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WORKS REFERRED TO

Austin,J. L. How to Do Things With Words, edited by J. O. Urmson, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962. , Nicomachean . Translated by Sir David Ross. Baier, Kurt. "Moral Obligations." American Philosophic Quarterv, III (July, 1966), 210-26. --. The Moral Point of View. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958. Barry, Brian. Political Argument. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965. Baylis, Charles A. "Grading, Values and Choice." Mind, LXVII (October, 1958), 485-50 1. --. "C. I. Lewis' Theory of and Ethics." The Journal of Philosophy, LXI (October 15, 1964), 559-67. Beardsley, Monroe C. "Intrinsic Value." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXVI (September, 1965), 1-19. Bentham, Jeremy. Introduction to the of Morals and Legislation. Brandt, Richard B. Ethical Theory. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959· --. "Some Merits of One Form of Rule-". Universi0' of Colorado Studies: Series in Philosophy. NO.3, January, 1967. --. "Toward A Credible Form of Rule-Utilitarianism." Morali0' and the Lan• guage of Conduct. Edited by Hector-Neri Castaneda and George Nakhnikian. Detroit: Wayne State University, 1963. Chisholm, Roderick M. "Lewis' Ethics of Belief." The Philosophy of C. 1. Lewis. Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1968. D'Arcy, Eric. Human Acts. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963. Donagan, Alan. "Is There A Credible Form of Utilitarianism?" Contemporary Utilitarianism. Edited by Michael D. Bayles. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1968. Dworkin, Ronald. "The Model of Rules". Universi0' of Chicago Law Review, 12 (1967), 22-40. Ewing, A. C. "C. I. Lewis on the Relation Between the and the Right." The Philosophy of c. 1. Lewis. Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1968. --. Review of The Ground and Nature qf the Right, by C. I. Lewis. Philosophy, XXXIII (July, 1967), 279--80. Falk, W. D. ", Self, and Others." Morali0' and the Language ofConduct. Edited by Hector-Neri Castaneda and George Nakhnikian. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1963. Firth, Roderick. "Ethical Absolutism and the Observer." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 12 (1952), 317-45. Foot, Philippa. "Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect." The Oxford Review, 5 (1967). WORKS REFERRED TO

Frankena, William K. "C. I. Lewis on the Ground and Nature of the Right." Journal of Philosophy, LXI (September 17, 1964), 41)g-g6. --. "Ethical Theory." Philosophy. Roderick Chisholm, et al., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. --. "Lewis' Imperatives of Right." Philosophical Studies, XIV (January• February, 1963), 25-28. --. Review of The Ground and Nature of the Right, by C. I. Lewis. Philosophical Review, LXVI (July, 1967), 398-402. --. "Three Comments of Lewis' Views on the Right and the Good." Journal of Philosophy, LXI (October 15, 1964),567-70. Fuller, Lon L. "Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart." Harvard Law Review, 71 (February, 1958), 630-72. Gellner, Ernest. Review of The Ground and Nature of the Right, by C. I. Lewis. Philosophical Qparterly, VII (June, 1957), 92-93. Handy, Rollo. Review of The Ground and Nature of the Right, by C. I. Lewis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XVIII (December, 1957), 273-74. Hare, R. M. Freedom and Reason. London: Oxford University Press, 1965. --. The Language of Morals. London: Oxford University Press, 1952. --. Review of Contemporary Moral Philosophy, by G. J. Warnock. Mind, LXXVII (July, 1968) 436-40. Harrison, J. "Utilitarianism, Universalization, and Our Duty to be Just." Proceedings of the AristotiUan Sociery, LII (1952- 1953), 105-34. Harrod, R. F. "Utilitarianism Revised." Mind, XLV (April, 1937) 137-56. Hart, H. L. A. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961. --. "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals." Harvard Law Review, 71 (February, 1958),593-629. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Hook, Sidney. "The Desirable and Emotive in Dewey's Ethics." : Philosopher of Science and Freedom. Edited by Sidney Hook. New York: The Dial Press, 1950. Hospers, John. Human Conduct. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Court, Inc., 196 I. Hume, David. Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Practical Reason. --. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Lange, John. "The Late Papers of C. 1. Lewis." Journal of the History of Philos• ophy, IV (July, 1966), 235-45. Lewis, C. 1. An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. (Cited herein as AKV). LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1946. --. The Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis, ed. by John D. Goheen and John L. Mothershead, Jr. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1970. --. Corner Notebook. (Cited herein as CN). An unpublished loose leaf note• book. --. Desk Notebook. (Cited herein as DN). An unpublished loose leaf note• book. --. The Ground and Nature of the Right. (Cited herein as GNR). New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. --. Our Social Inheritance. (Cited herein as OSI). Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1957. --. Shelf Notebook. (Cited herein as SN). An unpublished loose leaf note• book. --. Values and Imperatives: Studies in Ethics (cited herein as VI). Edited by John Lange. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1969. Lyons, David. Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965. WORKS REFERRED TO

