Reforms in Bahrain

tema: demokrati

REFORMS IN BAHRAIN

Genuine democratization or strengthening autocracy through liberalization? Those critical to the country’ s reforms argue that there will be progress, but just enough to consolidate the king’ s powerbase and improve his image, while isolating the opposition.

52 the freedom of expression that Hamad introduced with Al-Jazeera has had no impact on the Qatari sociopolitical system. But it did help the ruler win high international ratings; his reputation was further enhanced when in 1999 Qatar held its first elections ever in which women were allowed to vote and stand for office. In the commotion entailed by the introduction of universal suffrage in a region where denial of political rights to women is the rule, it is often forgotten that the object of the vote was a 29-member municipal council with no political functions whatsoever. The art of liberalizing without impinging upon the old autocracy recently reached new heights in Bahrain: the amir, sheikh Issa Al Khalifa died in March 1999 and was succeeded by his 50-year old son, Hamad. Unlike his namesake in Qatar, the new Bahraini ruler text: Anh Nga Longva inherited a deeply troubled land. The tiny island of Bahrain, tucked away in the Gulf it is generally hoped that when the aging of Salwa between the Saudi landmass and rulers of the Gulf pass away, their succes- the Qatari peninsula, was shaken by a con- sors will embark upon liberalizing the con- tinuous uprising (intifada) that peaked servative politics of the region thus paving between 1994 and 1998. It left 40 dead, the way for democracy. In this expectation thousands of arrests and detentions and lies the assumption that liberalization nec- hundreds of exiles in a population of slight- essarily leads towards greater democracy. ly more than half a million, of which only But does it? The first generation shift in the 406.000 are Bahraini citizens.2 Gulf took place in Qatar in 1995 when The unrest was preceded by two years of Crown Prince Hamad Al Thani deposed peaceful popular petitioning for the return his father to become amir. Since then he of the Constitution suspended since 1975 has taken a series of measures some of and the abrogation of the State Security which undeniably qualify as liberalizing Law. The popular petition was signed by steps. He allowed for instance the creation 25.000 citizens and formulated in a on Qatari soil of the Qatari financed satel- respectful manner, but sheikh Issa and his lite tv-station Al-Jazeera. While famously government refused to receive it, let alone outspoken and one of the most important enter into dialogue with the signatories. broadcasters in the Middle East today, Al- Furthermore, the initiative takers were Jazeera tactfully and consistently avoids arrested and jailed, most of them without dealing with internal Qatari affairs.1 Thus trial. The problems that beset Bahrain

53 reach well beyond the realm of politics, island’ s rich history of political activism of narrowly defined. They lie in social-struc- the 1930s and 1950s (Khuri 1980), which tural fault lines dating back to 1782 when upon independence in 1971 led Bahrain to the Al Khalifas and their tribal allies opt for the constitutional system. In 1973 a crossed over from the mainland via Qatar Constitution was drawn up and the coun- and conquered Bahrain from the Persians. try’ s first National Assembly was elected, The conquerors were Sunni and of in which both leftist secularists and conser- Bedouin stock, the Bahrainis were Shi’ a vative religious forces were well represent- and settled farmers. The Al Khalifas took ed. Despite their ideological differences the over the farmlands, turned the native pop- deputies were united in their common ulation into rightless labourers and treated refusal to ratify the State Security Law. In Bahrain since then as conquered territory.3 There is an Al Khalifa at the head of almost [ every single public institution of some sig- The Shi’ a are in majority, but they nificance. The family rules with the sup- are little represented either in the port of wealthy Sunni citizens and a hand- public or the private sector. ful of privileged Shi’ a. The Shi’ a are in majority – estimations vary between 60 [ percent and 70 percent – but they are little represented either in the public or the the stalemate that ensued, the amir private sector. They make up the poorest decreed the dissolution of the National tier of the society, and are the prime victims Assembly in August 1975. He also unilater- of unemployment, one of Bahrain’ s major ally suspended the articles in the Constitu- problems and biggest paradox, since the tion requiring the election of a new assem- country imports foreign workers from East bly within two months. Bahrain’ s short and West to be employed in all sectors.4 experience with parliamentarism came to an abrupt end, and the country reverted to The intifada and the opposition in exile the autocratic rule of the amir, his brother The 1990s were one of the darkest chapters the Prime Minister and other members of in Bahrain’ s history. The country lived his family. The civil and political rights con- under the state of emergency declared in tained in the Constitution were eliminated, 1957 and the 1975 State Security Law the rule of law was inexistent and the empowered the Minister of Interior to slightest criticism against the government detain political suspects for three years or led to arrest and incarceration without trial. more without trial. People were terrified to At the same time, with the financial assis- discuss anything that could be interpreted tance of Saudi Arabia notably, the regime as remotely related to politics, and it was strengthened the support of the Sunnis only within the safety of their homes that and part of the Shi’ ite establishment by they ventured to express their opinions. giving them the means to enrich them- Until the intifada erupted in 1994, Bahrain selves. Many within the vocal opposition was on the surface a peaceful and placid were gradually coopted, others left the place. This quietism contrasted with the country in self-exile. The regime also care-

