DGAPanalyse kompakt Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider (Hrsg.) Juni 2011 N° 5 Otto Wolff-Direktor des Forschungsinstituts der DGAP e. V. ISSN 2191-4869 Putting a Face to Europe in North Africa: Why the EU needs a Special Representative to respond to the Arab Spring by Cornelius Adebahr and Almut Möller Juni 2011 | DGAPanalyse kompakt | Nr. 5 Putting a Face to Europe in North Africa: Why Titel the EU needs a Special Representative to Untertitel respond to the Arab Spring Autor Einleitung Cornelius Adebahr and Almut Möller1 Text The European Union and its member states continue to struggle to find a response to the Arab Zwischentitel Spring. Surprised by the force of events that unrolled on their front porch, spreading from Tunisia across North Africa and the Middle East, the EU has since been digging through its toolbox. Past policy approaches had little impact on the area’s regimes, if anything doing more to support them than reform them. So it makes sense that the EU is now looking to counter its lack of credibility with the new movements and powers of reform in the southern Mediterranean area by strongly reorienting its policies. To this end, the EU should utilize one of its established and successful for- eign policy instruments and name an EU Special Representative (EUSR) for North Africa. The Special Representative— for the deployment of the EUSR—to guarantee an An Old Model that Still Works EU foreign policy presence in addition to the Com- mission’s representation—has since become moot. Since their introduction about a decade and a half However, a large part of the foreign policy person- ago the EUSRs have made a significant, though nel in Brussels has come to a consensus that Special often unnoticed, contribution to building an active Representatives are still indispensable for regional and integrated EU foreign policy. They have crises or conflicts that concern Europe because established themselves as important contacts for they can provide real value for the EU. The Febru- non-EU countries and partner organizations while ary 2011 agreement regarding the phasing out of taking over the coordination of important Euro- different mandates reached by Mrs. Ashton and the pean activities in the field. In the sensitive domain member states—after a lengthy conflict—is unfor- of European foreign policy, in which member tunately inconsequential. While the duties of the states continue to be the most important actors previous EUSRs for Macedonia and Moldova could and where collective positions require both distinc- be taken over by the respective delegation leader, tive political will and delicate adjustment, they have there is no comparable replacement within the profited from being out of the spotlight and thus EEAS for the abandoned mandates in the South being able to work in peace. Caucasus and for the Middle East peace process. In the past few years however, these Special Rep- The dramatic upheavals in North Africa and their resentatives have been caught in the firing line over profound effects on the region raise the ques- the course of developing the European External tion: Does the EEAS have the capacity to sup- Action Service (EEAS).2 The EU’s High Represen- port immediate and lasting developments toward tative, Catherine Ashton, threatened in June 2010 democracy and economic and social stabilization to allow a number of mandates to run out because for the foreseeable future? Doubts are beginning their duties would henceforth be taken over by the to mount since at this moment, when the course EEAS in accordance with the Lisbon Treaty. In is being set, the EEAS and its delegations are still fact, in the meantime EU delegations in non-EU tasked with building up their presence in the region. states have formally come to cover all areas of EU Could a Special Representative for North Africa fill foreign policy. Thus, one of the original reasons this role? 2 Juni 2011 | DGAPanalyse kompakt | Nr. 5 Conditionality Calls For A Presence What Kind of Mandate for a Special Representative for North The European Commission in the meantime has Africa? developed some initial proposals for the realign- ment of the EU’s North Africa policy. At the A Special Representative for the democratic upris- beginning of March 2011, the Commission submit- ings in North Africa would fill the three criteria ted its first report under the title “A Partnership for that apply for a re-authorization of and/or exten- Democracy and Prosperity in the Southern Medi- sion of a mandate.5 terranean.”3 A revision of the overall Neighbor- hood Policy followed in May 2011 with the report 1. The upheavals in North Africa are a matter of “A New Answer for a Changing Neighbourhood.”4 cross-border developments in a region of strate- In their report from March 2011, the Commission gic importance to the EU. The Union would be recommended that the EU place cooperation with directly affected if the situation began to slide countries in the southern Mediterranean on a quali- toward conflict. tatively new level. The core areas are closer cooper- 2. The EU must cooperate with existing multilat- ation in the areas of building institutions, civil soci- eral forums such as the Arab League, the Gulf ety, and support for socially sustainable economic Cooperation Council (GCC), and the African growth. In addition, funds should be raised for the Union (AU). The United Nations on the other southern neighborhood policy—though only at a hand has already appointed a Special Representa- moderate pace—and new funding sources should tive for Libya.6 NATO is also directly involved be opened through the European Investment Bank there. Especially if a common conciliatory pro- (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and posal arises from this group, the EU needs to Development (EBRD), and through cooperation entrust someone with negotiating powers. with non-EU countries and other organizations. 3. Finally, the EU has long-term interests in developments in this region beyond acute crisis But this broad transformation approach hardly management. It must therefore engage over the offers anything new. It can already be found in course of years and with a continuity of person- previous documents of the southern neighborhood nel instead of merely getting involved for a few policy. With their long established approach, the weeks or months. EU and its members have laid out a convincing model of promoting political, security, economic, In order to accompany the protracted transforma- and cultural cooperation—but only on paper. The tion processes and to influence them positively, a problem until now has not been intention, but continuous presence on the ground—or at the implementation. It is for this reason that the term very least intense travelling—are essential, as is a “conditionality” has played a decisive role in the convincing policy approach. This is especially true European debate over the past few months. Indeed, in a region where personal interaction plays such a the EU has already made this the principle of its decisive role. The High Representative will not be cooperation with partner countries in the past. In able to accomplish this task on her own since she practice however, it has not been called for consis- has an abundance of duties and is always facing tently. The principle of conditionality—changed deadlines and needing to make appearances. Even to “mutual accountability” in the latest report from the managing director of the EEAS’s North Africa May 2011—should finally take effect. But the Com- and Middle East department, Hugues Mingarelli, mission’s recommendations do not make clear how who is very experienced in EU foreign and neigh- the sudden adjustment to conditionality should be borhood policy, is working at full capacity to set up brought about in practice. An EUSR with a strong the department. The Task Force for the Southern presence in the region could be instrumental in this Mediterranean called for by Catherine Ashton in task. June 2011—which includes representatives of the 3 Juni 2011 | DGAPanalyse kompakt | Nr. 5 EEAS, the Commission, the EIB, the EBRD, and In this context, the EUSR could maintain regular other financial institutions—is quite sensible, but contact with the Arab League and the GCC. The cannot replace the role of a trusted confidant. The League has a bad reputation, but two noteworthy High Representative should at least guarantee that things have happened in the last few weeks: The the EUSR will take over the chairmanship of the first was their support of the UN mandate for a Task Force in order to coordinate the new policy military intervention in Libya, and the second was approach for North Africa among the multitude of the quick agreement on a successor for current actors involved. Secretary-General Amr Moussa, who has entered the presidential race in Egypt and who will be suc- An EUSR who commutes between North African ceeded by the current Egyptian foreign minister countries and European capitals would offer a face Nabil al-Araby. This suggests that the League has for the future southern neighborhood policy both maintained a certain room for maneuver despite on location as well as within the EU. This continual the uprisings in the region, and the EU should use presence would serve to build confidence between this. Concerning the GCC, the EU should lead an the EU and its (new) partners in North Africa—a intense dialogue on where and how the EU and quintessential buttress for a qualitatively new the GCC could work together in their response to neighborhood policy. For it is with confidence that the changes in North Africa, perhaps regarding the the feeling of “mutual accountability” called for financing of projects.7 The Mediterranean Union, by the EU can begin to arise.