Mabbot, j. D. Review of The Ground and Nature of the Right, by C. I. Lewis. Mind, LXVII (january, 1958), 137-39. McCormick, Suzanne, and Thalberg, Irving. "Trying." Dialogue, VI. (june, 1967), 29-46. Malcolm, Norman. "Knowledge of Other Minds." The Journal of Philosophy, LV (November 6, 1958),967-78. Mill, john Stuart. Autobiography. New York: Columbia University Press, 1924. --. On . --. Utilitarianism. Edited by Mary Warnock. Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1962. Moore, G. E. Ethics. Home University Library, 1917. --. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903. Narveson, jan. Morality and Utility. Baltimore: The johns Hopkins University Press, 1967. Nelsen, Leonard. Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft. Leipzig: 1917. Neilsen, Kai. "Why Should I be Moral?" Methodos, XV (1963), 275-306. Nowell-Smith, P. H. Ethics. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954. Pepper, Stephen C. "C. I. Lewis' Theory of Value." The Philosophy ofC. 1. Lewis. Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1968. Perry, Charles. Review of The Ground and Nature of the Right, by C. I. Lewis. Ethics, LXVI (january, 1956), 137-39. Putnam, Hilary. "The Analytic and the Synthetic." Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Edited by Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell. Minnea• polis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962. Quinton, A. M. "On Punishment." Anarysis, XIV (1954), 512-17. Rawls, John. '' as Fairness." Philosophical Review, LXVII (1958), 164-94. --. "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics." Philosophical Review, 66 (1957), 177-97· --. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. Reichenbach, Hans. The Theory of Probability. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949. Rescher, Nicholas. Distributive Justice: A Constructive Critique of the Utilitarian Theory of Justice. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968. Ross, W. D. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930. Royce,Josiah. The Religious Aspect of Philosophy. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Com• pany, 1885. Russell, Bertrand. Human Society in Ethics and Politics. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1952. Sartorius, Rolf. "The Doctrine of Precedent and the Problem of Relevance." Archivesfor and , LIII (1967), NO.3. --. "Individual Conduct and Social Norms: A Utilitarian Account." Ethics, 82 (April, 1972) 200-18. --. "The Justification of the Judicial Decision." Ethics 78 (April, 1968), 17 1- 87. Saydah, Roger J. The Ethical Theory of Clarence Irving Lewis. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1969. Sartre,jean-Paul. . Translated by Bernard Fruchtman. New York: Philosophical Library, 1947. Schilpp, Paul Arthur, ed. The Philosophy ofC. 1. Lewis. (Cited herein as PCIL). LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1968. Searle, John R. "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts." The Philo• sophical Review, LXXVII (October, 1968),405-24. --. Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. WORKS REFERRED TO

