 45 Top Iranian Official Mohammad-Javad Larijani on Claims in U.S. 911 Report: In Some Cases, We Clip No.6622 30-May-18 Allowed Al-Qaeda Members to Pass Through Iran Without Stamping Their Passport 46 in Advance of U.S.-North Korea Summit, Arab Journalists Wonder: Will U.S., South Korea Special Dispatch 7-Jun-18 Reconciliation with North Korea Be a Model for Dealing with Iran? No.7513 47 Senior Saudi Journalist 'AbdAlRahman Al-Rashed: Oil Sanctions Are the Most Effective Weapon Special Dispatch 6-Jul-18 Against the Iranian Regime No.7555 48 Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. Khalid Bin Salman: 'Iran's Malign Behavior Must Be Confronted, Not Special Dispatch 25-Jul-18 Appeased' Like Nazi Germany's in the 1930s No.7585 49 Calls in SaudiArabia for Firm Measures Against Iran's Attempts to Disrupt Shipping in Bab El-Mandeb Special Dispatch 31-Jul-18 No.7597 50 Saudi Researcher: The Clinton and Obama Administrations Ignored Iran's Involvement in Terror and Special Dispatch 4-Sep-18 Courted It No.7654 51 Saudi Journalist: The Resistance Axis Is Hypocritical – It Fights the Israeli Occupation in Palestine Special Dispatch 2-Oct-18 While Ignoring Arab Land Occupied by Iran and Other Countries No.7693 52 Saudi Columnist: Ahwaz Shooting Was 'Brave' and 'Legitimate' Act of 'Resistance,' Was Hopefully the Special Dispatch 15-Oct-18 First of Many No.7709

274

53 Debate About Normalization of Ties Between Gulf States and Israel: Iran Is the Real Enemy; Israel Clip No.6848 9-Nov-18 Should Be Part of the Anti-Iranian Alliance 54 Saudi Journalists Claim U.S. Withdrawal from Syria Serves Iran, Wonder About the Motives Behind It Special Dispatch 27-Dec-18 No.7821

275

APPENDIX E: REPORT TITLES IN TOPIC ISRAEL/PALESTINE

(Ordered by Date of Publication)

English Title Refrence Number Date of

in MEMRI Publication 1 Saudi Journalist: Iran – Not Israel – Is the Gulf States' No. 1 Enemy Special Dispatch 10-Mar-16 No.6346 2 Lebanese Satirist Nadim Koteich Mocks Syria: Assad Not Man Enough to Down an Israeli Plane on His Clip No.5675 14-Sep-16 Ipad 3 Tension Between Mahmoud 'Abbas, Arab Quartet over Initiative for Internal Reconciliation in Fatah Inquiry & Analysis 27-Sep-16 Series No.1270 4 Saudi Daily to Pa President Mahmoud 'Abbas: Do Not Dismiss Israeli Pm Benjamin Netanyahu's Special Dispatch 27-Sep-16 Invitation to Knesset No.6630 5 Saudi Writer: Blaming Israel for Inter-Arab Wars Is Shallow Special Dispatch 25-Oct-16 No.6651 6 Saudi Cleric Abd Al-Aziz Moussa: Suicide Operations Are Forbidden in Riyadh As Well As Tel Aviv Clip No.5817 15-Dec-16 7 Saudi Writer: Ahwaz Region Deserves Self-Determination; Its Occupation by Iran Is No Less Barbaric Special Dispatch 19-Jan-17 Than Palestine's Occupation by Israel No.6751 8 Saudi Journalist: The Palestinians' Reliance on Armed Resistance Is Political Suicide; the Palestinian Special Dispatch 26-Jan-17 Cause Is No Longer the Arabs' Primary Concern No.6757

