Stance | Volume 3 | April 2010

A Substantive Revision to Firth's Ideal Observer Theory

ABSTRACT: This paper examines Ideal Observer Theory and uses criticisms of it to lay the foundation for a revised theory first suggested by Jonathan Harrison called Ideal Moral Reaction Theory. Harrison’s Ideal Moral Reaction Theory stipulates that the being producing an ideal moral reaction be dispassionate. This paper argues for the opposite: an Ideal Moral Reaction must be performed by a passionate being because it provides motivation for action and places ethical decision-making within human grasp.

Nancy Rankin is a philosophy major and religious studies minor at Austin Peay State University in Clarksville, Tennessee. Her philosophical interests mainly center around ethical theory and the philosophy of religion. In her spare time, she enjoys reading and plans to become a fiction author sometime in the near future.

n an article titled “Ethical Absolutism and the of Ideal Observer Theory which can be termed Ideal Observer,” Roderick Firth advocates Ideal Moral Reaction Theory. Although this theory a theory that has come to be known as the was first suggested by Jonathan Harrison, I make a Ideal Observer Theory. Ideal Observer Theory substantive revision to his conception of the theory asserts that right and wrong are determined by an when I argue that an individual attempting an ideal Iideal observer’s reaction to a given act. That is, any moral reaction would be a passionate being, rather act X is morally permissible if an ideal observer than the dispassionate one Harrison suggests. This, would approve of X; conversely, any act Y is I argue, places ethical decision-making within morally blameworthy if an ideal observer would the grasp of human beings and thus makes it a disapprove of Y. pragmatic concept. In this paper, I examine several of the strengths Firth expounds upon several characteristics of and weaknesses of Ideal Observer Theory an ideal observer. An ideal observer is omniscient and explain how together, these strengths and with respect to non-ethical facts, omnipercipient, weaknesses lay the foundation for a revised version disinterested, dispassionate, consistent, and in

55 A Substantive Revision to Firth's Ideal Observer Theory

other respects, normal.1 Some of these characteristics The ideal observer must also be consistent, require further elucidation. The requirement for meaning that he or she would not react omniscience is a weighty one, as it strongly differently to two situations exhibiting the same limits who (or what) can act as an ideal observer. characteristics. That is, if A = B, the ideal observer Firth argues, however, that “to say that an ideal would not disapprove of A and simultaneously observer is omniscient is to insure that no limits approve of B. are put on the kinds or the quality of factual Finally, Firth asserts that the ideal observer information which are available to influence must be, in all other respects, a normal being. his ethically significant reactions.”2 That is, By normal, Firth simply means this individual according to Firth, an ideal observer must be cannot be suffering from a brain tumor or omniscient so as to avoid being mistaken when psychological disorder that may skew his or her making ethical decisions. All relevant facts must judgment on ethical matters. All other aspects of be taken into consideration. In order to ensure this being must be simply normal. that all relevant facts are, in fact, taken into In his article “The Definition of an ‘Ideal consideration, Firth prescribes omniscience as a Observer’ Theory in Ethics,” Richard Brandt necessary characteristic of an ideal observer. discusses seven reasons why this theory should Firth’s requirement for omnipercipience be considered further. Two of these reasons also greatly limits ideal observers, as an have implications for the revised Ideal Observer omnipercipient being is one that “must be able... Theory I will later suggest, so it is to these I will simultaneously to visualize all actual facts, and now turn. First, Brandt writes that this theory, the consequences of all possible acts in any given “explains why our feelings and attitudes – and situation.”3 That is, as Firth suggests, the ideal especially our sympathies – are (and properly observer must have “extraordinary powers of are) engaged in ethical reflection, and why imagination.”4 moral philosophers have thought that moral Further, Firth argues that the ideal observer experience is distinctively a union of cognition must be impartial and that impartiality requires and emotion.”5 That is, this theory explains the ideal observer to be both disinterested and why we incorporate our feelings and attitudes dispassionate. He argues that a simple lack into ethical decision-making, as this is also what of interest in a given situation is not enough an ideal observer does when making ethical to ensure impartiality, thus arguing the ideal decisions. observer must also lack the passions that so Second, Ideal Observer Theory, “explains often infect the thoughts and actions of most why we value the advice of knowledgeable, human beings. impartial, and consistent persons at times of

1. Roderick Firth, “Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1952): 333- 344. 2. Firth, “Ethical Absolutism,” 334. 3. Ibid: 335. 4. Ibid. 5. Richard Brandt, “The Definition of an ‘Ideal Observer’ Theory in Ethics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 15, No. 3 (1955): 407.