Sharp, F. C. "Voluntarism and in Ethics." The Philosophical Review, 50 (1941), 253-67· Smart,j.j. C. An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1961. Toulmin, Stephen. Reason in Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950. Unnson, j. O. "Saints and Heroes." Essays in Moral Philosophy. Edited by A. 1. Melden. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958. Waismann, Friedrich. "Verifiability." Logic and Language (First Series). Edited by Antony Flew. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1951. Warnock, G. j. Contemporary Moral Philosophy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. Wasserstrom, Richard. The Judical Decision. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961. Wheeler, Arthur M. "On Lewis' Imperatives of Right." Philosophical Studies, III (June, 1961) 59-60. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1953. INDEX

Absolute rightness, 101; defined 30; as compared to objective rightness 30 Absolute rationality, defined, 62 Act descriptions: and ordinary linguistic usage, 90--91; limitations on, for purposes of the imperatives, 90--102, 102-108, 120, 177; why for purposes of the imperatives it is necessary to have limitations on, 92-96 Additive properties, 63n Advantages and disadvantages, weighing of, 177 Analogy, argument from, 88-89 Analytic, as characterized by Lewis, 35n A posteriori, as characterized by Lewis, 35n A priori, 176; as characterized by Lewis, 35n Aristotle, 180 Attribute class, 96 Austin, J. L., 15-16 Authoritarianism, 2, 179-180

Baier, Kurt, 5g-{io, 146n, 176n Barry, Brian, 168 Baylis, Charles A., 7n, 34n, 56n Beardsley, Monroe, C., 7n Bentham,Jeremy, 144-146 Borderline cases, 133-37, 150; as being in minority, 133, 137 Brandt, R. B., 153-58

Carnap, Rudolf, 70n Chisholm, Roderick M., Ion Clear-cut cases, 113-114, 125; defined, 109-110, 126, 151-52 Closed question, characterized, 17 Cluster concept: characterized, 5-6; "right" as, 20 Cognitive function of saying something is right, 15 Comparative property, defined, 22 Complete description, defined, 101 Conceptual scheme, 48-49 Confirming answers to moral questions, 25-32; empirical data relevant to, 31 Conflicts between the rules, 137-143; examples of, 137-38; how to characterize correct action taken in cases of, 138-140; as probably not to be resolved by extremely hard to apply rules in ideal observer moral code, 140; examples of secondary rules ideal observer moral code might contain for resolving, 140--42; as not creating any widespread confusion, 143 Consequences, possible, see Possible consequences Contentual aspect of moral imperatives, 37-38, 84-85 Currency of a moral code, Brandt's definition of, 155

D'Arcy, Eric, 9In, 104n Deontological criterion of moral rightness, 153n Descriptive sentences, defined ,15 "Desert island" promises, 24-25, I 13, 132, 151-52 "Desirable," analysis of use of, 24-25 Diminishing returns, law of, 73 Direct limitation of freedom, defined, 178n Discrimination, racial, 159, 161-62, 166-69 186

Discriminatory moral code: compared with ideal observer moral code, 162-173; defined, 163; less overall fruits of cooperation and security with, 166-68; as not in our best interests to try to enforce, even if sometimes in our best interests to have, 171-73 Donagan, Alan 176n Dworkin, Ronald, 175n

Empirical investigation, need for, 56, 59, 173, 179- 180 Enforcement of morality, 123, 163-65, 171-73, 176; private or individual, defined, 57-58; public or state, defined, 57-58; insolvable problems with, if general use of the maximum social goodness imperative were morally fundamental, 116-19; meaning of for purposes of ideal observer criterion, 120 Enforcing a rule, defined, 57-58 Ethical egoism, 77 Ethical justification, see Justification, ethical Evaluative sentences: examples of, 4; Lewis' views on, 5-1 I; analysis of, 11-25 Ewing, A. C., 34n Exceptions to the rules, 125-133; for the prevention of wrongdoing, 129-130; , 130-31; for emergencies, 131-32; as not indepedent of the rules, but part of them, 132-33 Existing conditions, relevant: defined, 98-100; as either general or particular, 99-100; and how probability varies as description of act varies, 101-12; and how many must be inclu• ded in act descriptions for determining objective rightness, 101-2 Expected value, I 12 Experience: as that and that only which is intrinsically good and bad, 7-8; our knowledge of another person's 88-89 Extrinsic goodness, Lewis' definition of, 9

