The Bahrain Defence Force: the Monarchy’S Second-To- Last Line of Defense
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The Bahrain Defence Force: The Monarchy’s Second-to- Last Line of Defense By Zoltan Barany Senior Associate, CSIS Burke Chair December 9, 2016 Please provide comments to [email protected] Photo credit: JOSEPH EID/AFP/Getty Images Barany: Bahrain Defense Force 2 Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................... 3 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 4 PART I. THE MONARCHY AND THE BDF ..................................................................................... 4 The BDF’s Place in the State and Regime .............................................................................. 6 The Royal Family .................................................................................................................... 6 The State and the BDF ............................................................................................................ 8 Mission #1: Defending the Monarchy ..................................................................................... 9 THE ARMY AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS AND AT HOME AND ABROAD .......................................... 12 Economic Aspects: Budgets, Size, Weapons ......................................................................... 12 The 1981 Coup Attempt and Its Impact on the BDF ............................................................. 14 BDF Deployments and Military Cooperation ....................................................................... 15 THE ARMY AND SOCIETY .......................................................................................................... 16 The Shi’a – Sunni Divide in Bahrain and in the BDF ........................................................... 16 The Officer Corps .................................................................................................................. 17 Foreign Mercenaries ............................................................................................................. 18 Women in the BDF and the Issue of Conscription ................................................................ 20 Culture ................................................................................................................................... 21 THE BDF AND THE OUTSIDE WORLD ........................................................................................ 21 IRAN ........................................................................................................................................... 22 SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GCC ................................................................................................... 22 THE US AND THE UK ................................................................................................................. 24 II. THE 2011 UPRISING AND THE BDF ................................................................................ 26 MILITARY FACTORS ................................................................................................................... 27 REGIME FACTORS ...................................................................................................................... 28 SOCIETAL FACTORS ................................................................................................................... 29 The Application of Violence .................................................................................................. 29 FOREIGN DIMENSION ................................................................................................................. 30 Foreign Intervention ............................................................................................................. 30 Foreign Affairs ...................................................................................................................... 30 Revolutionary Diffusion ........................................................................................................ 31 III. POST-UPRISING REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENTS ................................................ 32 Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) ............................................................ 32 Addressing the Causes .......................................................................................................... 33 IV. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 35 BIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................... 36 NOTES .......................................................................................................................................... 37 Barany: Bahrain Defense Force 3 Executive Summary This report seeks to paint a comprehensive portrait of the Bahrain Defence Force (BDF), the monarchy’s principal military organization. The bulk of the study examines the BDF’s place in the monarchy, focusing on the role of the state and the royal family while also devoting attention to its mission, effectiveness, composition, and foreign relations. The BDF is a highly professional, well equipped, and, judging by the available evidence, effective army. Nevertheless, it is virtually closed to Shi’a Muslims, the majority of Bahrainis, who are considered potentially disloyal to the monarchy, and therefore are shut out from armed service. Two concise sections of the report analyze the BDF’s role in the 2011 uprising—the only major upheaval among the eight Arab monarchies—and reform proposals and outcomes in its aftermath. Although the uprising was brutally suppressed, the BDF did not participate in the crackdown but rather secured strategic areas cleared by other law enforcement agencies. In the wake of the uprising, the regime did implement some of the recommendations of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, but it held to account few culpable individuals, and has failed to address the underlying problems that inspired the revolt. The report makes three principal arguments. First, Bahrain’s army is the army of the royal family and is not a national army. Second, the BDF’s participation in the suppression of the 2011 uprising was minimal; that task was mainly executed by the National Guard and the police. Third, the Bahraini state, and by extension, its military, has been impacted more than any other army involved in the Arab Spring—and quite possibly more than any of its Arab counterparts—by its external environment, which should hardly be surprising given Bahrain’s size, location, and geostrategic significance. The BDF is also in the unique situation that while it is the army of an autonomous state, the monarchy it serves is highly dependent for its prosperity and security on its much larger, richer, and more powerful neighbor, Saudi Arabia. Barany: Bahrain Defense Force 4 Introduction Bahrain’s military is the servant of the absolute monarchy. It is not a national army, but rather the army of Sunni Muslim state and the regime. Aside from a few mostly token exceptions, the Bahrain Defence Force (BDF) is essentially closed to a large proportion of Bahrain’s population, the Shi’a Muslims, who are generally expected to be less loyal or supportive of the kingdom than Sunnis, and therefore are considered unfit for armed military service. Put differently, the BDF is the fighting force of Sunni Muslims who are charged with protecting a Sunni ruling family and Sunni political and business elites. Moreover, a large proportion of the armed forces is comprised of foreign nationals. Compared with the armies of most Arab republics, the BDF—especially its officer corps—has attained a respectable level of professionalism: it is relatively well supplied, and it enjoys the esteem of Sunni Muslim citizens. Bahrain’s army is also in the unique situation that while it is the army of an autonomous state, the monarchy it serves is highly dependent for its prosperity and security on its much larger, richer, and more powerful neighbor, Saudi Arabia. In this report, three principal arguments are made, along with supporting assertions regarding the BDF’s above-mentioned attributes. First, Bahrain’s army is the army of the royal family and is not a national army. Second, the BDF’s participation in the suppression of the 2011 uprising was minimal. Third, the Bahraini state, and by extension, its military has been impacted more than any other army involved in the Arab Spring—and quite possibly more than any of its Arab counterparts—by its external environment which should hardly be surprising given Bahrain’s size, location, and geostrategic significance. Part I. The Monarchy and the BDF Bahrain, an island kingdom just off the coast of Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf is by far the smallest Arab state. At 295 square miles (765 square miles) it is barely larger than the city of Austin, Texas or Singapore, and its area is not quite one-fifteenth of that of its Gulf neighbor, Qatar. Bahrainis are a minority in their land: according to the latest (2010) census, they only make up 46% of the total population of 1,234,571; the rest are 54% non-citizens. Just as importantly, in a Sunni Muslim-ruled state, Sunni Bahrainis are a minority: although reliable numbers are hard to come by and precise figures are virtually impossible to obtain, the most reasonable estimate is that between 53% and 62.3%