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moral decision, and why we reject previous simply create a human who knew the truth moral opinions of our own which we think value of all propositions?”8 That is, it seems reflect self-interest, inconsistency, or lack metaphysically possible for God to create an of information.”6 That is, most individuals omniscient human. Since this is possible, he value such things as knowledge, impartiality, argues, omniscience and omnipercipience do and consistency in ethical-decision making; not present problems for Ideal Observer Theory. conversely, they find lack of knowledge, self- This solution, however, is inadequate. interest, or lack of consistency as characteristics In addition to assuming the existence of God, antithetical to objective ethical reflection. Hence, an assumption not necessary in Ideal Observer this theory is consistent with what most people Theory, the argument seems to beg the question. pragmatically value in ethical reflection. That is, given that the problem exists because no Although this theory has its strengths, known human being exhibits the characteristics Ideal Observer Theory has been scrutinized in of omniscience or omnipercipience, creating a a variety of ways. In the following pages, I will solution by saying that one could be created does address three of the problems recognized by very little to help us in making practical ethical philosophers: the problem of omniscience and decisions. omnipercipience, the problem of a dispassionate Given that ethics should be concerned observer, and a problem that I have termed the with practical elements rather than nearly problem of the lucky guess. impossible metaphysical entities, it seems the Richard Brandt argues that the characteristics possibility of the creation of an omniscient of omniscience and omnipercipience, as deemed and omnipercipient human being does little to necessary by Firth, “eat away at the human actually help us. Since a normal human being characteristics of the ideal observer.”7 Brandt cannot achieve omniscience or omnipercipience, suggests that no human being can successfully it seems inconsequential to suggest that this achieve ideal observer status if omniscience and could occur. Furthermore, common intuition omnipercipience are required. This status must tells us that no normal human being can achieve be delegated only to a God-like or superhuman this status; thus, additional justification for this being. Consequently, Ideal Observer Theory can claim seems unnecessary. It seems the burden do little to help us in making important ethical of proof is on the individual who claims there decisions. are human beings who exhibit these qualities, “Relativising the Ideal Observer Theory,” rather than the individual who does not. an article by Charles Taliaferro, suggests Instead of arguing that omniscience and that omniscience (and, it can be assumed, omnipercipience are necessary, Brandt suggests omnipercipience as well) is not metaphysically an alternative: impossible when he writes, “could not God

6. Brandt, "Definition," 407. 7. Ibid: 409. 8. Charles Taliaferro, “Relativising the Ideal Observer Theory,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 49, No. 1 (1988): 125.

57 A Substantive Revision to Firth's Ideal Observer Theory

What a person needs to be vividly conscious of, omniscience and omnipercipience requirements in judging or reacting to an ethical situation, is and instead incorporating the ethically-relevant simply all those facts vivid awareness of which solution regarding knowledge of facts, exhibits would make a difference to his ethical reaction to circularity because an individual cannot know he this case if (to use Firth’s other qualifications) he or she has all ethically relevant facts without in were a disinterested, dispassionate but otherwise fact knowing all facts. It is for this reason that the normal person.9 problem of omniscience and omnipercipience is such a serious problem with no solution yet to Brandt is suggesting that an ideal observer solve it. need not be omniscient or omnipercipient, In the article, “Some Comments on Professor but rather simply exhibit these other Firthian Firth’s Ideal Observer Theory,” Jonathan Harrison qualities in order to be classified as an ideal raises the problem of a dispassionate observer observer. This suggestion, however, is also when he writes, “a being who had no passions... inadequate because it presents a problem which would have no moral reactions.”10 A being that can be called the problem of relevant facts. had no emotions or sympathies regarding an The problem can be formulated as follows: if ethical dilemma would consequently hold a being is neither omniscient nor omnipercipient, no moral reaction to such a dilemma. What, he cannot be sure he is “vividly aware” of all the then, would be the cause of this dispassionate relevant facts of an ethical situation because his observer’s reactions? If an ideal observer were knowledge is limited. He cannot know which completely dispassionate, he or she would not facts would make a difference to his ethical care enough to make a decision regarding an reaction unless he is aware of all other non- ethical dilemma. ethical facts. An individual needs omniscience Harrison further argues if, “you allow an and omnipercipience in order to ensure that all ideal observer to have passions, you are faced relevant facts are considered. Without knowing with the problem of specifying which of his all facts, an ethical decision-maker cannot have passions may affect his moral reactions, and this assurance. which may not.”11 What criteria do we have to Given the problem of omniscience and determine which passions should be accepted as omnipercipience and the problem of relevant influential in ethical decision-making and which facts, we have reached an impasse with regard should not? to Ideal Observer Theory. On the one hand, Thus, it seems we have reached another omniscience and omnipercipience limit an ideal impasse in regards to Ideal Observer Theory. observer to a God-like or superhuman being, Arguing that an ideal observer should be thus making the theory impractical in ethical dispassionate is problematic because it allows no reflection. On the other hand, taking away the room for right decision-making, as a dispassionate