Falk, W. D., 28n Fallibility, human, 153, 156-158, 171-72, 178, 179; and the rationale for general use of maximum social goodness imperative, 103-4; as in large part why it is socially better to try to follow certain moral rules than try to do what has best overall consequences, 110-12; as in large part why moral rules an ideal observer would try to enforce are usually readily knowable in rough outline, 150 Family resemblance concepts, characterized, 5 Firth, Roderick, 144n Foot, Philippa, 142n "For all practical purposes," no conflict, defined 109-110, 151-52 Formal aspect of moral imperatives, 37-38, 84 Frankena, William, 340, 35-39 Freedom, personal, 178-79 Freedom of speech, 177-78 Fuller, Lon L., 27n Fundamental imperative of morality: according to Lewis, 83-90; critique of maximum social goodness imperative in its general use as, 112-19 Fundamental imperative of prudence: formulated, 77; as being rational imperative (3), 76-77, 162. See also Fundamental imperative of rationality; Rational imperative (3); Maximum prudential goodness imperative Fundamental imperative of rationality, 42, 44, 57, 58-59, 78, 162; formulated, 69; as being rationale imperative (3), 76, 162; limitation on act descriptions for, 97-104, 16g-70; general use as fundamental for, 16g-70. See also Rational imperative (3); Fundamental imperative of prudence; Maximum prudential goodness imperative

Gellner, Ernest, 34n General existing conditions, 101; defined, 99-100 General obligation, rules of, defined, 141 General use of maximum social goodness imperative, 126, 153, 16g-70; defined, 102-8; a theoretically perfect act description for purposes of, 108-9; as prescribing that trying to follow certain moral rules takes precedence over trying to do what has best overall con• sequences, 1Og-12, 133, 179; critique of as morally fundamental, 112-19 Golden Rule, 83-84, 8g-90, 168 "Good": use of distinguished from use of "right", 22; use of distinguished from use of "bad", 22-24; analysis of use of, 22-24 Governmental deceit, 178 Governmental decisions, 177-179

Hardy, Rollow, 34n Hare, R. M., 14, 15n, 16, 146n, 152n Harrison, j., 152n Harrod, R. F., 152n Hart, H. L. A., 27n, 134n Hobbes, Thomas, 5g-:..60 Hook, Sidney, 7n Hospers, John, 160n Hedonic calculus, 145 Humanism, 179n Hume, David, 79, 146n

Ideal moral code criterion: compared to ideal observer criterion, 153-58; as not as broad in scope as ideal observer criterion, 154-155; and how similar to ideal observer criterion, 155-56; as not taking into account fully human fallibility and "self-interestedness," 155-57 "Ideal observer," meaning of explained, 123 Ideal observer criterion: formulated, 120-21; as applicable to procedural as well as sub• stantive moral rules, 121 ; possible modification of for meeting population problems, I 27n; use of for resolving borderline cases, 136-37; compared to ideal moral code criterion, 153-58; as broader in scope than ideal moral code criterion, 154-54; and how similar to ideal moral code criterion, 155-56; as taking human fallibility and "self-interestedness" fully into account, 156-58 Ideal observer moral code, 120-58, 162-73; when an act is morally right according to, 122; as not subject to the enforcement probleIns of maximum social goodness imperative in its general use, 123; as not doing away with distinction between the moral and immoral versus the non-moral, 123, 144; as not doing away with distinction between ordinary duty and beyond the call of ordinary duty, 123, 144; as containing a limited number of simple, easy to apply moral rules, 123-24; as uniform within a given society at a given time, 124; as possibly differing from one society to next, or from time to time, 124-25, 180; and hard to apply moral rules, 125; exceptions to moral rules of, 125-33; and limitations on procrea• tion, 126-27; as prohibiting using overall goodness of consequences as justification for exceptions to moral rules, 126-28; and borderline cases, 133-37; and conflicts between rules, 137-43; as probably not containing extremely hard to apply secondary rules, 140; examples of secondary rules that might be part of, 140-42; rules of requiring careful investigation before known exactly, 142; compared with classical utilitarianism, 143-53; rules of usually readily knowable in rough outline, 149-50, 179; how differing probabilities are handled by, 148-50; as not subject to standard objection to utilitarianism based on "desert island" cases, 151-53; as not disregarding claims of justice, 16 I -62; compared with a discriminatory moral code, 162-73; greater overall fruits of cooperation and security with, 166-68; as in our better interests to try to enforce, even if sometimes to have it would not be, 171 -73; as overall justified, 173 Ideal observer standpoint: characterized, 62-65; distinction between social and prudential, 121 Ideal observer utilitarianism, see Utilitarianism, ideal observer Illocutionary acts, 15-16 Imperatives: of morality characterized, 26; of prudence characterized, 26; rules and princi- ples, 33-34; use of term explained, 33-34 Imperfect evidence, 97 Indirect limitation on freedom, defined, 178n Intensive properties, 63n Intrinsic goodness and badness, 44-56, 86-88, 110; as certain sorts of experiences 7-8; Lewis' views on, 7-9; defined, 45-47; as not determinable merely by definition, 47; measurement of, 62-64, 145, 155