54 fully groomed its international image. tion of the most elementary international Bahrain became home to the US Fifth Fleet fair trial standards gave rise to strong criti- and gained the reputation of being a faith- cism and protests from various interna- ful ally of the West. As the only Gulf socie- tional human rights organisations. The ty that consistently allowed the consump- myth of Bahrain as a haven of tolerance tion of alcohol, it was also known as a “tol- began to fade. erant” society open to Western culture that The opposition in exile played a critical compared favourably with its surrounding role in this respect. They worked tirelessly neighbours. The first signs of resurging to bring the situation inside Bahrain to the unrest appeared in the early 1980s. In 1979 world’ s attention. The most influential Khomeini’ s revolution shook Iran and opposition group, the London-based ignited a wave of political activism among Bahrain Freedom Movement (bfm) was the the Shi’ a in the Arab Gulf countries channel through which detailed informa- (Wright 1995). In 1982 a group of Bahraini tion about the arbitrary arrests and deten- Shi’ a was arrested for allegedly plotting to tions reached the human rights organisa- turn Bahrain into an Islamic republic. tions and other relevant forums. The bfm Scores of Shi’ a were rounded, imprisoned also actively lobbied with Western politi- or sent into exile. Shi’ ite associations cians in the hope that pressure exerted by inside Bahrain were closed down, public them would have an effect on the regime in religious celebrations were monitored and Manama. But the government remained curtailed. The reaction of the regime was inflexible: it consistently downplayed the arguably efffective in the short run, but the significance of the unrest, and stuck to its seeds of unrest among the Shi’ a were description of the intifada as the work of already sown. A new generation of Shi’ ite marginal sectarian fanatics on Iran’ s pay- youths went to study in Qom and came roll. back to spread messages about justice for the oppressed majority. The experience of King Hamad’ s reforms age-old discrimination at the hands of the By 1998 the hardline policy adopted by the Sunni rulers, added to aspirations for mod- authorities towards the uprising was begin- ern parliamentary democracy, provided the ning to bear fruit, but only at the price of Shi’ a with a particularly potent political filling the country’ s prisons and earning motivation. Although liberal Sunni Bahrai- Bahrain widespread international condem- nis also called for the return of the 1973 nation. Furthermore, four years of contin- Constitution and democratization, it was ued and at times violent unrest threatened the Shi’ a who kept the intifada of the to impact negatively on the country’ s econ- 1990s going.5 It was also the Shi’ a who omy. By the late 1990s, Bahrain had devel- bore the brunt of the authorities’ wrath. oped a reputation of unstability and it Arrests, imprisonments and forcible exile seemed just a matter of time before private continued throughout the 1980s and national and international investors left the 1990s under the auspices of the State Secu- island for safer places like Dubai. Clearly rity Law. Summary trials were carried out change was needed, if only for the sake of by the State Security Court where the viola- the establishment. When sheikh Hamad