9. Brandt, "Definition," 410. 10. Jonathan Harrison, “Some Comments on Professor Firth’s Ideal Observer Theory,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1956): 260. 11. Harrison, “Comments,” 260.

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observer would fail to want to make a decision. lucky guess illustrates that Firthian Ideal Observer However, allowing an ideal observer to retain Theory gives us no method for determining right passions is problematic because one must then action and, consequently, places the epistemic determine which passions can be allowed in lucky guess on the same level as a guess based in ethical reflection and which would impede reason and rationality. objective decision-making. What do the problems of omniscience and I have developed a rudimentary solution to omnipercipience, the dispassionate observer, and the problem of a dispassionate observer, as will the lucky guess mean for Ideal Observer Theory? be discussed shortly. The problem I have termed As I have suggested, these problems indicate “the problem of the lucky guess” is further proof that Firth’s theory requires substantive revision. that Ideal Observer Theory needs substantive The solution I offer to these problems – and the revisions or additions. Although Firth describes revision to Ideal Observer Theory I suggest – in great detail the characteristics that constitute was first considered by Jonathan Harrison when an ideal observer, he does little to suggest how he wrote that individuals should consider ideal a non-ideal observer could actually make ethical moral reactions as characteristic of correct ethical decisions. The problem of the lucky guess is a decisions, as opposed to the concept of an ideal problem of practicality. An example can best observer. He writes: explain this problem. Take Ethan, a calm, conscientious, rational You may simply define ‘ideal moral reaction’ as one decision-maker who has attempted to gain all of which is disinterested, dispassionate, etc. There is the relevant facts of a situation in which ethical no need for the person who has the ideal reaction reflection is necessary. Now consider Eric, an to A to be disinterested, dispassionate, and so erratic, irrational, hasty decision-maker who on, on every occasion on which he experiences a has little knowledge of the facts of a situation. moral reaction. Hence observers who are far from Since Ideal Observer Theory depends only on ideal may have ideal moral reactions. Hence the the reaction of an ideal observer, Eric could just fact that there are no ideal observers would not as easily possess the ideal observer’s response prevent there being ideal moral reactions, and so to an ethical decision as Ethan, despite the statements about ‘all ideal reactions’ need not be fact that Ethan exhibits more rationality and statements about null classes, even if statements conscientiousness regarding ethical decision- about ideal observers are.12 making. An epistemic “lucky guess” on the ethical Harrison is suggesting that we consider ideal implications of a given action could be correct, moral reactions to situations, which he argues even though the lucky ethical decision- can be defined as reactions that are disinterested, maker failed to take into consideration those dispassionate, etc. The point Harrison makes is characteristics we deem worthy of consideration, clear: when we talk of ideal observers, we are not i.e. knowledge of the situation, rationality, talking about anything that actually exists – that consistency, etc. Ultimately, the problem of the is, unless God or superhuman beings exist, which,