Johnson, Samuel, 133 188

Judicial decisions, 177-79 "Just," analysis of use of, 159-61 Justice, 15g-62; rules of, 124, 161 Justification, ethical: Lewis on, 34-39,81-82; initial characterization of approach to, 42, 44, 57, 58-59, 78, 162; unifonnity of evaluation necessary for, 42-44; unifonnity of evaluation upon which is based approach to, 48-56; and morality enforcement, 56-61; and distinction between justifying a code for society and justifying acting according to it personally, 59, 175-76; ofideal observer moral code, 162-73; final formulation ofapproach to, 171-72; approach to compared to Rawls' approach, 173-75; as not entirely a priori and deductive, 176

Kant, Immanuel, 83n

Lange, John, 3n Legal reasoning, 135-36 Legal questions, 27-28 Leibniz, G. W. von, 176n Lewis, C. I., 70n; on importance of moral theory, I; and incompleteness of his ethical writings, 3; on analysis of evaluative sentences, 5-11 ; on what is intrinsically good, 7-9; on what is extrinsically good, 9; on , 16; on distinction between absolute, objective, and subjective rightness, 29-30; on imperatives, 33-34; on ethical justification, 33-39, 81-82; and his characterization of "pragmatically a priori" and "pragmatic con• tradiction," 35; on rationality, 35-36, 39-40; and his characterization of formal and contentual aspects of moral imperatives, 37-38; on the explication of "maximizing intrinsically good experiences over one's lifetime," 63-64; on how we might know what experiences of others would be like, 88-89; on rationality where probabilities differ, 66-67; on practical importance ofa precise criterion of rationality, 71; and how he would argue for rational imperative (3), given rational imperative (2), 71-2; and why he was rllluctant to accept something like rational imperative (3), 78-81; on need for concern for others to have independent validity, 79-81; on fundamental imperative of morality, 83-90; on the explication of "social goodness," 85-87; and , 90n "Lie," meaning of, 133 Locutionary acts, 15-16 Lyons, David, 152n

