tema: demokrati REFORMS IN BAHRAIN Genuine democratization or strengthening autocracy through liberalization? Those criti- cal to the country’ s reforms argue that there will be progress, but just enough to consoli- date the king’ s powerbase and improve his image, while isolating the opposition. 52 the freedom of expression that Hamad introduced with Al-Jazeera has had no impact on the Qatari sociopolitical system. But it did help the ruler win high interna- tional ratings; his reputation was further enhanced when in 1999 Qatar held its first elections ever in which women were allowed to vote and stand for office. In the commotion entailed by the introduction of universal suffrage in a region where denial of political rights to women is the rule, it is often forgotten that the object of the vote was a 29-member municipal council with no political functions whatsoever. The art of liberalizing without impinging upon the old autocracy recently reached new heights in Bahrain: the amir, sheikh Issa Al Khalifa died in March 1999 and was succeeded by his 50-year old son, Hamad. Unlike his namesake in Qatar, the new Bahraini ruler text: Anh Nga Longva inherited a deeply troubled land. The tiny island of Bahrain, tucked away in the Gulf it is generally hoped that when the aging of Salwa between the Saudi landmass and rulers of the Gulf pass away, their succes- the Qatari peninsula, was shaken by a con- sors will embark upon liberalizing the con- tinuous uprising (intifada) that peaked servative politics of the region thus paving between 1994 and 1998. It left 40 dead, the way for democracy. In this expectation thousands of arrests and detentions and lies the assumption that liberalization nec- hundreds of exiles in a population of slight- essarily leads towards greater democracy. ly more than half a million, of which only But does it? The first generation shift in the 406.000 are Bahraini citizens.2 Gulf took place in Qatar in 1995 when The unrest was preceded by two years of Crown Prince Hamad Al Thani deposed peaceful popular petitioning for the return his father to become amir. Since then he of the Constitution suspended since 1975 has taken a series of measures some of and the abrogation of the State Security which undeniably qualify as liberalizing Law. The popular petition was signed by steps. He allowed for instance the creation 25.000 citizens and formulated in a on Qatari soil of the Qatari financed satel- respectful manner, but sheikh Issa and his lite tv-station Al-Jazeera. While famously government refused to receive it, let alone outspoken and one of the most important enter into dialogue with the signatories. broadcasters in the Middle East today, Al- Furthermore, the initiative takers were Jazeera tactfully and consistently avoids arrested and jailed, most of them without dealing with internal Qatari affairs.1 Thus trial. The problems that beset Bahrain 53 reach well beyond the realm of politics, island’ s rich history of political activism of narrowly defined. They lie in social-struc- the 1930s and 1950s (Khuri 1980), which tural fault lines dating back to 1782 when upon independence in 1971 led Bahrain to the Al Khalifas and their tribal allies opt for the constitutional system. In 1973 a crossed over from the mainland via Qatar Constitution was drawn up and the coun- and conquered Bahrain from the Persians. try’ s first National Assembly was elected, The conquerors were Sunni and of in which both leftist secularists and conser- Bedouin stock, the Bahrainis were Shi’ a vative religious forces were well represent- and settled farmers. The Al Khalifas took ed. Despite their ideological differences the over the farmlands, turned the native pop- deputies were united in their common ulation into rightless labourers and treated refusal to ratify the State Security Law. In Bahrain since then as conquered territory.3 There is an Al Khalifa at the head of almost [ every single public institution of some sig- The Shi’ a are in majority, but they nificance. The family rules with the sup- are little represented either in the port of wealthy Sunni citizens and a hand- public or the private sector. ful of privileged Shi’ a. The Shi’ a are in majority – estimations vary between 60 [ percent and 70 percent – but they are lit- tle represented either in the public or the the stalemate that ensued, the amir private sector. They make up the poorest decreed the dissolution of the National tier of the society, and are the prime victims Assembly in August 1975. He also unilater- of unemployment, one of Bahrain’ s major ally suspended the articles in the Constitu- problems and biggest paradox, since the tion requiring the election of a new assem- country imports foreign workers from East bly within two months. Bahrain’ s short and West to be employed in all sectors.4 experience with