55 succeeded to his father hopes were high hence a meeting was convened on 8 Febru- that he would put an end to the deadlock. ary 2001 between the Amir and four senior The new amir did not disappoint these opposition figures […]. The session was expectations. He quickly initiated a series direct and the opposition figures ques- of positive gestures: in 1999 he freed the tioned two issues: whether the 1973 Consti- first batch of some hundred political pris- tution will be the governing criteria and oners and announced plans to hold munic- whether the upper chamber will ever have ipal elections in which women can both legislative powers. The Amir replied ‘ I give vote and stand as candidates. In January you my word as a gentleman that the 1973 2001 he announced that a National Action Constitution will be the basis and that the Charter (mithaq al amal al watani) was in upper house will only be for consultation’ . preparation and would be put to a referen- The opposition figures requested that these dum a month later. The Charter promised affirmations be published in the media. to reinstate constitutional rule, though with And the Amir responded. He ordered the a significant change: instead of the uni- Justice Minister to publish a statement that cameral National Assembly envisaged by appeared in the two daily newspapers the 1973 Constitution, the majlis al watani (Akhbar Al Khalij and Al Ayyam) the next would now consist of two chambers: the morning (9 February 2001) confirming elected Deputy Chamber (majlis al that the 1973 Constitution will be the basis nuwwab) and the appointed Consultative and that the upper chamber will be for con- Council (majlis al shura). The Charter also sultation only. In good faith, the opposition proposed that Bahrain be changed into a forces rallied behind the Amir.” (bfm 21 constitutional monarchy headed by a king February 2002). and no longer an amir. 90 percent of the Bahrainis took part in the February 16 ref- Some doubts were expressed but events in erendum and 98.4 percent voted in favour the following months relegated them to the of the Charter. This near unanimity may background. Immediately after the referen- surprise. After all, the intifada started as dum, the amir repealed the hated State the result of the regime’ s unwillingness to Security Law and abolished the notorious accede to the popular petition. A central State Security Court. He emptied the pris- demand in this petition was the return of ons of political prisoners, allowed most the 1973 Constitution and the parliamen- exiles to return home and promised to tary system as outlined in it. The bicameral allow the rest back as soon as possible. organisation proposed in the National Censorship was scrapped and for the first Action Charter departs importantly from time Bahrainis found they were free to the 1973 document, yet the Bahraini oppo- debate political issues and to form non-gov- sition threw its support behind the Charter. ernmental organisations without being To understand how this was possible let us arrested, imprisoned or fired from their listen to the account by the bfm: jobs. The amir even indicated he was will- ing to address long-standing problems “The opposition forces were opposed to the such as corruption, unemployment and ambiguous wording of the Charter and housing. Additional economic bonuses

56 were handed out: an extra month’ s pay many felt towards the amir – by now the was decreed for state employees, and ad king – was an equally genuine unease hoc assistance to some of the needy, with the way the reforms were unfolding. orphans and widows was distributed. The Part of the population held the view that government even issued a promise to com- the recent measures decreed by sheikh pensate hundreds of Bahrainis for salaries Hamad, no matter how welcome in the lost while they were detained in connection short term, were little more than a contin- with the political unrest of the 1990s. All gent occurrence: they depend entirely on these measures and promises were issued the king’ s goodwill. Unless they become within the few months between the Febru- legally sedimented rights to which citizens ary referendum and summer 2001. The are entitled under clearly spelled condi- breathtaking pace of these reforms left the tions – which most of the measures are Bahrainis in a state of up-beat optimism. The new ruler’ s popularity soared as the [ people felt a genuine wave of gratitude The new ruler’ s popularity soared towards him. Bahraini society had been liv- ing under a total absence of freedom for as as the people felt a genuine wave of long as the average young Bahraini adult gratitude towards him. can remember. Fear, or at least constant [ vigilance, had been the rule especially over the past two decades. By a stroke of the pen, not – they can be stopped or reversed at the amir has lifted the veil of suspicion and any time. In short, the Bahrainis worried silence. Thanks to him, an intoxicating that if the king can give, the king can also wind of freedom was blowing over take back. In addition, the opposition want- Bahrain. Yet for many the euphoria was ed to regain its previous active role: from tinged with uncertainty because, as we being able to steer events during the dark- shall see presently, the signals sent by est hours of the intifada they suddenly sheikh Hamad were mixed. As time went found themselves relegated to a reactive by, uncertainty turned into confusion and position. Initiative now lay with the king eventually, in some circles, into outright whose reforms gave the impression that scepticism. they fulfilled all the opposition’ s most basic demands. But these decisions are not The politics of personal generosity presented as the result of the intifada. In 2002 was the year the municipal and par- the official narrative of the role of the liamentary elections were held. I will focus Bahraini people, their demands and their on the latter, which took place in October sacrifices are not mentioned; rather the 2002. The confusion and scepticism men- reforms are depicted as owed entirely to the tioned above were brought into the open king’ s boundless generosity and his excep- when the four major opposition groups6 tional noble character (makramah). This decided to boycott this election. The boycott presentation could have been dismissed as revealed that Bahraini opinion was deeply just a source of mild irritation if the divided: alongside the genuine gratitude reforms and generous handouts had been