276

9 Prominent Saudi Journalist: West Jerusalem Is Part of Israel; Moving the U.S. Embassy There As Part of Special Dispatch 31-Jan-17 Overall Peace Agreement Could Herald the End of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflic No.6764 10 Former Palestinian Fm and Chief Negotiator Nabil Shaath: Saudi King Abdullah Financed the Second Clip No.5912 7-Feb-17 Intifada 11 Opponents of Syrian Regime Lash Out At Fatah Official for Congratulating Assad on Syrian Special Dispatch 24-Apr-17 Independence Day No.6892 12 Senior Saudi Analyst Khalid Aldakhil: Hamas's Refusal to Recognize Israel Contravenes Position of All Special Dispatch 30-Apr-17 Arab States That Have Approved Arab Peace Initiative No.6899 13 in Palestinian Authority and in Jordanian, Egyptian, and Saudi Press, Harsh Criticism of New Hamas Special Dispatch 12-May-17 Policy Document No.6921 14 Saudi Journalist to Palestinian Leaders: You Have Missed Too Many Opportunities to Resolve the Special Dispatch 23-May-17 Conflict with Israel; It Is Time for Palestinian Unity, Peace with Israel No.6941 15 Saudi Columnist: Iran Is the Real Enemy, Not Israel Special Dispatch 6-Jun-17 No.6951 16 Saudi Ambassador to Algeria: Hamas Is a Terror Organization; No Saudi Relations with "Zionist Entity" Clip No.6118 11-Jul-17 17 Saudi Columnist: The Sight of a Former Prime Minister in Prison Illustrates the Superiority of Israel's Special Dispatch 7-Aug-17 Justice System over the Arabs' No.7043 18 Saudi Writer: Arab States Should Stop Hiding Their Relations with Israel Special Dispatch 9-Aug-17 No.7047 19 Saudi Author Ahmedalarfaj: Normalization of Ties with Israel Is on the Agenda; We Have a Greater Clip No.6266 25-Oct-17 Problem with Iran 20 Article in Saudi Daily Slams Hamas: It Has Founded an 'Iranian Emirate' in Gaza and Is Completely Special Dispatch 25-Oct-17 Subordinate to Iran's Ayatollahs No.7148 277

21 Article in Saudi Daily 'Alsharqalawsat ' on the 100th Anniversary of the Balfour Declaration: Special Dispatch 2-Nov-17 Lamentations Won't Help, It's Time to Take Stock and Learn from Our Mistakes No.7160 22 Twitter Clash: Saudis Vs Palestinians on Palestinian Cause, Palestinian Resistance Special Dispatch 3-Nov-17 No.7203 23 Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah: Saudi Arabia Asked Israel to Attack Lebanon Clip No.6264 11-Nov-17 24 Editor of Saudi Daily 'Okaz': Hamas Is Ungrateful, Is Exploiting Palestinian Cause to Benefit Iran Special Dispatch 29-Nov-17 No.7202 25 Emirati Writer Al-Habtoor: Now Is the Time to Make Peace with Israel, in Order to Resolve Palestinian Special Dispatch 4-Dec-17 Issue and Join Forces in Fighting Iran No.7209 26 Reactions to U.S. President Trump's Jerusalem Announcement: Hamas, Resistance Axis Call for Special Dispatch 10-Dec-17 Violence, Attacks on U.S. Interests; Palestinian Authority, Moderate Arab Countries Express Restrained No.7217 Condemnation, Hope for Retraction 27 Saudi Writers: Why Should Saudi Arabia Pay the Price for the Mistakes of the Palestinians? Clip No.6335 12-Dec-17 28 Saudi Prince Turki Al-Faisal in Open Letter to Trump: Rectify Your Arrogant Mistake, Recognize Special Dispatch 13-Dec-17 Palestinian State Whose Capital Is East Jerusalem No.7225 29 Saudi Researcher Abdelhameed Hakeem: Jerusalem As Israeli Capital with Palestinian Management of Clip No.6324 15-Dec-17 Islamic Holy Places Is a Framework for Peace; Arabs Must Change Anti-Jewish Mentality, We Need to Realize That Jerusalem Is a Religious Symbol for the Jews 30 Saudi Researcher Abdelhameed Hakeem: I Visited Jerusalem; Israeli Society Wants Peace Clip No.6350 18-Dec-17 31 Saudi Researcher Abdelhameed Hakeem: Jerusalem As Israeli Capital with Palestinian Management of Special Dispatch 18-Dec-17 Islamic Holy Places Is a Framework for Peace; Arabs Must Change Anti-Jewish Mentality, We Need to No.7237 Realize That Jerusalem Is a Religious Symbol for the Jews