Mabbott, J. D., 34Il Malcolm, Norman, 89n Maximin rule, 174Il Maximum prudential goodness imperative, 162; formulated, 77; limitation on act descrip• tions for, 97-102, 169-70, 177; number of relevant existing conditions to be included in act descriptions for purposes of, 101-2; general use as fundamental for, 169-70; as useful in respects other than justification of moral codes, 177-79. See also Fundamental imperative of prudence; Fundamental imperative of rationality; Rational imperative (3) Maximum social goodness imperative, 85-120; formulated, 90; why some limitation on act descriptions is necessary for, 92-96; limitation on act descriptions for, 97-102, 102-8, 120, 177; number of relevant existing conditions to be included in act descriptions for purposes of, 101-2; general use of defined, 102-8; as holding that trying to follow certain moral rules takes precedence over trying to do what has best overall consequences, 109-12, 126, 172; critique of general use of as morally fundamental, 112-19; general use of as not subject to standard objection to utilitarianism based on "desert island" cases, 113-14; general use ofifmorally fundamental as doing away with distinction between moral and immoral versus non-moral, 114-15, 123,144; general use of if morally funda• mental as doing away with distinction between ordinary duty and beyond the call of ordinary duty, 115-16; general use of if morally fundamental as creating insolvable pro• blems of morality enforcement, 116-19; and its use as a criterion for determining what moral rules or codes to try to enforce explained, 120-22; as not a moral rule itself in its use as a criterion for evaluating moral rules or codes, 121; as that by means of which borderline cases are resolved, 136-37; as useful in respects other than evaluation afmoral rules or codes, 177-79. See also General use of maximum social goodness imperative; Ideal observer criterion 189

~cCorrrrlck, Suzanne, lo3n, I04n ~easurement of intrinsic goodness, 62-63,145,155 ~eaning of a , 15-16 ~eta-ideal observer: defined, 48-49; "relevant" knowledge defined in connection with, 49 Wll,john Stuart, 8-g, 56, gon, 144; on importance ofa philosophy oflogic, 8; as substitut- ing choice ranking for Benthamite calculas, 146; as ignoring problem raised by differing probabilities, 148; on rationale for personal freedom, 178 ~oore, G. E., 17n, 44n, 147 ~oral code: and how chosen by an individual, 57-58; how term is to be used, 33; proposed, 121; ofsome society, or that some society has, defined, 163-65; and general advantages of having one, 166 ~oral code, ideal observer, see Ideal observer moral code ~oral imperatives: distinguished from other kinds, 26; general function of, 26 ~orality, self-interest and rationality, related, 77-78 ~oral questions: ambiguities in, 25-32; compared to legal questions, 27-28 ~oral rightness: characterization of theory of, I; importance of theory of, I; as always being conforrrrlty to some imperative(s), 25-26; ambiguity of sentences about, 25-32; according to ideal observer moral code, 121-22; strong or mandatory sense, 122; weak or pennissive sense, 122 ~oral rules ideal observer would try to enforce, characterized, 123-43 ~oral rules, simple, easy to apply: examples of, 109, 124, 126; and "clear-cut" cases with respect to them, defined, 109-I 0, 126, 15 I-52; and definition of "for all practical purposes" no conflict between them, I 09-I 0, I 5 I -52; as being socially better to try to follow than to try to do what has best overall consequences, log-I 12; as that which ideal observer moral code consists of basically, 123-25; exceptions to, 125-33; as not adInitting in ideal observer moral code to any exceptions based on overall goodness of consequences, 126-28; borderline applications of, 133-37; conflicts between, 137-43; of ideal observer moral code, as requiring careful investigation before known exactly, 142; as enabling us in most cases to avoid problem raised by differing probabilities, 148-49; of ideal observer moral code as usually readily knowable in rough outline, 149-50; ofjustice, 124, 16 I -62; as analogous to constitutional , 177-78 Moral theory, importance of, I "~urder," meaning of, 133

Narveson, Jan, 15 In Naturalism: characterization of, 17-18; objections to, 17-18 Naturalistic fallacy: explained, 17; as not applicable to analysis of "right" as "shortcut" word, 17-18,31-32 Natural property, defined, 17 Negative duties, 140-41 Nelson, Leonard, 146n Nielson, Kai, 176n Noncognitive function of sentences: examples of, 15; as just as much part of meaning of descriptive sentences as evaluative sentences, 15-17; conclusions of inquiry as not affected by whatever is correct analysis of, 16-17; as not affecting truth value, 17 Noncognitivism, I I Nowell-SInith, P. H., 15m