57 accompanied by genuine change in the The Assembly was dissolved in 1975; strict- power structure and the state apparatus. ly speaking, it should have been reinstated But so far such a change has not taken so as to be in position to decide upon the place. The king still governs the country proposed amendments. Sheikh Hamad by- with the assistance of his uncle, the Prime passed this procedure and the constitution- Minister, his son the Crown Prince, an al committee, appointed by him, reported appointed cabinet of ministers and an only to him. Few citizens, whether loyal to appointed Consultative Council. Al Khali- the regime or oppositional, were informed fas still occupy half of the positions in the or consulted under the process. When the cabinet. The problem of lack of central new Constitution was officially announced democratic institutions has not been on February 14, 2002 it was a fait accompli. addressed, there are for instance few judi- Technically, one may say that sheikh cial checks on the actions of the king and Hamad had carried out a coup d’ Etat and his government, and the courts are still the Bahraini people had no choice but to go subject to government pressure. The indi- along with the outcome of the coup. The viduals responsible for gross human rights single major change promulgated in the abuses during the intifada have not been new Constitution is the establishment of called to account, punished, or even the bicameral system, something Bahrainis removed from office.7 The policy of recruit- were prepared for and in favour of when ing foreigners to work in the army, the they voted in the 2001 referendum. What police, and elsewhere is not only continu- they had not expected was to see the ing: foreign military personnel and police- appointed Consultative Chamber be invest- men – all of whom are Sunni Muslims – ed by the new Constitution with the power are granted Bahraini citizenship by the to legislate on a par with the elected Deputy thousands in spite of the Shi’ a’ s angry Chamber. It was arguably the blatant way claims that this is a strategy to upset the in which the king reneged upon his prom- sectarian balance within the population. ise given the year before that led the oppo- The only major institutional change intro- sition to boycott the parliamentary election. duced by the king so far is the issuance of Admittedly, the decision was controversial the new constitution to replace the 1973 even among the leading members of the one. opposition. Some feared that this would The reader will recall that in early Feb- result in their political marginalization and ruary 2001 sheikh Hamad promised to the that the Deputy Chamber would be left opposition that the 1973 Constitution entirely under the control of pro-govern- would not be supplanted by the National ment forces. But this was a minority view. Charter and would remain the basic docu- According to the official media and gov- ment of the state of Bahrain. Soon after, ernment sources, the turnout on Election however, the king proceeded to its unilater- Day was 53.2 percent. Compared to the al amendment. According to Article 104 of turnout at the 2001 referendum – 90 per- the 1973 Constitution any constitutional cent – and the overwhelming vote in amendments must be approved by the favour of the Charter – 98.4 percent – National Assembly and the Head of State. the difference is striking indeed, and it