278

32 Following Trump's Jerusalem Announcement, High Tension Between Saudi Arabia and Palestinians, Inquiry & Analysis 19-Dec-17 Jordan Series No.1364 33 Senior Iranian Official Admiral Ali Shamkhani: Protests Led by Saudi Arabia and Israel; Trump Asked Clip No.6352 1-Jan-18 to Meet Rouhani, But Was Rejected 34 Qatar, the Emirate That Fools Them All, and Its Enablers MEMRI Daily 18-Jan-18 Brief No.146 35 Cut Off Qatar MEMRI Daily 4-Mar-18 Brief No.152 36 Saudi Journalist: 'Deal of the Century' May Be Yet Another Opportunity Missed by the Palestinians; an Special Dispatch 23-Apr-18 Unjust Peace Agreement Is Better Than Nothing No.7440 37 Saudi Journalist: The U.S. Has the Right to Choose Its Embassies' Locations; the Move to Jerusalem Is Special Dispatch 15-May-18 an Opportunity for the Arabs to Renew Negotiations No.7473 38 Ibrahim Karagul, Editor-in-Chief of Akp Mouthpiece 'Yeni Safak': You, Uae Prince Mohammad Bin Special Dispatch 17-May-18 Zayed and Saudi Prince Mohammad Bin Salman, Are the Apparatuses of U.S. and Israeli Intelligence; No.7475 Soon, You Will Raise U.S./Israel Flags in Mecca and Medina 39 Shift in Saudi Media's Attitude to Israel – Part I: Saudi Writers, Intellectuals: Iran Is More Dangerous Inquiry & Analysis 29-May-18 Than Israel; Peace with It Is Vital in Order to Repel Iranian Threat Series No.1398 40 Shift in Saudi Media's Attitude to Israel – Part Ii: Saudi Writer Who Visited Israel: We Want an Israeli Inquiry & Analysis 29-May-18 Embassy in Riyadh; We Should Make Peace with Israel, Uproot Culture of Hatred for Jews Series No.1399 41 Saudi Writer: The Arab League Summits Are Completely Pointless; Palestinian Leaders – First and Special Dispatch 31-May-18 Foremost Jerusalem Mufti Al-Husseini and Plo Leader Arafat – Damaged the Palestinian Cause the Most No.7499 42 Head of Paris-Based Peace Ngo: Hamas Is Bad, Serves As Iran's Hired Gun Clip No.6635 2-Jun-18

279

43 Shiite Iraqi Cleric Yassin Al-Musawi Slams Saud Clan: That "Innocent Lamb of a Country" Sends Us Clip No.6644 8-Jun-18 Suicide Bombers on a Daily Basis, Stands Alongside Israel 44 Saudi Journalist Mishal Al-Sudairy Criticizes Palestinian Leaders for Multiple Missed Opportunities for Clip No.6646 13-Jun-18 Peace 45 Saudi Journalist Mishal Al-Sudairy Criticizes Palestinian Leaders for Multiple Missed Opportunities for Special Dispatch 3-Jul-18 Peace No.7550 46 Saudi Journalist: We Must Advance Peace with Israel, Even If We Have to Make Concessions Special Dispatch 18-Jul-18 No.7573 47 Senior Saudi Journalist on Anniversary of 1973 War Between Israel and the Arabs: Some Arabs Still Special Dispatch 19-Sep-18 Haven't Learned the Lessons of the War No.7677 48 Saudi Journalist: The Resistance Axis Is Hypocritical – It Fights the Israeli Occupation in Palestine Special Dispatch 2-Oct-18 While Ignoring Arab Land Occupied by Iran and Other Countries No.7693 49 Al-Aqsa Mosque Address by Sheikh Abu Mus'ab Al-Hadra: Saudis Cannot Even Carry Out an Clip No.6803 20-Oct-18 Assassination Professionally 50 Debate About Normalization of Ties Between Gulf States and Israel: Iran Is the Real Enemy; Israel Clip No.6848 9-Nov-18 Should Be Part of the Anti-Iranian Alliance 51 Saudi Journalist Dahham Al-Enazi: We Should Normalize Relations with Israel, Iran and Turkey Are Clip No.6916 16-Dec-18 Bigger Threats

280

APPENDIX F: REPORT TITLES IN TOPIC HUMAN RIGHTS

(Ordered by Date of Publication)