Objective rationality, 162; defined, 62; delineated by rational imperative (3), 6g Objective rightness, 10 I -2; defined, 29-30; as compared to absolute rightness, 30 Open question, characterized, 17 Open texture of language, 134 "Ought," analysis of use of, 24

Paradigm cases, 134-36 Particular existing conditions, defined, g9-100 Paternalistic legislation, 178 Penumbra ofa rule, 134-35, 137 Pepper, Stephen C., gn Perlocutionary acts, 15-16 19°

Perry, Charles, 34n Persuasive definitions, 23 Phrastics, 16 Population control, 126-27, 127n, 154n Positive duties, 140--41 Possible consequence, 93-4; defined, 67-68 Possible set of consequences, defined, 68 Pragmatically a priori, Lewis' characterization of, 35 Pragmatic contradiction, Lewis' characterization of, 35 Primary rules, defined, 138 Principles, rules and imperatives, 34 Property, definition of for analysis of evaluative sentences, 12 Probability theory, 70, 95-96 Procedural moral rules, 121 Propositions, 18 Prudence, fundamental imperative of, see Fundamental imperative of prudence Prudential goodness, 86-87,170--71; defined, 76-77; as almost coinciding with social good- ness in private morality enforcement, 172-73 Prudential ideal observer standpoint, distinguished from social ideal observer standpoint, 121 Prudential imperatives, distinguished from moral imperatives, 26 Prudential rules, simple, easy to apply, 170--73, 176 Psychological egoism, 77 "Punishing" innocent men, 151-52 Purpose of book, 1-3,33,179 Putnam, Hilary, 5-6

Quinton, A. M., 15m

Rational choice, under conditions of uncertainty, 65-76 Rational imperative (I): formulated, 40; as inadequate, 41 Rational imperative (2), 61-62, 65-67, 69,71,73; initialformulation of, 41-42; as delineat• ing the absolutely rational, 62; final formulation of, 64; as collapsing into rational imperative (3) Rational imperative (3): formulated, 69; and probability estimates, 70; rationale for, 71-76; as being the fundamental imperative of rationality, 76, 162; as being the fundamental imperative of prudence, 76-77, 162; and Lewis' reluctance to accept something like it, 78-81. See also Fundamental imperative of rationality; Fundamental imperative of pru• dence; Maximum prudential goodness imperative Rationality: as characterized by Lewis, 35-36, 39-40; general characterization of, 39-41; as more than consistency, 39-41 ; absolute, defined, 62; objective, defined, 62; subjective, defined, 62; where probabilities differ, 65-76; practical value of a precise imperative of, 70--71; related to self-interest and morality, 77-78. See also Fundamental imperative of rationality Rawls,John,5g-Qo, 144n, 173-75 Reference class, 96-102 Reflective equilibrium, 174-75 Reichenbach, Hans, 7on, 95n Relativism, ethical, 2, 33, 47, 17g-80 Relevant existing conditions, see Existing conditions, relevant Relevant knowledge, with regard to meta-ideal observer standpoint, 49 Rescher, Nicholas, 160n "Right": analysis of use of, II -22; strong sense of explained, 12; weak sense of explained, 12; use of distinguished from use of "wrong," 19-22; use of distinguished from use of "good," 22 Right-Jnaking property: defined, 18; distinguished from properties that are neither right• making nor wrong-making, 18-19; distinguished from a wrong-making property, 19-20; of an act as being always consistency to some imperative(s), 25-26 Rights, constitutional, 177-78 Ross, W. D., 151n Royce, Josiah, 146n 191

Rules, principles and imperatives, 34 Rules of general obligation, defined, 141 Rules of obligation, defined, 140-41 Rules of prohibition, defined, 140-41 Rules of specific obligation, defined, 141 Russell, Bertrand, sg-6o