58 begs the question: What happened to the contradictory signals sent out by the enthusiasm that fired the Bahraini people a regime as inevitable hurdles on the road to mere 18 months earlier? And why has not democracy. Those critical to the reforms the king’ s generosity since then helped reject this approach as self-delusion: the keep this enthusiasm alive? The answer regime, they argue, is in the process of win- points to the constitutional amendments: ning legitimacy at the expense of the peo- they have led many to question the motives ple. There will be some progress in the behind the reforms and to lose faith in immediate future, they predict, but just their democratizing effect. enough to consolidate the king’ s powerbase and improve his image, while isolat- Democratization or reforms to end all ing the opposition, both at home and reforms? abroad. The effects of this policy are readi- Supporters of the new Constitution argue ly observable: In some circles the opposi- that the bicameral system will enhance the tion is already being criticized for being too balance between extreme political tenden- inflexible and uncooperative and its cies and prevent the radicalization of poli- demands for further genuine change are tics to which a single Chamber would, they dismissed as unreasonable. In contrast, the believe, inevitably lead. The argument goes regime, having done the necessary ges- as follows: if the deputies are liberals and tures – freeing political prisoners, granti- leftists, the king appoints a conservative in ng universal suffrage, permitting elections order to counteract the deputies’ radical- – is capitalizing on its newly won reputa- ism. If, on the other hand, the deputies are tion of goodwill and liberalism. Whereas a in majority Islamists, as is the case today, few years ago the future of the Al Khalifa the king appoints a religiously moderate dynasty was uncertain, the family has now and even secularist Shura. If anything, this regained popularity with at least half of the argument clearly shows that, in the present population. They seem ready to give the Al Bahraini context, the sole raison d’ étre of Khalifas’ autocratic rule a new lease of life the Consultative Council is to allow the on the basis of reforms that allow Bahrainis ruler to always have the upper hand: what- the freedom to speak but not the right to ever the composition of the elected Cham- truly participate in the political process. If ber, the deputies’ attempts at passing laws this analysis is correct, autocracy in that do not please the government can Bahrain has found its best ally in liberal- always be voted down by a Shura that is ization; concomitantly and paradoxically, handpicked by the ruler and whose mem- liberalization is, in this case, the most bers are dismissed or reappointed by him effective roadblock to genuine democrati- every four years. zation. The reforms in Bahrain are too recent to allow a conclusive analysis. After years of • f • repression and conflicts, Bahrainis under- standably yearn for stability and reconcilia- Anh Nga Longva works at the Department of tion. This yearning leads many to interpret Social Anthropology, University of Bergen. the ongoing events positively, viewing the

59 >> the ruler and his closest relatives. acknowledgements 4For example: The police is staffed in Fieldworks in Bahrain in 1994, 1995 and majority by Baluchis from Pakistan and the 2002 were financed by the Norwegian Bahrain Defence Force (BDF) enrols Syri- Council for Research and the Faculty of ans and Yemenis as soldiers. Social Sciences, University of Bergen. 5The Sunnis who took part in the opposi- references tion were few but they were important fig- Bahrain Freedom Movement. 2002. ures in Bahraini society. In majority secu- Newsletter. February 2002. larists and professionals (lawyers, academ- ics) they were among those who took the Human Rights Watch. 2001. «World initiative for the 1992 popular petition for Report 2000: Bahrain». the return of constitutional rule.

Khuri, Fuad I. 1980. «Tribe and State in 6Political associations and groups are now Bahrain». Chicago and London: Univeristy allowed, but not political parties. The most of Chicago. influential among the four boycotting groups was the Shi’ ite Al Wifaq, the pres- Wright, Robin. 1985. «Sacred Rage. The ent-day avatar of the Bahrain Freedom Wrath of Militant Islam». New York: Simon Movement. & Schuster. 7On the contrary a royal decree was issued 1Another Gulf country that has much expe- in late 2002 which extends impunity to all rience in supporting internationally out- government officials, civil servants and spoken but internally “tactful” news media security and military officers, for abuses is Saudi Arabia: one of the most widely committed before the promulgation of the quoted Arabic language newspapers in decree. Europe, Al Hayat, is owned by a Saudi prince. Furthermore, the Dubai-based Mid- dle East Broadcasting Center (mbc) is plan- ning to launch Al Arabiya, a 24-hour news channel which will compete with Al- Jazeera. Most of the funding will come from Saudi Arabia.

2The remaining are migrant workers from Asia, the Middle East and Western countries.

3Thus access to some of the 42 islands that make up Bahrain is barred to the citizens because they are the private properties of