English Title Refrence Number Date of

in MEMRI Publication 1 Senior Saudi Cleric Saleh Al-Fawzan: Husbands Must Force Wives to Wear the Hijab (Archival) Clip No.5609 14-Apr-13 2 Kuwaiti Researcher Fahd Al-Shelaimi Waxes Lyrical About Saudi War Ethics in Operation Decisive Clip No.5344 19-Jan-16 Storm, Says: Ali Abdallah Saleh Should Be Hanged by the Belt of His Pants 3 Saudi Family Therapist Khaled Al-Saqaby Gives Advice on Wife Beating, Says: Women's Desire for Clip No.5444 23-Feb-16 Equality Causes Marital Strife 4 Saudi-Born Atheist Rana Ahmad: My Family or the State Would Have Killed Me If I Hadn't Fled; the Clip No.5639 15-Aug-16 Hijab Robbed Me of My Childhood 5 Saudi Cleric Muhammad Al-Shemali: Women in the West Suffer Humiliation and Degradation Clip No.5648 24-Aug-16 6 Saudi Journalist: The Saudi Law Banning Wife Beating Supersedes Islamic Law Special Dispatch 29-Aug-16 No.6590 7 Saudi Writer and Women's Rights Activist Hala Al-Dosari: The Saudi Legal System Uses 7th-Century Clip No.5714 9-Oct-16 Mentality to Deal with People in the 21st Century 8 Saudi Journalist: Saudi Government Must Immediately Lift Ban on Women Driving Special Dispatch 13-Oct-16 No.6643 9 Saudi Activists Defy Guardianship of Women in TV Debate: The State Still Considers Women to Be Clip No.5751 30-Oct-16 Inferior

281

10 Saudi Cleric Abd Al-Rahman Abd Al-Karim: The Woman Is Better Off at Home; We Need Separate Clip No.5786 6-Nov-16 Hospitals for Men and Women 11 Liberal Moroccan Writer Said Nachid: Raif Badawi Is Forced to Pray and Attend Religious Classes in Clip No.5768 12-Nov-16 Prison 12 Saudi Marital Consultant Dr. Zahra Al-Muabi: One Wife Is Not Enough; Men Are Capable of Clip No.5764 14-Nov-16 Dispensing Love to Four Wives 13 Saudi Academic: It's Time to End Gender Segregation in Mosques; Let's Make Mosques Similar to Special Dispatch 22-Nov-16 Churches! No.6688 14 Saudi Demands for Women to Be Allowed to Drive Continue; Columnist: This Ban Is Aimed At 18-Jan-17 Perpetuating Men's Control of Women Special Dispatch No.6747 15 Saudi Academic and Preacher Saad Al-Durihim: Islamic Law Does Not Prevent Women from Driving; Clip No.5910 19-Jan-17 the Ruler Should Make This Decision 16 TV Host Nadine Al-Budair: Saudi Men Say Women Are Diamonds but Treat Them as Cheap Stones Clip No.6026 6-May-17 17 the Saudi Royal Decree Easing Guardianship Requirements for Women, and Responses to It in Inquiry & Analysis 2-Jun-17 SaudiArabia Series No.1316 18 Shi'ite Guest Kicked Out of Egyptian TV Studio for Saying Iraqi Pmu Would Protect Saudi Women Clip No.6183 26-Jul-17 19 Saudi University Lecturer: The Solution to the Problem of Single Women in Saudi Arabia Is Polygamy 10-Aug-17 – Three Wives Per Man, and If That Works Out, He Gets One More Special Dispatch No.7049 20 Yemeni Health Minister Nasser Ba'aom: We Will Fight Khat Only When the War Is over; I Myself Clip No.6211 20-Aug-17 Chew Khat

282

21 Saudi King Lifts Ban on Women Driving: over a Decade of MEMRI Reports and Clips on the Issue of Special Dispatch 27-Sep-17 the Ban No.7111 22 Sister, You Will Drive - Saudi Band Releases "Born to Be Wild" Cover Celebrating Royal Decree Clip No.6239 1-Oct-17 Permitting Women to Drive 23 the Lifting of the Saudi Ban on Women Driving As Reflected in Cartoons Inquiry & Analysis 10-Oct-17 Series No.1350 24 Former Jordanian Ambassador to Iran Sheikh Bassam Al-Amoush: Missiles Fired at SaudiArabia Were Clip No.6301 21-Nov-17 Iranian; Hizbullah Is Slaughtering the Syrian People 25 Saudi Columnist Mocks Opponents of Physical Education for Saudi Girls Special Dispatch 12-Jan-18 No.7279 26 Saudi Media Removes Reports About Homosexuality, While Twitter Users Recognize It Is Widespread Special Dispatch 19-Jan-18 in the Kingdom No.7289 27 Saudi Columnist: 'Selfish' Women Who Keep Their Husbands from Taking Second Wife Cause Them 19-Apr-18 to Commit Adultery Special Dispatch No.7435 28 First Saudi Women Obtain Their Driver's License - Saudi Government Broadcast Clip No.6607 5-Jun-18 29 in Advance of Implementation of the Historic Decree Permitting Women in the Kingdom to Drive, Special Dispatch 21-Jun-18 Female Saudi Columnist Writes: We Are Better Drivers Than the Men No.7534 30 Saudi Traffic Department: Women Will Also Be Permitted to Ride Motorcycles, Drive Trucks Special Dispatch 22-Jun-18 No.7535 31 Saudi Senior Clerics Council Members: Bring Women into Religious Establishment Special Dispatch 25-Jul-18 No.7586