parliamentarism came to an abrupt end, and the country reverted to The intifada and the opposition in exile the autocratic rule of the amir, his brother The 1990s were one of the darkest chapters the Prime Minister and other members of in Bahrain’ s history. The country lived his family. The civil and political rights con- under the state of emergency declared in tained in the Constitution were eliminated, 1957 and the 1975 State Security Law the rule of law was inexistent and the empowered the Minister of Interior to slightest criticism against the government detain political suspects for three years or led to arrest and incarceration without trial. more without trial. People were terrified to At the same time, with the financial assis- discuss anything that could be interpreted tance of Saudi Arabia notably, the regime as remotely related to politics, and it was strengthened the support of the Sunnis only within the safety of their homes that and part of the Shi’ ite establishment by they ventured to express their opinions. giving them the means to enrich them- Until the intifada erupted in 1994, Bahrain selves. Many within the vocal opposition was on the surface a peaceful and placid were gradually coopted, others left the place. This quietism contrasted with the country in self-exile. The regime also care- 54 fully groomed its international image. tion of the most elementary international Bahrain became home to the US Fifth Fleet fair trial standards gave rise to strong criti- and gained the reputation of being a faith- cism and protests from various interna- ful ally of the West. As the only Gulf socie- tional human rights organisations. The ty that consistently allowed the consump- myth of Bahrain as a haven of tolerance tion of alcohol, it was also known as a “tol- began to fade. erant” society open to Western culture that The opposition in exile played a critical compared favourably with its surrounding role in this respect. They worked tirelessly neighbours. The first signs of resurging to bring the situation inside Bahrain to the unrest appeared in the early 1980s. In 1979 world’ s attention. The most influential Khomeini’ s revolution shook Iran and opposition group, the London-based ignited a wave of political activism among Bahrain Freedom Movement (bfm) was the the Shi’ a in the Arab Gulf countries channel through which detailed informa- (Wright 1995). In 1982 a group of Bahraini tion about the arbitrary arrests and deten- Shi’ a was arrested for allegedly plotting to tions reached the human rights organisa- turn Bahrain into an Islamic republic. tions and other relevant forums. The bfm Scores of Shi’ a were rounded, imprisoned also actively lobbied with Western politi- or sent into exile. Shi’ ite associations cians in the hope that pressure exerted by inside Bahrain were closed down, public them would have an effect on the regime in religious celebrations were monitored and Manama. But the government remained curtailed. The reaction of the regime was inflexible: it consistently downplayed the arguably efffective in the short run, but the significance of the unrest, and stuck to its seeds of unrest among the Shi’ a were description of the intifada as the work of already sown. A new generation of Shi’ ite marginal sectarian fanatics on Iran’ s pay- youths went to study in Qom and came roll. back to spread messages about justice for the oppressed majority. The experience of King Hamad’ s reforms age-old discrimination at the hands of the By 1998 the hardline policy adopted by the Sunni rulers, added to aspirations for mod- authorities towards the uprising was begin- ern parliamentary democracy, provided the ning to bear fruit, but only at the price of Shi’ a with a particularly potent political filling the country’ s prisons and earning motivation. Although liberal Sunni Bahrai- Bahrain widespread international condem- nis also called for the return of the 1973 nation. Furthermore, four years of contin- Constitution and democratization, it was ued and at times violent unrest threatened the Shi’ a who kept the intifada of the to impact negatively on the country’ s econ- 1990s going.5 It was also the Shi’ a who omy. By the late 1990s, Bahrain had devel- bore the brunt of the authorities’ wrath. oped a reputation of unstability and it Arrests, imprisonments and forcible exile seemed just a matter of time before private continued throughout the 1980s and national and international investors left the 1990s under the auspices of the State Secu- island for safer places like Dubai. Clearly rity Law. Summary trials were carried out change was needed, if only for the sake of by the State Security Court where the viola- the establishment. When sheikh Hamad 55 succeeded to his father hopes were high hence a meeting was convened on 8 Febru- that he would put an end to the deadlock.