12. Harrison, "Comments," 257.

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as previously discussed, need not be considered. Although an individual can never be Ideal moral reactions, on the other hand, could epistemically certain he or she has attained exist. It is to this concept that I will now turn in an that level of knowledge, it gives him or her an attempt to expound upon Harrison’s suggestion. incentive to seek the facts, and to do so to the Harrison argues that an ideal moral reaction extent that his or her knowledge gives an answer would consist of the following requirements: beyond a reasonable doubt. Harrison is further by-passing these problems (a) It would not be altered by any increase in because he accepts that individuals may have knowledge or true opinion by the observer whose false beliefs, which is a fact of human existence, reaction it is, whether this increase in knowledge yet something Firth’s ideal observer could not or true opinion takes the form of the addition of possess. This fact simply provides individuals any one piece of information, or any possible making ethical decisions a further incentive to combination of pieces of information. seek as much knowledge as possible about the (b) To make sure that the class of ideal reactions is situation before making any decision. not null, I cannot say that the observer who has the Harrison, however, argues an individual reaction has no false beliefs. Instead I shall stipulate making an ethical decision must be disinterested that he has no false beliefs which would be such and dispassionate; that is, he argues for the same that the removal of any, either severally, or in any impartiality that Firth does for his ideal observer. combination, alters his reaction.13 Agreeing with Taliaferro and his suggestion that a dispassionate observer would not make With (a) and (b), Harrison is attempting to any decision at all, I argue that an individual solve the impasse between omniscience and seeking to attain this type of ideal moral reaction omnipercipience and relevant facts. Rather than to an ethical situation would, in fact, be allowed having an ethical decision-maker omniscient passions, as it is something that most human and omnipercipient, Harrison first suggests that beings have whether they are aware of it or not. the decision-maker’s ethical choice must not be For instance, most human beings would altered by any further information. This avoids cringe at the thought of children being tortured the problem that no being can be omniscient during the Nazi Holocaust. This reaction is or omnipercipient, yet fails to encounter the passionate, yet does not seem to be an incorrect problem of relevant facts because it does not reaction. Indeed, it seems some level of passion suggest that one must know what knowledge is is necessary to make ethical decisions – what relevant or irrelevant. Instead, when making an matters is that an individual has the right level of ethical decision the individual must attempt to passion, a fact which has already been shown to gain as much knowledge as possible about the be problematic. How, then, are we to determine situation – enough to reasonably ensure him or what the right level of passion should be? her that the decision would not be altered by I argue it is simply human for an individual further evidence. to feel passions, and since we are talking about

13. Ibid., 258.

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humans, rather than some metaphysical ideal be consistent if the given situation were to arise observer, this is okay. In fact, given that ethics again. This is superior to the one defended by is entirely about human beings, it seems unwise Harrison because it takes into account human to develop a theory to the contrary, as the passions that exist whether an individual claims dispassionate observer does. With regard to which they do or not. passions should be admitted and which should My theory also accounts for the problems be rejected, I suggest that we simply require that of omniscience and omnipercipience by not these passions do not cloud the judgment of the requiring them, yet accounts for the problem of ethical decision maker to the extent that he or she relevant facts by arguing that an individual must would ignore all other facts of the situation at not be persuaded to change his or her opinion hand. As long as the passions do not hold more by the addition or removal of facts. Further, it sway than a substantial amount of evidence does not succumb to the problem of the lucky towards the contrary viewpoint, those passions guess because it pragmatically offers a means for should be admitted in ethical reflection. an individual to work towards making an ideal How does the concept of an ideal moral moral decision. This theory also maintains the reaction, as opposed to an ideal observer, fare strengths of ideal observer theory mentioned with the problem of the lucky guess? As we can earlier: it still explains the ways in which our stipulate what it takes to have an ideal moral attitudes and passions influence our thinking reaction, we can suggest what steps an individual and explains why we regard individuals who are should take in order to achieve an ideal moral rational, consistent, and level-headed as better reaction. Consequently, the concept of a lucky ethical decision-makers. guess is no longer as problematic – Ethan, our In this paper, I have reviewed the Ideal rational, consistent, knowledgeable decision- Observer Theory provided by Roderick Firth maker, would indeed be closer to making an ideal and examined some of the strengths and moral judgment than Eric, the erratic, irrational weaknesses of this theory. I have further argued decision maker who could have fared just as well that, in order to avoid the problems presented under Ideal Observer Theory. by Ideal Observer Theory, we should instead My contribution to Ideal Moral Reaction adopt a theory of ideal moral reactions, as first Theory is simple: remove the requirement that introduced by Jonathan Harrison. In adopting the reaction be dispassionate, as this requirement his theory, I have altered the concept of an ideal is nonsensical because passions are necessary for moral reaction to be one that is passionate, as any reaction to occur. Ultimately, my conception passions must exist for a reaction to occur at all. of an ideal moral reaction is one in which an The argument is strengthened because it makes individual is disinterested, rational, has sufficient ideal moral reactions possible for humans to knowledge of the situation at hand, and would actually attain.

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