Sartorius, Rolf, 13Sn, I S In, 17Sn Sartre, Jean-Paul, 138 Satisfying experience: as being intrinsically good, 7-8; characterized, 7-8; as that valued for its own sake from an ideal standpoint, S2-S6 Saydah, J. Roger, 34n Scaler property, defined, 22 Secondary rules, I So; defined, 138; standard, defined, 142-43; of ideal observer moral code as possibly being innumerable, 143 Self-interest, morality and rationality, related, 77-78 "Self-interestedness," IS3, IS7-S8, 178, 179; defined, 118; as in part why moral rules an ideal observer would try to enforce are usually readily knowable in rough outline, I SO Searle, John, IS-16 Sharp, F. C., 144 Shortcut word: explanation of, 13-14; "just" as, 160-61 "Should," analysis of use of, 24 "Shouldness," criterion of for what should be valued for its own sake, SI-S2 Sidgewick, Henry, 176 Simple, easy to apply moral rules, see Moral rules, simple, easy to apply Smart, J. J. C., 146, 147n Smith, Adam, 146n Social goodness, 170; defined, 8S-88; as almost coinciding with prudential goodness in private morality enforcement 173; as that in terms of which we might "weigh" advantages and disadvantages 177 Social ideal observer standpoint, distinguished from prudential ideal observer standpoint 121 Social value, see Social goodness Specific obligation, rules of, defined, 141 Standard secondary rules, defined, 142-43 "Stealing," meaning of, 133 Strong preference or choice ranking, 63n Strong sense of "right," 122n; explained, 12 Subjective rationality, defined, 62 Subjective rightness, 101; defined, 30 Subscribing to a moral code, Brandt's definition of, 156 Substantive moral rules, 121 Supererogatory acts, 115-16, 119 Synthetic, as characterized by Lewis, 3Sn

Teleological criterion of moral rightness, 153n Thalberg, Irving, 103n, 104n "Thing," special sense of explained, I I Toulmin, Stephen, 28n "Trying," special sense of defined, 104-8; special sense compared with ordinary sense of, 107-8

Urmson, J. 0., 115n Utilitarianism, act: what counts as a consequence for purposes of, 9 I -92; and standard objection based on "desert island" cases, 113, 147, 151-52; defined, 144; as abandoning distinction between the moral and immoral versus the non-moral, 144-45; as abandoning distinction between ordinary duty versus beyond the call of ordinary duty, 144-4S; compared to ideal observer moral code, 144-53; and the measurement of intrinsic goodness, I 4S; as not in most versions addressing itself to problem of differing probabilities, 147-48; as, along with other versions of utilitarianism, supposedly disregarding clahns of justice, 159, 161-62 Utilitarianism, ideal observer: as combining a particular version of rule utilitarianism and of ideal observer theory, 143-44; compared to classical act utilitarianism, 143-53; as not abandoning certain ethical distinctions abandoned by act utilitarianism, 144-45; as not requiring cardinal measurement of intrinsic goodness, 145-47; how differing probabilities are handled by, 148-50; rules of as usually readily knowable in rough outline, 14g--50; as avoiding objection based on "desert island" cases, 151-53; distinguished from other versions of rule utilitarianism, 152-53; as not collapsing into act utilitarianism, 152-53; as not disregarding clahns of justice, 161-62. See also Ideal observer moral code Utilitarianism, Rule, 143-44, 152-53; defined, 144. See also Utilitarianism, ideal observer

"Valuable," analysis of use of, 24-25 Valuable for its own sake: explication of phrase, 47; as evidenced by that valued for its own sake, 55-56 Valued for its own sake: explication of phrase, 45-47; from an ordinary standpoint, 48-50; and the appropriate "should"-making property, 51-52; from an ideal standpoint, 52-56; as evidence for that valuable for its own sake, 55-56 Veil of ignorance, 173-75

Waismann, Friedrich, 134n Warnock, G.]., 15n Wasserstrom, Richard, 152n Weak preference or choice ranking, 63n Weak sense of "right," 122n; explained, 12 Wheeler, Arthur M., 34n Why be moral?, 175-76; as distinct from question of why having some moral code is justified, 59, 175-76 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 5-6 Wrong-making property: defined, 18; distinguished from a right-making property, 19--20