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32 MEMRI Reform Project Director Mansour Al-Hadj: Allowing Women to Drive Is a Formality; Political Clip No.6704 31-Jul-18 Reforms Are the Most Important 33 Saudi TV Commentators Take on Canada's Human Rights Record: If You Live in a Glass House, Oh Clip No.6703 6-Aug-18 Canada, Don't Throw Stones 34 Article in Saudi Daily: Canada Is Waging a New Crusade in the Guise of Defending Human Rights Special Dispatch 10-Aug-18 no.7617 35 Saudi-Kuwaiti Singer Shams Bandar Slams Arabs' Antisemitic Notions, Adds: I'm Not Against Gays, Clip No.6792 24-Sep-18 But They Are Sick Unhappy People, Most of Whom Commit Suicide 36 Leading Saudi Scholar Abdullahalmutlaq on Polygamy: Instead of Going Berserk, the First Wife Should Clip No.6791 3-Oct-18 Help Her Husband Treat His Wives Equally 37 the Disappearance of Journalist Jamal Khashoggi: Before He Disappeared, the Saudi Press Accused Special Dispatch 9-Oct-18 Him of Treason; Now It Is Expressing Concern No.7702 38 Al-Jazeera TV Simulation of the Murder of Jamal Al-Khashoggi Clip No.6844 16-Oct-18 39 Al-Aqsa Mosque Address by Sheikh Abu Mus'ab Al-Hadra: Saudis Cannot Even Carry Out an Clip No.6803 20-Oct-18 Assassination Professionally 40 Saudi Writers Criticize the Saudi Media's and State Institutions' Handling of the Khashoggi Affair Special Dispatch 25-Oct-18 No.7731

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APPENDIX G: REPORT TITLES IN TOPIC HATE SPEECH

(Ordered by Date of Publication)

English Title Refrence Date of Number in Publication MEMRI 1 Saudi Cleric Ali Al-Malki: West Tampers with Burgers, Whiskey to Induce Birth of Girls Among Clip No.5291 13-Jan-13 Muslims (Archival) 2 Saudi Cleric Muhammad Al-Arifi: The Jews Are Cowardly by Nature; in the Holocaust They Came to Be Clip No.6785 20-Sep-14 Slaughtered - Archival 3 Saudi Blogger Wields Dagger in Antisemitic Skit, Celebrates "Jerusalem Intifada" - Archival Clip No.5973 22-Oct-15 4 Cleric Sa'd Al-Ateeq Warns Saudis Travelling to the West of the Promiscuity of Modern Girls Clip No.5364 23-Nov-15 5 MEMRI TV Weekly Highlights: February 26 - March 3, 2016 Clip No.5365 23-Feb-16 6 Saudi Cleric Muhammad Al-Habdan: Citizenship of Infidel Countries Only in Cases of Life and Death Clip No.5448 6-Apr-16 7 Saudi Cleric Awadh Al-Qarni: Hitler Wanted to Solve the "Jewish Question" by Gas Chambers, the West Clip No.5489 21-Apr-16 by Sending Them to Palestine 8 Saudi Cleric Muhammad Al-Munajid: Our War with the Jews, the Plague of History, Will Continue to the Clip No.5502 14-May-16 End of Time 9 Leading Pakistani Cleric on Medina Attack: 'Conspiracies Are Being Readied for the Destruction of the Special Dispatch 4-Aug-16 Muslim Ummah; Turkey, Pakistan and SaudiArabia Are Continuously Targeted' No.6557 10 Articles in Saudi Press: End the Antisemitic Discourse, Learn from the Jews' Success Special Dispatch 13-Aug-16 No.6574

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11 Islamic Researcher Muhammad Al-Tawbah: Jews, West behind Islamophobia, Gay Rights Clip No.5711 20-Aug-16 12 Saudi Scholar Abdallah Al-Yahya: The Jews Are Like a Cancer; Woe to the World If They Become Clip No.5698 30-Aug-16 Strong 13 Saudi Professor Sheikh Ibrahim Duwaish in Friday Sermon: Like Foxes and Snakes, the Jews "Never Clip No.5783 4-Nov-16 Abandon Their Slyness and Wickedness 14 Saudi Cleric Khaled Al-Felaij: Muslims Are Forbidden from Greeting Christians and Jews on Their Clip No.5806 12-Nov-16 Holidays 15 U.K.-based Islamic Scholar Haitham Al-Haddad Speaking in Norway: We Want to Bring Light to Europe Clip No.6306 5-May-17 So Europeans Decide That They Want Islam 16 Writer for Official Saudi Daily: The Jews Have an Eternal Plot to Destroy Mankind Special Dispatch 16-May-17 No.6927 17 Istanbul Friday Sermon by Syrian Cleric Mohammad Basem Dahman: The U.S. Created ISIS to Distort Clip No.6160 19-Jun-17 the Image of Islam 18 Saudi Columnist: Christians Should Be Accepted As Equal Citizens, Not Treated As 'Protected People' Special Dispatch 20-Jul-17 (Dhimmis) No.7019 19 Saudi Cleric MamdouhAlHarbi: Muslims' War Is with the Jews, Not Just Zionists Clip No.6162 26-Jul-17 20 School Curricula in the Arab World: The Situation Today Inquiry & 31-Aug-17 Analysis Series No.1340 21 American Muslims Should Expose and Challenge Hate Preaching and Radical Imams MEMRI Daily 1-Sep-17 Brief No.133 22 Sheikh Kamal Khatib, Deputy Leader of the Islamic Movement in Israel, Slams Saudi King for Offering Clip No.6199 8-Sep-17 Aid to Houston "Oppressors" Instead of Rohingya People 286

23 Arab Journalists Ridicule Claim That Hurricane Irma Is Divine Punishment, Call for Solidarity with the Special Dispatch 15-Sep-17 American People No.7092 24 Oman Deports Indian Cleric Salman Al-Nadwi to Qatar after He Lambasted Saudi King and U.S. Clip No.6216 19-Sep-17 President 25 Saudi Cleric Abd Al-Aziz Fawzan Al-Fawzan: It Is Forbidden to Congratulate Christians on Christmas or Clip No.6328 3-Dec-17 Send Them Gifts 26 Lebanese-American Imam Abu Musaab Wajdi Akkari: by Saying "Merry Christmas," You Are Clip No.6327 15-Dec-17 Acknowledging a Satanic Holiday; Your Religion Is a Joke 27 Saudi Imam Abdulwahab Al-Omari Prays for Allah to Hasten Annihilation of Jews, Conversion of Special Dispatch 14-Feb-18 Christians to Islam on Judgment Day No.7332 28 Saudi Cleric Abd Al-Aziz Fawzan Al-Fawzan: One Must Not Tell a Muslim He Has the Nasty Clip No.6449 23-Feb Despicable Traits of the Jews - Even If It's True 29 on Social Media, Criticism of Muslim World League Secretary-General's Condemnation of Holocaust – Special Dispatch 6-Mar-18 But in Saudi Press, Support for It No.7368 30 Saudi Scholar Saad ibn Abdullah Al-Humayd: What Is Written in "the Protocols of the Elders of Zion" Is Clip No.6518 21-Mar-18 Translated into Reality 31 Saudi Scholar Saad Ibn Abdullah Al-Humayd: What Is Written in 'The Protocols of the Elders of Zion' Is Special Dispatch 7-Apr-18 Translated into Reality No.7434 32 Saudi Journalist: The Arab Countries Oppressed Their Jews, Failed to Benefit from Their Presence Special Dispatch 18-Apr-18 No.7433 33 Shiite Iraqi Militia Leader Yousuf Al-Nasseri Calls to Topple Saudi "Kingdom of Sands": More Clip No.6619 5-Jun-18 Dangerous Than Zionism

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34 Saudi-Kuwaiti Singer Shams Bandar Slams Arabs' Antisemitic Notions, Adds: I'm Not against Gays, But Clip No.6792 24-Sep-18 They Are Sick Unhappy People, Most of Whom Commit Suicide 35 Saudi Journalist: If Muslims Despise the 'Infidel' West, Why Are They So Eager to Live There? Special Dispatch 10-Jan-19 No.7840

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